DOCSLIB.ORG

Decentralisation and Budget Accountability in the Twilight of Mexican Presidentialism

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Decentralisation and Budget Accountability in the Twilight of Mexican Presidentialism THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT Decentralisation and Budget Accountability in the twilight of Mexican Presidentialism Juan E. Pardinas This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy M ay 2009 1 Key Words: Decentralisation, Mexico, Budget Accountability, Presidentialism UMI Number: U615967 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615967 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 TM£S£5 Till iJHW VO'lP Para Jimena Cerramos un capitulo y abrimos otros, de un libro muy feliz que vamos escribiendo juntos. Acknowledgments The guidance of Professor George Philip was a fundamental contribution to the design of the case study and the writing of the whole dissertation. The observations of professors Christopher Hood (Oxford University) and Gareth Jones (LSE) helped to strengthen the quality of the arguments. Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid assumed the anguishes and worries of my doctoral program as if they were his own. I read his concerns as a sincere proof of fraternal affection. Now, after seven years, he should share the joy of reaching the goal line, with the same intensity as he lived through the tribulations of this long distance run. Luis Rubio, President of CIDAC, believed in the need and pertinence of research on the accountability mechanisms of Mexico's young democracy. Edna Jaime, former director of CIDAC, has the virtue of always asking brilliant questions to her colleagues, in consequence, the people who work around her tend to provide intelligent answers. Some parts of this dissertation are the result of that fruitful dialogue. CIDAC's support was an enormous help through my years as a research student in London. Roberto Newell, Director-general of IMCO, gave me the professional opportunity to transform the premises of this research into a public policy agenda to improve the conditions of budget accountability in Mexico. Roberto has built an institution driven by intellectual freedom and evidence-based-research. It is a privilege to be part of IMCO's team. Rene Delgado, Editorial Director of the newspaper Reforma, provided help and active support for implementing the first national survey of Mexico's subnational Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI). Bob Rich and Sofia Falomir helped to polish the British English of a Spanish native speaker. Professor Ana de la 0 (Yale University) delivered constructive criticisms to improve the analysis of decentralization and clientelism in modern Mexico. David Lampon and Gabriela Otero helped me to sail through some uncharted waters of human knowledge. Edgar Franco's intelligence and initiative contributed in the improvement of the contents of the dissertation. Thanks to CR Hibbs and Guadalupe Mendoza, I have been able to further the scope of this research on the accountability of state and municipal governments in Mexico. Benjamin Fuentes, from the Auditori'a Superior de la Federation provided information and contacts that were crucial for the results of this research. One of the most treasured fortunes of my life is being the sibling of my brothers and sisters, with their love and good vibes I have never walked alone. Mark and Emma Quinn gave us a family, a home and a life enduring friendship. My dearest friend and teacher, Lourdes Quintanilla, gave me the wisdom and strength to keep the pace, when the PhD marathon was an uphill climb. When in London, I landed on my feet thanks to my LSE friends: Susana Berruecos, Miguel Angel Jimenez, Jesus Lopez, Jaime Ramirez and Jesus Ramirez. Jimena Otero read and reread this dissertation until she knew it by heart. In every reading she improved the form and substance of the following 300 pages. The everyday opportunity to honour this debt of gratitude towards her is a constant source of joy. This dissertation is also in debt with the knowledge and time of the 28 interviewees, whose name appear at the end of this volume. The British Council and the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologi'a, (CONACYT) provided the financial support that made it all possible. 3 DECLARATION I declare that this thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text. Juan E. Pardinas Date: 4 ABSTRACT This dissertation is an attempt to understand how Mexico's democratisation process transformed budget accountability and the relationship between the federal, state and municipal governments. With the decline of presidentialism, two major changes occurred: the federal Congress became a more powerful regulator of public expenditure; and a large share of the budget was decentralised to subnational governments. The research objective is to produce an empirical analysis of how it came about that the president lost control over a major share of discretionary budgetary spending while state and municipal authorities increased their financial capacities without strong local systems of checks and balances. The work then evaluates the unintended consequences of the process including uneven mechanisms of accountability among different levels of government. The dissertation uses original survey material in order to do this. This is a piece of empirical research that aims to fill a gap in the literature on the budgetary process in contemporary Mexico. This work contributes to the literature about decentralisation in both Mexico and the rest of Latin America. In particular, it is part of a new wave of studies that look at processes of institutional change related to democratisation and decentralisation within the region. The dissertation is based on the assumption that the congressional election of 1997 was the threshold of democratic change in Mexico. The results of that election changed the political conditions that permitted the existence of Mexico's presidentialism. The emergence of an opposition majority in the Chamber of Deputies triggered the transformation from a metaconstitutional to a constitutional presidency. In this transformation, an Executive with unwritten and overreaching powers evolved into a presidency bound by written laws and the institutions in charge of enforcing them. The active presence of opposition parties inside the Chamber of Deputies triggered several reforms that forced the President to the unprecedented practice of rendering accounts. As these changes were occurring at federal level, subnational politics were transformed through an unprecedented combination of political and financial autonomy for state governors and municipal presidents. On December 2002, a Mexican newspaper reported that the Municipal President of Tultitlan, a municipality with 432,000 inhabitants, had a higher salary than the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. According to the secret payroll of the municipal government, the Mayor received at least US$213,000 a year. That newspaper 5 report triggered the question that inspired this empirical research: which de jure and de facto institutional mechanisms allowed a mayor from a small Mexican town earn a higher wage than head of government from a G-8? The dissertation is focused on two reforms related to budgetary policy: 1) The creation of a new Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) at federal level; and 2) The decentralisation of federal spending to states and municipalities. The creation of a new SAI, the Auditoria Superior de la Federacion (ASF), improved the political autonomy and technical capability of the congressional bureau in charge of ex post budgetary oversight. Through the ASF, the Congress improved its capability to demand an accountable presidency. The second reform was the decentralisation of an important share of government expenditure to state and municipal authorities. This implied the creation of clear norms and transparent formulas for the distribution of public resources among the three levels of government. In the former political system, the President had the unwritten prerogative to decide the geographical allocation of public expenditure, according to unaccountable criteria. The federal Executive had deep pockets and full political power to determine the fiscal surplus or financial bankruptcy of a subnational government. The decentralisation process created rules that forced the President to render financial accounts to subnational governments. For the first time, the Federal Executive had to follow transparent and stable criteria for the transfer of resources to states and municipalities. The decentralisation process rested on the premise that local authorities would allocate public expenditure more efficiently and would maximise social welfare. The decentralisation of public expenditure increased the accountability of the federal government to states and municipalities. However, a central claim in my thesis is that an unforeseen consequence of this process was a lack of accountability of political leaders at subnational levels. With the dusk of presidentialism and the decentralisation
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Understanding the Problems and Obstacles of Corruption in Mexico
    ISSUE BRIEF 09.13.18 Understanding the Problems and Obstacles of Corruption in Mexico Jose I. Rodriguez-Sanchez, Ph.D., Postdoctoral Research Fellow in International Trade, Mexico Center Corruption is an ancient and complex and public issue. Some focus on it in the phenomenon. It has been present in public sector; others examine it in the private various forms since the earliest ancient sector. Of the various approaches to defining Mesopotamian civilizations, when abuses corruption, the most controversial approach from public officials for personal gain were is that of the so-called moralists. From the recorded.1 Discussions on political corruption moralist perspective, an act of corruption also appeared in the writings of Greek should not be defined as wrong or illegal, philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle.2 as it is contextual and depends upon the For centuries now, philosophers, sociologists, norms of the society in which it occurs. This political scientists, and historians have perspective, though important, has been analyzed the concept of corruption, usually largely avoided by modern social scientists in in the context of bribery. More recently, in favor of an institutional approach to defining the face of globalization and political and corruption, which is based on legal norms that financial integration, the study of corruption resolve conflicts between different sectors has broadened to include many different of a society that are affected by corruption. manifestations. Even so, there is not a single This institutional approach may better help in definition of corruption accepted by scholars measuring and combating corruption. and institutions working on this issue.
    [Show full text]
  • The Civil Society-Driven Anti-Corruption Push in Mexico During the Enrique
    MEXICO CASE STUDY Rise and Fall: Mexican Civil Society’s Anti-Corruption Push in the Peña Nieto Years Roberto Simon AS/COA Anti Corruption Working Group Mexican Civil Society’s Anti-Corruption Push in the Peña Nieto Years Rise and Fall: Mexican Civil Society’s Anti-Corruption Push in the Peña Nieto Years Mexico City — “Saving Mexico” declared the cover of Time magazine, alongside a portrait of President Enrique Peña Nieto gazing confidently toward the future.1 Elected in 2012, Peña Nieto had been in power for only 15 months, yet already his bold reform agenda — dubbed the “Pacto por Mexico” (Pact for Mexico) — had made him a darling of global investors. Time noted that the president — “assisted by a group of young technocrats (including) Finance Minister Luis Videgaray and Pemex chief Emilio Lozoya” — was making history by breaking Mexico’s eight-decade state monopoly over the energy industry. “And the oil reform might not even be Peña Nieto’s most important victory,” the magazine said. There was “evidence” that Peña Nieto was about to “challenge Mexico’s entrenched powers.” While most investors focused on the deep regulatory changes under way, leading Mexican civil society organizations were looking at another critical promise in the Pacto por Mexico: fighting endemic corruption. “For centuries, corruption has been one of the central elements of the Mexican state (and) a constant in shaping the political system,” said Jorge Buendía, a prominent pollster and political analyst. A powerful governor from the 1960s to the 1980s allegedly once said that in Mexico “a poor politician is a poor politician.”2 And by the time Peña Nieto came to power, most in the country believed that things hadn’t really changed.
    [Show full text]
  • PROGRESA and Its Impacts on the Welfare of Rural Households in Mexico
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Research Papers in Economics PROGRESA and Its Impacts on the Welfare of Rural Households in Mexico Emmanuel Skoufias RESEARCH REPORT 139 INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE WASHINGTON, DC Copyright © 2005 International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved. Sections of this material may be reproduced for personal and not-for-profit use without the express written permission of but with acknowledgment to IFPRI. To reproduce the mate- rial contained herein for profit or commercial use requires express written permission. To obtain permission, contact the Communications Division <[email protected]>. International Food Policy Research Institute 2033 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-1002 USA Telephone +1-202-862-5600 www.ifpri.org Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Skoufias, Emmanuel. PROGRESA and its impacts on the welfare of rural households in Mexico / Emmanuel Skoufias. p. cm. — (Research report ; 139) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-89629-142-1 (alk. paper) 1. Rural poor—Government policy—Mexico. 2. Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (Mexico City, Mexico)—Evaluation. 3. Poverty— Government policy—Mexico. 4. Mexico—Social policy. I. Title. II. Research report (International Food Policy Research Institute) ; 139. HC140.P6.S58 2005 362.5′56′0972—dc22 2005006221 Contents List of Tables iv List of Figures v Acronyms and Abbreviations vi Foreword vii Acknowledgments viii Summary ix 1. Background and Program Description 1 2. PROGRESA Seen through an Economic Lens 13 3. The Experimental Design and Information Sources Used to Evaluate PROGRESA 26 4.
    [Show full text]
  • The Historical Consequences of Institutionalised
    THE HISTORICAL CONSEQUENCES OF INSTITUTIONALISED CORRUPTION IN MODERN MEXICO by Michael Malkemus, B.A. A thesis submitted to the Graduate Council of Texas State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts with a Major in Political Science December 2014 Committee Members: Omar Sanchez-Sibony, Chair Edward Mihalkanin Paul Hart COPYRIGHT by Michael Malkemus 2014 FAIR USE AND AUTHOR’S PERMISSION STATEMENT Fair Use This work is protected by the Copyright Laws of the United States (Public Law 94-553, section 107). Consistent with fair use as defined in the Copyright Laws, brief quotations from this material are allowed with proper acknowledgment. Use of this material for financial gain without the author’s express written permission is not allowed. Duplication Permission As the copyright holder of this work I, Michael Malkemus, authorize duplication of this work, in whole or in part, for educational or scholarly purposes only. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis is a culmination of many years of passionate and exciting study of México. Its culture, politics, and people have long fascinated me. Therefore, first and foremost, the people of México must be warmly acknowledged. Secondly, I would like to extend gratitude to all of my professors and mentors that have introduced and taught me vital concepts relating to the political culture of México and Latin America. Finally, this would have been impossible without my parents and their unwavering support. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Mexico's Anti-Corruption Spring
    CHAPTER 1: CORRUPTION What are the mechanisms recently implemented in Mexico to reduce corruption and what Qis still to be done? POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS • Provide the special anti-corruption pros- ecutor with autonomy from government and other sources of potential conflict of interest. • Creating new laws alone will not reduce the problem. It is about implementing Aand setting an example. • Do not measure anti-corruption success by simple metrics of prosecution, instead rely on financial measures such as “gov- ernment corruption savings.” Mexico’s Anti- Corruption Spring BY MAX KAISER AND VIRIDIANA RÍOS exico’s policy priorities have shifted greatly during the last cou- ple of years, moving from an agenda focused mostly on reduc- Ming drug-related homicides to one that places a war against corruption as a requirement for successfully combatting drug trafficking organizations and their violence. This shift is significant on many fronts. The war against drug-related vio- lence was a war of the government against criminal organizations, a war to try to regain control over the impunity that reigned in territories where drug trafficking operations were conducted. The war against corruption is a war of its citizens against corruption rackets, a war against the illegal arrangements for private gain that pervade business, government, me- dia, and many other sectors of Mexican society, and that have allowed impunity to become systemic. Most critically, the definition of success has changed in nature, moving on from the targeted goal of reducing activities of organized crime to the more general goal of implanting the rule of law. In this chapter, we provide the reader with an up-to-date recounting of Mexico’s most recent efforts to promote the implementation of the rule of law in public affairs, namely the struggle to create a complete legal framework for prosecuting corruption cases.
    [Show full text]
  • Ingreso-Gasto 2010 130117
    Distribución del pago de impuestos y recepción del gasto público por deciles de hogares y personas. Resultados para el año de 2010 Contenido I. Introducción II. Distribución de la carga fiscal II.1 Revisión de la literatura II.2 Distribución del pago de impuestos III. Distribución del gasto público federal III.1 Revisión de la literatura III.2 Distribución del gasto público IV. Impacto redistributivo de la política fiscal Anexo metodológico y bibliografía 2 I. Introducción En cumplimiento de lo establecido en los artículos 24 de la Ley de Ingresos de la Federación para el Ejercicio Fiscal de 2013 y 31 de la Ley del Servicio de Administración Tributaria, se presenta a la consideración de las Comisiones de Hacienda y Crédito Público de las Cámaras de Diputados y de Senadores y de Presupuesto y Cuenta Pública de la Cámara de Diputados, el estudio sobre la distribución del pago de impuestos y recepción del gasto público por deciles de hogares y personas. En los artículos antes citados se establece que el estudio se deberá realizar con la información estadística disponible. En este sentido, la información más reciente corresponde a la contenida en la Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares 2010 (ENIGH 2010), publicada por el Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) en julio de 2011. Cabe señalar que la ENIGH se elabora cada dos años. Por lo anterior, el presente documento contiene la misma información que el estudio enviado a las Comisiones de Hacienda y Crédito Público de las Cámaras de Diputados y de Senadores y de Presupuesto y Cuenta Pública de la Cámara de Diputados en el año de 2012.
    [Show full text]
  • Mexico's Latest Poverty Stats
    Mexico’s Latest Poverty Stats By Christopher Wilson and Gerardo Silva In July, Mexico’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) released new statistics on poverty in Mexico. They show that Mexico's poverty rate fell slightly between 2010 and 2012, dropping 0.6 percent, from 46.1 percent to 45.5 percent. Nonetheless, during the same period the number of people living in poverty actually increased from 52.8 million to 53.3 million, since the overall population of Mexico grew from 114.5 million in 2010 to 117.3 million in 2012. The results, then, are mixed. The poverty rate declined, yet the number of poor increased. Extreme poverty, on the other hand, clearly declined. Both the number and percentage of Mexicans living in extreme poverty fell between 2010 and 2012, from 13.0 million (11.3 percent) in 2010 to 11.5 million (9.8 percent) in 2012. This reflects both the continuation of a long term trend of declining extreme poverty in Mexico and a recovery from the 2009 recession. Anti‐poverty efforts like the successful conditional cash transfer program, Oportunidades, and the expansion of health care toward universal coverage with Seguro Popular are certainly part of the explanation for such improvements. Still, a deeper look into the components of Mexico’s multidimensional poverty measurements reveals a troubling issue. Despite the overall decline in poverty shown with the multidimensional measure, poverty as measured solely by income continues to rise. That is, even as access to things like education, housing, and healthcare improve, and even as the overall economy is growing, Mexico’s poor are not seeing their incomes rise as quickly as prices.
    [Show full text]
  • Did NAFTA Help Mexico? an Update After 23 Years
    CEPR CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH Did NAFTA Help Mexico? An Update After 23 Years By Mark Weisbrot, Lara Merling, Vitor Mello, Stephan Lefebvre, and Joseph Sammut* Updated March 2017 Center for Economic and Policy Research 1611 Connecticut Ave. NW tel: 202-293-5380 Suite 400 fax: 202-588-1356 Washington, DC 20009 http://cepr.net Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) in Washington, DC. Lara Merling is a Research Assistant, Vitor Mello is an International Program Intern, Stephan Lefebvre is a former Research Assistant, and Joseph Sammut is a former International Program Intern at CEPR. Contents Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 2 Income and Growth .......................................................................................................................................... 5 Agriculture and Employment ......................................................................................................................... 14 Economic Policy and Mexican Integration with the United States Economy ....................................... 16 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................ 21 References ........................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Missing Reform: Strengthening Rule of Law in Mexico
    The Missing Reform: Strengthening the Rule of Law in Mexico EDITED BY VIRIDIANA RÍOS AND DUNCAN WOOD The Missing Reform: Strengthening the Rule of Law in Mexico EDITED BY VIRIDIANA RÍOS AND DUNCAN WOOD Producing a book like this is always a team effort and, in addition to the individual chapter authors, we would especially like to thank the Mexico Institute and Wilson Center team who gave so many hours to edit, design, and produce this book. In particular, we would like to mention Angela Robertson, Kathy Butterfield, and Lucy Conger for their dedication as well as their professional skill. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004-3027 www.wilsoncenter.org Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ISBN 978-1-938027-76-5 Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS INTRODUCTION / 1 SECTION 1 / 18 Corruption / 18 The Justice System / 44 Democracy and Rule of Law / 78 Business Community / 102 Public Opinion / 124 Media and the Press / 152 SECTION 2 / 182 Education / 182 Transparency / 188 Competition / 196 Crime Prevention / 202 Civil Society / 208 Congress and Political Parties / 214 Energy / 224 Land Tenure / 232 Anticorruption Legislation / 240 Police Forces / 246 Acknowledgements This book collects the intelligence, commitment, and support of many. It comprises the research, ideas and hopes of one of the most talented pools of Mexican professionals who day-to-day, in different spheres, work to strengthen rule of law in their own country. Collaborating with them has been among the highest honors of my career. I cannot thank them enough for believing in this project.
    [Show full text]
  • Corruption at the Border: Violence and Security Concerns
    Corruption at the Border: Violence and Security Concerns By Jorge Manuel Aguirre Hernández (Universidad de Monterrey) Jeremy Slack (University of Arizona) Scott Whiteford (University of Arizona) The Puentes Consortium 2009-10 December 2. 2009 Abstract: International borders throughout the world are spatial divides that create the conditions for corruption, especially when they separate countries with very different economies and levels of development. This article examines the different forms and impacts of corruption that occur along the Mexico-U.S. border by using ethnographic methods to highlight the voices of the people that are impacted the most by corruption but are rarely acknowledged in debates held in Washington and Mexico City. We conclude by offering policy recommendations in the areas of transparency, training for border officials and local participation and oversight in the decision making process. 2 Introduction: In the spring of 2009 President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Mexico, an indication of the gravity of the common security problems related to the fight against organized crime and its component flows (weapons trafficking, people trafficking/smuggling, money laundering, and drug trafficking). The second Bush administration drastically increased border surveillance and built hundreds of miles of fences to protect the border and a military aid package to combat drugs and crime called the Merida Initiative. In light of the past two decades of attempted economic integration through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), these attempts to restrict the flow of people and commodities have led to unforeseen problems and new possibilities for corruption. The Obama administration has acted quickly, spurred by the media attention that resulted from a special report prepared by the Joint Operating Environment think tank that accused Mexico of becoming a failed state (United States Joint Forces Command 2008).
    [Show full text]
  • Corruption in Mexico: Implications for U.S
    University of Miami Law School University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository Articles Faculty and Deans 1987 Corruption in Mexico: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy Keith S. Rosenn University of Miami School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons Recommended Citation Keith S. Rosenn, Corruption in Mexico: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy, 18 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 95 (1987). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CORRUPTION IN MEXICO: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY Keith S. Rosenn* INTRODUCTION Most academicians prefer to ignore corruption,' particularly when a foreign country is involved. As Gunnar Myrdal explained, "any attempt by a foreign scholar to deal with the problem of cor- ruption is bound to present a problem of diplomacy in research."' Second, virtually no empirical evidence on the extent of corruption exists. Corruption is deliberately hidden from public view, and the participants cannot be depended upon to respond honestly to ques- tionnaires. Third, corruption is a value-laden concept. Certain prac- tices, such as employing one's relatives, trading on inside informa- tion, or accepting grease payments, which might be regarded as corrupt in one culture, may be regarded as quite honest in another culture.3 Fourth, a certain amount of corruption is found in all countries, be they developed or developing.
    [Show full text]
  • Militarization, Organized Crime, and Democratic Challenges in Mexico
    RESEARCH & ANALYSIS Militarization, Organized Crime, and Democratic Challenges in Mexico Roberto Zepeda, Jonathan D. Rosen and Thiago Rodrigues Introduction This paper examines the nexus between corruption, weak institu- tions, drug trafficking, and organized crime in Mexico. (Morris 2012; Zepeda, Rosen 2019). Historical legacy has determined the current events of contemporary Mexico, which is characterized by a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime (Velasco 2012). Despite its transition to democracy, Mexico has been plagued by high levels of corruption and impunity. This article utilizes data and qualitative analysis to examine the trends in corruption and insecurity as well as lack of trust in institutions. This chapter also analyzes organized crime in Mexico and how the country’s war on drugs has resulted in increases in violence and insecurity. Our main argument is that the PENSAMIENTO PROPIO 51 PENSAMIENTO 233 Militarization, Organized Crime, and Democratic Challenges in Mexico militarization of public safety, especially since Calderón’s administra- tion (2006-2012), and tough on crime policies in general have failed to address the underlying institutional challenges that the country faces connecting corruption, organized crime and political institutions. Democratization and Corruption: Fragile Institutions According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNO- DC), corruption is a complex social, political and economic phenom- enon that affects all countries, as it undermines democratic institu- tions, hinders economic development, and contributes to government instability. Corruption, according to the UNODC, attacks the basis of democratic institutions by distorting electoral processes, perverting the rule of law, and creating bureaucratic obstacles whose only reason for existence is to ask for bribes.
    [Show full text]