ALL I WANT IS EQUALITY WITH GIRLS: GENDER AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GULF By Sean Foley*

This article explains how women in the Gulf states have harnessed political and socioeconomic changes over the last decade to alter their standing at home and abroad. It argues that Gulf women have benefited from investments made by Gulf governments in higher education since the 1970s, the war on terrorism, the ever higher costs of employing expatriate workers, and the inability of their male colleagues to fill either skilled or unskilled positions. It also argues that the position of women today is consistent with their position historically in Gulf society, and that questions of gender are not limited to women.

INTRODUCTION Olayan did not wear the full hijab (head- scarf) and covering traditionally worn by In January 2004, Lubna Olayan stepped up women in in public settings. Pic- to the lectern to deliver a speech to the Jeddah tures of her and other businesswomen, many Economic Summit. She was a natural choice of whom wore no veils and freely interacted to be the first woman to address the forum in with men in public, appeared on the front pag- the Saudi port city because she headed one of es of Saudi newspapers. Olayan and her col- Saudi Arabia’s best-known conglomerates, the leagues had broken social taboos and chal- Olayan Financing Group. Lubna was a daugh- lenged the authority of Saudi religious elites. ter of Sulayman Olayan, who had risen from It is not surprising that the reaction of these humble circumstances to become one of Saudi elites was one of profound shock and anger. Arabia’s most successful businessmen. Yet the The highest religious figure in the kingdom, organizers of the conference might have re- Grand Mufti Shaykh Abd a-l Aziz bin Abdul- thought their decision to let her speak had they lah al-Shaykh, immediately released a state- known what she would say and the controver- ment in which he condemned the summit, es- sy it would spawn. Throughout her speech, pecially the public mixing of men and women. entitled “A Saudi Vision for Growth,” Olayan He argued that such behavior was the “root” outlined a vision of a Saudi Arabia that was at of every evil and catastrophe, along with the odds with what the kingdom’s religious elites sins of decadence and adultery. He also ex- sought (and still seek) to project to the outside pressed his bewilderment and sorrow that world. For nearly twenty years, they had rigid- “such shameful behavior” could have ever ly enforced social norms that aimed to exclude taken place in Saudi Arabia. Although he did women from virtually all public settings and to not mention Olayan or the conference orga- create a workforce that was overwhelmingly nizers by name, he nonetheless made it clear male, even if that meant importing thousands that he felt that they should be reprimanded. of expatriate workers. Instead, Olayan argued The mixing of men and women, he said, “is that any Saudi, “irrespective of gender,” who highly punishable” and “prohibited for all.” 2 was serious about working should have the These were not idle threats. Fourteen years opportunity to “find a job in the field for earlier, in November 1990, the government which he or she is best qualified.” 1 The reac- delivered swift retribution against 45 elite tion of the audience, which was composed of educated women who deliberately dismissed Saudi and foreign men and women, was en- their drivers and drove through the streets of thusiastic and electric. Riyadh—an act that at the time was legal un-

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 2010) 21 Sean Foley der Saudi law but frowned upon by the reli- To understand contemporary Gulf society gious establishment. The government imme- and the gender relations that will shape it in diately dismissed the women from their jobs, the future, one must start in the period before confiscated their passports, and sought to the 1930s. During that time, women, like men, shame them and their families by labeling lived in very poor societies, in which pearling them infidels. Some were even forced into ex- was the chief means of livelihood. Within that ile. It took years for the 45 women to regain milieu, the tribal, clan, or socioeconomic sta- their rights and privileges in Saudi life. To tus of the women’s husbands or male relatives make clear how seriously the government had defined their freedoms and horizons. Women taken the act, it formally outlawed women had limited social freedoms everywhere in the from driving in the kingdom. Those women Gulf. They could not choose their husbands who contemplated driving would now face the and were generally expected to wear the veil wrath of both the state and the religious au- and the long cloak ( abaya ). Significantly, the thorities. 3 use of the veil in coastal communities reflect- Because Olayan had violated social taboos ed the presence of Iranian and South Asian and challenged religious elites in the same merchants, both of whom saw the veil as a way as the 45 female drivers, one would have symbol of female decency and propriety. 4 expected the grand mufti’s words to bring a (Veiling was far less common in rural and swift retribution against her. Quite the oppo- other areas of the Gulf, where these groups did site occurred: the Saudi government did not not exist in large numbers.) Male relatives had take action against Olayan, who has continued considerable power over women and were al- to this day to advocate for women’s rights and lowed to use capital punishment if one suffi- to appear at home and abroad without the tra- ciently dishonored her family. 5 Dowries were ditional Saudi covering and hijab. modest and it was not unheard of for families This article seeks to explain how Ms. to limit women’s inheritances, thereby violat- Olayan and other women in the Arab Gulf ing a chief tenet of Islamic law. states have harnessed political, economic, and Yet the wives of wholesale or retail mer- social changes since 2000 to alter their stand- chants from the Iranian side of the Gulf, where ing at home and abroad. It contends that wom- social mores regarding gender were more re- en are well-positioned to take advantage of laxed, did not face the same social restrictions these changes, owing to their advanced educa- and often received some education. The wives tions, the ever-higher social and financial costs of pearl divers, fishermen, grocers, black- of employing expatriate workers, and the ina- smiths, carpenters, and other skilled traders bility of their male colleagues to fill either had even more freedom. From Unayzah in the skilled or unskilled positions. It also argues Najd to Dubai in the Trucial Coast, women that questions of gender are not limited to bought and sold a host of products with men women . Just as women are expected to dress and women. 6 The central role of women in the and act according to established social norms Gulf economy is well-illustrated by the public and obligations, men are also expected to ad- reaction to a decision by the Dubai legislative here to social expectations. It is ironic that as council in 1931 to ban women from selling women gain a greater role in Gulf life in com- fish. 7 Much to the surprise of the legislators, ing years, they will attain a position that will male fishermen, who presumably would have be closer to that of their grandmothers and benefited the most from the new law, called great-grandmothers in the 1920s than to that of for it to be repealed. Male fishermen argued their mothers in the 1970s and 1980s. that they could not simultaneously catch fish and sell their goods in markets—a clear indi- MEN AND WOMEN IN THE GULF BE- cation of the importance of women in the local FORE 1970 economic life. The law was repealed, but as Fatima al-Sayegh notes, the fishermen’s pro- tests had little to do with time and everything

22 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 2010) All I Want Is Equality with Girls: Gender and Social Change in the Twenty-First Century Gulf to do with money, because women could sell tice Zar and other similar traditions were se- fish at far higher prices than their male col- verely curtailed, and the abaya emerged as the leagues. 8 They simply had a better understand- national Saudi female equivalent of the thob .14 ing of the market than did their husbands. Besides the sheer size of Saudi Arabia vis- Since fishermen would want to strive to get à-vis its neighbors, a significant factor in the the best price for their fish, they understood kingdom’s ability to shape the culture and pol- that the best people for the job were their itics of peoples beyond its borders was the women. discovery of massive oil deposits in the 1930s. Throughout the Gulf, women also worked This discovery brought wealth into the king- as seamstresses, shop keepers, and Koranic dom, especially after the international price of instructors. There had been schools and tutors, oil quadrupled in 1973. Flush with unprece- known as mutuwah, for both boys and girls in dented revenues, the Saudi state came to do- Gulf communities since the 1890s,9 while minate the socioeconomic and political struc- daughters of merchants in the Hijaz studied in tures of the kingdom as never before via infra- elite British schools in . 10 Older women structure projects, direct cash payments, and were midwives, folk healers, or senior practi- social services. As large oil deposits were dis- tioners of Zar, a religious tradition akin to covered in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia’s neighbors voodoo. By contrast, rural women worked in from Kuwait to Oman adopted very similar agriculture and animal husbandry. Bedouin development strategies. women often wove clothing and produced small-scale craft goods. Many of them were AN ISLAMIC FACADE the chief commercial agents for their tribes or managed tribal or family life for extended pe- For men and women of the Gulf, the events riods. 11 Some women, such as Dubai’s Shayk- of the 1970s marked a transition as important ha Husa, wielded political power, owned land, as the disappearance of the pearling industry were leading merchants, and hosted their own decades earlier. Gulf states invested the weekly majleses (councils in which politicians proceeds from their newfound wealth in infra- field requests from ordinary citizens). 12 structure, including education, and sought to The collapse of the Gulf’s pearl industry build robust modern economies. Gulf women and the rise of Saudi Arabia in the 1930s and men lived in cities and steadily gained transformed the position of many women (and access to every level of education. Women, for men) for the worse. Almost overnight, a chief the first time, began to surpass men in school source of foreign exchange dried up, export enrollment, literacy, and even educational earnings plummeted, boats were laid ashore, achievement. Yet they were also encouraged and divers returned home permanently. Within to have large families in order to swell the in- this environment, many individuals lost their digenous workforce—which was still tiny, savings, investments, businesses, and social compared to the expatriate workforces from status. Following the establishment of Saudi Europe and Asia that were transforming the Arabia in 1932, the elites of the newly formed Gulf states into modern societies.15 kingdom sought to eliminate ethnic differenc- These new policies reflected the desire of es in their new state by imposing strict social, Gulf governments to check the ability of so- religious, and sartorial regimes on men and cialist, Marxist, religious, and Arab national- women. Saudi Arabia’s first king, Abd al-Aziz ists from influencing the indigenous national al-Saud, decreed in 1932 that all Saudi men populations and to appeal to Islamic groups.16 serving in government must wear the Najdi Islamist groups had gained influence in Gulf Bedouin thob or dishdasha (a full-length, societies after Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 usually white, garment), which is the attire Arab-Israeli war, and the events of the 1979 still seen widely in the kingdom today. 13 Old Islamic Revolution in Iran, where the Shah’s regional and more colorful male dress disap- secular government could not check a mass peared. Over time, women’s freedoms to prac- popular movement headed by a Muslim cleric,

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Ayatollah Khomeini. The seizure of the Grand companied by a male guardian to travel any- Mosque in Mecca in November 1979 and the where. 19 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a month later Now confined to both private and gender- reinforced the position of Islamic groups in specific places, women focused on what the Gulf society. By 1980, many Sunni Gulf state saw as their two primary tasks: having Arabs had come to believe that their fellow very large families and helping to educate Muslims were under assault and that Islam Saudis to replace foreign workers. Because offered the best hope to address the challenges salaries in the Gulf were far higher than those of late-twentieth-century life in the Gulf and in , Pakistan, the Philippines, and the the rest of the Islamic world. other states that provided expatriate labor to No state in the Gulf was more acutely the kingdom, Riyadh could easily keep those aware of these trends than Saudi Arabia. At foreigners until its own population had pro- the heart of the Saudi program in the 1970s duced enough educated technicians to run the was a vision of a society that was technologi- kingdom’s modern society on their own. cally advanced but that rigidly upheld con- These changes in Saudi Arabia were espe- servative Islamic values. This vision was cially important because they coincided with without precedent in either Saudi history in the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council particular or in Islamic history in general. A (GCC) in 1981—an alliance of six Arab Gulf critical benchmark for the success of this new states: , Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi society was the absence of women in public Arabia, and the . This settings. Banning women from public places new organization, based in Riyadh, helped to allowed the government to provide tangible create a new pan-Gulf social identity modeled proof that it was addressing the concerns of on the social mores of the council’s largest many conservative Saudis. To reinforce its member state, Saudi Arabia. Personal status commitment to these values, the Saudi gov- laws in various Gulf states began to mirror ernment gave wide latitude to the religious those of Saudi Arabia. Expatriate laborers police to enforce Muslim morality regarding dominated the economies of other GCC women in all public settings. 17 states—just as they did in Saudi Arabia. Under this new arrangement, once gender- Moreover, the tensions from the Iran- war integrated institutions, such as buses, offices, in the 1980s, which pitted an Arab-Sunni gov- and recreational areas, were rigidly segre- ernment in Baghdad against a revolutionary gated. A whole set of parallel buildings and Shi’a government in Tehran, further intensi- sections of communities arose just for women. fied conservative Sunni sensibilities through- Pictures of Western women in newspapers and out the Gulf. Many GCC states supported Iraq other publications, as well as on public signs, and used the war as an excuse to tighten con- were edited to conform to Islamic norms. In trols over their Shi’a populations. 1982, the Saudi government curtailed oppor- The example of Bahrain is instructive. tunities for single Saudi women to study Starting in the 1950s, Bahrainis of all ages be- abroad. 18 The Saudi state also rigidly enforced gan to wear Western clothing, and Bahraini the mahram regulation, by which women men, as a Christian missionary noted at the could not travel abroad without a close male time, “left the Arab gown” for “foreign relative. A royal decree in 1985 forbade wom- clothes.” 20 However, when Bahrain joined the en from working in all sectors of the economy GCC in 1981, Bahraini men switched back, outside of education and health. Nor could adopting the thobs worn by their fathers and women manage businesses even if they owned grandfathers. It was now important for Ba- them. In such cases, they had to prove that hrainis to look a certain way and to signal that they had a male guardian or administrator. In they had joined the community of Gulf addition, the Saudi ulama issued a fatwa an- Arabs. 21 nouncing that a Saudi woman had to be ac- Bahraini women were no exception to this trend. In the early 1980s, close to 95 percent

24 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 2010) All I Want Is Equality with Girls: Gender and Social Change in the Twenty-First Century Gulf of the female students at Bahrain’s National These insights take on greater importance University wore the veil, and those who chose when one bears in mind that Saudi society not to were under constant pressure to do so. 22 looks at marriage as a socioeconomic alliance Bahrain’s government announced in the mid- between families or between tribes. Within 1980s that it would regulate all aspects of this arrangement, brides have substantial say women’s work. Furthermore, the island’s gov- in marriages and wide latitude to reject poten- ernment established a semiofficial policy of tial spouses. Furthermore, when it comes to blocking the hiring and promotion of profes- picking marital partners, families expect sional women, even if they were better quali- young men to defer to the judgment of others fied and had more experience than men or ex- in their family, including their mothers and patriate workers. 23 other female family members. The compara- From the start, the Islamic facade had im- tive weakness of Saudi men of all ages ap- portant and tangible limits. Wealthy Gulf pears in Saudi novelist’s Raja’a al-Sanea’s Arabs of both genders often wore Western- 2006 work, The Girls of Riyadh. Throughout style clothing behind closed doors at home or the novel, the male characters, including the at embassies, and men and women mixed free- most powerful and educated, cannot overcome ly. At the ARAMCO complex in Dhahran, their families’ various objections to their de- Saudi women often worked side by side with sire to marry the Saudi and non-Saudi women Western women (and men) and wore Western- they love. Commenting on the state of Saudi style clothing. Saudi women regularly drove men, one female character notes that they are on the compound as well (although without “passive and weak…just pawns their families licenses), and the Saudi government issued move around the chessboard.” 26 Even in the official driver’s licenses to both male and fe- most conservative of Gulf societies, Saudi male drivers from Western nations. Further- Arabia, Islamic patriarchy clearly can have more, the female drivers on ARAMCO com- limits. 27 pounds were not the only women who drove Other states more directly exposed the lim- in Saudi Arabia: Bedouin women drove trucks its of patriarchy and retained their commit- and other farm equipment. There were so ment to Western notions of equality and fe- many female Bedouin truck drivers in the male education. In Kuwait, for example, Is- 1970s that a Saudi prince, Bandar bin Sultan, lamists discovered that their influence had half jokingly predicted to the Washington Post significant limits in the 1980s, especially in in 1978 that the “spearhead of the Saudi wom- regard to women. An excellent example of this en’s movement will come from the Bedouins occurred in 1986, when Islamist deputies of the desert.”24 sought to establish an authority to enforce Is- The restrictions on unmarried Saudi wom- lamic law in Kuwait, including severe restric- en’s traveling abroad for education arose at the tions on women’s liberties. The government same time that the Saudi government offered responded to this initiative first by indirectly to pay the college tuition of any Saudi wife hindering or ignoring it and then by dissolving who married before she traveled abroad. Such the government. Although Islamists and liber- incentives were meant, in part, to control the al and secular groups often found common behavior of Saudi men abroad by encouraging ground to oppose repeated government efforts them to marry Saudi women instead of fo- to check parliamentary power, the two groups reigners. However, the government would parted ways on many social and political is- never have extended its tuition offer if offi- sues. To divide the opposition, the Kuwaiti cials did not believe that many Saudi men government sometimes forged alliances with wanted to marry educated women,; that many secularists and at other times with Islamists. 28 Saudi women wanted to be educated abroad; and that many Saudi families viewed the high- THE GULF WAR AND THE 1990s er education of their daughters as a viable rea- son for marriage. 25

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In August 1990, Kuwait became the cen- show contrasted correct Islamic behavior with terpiece of a debate regarding women’s rights the infidelity of women who wish to drive in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf when cars. Again and again, the girls sang, “I am a Iraq invaded the tiny Gulf state. In response, Saudi woman, and I don’t drive a car.” 31 the Saudi government invited the United In Kuwait, the picture was quite different. States to deploy military forces to defend the Kuwaiti women’s efforts in the war, both at kingdom and its strategic oil fields. Riyadh home and abroad, were welcomed (at least then expelled nearly 1 million Arab expa- until the war was over). During the occupa- triates from and other countries that tion, Kuwaiti women outside the country mo- supported Iraq and also sought to free up Sau- bilized support against Iraq, and some of them di men for military service. In September of received military training at Fort Dix in the that year, the Saudi government issued an United States alongside their male Kuwaiti edict that encouraged government agencies to colleagues. 32 Women inside Kuwait launched accept female volunteers for social and medi- the first mass public protests against the occu- cal positions. The significance of the edict was pation, some of them paying for their actions reinforced by the presence in Saudi Arabia of with their lives. By the end of the Iraqi occu- female U.S. and Kuwaiti soldiers, many of pation in February 1991, women were such an whom drove their vehicles openly in public. In important aspect of civil society in Kuwait that one widely told story, a member of the Saudi the country earned the nickname “the city- religious police used his stick to taunt a U.S. state of women.” 33 Kuwait’s women had see- female soldier, who had just driven her car to mingly come of age. Many expected that they a store in the kingdom’s Eastern Province. In would achieve full political rights after libera- response, she drew her pistol and forced him tion. to flee for his life. 29 However, as Mary Ann Tétreault has The 1990 edict and the presence of armed pointed out, their hopes were soon dashed. foreign soldiers renewed the public debate Wartime female activism had taken place about the role of women in Saudi life and may within occupied Kuwait but faded from view have prompted one of the most audacious shortly after the war. In the struggle for who challenges ever to the kingdom’s separation of would define the memory of the war between genders: the incident alluded to above, when insiders and outsiders—that is, between those 45 women drove through the streets of who had remained in Kuwait and those who Riyadh. No one in Saudi Arabia had ever seen had fled—the outsiders emerged victorious. In anything quite like that, and the protest gener- particular, Kuwait’s Islamists framed the inva- ated headlines around the world. Iraqi propa- sion and war to fit their own agenda, contend- gandists sought to frame this event, as well as ing that the events signaled God’s displeasure the offer to allow women to volunteer in gov- with the Kuwaitis’ lavish lifestyle. Only by ernment agencies, as proof that the Saudi gov- returning to Islam (including the control of ernment was really an agent of the West and women), they argued, could Kuwaitis guard Israel. against further divine retribution. This argu- For a government already worried about its ment resonated with the people and won gov- Islamic credentials after it had invited tens of ernment support. Consequently, Kuwaiti Is- thousands of U.S. soldiers into the kingdom, lamists performed well in parliamentary elec- the only response was swift retribution. 30 tions in the 1990s, successfully segregated Aside from losing their jobs and being public- Kuwait University by gender, and intimidated ly humiliated, some of these women received professors there who did not share their harassing phone calls accusing them of sexual views. 34 immorality and promoting Western vices and The success of the Islamists in the 1990s goals. The Saudi government then produced a also significantly reflected technological and children’s television show to emphasize the political changes in the Gulf. Among the most point. Set to a chorus of singing children, the important of these changes were the rise of

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Arab satellite news networks, the seemingly diers beating elderly women are juxtaposed permanent deployment of Western military with calls to uphold male Arab-Muslim hon- forces in the region, a steep decline in oil pric- or. 36 es, the rise of opposition groups at home and The second organization, the Committee abroad, and the erosion of the societal benefit for Defense of Legitimate Rights, shared al- from petroleum income due to population Qa’ida’s view of women and their place in growth. All of these factors raised questions society. The CDLR’s founder, Muhammad al- about the ability of governments and societies Mas‘ari, issued a statement in 1996 in which in the region to maintain their values and tra- he argued that granting equal rights to women ditions. Within this transitional environment, violated Islamic law and that his group op- women, like other elements in Gulf society, posed any diminution of laws that governed suddenly found new political and socioeco- women’s Islamic dress or lessened patriarchal nomic opportunities. power. 37 Among the earliest signs of the increasing One of the key factors contributing to the tensions involving women in the Arab Gulf rise of opposition groups throughout the Gulf states were the large antigovernment protests was Arab satellite television, especially al- in Bahrain, where the U.S. military’s presence Jazeera. Not only did unveiled female anchors was especially visible. Starting in 1994, vio- and journalists appear on air, but Shaykh Yu- lent street protests accompanied ever bolder suf al-Qaradawi and other religious scholars religious and political challenges to the mo- used the networks as platforms to present their narchy’s authority. Women from both the views on issues long repressed in the Gulf and Sunni minority and the Shi’a majority actively other parts of the Arab world, including gend- participated in all phases of these protests. er. 38 They formed professional, charitable, and oth- er organizations that forwarded the opposi- SETTING THE AGENDA tion’s agenda and resisted government crack- downs. These women made up a quarter of the These debates had a tangible and imme- 25,000 signatories to a national charter, issued diate impact on Gulf society. In 1999, Crown in October 1994, that outlined the chief de- Prince (later King) Abdullah, asserted that “we mands of the opposition, particularly the resto- will leave no door…closed to women…as ration of democratic institutions on the island. long as it involves no violation of our religion The petition also demanded that women be and ethics.” 39 Hinting at a new future for Sau- integrated into Bahrain’s political life and that di women, Abdullah added, “Issues like driv- the island reduce its dependence on expatriate ing cars by women, and women [obtaining] ID workers. 35 cards are comparatively simple. The most im- Yet the most cogent opposition to the status portant thing is their full participation in the quo in the Gulf came in Saudi Arabia and life of the society.” 40 Two years later, Saudi from a very different direction. Two organiza- women were issued their own identification tions were especially important in this. The cards, so no longer would they be listed as de- first, al-Qa’ida, was composed of former sol- pendents of their male relatives on family diers who had fought in Afghanistan under the cards. The new identification cards for Saudi leadership of Usama bin Ladin, who framed women included pictures of their uncovered his arguments in a Salafi tradition in which faces. 41 In 2006, Saudi information minister women’s social role was to uphold the dignity Iyad Madani encouraged women to apply for of Muslim families. This theme was central to driver’s licenses when he observed that there an al-Qa’ida-produced video that was widely was “nothing in the Saudi legislation that for- distributed in the Middle East shortly before bids Saudi women to apply for a driving li- the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. cense.” 42 The minister’s comments hinted that Throughout the tape, graphic images of sickly urban Saudi women could look forward to children, demolished homes, battles, and sol- driving in much the same way that rural and

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Bedouin Saudi women had driven for years. figures as Oracle’s Larry Ellison and Hewlett- And there was a financial logic to Madani’s Packard’s former chief executive officer argument: women held half of all car loans in (CEO), Carly Fiorina. In Qatar, Kuwait, and the kingdom, but females accounted for only the UAE, women work as police and customs 46 percent of the total population in 2004. 43 officers. 50 In Saudi Arabia, thousands of Other Gulf rulers were even bolder than women serve as security guards in banks, hos- those in Saudi Arabia. In 2002, Bahrain’s emir pitals, and women’s prisons. 51 Kuwaiti, Ba- drafted and helped win passage of a new con- hraini, and Qatari women have been senior stitution, which allowed women, who make up diplomats. For example, in 2008, Bahrain’s 43 percent of the total population, to vote and government appointed a Jewish woman, Hou- run for office in national elections. 44 The per- da Nonoo, as ambassador to the United States. centage of women in the Bahraini legislature’s Nonoo was, in fact, the third woman to be- upper house, or Shura Council, was higher come a Bahraini ambassador, the others being than that of the U.S. Senate by 2010. Qatar Shaykha Haya al-Khalifa to France and Bibi approved a new constitution in late April 2002 Alawi to China. 52 and held elections in 2007 for a Central Mu- Women have also assumed leading roles in nicipal Council, in which all Qataris—men education and other cultural fields in the Gulf. and women—were allowed to vote. 45 In 2003, Several Western-trained female members of Oman’s government extended the franchise to Gulf ruling families have important social, re- all Omanis, regardless of gender. 46 Kuwait ligious, and cultural roles in the Gulf and permitted women to vote in 2006. Since the represent their nations at international forums. election in 2007 in the UAE, nine women have These include Shaykha Moza of Qatar, a been serving in its 40-seat mixed (elected and graduate of Texas A&M University and appointed) Federal Legislature, a percentage Shaykha Latifa, the wife of the former Kuwai- of 22.5 percent, which is slightly lower than ti emir, who heads an official women’s organ- the percentage of females in the UAE’s popu- ization, the Islamic Care Society, and speaks lation (32 percent). 47 frequently at global conferences related to This trend has already had an impact on women. 53 politics in the Gulf. Although Kuwaiti Islam- In business, the presence of women is even ists opposed extending the franchise to wom- more pervasive. Here women have benefited en, their candidates courted female voters dur- from family connections, their own wealth ing the 2006 elections. They provided mate- (Saudi women own much of the real estate in rials geared especially toward women, includ- Jeddah and Riyadh), 54 and a work environ- ing cassette tapes of candidates’ speeches for ment that generally stresses merit and compe- women unwilling to travel to public rallies or tence. Again, Lubna Olayan heads one of Sau- other campaign events. These materials and di Arabia’s largest businesses, the Olayan strategies were critical, given that more than Group. Another Saudi, Nahed Taher, directs 50 percent of the eligible Kuwaiti voters were Bahrain’s Gulf One Investments, which has women. The fact that Islamists polled well in $10 billion in assets. Vidya Chabria oversees elections and have won the support of many the Jumbo Group, a $2 billion Emirati multi- Kuwaiti women bodes well for their continued national company that operates in 50 coun- political success. 48 tries. Raja’a Easa Saleh al-Gurg manages the Since 2003, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, al-Gurg group, an Emirati conglomerate with the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have appointed 29 manufacturing and trading companies and women to cabinet-level positions. 49 Among an annual revenue of $2 billion. Maha al- the most noteworthy of these new ministers is Ghunaim founded Global Investment House, a Lubna al-Qasimi, who founded Tejari.net, a Kuwaiti investment firm with $7 billion of as- successful UAE technology company. She has sets. Shaykha al-Bahar directs the Corporate also regulated Emirati stock markets and has Banking Arm of the National Bank of Kuwait. regularly dined with such leading high-tech Mohsin Haider Darwish holds senior man-

28 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 2010) All I Want Is Equality with Girls: Gender and Social Change in the Twenty-First Century Gulf agement posts in more than half of the ten ma- ties of Gulf governments to the international jor trading houses in Oman. 55 economy, and because of their desire to win Even more impressive has been the ability foreign investment, these governments care of women to transform their prominence into a more than ever about how investors in Lon- type of sociocultural power far more signifi- don, New York, Tokyo, and elsewhere look at cant than either the right to vote or the right to their states. This explains, in part, why Nahed drive. Olayan and her colleagues are increa- Taher was chosen in 2005 to lead a Saudi singly setting the socioeconomic agenda for Arabian trade delegation to the United States their societies, outshining figures who have to obtain more foreign investment in the king- long promoted religious and patriarchal dom. 57 worldviews. Despite the grand mufti’s vocal protests against Olayan’s Jeddah speech (itself ARE WOMEN THE SOLUTION? a sign of his desire to make up for his dimi- nished power), she has continued to promote Because of critical changes in the econo- her ideas at home and abroad, encouraged oth- mies and population dynamics of the Arab er women in her company to promote wom- Gulf states, Taher and other educated women en’s rights, and has been photographed un- are positioned to solve two problems far great- veiled in public settings with men. er than terrorism: expatriate labor and the The power of Olayan and other women re- dearth of qualified indigenous male workers. flects a conscious decision on the part of Gulf Both problems originate in failed policies and decision-makers to form an implicit alliance in changes within the global economy. Despite with educated Gulf women and to reduce the decades of programs promoting male indigen- influence of groups that wish to preserve the ous workers in every sector of the economy, patriarchal structures established in the 1970s such workers have been unable to obtain the and 1980s. Gulf monarchies and their politics skills necessary to compete with expatriate are interconnected sets of communities, feder- workers, who fill as much as 90 percent of the ations, and coalitions that are constantly in workforce in some sectors of the Gulf econo- motion. Although there is little doubt that my. 58 The numbers of expatriate workers rose King Abdullah and other Gulf leaders are sharply in the Gulf in the 2000s, as the re- idealistically committed to promoting equality gion’s economy boomed. The new workers between the genders, the decision to ally with contributed to population growth rates of 3 women also serves the political and socioeco- percent or higher in the UAE, Oman, and Ku- nomic needs of Gulf rulers. wait in the 2000s—growth rates that put Women are a natural political base of sup- enormous pressure on the region’s already li- port for regimes in their ongoing struggle with mited natural resources. 59 By 2008, nine out of violent Islamic opposition groups, many of ten residents in Dubai were foreigners. 60 In- which voice their grievances in patriarchal deed, the presence of the foreign workers has terms, seeking to impose strict controls on led some Gulf Arabs to fear that their culture women. Educated women in particular also may be overrun and eventually disappear from provide the regimes with a more cosmopoli- the region. 61 tan, softer, and less austere vision of the Gulf If these problems were not serious enough, to the outside world. This is not a minor issue expatriates send much of their incomes home for the Gulf states politically or economically. and are increasingly expensive to employ. As Usama bin Ladin is a Saudi, and all but two of the U.S. dollar has depreciated since 2003, the hijackers who perpetrated the September Gulf currencies, which are closely tied to the 11, 2001, terrorist attacks were from the dollar, have declined relative to the value of Gulf. 56 Citizens of Gulf states stand accused of the home currencies of many expatriate work- financing and participating in extremist vi- ers. 62 For the first time, salaries and wages in olence in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and other India and other regions of Asia have been areas around the world. Because of the close competitive with those in the Gulf and forced

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GCC employers to raise wages in order to re- percent in 1995, and up to 22.4 percent in tain foreign workers.63 2004. 72 In 2007, Emirati women became pilots By contrast, indigenous Arab Gulf women for Bahrain-based Gulf Air and other regional offer an alternative solution to employing ex- carriers. 73 By that time, they had become as patriates, especially those with skills. In Ba- much as 60 percent of the employees of the hrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Ku- government workforce in the UAE and Saudi wait, female enrollment in higher education Arabia. 74 In Qatar, it is commonly accepted significantly exceeds that of men, sometimes among middle-class and even elite nationals by as much as 24 percent. 64 Women dominate that it is now an economic necessity for both a variety of disciplines in the liberal arts and spouses to work. 75 Qatari men have also large- journalism, in which they represent as much as ly accepted the fact that they may play the role 90 percent of the students. 65 Female students of junior income earners. 76 Qatar is an impor- work far harder than their male counterparts tant test case because it and Saudi Arabia are and regularly outperform them in secondary the only states in the world in which Wahhab- and postsecondary institutions. In Kuwait, ism is the official interpretation of Islam and women’s success at the college level has been because Qatar is facing many of the same fi- a political issue, with Islamist politicians nancial challenges as Saudi Arabia. An aver- claiming that it is unfair and demoralizing for age middle-class woman in Saudi Arabia will Kuwaiti men to have to compete with female pay nearly half her salary to a male driver (in- students. 66 In Bahrain, female high school stu- variably an expatriate) to get her to and from dents have a long tradition of outperforming work. 77 their male counterparts. In 2007, for example, At the same time, one must bear in mind the girls graduated at a rate of 74.36 percent, that there are significant barriers to women’s compared to only 53.37 percent for the boys. 67 filling the future labor needs of the Gulf states. Nor is this situation likely to change any- Although it is true that women dominate high- time soon. Even though, in 2007, equal num- er education, they are often not earning the bers of girls and boys attended middle school types of technical degrees desired by employ- in Bahrain, 828 girls achieved a score of at ers—that is, in engineering, math, and various least 90 percent on their middle school exams, sciences. In part, this discrepancy reflects a compared to the 263 boys who made the broad preference among Gulf nationals of both mark. 68 The World Bank reported in 2004 genders to earn degrees in the humanities, re- “that for every Qatari man aged 25 and gra- ligion, and social sciences. It is also indicative, duating from university, there are two women however, of the scarcity of technical and voca- graduates of the same age.” 69 In Qatar and tional institutions and instructors for women in other Gulf states, the school dropout rate of several of the Gulf states, especially Saudi males is double that of females. 70 By 2007, the Arabia, where the top jobs desired by employ- literacy rate of women between the ages of 15 ers in 2001 were in medicine and computer and 24 in the Gulf states was consistent with technology. Thus, in 2001, there were nearly that of women in developed nations. 71 This is 50,000 Saudi women looking for work; and in an especially remarkable achievement when 2007, the Saudi government estimated that one remembers that there were no schools for unemployment among Saudi women stood at women in some Gulf states as recently as 37 percent. 78 1970. Even those women who have the right sets The question still remains: Can women of skills and experiences face two additional dominate the professions and even the work- constraints. First, strong cultural and familial ing classes of the Gulf states? In the UAE and pressures for women to remain close to their Qatar, in particular, there are already reasons families can limit their ability to travel to re- to believe this might occur. For example, in gions in which jobs are available or to assume the UAE, women’s share of the labor market positions for which they would otherwise be jumped from just 9.6 percent in 1985 to 13.0 qualified. Second, Gulf employers do not nec-

30 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 2010) All I Want Is Equality with Girls: Gender and Social Change in the Twenty-First Century Gulf essarily perceive indigenous women as work- gerous of terrorists was a drifter: Yusuf al- ers. For instance, when social critics repeated- Ayyeri headed al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Penin- ly warned about the dangers to public morality sula until he died in a shootout with Saudi se- from allowing expatriate males to work in lin- curity forces in 2003. 81 Al-Ayyeri’s successors gerie stores, the Saudi government announced continue to train terrorists, including Umar in April 2006 that it would ban expatriate men Faruk Abd al-Mutallab, who attempted to from working in those stores and that Saudi detonate a bomb on a U.S. jetliner on Decem- women would take their place by June. At that ber 25, 2009. point, nearly 10,000 women applied for the Nor are drifting and a dearth of educational new positions, forcing the Saudi government and work opportunities the only things holding to announce, on June 1, 2006, that it would men back. Many Arab Gulf men, like women, extend the deadline for changing over to fe- face class, ethnic, religious, and familial bar- male workers indefinitely. 79 riers in education, employment, marriage, and sociopolitical freedoms. In some states, Shi’as WHEN MEN ARE THE “GENDER” and expatriates of both genders have substan- PROBLEM tially fewer rights than some Sunni women. Even some Arab Sunni men face barriers that However Saudi Arabia eventually resolves do not hold back indigenous women. A Saudi the question of workers in lingerie stores, it college dropout told the Washington Post in remains clear that many indigenous men can- 2007 that young Saudi men yearn to be equal not play a tangible role addressing the Gulf’s with young Saudi women and many face se- private sector labor needs. Although this is not vere restrictions: “Young men are oppressed a new problem, it has taken on greater social here [in Saudi Arabia]…All I want is equality significance in recent years. With bleak career with girls.” 82 prospects and ample time on their hands, Drifting, especially when linked to other young men (and even some older ones) have dangerous antisocial problems and resent- gravitated toward antisocial behavior, includ- ments of young men, suggests that future ing truancy, petty crime, drug abuse, religious “gender questions” in the Gulf will no longer extremism, and “drifting,” a form of car racing focus exclusively on women, the veil, and oth- in which drivers perform complex and dan- er related issues—as they have for genera- gerous maneuvers at extremely high speeds. tions. Instead, they will revolve around how to Drifters throughout the Gulf post their perfor- integrate young men (including those in their mances on YouTube, where they are celebri- twenties and thirties) into society and make ties who are said to have their pick of young them productive individuals before they en- male sexual partners. Drifting has become so gage in behavior that is dangerous to them- popular that Chevrolet and the energy drink selves and others. Red Bull have begun to sponsor “drifting” Finally, it is significant that the problems of races in Middle Eastern cities. 80 men in Gulf societies are analogous to those Yet the dangers of drifting to Gulf society faced by men in the United States and else- have been clear for many years. In 2005, three where during the current economic downturn. young boys died in Jeddah in the car crash of a A white paper produced by the Georgia De- Saudi naval officer, Faysal al-Utabi—better partment of Labor in July 2009 called for the known as Abu Kab (or the One Who Wears a state radically to alter how it delivers social [Baseball] Cap)—who wrecked his car while services to men, a significant percentage of attempting to perform a stunt-driving maneuv- whom are in grave danger of becoming “struc- er. Abu Kab’s trial caused considerable public turally unemployed.” The report noted that outcry, especially after it was revealed that he men in Georgia and in other parts of the Unit- had more than 60 speeding tickets. There have ed States—much like men in the Arab Gulf been similar deadly accidents in Jeddah and states—lack basic modern skills and lag far other cities in the Gulf. One of the most dan- behind women in educational achievement.

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The report also noted the striking statistic that rated from society, and women will be driving, the percentage of students who are female in whether it’s now or fifty years from now.” 86 Georgia’s universities, colleges, and technical Nor are Samhan’s views radical: polls have institutes is approximately 60 percent, a num- shown that nearly two-thirds of Saudis favor ber that is in line with the percentages in the allowing women to drive and work.87 In to- Gulf. 83 day’s Saudi Arabia, women already drive trac- tors, water tankers, and cars in rural communi- CONCLUSION ties. 88 Nonetheless, not all women support Sam- How women use their growing social pow- han’s vision. Islamic parties in Kuwait have er in the future and engineer social changes for polled well among women, and young Gulf both themselves and their educated and unde- women have yet to abandon the hijab or other reducated male colleagues remains to be seen. traditional symbols of patriarchal power. Olayan and a host of other well-placed profes- There is, of course, precedent for this type of sional women throughout government and conservatism among women in other parts of business advocate a social vision that is con- the world and in the Middle East. Images of sistent in many ways with Western social veiled women holding assault rifles were a norms. In recent years, Olayan has continued powerful propaganda weapon for Ayatollah to link the vision she outlined in Jeddah with a Khomeini in Iran’s Islamic Revolution in call for a society that is less dependent on ex- 1979. patriate workers. She and other educated Gulf It is ironic that women’s place in the Gulf women know that they are the only cost- may evolve into something reminiscent of the effective option to fill the Gulf states’ future nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A needs for skilled and unskilled labor. What is Saudi female activist, Wajeha al-Huwaider, more, Gulf women are in a unique position to argues that the past provides Gulf women with “rebrand” the conservative patriarchal image a possible future social model. “Our parents,” of Gulf states in the world community, to win she said, “had the right of movement; our needed foreign investment, and to forge new grandparents had it too…But we ladies of the political alliances at home and abroad. cities lost the old ways and got nothing in their Gulf governments and Saudi popular cul- place.” 89 In the past, as now, one can find ture have already begun to accommodate women in positions of authority and power. women’s growing socioeconomic and political Women have been successful in commerce, influence, promote their goals, and seek their medicine, education, and government. They support. Saudi Arabia’s first feature-length have also been religious leaders, who received film, Keif al Hal? (How’s It Going?), deals both social and cultural respect for their know- with the desire of some young women to have ledge and power. a career instead of marriage after finishing Future generations of women in the Gulf their education. Throughout much of the film, will most likely live in societies that resemble the lead character, Hind, and other women, those of al-Huwaider’s grandparents and great frequently appear unveiled, and Hind herself grandparents more than they do the Gulf states has multiple scenes in which she is driving— since the 1970s. Women will be integrated with her father’s consent, no less. 84 Hind is into virtually every aspect of public and pri- also educated and works for a Saudi newspa- vate life at home and abroad and will have an per. Tash Ma Tash, one of Saudi Arabia’s increasing say in how their societies are ma- most popular television programs, regularly naged. Once this happens, earlier female expe- shows women driving. 85 In an interview with rience will be reinterpreted and reevaluated. the New York Times, Abdullah Samhan, the American songwriter Cole Porter made a point producer of Tash Ma Tash, explained why fe- that applies strongly to women of the Gulf: “If male characters are so often seen driving in his you want a future, darling, why don’t you get show. “A woman,” he said, “cannot be sepa- a past?” 90

32 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 2010) All I Want Is Equality with Girls: Gender and Social Change in the Twenty-First Century Gulf

* Sean Foley is an Assistant Professor of His- and ed. Deborah Akers and Abubaker Bagader tory at Middle Tennessee State University. He (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2009), p. 35. specializes in the Middle East and religious 10 Phebe Marr, “Girls’ Schools—The Hijaz,” and political trends in the broader Islamic April 8, 1961, William Mulligan Papers, world. Previously, he taught at Georgetown Georgetown University Library Special Col- University, where he earned an M.A. in Arab lections, Box 3, Folder 6. Studies in 2000 and a Ph.D. in History in 11 Abeer Abu Said, Qatari Women: Past and 2005. Foley held Fulbright fellowships in Sy- Present (London: Longman Group Limited, ria and Turkey in 2002 and 2003. He has pub- 1984), pp. 24–25. lished widely on Middle Eastern history, Suf- 12 Raymond O’Shea, The Sand Kings: The Ex- ism, Persian Gulf politics, and Muslims in Eu- periences of an RAF Officer in the Little- ro-American history. His first book, The Arab Known Regions of Trucial Oman, Arabia Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam , will be (London: Methuen and Co., 1947), pp. 62–63. published by Lynne Rienner Press in March 13 Mai Yamani, “Changing the Habits of a 2010. His website is http://website-- Lifetime: The Adaptation of Hejazi Dress to www.seanfoley.org/ . the New Social Order,” in Languages of Dress in the Middle East, ed. Nancy Lindisfarne- NOTES Tapper and Bruce Ingham, pp. 57–58 (Rich- mond, UK: Curzon Press, 1997). 1“Saudi Arabia’s Top Cleric Condemns Calls 14 Eleanor Doumato, Women, Islam, and Heal- for Women’s Rights,” New York Times, Janu- ing in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf (New York: ary 22, 2004. Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 176, 2Robin Gedye, “Unveiled Women Are Root of 182–83. All Evil, Says Saudi Cleric,” Daily Telegraph 15 Ibid. (London), January 22, 2004. 16 Shafeeq N. Ghabra, “Balancing State and 3The women drove for at least an hour before Society: The Islamic Movement in Kuwait,” in they were stopped by the Saudi police. Donna Revolutionaries and Reformers: Contempo- Abu-Nasr, “Stunning Saudi Car Ride Cele- rary Islamist Movements in the Middle East, brated 18 Years Later,” Associated Press, No- ed. Barry Rubin, pp. 106–08 (Binghamton: vember 14, 2008. State University of New York Press, 2003). 4Fatima al-Sayegh, “Women and Economic 17 Eleanor Doumato, “Gender, Monarchy, and Changes in the Gulf: The Case of the United National Identity in Saudi Arabia,” British Arab Emirates,” Domes , Vol. 10, No. 2 Journal of Middle Eastern Studies , Vol. 19, (2001), p. 3. No. 1. (1992), pp. 34–39; Eleanor Doumato, 5Haya al-Mughni, Women in Kuwait: The Pol- “The Saudis and the Gulf War: Gender, Pow- itics of Gender (London: Saqi Books, 2001), er, and Revival of the Religious Right,” in p. 46. Change and Development in the Gulf, ed. Ab- 6For more on these issues in Unayzah, see So- bas Abdelkarim (New York: Palgrave Mac- raya Altorki and Donald P. Cole, Arabian Oa- millan, 1999), pp. 184-210. sis City: The Transformation of 'Unayzah 18 Doumato, “Gender, Monarchy, and National (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989). Identity,” p. 41. 7Al-Sayegh, “Women and Economic 19 Munira Fakhro, “Gulf Women and Islamic Changes,” pp. 5–6. Law,” in Feminism and Islam , Legal and Lite- 8Ibid. rary Perspectives , ed. Mai Yamani (New 9Louay Bahry and Phebe Marr, “Qatari Wom- York: New York University Press, 1996), p. en: A New Generation of Leaders,” Middle 257. East Policy , Vol. 12, No. 2 (2005), pp. 104- 20 Ida Patterson Storm, “Bahrain,” Arabia Call- 05; Ahmad Suba’i, My Days in Mecca , trans. ing , Vol. 244 (Autumn 1956), p. 10.

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21 Bruce Ingham, “Men’s Dress in the Arabian 30 Eleanor Doumato, “Women and the Stability Peninsula: Historical and Present Perspec- of Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Report , Vol. tives,” in Languages of Dress in the Middle 171 (July–August 1991), p. 37. East, ed. Nancy Lindisfarne-Tapper and Bruce 31 Doumato, “Gender, Monarchy, and National Ingham (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1997), Identity in Saudi Arabia,” p. 32. pp. 40-54. 32 Mary Ann Tétreault, “A State of Two 22 May Seikaly, “Women and Religion in Ba- Minds: State Cultures, Women, and Politics in hrain: An Emerging Identity,” in Islam, Gend- Kuwait,” International Journal of Middle East er, and Social Change, ed. Yvonne Haddad Studies , Vol. 33, No. 3 (May 2001), p. 211. and John Esposito (New York: Oxford Uni- 33 Ibid. versity Press, 1997), p. 178. 34 Mary Ann Tétreault, Stories of Democracy: 23 For more on these issues, see Munira Fak- Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait hro, Women at Work in the Gulf: A Case Study (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. of Bahrain (London: Kegan Paul International, 110–31. 1990). 35 Munira A. Fakhro, “The Uprising in Ba- 24 Bandar added that Bedouin women “had hrain: An Assessment,” in The Persian Gulf at started driving trucks” in the desert and em- the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, phasized the seriousness (and veracity) of the Security, and Religion, ed. Gary G. Sick and observation by adding “and I’m not kidding.” Lawrence G. Potter (New York: St. Martin’s Richard Harwood, “Change Is Slow for Saudi Press, 1997), p. 181. Women,” Washington Post, February 12, 36 Sean Foley, “The Naqshbandiyya- 1978. Khalidiyya , Islamic Sainthood, and Religion 25 Eleanor Doumato, “Saudi Arabia: The So- in Modern Times ,” Journal of World History , ciety and Its Environment,” in Saudi Arabia: Vol. 19, No. 4 (December 2008), p. 535. A Country Study , ed. Helen Metz (Washing- 37 Eleanor Doumato, “Women and Work in ton, DC: Library of Congress Federal Re- Saudi Arabia: How Flexible Are Islamic Mar- search Division, 1993), p. 103. gins?” The Middle East Journal , Vol. 53, No. 26 Rajaa al-Sanea, Girls of Riyadh, trans. Rajaa 4 (Autumn 1999), p. 577. al-Sanea and Marilyn Booth (New York: Pen- 38 Sean Foley, “Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, guin Press, 2007), p. 270. and the UAE,” in Guide to Islamist Move- 27 For its part, the Saudi state recognized these ments , ed. Barry Rubin (New York: M. E. limitations and sought to encourage women— Sharpe, 2010), p. 309. at least indirectly. In 1989, it awarded its 39 Hamad bin Hamid al-Salimi, “Where Is the highest award, the King Faisal Award in Is- Saudi Woman?” Al-Jazeera (Riyadh), May 3, lamic Studies, to the Egyptian scholar Shaykh 1999. Muhammad al-Ghazali, who had taken a 40 Ibid. strong stand that year in an article in a Saudi 41 Kathy Sheridan, “They Mean Business: How daily newspaper on allowing women to earn Saudi Women Are Making a Breakthrough,” an education and work. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Irish Times, February 18, 2006. “Saudi Women Quietly Win Some Battles,” 42 Christian Chaise, “Saudi Arabia Discreetly New York Times, April 26, 1989. Presses Ahead with Reform,” Agence France- 28 Ghabra, “Balancing State and Society,” pp. Presse—English, March 1, 2006. 107–08. 43 Donna Abu-Nasser, “Women Can Now Sell 29 Youssef Ibrahim, “Amid Crisis, West Meets Cars in Saudi Arabia, but the Ban on Female Mideast in Saudi Arabia,” New York Times, Driving Remains,” Associated Press, Decem- August 25, 1990, ( Historical New York ber 3, 2006; “Women Received 1,848 Auto Times ), p. 1. Loans,” IPR Strategic Business Information Database, December 26, 2006; “Saudi Wom- en Receive 11% of Total Credit,” Global

34 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 2010) All I Want Is Equality with Girls: Gender and Social Change in the Twenty-First Century Gulf

News Wire—Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 56 The exceptions were Muhammad Atta, who December 26, 2006. was from Egypt, and Ziad al-Jarrah, who was 44 Sean Foley, “The Gulf Arabs and the New from . Iraq: The Most to Gain and the Most to Lose,” 57 “Saudi Arabia: From Banking to Racing,” Middle East Review of International Affairs , Saudi-US Relations Information Service New- Vol. 7, No. 2 (2003), p. 34, http://www.gloria- sletter, February 12–18, 2006. center.org/meria/2003/06/foley.html . 58 There are many examples of this phenome- 45 Ibid. non, but perhaps the most infamous was in 46 Ibid. 1995 in the UAE. During that year, the coun- 47 “Woman Wins Seat in First UAE Poll,” Fi- try’s private sector created 50,000 jobs; just 30 nancial Times Information Limited , December were taken by Emirati nationals. Gary Sick, 17, 2006; “Chosen People of the UAE,” Fi- “The Coming Crisis,” in The Persian Gulf at nancial Times Information Limited , October the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, 23, 2007. Security, and Religion , ed. Gary Sick and 48 For more on this issue, see Foley, “Kuwait, Lawrence Potter (New York: St. Martin’s Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE,” p. 308. Press, 1997), p. 18. 49 Sobhi Rakha, “New Woman Minister Cracks 59 “Kuwait’s Population Reaches 3.4 million,” Saudi Glass Ceiling,” Agence France-Presse— Agence France-Presse—English, March 30, English, February 15, 2009. 2008; “Kuwait Population to Reach 5.63 Mil- 50 Bahry and Marr, “Qatari Women: A New lion by 2030,” Middle East Financial News Generation of Leaders,” p. 110. Wire, February 6, 2008; Central Intelligence 51 “Saudi Women Brave Stares to Carve a Agency, World Fact Book , “Kuwait,” Niche,” Financial Times Information Limited , “Oman,” and “UAE” (available at April 17, 2007. https://www.cia.gov/ ). 52 “Bahrain Names Jewish Woman as Ambas- 60 Robert Worth, “Laid-Off Foreigners Flee as sador to US,” Agence France-Presse— Dubai Spirals Downward,” New York Times, English, June 8, 2008. February 11, 2009. 53 Al-Mughni, Women in Kuwait, pp. 104–11, 61 Jamal al-Suwaidi, who directs the Center for 164–65. Emirates Studies, a top GCC policy institution 54 John Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the in Abu Dhabi, articulated this angst in a series Name of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University of articles published in the UAE media from Press, 2002), p. 130. 2006 to 2008. His views are worth noting be- 55 Information taken from the following cause he is a leading Emirati academic and sources: Greg Levine and Zina Moukheiber, adviser to Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, Shaykh “Al-Olayan Leads Forbes’ Top Arab Busi- Muhammad bin Zayid al-Nahyan. In 2006, he nesswomen List,” Forbes Magazine, March noted in al-Itihad, a major daily in the 28, 2006; Elizabeth MacDonald and Meghan UAE, that he and his fellow Emiratis no long- Bahree, “The World’s Most Powerful Women: er existed socially or politically. “Our coun- Muslim Women In Charge,” Forbes Maga- try,” he lamented, is now “filled with various zine, August 30, 2007; Elizabeth MacDonald nationalities to such an extent that there is no and Chana R. Schoenberger, “Special Report: longer any place left for us.” Although al- The 100 Most Powerful Women,” Forbes Suwaidi failed to define what the conse- Magazine, August 30, 2007; Elizabeth Mac- quences of this situation might be, he implied Donald and Chana R. Schoenberger, “The 100 that indigenous Emirati culture might soon Most Powerful Women,” Forbes Magazine, vanish in a society comprising people who are August 31, 2006; Hassna’a Mokhtar, “Wom- neither Arabs nor Sunni Muslims. The minis- en’s Empowerment a Must,” Arab News, ter of labor of Bahrain, Majid al-Alawi, March 20, 2007; “Special Issue: The Time echoed al-Suwaidi’s words in 2008, observing 100,” Time, April 10, 2005. that the presence of 17 million South Asians

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 2010) 35 Sean Foley

and other foreigners was “a danger worse than 76 Ibid., p. 109. the atomic bomb or an Israeli attack” to the 77 Hassan Fattah, “Saudis Rethink Taboo future of the Gulf. Abdullah Khalaq, “UAE’s About Women Behind the Wheel,” New York Demographic Imbalance,” Gulf News, April Times, September 28, 2007. 14, 2007; “Bahrain Labour Minister Warns of 78 For more on employment issues, see John R. Asian Tsunami,” Agence France-Presse— Calvert and Abdullah S. al-Shetaiwi, “Explor- English, January 27, 2008. The al-Itihad ar- ing the Mismatch Between Skills and Jobs for ticle is cited in Abdelbari Atwan, “The Gulf’s Women in Saudi Arabia in Technical and Vo- Momentous Challenges,” Mideast Mirror, cational Areas: The Views of Saudi Arabian May 11, 2006. Private Sector Business Managers,” Interna- 62 “Value of Indian Workers’ Wages in Gulf tional Journal of Training and Development , May Fall Further,” Indo-Asian News Service , Vol. 6, No. 2 (2002), pp. 112–24; “Saudi Ara- April 2, 2008. bia: Fewer Women Employed in Private Sec- 63 Habib Toumi, “Bahrain Minister Pushes for tor,” Financial Times Information Limited , New Law,” Gulf News, December 26, 2008. May 17, 2007; “Women Rising in the Ranks 64 World Bank, The Status and Progress of in Middle East Job Market,” Middle East Women in the Middle East and North Africa Newswire, April 30, 2007. (Washington, DC: World Bank Press, 2007), 79 “10,000 Chase KSA lingerie jobs,” AME pp. 129, 135, 139, 140, 141, 144. Info FZ, LLC—Middle East Retail and Lei- 65 “Bahraini Women Fail to Make It to the Up- sure News Wire, April 22, 2006; “Saudi Sus- per Echelons of Journalism,” Financial Times pends Lingerie Plans,” AME Info FZ, LLC— Information Limited , July 6, 2007. Middle East Retail and Leisure News Wire, 66 Tétreault, Stories of Democracy, pp. 160–64. May 15, 2006; Alexandra Pironti, “Saudi 67 “Girls Outshine Boys in Graduation Exams,” Women Obliged to Discuss Underwear Size Financial Times Information Limited , June 13, with Men,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 31, 2007. 2006. 68 Ibid. 80 Tom Whitwell, “This Week: The Arab 69 Barbara Bibbo, “Qatari Women Find Key to Drift,” Times, August 16, 2008; Robert F. Greater Emancipation,” Gulf News, March 24, Worth, “Saudi Races Roar All Night Fueled 2007; World Bank, Women in the Middle East by Boredom,” New York Times, March 7, and North Africa: Women in the Public Sphere 2009. (Washington, DC: World Bank Press, 2004), 81 Fatima Sidya, “Verdict in Abu Kab Case pp. 31–33. Today,” Arab News, February 2, 2009 and 70 World Bank, Women in the Middle East and Worth, Saudi Races Roar All Night Fueled by North Africa, pp. 31–33. Boredom . 71 World Bank, Status and Progress of Women , 82 Faiza Saleh Ambah, “Bored Young Saudis p. 10. Find Outlet in Graffiti,” Washington Post, Oc- 72 Bahgat, “Education in the Gulf Monarchies,” tober 31, 2007. p. 134; al-Sayegh, “Women and Economic 83 Michael Thurmond, “Georgia Men Hit Changes, p. 9; World Bank, Status and Hardest By the Recession, December 2007 to Progress of Women, p. 144. May 2009,” Georgia Department of Labor: 73 “UAE’s First Female Pilot,” United Press White Paper on Georgia’s Workforce, July International, June 17, 2007; “First Bahraini 2009, p. 7. Lady Pilot Gains Her Wings with Gulf Air,” 84 Hassan Fattah, “Riyadh Journal: Daring to al-Bawaba, February 5, 2007. Use the Silver Screen to Reflect Saudi Socie- 74 Al-Sayegh, “Women and Economic ty,” New York Times, April 28, 2006; Hassan Changes,” p. 9. Fattah, “Saudi Arabia Begins to Face Hidden 75 Bahry and Marr, “Qatari Women: A New AIDS Problem,” New York Times, August 8, Generation of Leaders,” p. 112. 2006.

36 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 2010) All I Want Is Equality with Girls: Gender and Social Change in the Twenty-First Century Gulf

85 The name Tash Ma Tash comes from a game played by Saudi children in the 1960s where they would “pop” the tops off soda bottles by shaking them hard. It roughly translates as “you either get it or you don’t” or “make or break it.” Neil MacFarquhar, “Riyadh Journal; Seeing the Funny Side of Islamic Law, and Not Seeing It,” New York Times, November 24, 2003; Pascal Ménoret, “‘State Television Has Guarded Us Against Cretins’: Saudi TV’s Dangerous Hit,” Le Monde diplomatique Eng- lish edition, September 16, 2004. 86 Fattah, “Saudis Rethink Taboo.” 87 Sheridan, “They Mean Business.” 88 Donna Abu-Nasr, “Saudi Ban on Women Drivers May Be Eroding,” Associated Press, August 22, 2008. 89 Fattah, “Saudis Rethink Taboo.” 90 Cole Porter, “Let’s Misbehave,” Paris, in The Complete Lyrics of Cole Porter, ed. Ro- bert Kimball (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), p. 104.

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 2010) 37