FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES Department Political Science

Otpor’s usage of nonviolent action to undermine the authority of Slobodan Milosevic

Bachelor thesis – Citizens in Europe

Bachelor Political Science, Year 3, Semester I

Thom Groot Student number: 5980178 Supervisor: Rosa Sanchez Second reader: Jurgen van der Heijden Deadline: Tuesday 29 January 2013, 23:59

Word count: 9589

UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM Table of contents 1 Introduction ...... 3

1.1. Research question and scope ...... 6

1.2. Theoretical framework ...... 8

2. Research design ...... 11

2.1. Methodology...... 12

2.2. Data collection methods ...... 13

2.3. Data analyse methods...... 14

3. The hybrid regime of Serbia during Milosevic’s rule ...... 14

4. Data analysis ...... 16

4.1. Otpor’s usage of Gene Sharp’s work in their nonviolent struggle against Milosevic .. 16

4.2. Undermining the authority of Milosevic: Otpor’s usage of protest and persuasion ..... 19

4.3. Otpor’s strategy of noncooperation to undermine the authority of Milosevic ...... 23

4.4. Undermining the authority of Milosevic: Otpor’s usage of nonviolent intervention ... 26

5. Conclusion ...... 28

5.1. Reflection ...... 30

5.2. Suggestions for future research ...... 31

Appendix I: Data-planning matrix ...... 32

Appendix II: Timeline of the nonviolent struggle against Milosevic in Serbia ...... 32

Appendix III: Map of Serbia ...... 38

Appendix IV: List of Gene Sharp’s methods of nonviolent action used by Otpor ...... 39

Appendix V: The key points of Otpor’s strategy ...... 42

Bibliography ...... 43

2

Otpor’s usage of nonviolent action to undermine the authority of Slobodan Milosevic 1. Introduction Over the past decade, the rise of social movements applying nonviolent methods of resistance against repressive regimes occurred in the post-Soviet region. 1 After the collapse of the Soviet-Union, Slobodan Milosevic became president of Serbia. His tenure was marked by the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia’s participation in four wars that resulted in more than 210,000 deaths, the creation of nearly three million refugees, and isolation from the international community.2 In the year 2000, in a war barely noticed outside Serbia, Milosevic fought to hold power. He controlled a battle-hardened army, a tough police force, and most media. However, Milosevic underestimated his opponents, led by a movement called Otpor (Serbian for ‘Resistance’). Otpor attacked the Serbian regime with nonviolent methods such as street theatre, humorous actions, demonstrations, postering, physical occupation, and a willingness to be arrested. Furthermore, Otpor organised symbolic protests which mocked and tried to undermine the authority of Milosevic. 3 Their courage and ideas inspired other Serbs to overcome their fear, and join the fight against Milosevic. Otpor-students were the shock troops in what became an army of human rights and pro-democracy activists, who systematically undermined police and army loyalty to Milosevic, and forced him to call early elections.4 When Milosevic refused to accept his defeat at the elections on 24 September 2000, the Serbian people responded with a general strike. As normal life ground to a halt, hundreds of thousands Serbs invaded Belgrade on 5 October 2000 to seize the capital in a triumph for democracy. Thousands of people took to the street to demand political change at a critical juncture in Serbian politics. By using nonviolent methods of resistance, Otpor managed to play a vital role in the fall of Milosevic.5 When a group of students founded Otpor in October 1998, the Milosevic-regime looked very powerful and seemed not to be swept away in the nearby future.6 Only two years later, the Serbian president was forced from power after an intensive campaign of strategic nonviolent action shaped by Otpor. The movement was initially formed as a reaction to the new repressive university and media legislation.7 After the NATO-bombing of Yugoslavia in

1 Nikolayenko (2009), p. 1. 2 Paulson (2011), p. 10. 3 In this thesis, authority is defined as the quality that leads the judgments, decisions, recommendations, and orders of certain individuals and institutions to be accepted voluntarily as right and therefore to be implemented by others through obedience or cooperation. See Sharp (2003), p. 31. 4 A Force More Powerful (2012). Bringing Down A Dictator. 5 Nikolayenko (2009), pp. 2-3. 6 Kurtz (2010), Otpor and the Struggle for Democracy in Serbia (1998-2000). 7 Popovic (2001), An Analytical Overview of the Application of Gene Sharp’s Theory of Nonviolent Action in Milosevic’s Serbia. 3 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM early 1999, Otpor shifted its main focus to a political campaign aimed directly against Milosevic. 8 The movement wanted to bring change in the Serbian political situation by achieving three main goals:

[…] dismissal and accountability of Milosevic and his regime due to detrimental policies and effects over the last ten years, free and fair general elections by rules and under control of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the end of repression against journalists, news media and the truth.9

The task for Otpor was to mobilise the public opinion against Milosevic by using nonviolent methods. The movement emerged as a driving force behind efforts to promote democratic principles, and it did so by adopting the strategies and tactics of other successful nonviolent movements. More important, Otpor used the work on nonviolent action by political scientists – in particular Gene Sharp, a Senior Scholar at the Albert Einstein Institution – to undermine Milosevic.10 Sharp’s work has influenced numerous anti-government resistance movements around the world. His books, The Politics of Nonviolent Action and From Dictatorship to Democracy: a Conceptual Framework for Liberation, became very important sources of strategy for Otpor. 11 The former constituted the base for Otpor’s tactics, strategies and nonviolent discipline, in spite of that it had to be smuggled into Serbia. The latter was praised by Otpor as an effective blueprint for confronting the Milosevic-regime, because it contained a systematic reading of how power and the ‘pillars of support’ operated.12 In the beginning Otpor was a student movement, because it was explicate in a political ideology and moved by an emotional rebellion in which there was always present a disillusionment with and rejection of the values of the older generation in Serbia. Moreover, the students of Otpor had the conviction that their generation had a ‘special historical mission’ to fulfil where the older generation, the older elites and other classes have failed. 13 The student movement came into being in a time of sickness of society.14 The students of Otpor attempted to make life in Serbia better. As time passed, Otpor developed itself from a student organisation to a social movement, defined as a collective, organized, sustained and

8 Cevallos (2009), pp. 3-4. 9 Rennebohm (2011), Serbians overthrow Milosevic. 10 Cevallos (2009), p. 2. 11 Mvros (2010), p. 8. 12 Gene Sharp (2005) sets that the ‘pillars of support’ are institutions and sections of the society that supply the existing regime with sources of power required for maintenance and expansion of its power capacity (p. 35). 13 Feuer, L.S. as quoted in Nenadic and Belcevic (2006). From Social Movement to Political Organisation: The case of Otpor. Coventry: Centre For Peace and Reconciliation Studies, p. 9. 14 A complex combination of factors – including a shattered economy, increased repression, losing another war – contributed to the animosity and dissatisfaction of the Serbs. 4 noninstitutional challenge to the authorities.15 As Nenadic and Belcevic argue in their article on the Serbian movement:

Otpor can be put in the family of social movements. When they [transformed into a social movement], they announced an alliance with democratic parties, non-governmental organizations, independent media and individuals. They broadened its membership to include well-known public figures. They were less elitist and willing to accept anybody who wanted to defeat Milosevic. Thus, the spectrum of their supporters was wide – they mobilized from everywhere on the social scale including radicals, right and left wing orientated population, feminists, nationalists, workers, peasants, intellectuals, students, monarchists, republicans etc.16

By using nonviolent methods, Otpor effectively mobilised a large number of Serbs. They did so by rallying resources from abroad, including funding, training and manuals. Furthermore, Otpor drew on the extensive reserves of energy and creativity of young Serbs.17 While the fall of Milosevic was widely reported as a spontaneous revolution, most of the world’s news organizations missed the real story – a long battle involving thousands of Otpor-activists in a calculated nonviolent strategy to strip Milosevic of his authority, turn his own police and army against him, and force him to call for elections, which he lost and then tried to steal.18 Otpor can be seen as a movement of liberation that united Serbs who were isolated but shared the same goals: to bring democracy in Serbia; to overthrow Milosevic; to stop policies of nationalism, internal repression, economic devastation and armed conflicts with neighbouring countries; to bring the war criminals to justice; and to integrate Serbia into the European community.19 The Otpor-activists declared the clenched fist to be their symbol, because it represented their will to go all the way in bringing down Milosevic. The clenched fist was conceived as a symbol of individual commitment to do something in the conviction that the time and energy of every single Serb had to be invested, because change would never happen without that.20 Otpor’s idea was to deprive the regime of the fear that had become its greatest weapon, and thereby withdraw the consent of the Serbian people.21 Otpor realised that they would never win the fight against Milosevic with violent force, and because of that they chose nonviolent methods as their ‘combat weapons’.22

15 Goodwin and Jasper (2003), p. 3. 16 Nenadic and Belcevic (2006), pp. 10-11. 17 Smiljanic and Mahony (2003), p. 6. 18 A Force More Powerful (2012), The Story. 19 Smiljanic and Mahony (2003), pp. 8-9. 20 Ibid. 21 Cevallos (2009), pp. 3-4. 22 Mvros (2010), p. 7. 5 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM 1.1. Research question and scope This thesis will analyse Otpor’s nonviolent methods and strategies that contributed to the uprising that ended the 13 year-long rule of Milosevic. The study seeks to contribute to the academic literature by examining Otpor’s application of Sharp’s model for nonviolent action in Serbia from 1998 until 2000. 23 Nonviolent activists fight with psychological, social, economic, and political methods, and most often circumvent conventional ways of influencing public policy such as lobbying. Sharp, author of the most exhaustive survey of strategic nonviolent resistance, entitled The Politics of Nonviolent Action, identifies humorous skits and pranks, taunting officials, mock awards, boycotts, strikes, blockades and physical occupation, as but seven of hundred ninety-eight methods of nonviolent action in that work’s original printing.24 This thesis seeks to advance the understanding of nonviolent resistance by providing a detailed analysis of a practical example of the usage of nonviolent action in Serbia. Scholars have written a lot about the October revolution in Serbia, but they did not focus on the use of Sharp’s work in this revolution.25 There is also a practical need for research on this particular subject because, according to Sharp, nonviolent resistance can be a substitute for violent resistance.26 The justification of this research topic lies in the fact that peace is a great good. If it appears that nonviolent action can be effective, it should be preferred above violent resistance. The study of the nature and potential of nonviolent struggle is important for anyone who wants to eliminate violent resistance in favour of nonviolent resistance, because no liberation movement and no government will be able to renounce violence without an effective alternative available to fight against oppression and aggression. 27 People need to be able to prevent and destroy oppression, because of a belief that human beings should not be dominated by repressive regimes. Some movements still seem susceptible to nonviolent ideas. Therefore, a thesis

23 Sharp has been called the ‘the Clausewitz of nonviolent warfare’, because of his extensive writings on nonviolent action. Sharp’s writings on nonviolent action – in particular From Dictatorship to Democracy, a guide to toppling autocrats, have inspired dissidents around the world in their nonviolent resistance to repressive regimes. 24 Sharp (1973), pp. 131, 145, 148. 25 Popovic (2001), An Analytical Overview of the Application of Gene Sharp’s Theory of Nonviolent Action in Milosevic’s Serbia. 26 In fact, Sharp points out that history is full of these alternatives, where people from almost every cultural and ethnic background have assumed nonviolent struggle to successfully combat and dismantle repressive regimes, achieve civil and human rights, eliminate Apartheid and slay other seemingly invincible dragons. A defiance to cooperate with a repressive power with civil disobedience, boycotts, the distribution of leaflets, the organization of marches, coordination of resistance activities, and the discovery of the weak link in the social, economic and political structure can successfully “attack” repressive regimes through nonviolent struggle. See Sharp, interview with Mamorsky (2003), Scholar Promotes Alternatives To War. 27 Sharp (1982), p. 7. 6 about Otpor is important, because the effectiveness of nonviolent action will be discussed.28 Repressive rulers, like Milosevic, are known for (violently) imposing their will. The question is what happens when the oppressed turn to using nonviolent action to overthrow the regime. If individuals decide to make a change, Lucas argues, they can exert their own power, especially when they act collectively and strategically. Since rulers only have that power which people provide to them through obedience, whether willingly, unwillingly through coercion or through relinquishment because of apathy. 29 Trusting in people’s ability to withhold support from their ruler underpins an explanation of how nonviolent action works. The technique can be used to undermine repressive leaders, because all rulers can rule only as long as they receive replenishment of the needed sources of their power from the cooperation, submission, and obedience of the population and the institutions of the society.30 Otpor was a movement that tried to undermine the authority Milosevic by using nonviolent action. The movement has eventually played a crucial role in the fall of the Serbian president, even though it is very difficult to measure its exact influence.31 In this thesis, Otpor’s use of nonviolent action against Milosevic will be analysed. The research question that will have to be answered is: how has Otpor used nonviolent actions to undermine the authority of Milosevic? In order to answer the research question, the following sub-questions will have to be examined: 1. To which extent did Otpor use protest and persuasion to undermine the authority of Milosevic? 2. To which extent did Otpor incite noncooperation to undermine the authority of Milosevic? 3. To which extent did Otpor’s nonviolent interventions, by psychological, physical, social, economic and political means, undermine the authority of Milosevic? Several sources mention that Otpor learned about nonviolent methods and strategy from Sharp’s writing.32 In the following chapters, I examine how Sharp’s theory about nonviolent action applies in the case of Otpor. In an attempt to analyse Otpor’s specific nonviolent actions in the Serbia of Milosevic, Sharp’s vision on nonviolent action will have to be explored first.

28 Endorsing that nonviolent strategy can have the same impact as violent strategy only with (much) less severe physical and psychological damage, it is important to understand its theoretical and practical implications. 29 Lucas (2010), pp. 4-5 30 Sharp (2012), p. 45. 31 Popovic interview with York (2000), In His Own Words: Srdja Popovic. 32 Mvros (2010), p. 8 7 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM 1.2. Theoretical framework According to Sharp, nonviolent action is based on a simple postulate: people do not always do what they are told to do, and sometimes they do things which have been forbidden. When people refuse their cooperation, withhold their help, and persist in their disobedience and defiance, they are denying their opponent the basis human assistance and cooperation which any regime requires.33 If they do this in sufficient numbers for long enough, the government will no longer have power. Sharp defines nonviolent action as:

[...] a generic term covering dozens of specific methods of protest, noncooperation and intervention, in all of which the actionists conduct the conflict by doing – or refusing to do – certain things without using physical violence. Nonviolent action is a means of combat. It involves the matching of forces and the waging of “battles,” requires wise strategy and tactics, and demands of its “soldiers” courage, discipline, and sacrifice.34

The reason why a movement should choose nonviolent methods is based on a strategic calculation. When oppressed people try to fight against a repressive regime with whatever military capacity they possess, one has chosen the very type of struggle with which the oppressors nearly always have superiority. 35 The alternative for a liberation movement is political defiance: the strategic application of nonviolent struggle in order to undermine the opponent and to replace it with a democratic system. This resistance by noncooperation and defiance mobilises the power of the oppressed population in order to restrict and cut off the sources of the ruler’s power. Those sources are provided by groups and institutions called the ‘pillars of support’, which often include the military, the police, labourers, media, and religious institutions.36 If the people’s support for these pillars is withdrawn or weakens, the government will begin to collapse. Sharp created a list of hundred ninety-eight methods of nonviolent action. 37 To undermine repressive regimes, Sharp has developed these specific methods for nonviolent resistance which include adopting a single colour, creating an identifiable symbol and protesting in public spaces. Other methods are more lateral, including humorous skits and

33 Sharp (1973), pp. 63-64. 34 Ibid., pp. 64-67. 35 Sharp (2012) argues that military resistance against repressive regimes does not strike them where they are weakest, but rather where they are strongest. By choosing to compete in the areas of military forces, supplies of ammunition, weapons technology, and the like, resistance movements tend to put themselves at a distinct disadvantage. The regimes will almost always be able to muster superior resources in these areas. (pp. 43-44). 36 Helvey interview with York (2000), In His Own Words: Retired U.S. Army Colonel Robert Helvey. 37 Strategic nonviolent action is a set of tactics and strategies to non-violently bring about social change through psychological, economic and other means. See Lucas (2010), p. 4. 8 pranks, singing, civil disobedience of ‘illegitimate laws’, seeking imprisonment, and nonviolent occupation. These methods are classified under three broad categories: protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention.38 Methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion are largely symbolic demonstrations, including parades, humorous skits and pranks, marches, and the wearing of symbols. Noncooperation means that people stop obeying the opponent and deny and withdraw their support from the opponent’s system of power and control.39 Noncooperation is divided into three sub-categories: (a) social noncooperation, (b) economic noncooperation, including boycotts and strikes, and (c) political noncooperation. Some of these methods require many people in order to be effective. Some methods in this category, such as a consumer boycott or a work slowdown, allow large segments of a society’s population (young and old people, men and women, etc.) to actively participate in the struggle by using simple, low-risk actions. 40 Nonviolent intervention, by psychological, physical, social, economic, or political means, such as the sit-ins, nonviolent occupation, parallel government, and civil disobedience of ‘neutral laws’, is the final group. These methods directly disrupt the ability of the opponent to function. The risk level is often high: failure can damage the movement’s authority and the opponent could mount a harsh response.41 Sharp gives these categories of nonviolent methods a theoretical foundation by arguing that the power of a regime is based on the obedience of the subjects.42 For Sharp, power does not derive from some intrinsic quality of those who are in power. They have power because the people actually provide them with it. He defines social power as the capacity to control the behaviour of other, directly or indirectly, through action by groups of people, which action impinges on other groups of people. Sharp defines political power as:

[...] that kind of social power which is wielded for political objectives, especially by governmental institutions or by people in the opposition to or in support of such institutions. It thus refers to the total authority, influence, pressure and coercion which may be applied to achieve or prevent the implementation of the wishes of the power-holder.43

38 Sharp (2012), pp. 46, 124-135. 39 Popovic et al. (2007), p. 69. 40 Ibid., p. 70. 41 However, methods of nonviolent intervention can sometimes have a large impact with relatively few people participating in them. Because of the risk involved, the people who carry out methods of nonviolent intervention are often the best-trained, most committed members of your movement who may be willing to take on greater sacrifice than others in your movement. See Popovic et al. (2007), pp. 69-71. 42 Sharp (2012), p. 28-36. 43 Sharp (1973), pp. 7-8. In this thesis, when used alone, the term power is to be understood as political power. 9 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM According to Sharp, power ultimately derives from the subjects of the state.44 He believes that a power structure relies upon the submission and obedience of the subjects to orders of the one who rules. Power is not to be rejected by nonviolent activist, it is necessary to wield power in order to control the power of the government. Sharp argues that nonviolent action is based on that regimes depend on people, that power is pluralistic, and that power is fragile because it depends on many groups for reinforcement of its power sources.45 Sharp rejects the monolithic model of power, which states that power is solely and solidly held by an individual or group of specific individual, and that nothing can be changed regarding the power structure except the person or people at the top. 46 He sets that if subjects do not obey, the power of the regime will collapse. According to Sharp, power is not intrinsic to the power-holder; it appears to emerge from the interaction of all or several of the following sources of power:  Authority, the belief among the people that the regime is legitimate, and that they have a moral duty to obey it. It is about the ability to issue a command and have people submit to it. Authority is built slowly and patiently, but is lost easily by reneging on promises and not delivering outcomes;  Human resources, the number and importance of the persons and groups which are obeying, cooperating, or providing assistance to the rulers;  Skills and knowledge, needed by the regime to perform specific actions and supplied by the cooperating persons and groups;  Intangible factors, psychological and ideological factors that may induce people to obey and assist the rulers;  Material resources, the degree to which the rulers control or have access to property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, and means of communication and transportation;  Sanctions, punishments, threatened or applied, against the disobedient and noncooperative to ensure the submission and cooperation that are needed for the regime to exist and carry out its policies.47 The sources of political power depend on acceptance of the regime, on submission and obedience of the population, and on the cooperation of innumerable people and the many of the institutions of the society. Rulers require the assistance of the people they rule, without

44 Sharp (2012), p. 29. 45 Sharp (1980), pp. 7-9 46 Popovic et al. (2007), p. 26. 47 Sharp (2012), p. 29. 10 which they cannot secure and maintain the sources of power. Full cooperation, obedience and support will increase the availability of the needed sources of power and expand the power capacity of a regime. On the other hand, withdrawal of popular and institutional cooperation with oppressive rulers diminishes, and may sever, the availability of the sources of power on which all rulers depend, without availability of those sources, the rulers’ power weakens and finally dissolves.48 Sharp concludes that the power of the government depends on obedience and consent rendered by those ruled – the people – and accordingly, the power of the ruler can be weakened when the ruled cease to obey and withdraw their consent.49 Sharp’s theory of power provides a basis for understanding how nonviolent action can bring about change. He argues that nonviolent action produces change in four ways: conversion, accommodation, coercion, and disintegration. 50 According to Sharp, the maintenance of nonviolent discipline against violent opponents facilitates the workings of the four mechanisms of change. Furthermore, nonviolent discipline is also extremely important in the process of political jiu-jitsu. In this process the repression of the regime against the clearly nonviolent actionists politically rebounds against the ruler’s position, causing dissention in their own ranks as well as fomenting support for the resisters among the general population, the regime’s usual supporters, and third parties.51 This chapter has officered a conceptual toolkit for the analysis of Otpor’s nonviolent actions. The theoretical underpinnings of nonviolent methods and strategies were addressed. Using Sharps insights, it is possible to see how nonviolent methods were used by Otpor in the struggle against the Milosevic-regime.52

2. Research design In the next paragraphs, the research methodology, data collection methods and the data analyse methods will be presented. My overarching methodology is a single case study of Otpor’s nonviolent methods and strategic efforts from October 1998 to October 2000.

48 Sharp (2012), p. 30. 49 Sombutpoonsiri (2012), p. 31. 50 Conversion denotes a process of change in which activists generally introduce a dialogue with the opposing party and convince it to admit the activists’ position in a conflict. More probably, nonviolent action may lead to change through a process of accommodation whereby the activists and their opponents agree to reach grounds of mutual benefit as a way to end a dispute. Coercion takes place when activists apply methods of nonviolent action to achieve their stated goals against the will of the opposing party. Disintegration is a step further than coercion. When nonviolent coercion has been extensively carried out, support networks of the opposing regime may no longer exist. And the regime cannot maintain its ruling position. Eventually, it may be brought down from power. See Sharp (2012), pp. 54-55 and Sombutpoonsiri (2012), pp. 35-36. 51 Sharp (2012), p. 49. 52 I use the ‘Milosevic-regime’ to collectively refer to the following authority figures and groups: Milosevic, Milosevic’s top political officials, police commanders and officers and any other individual or group authority that saw Otpor as a threat to the regime. 11 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM Qualitative data and analysis will be used. An in-depth understanding of a case, where nonviolent action was used to undermine a repressive ruler, will be presented.

2.1. Methodology A case-study will be carried out to examine how Otpor used nonviolent action to undermine the authority of Milosevic. The goal is to explain, to get a detailed examination and to achieve a contextual understanding of the phenomenon Otpor.53 This methodology does not draw a generalisation from the case in the sense that research findings can be applied across historical and geographical contexts, but instead, it allows elaborate research of a social event that shows a unique representation of a general subject of study.54 The choice for a case-study on Otpor is justified because it involves an in-depth, longitudinal examination of a single phenomenon. A case-study provides a systematic way of looking at events, collecting data and analysing information, and as a result a sharpened understanding of Otpor’s nonviolent methods can be achieved.55 The focus of this thesis is not so much in the generalising of the findings, rather the focus lies on presenting rich narrative details and offering insights about the social movement. Otpor is selected as case because it is exemplary in demonstrating nonviolent actions substantial contribution to the fall of Milosevic. The Serbian president had survived waves of protest in the early 1990s, but failed to have an adequate answer to Otpor’s highly systematised nonviolent resistance.56 The message conveyed in Otpor’s actions consistently undermined the authority of the Milosevic-regime, and it eventually mobilised the Serbs to turn against Milosevic. Through the widespread nature of the movement’s branches, Otpor’s street skits and messages proliferated. At the end of Otpor’s campaigns, the national ridicule of Milosevic created a crisis of legitimacy for him, setting the stage for his defeat in the elections on 24 September 2000.57

53 Political scientist Burnham (2008) argues that case studies enable researchers to focus on a single individual, group, community, event, policy area or institution, and study it in depth, perhaps over an extended period of time. The researcher will have a number of research questions to give focus to the research and organize the data collection, analysis and presentation of the material. The attractiveness is that data on a wide range of variables can be collected on a single group. A nearly complete account of the phenomenon can be achieved. (pp. 63-66). 54 Sombutpoonsiri,(2012), pp. 23-24. 55 A point of critics against the usage of a case-study is that the method maintains a bias towards verification, understood as a tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions, so that the study will be of doubtful scientific value. Social scientist Flyvbjerg tackles this argument by saying that the case-study contains no greater bias toward verification of the researcher’s preconceived notions than other methods of inquiry and that experience indicates that the case study contains a greater bias toward falsification of preconceived notions than toward verification. See Flyvbjerg (2006), pp. 234-237. 56 Sombutpoonsiri,(2012), p. 24. 57 Ibid. 12

2.2. Data collection In this thesis, the analysis is based on insights and information obtained from a variety of data sources. Because of this triangulation, the risk that my conclusions reflect only the systematic biases or limitations of a specific source or method will be reduced. 58 Furthermore, it allows me to gain a broader and more secure understanding of Otpor. The evidence that is used in this thesis comes from interviews, documents and documentaries. Another important source of data is the website of the Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS).59 The websites contains valuable information about Otpor. By using different data sources, converging evidence will be provided.60 The first step in the qualitative analysis was the reading of interview transcripts, documents, observations and the online material of the CANVAS-website. Fourteen interviews have been examined. Otpor is perceived as an organisation with a horizontal structure and a lack of identified leaders.61 Nonetheless, Otpor had ten-thousands of members and there was a certain group of activists within the organisation that had an organizational position. 62 In this thesis, only interviews with Otpor-activists that had an organizational position are examined, because there are a lot of ex-Otpor members with little knowledge about the core ideas of the movement. The weakness of using these particular interviews was that the interview questions have not been made by me.63 Another problem that had to be faced was the usage of afterwards obtained oral accounts of the past events. The fall of Milosevic happened twelve years ago. The risk was that activists have developed a routine in giving interviews about Otpor’s actions, and that some have forgotten elements that were of lesser importance in their own story. 64 The positive side of using these particular interviews was that the Otpor-members were not being enclosed by victorious emotions and euphoria, because the events happened more than a decade ago. The interviewees gave a more balanced story and because of that, a more honest and transparent view of Otpor has been obtained. For that reason, the interviews increased the validity of the research.

58 Maxwell (2005), p.93. 59 In 2003, Srdja Popovic, the leader of Otpor, together with Slobodan Dinovic, co-founded CANVAS, an organization focused on the use of nonviolent conflict to promote human rights and democracy. 60 Leedy and Ellis Ormrod (2005), pp. 365-367. 61 Otpor was completely decentralized, without any ‘heads’ to be beheaded or co-opted by the regime. Each regional office was virtually autonomous, while being supported in its actions by all the other Otpor chapters. The idea was, cut off one Otpor head, and fifteen heads would instantly appear. See Paulson (2011), pp. 13-14. 62 Arens (2008), p. 9. 63 For that reason, a possibility existed that some of the evidence, that was needed to answer my research question, might not have been obtained from the interviews. After the data analysis was finished, it became clear that the research questions could be answered adequately. 64 Arens (2008), p. 9. 13 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM Documents have been collected to supplement details of information provided by the interviewees. They were useful for cross-checking factual details about Otpor’s nonviolent actions. My document sources include scholarly journal articles, books written by Otpor- members, books about Otpor, press materials, the online archives of the Centre for Nonviolent Action, documentaries on Otpor, photographs of Otpor and their actions, and print materials produced by Otpor.65 The use of various methods of data collection increases the validity of this thesis. The only weakness that this triangulation brings is that it is time- intensive, but the benefits outweigh the costs in this regard.

2.3. Data analyse methods To achieve a feasible and productive study, a coherent research design is created. Using this design, the research methods have provided me the data needed to answer the research questions. The tool that helped me to achieve this compatibility is a data-planning matrix. The matrix contains a list of my research questions. Furthermore, the matrix explains how each of the components of the research methods helped me to get the necessary data to answer the research questions.66 In order to analyse the data, a categorizing strategy is used. The data has been ‘fractured’ and rearranged into categories that facilitate comparison between things in the same category.67 I have identified chunks of meaning in the data, and each meaningful unit of data is subsequently grouped (coded) with similar units of meaning.68 In this part of the thesis I have covered how my data has been collected and analysed. I also discussed which interviews have been used, what the problems were and how these handled. The other sources of data supplement details of information provided by the interviews. The purpose of the next chapter is to show what kind of regime the Milosevic- regime was. Furthermore, the immediate conditions that were present in the Republic of Serbia at the end of the 20th century will discussed briefly.

3. The hybrid regime of Serbia during Milosevic’s rule The Milosevic-regime led Serbia into wars with the Yugoslav republic of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Furthermore, it struggled with rampant inflation, corruption, crime and sanctions

65 These documents have been categorised into the following groups: 1) personal records of Otpor members; 2) pamphlets and leaflets published by Otpor-members, 3) newspapers; 4) pictures, books, films and documentaries which record events of protests in Otpor’s campaigns. 66 Maxwell (2005), p.102. See Appendix I for the data-planning matrix. 67 Ibid., p.96. 68 Lucas (2010), p. 31. 14 imposed by the international community. 69 Serbia under Milosevic was a hybrid regime, displaying a combination of democratic and authoritarian components.70 On the one hand, the incumbent government maintained a facade of democracy and regularly held multiparty elections. On the other hand, the ruling elite systematically hampered the turnover of power by safeguarding ‘an uneven playing field’. Although the political system did tolerate oppositional activities, Milosevic was able to centre most power in his own hands. The regime skilfully kept the opposition divided over its own strategies. Furthermore, Milosevic exploited a repressive state machinery inherited from the communist period. The repressive tools of Milosevic were strengthened by increasing the size of state security forces and the police. In the 1990’s there were a few elements which contributed to the consolidation of Milosevic’s power:

[...] the Serbian president’s imposition of the rules of the game, the fragmentation of the political opposition, state control of the media, and the lack of a viable alternative to the government.71

The Milosevic-regime lacked free and fair elections, and did not provide proper guarantees for political and civil rights.72 The regime impeded political space in reality by controlling the media and dispersing anti-Milosevic demonstrations with a strong police force. 73 The question now is how Otpor fought against the repression of the hybrid regime of Milosevic. Sharp gives little attention to the political circumstances under the which nonviolent methods described by him are applied, although he is not entirely indifferent to circumstances.74 He mentions four factors that determine the choice of nonviolent methods, the last one being ‘the type of repression and other countermeasures expected, the ability of the nonviolent group to withstand them, and the intensities of the commitment to the struggle within the nonviolent group’.75 It looks like Sharp thinks that the nonviolent methods in his classification are all employable in the same way, irrespective of the type of regime. Only the accidental situation is apparently relevant for the choice of methods.76 He emphasizes the

69 Smiljanic and Mahony (2003), p. 7. 70 Levitsky, S. and Way, L. as quoted in Nikolayenko (2012), ‘Origins of the Movement’s Strategy: The case of the Serbian youth movement Otpor’ in International Political Science Review 1(19), p. 3. 71 Nikolayenko (2012), p. 3 72 Marksberry (2010), Competitive Authoritarianism in Milosevic’s Serbia. 73 Arens (2008), p. 16. 74 Bij de Weg (2012), Nonviolent Resistance and Repressive Regimes. 75 Sharp (1973) sets that the choice of nonviolent weapons will need to be taken in the light of a variety of factors. They include the issues at stake, the nature of the contending groups, the type of culture and society, and the social and political context of the conflict. Other factors are the mechanisms of change intended by the nonviolent group, the experience of the nonviolent group, and the ability in applying nonviolent action. (p.501). 76 Sharp (1973), p. 501. 15 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM importance of strategic planning, but he does not link the political circumstances directly to the methods. 77 Sharp states that the same methods can often be employed in different situations.

4. Data analysis In the following paragraphs, the data will be analysed using the theoretical framework. A link between theory and practise will be presented by showing what kind of nonviolent methods were used by Otpor. The chapter will elaborate upon the theory of nonviolent action and an overview of the nonviolent actions of Otpor will be given.78 The goal of the next paragraph is to show that Otpor opted for a nonviolent strategy. Furthermore, the reason behind and the justification of Otpor’s choice for nonviolent action will be presented.

4.1. Otpor’s usage of Gene Sharp’s work in their nonviolent struggle against Milosevic A nonviolent approach was central in Otpor’s ideas, activities and campaigns. 79 The movement deliberately choose to use nonviolent methods instead of using violence to achieve the removal of Milosevic. Sharp argues that an oppressed movement should not choose for military resistance, because this strikes the repressive regime where he is strong. Political defiance does strike the regime where it is weak.80 Otpor understood this notion and applied political defiance against Milosevic in the form of nonviolent methods. The basics of Otpor’s methods and strategies were formed by the work of Sharp. His work helped Otpor think more clearly about how power operates in a society, and it showed how a repressive regime could be undermined in a nonviolent way.81 A key moment in the development of Otpor’s sources of power, in particular human resources and skills and knowledge, was the creation of Otpor’s own training program, as well as a training workshop for Otpor-activists set up in Budapest. The National Republican Institute (NRI) assigned nonviolent activist Bob Helvey

77 Sharp (1973), p. 501. 78 Appendix II contains a timeline of the nonviolent struggle of Otpor against Milosevic. 79 The movement operated on the basis of three principles: unity, strategic planning and nonviolent discipline. See Arrow (2011), How to Start a Revolution. 80 Sharp sets (2012) that political defiance has the following characteristics: 1) it does not accept that the outcome will be decided by the means of fighting chosen by the repressive regime; 2) it is difficult for the regime to combat; 3) it can uniquely aggravate weaknesses of the regime and can sever its sources of power; 4) It can in action be widely dispersed but can also be concentrated on a specific objective; 5) it leads to errors of judgment and action by the regime; 6) it can effectively utilize the population as a whole; 7) it helps to spread the distribution of effective power in the society, making the establishment and maintenance of a democratic society more possible. (p. 43). 81 Popovic, interview with Manea (2012), Nonviolent Struggle as Asymmetric Warfare: Interview with Popovic. 16 to teach Sharp’s The Politics of Nonviolent Action to thirty core Otpor-activists.82 The workshop primarily focused on the theory of power, its sources, how those sources of power are expressed in organisations and institutions (pillars of support), how to analyse the pillars of support, how to identify strengths and weaknesses of a regime, and lastly, how to neutralise or destroy the pillars of the regime in a strategic way.83 The Otpor- activists learned how to develop support from a wide spectrum of Serbian citizens, including people from the Milosevic-regime. Furthermore, they were taught how to overcome fear and how to keep people committed to nonviolence, even when being attacked.84 Helvey showed the Otpor-activists how Milosevic could be resisted by taking away his authority while keeping up nonviolent discipline. Otpor’s spirit of nonviolent action, already let out of the bottle in Serbia, could now assume a concrete shape – a strategically positioned nonviolent movement on the national level.85 Popovic, the leader of Otpor, argues that:

Otpor was starting from individual actions in hundreds of places across Serbia. [T]rained activists started leading blockades of roads, local marches, and sit-in strikes. Sedulous attention to local conditions both reinforced Otpor’s commitment to non-centralized decision making and offered a powerful incentive for participation to a people fed-up with a highly centralized regime and opposition. Large-scale nonviolent social disobedience slowly became common place. It naturally culminated during the October revolution into a general strike. The general strike embodied the realization of one of Otpor’s key aims; itself embodied in the slogan ‘The People are Otpor’.86

With the core members of Otpor being provided with a theoretical foundation for their nonviolent methods, they could offer a better training for their supporters in Serbia. 87 Furthermore, Otpor developed a strategy which identified Milosevic’s weaknesses. Sharp argues that nonviolent discipline is a key to success and must be maintained

82 Robert Helvey has worked with Gene Sharp's Albert Einstein Institution, teaching people in various parts of the world, including Burma and Serbia, effective ways of opposing repressive regimes non-violently. See Arrow (2011), How to Start a Revolution. 83 Paulson (2011), p. 17. 84 Bacher (2003), pp. 10-13. 85 Popovic (2001), An Analytical Overview of the Application of Gene Sharp’s Theory of Nonviolent Action in Milosevic’s Serbia. 86 Ibid. 87 Otpor created a training manual for the members of the movement, titled ‘Resistance in your neighbourhood: how to resolve the Serbian crisis peacefully. The manual included adapted and condensed element of Gene Sharp’s The Politics of Nonviolent Action. It emphasized the need to analyse Milosevic’s six sources of power. Attention was then called to the group and institutions supplying those sources of power, known as the ‘pillars of support’. Once they were identified, it was necessary to systematically undermine and remove those pillars supporting Milosevic by using nonviolent methods. The manual also identified factors in the choice and application of a winning technique, the inevitability of repression, and the need for offering the population low- risk resistance methods. Furthermore, the importance of planning was emphasised. See Paulson (2011), p. 17 and Popovic, interview with York, S. (2000). In His Own Words: Srdja Popovic. 17 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM despite provocations and brutalities by the regime and their agents. Otpor’s nonviolent discipline is one of the key principles of success in the nonviolent struggle against Milosevic, because once violence is unleashed, a movement will lose numbers, momentum, and credibility – putting the overall goals of a struggle in danger.88 Sharp argues that:

[...] nonviolent actionists deliberately refuse to challenge the opponent on his level of violence. The nonviolent group not only does not need to use violence, but they must not do so lest they strengthen their opponent and weaken themselves. They must adhere to the nonviolent ‘weapon system,’ since nonviolent action tends to turn the opponents violence and repression against his own power position, weakening it and strengthening the power of the nonviolent group.89

By maintaining nonviolent discipline, even in the face of brutal repression, the nonviolent actionists can demonstrate that repression is incapable of cowing the populace, and they can undermine the opponent’s existing support.90 Otpor maintained nonviolent discipline, because they knew that violent incidents could potentially undermine the movement. The Otpor- activists had no confidence in violence because they saw that guerrilla warfare tactics would only play into Milosevic’s hands.91 According to Nikolayenko, the use of nonviolent methods was advantageous to Otpor in several ways:

First, nonviolent action could check the military capabilities of the Milosevic-regime. Second, Otpor’s commitment to nonviolence had a positive impact on the recruitment campaign, since it appealed to a larger number of citizens in the war-torn country. Finally, the use of nonviolence boosted Otpor’s legitimacy in the international community. 92

By turning to nonviolent methods, such as marches and the performance of skits, the Otpor- students hoped to resuscitate Serbia with demonstrations of individual courage.93 Popovic argues that the power of the nonviolent struggle of Otpor lied in the mobilisation of a great number of people around a vision of tomorrow, a defined strategy, and efficient nonviolent methods and discipline.94 Otpor’s campaigns were generally of a symbolic nature, using nonviolent methods of

88 Popovic, interview with Farrel and Stoner (2010), How We Brought Down a Dictator. 10 years later: A conversation with Srdja Popovic, a leader in the nonviolent overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic. 89 Sharp (1973), p. 112. 90Ibid., p. 113. 91 Paulson (2011), p. 13. 92 Nikolayenko (2012), p. 8. 93 Cevallos (2009), pp. 3-4. 94 Popovic, interview with Manea (2012), Nonviolent Struggle as Asymmetric Warfare: Interview with Popovic. 18 protest and persuasion.95 According to Paulson, they worked first and foremost to eliminate the climate of fear amongst the Serbian population.96 Otpor knew that if the fear amongst the Serbs would disappear, Milosevic would lose a central pillar of his power. The goal of the movement was to adjust the balance of power among the Milosevic-regime, the democratic opposition and the civil society. The Otpor-activist saw that Milosevic’s authority was his most important source of power. Moreover, they also saw that this source of power was his weakest. Otpor’s actions were thus consciously designed simultaneously to bolster Otpor’s (moral) authority among the Serbian population and to weaken the authority of Milosevic.97

4.2. Undermining the authority of Milosevic: Otpor’s usage of protest and persuasion Sharp defines nonviolent methods of protest and persuasion as ‘a large class of methods of nonviolent action that are symbolic acts expressing opposition opinions or attempting persuasion.98 Sharp set that:

[w]ithin the context of this class of methods, emphasis may be placed on being against something; the grievances may be divers; the group to whom the act is primarily directed may vary; the types of influence will differ; the intended result may vary. The methods usually remain expressions in action of a point of view, or an attempt in action to influence others to accept a point of view or to take a certain action.99

Sharp argues that the political conditions are likely to influence the impact of protest and persuasion, with dictatorial conditions making it less possible, more dangerous and rarer. As mentioned, Otpor mainly used methods of protest and persuasion to undermine Milosevic. Sharp sets that the use of slogans, symbols, banners, posters and displayed communications is primarily designed to communicate ideas, viewpoints and information to a wider audience.100 The objective may be to influence the opponents group, gain sympathy and support from third parties, or gain converts, members or assistance for the nonviolent group. The first protest action of Otpor was the selecting of their symbol. The clenched fist stood for individual courage, unity amongst activists, and it was perceived as a symbol of power. Otpor had chosen a provocative symbol of defiance: a clenched fist, black-on-white or white-on-black, that riffed off the communist imagery of a red fist which was dear to

95 Appendix III contains a list of the nonviolent methods that Otpor used in the struggle against Milosevic. 96 Paulson (2011), pp. 14-15. 97 Ibid. 98 Sharp (1973), p. 117. 99 Ibid., p. 118. 100 Sharp (1973), p. 125. 19 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM Milosevic.101 To spread the idea of resistance, the symbol could be seen on stickers, badges, T-shirts, and was spray-painted on walls in several cities in Serbia. In October 1998, four Otpor-activists were arrested for spray-painting their symbol on walls in Belgrade. Political scientist Arens argues:

The display of symbols of resistance on flags, posters or cloths is a common type of nonviolent action. It is an easy way to show engagement pro- or against something and it is hard for a repressive regime to get rid of all the symbols of resistance. Otpor’s clenched fist could easily be used to provoke authorities and to show one’s resentment against the regime.102

Sharp argues that, under certain conditions, television can become an instrument of protest. Otpor achieved this through a western style advertisement which was broadcasted by several local television channels.103 Other protest activities in the beginning of Otpor included ‘A dinar for a change’, within which Otpor-activists raised money in front of the National Theatre, offering the passers-by a chance to punch Milosevic’s picture painted on a barrel after paying one dinar, as well as ‘It’s rotten, it’s going to fall’ from the same period, pointing to Milosevic as the main problem in Serbia. 104 Otpor arranged various different actions all over Serbia. The meaningful protest actions were all strategically planned, and included the signing of petitions, distributing leaflets, organizing rock concerts, making performances in the streets, and organizing workshops and rallies.105 The Serbian population could easily identify with the movement protest actions due to its inclusive character, the nonviolent approach and Otpor’s collective goal that addressed the public feeling of resentment. 106 The symbolic public acts expressed the viewpoint of Otpor and aimed to undermine Milosevic. Sharp argues that the delivering of symbolic objects which symbolises a grievance or objective to the official has been used in various ways to advance the view of the protesters.107 In August 1999, Otpor-activists organised a ‘birthday party’ for Milosevic. The protest action took place in Nis, the largest city of southern Serbia. More than two thousand citizens had a chance to write down what they wished Milosevic for his birthday on a joint

101 Cohen (2000), Who Really Brought Down Milosevic? 102 Arens (2008), p. 20. 103 In this advertisement, a housewife puts a T-shirt with the image of Milosevic inside a washing machine and pushes the power button with the symbol of Otpor on it. When the washer finishes, the T-shirt was shown impeccably clean, without any trace of Milosevic on it. The political message was that Otpor was capable of achieving the fall of the Serbian president. See York and Ackerman (2002), Bringing Down a Dictator. 104 Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategy (2012), 10 Years Smarter? 105 Nikolayenko (2012), p. 15. 106 Arens (2008), p. 58. 107 Sharp (1973), p. 139. 20 birthday card. Along with the card, gifts, including a one-way ticket to the Hague, prison uniform, books by Mira Markovic, handcuffs and a birthday cake in the shape of a five pointed star served to everybody present at the end of the action, were received on behalf of Milosevic. 108 In November 1999, prominent public figures in Serbia took part in the campaign ‘The fist is the salute’. Images of famous actors and other public figures were printed on posters and more than fifty-thousand copies showed their raised fists as the symbol of resistance.109 Sharp argues that political humour may become a method of nonviolent action when it is expressed in some social form such as a humorous prank, skit or a play of political satire.110 To mock the authority of Milosevic and to gather more support from the Serbian population, Otpor added a large dose of humour to several of its protest actions. They created innovative satirical street theatre to mock the regime’s propaganda and organised a broad array of concerts and parties to promote their resistance campaigns.111 Furthermore, humour was used as a crucial tool to get media coverage of the movement’s actions, and thereby increase its publicity. Sørensen argues that the functions of humour in the nonviolent resistance of Otpor appeared to be three-folded:

First of all humour facilitated outreach and mobilization. It attracted more members and eventually became part of the style of Otpor which made it ‘cool’ to be an activist. Second, humour facilitated a culture of resistance. It built solidarity amongst the members and it strengthened the individual’s capacity for participating in resistance. Finally, maybe the most important aspect of humour was that it turned oppression upside down. It reduced fear of the regime and it limited Milosevic’s possibilities for responding adequately.112

According to Gene Sharp, casting off and controlling fear is a prerequisite of nonviolent action. Furthermore, he sets that conquering fear is not only moral valour, but it is a practical requirement.113 Humour can meet this requirement because of the following logic: it is more difficult to be afraid of someone when you laugh at him. According to Popovic, creativity and humour were crucial in the struggle against Milosevic. He argues that humour and satire, trademarks of Otpor, were efficient in pushing a positive message, attracting the widest

108 Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategy (2012), 10 Years Smarter? 109 The campaign was concluded shortly before New Year with posters depicting Santa Claus with fist raised in salute. See Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategy (2012), 10 Years Smarter? 110 Sharp (1973), p. 148. 111 Sombutpoonsiri (2012), p. 178. 112 Sørensen, as quoted in Lucas (2010), pp. 43-44. 113 Sharp (2005), p. 364. 21 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM possible audience, and making the Milosevic-regime look ridiculous and brainless.114 Most importantly, humour broke the fear and inspired the tired, disappointed and apathetic Serbian society at the end of the 1990s. Popovic argues:

On a strategic level, the emphasis on humour in the otherwise moribund, kitsch and propaganda saturated public space proved farsighted. Otpor’s actions became silly and benign. Their light- hearted content made the inevitable arrests of Otpor-activists more senseless. The arresting of neighbourhood kids for clowning around on the streets because of their ‘subversive, terrorist actions’ simply made no sense to any normal Serb.115

By choosing humour and irony as their means of confrontation, Otpor-activists not only achieved the moral and political high ground; they also clung to a fundamental belief that ‘violence is the last sanctuary of the weak’.116 In Otpor’s case, the humour and satire ceased to be simply verbal political dissent and became an act of public political protest. Milosevic did not know how to respond the mockery of the movement. Sharp argues that some of the best-known methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion are forms of processions.117 Otpor carried out its first nationwide action, a march from Belgrade to Novi Sad, on December 17, 1998. Conscious of the fact that the level of opposition would have to rise dramatically in the provinces for Milosevic to be overcome, the Otpor-students took back roads along the route, passing through as many small rural communities as possible.118 In the second largest city in Serbia, Novi Sad, the number of social gatherings and protests accumulated rapidly. Since September 1999, there were parades and marches almost every evening in Novi Sad. Furthermore, the symbol of Otpor became visible in the street scene because activists hanged banners of the clenched fist on the walls during the processions.119 At the end of the 1990s, much of the Serbian population was dissatisfied with international isolation, the stigma of lost wars, thousands of dead, a ruined economy, average salaries under $70 per month, staggering inflation, and high unemployment.120 It was this

114 Popovic, interview with Farrel and Stoner (2010), How We Brought Down a Dictator. 10 years later: A conversation with Srdja Popovic, a leader in the nonviolent overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic. 115 Ibid. 116 A Force More Powerful (2012), The Story. 117 Sharp (1973) sets that the march as a form of nonviolent protest and persuasion is practiced when a group of people walk in an organized manner to a particular place which is regarded as intrinsically significant to the issue involved. A parade involves a group of people walking in an organized manner as a means of calling attention to their grievance or point of view. (p. 152-154). 118 Paulson (2011), pp. 13-15. 119 Arens (2008), p.18. 120 Paulson (2011), p. 11. 22 feeling discontent where Otpor managed to leap onto. Rather than focusing on large-scale demonstrations or organizing a political party, Otpor began with creative street theatre – public protests that mocked Milosevic, focused on shifting the political culture of the Serbian nation toward opposition to the regime and empowering people to see its vulnerability and overcome their fear of sanctions. 121 Otpor did not use a traditional model of protest, but instead they focused on a model based on symbolic action. Otpor channelled the public dissatisfaction into collective action by planning several little demanding protest actions. Furthermore they persuaded the Serbian population that a better life would be possible if Milosevic would disappear from the political scene.122

4.3. Otpor’s strategy of noncooperation that undermined the authority of the Milosevic Otpor also used various methods of noncooperation to undermine the authority of Milosevic. Sharp sets that methods of nonviolent action involve noncooperation with the opponent:

[t]hat is, the actionists deliberately withdraw the usual forms and degree of their cooperation with the regime. Noncooperation involves the deliberate discontinuance, withholding, or defiance of certain existing relationships – social, economic or political.123

Otpor was an organisation that was forbidden by Milosevic.124 The regime enacted the anti- terrorism law to Otpor, which licensed police repression of all opposition activities. However, the activists made sure that enforcement of these laws was perceived by the public to be not only unjust, but also ridiculous. By being a member or supporter of Otpor, citizens were noncooperative with the regime. Sharp argues that civil disobedience of ‘illegitimate’ laws is a deliberate, open and peaceful violation of particular laws, which are believed to be illegitimate for some reason. He sets that it may be used during a major social or political upheaval as a means of undermining, paralysing and disintegrating a regime which is seen as unjust or oppressive, with the aim of replacing it with a new system. 125 Otpor-activists disobeyed several of ‘illegitimate’ laws of the Milosevic-regime, because they stood for a different Serbia. Repression was the reaction of Milosevic to Otpor’s noncooperative actions, and

121 Kurtz (2010), Otpor and the Struggle for Democracy in Serbia (1998-2000). 122 Marovic, interview with Tavanaa (2010), Interview with Ivan Marovic. 123 Sharp (1973), p. 183. 124 The regime enacted the anti-terrorism law to Otpor, which licensed police repression of all opposition activities. However, the activists made sure that enforcement of these laws was perceived by the public to be not only unjust, but also ridiculous. The detention of ‘kids’ who merely participated in a funny street performance was portrayed as illegitimate and absurd. 125 Sharp (1973), pp. 315-316 23 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM usually took the form of censorship, arrests or beatings. A key event that provoked a repressive response from Milosevic was the ‘Orthodox New Year’ campaign, which rejected the authority of the Serbian president.126 The repression exposed the nature of the Milosevic regime, which became more ‘dictatorial’ at the end of the 1990s as it shut down independent media and arrested more Otpor-activists.127 Otpor responded to the repression of Milosevic with ‘political jiu-jitsu’, which weakened Milosevic’s authority. This nonviolent technique caused a shift in the loyalty among the supporters of Milosevic. Sharp argues that ‘political jiu-jitsu’ is a:

[...] special process that may operate during a nonviolent struggle to change power relationships. In political jiu-jitsu negative reactions to the opponents’ repression against nonviolent resisters is turned to operate politically against the opponents, weakening their power position and strengthening that of the nonviolent movement. This can operate only when violent repression is met with continued nonviolent defiance. The repression is then seen in the worst possible light. Resulting shifts of opinion are likely to occur among third parties, the general grievance group, and even the opponents’ usual supporters. Those shifts may produce both withdrawal of support for the opponents and increased support for the nonviolent resisters.128

The repressive response of Milosevic to the Otpor-activists backfired, because the movement maintained resilient in their nonviolent discipline.129 Milosevic did not know how to respond adequately to the noncooperation by Otpor. It was bad enough for his reputation that he was made fun of by ‘a bunch of students’, but through his violent response he further damaged his own authority. Arens argues that the repression of Otpor can be seen as one of the biggest mistakes of Milosevic. By marking the Otpor-activists as terrorist and beating them up in the sight of people, Milosevic contributed to the worsening of his own image. It offered Otpor the opportunity to show the Serbian population the unjustness of the regime’s repression. The exposure of the regime in the worst possible light was successfully used by Otpor to convince the third parties in and outside Serbia to distance themselves from Milosevic.130

126 The celebration of Orthodox New Year on January 13, 2000 at Republic Square in Belgrade was an opportunity for Otpor’s campaign ‘This is THE year’. New Year celebration for 3,000 people gathered in the centre of Belgrade was interrupted with the message ‘It’s not [the] time for celebration’. After midnight, dramatic scenes, photos and the names of the soldiers, policemen and citizens who had been killed during the NATO bombing were shown on a projection screen. Fifteen minutes after midnight, Otpor representatives asked the citizens to go home peacefully, explaining that Serbia had nothing to celebrate. The message was reinforced by Boris Tadic: ‘This year, life finally must win in Serbia – this is THE year’. See CANVAS (2012). 127 Paulson (2011), p. 22. 128 Sharp (2003), p. 36. 129 Sombutpoonsiri (2012), p. 37. 130 Arens (2008), p. 25. 24

A clear example of the movement’s ‘political jiu-jitsu’ is Otpor’s plan-B tactic.131 The activists used one of the seeming advantages of the Milosevic-regime – its policy of arresting those involved in strikes and other noncooperative action – into a source of power for the resistance-movement.132 The arrests threatened to demoralise the activists and intimidated them into giving up. The plan B tactic turned each arrest into a political event that would damage Milosevic’s credibility, build public support for Otpor and provide social and emotional support for the arrested activists, empowering them to stick with the movement. Otpor managed to convince the police and security forces that they should withdraw their loyalty to Milosevic.133 The movement achieved that the police and military would no longer cooperate with the Serbian president. Because Otpor was strictly nonviolent and advocated elections as a legitimate tool for change, policemen and soldiers did not see the movement as a threat. Otpor successfully undermined the willingness of state security forces to engage in violent acts against them. Ackerman argues that Otpor convinced the police officers and militaries that all of them were victims of Milosevic:

[Otpor] got under the officers skins and under their uniforms and tried to reach them somewhere deep to say, ‘Come on guys, we are together. This is our country.’ The result [was that] the loyalty of the police and security services to Milosevic was eroded from within. In the final days, when Milosevic tried to hold on to power after failing to sabotage an election, and hundreds of thousand Serbs marched on Belgrade, he ordered the police to blockade the roads. But the police knew that any kind of using force against these people would be self-destruction, and they would be losers together with Milosevic. The police disobeyed the orders.134

Popovic argues that it was crucial for Otpor to not appear threatening and aggressive towards the police and military. From the very beginning, Otpor acted in a very fraternizing manner towards the police and security forces, carrying flowers and cakes to them, rather than yelling or throwing stones.135 Sharp sets:

131 Once arrests occurred, Plan B consisted of mobilising Otpor’s network of contacts by: 1) calling lawyers who would go to the police station and begin negotiating for the activists’ release; 2) calling Otpor activists to gather at the police station. They would then participate in nonviolent activities such as singing and games at this new demonstration; 3) informing the media and calling on them to come to the police station to support the action; 4) calling on all opposition political parties in order to condemn the arrest and to call their members from that territory to join the activists in front of the police station; and 5) calling on local NGOs to inform international organizations and to send protest letters condemning the arrest. See Smiljanic and Mahony (2003), p. 7. 132 Ibid. 133 Bunce and Wolchik (2010), pp. 420-421. 134 Ackerman (2012), p. 35. 135 Popovic, interview with Farrel and Stoner (2010), How We Brought Down a Dictator. 10 years later: A conversation with Srdja Popovic, a leader in the nonviolent overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic. 25 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM [...] an alternative to a social boycott of the soldiers and the police of the opponent is to fraternize with them, in the process subjecting them to intense influence and propaganda. The objective may be 1) to become personal friends with the soldiers and convince them that no personal hostility or desire to injure them is involved in the resistance; 2) to convince them that the objectives of the regime which they serve are unjust and immoral; 3) to reduce the efficiency with which they carry out orders against the resisters, or eventually, to mutiny and refuse to carry them out.136

The nonviolent image of Otpor generally convinced the regime’s allies to shift their loyalty to the movement. A key event was that the police disobeyed Milosevic’s orders to repress the workers at the Kolubara coal mines, where 7000 miners were on a strike.137 These mines were essential to Serbia’s electricity production, and the strike threatened to impose severe blackouts. Other methods of noncooperation to undermine the authority of the Serbian president included the organisation several strikes and boycotts by workers, students, artists, actors and business owners.138 Sharp argues that these economic forms of noncooperation consist of a suspension of or a refusal to continue specific economic relationships. Furthermore, Otpor created election monitors and a well-organized election results reporting system to make sure that the election on 24 September would be fair.139 This prevented Milosevic from stealing the elections.

4.4. Undermining the authority of Milosevic: Otpor’s usage of nonviolent intervention Otpor’s campaigns ‘He’s Finished’ and ‘It’s Time’, launched in mid-2000, culminated in the victory of the democratic opposition coalition and the overthrow of Milosevic. 140 On September 24, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) won the elections. Milosevic moved to undo his defeat through the Electoral Commission falsifying the original election

136 Sharp (1973), p. 146. 137 Binnendijk and Marovic (2006), p. 422. 138 Kurtz (2010), Otpor and the Struggle for Democracy in Serbia (1998-2000). 139 Ibid. 140 The campaign ‘It’s time’ was the first ‘get out and vote’-campaign in Serbia. It was very simple and positive, aiming to attract younger population aged 18–25, particularly the first-time voters. Rock concerts were organised in more than 60 towns in Serbia. The main promoters of Otpor were public figures – a ‘Caravan of Celebrities’ toured Serbia, spreading the message nationwide. The symbol of the campaign was a clock showing five minutes to twelve, thus emphasizing the importance and significance of the forthcoming election. The campaign was aimed at various target groups, regardless of their level of education and political affiliation. The campaign ‘He’s finished’ had a simple message – Milosevic is finished, he will realize it after the election. Over 20,000 volunteers were recruited, which was the regional record in an election campaign. More than 1,500,000 ‘He’s finished’ stickers were printed and stuck over the existing posters of Milosevic. One of the objectives of the campaign was to set up foundations for the united opposition campaign, which started after the action of Otpor. See CANVAS (2012), 10 Years Smarter? 26 outcome.141 When Milosevic refused to concede power after the September elections, Otpor developed a strategy for escalating pressure over the next few days, in which they used methods of nonviolent interventions. Sharp argues:

The methods of nonviolent intervention directly interfere by nonviolent means with the opponents’ activities and operation of their system. The methods differ from protest and persuasion and of noncooperation in that they intervene in the situation. Sharp argues that methods of intervention operate both negatively and positively; they may disrupt, and even destroy, established behaviour patterns, policies, or institutions which are seen as objectionable; or they may establish new behaviour patterns, policies, or institutions which are preferred.142

Otpor only used nonviolent interventions during the period of the escalating pressure. Otpor’s protest and persuasion gave way to economic, social, and political noncooperation and finally nonviolent intervention. Disciplined crowds of nonviolent activists from all around Serbia swarmed into Belgrade, surrounded key buildings, and eventually occupied them, forcing Milosevic to resign.143 The popular mayor of Cayak, Velimir Ilic, called for a total blockade of his own city to undermine Milosevic’s authority. Ten days after the election, hundreds of thousands of Serbs – miners, farmers, men and women from all walks of life – converged angrily on the capital, in convoys that clogged the highways in every direction. By the same token, Otpor planned blockades of highways and railroads with cars, trucks, buses, and large crowds of people to shut down economic and political activity. 144 Furthermore, Otpor demonstrated parallel sources of powers. Sharp argues that this method involves the continued loyalty to an existing rival government to that of the opponent.145 In Otpor’s case, the parallel government (DOS) received overwhelming support from the Serbian population, and it replaced Milosevic’s established government. Another example of Otpor using nonviolent intervention is that a bulldozer broke down the door of the state radio and television headquarters, seen as Milosevic’s main propaganda mouthpiece.146 Paulson argues that the plan of Otpor was to:

[...] seize two key pillars of the Milosevic-regime: the federal parliament building and the broadcasting studios of Radio Television Serbia. ‘We wanted to get rid of Milosevic once and for all,’ said Ilic, ‘and we knew we could only achieve that by liberating the parliament and

141 Sombutpoonsiri (2012), p. 371. 142 Sharp (1973), pp. 357-358. 143 Kurtz (2010), Otpor and the Struggle for Democracy in Serbia (1998-2000). 144 Ibid. 145 Sharp (1973), p. 423. 146 Chiclet (2001), p. 41. 27 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM television.’147

Popovic argues that October the 5th should be seen in a context of successful nonviolent strategy. The physical takeover of the Parliament building by activists can be seen as symbolic takeover, because what happened was that Milosevic lost authority that day.148 The police disobeyed, the military disobeyed, and the Serbian population no longer supported the Milosevic-regime.149 On 6 October, the people of Serbia had successfully waged peace with strategic nonviolence, ousting a repressive ruler.150

5. Conclusion In this thesis I have examined how Otpor used nonviolent actions to undermine the authority of Milosevic. Otpor managed to undermine Milosevic’s authority by using nonviolent methods of protest and persuasion, noncooperation and intervention. In doing so, the social movement was able to play an important role in (nonviolent) overthrow of the Serbian president, even though Otpor’s exact role remains uncertain.151 The message conveyed in Otpor’s actions consistently damaged Milosevic and eventually aimed to convince the Serbs to vote against Milosevic in the elections. Otpor motivated a large segment of the Serbian population to overcome their fear and to fight against the Serbian president. They lost the belief that the Milosevic-regime was legitimate. At the end of the 1990s, Serbs felt like they did not have a moral duty to obey Milosevic anymore. Otpor saw that Milosevic could only rule because he received replenishment of the needed sources of his power from the cooperation, submission, and obedience of the Serbian population and institutions. The movement used Sharp’s nonviolent methods and strategy to strip Milosevic of his power, turn his support networks against him, and force him to leave from the political scene. 152 Furthermore, the nonviolent methods – expressed in public demonstrations, humorous street theatre, postering, and physical occupation – showed the Serbs that resistance to Milosevic could be possible.153 The sedulous nonviolent methods of Otpor constitutes a key component

147 Paulson (2005), p. 35. 148 Arrow (2011), How to Start a Revolution. 149 Police, with whom Otpor and the opposition had quietly worked for months, acknowledged Milosevic’s orders but refused to carry them out. 150 Just as Otpor activists ushers in the struggle against Milosevic with humorous jesting and a sarcastic logo, their ultimate triumph came with the voices of hundreds of thousands of Serbs chanting ‘Gotov Je!, Gotov Je!, Gotov Je!’ (Serbian for ‘He’s Finished’). See Lucas (2010), p. 139. 151 Popovic (2001), An Analytical Overview of the Application of Gene Sharp’s Theory of Nonviolent Action in Milosevic’s Serbia. 152 A Force More Powerful (2012), The Story. 153 Arens (2008), p. 57. 28 in the mobilisation of the Serbian population against the Milosevic.154 Nonviolence governed Otpor’s principles, methods, and strategy. Sharp posits that nonviolent actions work to undermine the regime by removing the resources that support their power, and that obedience underpins all these resources; nonviolent activists are encouraged from the outset to cease to obey those that rule them.155 Otpor deliberately choose to use nonviolent action instead of violent resistance. The movement understood Sharps notion that a liberation movement should not choose militarily resistance, because this does not strike the oppressive regime where it is weak. Most of Otpor’s campaigns had a symbolic character, using methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion. The methods of protest and persuasion helped to eliminate the climate of fear in Serbia and it achieved that Milosevic lost a central pillar of his power, namely fear. Otpor’s action aimed to boost Otpor’s authority and to weaken the authority of Milosevic.156 The movement used slogans, posters, banners and other kinds of nonviolent methods of protest to communicate the idea’s and objectives of the Optor. The Serbian population could straightforwardly identify with Otpors protest actions because of its inclusive character and its goal that addressed the public feeling of dissatisfaction.157 To spread the idea of resistance, Otpor’s clenched fist could be seen on badges, T-shirts, stickers and walls all over Serbia. To undermine Milosevic and to gather more public support, Otpor added humour to its methods of protest and persuasion. The humour and satire helped Otpor pushing a positive message, attracting the widest possible audience, and making Milosevic look ludicrous and stupid.158 Furthermore, the humour also helped to break the fear of the Serbs and it turned Milosevic’s oppression upside down. Otpor did not focus on large-scale demonstrations or organising a political party, but began with creative street theatre that mocked the Serbian president. Otpor also used several of Sharp’s methods of noncooperation. The movement organised several strikes and boycotts, and refused to obey ‘illegitimate’ laws. Repression was Milosevic’s response to the methods of noncooperation. The repression of Optor, a movement which nevertheless persisted in nonviolent struggle and also maintained nonviolent discipline, had the following effects. As cruelties to nonviolent people increased, the Milosevic-regime appeared more despicable, and sympathy and support for Otpor

154 Popovic (2001), An Analytical Overview of the Application of Gene Sharp’s Theory of Nonviolent Action in Milosevic’s Serbia. 155 Sombutpoonsiri (2012), p. 272. 156 Paulson (2011), p. 14-15. 157 Arens (2008), p. 58. 158 Popovic, interview with Farrel and Stoner (2010), How We Brought Down a Dictator. 10 years later: A conversation with Srdja Popovic, a leader in the nonviolent overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic. 29 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM increased. 159 The Serbian population became more alienated from Milosevic and more citizens joined the resistance movement. Milosevic’s own citizens, agents, and troops, disturbed by the repression of Otpor, began to doubt the regime. The repression increased the numbers of the nonviolent activists and enlarged the defiance of Otpor. Furthermore, it led to sufficient internal opposition among Milosevic’s usual supporters, which reduced his capacity to deal with the defiance. In short, Otpor was able to apply ‘political jiu-jitsu’, because they maintained nonviolent discipline. Furthermore, Otpor managed to convince the police and military that they would withdraw the loyalty to Milosevic. The Serbian president refused to concede power after the elections. Otpor created a plan for escalating pressure to force him out of office. In this campaign, the movement made use of methods of nonviolent interventions. The plan to ‘finish’ Milosevic culminated in the masses’ seizure of Belgrade’s city hall, the Parliament building and office of the state-owned media.160 On October 5, hundreds of thousands of protesters arrived in Belgrade. Eventually, the activists got through the cordons and ‘stormed’ the Parliament building. Others followed the bulldozer, seizing the office of the Radio and Television Station of Serbia. The physical takeover of the Parliament building can be seen as symbolic takeover of power by the democratic forces. Milosevic lost authority that day because the police, military, and a large segment of the Serbian population disobeyed. Otpor used these particular methods in the pressure period. For that reason, the victory of the movement came quicker, because of the disruptive effects of the intervention.161

5.1. Reflection My original focus of inquiry was to explain the role of Otpor in bringing down Slobodan Milosevic, but I realised that this was too large of an endeavour for my bachelor thesis. I could not answer this question with the data that was collected. This could have been prevented if I would have conducted interviews myself, because then the interview questions could have been aimed at answering the research questions. 162 I decided to change my research question into how Otpor has used nonviolent methods to undermine the authority of Milosevic. In doing so, I was no longer analysing the causal relationship between Otpor’s nonviolent actions and the fall of Milosevic. Instead, I have attempted to contribute to the literature on nonviolent action by conducting an in-depth understanding of the Optor case. An

159 Sharp (1973), p. 113. 160 Sombutpoonsiri (2012), p. 319. 161 Sharp (1973), p. 357. 162 Burnham et al. (2008), pp. 123-124. 30 examination of how Otpor applied Sharp’s model for nonviolent action in Serbia has been given. I have shown that Otpor represents a genuine historical instance where nonviolent methods were applied against a repressive regime. One has to look further in time, deeper into the Otpor-organisation, and has to careful examine the political context to understand how Otpor was able to beat Milosevic.

5.2. Suggestions for future research The importance of the theory of nonviolent action that substantiated the strategies of Otpor cannot be overemphasised. 163 Sharp’s theory offers great insights in how oppressed movements can develop strategies and campaigns that limit the use of violence while fighting a repressive regime on a field where it is relatively weak.164 Otpor was a movement that understood this notion, and was able to fight against Milosevic with ‘nonviolent weapons’. The Serbian president was not able to respond adequately to highly systemised nonviolent resistance. The question remains if nonviolent action can offer an effective blueprint for every social movement in their struggle for liberation. How do nonviolent theories explain how to overcome brutal repression where the actionists actually face death with the opposing a dictator? In the right context, nonviolent action can curtail human suffering and lead to a successful outcome, as we have seen in the case of Optor.165 Related to this, it might be interesting for further research to explore how nonviolent resistance can be used in the Arab world, in particular in Syria. In the beginning of the Syrian uprising, the Syrian resistance movement chose to fight President Bashar al-Assad with nonviolent methods. As time passed, the movement made the decision to turn from a campaign of nonviolence to violent insurgency.166 It is interesting to study why the Serbian liberation movement made this choice.

163 Arens (2008), p. 57. 164 Sharp (2012), pp. 43-45. 165 Arens (2008), p. 57. 166 Protection Gateway (2012). Syria and the Question of Nonviolent Resistance. 31 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM Appendix I – Data-planning matrix Question: To which extent did Otpor use protest and persuasion to undermine the authority of Milosevic?

Whom do I Time Why do I need to What kind of data will Where can I find contact for Frame for know this? answer the question? the data? access? Collection

To understand how Data about Otpor’s protest and Internet, Srdja Popovic, December Otpor became a persuasion which will be YouTube, CANVAS, and the serious threat for the obtained by interviews with canvasopedia.org, UvA digital beginning Milosevic-regime and Otpor-members about protest newspaper- library, of January to understand how the and persuasion actions , articles, scientific UvA library authority of Serbian documentaries that show what articles, Bringing President got kind of protests were down a dictator undermined organised by Otpor, pictures documentary, of Otpor-member protesting How to start a and press articles about revolution demonstrations organized by documentary Otpor

Question: To which extent did Otpor incite noncooperation to undermine the authority of Milosevic?

Whom do I Time Why do I need to What kind of data will Where can I find contact for Frame for know this? answer the question? the data? access? Collection

To understand how Data about noncooperation by Internet, CANVAS, December Otpor’s Otpor which will be obtained YouTube, UvA digital and the noncooperation with through interviews with canvasopedia.org, library, beginning the regime could Otpor-members, aeinstein.org, UvA library, of January undermine Milosevic’s documentaries, newspaper documents, Srdja Popovic authority and to articles and documents Bringing down a examine how Sharp’s dictator theory of power documentary, operates in a practical How to start a situation revolution documentary

Question: To which extent did Otpor’s nonviolent interventions, by psychological, physical, social, economic and political means, undermine the authority of Milosevic?

Whom do I Time Why do I need to What kind of data will Where can I find contact for Frame for know this? answer the question? the data? access? Collection

To understand how Data about nonviolent Internet, CANVAS, December nonviolent action can intervention used by Otpor YouTube, UvA digital and the be used to attack the which will be obtained canvasopedia.org, library, beginning authority of a regime through interviews with newspaper UvA library, of January and to see how power Otpor-members which show articles, scientific Srdja Popovic operates they used nonviolent articles, Bringing interventions to undermine down a dictator Milosevic, documentaries, documentary, newspaper articles and How to start a documents revolution documentary

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Appendix II – Timeline of the nonviolent struggle against Milosevic in Serbia167 December, 1990: First multi-party election held in Serbia. March 9, 1991: Vuk Draskovic, the leader of the Serbian Renewal Party leads a mass demonstration which is harshly crushed by the regime. June and July, 1992: Students stage protests, demanding immediate elections and the removal of Milosevic regime. November, 1996: On November 17, with a NATO force in Bosnia, elections are held for the Yugoslav National Parliament. The opposition coalition, Zajedno ("Together") wins in 32 municipalities, including Belgrade. On November 20 the Electoral Commission calls for a recount in most of the areas won by the opposition. On November 25 Milosevic annuls the election results, prompting massive demonstrations, mostly nonviolent. On November 27 Milosevic holds a new election, boycotted by the opposition. The protests grow in size. December, 1996: As hundreds of thousands demonstrate, Milosevic invites international review of the election results. On December 27, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe tells Serbia to reinstate the winners of the original elections or face international isolation. January, 1997: Beleaguered by unremitting opposition in the streets, Milosevic concedes defeat in the city of Nis, but opposition leaders vow to continue demonstrations until all election results are honoured. On January 14, electoral commissions in Belgrade and elsewhere call for further seating of elected representatives. February 4, 1997 Milosevic announces he will restore the opposition's victories in the November 17 elections. Demonstrations continue, with protestors demanding election reform and freedom for the media. July 23, 1997: Slobodan Milosevic appointed as President of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. May 26, 1998: University Act enacted.

167 The timeline is based on the following sources: A Force More Powerful (2012), A Chronology of Events and Sombutpoonsiri (2012), The chronology of the nonviolent struggle in Serbia’s 1990s. 33 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM October 20, 1998: National Assembly enacts Public Information Act. Otpor founded in the same month. Initially they work for repeal of laws putting the University under Socialist political control and imposing restrictions on the media. Toward the end of the month four Otpor members are arrested for spray-painting their symbol, a clenched fist, on walls in Belgrade. November 3, 1998: Otpor’s clenched fist symbol sprayed on a wall in Belgrade. Consequently, four activists arrested. Mid-November, 1998: Ivan Andric, Branko Illic and Srdja Popovic interrupt the ceremony of the 61st anniversary of Economics Faculty, Belgrade University. 17 November, 1998: March, ‘We are Paving the Way’ from Belgrade to Novi Sad. 24 March-June 9, 1999: NATO strikes carried out. Otpor suspend its activism. August 1999: Otpor and other student organisations release ‘Declaration for the future of Serbia.’ Otpor resume its activism. Following months of protest demonstrations, Otpor holds a "birthday party" for Milosevic in Nis, accepting such gifts as prison coveralls and a one-way ticket to The Hague. September, 1999: Protests continue as the Serbian economy deteriorates further and in spite of a government propaganda initiative to rebuild Serbia. September 21 sees the beginning of rallies in 20 cities urging Milosevic to resign. At the same time, the opposition begins to fragment, and the number of demonstrators dwindles. On September 29 and 30, the police and army use force to break up separate demonstrations. October, 1999: On October 2, police block some 7,000 demonstrators marching to a city hospital to see those who were wounded in previous demonstrations. An opposition leader, Zoran Djindjic, vows rallies will continue through mid-October. On October 3, Serbian Renewal Movement leader Vuk Draskovic is injured in an automobile accident that kills his brother. He blames the incident on Milosevic's security forces. On October 14 the fractious opposition unites to demand early elections. November 22, 1999: The rock concert ‘We Have a Situation’ organised followed by

34

speeches. Milosevic allies pass a law curbing authority of opposition municipal governments in areas where demonstrations have taken place. January 13, 2000: Campaign ‘This is the YEAR’ launched. Otpor organizes an enormous rally on Orthodox New Year's Eve highlighting Serbian misery under a decade of Milosevic. Opposition politicians speak. All call for early elections. January 21, 2000: Milosevic moves against the independent press, fining the Belgrade newspaper Danas 310,000 dinars. February 17, 2000: Otpor holds first Congress that transforms it from a student movement into People’s Resistance Movement (Narodni pokret Otpor). Campaign ‘It’s Spreading’ launched. March, 2000: Press and media oppression continue; newspapers are fined 202 million dinars, and a television station in Belgrade is temporarily pulled off the air and then harassed with lawsuits. Otpor-activists in 20 towns are arrested and interrogated, and sometimes beaten. Nonetheless, 60,000 anti-Milosevic posters are put up in 67 towns and cities. April 14, 2000: Activists from Novi Sad march to Belgrade under the theme ‘This is the Last March.’ Pressure put on opposition coalition to remain united. Media outlets are levied increasingly heavy fines, and one of the infractions is coverage of Otpor activity. 100,000 people mass in Belgrade to demand early elections to depose Milosevic, and the two primary opposition leaders appear together for the first time since 1997. May, 2000: On 2 may, Marko Milosevic beats up Otpor-activists, Radojko Lukovic, Nebojsa Sokolovic and MomciloVeljkovic. As a response, Otpor launches campaign ‘This is the Face of Serbia.’ With the government on the offensive, 18 Serb political parties unite to form a coalition, the "Democratic Opposition of Serbia," or DOS. Tensions mount with the assassination of a Milosevic ally on May 13. The government blames the killing on the opposition and Otpor. That same day Otpor organizes a surrender action, turning their membership lists over to police

35 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM throughout the country. The government accelerates its repression, arresting activists and taking off the air two independent television and radio stations. 20,000 people demonstrate for days. Otpor attempts to register as a political organization, citing opposition incompetence; the application is rejected. On May 27 the opposition parties come together for a rally, and on May 29 the government issues a statement blaming all unrest on pressures from international media outlets under NATO control and the activities of an internal fifth column.168 June 29, 2000: Regime outlaws Otpor as a terrorist organisation. July, 2000: On July 17 Otpor members hold a demonstration to dramatize high food prices and enact a parody of official government news. Milosevic, having pushed through Parliament a constitutional amendment that will allow him two more terms as President, announces early elections scheduled for September 24. Otpor launches the campaign ‘He’s Finished’ (Gotov je) on 27 July. August, 2000: Election campaign ‘It’s Time’ (Vreme je) announced. As elections approach, On August 8, Milosevic's birthday, Otpor displays giant satirical birthday cards in town squares throughout Serbia. September, 2000: Otpor headquarters are raided and materials seized. On September 8, Otpor-activists in Vladicin Han are arrested and tortured by police. In an atmosphere of state-ordered vilification of the opposition, the elections are held on September 24. More than 30,000 volunteers monitor some 10,000 polling places to prevent fraud. By the close of the day the monitors announce that Milosevic has been defeated by a substantial margin. The new President is the DOS candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, a scholar and lawyer untainted by Serbian political corruption. Milosevic, claiming that neither he nor Kostunica received a majority of the votes, calls for a run-off election. The opposition

168 Internal fifth column was an expression often used by Milosevic and his propaganda apparatus, which characterized his enemies as traitors, NATO traitors, enemies of the state paid by NATO, etc. 36

calls for a general strike to force Milosevic to honour the popular vote. October, 2000: Beginning with a coal miners' strike, sector after sector of the country grinds to a halt. Protestors block streets with barricades and their bodies. When Milosevic sends soldiers to break the strike tens of thousands of citizens turn out. By October 5 the country has come to a virtual standstill. Hundreds of thousands of protestors pour peacefully into Belgrade. The police, with a few exceptions, acknowledge their orders but refuse to obey them. By the end of the day the protestors control the parliament building and the state-run television and radio stations. European leaders call for Milosevic to step down. On October 6, Milosevic acknowledges defeat, and the head of the Army congratulates Kostunica on his victory.

37 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM Appendix III: Map of Serbia

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Appendix IV: List of Gene Sharp’s methods of nonviolent action used by Otpor169 The Methods of Nonviolent Protest and Persuasion Formal statements 1. Public speeches 2. Letters of opposition or support Communications with a wider audience 7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols 8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications 9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books 11. Records, radio, and television Group representations 16. Picketing Symbolic public acts 18. Display of flags and symbolic colours 19. Wearing of symbols 21. Delivering symbolic objects 25. Displays of portraits 26. Paint as protest Pressures on individuals 31. “Haunting” officials 33. Fraternization Drama and music 35. Humorous skits and pranks 36. Performance of plays and music Processions 38. Marches 39. Parades Public assemblies 47. Assemblies of protest or support 48. Protest meetings

169 This list of Otpor's nonviolent methods is distilled from the following sources: Arrow (2011), How to Start a Revolution, Kurtz (2010), Otpor and the Struggle for Democracy in Serbia (1998-2000), Rennebohm (2011), Serbians overthrow Milosevic (Bulldozer Revolution 2000), Sharp (2012), pp. 124-135, York and Ackerman (2002), Bringing Down a Dictator. 39 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM The Methods of Social Noncooperation Noncooperation with social events, customs, and institutions 62. Student strike The Methods of Economic Noncooperation (1) ECONOMIC BOYCOTS Action by workers and producers 78. Workmen’s boycott 79. Producers’ boycott (2) THE STRIKE Symbolic strikes 97. Protest strike Strikes by special groups 103. Craft strike 104. Professional strike Ordinary industrial strikes 105. Establishment strike 106. Industry strike Restricted strikes 115. Selective strike Multi-industry strikes 116. Generalized strike 117. General strike The Methods of Political Noncooperation Rejection of authority 120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance 121. Refusal of public support 122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance Citizens’ noncooperation with government 129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents Citizens’ alternatives to obedience 135. Popular nonobedience 141. Civil disobedience of “illegitimate” laws Action by government personnel 142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides

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145. General administrative noncooperation 147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents The Methods of Nonviolent Intervention Psychological intervention 161. Nonviolent harassment Physical intervention 162. Sit-in 163. Stand-in 164. Ride-in 168. Nonviolent raids 169. Nonviolent air raids 170. Nonviolent invasion 173. Nonviolent occupation Social intervention 174. Establishing new social patterns 178. Guerrilla theatre 179. Alternative social institutions Economic intervention 184. Defiance of blockades Political intervention 195. Seeking imprisonment 196. Civil disobedience of “neutral” laws

41 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM Appendix V: The key points of Otpor’s strategy According to Popovic, Otpor’s strategy to undermine the authority of Milosevic can be explained through the following key points.170 The first key point is that the movement opted for offence, making the regime of Milosevic respond to its provocations, and being ‘one step ahead’ all the time. As Otpor grew, the offensive was also taken towards potential allies: domestically, by pressing the fragmentised political opposition and civil society to unite against the Milosevic-regime, and internationally, by cultivating external support from anti- Milosevic forces. Furthermore, Otpor understood the concept of ‘power in numbers’.171 The movement successfully mobilised and recruited students and the Serbian youth, gaining in numbers from the very beginning.172 The numbers of Otpor constantly grew by using an ‘act, recruit and train model’, which enabled the constant engagement of newly recruited activist. The third key point is that Otpor developed a superior communication strategy. The movement defined four crucial target audiences within Serbia, which included members and supporters of Otpor, the Serbian population, potential allies within the political opposition and civil society, and the international community. The fourth key point in the strategy of Otpor was the creation of the perception of a successful social movement. Otpor only organised campaigns and protest which had the potential of being successful. The organisation adopted selective resistance, in which they identified specific limited issues or grievances that symbolized the oppression of Milosevic.173 The fifth key point in the strategy of Otpor was the investing in the skills and knowledge of activists. Furthermore, Otpor managed to persuade the police and the army to no longer supported Milosevic. The last key point in the strategy was that Otpor was making the oppression backfire. From the very beginning, Otpor was preparing for the upcoming repression and managed to deal with it in an adequate way. Carefully crafted motivating messages, as well as the use of humour helped in maintaining high morale of both membership and the Serbian population.174

170 The key points are: 1) taking an offensive approach; 2) understanding the concept ‘power in numbers’; 3) developing a superior communication strategy; 4) creating the perception of a successful movement; 5) investing in the skills and knowledge of activists; 6) inducing security force defections; and 7) making oppression backfire. See Popovic, interview with Manea (2012), Nonviolent Struggle as Asymmetric Warfare: Interview with Popovic. 171 Popovic et al. (2006), p. 98. 172 Other social groups were targeted as well at the end of the 1990s. The spectrum of their supporters became wide in this period. They mobilized from everywhere on the social scale including radicals, right and left wing orientated population, feminists, nationalists, workers, peasants, intellectuals, students, monarchists and republicans. See Nenadic and Belcevic (2006), pp. 10-11. 173 Sharp (2012), p. 93. 174 Popovic, interview with Manea (2012), Nonviolent Struggle as Asymmetric Warfare: Interview with Popovic. 42

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43 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM Mvros (2008). The Rise and Disappearance of Otpor: Nonviolent Movement. Champaign- Urbana: Illinois State University. Nenadic, D. and Belcevic, N. (2006). From Social Movement to Political Organisation: The case of Otpor. Coventry: Centre For Peace and Reconciliation Studies. Nikolayenko, O. (2009). ‘Youth Movements in Post-Communist Societies: A Model of Nonviolent Resistance’ in CDDRL Working Papers, pp. 1-48. Nikolayenko, O. (2012). ‘Origins of the Movement’s Strategy: The case of the Serbian Youth Movement Otpor’ in International Political Science Review 1(19), pp. 1-19. Paulson, J. (2005). ‘Removing the dictator in Serbia – 1996-2000’ in Gene Sharp (Eds), Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential. (pp. 315-39). Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers. Paulson, J. (2011). ‘Case Study: Serbia, 1996-2000’ in Gene Sharp (Eds), Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts (pp. 10-33). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Popovic, S., Djinovic, S. and Milivojević, A. (2006). Nonviolent Struggle - 50 Crucial Point: A Strategic Approac to Everyday Tactics. Belgrade: Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies. Popovic, S., Djinovic, S., Milivojević, A., Merriman, H. and Marovic, I. (2007). CANVAS Core Curriculum: A guide to effective nonviolent struggle. Belgrade: Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies. Roberts, A. (2011). ‘Introduction’ in Roberts, A. and Garton Ash, T. (Eds), Civil Resistance and Power Politics. The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present (pp. 2-24). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sharp, G. (1973). The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher. Sharp, G. (2003). There Are Realistic Alternatives. Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution. Sharp, G. (2005). Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential. Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher. Sharp, G. (2012). From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation. Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution. Smiljanic, Z. and Mahony, L. (2003). Plan B: Using Secondary Protests to Undermine Repression. Minneapolis: New Tactics in Human Rights Project. Sombutpoonsiri, J. (2012). The Use of Humour as a Vehicle for Nonviolent Struggle: Serbia’s 1996-7 Protests and the Otpor (Resistance) Movement. Master’s thesis, Queensland University.

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Newspaper articles BBC (2000). Analysis: Otpor's challenge to Milosevic (Last accessed on 14 November 2012: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/749469.stm). Cohen, R. (2000). ‘Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?’ in New York Times Sunday Magazine. (Last accessed on 26 November 2012: http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/26/magazine/who-really-brought-down- milosevic.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm).

Interviews Andric, I., interview with York, S. (2000). In His Own Words: Ivan Andric. (Last accessed on 18 January 2012: http://aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/story/Otpor/ivan-andric.php). Helvey, R., interview with York, S. (2000). In His Own Words: Retired U.S. Army Colonel Robert Helvey. (Last accessed on 18 January 2012: http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/story/otpor/robert-helvey.php). Lazendic, S., interview with York, S. (2000). In His Own Words: Stanko Lazendic. (Last accessed on 18 January 2012: http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/story/otpor/stanko-lazendic.php). Marovic, I., interview with Bjelovuk, M. (2000). ‘If Necessary, We Shall Join the Socialist Party of Serbia’ in Glas Javnosti, Belgrade, FR Yugoslavia, May 31 2000. (Last accessed on 11 January 2012: http://www.ex-yupress.com/glas/glas18.html). Marovic, I., interview with Stefanovic, N. L. (2000). ‘What is Otpor? Fist in the Eye of Regime’ in Vreme, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, May 13 2000. (Last accessed on 26 November 2012: http://ex-yupress.com/vreme/vreme72.html). Marovic, I., interview with Tavanaa (2010). Interview with Ivan Marovic. (Last accessed on 26 November 2012: www.tavaana.org/videodetail.jsp?videoitemid=2071502000341267132512297&clipnu m=1). Milivojevic, S., interview with York, S. (2000). In His Own Words: Srdjan Milivojevic. (Last accessed on 18 January 2012: http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/story/otpor/srdjan-milivojevic.php). Popovic, S, interview with York, S. (2000). In His Own Words: Srdja Popovic. (Last accessed on 18 January 2012: http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/story/otpor/srdja- popovic.php). Popovic, S. (2011). ‘A Bad Year for Bad Guys’ in The talk at the Technology, Entertainment, Design Conference (TED). (Last accessed on 20 January 2012: 45 UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM http://www.ted.com/talks/srdja_popovic_how_to_topple_a_dictator.html). Popovic, S., interview with Farrel, B. and Stoner, E. (2010). How We Brought Down a Dictator. 10 years later: A conversation with Srdja Popovic, a leader in the nonviolent overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic. (Last accessed on 20 January 2012: http://www.yesmagazine.org/peace-justice/how-we-brought-down-a-dictator). Popovic, S., interview with Manea, O. (2011). Nonviolent Struggle as Asymmetric Warfare: Interview with Srdja Popovic. (Last accessed on 26 December 2012: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/nonviolent-struggle-as-asymmetric-warfare- interview-with-srdja-popovic). Popovic, S., interview with Spencer, M. (2010). Interview with Srdja Popović (Otpor leader). (Last accessed on 26 November 2012: http://russianpeaceanddemocracy.com/srdja- popovic-2010). Sharp, G., interview with Mamorsky, J. (2003), Scholar Promotes Alternatives To War. (Last accessed on 18 January 2012: http://www.aeinstein.org/Teenspeak.pdf) Sharp, G., interview with York, S. (2000). In His Own Words: Gene Sharp. (Last accessed on 18 January 2012: http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/story/otpor/gene-sharp.php).

Films and documentary films A Force More Powerful. DVD. Directed by Jack Duvall and Peter Ackerman. The United States: York Zimmerman Inc., (1999). Bringing Down a Dictator. DVD. Directed by Steve York and Peter Ackerman. The United States: York Zimmerman Inc., (2001). How to Start a Revolution. DVD. Directed by Ruaridh Arrow. United Kingdon: TVF International, (2011).

Internet sources A Force More Powerful (2012). Bringing Down A Dictator. (Last accessed on 14 November 2012: http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/index.php). Bij de Weg, H. (2012). Nonviolent Resistance and Repressive Regimes. (Last accessed on 26 January 2012: http://home.kpn.nl/wegweeda/Nonviolence.htm). Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (2012). 10 Years Smarter? (Last accessed on 14 November 2012: http://www.newtactics.org/sites/newtactics.org/files/OTPOR%20Campaigns%20meanin g%20and%20concept.pdf). 46

Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (2012). Otpor Resistance Movement. (Last accessed on 13 November 2012: http://www.canvasopedia.org/legacy/content/serbian_case/otpor.htm#). Kurtz, L.R. (2010). Otpor and the Struggle for Democracy in Serbia (1998-2000). (Last accessed on 13 November 2012: http://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/index.php/movements-and-campaigns/movements- and-campaigns-summaries?sobi2Task=sobi2Details&catid=33&sobi2Id=16). Marksberry, B. (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism in Milosevic’s Serbia. (Last accessed on 25 January 2012: http://www.geostrategicforecasting.com/competitive-authoritarianism- in-milosevics-serbia/). Mvros, D. (2010). The Rise and Disappearance of Otpor: Nonviolent Movement. (Last accessed on 13 November 2012: http://pol.illinoisstate.edu/current/conferences/documents/mrvos.doc). Popovic, S. (2001). An Analytical Overview of the Application of Gene Sharp’s Theory of Nonviolent Action In Milosevic’s Serbia. (Last accessed on 14 November 2012: http://nonviolentaction.net/?p=70). Protection Gateway (2012). Syria and the Question of Nonviolent Resistance. (Last accessed on 29 January 2012: http://protectiongateway.com/2012/09/25/syria-and-the-question- of-non-violent-resistance/). Rennebohm, M. (2011). ‘Serbians overthrow Milosevic (Bulldozer Revolution 2000)’ in Global Nonviolent Action Database. (Last accessed on 9 December 2012: http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/serbians-overthrow-milosevic-bulldozer- revolution-2000).

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