Günter Bischof on the Last Empire: the Final Days of the Soviet Union
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Serhii Plokhy. The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union. New York: Basic Books, 2014. 520 pp. $32.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-465-05696-5. Reviewed by Günter J. Bischof Published on H-Diplo (May, 2014) Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York) The Soviet Union expired in a whimper with how the borders of the post-Soviet succession re‐ Mikhail Gorbachev’s resignation speech on De‐ publics were being determined in the fall of 1991, cember 25, 1991, after a dramatic year of political this fast-paced account of the breakup of the Sovi‐ infighting in the Kremlin and bold action in Kyiv. et Union in 1991 provides the answers. If anyone The Soviet Union lost its “outer empire” in East‐ is keen on understanding the death throes of the ern Europe in 1989-90. The dissolution of what Soviet Union and Moscow’s struggle with the Serhii Plokhy calls “the last” European empire did growing spirit of independence among con‐ not come as a dramatic implosion over a short pe‐ stituent republics, this is the book to read. riod of time like the Habsburg Empire in the fnal Ukraine’s drive to independence in 1991 days of World War I. The Soviet Union may have tipped the balance in the implosion of the Soviet had economic problems since the 1970s, but it Union. Plokhy’s main point is that electoral was not known as “the sick man” of Europe like democracy ended the Soviet Union after the Com‐ the Ottoman Empire had been in its fnal decades munist plotters tried to save it in a coup that of muddling through. The fnal days of the Soviet failed. The “fall of the Soviet Union” came about Union were marked by political infighting as a result of the Ukrainian referendum of Decem‐ amounting to a classical Greek drama among the ber 1, 1991, “in which more than 90 percent voted political leadership class. Once Boris Yeltsin’s bold for independence.” The December 1 referendum leadership arrested the coup of the old Commu‐ overruled the March 1991 referendum in the nist apparatchiks in August 1991, the fnal months Ukraine. In March, 70 percent of Ukrainians had of the Soviet Union were marked by a gargantuan voted for participation in the union but with the struggle between President Gorbachev of the Sovi‐ demand of reforms. As Plokhy puts it: “The Union et Union trying to hang on to power and saving lived or died depending on the vote of its citizens” the Soviet Union and President Yeltsin moving (p. 394). The arrival of electoral democracy Russia out of the union as Ukraine was breaking changed everything as leaders now depended on away following the Baltic states. popular support. Given the current crisis over Ukraine’s histor‐ Plokhy’s book concentrates on the second half ical borders, this book, which is written by one of of the annus mirabilis 1991 leading to the dissolu‐ the world’s leading authorities on Ukrainian histo‐ tion of the Soviet Union. Plokhy introduces the ry, could not be more timely. If anyone wonders four main antagonists in the opening chapters. H-Net Reviews The main drama unfolded inside the Kremlin be‐ Yalta conference of 1945). In the afternoon of Au‐ tween the incumbent president and chief of the gust 18, the coup plotters in Moscow cut Gor‐ Communist Party, Gorbachev, and “the party bachev’s communication links with the outside crasher” and leader of Russia, Yeltsin (pp. 24ff). world and had the nuclear briefcase carried to George H. W. Bush, the American president, was a Moscow. Gorbachev was deeply hurt by the trea‐ principal actor in this drama, too, often playing son of his close associates led by Prime Minister the role of the sounding board and passive media‐ Valentin Pavlov and KGB chief Vladimir Kri‐ tor--some might say Delphic oracle--between Gor‐ uchkov in Moscow, people he had appointed to bachev and Yeltsin. The leaders in Moscow and high office. He was also afraid of the contingency Leonid Kravchuk in Kyiv regularly kept him in‐ of a Romanian scenario, fearing the kind of blood‐ formed in crunch times. Bush came to Moscow for shed that ended Nicolae Ceauşescu’s rule. Gor‐ the frst time in his presidency in late July 1991 bachev refused to sign documents that would for a summit meeting with Gorbachev. On this have handed over power to the plotters, which trip, he also visited the Ukrainian capital Kyiv-- caused disagreements among them about how to Ukraine at this point being “a sovereign if not yet proceed. Yeltsin considered the coup “illegal” and independent state” (p. 53). Kravchuk, the speaker sprang into action, organizing the resistance from of the Ukrainian parliament and fourth principal the Parliament building (the Russian White actor, welcomed Bush to Kyiv. In his speech to the House) (p. 93). A crucial telephone call on August Ukrainian parliament, where the Communists still 19 between Bush and Yeltsin encouraged Bush to held a solid majority, Bush did not want to under‐ condemn the coup (his initial reaction had been mine Gorbachev’s policy of holding together the waffling). Yeltsin sent his Russian foreign minister Soviet Union by favoring outright Ukrainian inde‐ Andrei Kozyrev to Paris to organize Western con‐ pendence, making the confusing distinction that demnation of the coup with a call “to bring back “freedom is not the same as independence” (p. Gorbachev,” which was a crucial element in the 64). In the summer of 1991, Bush did not support success of the Yeltsin anti-coup faction (p. 113). nationalist movements, such as Rukh (the People’s Plokhy elaborates a hairy subplot in the Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika), and the coup’s high drama, namely, the monumental mis‐ disintegration of the Soviet Union. Washington trust between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Gorbachev’s pursued, in the words of National Security Coun‐ principal worry at the time of the coup was how cil staffer Nicholas Burns, a policy of “stable de‐ to deal with Yeltsin, who on August 18, the day cline” (p. 64). The Communists liked Bush’s cau‐ when the coup began, had issued “a decree taking tious approach to Ukrainian independence, but over all-Union institutions responsible for supply Rukh rejected it and so did Ukrainian Americans. chains on the territory of the Russian Federation” William Safire, the sharp-witted New York Times (p. 84). Yeltsin was not sure whether Gorbachev, columnist, dubbed it the “Chicken Kiev speech,” while in the Crimea, was playing a “double game.” making fun of the president’s proverbial indeci‐ Maybe Gorbachev was on the side of the plotters, siveness (p. 65). using his former aides “to do the dirty work of In the next section, Plokhy recounts in com‐ crushing the democratic opposition and then re‐ pelling detail the breathtaking drama of the Au‐ turning to Moscow as the savior of the nation” (p. gust coup in Moscow. Like Bush taking time off in 113). Gorbachev’s new union treaty was ready for Kennebunkport, Gorbachev was vacationing in adoption but was killed by the coup. his summer villa in Foros in the Crimea, not far The storming of the Russian White House by from Yalta (Plokhy is familiar with the Black Sea Soviet army units, planned for the night of August seaside resorts as his previous book was on the 2 H-Net Reviews 20 but never taking place as the plotters lost their pretext to introduce a state of emergency in nerve, is narrated in compelling detail. Due to the Ukraine” (p. 156). The nationalist Rukh frmly con‐ hedging of bets in the coup leadership, the assault demned the coup. On the day the coup was unrav‐ was stopped as Russian soldiers did not want to eling, Kravchuk “jumped on Yeltsin’s bandwag‐ spill the Russian blood of the defenders of the on,” as Plokhy puts it (p. 161). Kravchuk’s caution White House. The Soviet military had learned during the coup made sense and paid off. On Au‐ from the crushing of independence movements in gust 23, Kravchuk was in Moscow and witnessed Tiblisi (April 1989) and Vilnius (January 1991) and Gorbachev’s power waning and Yeltsin in com‐ did not want to be made responsible for the mand. He did not want “any part of a Yeltsin run bloodshed, so the planned assault was called off. Union” (p. 164). The next day the Ukrainian par‐ Plokhy notes that American intelligence officials liament voted for independence, with a referen‐ shared with Yeltsin telephone intercepts between dum to be held on December 1 confirming the the plot leaders and military commanders. Once vote. The Communists supported the resolution the plot fell apart, Yeltsin went back to worrying for independence too, since Yeltsin had “declared about Gorbachev and his intentions after the open season on communists” in Moscow (p. 167). coup. Yeltsin accepted the vote; Gorbachev was deeply Plokhy terms Yeltsin’s and Russia’s ascendan‐ upset. cy vis-à-vis Gorbachev and his efforts to hold to‐ Now the race was on to preserve the Soviet gether the Soviet Union a “countercoup” in the Union. Also, quarreling over the borders of a dis‐ postcoup period (pp. 131ff). Yeltsin pressed Gor‐ integrating union began. Ukraine was reminded bachev to accept the decree that he signed during in an article of the pro-Yeltsin newspaper Nezav‐ the coup giving the Russian Federation economic isimaia gazeta that if the Supreme Soviet of the sovereignty. He also intervened in Gorbachev’s Crimea declared independence it might “set off ministerial appointments, pushing him to fre De‐ the process of partition that might lead to a vio‐ fense Minister Mikhail Moiseev.