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The U.S.-Japan Alliance The U.S.-Japan Alliance Updated June 13, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL33740 SUMMARY RL33740 The U.S.-Japan Alliance June 13, 2019 The U.S.-Japan alliance has long been an anchor of the U.S. security role in Asia and arguably a contributor to peace and prosperity in the region. Forged during the U.S. occupation of Japan Emma Chanlett-Avery, after its defeat in World War II, the alliance provides a platform for U.S. military readiness in the Coordinator Pacific. About 54,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan and have the exclusive use of 85 Specialist in Asian Affairs facilities. In exchange for the use of these bases, the United States guarantees Japan’s security. Caitlin Campbell Since the early 2000s, the United States and Japan have improved the operational capability of Analyst in Asian Affairs the alliance as a combined force, despite constraints. In addition to serving as a hub for forward- deployed U.S. forces, Japan now fields its own advanced military assets, many of which complement U.S. forces in missions like antisubmarine operations. The joint response to a 2011 Joshua A. Williams tsunami and earthquake in Japan demonstrated the increased interoperability of the two Research Associate militaries. Cooperation on ballistic missile defense and new attention to the cyber and space domains remains ongoing. The U.S. Military in Japan: Japanese Prime Minister 54,000 troops with the exclusive use of 85 facilities Shinzo Abe is a stalwart supporter of the alliance and has had notable success on his ambitious agenda to increase the capability and flexibility of Japan’s military. Abe’s dominance over Japanese politics since his election in late 2012 has created opportunities for more predictable alliance planning. Although constitutional, legal, fiscal, and political barriers hinder further development of defense cooperation, Japan is steadily expanding its capabilities and, subtly, its attitude toward the use of military force, which is constrained by the Japanese constitution. Japan faces a complex security landscape in the region, with potentially significant implications for the alliance. North Korea’s increased ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities pose a direct threat to Japan. Both Japan and the United States view China’s growing power (especially military power) and territorial assertiveness in the East China Sea and elsewhere as a destabilizing force that diminishes U.S. influence and erodes longstanding norms in the region. Japan has pursued security cooperation with others, including Australia, India, and several Southeast Asian countries, both bilaterally and within the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Of particular concern to the United States is the tense Japan-South Korea relationship, which has prevented effective trilateral coordination. Without cooperation among its allies, the United States may find itself less able to respond to North Korean threats or to influence China’s behavior. Limited resources could strain alliance capabilities as well as produce more contentious negotiations on cost-sharing. The Japanese government currently provides nearly $2 billion per year to offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan, in addition to purchasing millions of dollars of U.S. defense equipment annually. Furthermore, the alliance has faced new strains in recent years. U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s open skepticism of the value of U.S. alliances and his admiration of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un have exacerbated longstanding anxiety in Tokyo about the U.S. commitment to Japan’s security. Congressional Research Service The U.S.-Japan Alliance Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Congress and the U.S.-Japan Alliance ............................................................................................. 2 The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Trump Administration ................................................................. 4 China Emerges as Central Focus of Alliance ............................................................................ 5 Abe’s Imprint on the Alliance ......................................................................................................... 7 Toward a More Equal Alliance Partnership ..................................................................................... 8 Challenges to a Deeper Alliance ...................................................................................................... 8 Constitutional and Legal Constraints ........................................................................................ 9 Fiscal Constraints ...................................................................................................................... 9 Public Sentiment: How Far Is Japan Willing to Go?................................................................ 11 Regional Security Environment: Threats and Partners .................................................................. 12 China ....................................................................................................................................... 13 North Korea ............................................................................................................................. 15 South Korea ............................................................................................................................. 16 Australia .................................................................................................................................. 17 India ........................................................................................................................................ 18 Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 19 Taiwan ..................................................................................................................................... 20 Southeast Asia ......................................................................................................................... 20 Europe and the Middle East .................................................................................................... 21 Burden-Sharing Issues ................................................................................................................... 22 Host-Nation Support ............................................................................................................... 23 Additional Japanese Contributions.......................................................................................... 23 Indirect Alliance Contributions ......................................................................................... 23 U.S.-Japan Alliance: Bilateral Agreements and Cooperation ........................................................ 24 Major Outcomes from SCC (“2+2”) Meetings ....................................................................... 26 2015 Revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism ..................................................... 28 Progress on Implementing the Defense Policy Review Initiative ........................................... 29 International Operations and Cooperation .............................................................................. 32 Maritime Defense Cooperation ............................................................................................... 34 Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation .................................................................................... 35 Extended Deterrence ............................................................................................................... 37 U.S. Arms Sales to Japan ........................................................................................................ 38 Defense Technology Cooperation and Coproduction .............................................................. 39 Okinawa-Guam Realignment and the Futenma Base Controversy ............................................... 40 U.S.-Japan Cobasing Remains Elusive ................................................................................... 41 Evolution of Japanese Defense Policy .......................................................................................... 42 Japan’s Pursuit of Offensive Capabilities ............................................................................... 43 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines ........................................................................... 44 “Multi-Domain Defense Force” Concept ................................................................................ 45 Preparation for “Gray Zone” Contingencies ........................................................................... 46 Attention to the Space Domain ............................................................................................... 46 Attention to the Cyber Domain ............................................................................................... 47 Congressional Research Service The U.S.-Japan Alliance Attention to the Electromagnetic Spectrum ............................................................................ 49 Attention to Amphibious Capabilities ....................................................................................
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