European History Quarterly

The transnational co-production of interwar ‘fascism’: on the dynamics of ideational mobility and localisation

Journal: European History Quarterly

Manuscript ID EHQ-19-0028.R1

Manuscript Type: Original Manuscript

fascism, diffusion, transnational, norm localisation, authoritarianism, Keywords: Formobilities Peer Review Interwar fascism achieved sensational international reach through the appeal and circulation of a set of generic ideological norms and political practices. Therefore models of interpretations must accommodate alternative local interpretations, adaptations, and a wide range of varied outcomes in the process of its diverse local translations. In this article, I propose the new trans-discplinary mobility paradigm as a productive methodological extension of the transnational approach in fascism studies. I focus on the fluid dynamics of trans-national circulation of ‘fascist’ ideas and political innovations, as well as on how these were perceived, (re-)interpreted, adopted/adapted by a wide set of local Abstract: agents in interwar Europe. I employ a decentred, anti-literarist, and multi-directional mobility approach that analyses the history of interwar ‘fascism’ as the messy net force of diverse, multivalent agencies, of interactions and frictions, in the end of creative translation and trial-and- error. I argue that a focus on this mobility dynamic offers three advantages: first, it promotes the re-integration of diverse fragmented histories of interwar fascism; second, it is capable of exposing the dynamic co-production of the political history of ‘fascist’ over time and space; and third, it fosters a far better understanding of the reasons for the ideological travel and political traction of radical ideas and politics in interwar years.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 The transnational co-production of 7 8 interwar ‘fascism’: on the dynamics of 9 10 11 ideational mobility and localisation 12 13 14 15 16 17 ABSTRACT 18 19 Interwar fascism achievedFor sensational Peer international Review reach through the appeal 20 21 and circulation of a set of generic ideological norms and political practices. 22 Therefore models of interpretations must accommodate alternative local 23 interpretations, adaptations, and a wide range of varied outcomes in the process 24 25 of its diverse local translations. In this article, I propose the new trans-discplinary 26 mobility paradigm as a productive methodological extension of the transnational 27 approach in fascism studies. I focus on the fluid dynamics of trans-national 28 29 circulation of ‘fascist’ ideas and political innovations, as well as on how these 30 were perceived, (re-)interpreted, adopted/adapted by a wide set of local agents 31 in interwar Europe. I employ a decentred, anti-literarist, and multi-directional 32 33 mobility approach that analyses the history of interwar ‘fascism’ as the messy net 34 force of diverse, multivalent agencies, of interactions and frictions, in the end of 35 creative translation and trial-and-error. I argue that a focus on this mobility 36 37 dynamic offers three advantages: first, it promotes the re-integration of diverse 38 fragmented histories of interwar fascism; second, it is capable of exposing the 39 dynamic co-production of the political history of ‘fascist’ over time and space; 40 41 and third, it fosters a far better understanding of the reasons for the ideological 42 travel and political traction of radical ideas and politics in interwar years. 43 44 45 46 47 Mobility and fascism: between the generic and the dynamic 48 49 Fascism studies are at a fascinating intersection. After decades in the 50 51 wilderness of untheorised survey studies and of conceptual laxity, George 52 L Mosse’s important early theoretical insights were subsumed into 53 54 sophisticated conceptual and analytical frameworks in the eighties and 55 nineties by a fresh generation of scholars spearheaded by Stanley Payne 56 57 58 59 1 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 2 of 36

1 2 3 4 and Roger Griffin.1 This eventually led Griffin, who had formulated a 5 6 concise and hugely influential definition of the ‘fascist minimum’ in the 7 early 1990s, to claim that a ‘new consensus’ had finally emerged in the fray 8 2 9 of fascism studies around a definition of the fascist ideological minimum. 10 By reducing fascism to its ‘bare essentials’ – a distinct ideological amalgam 11 12 of ‘populist ultra-nationalism’ and the ‘myth of palingenesis/rebirth’ -, 13 Griffin extrapolated its ineliminable core that distinguished it from other 14 3 15 preceding and contemporary adjacent political ideologies. Both the 16 definition and the claim of a consensus did not go unchallenged of course;4 17 18 but such was the clarity, efficacy, and heuristic power of Griffin’s premise - 19 as well as the willingnessFor of Peer a considerable Review number of subsequent 20 21 historians to adopt the term ‘fascism’ in generic terms, however 22 conditionally5 - that even its fiercest critics made extensive references to it 23 24 as a central plank of their alternative interpretations. 25 26 The polemic around the merits and demerits of the ‘new consensus’ raged 27 6 28 on for some time. It produced a fair amount of supporting and dissenting 29 literature, the latter criticising Griffin’s ‘fascist minimum’ as essentialist, 30 7 31 inflexible in its adherence to bounded conceptual entities, and static. The 32 criticisms raised by the French sociologist Michel Dobry have been to a 33 34 significant extent shaped by his vehement opposition to the way that 35 arguments about ‘generic’ fascism have been utilized by proponents of the 36 37 so-called ‘immunity thesis’ within the particular French historiographical 38 context.8 Nevertheless they underlined how the obsession with strict 39 40 classificatory models obscured the fascinating histories of mobility and 41 fluidity, intersection and interpenetration, between supposedly different 42 43 categories, as well as different political and social actors that shaped – less 44 through intent than through contingency – the history of radical politics 45 9 46 across interwar Europe. 47 48 49 The ‘new consensus’ polemic has mercifully run out of steam, clearing the 50 path for new perspectives on the multiple histories of ‘generic fascism’. Of 51 52 these the transnational approach has arguably signalled the most exciting 53 re-thinking and re-dimensioning of the field, premised on a shift away 54 55 from the previously dominant idea that historical accounts of fascism had 56 to be mapped onto national boundaries. Instead attention was drawn to the 57 58 59 2 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 3 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 critical role of cross-border nodes, networks, and interactions that 5 6 facilitated the diffusion of fascist ideas and political innovations in Europe 7 and across the world.10 Here the pioneering work of Hans Rogger and 8 11 9 Eugen Weber from the 1960s, and of Martin Blinkhorn in the 10 early-1990s,12 which had engaged in fruitful and nuanced ways with the 11 12 ideological and political intersections between conservative and fascist 13 right in the interwar period, had already suggested a workable interpretive 14 15 framework that embraced the fuzziness of the political boundaries between 16 the two constituencies, albeit still largely understood as bound by national 17 18 histories. But the transnational approach expanded the horizons of enquiry 19 both geographicallyFor and conceptually, Peer Review subsuming previously ignored or 20 21 under-studied dynamics of contact, exchange, and conflict that perforated 22 state borders. 23 24 25 The transnational approach to fascism has not evaded entanglements with 26 the earlier debates about ‘generic’ fascism and the ‘new consensus’. Kevin 27 28 Passmore claimed that “[t]o treat fascism as a social movement in a 29 transnational context is to buck the trend in studies of so-called ‘generic 30 13 31 fascism’”. In contrast, Arnd Bauerkämper and Constantin Iordachi have 32 approached the transnational paradigm in a more nuanced way as a 33 34 productive methodological extension of, rather than departure from, some 35 form of generic understanding of fascism.14 In this article, I seek to extend 36 37 discussion of the inter- and trans-national dynamics of interwar fascism by 38 taking on board trans-disciplinary insights from mobility theories.15 39 40 According to Tim Cresswell, “mobility involves a fragile entanglement of 41 physical movement, representations, and practices”.16 For a long time, the 42 43 most dominant understanding of mobility revolved around the notion of 44 diffusion.17 According to one of its pioneers, Everett Rogers, diffusion is “the 45 46 process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels 47 over time among the members of a social system”.18 The multi-disciplinary 48 49 field of diffusionist research has generated evocative and powerful 50 metaphors, such as the epidemiological notion of ‘contagion’;19 51 52 predominantly spatial categories such as ‘neighbourhood effect’ and 53 'spatial clustering’;20 ‘wave’, ‘cascade’, and 'demonstration effect’ of 54 21 22 55 paradigm change; and ‘domino effects’. In spite of these and other 56 57 58 59 3 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 4 of 36

1 2 3 4 variations, all genres of the diffusion model highlight patterns of spatial, 5 6 social, political, economic or cultural interdependence and of spatial and 7 temporal clustering,23 be that on a subnational or an international scale. 8 9 10 Theoretically rooted in the social sciences, diffusion models have been 11 applied to the study of policy transfer and regime change in the 19th and 12 13 20th centuries. Juan J Linz was one of the first scholars to connect 14 meaningfully the study of fascism with the broader context of regime 15 24 16 transition and democratic breakdown in the interwar years. Kurt 17 Weyland has productively studied the long-term dynamics of both 18 19 democratisation andFor authoritarian Peer ‘reverse Review waves’ in Europe and Latin 20 America in the 19th and 20th centuries in ways that shed new light on 21 25 22 comparative fascism studies, directly or indirectly. Some fascism scholars 23 too have applied the diffusionist perspective to the study of the inter- 24 25 national circulation of radical/’fascist’ ideas and political innovations in 26 the interwar period, in Europe and on a global scale.26 Nevertheless 27 28 diffusionist approaches to fascism have generally been treated with 29 suspicion. This is in part related to deeper methodological objections to 30 31 their perceived essentialism and their teleological horizon derived from 32 biased notions of supposed directional change that they implied, especially 33 27 34 in the context of modernisation and democratic transition. Yet they have 35 also been challenged on grounds that they reproduce assumptions about 36 37 some kind of ‘generic fascism’ projected outwards from alleged 38 prototypical manifestations - in Italy, Germany or both. 39 40 41 In contrast, the new mobility paradigm builds on the diffusionist emphasis 42 43 on circulation and movement, dynamic change and hybridities, while 44 offering a much-needed corrective to earlier notions of a unidirectional 45 46 flow of ideas ‘radiating’ from a supposed originator or innovation source 47 to allegedly second-order local adopters.28 In so doing, the mobility 48 49 paradigm provides an anti-essentialist toolkit to navigate historical 50 unpredictability and fluidity without denying a degree of conceptual 51 52 affinity between particular subsets produced through the circulation, 53 reception, translation and/or revision of ideas and practices emanating in 54 55 another place or time. Extending insights from the new mobility paradigm 56 to the study of interwar radical ideologies and politics will not somehow 57 58 59 4 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 5 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 settle the question of whether ‘fascism’ was a generic ideological-political 5 6 entity or not. Nor will it explain by itself why particular radical ideas or 7 policies were more popular than others, in particular places but not 8 9 elsewhere, at particular moments in time, among particular political and 10 social constituencies. But it does provide an alternative analytical 11 12 perspective that shifts emphasis to dynamic, protean fluidity without 13 denying altogether the influence of ideological clusters (as perceived by 14 15 contemporaries rather than modelled by scholars ex post facto) in all these 16 processes. It also enables a re-reading of the intellectual and political 17 18 history of interwar ideologies and politics as a jumble of fragmented and 19 fluid histories withinFor a context Peer of far broaderReview (in scope and kind) 20 21 interactions. This larger ‘universe’ of interwar radical politics, to use the 22 term used by David Roberts,29 was both the hub and the dynamic upshot of 23 24 multiple intersections – not just between ‘fascists’ but also involving other 25 constituencies of the new and old right (more conventional authoritarians, 26 27 radical conservatives etc), not to mention in a few cases sectors of the 28 dissident left (e.g. planisme in Belgium and France). And just as we require 29 30 an awareness of the broader context of radical ideological and political 31 mobilities in order to assemble the dynamic histories of interwar fascism (a 32 33 subset thereof), we also need to analyse how this subset of ‘fascist’ ideas 34 and political innovations shaped the dynamic field of interwar radical 35 36 politics as a whole. This perspective neither denies the utility of ‘conceptual 37 cores’ and ‘ideological minima’ nor seeks to make the web of interactions 38 39 fit delimited ideological/political entities. Instead it shifts attention to the 40 circulatory processes of reception and (re)formulation/translation of ideas 41 42 that challenged and very often transcended supposedly bounded 43 conceptual and political entities, whether perceived as such at the time or 44 45 extrapolated in hindsight. 46 47 Consensus or not aside, there was something distinct about interwar 48 49 ‘fascism’, however we choose to define and demarcate it conceptually; but 50 it was not the originality of any of its core ideas.30 Fascism’s distinctiveness 51 52 lay elsewhere – in the inventive constellations of otherwise familiar ideas 53 that it encompassed at the core of its discourse and political praxis. Rather 54 55 than understanding these constellations as transmitted – a priori formed - 56 57 58 59 5 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 6 of 36

1 2 3 4 from a geographic and political centre towards obliging audiences in the 5 6 peripheries, this article draws attention to a much broader, dynamic, 7 unpredictable, and decentred field of ideational mobility and diffusion that 8 9 produced them – and, through them, shaped the history of interwar 10 fascism. Human actors of diverse nationalities and, more importantly, 11 12 ideological complexions were as central to these processes as mobile ideas 13 of equally diverse derivation. These actors shared a perceived sense of 14 15 profound crisis – of ‘civilisation’, mainstream politics, and national culture. 16 They also held a mutual conviction that a different kind of radical politics 17 18 was desperately needed in order to avert an impending catastrophe, even if 19 they did not agree entirelyFor onPeer its precise Review optimal form and content. Their 20 21 shared sense of a horrifying gap between how things were and how they 22 ought to be that generated the stirring tension that made radical ideas flow 23 24 fast and far. They were avid observers of each other’s initiatives, keen 25 learners from perceived good practice, but also creative political 26 27 entrepreneurs of revised or new idea and practices that fed back into the 28 dynamic loop and travelled further. They were not the proverbial passive 29 30 norm receivers but active co-producers of the history of interwar fascism in 31 all its contradictions and messy entanglements. 32 33 34 It should be clear by now that my approach to ideational mobility and 35 diffusion is not uni-directional or literalist. And while I do recognise that 36 37 the genealogical history of fascism accords a special place to Italy, this is 38 due to temporal sequence rather than any sense of de facto conceptual 39 40 hierarchy. Fascism, Dobry noted, was the ‘product of the actions, struggles 41 and the self-identification of the political actors themselves’.31 The right- 42 43 wing radical field was sparsely populated in the first half of the 1920s. This 44 afforded a special status to those actors who first challenged conventional 45 46 political norms and put in (successful, as it turned out) practice a repertoire 47 of taboo-breaking propositions that were attractive to others abroad and 48 49 easier to attract attention. Yet, as the field of radical right-wing politics 50 became increasingly crowded and multifaceted in the late 1920s and 51 52 especially 1930s, the flow of ideas became increasingly complex and 53 tangled. Dynamic hierarchies did emerge in the process but not out of 54 55 design or from some kind of fixed natural order. 1945 became the sort of 56 57 58 59 6 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 7 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 historical terminus that ‘froze’ the busy landscape of ideational mobility 5 6 and generated a potentially misleading snapshot of stasis and teleology for 7 an ideology otherwise proudly flaunting its credentials as a radical open- 8 9 ended political phenomenon constantly in-the-making. 10 11 The mobility paradigm offers a meaningful way to reverse the order of 12 13 analysis - from outcomes to processes of formation; to expand the 14 analytical field by re-integrating historical fragments usually excluded or 15 16 ignored from the histories of a fascist ‘mainstream’; and to ask incisive 17 questions about the history of interwar radical ideas and politics, of which 18 19 ‘fascism’ was a – distinctFor and Peer critically Review important, to be sure – subset. In the 20 following sections of this article, I navigate the complexities of the field of 21 22 fascist mobilities by asking four key questions: why radical ideas travelled; 23 what ideas and/or practices were involved in each diffusion instance and 24 25 who the agents were in each case; how circulation occurred; and what 26 outcomes (intended and actual) it produced in diverse temporal and spatial 27 28 settings. 29 30 31 32 33 Context and motivation: why was ‘fascism’ diffused? 34 35 The interwar period kicked off with a striking paradox. On the one hand, 36 37 in the wake of WW1, liberalism extended its reach across Europe, with a 38 number of new states that succeeded the collapsed empires moving along 39 40 the path of democracy and enshrining an extended set of liberal rights in 41 new constitutions.32 On the other hand, the fundamental assumptions of 42 43 the liberal mainstream came under unprecedented sustained challenge by 44 both the revolutionary left and the hyper-nationalist ‘old’ and especially 45 46 ‘new’ right; and it was this intersection that produced a crucial dynamic of 47 increasingly vocal and aggressive contestation of liberal norms in the 48 33 49 1920s/1930s. Right-wing nationalist resentment in particular at the post- 50 1918 promoted liberal-internationalist settlement targeted a series of 51 52 political and social innovations: the new institutions of global cooperation 53 (such as the fledgling League of Nations), the extension of parliamentary 54 55 rule, the formalisation of a wider set of liberal rights into the constitutional 56 57 58 59 7 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 8 of 36

1 2 3 4 order of an increasing circle of countries, and the normative legal 5 6 protection extended to ethnic and religious minorities. In this respect, the 7 rise and subsequent diffusion of fascism gave more concrete ideological 8 9 and political expression to an already powerful sub-stratum of hyper- 10 nationalist/exclusionary backlash to both liberalism34 and the threat of 11 35 12 revolutionary socialism, positing a radical nationalist counter-utopia to a 13 (seemingly) mainstream liberal teleology of pluralism, growing empathy 14 15 for an expanding circle of others, and pacifism. 16 17 There was, however, one seismic event – with multiple chain reactions in 18 19 its wake - that playedFor a critical Peer role in Review gave more concrete ideological 20 substance and political expression to this rich but initially amorphous 21 22 ferment of angry backlash. What happened in Italy from 1919 to 1922 was 23 exceptional and deeply transformational, not only within the Italian 24 25 context but also in an inter- and trans-national sense. The October 1922 26 ‘March on Rome' in particular became a ‘condensation symbol’, a symbolic 27 28 performative - and tumultuous even in its immediate outcomes - event that 29 very soon developed into a powerful icon of a new kind of radical politics 30 36 31 well in Italy and beyond. The subsequent political consolidation of the 32 Fascist dictatorship invested the symbol with the all-important aura of 33 37 34 ‘success’ that always strengthens a new norm’s diffusion dynamic. 35 Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the later leader of the Iron Guard in Romania 36 37 but in 1922 only a young radical nationalist agitator, wrote about the 38 moment that the news of the March reached him, describing Mussolini as 39 40 “one of us” and investing the event with a trans-national transformative 41 significance by calling it “proof of the possibilities of victory”.38 Barely a 42 43 month after the March on Rome, the leader of the then fledgling NSDAP 44 Adolf Hitler was reportedly quoted saying “so it will be with us”,39 in an 45 46 allusion to his intention to emulate the particular model of attempted take- 47 over in Germany.40 48 49 50 At the time of the ‘fascist’ diffusion, knowledge of ‘fascism’ was 51 52 constructed through dual processes of interpretation by local agents and 53 mediation by them. Therefore ‘fascism’ was understood and (re- 54 55 )constructed largely independently from whatever intentions and 56 expectations its key leaders may have had, depending far more on the 57 58 59 8 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 9 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 particular perceptions, interpretations, and expectations of the local 5 6 entrepreneurs. Two main categories of local agents became involved in the 7 diffusion of 'fascism' in the interwar period - fascist adherents who saw this 8 9 'fascism' as the norm in toto (or as a more or less fixed set of organically 10 interconnected norms) to be diffused locally as well transnationally; and 11 12 more critical and selective norm entrepreneurs who perceived the 'fascist' 13 external sources as a set of partly independent norms and inventive 14 15 practices that could be appropriated and translated more flexibly and 16 critically into their local context, on the basis of each one's perceived degree 17 41 18 of cultural salience and capacity for facilitating better outcomes. In the 19 former scenario, diffusionFor wasPeer driven Review to a significant degree by genuine 20 21 fascination, often in spite of any forensic assessment of cultural match or 22 any expectation of enhanced payoffs for them; whereas, in the latter case, it 23 24 was principally a mechanism for maximising dividends and making the 25 most in a situation of changed international conditions not of their own 26 27 making. These agents ‘read fascism’ through their particular filters and 28 made a critical input in the process of norm localisation, adapting the 29 30 external reference to fit not just their own intentions but the particular 31 cultural attributes of their national context and the audience that they may 32 42 33 need to convince. All this does not mean that leaders of radical 34 movements were instantly or unconditionally attracted to the allure of 35 36 Fascism, however they chose to perceive it. In spite of their emotional bias, 37 they remained supremely strategic political entrepreneurs who subjected 38 39 external norms to scrutiny for their congruence and utility for their 40 particular national context and audience. This said, conservative 41 42 authoritarians like general-turned-politician Ioannis Metaxas in Greece 43 (head of the ‘4th of August’ dictatorship in Greece in 1936-1941), Kārlis 44 45 Ulmanis in Latvia (instigator of an anti-parliamentary coup in 1934), and 46 Antonio Salazar (the prime minister of the Portuguese dictatorship with 47 48 the longest term in office from 1932 to his death in 1974) adopted and 49 adapted external ‘fascist’ norms on the basis of an alternative reading of 50 51 their originally intentions and expected outcomes. For them, while some 52 'fascist' norms appeared of dubious value or even potentially dangerous to 53 54 them, others seemed eminently useful, albeit very often in ways that did 55 not conform to the intentions of the norm initiators themselves. 56 57 58 59 9 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 10 of 36

1 2 3 4 This last point also highlights a deeper paradox in the history of interwar 5 6 fascism. While local radical nationalist agents appropriated and 7 recontextualised external models of ‘fascism’ as an organisational, 8 9 ideological, and political norm in their fight against the left, liberals, 10 conservatives, and forces of the ‘old’ authoritarian right redeployed the 11 43 12 diffused norms against local fascists themselves. In this scenario, the local 13 actors’ engagement with ‘fascist’ norms was underpinned by a constructive 14 15 and restraining rationale alike: on the one hand, the (however selective and 16 qualified) translation of external norms generated or facilitated new modes 17 18 of, and opportunities for, action; on the other hand, it was deployed as an 19 acceptable alternativeFor to current Peer practices Review while also proscribing other, 20 21 more radical options also suggested by the diffused external norms (in this 22 case, the revolutionary ‘fascist' pathway). The list of examples is long: 23 24 indicatively, Salazar crushed the Blueshirts in Portugal; Dollfuss used the 25 momentum generated by the introduction of the one-party Ständestaat in 26 27 1934-38 as a tool to defeat or contain the Austrian Nazis too; the abortive 28 take-over attempt (a la March on Rome) by the Estonian Veterans (Vaps) in 29 30 1934 prompted the controlled fascistisation of the regime headed by 31 Konstantin Päts but also Vaps’s violent suppression; in Romania, the 32 33 declaration of dictatorship by King Carol in 1937 and the fascistisation 34 ‘from above’ that he oversaw was combined with the violent crackdown on 35 36 the Iron Guard. This form of pre-emptive and selective adoption of ‘fascist’ 37 norms in order to deploy them (also) against the fascists themselves was 38 39 part of a technique geared to ‘immunising’ the political status quo against 40 more radical or revolutionary challenges.44 41 42 43 44 45 Agency and content: who diffused what ‘fascism’ exactly? 46 47 48 To say that ‘fascist’ ideas and/or political innovations travelled across 49 Europe and beyond in the interwar years divulges very little about what 50 51 was diffused. This is particularly problematic in the case of fascism for, 52 unlike an authoritarian or dictatorial ‘wave’ (where outcomes can be 53 54 benchmarked against a set of more conventional institutional and political 55 expectations), mobilities of ‘fascism’ involved (i) exposure to novel taboo- 56 57 58 59 10 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 11 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 breaking ideological norms and political practices; and (ii) their reception 5 6 and translation by a burgeoning circle of very different national, political, 7 and social constituencies with bewilderingly different results. As a result, 8 9 large ideological as well as political variations were recorded across 10 different national contexts - and sometimes even within a single country. In 11 12 addition, the diffusion of ‘fascism’ unfolded over a protracted period of 13 time during which the meaning of both ‘fascist ideology’ (already 14 15 notoriously multi-faceted as something akin to a ‘scavenger’) and ‘fascist 16 rule' constantly evolved or mutated. While, for example, corporatism was 17 18 the main ideological and political ware brandished by Italian Fascism in 19 the second half of theFor 1920s Peer and the early-1930s, Review it occupied a more 20 21 marginal place in earlier years (and was largely associated with a militant 22 anti-capitalist rhetoric that was abandoned once Mussolini came to power) 23 45 24 and was largely eclipsed in the late-1930s. Meanwhile, the fact that 25 antisemitism - so central a facet in the ideological profile of some 26 27 movements such as National Socialism and the Iron Guard - was non- 28 existent as a discursive or political element in Italy and other case studies, 29 46 30 at least until the mid-1930s, cast doubts on the benefits of an inclusive 31 model of generic ‘fascism’ in interwar Europe.47 In fact, historians have 32 33 never stopped debating whether particular case studies should be 34 considered ‘fascist' and therefore whether they should be included in the 35 36 histories of fascist diffusion or dismissed as ‘failed’ or ‘not-quite-fascist’ 37 outcomes.48 The criteria used for distinction remain disputed and often 38 39 controversial: typically, a genuinely revolutionary ideology; antisemitism; 40 charismatic leadership; a radicalism that rejects traditional authoritarian 41 42 sources; or para-militarism. Employing particular criteria results in rather 43 different lists of ‘fascist’ cases and throws up all sorts of dichotomies – 44 45 fascism versus authoritarianism, top-down versus bottom-up, movement 46 versus regime, success versus failure, and so on. I would not suggest that 47 48 such distinctions are without their heuristical value. Yet I find their rigid 49 application to exclude discussion of non-normative entanglements between 50 51 fascism and other expressions of radical politics in the interwar period both 52 problematic and analytically impoverishing. As Roberts put it, we ‘need to 53 54 loosen up on [distinctions] … and we may need more bases or axes of 55 differentiation than fascism versus whatever else’.49 56 57 58 59 11 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 12 of 36

1 2 3 4 Therefore the question of what was diffused in the history of the circulation 5 6 of fascist ideas and political innovations is far more complicated and 7 important for the analysis of fascism’s diffusion than it may appear at first. 8 9 Neither the precise content nor the agents involved nor their perceptions of 10 what ‘fascism’ was nor their interpretations of the diffused content can be 11 12 taken for granted, at any given moment and place or over a prolonged 13 period of time. Even Italian Fascism agonised over producing its 14 15 authoritative ideological statement. When such a statement did emerge, in 16 1932 and in the elliptical form of The Doctrine of Fascism, it was introduced 17 18 with a rather unusual caveat for an ideological manifesto as ‘action and 19 thought … [with] anFor ideal contentPeer … [butReview also] a form linked to the 20 50 21 contingencies of time and space”. David Roberts has reminded us that, 22 when it came to the fore in the early 1920s, ‘fascism’ meant very little to 23 24 contemporary audience, even within Italy; instead it followed “an 25 uncertain, open-ended trajectory, partly because of the messiness of the 26 51 27 Fascist mixture the heterogeneity of fuelling aspirations”. In the 1920s, 28 this also affected Fascism's self-image and the ways in which its leadership 29 30 communicated its core message outside of Italy. The Fascist regime used 31 clandestine networks to support financially and politically revisionist states 32 52 33 and fringe movements in other parts of Europe; but these early initiatives 34 were mostly motivated by a pragmatic foreign policy aspirations and not 35 36 from a conscious desire to diffuse 'Fascism' in a top-down manner as 37 ideological and political ware. 38 39 40 Throughout this period, Mussolini had wavered on the topic of Fascism's 41 internationalisation;53 but by 1932 he had eventually decided that the 42 43 future of Europe as a whole was ‘Fascist’, thereby actively re-branding 44 Fascism as an export product with universal validity.54 No other fascist 45 46 regime or movement – not even National Socialist Germany that conceived 47 of its ‘new order’ project primarily as a pragmatic device of political 48 55 49 hegemony - attempted something similar to Italian Fascism’s 50 internationalisation project. Ironically too, the decisive momentum for the 51 52 launch of Fascism's project of international diffusion came in the wake of 53 Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in 1933 and the rapid deterioration of 54 55 the relations between the two regimes in 1934. What became known as the 56 57 58 59 12 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 13 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 Action Committees for the Universality of Rome (Comitati d’Azione per 5 56 6 l’Universalità di Roma, CAUR) spearheaded an official effort, supported by 7 regular international conferences, meetings, visits, and other kinds of 8 9 informal contact, to diffuse ‘fascism’ beyond the Italian borders. Note the 10 chosen name for the organisation, however - without a single mention of 11 12 this ‘fascism’, the regime's projected self-image used the twin synecdoches 13 of spiritual romanità and corporatism as the drivers of its project of 14 57 15 ideological diffusion. The initiative, starting with a promising founding 16 meeting held at Montreux, Switzerland in December 1934 (to which Nazi 17 18 Germany was deliberately not invited), had mixed fortunes (especially 19 concerning resistanceFor to the Peer chosen ideological Review platform of 'Roman 20 21 universality’, which was more amenable to Mediterranean ‘Latin’ countries 22 than their central and northern European counterparts) before gradually 23 58 24 running out of steam and being officially abandoned by 1938-39. 25 26 Diffusion, however, is rarely a tidy one-sided linear process of norm 27 28 externalisation by an initiator directed at local passive receivers. The initial 29 line of defence used by local fascists and conservative actors who 30 31 collaborated one way or another with the Nazi designs that they 32 succumbed to external pressure or had no other alternative than to be seen 33 34 to subscribe to the radical political agenda of Hitler’s regime in order to 35 avoid a hostile Nazi take-over (essentially the argument made by Marshall 36 37 Petain, head of the Vichy regime in France) neither saved collaborationist 38 leaders from postwar trials nor stood up to historical scrutiny ever since.59 39 40 Meanwhile, similar assumptions that the transnational diffusion of anti- 41 Jewish persecution and later participation in the ‘Final Solution’ were 42 43 attributable to German - direct or implicit - pressure also proved to be 44 exaggerated or misleading, masking a reality of willing and unforced 45 60 46 collaboration on numerous occasions. More often than not then diffusion 47 started on the initiative of local or transnational agents, regardless or in 48 49 spite of the intentions of the norm initiators themselves. The process 50 involved complex and unpredictable reciprocal interactions between the 51 52 perceived norms themselves and any trans-national entrepreneurs and 53 active local agents who selected, re-interpreted, adapted, resisted or even 54 61 55 rejected the ‘fascist’ norms. 56 57 58 59 13 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 14 of 36

1 2 3 4 The very different attitudes displayed by local agents to antisemitism in the 5 6 1920s and 1930s is an interesting example of this dynamic relationship 7 between external norms and active (re-)interpretation by diverse 8 9 contemporary local agents. In France, for example, the existence of a 10 complex national tradition of socio-economic and cultural antisemitism 11 12 resulted not in a uniform acceptance of antisemitism by different ‘fascist' 13 movements but in a wide range of responses ranging from strong 14 15 ideological attachment to near-rejection. In the 1920s, the Faisceau did not 16 officially adopt antisemitism, even if many of its leaders and members – 17 18 including Valois himself - had a notable antisemitic past from their days in 19 the Action Française,For but showed Peer a strong Review interest in social corporatism 20 62 21 and the performative aspects of Fascist ‘style’. Antisemitism also held a 22 dubious position in the official ideology of the Solidarité Française, which 23 24 nevertheless propagated intensely xenophobic and racist views. 25 Francisme, the movement founded by Marcel Bucard, juggled official 26 27 denunciations of the doctrine of antisemitism (and rejected altogether the 28 Nazi biological variant) with strong anti-Jewish sentiments within its 29 63 30 ranks. In the 1930s new movements generally displayed mixed attitudes 31 to antisemitism, with the Croix de Feu and later the Parti Social Français 32 33 (PSF), headed by Francois de La Rocque, as well as Jacques Doriot's Parti 34 Populaire Français originally displaying an aversion to the Nazi-inspired 35 36 rhetoric of biological antisemitism, opting instead for a more selective and 37 strategic invocation of the tradition of cultural antisemitism and with an 38 64 39 increasing focus on the Blum government and financial corruption. 40 While, however, La Rocque eventually turned against the Vichy regime in 41 42 the 1940s and rejected the introduction of radical anti-Jewish legislation 43 largely influenced by the Nazi racial and legal norms, Doriot re-invented 44 45 himself as a pillar of Nazi collaboration and a strong support for an even 46 more radical implementation of Nazi ideology and the ‘Final Solution’ in 47 65 48 France than what was being attempted by the Vichy regime. Clearly 49 attitudes to antisemitism, cultural/economic and biological, were 50 51 changeable and refracted through broader political calculations, be that 52 questions of foreign policy or of the need to appeal to settlers in north 53 54 Africa. 55 56 57 58 59 14 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 15 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 When it came to corporatism, the striking circulation of corporatist ideas 5 6 from the second half of the 1920s onwards may have been propelled by the 7 novelty of the Italian Carta del Lavoro and the systematic propaganda efforts 8 9 of the Fascist regime to promote it as the most innovative differentiator of 10 the Fascist ‘third way’; but in the end its diffusion dynamic or absence 11 12 thereof in other countries was largely shaped by the perceptions and 13 actions of local norm entrepreneurs. It is easy to identify the shared 14 15 impulse for nearly all local actors in the introduction of social and/or 16 political corporatist experiments - the iconoclastic desire to make a clean 17 18 break with both liberal parliamentary institutions and socialist 19 organisational normsFor that ‘fascism’Peer had Review sought to supplant and replace 20 21 with an organic new system of economic organisation and political 22 representation to fill the vacuum. But while social corporatist innovations 23 24 were largely shaped by local adaptations of the innovative precedent of the 25 earlier Italian model, when it came to corporatist legislative systems the 26 27 diffusion equation was far more complex and varied. Not only was Fascist 28 Italy a relatively late-comer in this respect (the Fascist corporatist 29 30 parliament was only introduced in the late-1930s) but other factors such as 31 the particular local input of traditional institutions such as the Catholic 32 33 Church, the conservative elites, and the military forced compromises that 34 affected the final shape of the experiment. Salazar’s Estado Novo in Portugal 35 36 and Dollfuss’s Ständestaat in Austria - both taking shape in 1933-34 - also 37 occupied an important role in the diffusion process, functioning as both 38 39 receivers of prior ‘fascist’ innovations and sources of autonomous 40 inspiration for new channels of diffusion that extended throughout the 41 42 1930s and the war years. 43 44 45 46 47 3. Process: how diffusion took shape and place 48 49 Diffusion operates both in space and over time.66 Exposure to new norms is 50 51 commonly the first all-important step in this process. Awareness of new 52 ideas and practices is the essential starting point of any diffusion process. 53 54 This is then followed by a local agent-led assessment and selection, often 55 on the basis of their subjective perceptions and interests but also in relation 56 57 58 59 15 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 16 of 36

1 2 3 4 to the peculiarities of the domestic context in which these local agents 5 6 operate. Whereas ‘early adopters’ are more likely to change their 7 behaviour early in spite of the absence of evidence that others are doing the 8 9 same, those engaging with the process at subsequent stages of the curve 10 (‘early majority’, ‘late majority’) indicate a higher sensitivity to how other 11 12 members of the local or international network behave before calibrating 13 their attitude and behaviour.67 The parabola of ‘fascism’s’ diffusion in the 14 15 interwar years followed a very similar pattern, with only a modest uptake 16 in the still uncertain 1920s that extended decisively upwards only in 1933- 17 18 34, in the wake of Hitler’s appointment as chancellor, and continued to 19 gather adherents untilFor well Peerinto WW2 Review before petering out (and actually 20 21 becoming reversed in 1944-45 in the shadow of an impending crushing 22 defeat for the Axis). 23 24 25 Finally the external norms are subjected to complex processes of norm 26 operationalisation to suit its new local context. This third stage describes 27 28 the active, again local agent-led processes of bestowing external norms 29 with local resonance and utility through enhancing their perceived 30 31 compatibility with pre-existing local particularities. In this process, 32 diffusion becomes a set of processes of not just replication or faithful 33 34 translation of the prototype but of creative co-production of (new) hybrid 35 norms to suit local conditions and expectations.68 In the context of interwar 36 37 fascism, this phase was particularly important and complex, for ‘fascism’ 38 was above all a nationalist ideology and thus any suspicion that fascist 39 40 movements sought to emulate an external (that is, foreign) source would be 41 inherently at variance with its ideological origins and nature.69 When the 42 43 Spanish dictator Primo de Rivera was asked whether he had been inspired 44 by Mussolini's March on Rome in his 1923 successful coup against the 45 46 Spanish Republic, he invoked instead domestic national sources of 47 reference instead (the nineteenth-century General Juan Prim who had been 48 49 a major instigator of coups against the monarchy; and the rural 50 paramilitary formations of the Somatén in the immediate post-WW1 years, 51 70 52 to explain his seeming admiration for Mussolini and Fascist Italy. The 53 leader of the French Faisceau went even further down this path, claiming 54 55 that his movement’s seemingly ‘fascist’ ideas that suggested borrowing 56 57 58 59 16 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 17 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 from Fascist Italy were actually pioneered by him and his movement in 5 71 6 France and then diffused to Italy. Meanwhile Swedish fascists showed 7 astute awareness of the danger of being branded fascist ‘copycats’, first by 8 9 adapting selectively norms developed in Italy, then by refashioning their 10 ideological profile in proximity to the Nazi racialist doctrine, and finally by 11 12 jettisoning discursive references to ‘fascism’ in the late 1930s in a response 13 to an increasingly hostile public opinion.72 14 15 16 Balancing admiration for foreign ‘fascist’ leaders and political innovations 17 with the need to constantly shake off any suspicion of emulating 18 19 prototypes alien to nationalFor Peer tradition Reviewand culture was no mean task for 20 leaders of movements and regimes inspired by aspects of the ‘fascist’ 21 22 experience elsewhere. One of the most common techniques in this direction 23 involved creative onomatopoeic solutions for national movements. Primo’s 24 25 son, José Antonio, co-founded the Falange Española in the autumn of 1933, 26 initially choosing the cryptic acronym ‘F.E.’ but shortly afterwards 27 28 clarifying that it did not stand for ‘Fascismo Español’ and opting instead 29 for the word ‘Falange’ that had more resonance in Spanish culture and 30 31 history. Later, José Antonio declared in the Spanish parliament that “we 32 have entered the world at a time that fascism is prevailing - and this … 33 34 handicaps us more than it favours us, for fascism has a series of 35 interchangeable inflections that we do not all wish to adopt”. He did not 36 37 deny that the Falange had adapted ‘fascist' elements but he defended these 38 points of inspiration by describing them as permanent in moral validity 39 73 40 and universal in character. 41 42 43 This kind of justification was also used by Oswald Mosley in 1932, when he 44 fused his own New Party with the British Fascisti and the Imperial Fascist 45 46 League (IFL) to form the British Union of Fascists (BUF). In contrast, 47 however, to José Antonio, Mosley did not shy away from adopting the 48 49 noun ‘fascism’ in the official name of his party and in referring to his 50 movement and future government as ‘F(f)ascist’.74 In a BBC interview he 51 52 gave just before announcing the fusion of the parties, he insisted, echoing 53 Mussolini, that fascism was the dominant creed of the century and 54 55 universal in its ideological foundations; but he also claimed that this same 56 ‘fascism’ was shaped into “practical national expression in each country”.75 57 58 59 17 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 18 of 36

1 2 3 4 Mosley sought to internalise Fascist symbols and cultural points of 5 6 reference by presenting them as rooted in a transcultural continuum of 7 historical greatness in which Britain had always occupied a central role. 8 9 Unsurprisingly then, the thrust of Mosley’s project of localising the ‘fascist' 10 political norms in the British context involved the re-conceptualisation of 11 12 empire as the undisputed political, spiritual, cultural, and moral hub of the 13 BUF's regenerative project76. But even the adoption of the symbol of the 14 15 fasces - and, more broadly, of the imperial legacy of ancient Rome - was 16 presented as supremely salient to British traditions by presenting the 17 18 British Empire as the 'custodian’ of a millennia-long ‘tradition of 19 civilisation and progress”For rooted Peer in the Review classical past.77 20 21 22 In contrast to the only limited adoption of the adjective ‘fascist’ in the 23 onomatopoeic conventions of kindred movements and parties, the 24 25 designation ‘national socialist’ proved markedly more popular and 26 seemingly less troubling to local norm adopters. Anton Mussert’s National 27 28 Socialism Movement in The Netherlands and Fritz Clausen’s Danish 29 National Socialist Workers’ Party were only two - and arguably the most 30 31 successful - of a far longer and varied in national dispersal list of parties 32 taking up a variant of this designation, usually appearing in the late-1920s 33 34 or early-1930s. While in a large number of cases the name was adopted 35 deliberately to declare strong ideological affinity and political identification 36 37 with Hitler’s movement and regime in the 1930s, the naming convention 38 was not a bizarre neologism like ‘fascism’, with its two adjectives 39 40 individually and combined in a composite phrase possessing a more easily 41 defensible universal meaning independently from German National 42 43 Socialism. When it came to conjuring up racialism, the schemas of the 44 ‘Nordic race’ and of the ‘Aryan’ theories of racial superiority also 45 46 referenced broader ideological legacies that predated the rise of German 47 National Socialism, pointed to a rich and long-standing international body 48 49 of pseudo-research in support of such arguments, and had already 50 developed some traction in a number of Northern European societies.78 51 52 53 In justifying the adoption of particular ‘fascist’ norms, the bulk of ‘fascist’ 54 55 movements in interwar Europe responded to actual or anticipated 56 criticisms of ‘foreign’ mimicry by engaging consciously with two principal 57 58 59 18 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 19 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 techniques of norm localisation. First, the external norm was ‘framed’ - as a 5 6 novel, fuller or better solution – in reference to a wider, more easily 7 internalisable ‘problem’ with both transnational and local resonance.79 So, 8 9 for example, Mosley localised his understanding of the ‘Fascism’ norm by 10 articulating a contrast between a present-past of national degeneration 11 12 (caused by the weaknesses of liberalism, corruption, lack of national vision; 13 and the perceived corrosive effects of every form of internationalism, 14 15 including socialism, ‘immoral’ capitalism, ‘Jewish conspiracies’ etc) and an 16 alternative present-future pathway of national rebirth, based on ‘fascism’, 17 18 empire, militarism, and strong executive leadership. Even when it came to 19 controversial decisions,For such Peer as the adoption Review of the ‘fascist’ black shirt as 20 21 the official uniform of the party, Mosley responded to escalating criticisms 22 of foreign mimicry80 by invoking an alleged neutral universalised 23 24 symbology behind this decision (e.g. uniform as classless unity, attack on 25 bourgeois values, show of ‘manhood’ etc).81 Thus Mosley attempted to 26 27 reverse-engineer ‘fascism’ as a global framework of problem-solving with 28 regard to issues of interconnected national and inter-/trans-national 29 30 salience. 31 32 Second, once justified, the new adapted norm was ‘grafted’ onto existing 33 34 local traditions and norms, either by supplementing or by displacing 35 them.82 The most effective local norm diffusion agents understood how 36 37 important this step was, spending significant discursive capital in forging 38 historical and cultural genealogies that linked the chosen external with 39 40 both universal and purely sources or local points of reference. This 41 explains, for example, the diversity of historical references in the ideology 42 43 and discourse of diverse fascist movements: the Verdinaso in Belgium 44 spoke of its vision of reconstituting the medieval kingdom of Burgundy;83 45 46 Szalasi's Arrow Cross evangelised the recreation of a great ‘Carpatho- 47 Danubian fatherland' along the lines of medieval Hungarian kingdom;84 48 49 the Croat Ustasha linked 'Aryanism' with their historical status as alleged 50 outpost of western Christianity against either (Ottoman) Islam of eastern 51 52 Orthodox peoples (Serbs being presented as the arch-enemy of modern 53 Croat nationalism);85 in the fiercely contested marketplace of national and 54 55 historical traditions in the post-WW1 Austrian republic, the Heimwehr 56 57 58 59 19 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 20 of 36

1 2 3 4 mostly threw its weight behind a Habsburg and Catholic genealogy of 5 6 modern Austria while the Austrian NSDAP subsumed and updated the 7 long tradition of territorial pan-German nationalism.86 8 9 10 These examples highlight how local agents employed inventively both re- 11 interpretation and re-constitution of the external norms as part of their 12 13 strategy of localisation. Acharya noted how norm-takers seek to enhance 14 the norm’s congruence with its new coordinates of space (local context) and 15 16 time (the particular register of challenges that its diffusion seeks to address 17 at a given moment). 87 This means that very often the local agent may have 18 19 to convincingly articulateFor not Peer only why Review the external norm is supremely 20 suited for in its new context but also why it may change form, meaning, 21 22 and function without losing its association with the original external 23 prototype. When Codreanu defended his movement's focus on aggressive 24 25 antisemitism even in the face of its notable absence (until that point…) in 26 Fascist Italy that he had so highly praised as a source of ideological 27 28 reference, he explained: 29 30 Italy has as many Jews as Romania has Ciangai in the Siret valley. An Italian 31 anti-Semitic movement would be as if Romanians started a movement 32 33 against the Ciangai. But had Mussolini lived in Romania he could not but be 34 anti-Semitic, for fascism means first of all defending your nation against the 35 dangers that threaten it. … In Romania, fascism could only mean … the 36 removal of the Jewish threat and the clearing of the path to the survival and 37 glory to which Romanians are entitled to aspire.88 38 39 40 This process of adaptive localisation cannot be reduced to a simple matter 41 of reception. Selective adoption, translation, and instrumentalization of 42 43 external norms were supremely creative processes, generative of essentially 44 new norms for others to observe and interact with. One of the most striking 45 46 examples of a ‘wave’ of diverse localisations of a single new radical, taboo- 47 breaking norm concerned the widespread accommodation and adaptation 48 49 of the ‘Nuremberg canon’ of racial/anti-Jewish persecution by a rapidly 50 expanding circle of regimes in Europe from the late-1930s onwards. Each of 51 52 them engaged in either pruning and fusing or both, thereby producing 53 interesting variations refracted through particular local peculiarities and 54 55 historical legacies. The three Hungarian laws introduced in 1938, 1939, and 56 57 58 59 20 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 21 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 1941 respectively used the - particularly resonant in Hungary - filter of 5 6 religious conversion as a key device: the first law completely excluded 7 converted Jews from the restrictive legislation, the second introduced some 8 9 restrictions to the award of this preferential status, while the third 10 abandoned it altogether and adopted for the first time a large portion of the 11 89 12 Nazi racial rationale. A similar trajectory was followed in Romania in 13 1938, with two pieces of anti-Jewish legislation following the Nuremberg 14 15 citizenship canon - the first allowing for exceptions on the basis of proving 16 Romanian descent while the second removing this route to exception and 17 18 incorporating racialist principles. In wartime Slovakia, the introduction of 19 the so-called JewishFor Codex Peerdiffused the Review majority of norms underpinning 20 21 the Nazi Nuremberg legislation but went even further by adding a further 22 requirement for half- or even one-quarter Jews who continued to practise 23 90 24 the Jewish faith. But the example of the Independent State of Croatia is 25 perhaps the most revealing with regard to the dynamics of expanding the 26 27 diffused norm in an originally unanticipated direction by its pioneers. The 28 Ustasha-led regime introduced a cascade of legislation inspired by the Nazi 29 30 ’Nuremberg model’ in the summer and autumn of 1941. Among them, the 31 racial re-definition of Jewish citizenship extended even further than the NS 32 33 Nuremberg stipulations, targeting also ‘half-Jews’, illegitimate children, 34 offspring of unmarried Jewish women, and spouses regardless of their own 35 36 ‘racial’ makeup. It also introduced a distinction between Jews born in the 37 territories of Independent Croatia and/or by parents residing there and 38 39 those who were not. In addition, however, the Ustasha regime directed the 40 main thrust of its vicious eliminationist campaign to the new state’s large 41 42 Serb minority and imputed distinct cultural canons of performative raw 43 violence in its execution that departed markedly from the industrialised 44 91 45 modernity of the Nazi project. 46 47 48 49 50 4. Outcome: what the diffusion of ‘fascist’ norms actually 51 produced 52 53 When it comes to the fourth stage of the diffusion process, the outcomes, the 54 55 original intentions of the local agents cannot pre-determine the actual 56 57 58 59 21 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 22 of 36

1 2 3 4 upshots of a diffusion process and cannot prevent different, often 5 6 undesirable consequences. When King Carol II of Romania introduced a set 7 of radical changes in the operation of the political system in 1937 by 8 9 adapting a set of norms inspired by external ‘fascist’ norms, his primary 10 motivation was to pre-empt a further strengthening of the Iron Guard that 11 12 could threaten his authority. Thus by suspending elections and the 13 parliamentary system, by revising the constitution in a hybrid 14 15 authoritarian-fascist direction (including the introduction of a corporatist 16 system), by instituting radical methods of violent persecution of the 17 18 country’s Jews, by adopting para-military paraphernalia including Iron 19 Guard-like uniforms,For and eventually Peer byReview outlawing the Legionaries and 20 21 arresting their leaders (Codreanu was executed shortly afterwards), Carol 22 expected that he would neutralise the growing danger posed by the Iron 23 92 24 Guard. 25 26 Similar concerns about the growing militancy and power of the Austrian 27 28 National Socialists (DNSAP) in the wake of Hitler’s appointment as 29 chancellor, as well as a decision to force a showdown with the powerful 30 31 socialist left, provided the pretext for Dollfuss to install a ‘Christian 32 corporatist’ dictatorship in 1933.93 The experiment soon morphed into a 33 34 one-party system, in alliance with the ‘fascist’ Heimwehr but in explicit 35 opposition to the DNSAP that was banned.94 In both cases, the strategy 36 37 delivered short-term payoffs that were soon reversed with catastrophic 38 consequences for the two dictators: the Iron Guard was weakened but 39 40 managed to resurfarce in 1940-41, this time (briefly) even as a government 41 partner; the DNSAP was also disrupted but nevertheless attempted a 42 43 violent coup in 1934, during which Dollfuss was assassinated, and despite 44 its continued proscription under Dollfuss's successor Kurt von 45 46 Schuschnigg managed to remain part of the power equation until 1938, 47 when Germany decided to force the annexation of Austria into the German 48 95 49 Reich. Thus pre-emptive ‘fascistisation’ from above did not deliver what 50 either Carol of Dollfuss-Schuschnigg had originally expected: it did not 51 52 secure their power in the longer term or eliminate the threat of their 53 ‘fascist' opponents as they had originally intended.96 54 55 56 57 58 59 22 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 23 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 As noted earlier, historians of interwar fascism have encountered heuristic 5 6 and classificatory problems when dealing with such hybrid regimes that 7 engaged with a controlled, selective, and limited introduction of ‘fascist’ 8 9 norms from above. Neither ‘fascist’ - in the sense of being driven by a truly 10 revolutionary project or possessing the ideological and organisational 11 12 cohesion to drive radical change - nor ‘authoritarian’ - in the form of a 13 more traditional dictatorship aimed at demobilisation of the masses -, these 14 97 15 “radical right regimes with fascist trappings” have for too long treated as 16 marginal or aberrant in the history of ‘fascism' even as they occupied such 17 18 an important place in the history of ‘fascism's' diffusion in interwar 19 Europe. Originally labelledFor Peeras 'failed’ Reviewor ‘incomplete' against the 20 21 benchmarks of the presumed prototypical ‘fascism' of National Socialist 22 Germany and Fascist Italy, in the last three decades they have gradually 23 24 moved from their earlier pariah status to, first, a partial rehabilitation as 25 hybrid political regimes and, more recently, to a re-integration into the core 26 98 27 of fascism studies. A similar label of failure was reserved for ‘fascist' 28 movements that, while deemed to belong to the ideological universe of 29 30 interwar fascism, fell short of developing mass following, electoral success 31 or achieving the prize of political power that would have allowed them to 32 99 33 implement their programme of radical change in their local contexts. 34 35 Nevertheless, if the focus shifts momentarily from actual outcomes to the 36 37 rational and process of diffusion, then these two categories of putatively 38 ‘failed’ fascist case studies acquire fresh historical significance and become 39 40 objects of enquiry. Closer attention to the rationale and intended goals of 41 the local agents rather than to a direct comparison with the outcomes of 42 43 other case studies is essential as it helps nuance and calibrate the heuristic 44 benchmarks of 'success' when it comes to the diffusion process. Weyland 45 46 has outlined four main outcomes in a diffusion process: norm replication 47 lies at the one end of the spectrum of outcomes and norm blockage at the 48 49 other, with pre-emptive and abortive emulation occupying interim points 50 along the way. The latter two outcomes are indicative of a distance 51 52 between the original norm and the particular outcome of norm diffusion in 53 a given context. Pre-emptive emulation is invested with both ‘positive’ and 54 55 ‘negative’ value by the local agents, intended as selective and partial 56 57 58 59 23 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 24 of 36

1 2 3 4 emulation of the norm itself but also deliberately aiming at severing it from 5 6 its more radical consequences observed elsewhere. Abortive emulation, by 7 contrast, results from an actual mismatch between intention and outcome, 8 100 9 the latter falling significantly short of the benchmarks set by the former. 10 While many cases of ‘fascist' movements that failed to gain any significant 11 12 traction within their local societies could be viewed as examples of abortive 13 emulation, a lot of the hybrid fascist-authoritarian dictatorships that were 14 15 headed by unlikely conservative figures in the interwar years (e.g. 16 Salazar’s, Dollfuss’s or Metaxas’s dictatorships) presented mixed patterns 17 18 of pre-emptive emulation by design and abortive emulation in terms of 19 (some at least of) theirFor outcomes. Peer Review 20 21 22 To assume that the default intention of the local agents was a more or less 23 close replication of the external norm is misleading. After all, a large part of 24 25 the historical enquiry into the dynamics of radical norm diffusion in the 26 interwar years offered in this article involves cases of partial contestation or 27 28 constructive localisation that resulted in a series of intended departures 29 from the original norm. Contestation was undoubtedly far more 30 31 pronounced among conservative-authoritarian elite local agents who 32 approached norm diffusion as largely a pre-emptive move aimed at 33 34 neutralising the 'fascist' radical challenge. However, even the usually far 35 more sympathetic radical nationalist agitators who experienced genuine 36 37 fascination with the external norm and in principle desired its faithful 38 replication in their local context did sometimes display more critical 39 40 attitudes to the external norm. At the 1934 Montreux conference, otherwise 41 supremely sympathetic ‘fascist' participants evinced a degree of unease 42 43 with CAUR's 'universality of Rome' formula, even as they wholeheartedly 44 agreed with the benefits of the bulk of norms pioneered by Fascist Italy.101 45 46 Thus the intended outcomes may end up differing from those of the 47 original norm - and, when they occur, such divergences should be 48 49 regarded as successful instances of localisation rather than as 'abortive' 50 replications thereof. In addition, localisation is a dynamic ongoing process 51 52 that does not exclude subsequent re-calibrations in order to further 53 maximise the resonance of diffused norms in the local context. Even 54 55 someone as central to the historical narratives of ‘fascism’s’ diffusion as 56 57 58 59 24 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 25 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 Hitler spent most of the 1920s in political wilderness, having failed to 5 6 emulate the March on Rome in 1923 or to achieve electoral or political 7 traction for the NSDAP until 1929.102 In the process, he was often forced to 8 9 change his political strategy and communication in order to increase the 10 political and social appeal of his movement for the audience of Weimar 11 12 Germany. As Christian Goeschel has convincingly demonstrated, the 13 relationship with Mussolini and Italian Fascism was a dynamic amalgam of 14 15 a sense of ideological affinity and functional calculation. The Hitler of the 16 first half of the 1920s balanced his personal admiration for the Italian 17 18 dictator against his selective pragmatic approach to Fascist ideology and 19 political initiatives. AtFor times, Peer juggling Review his strategic use of the Italian 20 21 precedent, as well as deploying (adapted) signifiers indebted to Fascism, 22 for his own political benefit against accusations of being a Fascist copycat 23 24 proved awkward and landed him in trouble. Yet, while the political 25 formation of the NSDAP in the 1920s makes little sense outside the broader 26 27 context of European radical politics dominated at the time by Fascist Italy, 28 the ideological development of National Socialism was only partly and 29 30 tangentially indebted to it. Mussolini’s Fascism was more useful to Hitler 31 as a discursive reference than as an ideological compass.103 32 33 34 35 36 Conclusions: diffusion analysis and the transnational approach to 37 38 fascism 39 40 Shortly after violently repressing the Iron Guard in January 1941, general 41 Antonescu described to the Romanian press the character of his new 42 43 regime: 44 45 This state shall base its policies on the primacy of Romanianism in all 46 47 domains of life. I pledge to unhesitatingly enforce all reforms necessary for 48 the elimination of foreign influences and the safeguarding of our national 49 interest. The struggle of the grand German National Socialist revolution and 50 fascist achievements shall serve as guideposts of experience to be adapted to 51 Romanian needs in order to graft on our realities the new world supported 52 by the achievements in organization of these peoples.104 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 25 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 26 of 36

1 2 3 4 Here then, in a nutshell, was a snapshot of all the alleged ‘contradictions’ 5 6 often highlighted by the historiography of fascism that an unlikely local 7 agent reconciled in the space of a few words, without registering any sense 8 9 of tension or awareness of incompatibility between the diverse components 10 of the statement. ’Romanianisation’ as the primary policy objective of 11 12 Antonescu’s new hybrid dictatorship post-January 1941 was an anti-Jewish 13 and anti-minority platform indebted to hyper-nationalist, anti-liberal, 14 15 exclusionary, and eliminationist norms pioneered - in different ways - in 16 both Germany and Italy. It was guided by their precedent, with their 17 18 ‘achievements’ ‘grafted’ on Romanian ‘realities’ but also refracted through 19 the prism of distinctFor ‘Romanian Peer needs’ Review and producing a hybrid norm. Here 20 21 was a distinctly Romanian hybrid form of ‘fascism’, headed by a 22 conservative general who had nevertheless been exposed to the external 23 24 ‘fascist’ precedent and used the filter of ‘cultural fit’ to translate and adapt 25 them for his local context while also promoting his ‘positive’ goals (his 26 27 political calculations for enhancing his power and advancing what he 28 perceived as Romanian interests through an even closer alignment with the 29 30 Axis). ‘Fascism’, even in its radical innovations pioneered by Fascist Italy 31 or its subsequent spectacularly radical manifestations in National Socialist 32 33 Germany, was not - and was not regarded by contemporary observers - as 34 a universal scripture. 35 36 37 In this article, I have argued that a dynamic, decentred, and non-literalist 38 mobility paradigm of analysis offer a welcome extension of the heuristic 39 40 power of transnational approaches to interwar fascism. It complements the 41 significant insights gained through sophisticated conceptual studies 42 43 regarding the origins and essence of fascist ideology by making them less 44 rigid and prescriptive, more flexible and analytically useful. It also 45 46 promotes a better understanding of the dynamic channels of inter- and 47 trans-national circulation of radical ideas and practices in the interwar 48 49 years. If we accept that interwar fascism was a phenomenon with 50 international reach driven by the appeal and circulation of a set of generic 51 52 ideological norms and political practices, then our models of 53 interpretations must accommodate alternative local interpretations, 54 55 adaptations, and a wide range of varied outcomes in the process of their 56 57 58 59 26 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 27 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 translation and operationalisation in each case. The history of interwar 5 6 fascism was shaped, incrementally and cumulatively, by a multitude of 7 local agents who crucially depended on one another, caught in a far wider 8 9 web of interactions and entanglements than previously assumed.105 Its 10 projection into history was not a simple matter of ‘successful’ diffusion of a 11 12 core ideology outwards and of ‘abortive’ instances branded as not-quite- 13 fascism; instead ‘fascism’ emerged from the debris of 1945 as the messy net 14 15 force of diverse, multivalent agencies, of interactions and frictions, in the 16 end of trial and error. 17 18 19 For Peer Review 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 27 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 28 of 36

1 2 3 4 References 5 6 7 8 1 9 Roberts D. D. Fascist Interactions: Proposals for a New Approach to Fascism and Its Era, 10 1919-1945. New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2016, 11-14; Kallis A. The Fascism Reader. 11 London & New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 20, 38-40. 12 2 13 Griffin R. The Primacy of Culture: The Current Growth (or Manufacture) of Consensus 14 within Fascist Studies. Journal of Contemporary History 2002; 37/1: 21-43; cf. the first 15 edition of his The Nature of Fascism. London: Pinter, 1991. 16 17 3 Griffin R. The Nature of Fascism. London and New York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 13, 26; 18 Feldman, M. ‘Editorial Introduction’. In Feldman M (ed) A Fascist Century. Essays by 19 Roger Griffin. Basingstoke:For Palgrave, Peer p. xvii. Review 20 21 4 See, for example, the exchange of views on an article by Griffin hosted by the journal 22 Erwaegen, Wissen, Ethik 2004; 15, republished by Griffin R., Loh W., Laqueur W., & 23 24 Umland A. (eds). Fascism Past and Present, West and East: An International Debate on 25 Concepts and Cases in the Comparative Study of the Extreme Right. New York: Columbia 26 University Press, 2006. 27 28 5 e.g. Drabik J. On the problem of defining fascism, the “new consensus” and the 29 development in fascist studies. Historický èasopis, 2014; 62/4: 695-718. 30 31 6 For example, Roberts, D., De Grand, A., Antliff, M., & Linehan, T. Comments on Roger 32 Griffin, 'The Primacy of Culture: The Current Growth (Or Manufacture) of Consensus 33 within Fascist Studies'. Journal of Contemporary History. 2002; 37: 259-274. 34 35 7 Van Herpen, M.H. Putinism: The Slow Rise of a Radical Right Regime in Russia. 36 Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 116-126. 37 38 8 Dobry M. February 1934 and the Discovery of French Society’s Allergy to the “Fascist 39 Revolution”. In Jenkins B (ed). France in the Era of Fascism: Essays on the French 40 41 Authoritarian Right. New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2005, pp. 129-50. 42 9 Dobry M. Desperately Seeking ‘Generic Fascism’: Some Discordant Thoughts on the 43 44 Academic Recycling of Indigenous Categories. In Costa Pinto, A (ed) Rethinking the 45 Nature of Fascism. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011, pp. 53-84. 46 10 47 Bauerkämper A, and Rossolinìski-Liebe G (eds). Fascism Without Borders. Transnational 48 Connections and Cooperation between Movements and Regimes in Europe from 1918 to 1945. 49 New York: Ashgate, 2017; Patel K. K. Der Nationalsozialismus in transnationaler 50 Perspektive. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 2004; 9: 1123–1134; Pinto A. C. 51 52 and Kallis A. (eds). Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 28 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 29 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2014; Goodfellow, S H. Fascism as a Transnational Movement: The Case of Inter-War 8 Alsace. Contemporary European History. 2013; 22: 87-106. 9 11 10 Rogger H, Weber E. The European Right: A Historical Profile. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 11 University of California Press, 1965. 12 12 13 Blinkhorn M. Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in 14 Twentieth-Century Europe. London: Unwin Hymen, 1990. 15 13 16 Passmore, K. Fascism as a social movement in a transnational context. In Berger S, 17 Nehring H (eds). The history of social movements in global perspective. Basingstoke: 18 Palgrave, 2017, pp. 579-617; cf. Alcalde, Á. Towards Transnational Fascism: German 19 Perceptions of Mussolini’sFor Fascists Peer and the EarlyReview NSDAP. Politics, Religion & Ideology. 20 2018; 19: 176-195, here 194. 21 22 14 Bauerkämper A, Rossoliński-Liebe G (eds). Fascism Without Borders: Transnational 23 Connections and Cooperation Between Movements and Regimes in Europe From 1918 to 1945. 24 25 New York and London: Berghahn, 2017; Iordachi, C. Introduction: Fascism in Interwar 26 East Central and Southeastern Europe: Toward a New Transnational Research Agenda. 27 East Central Europe. 2010; 37: 161-213. Bauerkämper stated that ‘As a generic 28 phenomenon, fascism was based on a particular institutional framework, common aims 29 30 and experiences and above all transnational collective action’ (Bauerkämper, A. A New 31 Consensus? Recent Research on Fascism in Europe, 1918-1945. History Compass. 2006; 4: 32 536-566, here 555; emphasis added). 33 34 15 Merriman P, Pearce, L. Mobility and the humanities. Mobilities. 2017; 12: 493-508. 35 16 36 Cresswell, T. Towards a politics of mobility. Environment and Planning D: Society and 37 Space; 2010; 28: 17-31, here 18. 38 17 39 Rogers E M. Diffusion of Innovations, 5th Edition. New York: Free Press, 2003; Valente 40 TW, Rogers EM. The origins and development of the diffusion of innovations paradigm 41 as an example of scientific growth. Science Communication. 1995; 16: 242-273 42 43 18 Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 4-5. 44 19 45 See Midlarsky MI, Crenshaw M, Yoshida F. Why Violence Spreads: The Contagion of 46 International Terrorism. International Studies Quarterly. 1980; 24: 262-298, here 262; 47 LaFree G, Xie M, Matanock AM. The Contagious Diffusion of Worldwide Terrorism: Is 48 It Less Common Than We Might Think. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 2018; 41: 261-280; 49 50 Centola D, Macy M. Complex Contagions and the Weakness of Long Ties. American 51 Journal of Sociology. 2007; 113: 702-734. 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 29 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 30 of 36

1 2 3 4 5 6 20 7 For example, Cliff C, First A. Testing for Contagion/Diffusion of Terrorism in State 8 Dyads. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 2013; 36: 292-314; Gleditsch K S, Ward M D. 9 Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization. International Organization. 10 2006; 60: 911-933. 11 12 21 Weyland K. Patterns of Diffusion: Comparing Democratic and Autocratic Waves. 13 Global Policy. 2016; 7: 557-562.; Huntington SP. The Third Wave: Democratization in the 14 15 Late 20th Century. Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012. 16 22 Starr H. Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in 17 18 the International System. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 1991; 35/2, 356-381. 19 23 Gilardi F. TransnationalFor diffusion: Peer Norms, Review ideas, and policies. Handbook of 20 International Relations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; 2012, pp. 453-477; Elkins Z, Simmons 21 22 B. On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework. The Annals of the 23 American Academy of Political and Social Science 2005; 598: 33-51, here 34-35. 24 24 25 Larsen S U, Hagtved B and Myklebust J P. Who Were the Fascists?: Social Roots of 26 European Fascism. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1979, 153-89; Linz J J. Fascism, 27 Breakdown of Democracy, Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes: Coincidences and 28 Distinctions. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan 29 30 March de Estudios e Investigaciones, 2002. 31 25 Weyland K. Autocratic diffusion and cooperation: the impact of interests vs. ideology. 32 33 Democratization 2017; 24: pp. 1235-1252, and Weyland K. Making Waves: Democratic 34 Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848. Cambridge: 35 Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 65-75; Huntington, The Third Wave, 16. 36 37 26 For example, Larsen, S U (ed). Fascism outside Europe: the European impulse against 38 domestic conditions in the diffusion of global fascism. Boulder CO: Social Science 39 Monographs, 2001; Passmore, K. Fascism: a very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford 40 nd 41 University Press, 2014, 2 ed, pp. 68-91; Kallis A. The ‘Fascist Effect’: On the Dynamics 42 of Political Hybridization in Inter-War Europe. In: Pinto A C, Kallis A (eds). Rethinking 43 Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. pp. 13- 44 41. 45 46 27 Peck, J. Geographies of policy. Progress in Human Geography. 2011; 35: 773-797. 47 48 28 Peck, J. & Theodore, N. Fast policy: Experimental statecraft at the thresholds of 49 neoliberalism. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2015, pp. xxvii. 50 51 29 Roberts, D D. Fascist Interactions: Proposals for a New Approach to Fascism and Its 52 Era, 1919-1945. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2016, p. 228. 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 30 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 31 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 5 6 30 7 Mosse G L. The Fascist Revolution: Towards a General Theory of Fascism. New York: 8 Fertig, 2000, pp. 23, 42 9 31 10 Dobry, ‘Desperately seeking fascism’, 54. 11 32 Huntington, The Third Wave, 16-17; Ziblatt D. How Did Europe Democratize. World 12 13 Politics 2006; 58: 311-338. 14 33 Kallis A. Fascism and the Right in Interwar Europe: Interaction, Entanglement, 15 16 Hybridity. In: Doumanis N (ed) The Oxford Handbook of European History, 1914-1945. 17 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 301-322. 18 34 Hung J. A backlash against liberalism? What the Weimar Republic can teach us about 19 For Peer Review 20 today’s politics. International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity 2017; 5: 91-107; 21 Green D M. The lingering liberal moment: An historical perspective on the global 22 durability of democracy after 1989. Democratization 1999; 6: 1-41. 23 24 35 Weyland, ‘Diffusion of regime contention’, 1156. 25 36 26 Edelman M J. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana & Chicago IL: University of Illinois 27 Press, 1985, pp. 5-11. 28 37 29 Brennan G, Eriksson L, Goodin R E. Southwood N. Explaining Norms. Oxford: Oxford 30 University Press, 2013, p. 188. 31 38 32 Codreanu, C Z. Pentru Legionari. Sibiu: Tipografia Vestemean, 1936. 33 39 Kershaw I. Hitler, vol 1: Hubris (1889-1936). London: Allen Lane, 1998, p. 343*. 34 35 40 Welch D. Hitler: Profile of a Dictator. London & New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 18; cf. 36 Michaelis M. I rapporti tra Fascismo e Nazismo prima dell'avvento di Hitler al potere 37 38 (1922-1933). Rivista Storica Italiana 1973; LXXXV/3, 544-600. 39 41 Schattschneider E E. The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. 40 41 New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960, 642. 42 42 Cortell A P and Davis J W Jr. Understanding the domestic impact of international 43 44 norms: A research agenda. International Studies Review. 2000; 2: 65-87. 45 43 Kallis A. The ‘regime-model’ of fascism: A typology. European History Quarterly. 2000; 46 47 30: 77-104. 48 44 Nuñez-Mietz F. G., García Iommi L. Can Transnational Norm Advocacy Undermine 49 50 Internalization? Explaining Immunization Against LGBT Rights in Uganda. 51 International Studies Quarterly 2017; 61: 196-209.; Weyland, ’The diffusion of regime 52 contention in European democratization’, 1156. 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 31 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 32 of 36

1 2 3 4 5 6 45 7 Baker D. The political economy of fascism: Mythorreality, or mythandreality? New 8 Political Economy 2006; 11: 227-250. 9 46 10 Kallis A. Fascism and the Jews: From the Internationalisation of Fascism to a ‘Fascist 11 Antisemitism’. Holocaust Studies. 2009; 15: 15-34. 12 47 13 Sternhell Z. The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political 14 Revolution. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. 15 48 16 Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, 116-45; Kallis A. ‘Fascism’, ‘para-fascism’ and 17 ‘fascistization’: On the similarities of three conceptual categories. European History 18 Quarterly 2003; 33: 219-249. 19 49 For Peer Review 20 Roberts, Fascist Interactions, pp. 227-8. 21 50 Mussolini B. Fascismo: Dottrina. In: Enciclopedia Italiana di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, vol. 22 23 14. Rome: Treccani, 1932, p. 847; emphasis added. 24 51 Roberts, Fascist Interactions, 53, 256. 25 26 52 Morgan P. Italian Fascism, 1919-1945. Houndmills & London: Macmillan, 1995, pp. 27 134-35. 28 29 53 Scholz B. Italienischer Faschismus als ‘Export’-Artikel (1927-1935). Ideologische und 30 organisatorische Ansätze zur Verbreitung des Faschismus im Ausland. PhD Thesis, 31 32 University of Trier, Germany, 2001. 33 54 Susmel E and Susmel D (eds) Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini. Florence: La Fenice, 34 35 1951-63, vol XXV, 147-8 (‘Discorso di Milano’, 25.10.1932). 36 55 For these ideas see Martin B G. The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture. 37 38 Cambridge MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2016. 39 56 Cuzzi M. L’internazionale delle camicie nere. I CAUR, Comitati d' Azione per 40 41 l'Universalità di Roma 1933–1939. Milan: Mursia, 2005; Ledeen M A. Universal Fascism: 42 The Theory and Practice of the Fascist International, 1928–1936. New York: Fertig, 1972. 43 57 44 Steffek J and Antonini F. Toward Eurafrica! Fascism, Corporativism, and Italy’s 45 Colonial Expansion. In: Hall I (eds) Radicals and Reactionaries in Twentieth-Century 46 International Thought. New York: Fertig, 2015, pp. 145-69. 47 48 58 Kallis A. From CAUR to EUR: Italian Fascism, the ‘myth of Rome’ and the pursuit of 49 international primacy. Patterns of Prejudice 2016; 50: 359-377. 50 51 59 Kupferman F. Le procès de Vichy: Pucheu, Pétain, Laval. Brussels: Complexe, 2006, p. 82; 52 Paxton R O. Vichy France. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2015, p. 215*; 53 Deak I. Europe on Trial. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2018, pp. 199-223. 54 55 56 57 58 59 32 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 33 of 36 European History Quarterly

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1 2 3 4 5 6 75 7 Worley M. Oswald Mosley and the New Party. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010, p. 161. 8 76 Love G. `What’s the Big Idea?’: Oswald Mosley, the British Union of Fascists and 9 10 Generic Fascism. Journal of Contemporary History 2007; 42: 447-468, 451; Stocker P. ‘The 11 Imperial Spirit’: British Fascism and Empire, 1919-1940. Religion Compass 2015; 9: 45-54. 12 77 13 Worley M. Why Fascism? Sir Oswald Mosley and the Conception of the British Union 14 of Fascists. History 2011; 96: 68-83. 15 78 16 Poliakov L. The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe. 17 New York: Basic Books, 1977. 18 79 Acharya A. Whose Ideas Matter?: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism. Ithaca NY: 19 For Peer Review 20 Cornell University Press, 2011, pp. 14-21. 21 80 For example, the Labour politician John R Clynes accused the BUF for mimicking 22 23 "foreign symbols, foreign salutes, foreign names and foreign dress”. The Conservative 24 MP Vyvyan Adams went even further in censuring Mosley for 'foreign' mimicry during 25 the discussion of the 1936 Public Order Act that proscribed paramilitary uniforms, 26 stating that British ‘fascism’ was “the most un-British weed that has ever pushed itself 27 28 above British soil. See Gottlieb J V and Linehan T P. The Culture of Fascism: Visions of the 29 Far Right in Britain. London: I. B. Tauris, 2004, p. 106; “Debate in the House of Commons 30 on Public Order Bill, 16 November 1936”, Parliamentary Debates (London: House of 31 Commons, 1936), 1439 and 1391 respectively. 32 33 81 Channing I. The Police and the Expansion of Public Order Law in Britain, 1829-2014. 34 London & New York: Routledge, 2015, pp. 213-4. 35 36 82 Acharya, ’How ideas spread: Whose norms matter?’, 243-4. 37 38 83 Warmbrunn W. German occupation of Belgium, 1940-1944. New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 39 pp. 31-2. 40 41 84 Hanebrink P. In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism, and 42 Antisemitism, 1890–1944. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2018, p. 140. 43 44 85 Bartulin N. The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia: Origins and Theory. 45 Amsterdam & Boston: Brill, 2013, pp. 34-8, 160-202. 46 47 86 Thorpe J. Austrofascism: Revisiting the ‘Authoritarian State’40 Years On. Journal of 48 Contemporary History 2010; 45: 315-343. 49 50 87 Acharya, ’How ideas spread’, 252; Hall R B. Reducing Armed Violence with NGO 51 Governance. London & New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 97-113. 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 34 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq Page 35 of 36 European History Quarterly

1 2 3 4 5 6 88 7 Murariu M. Totality, Charisma, Authority: The Origins and Transformations of 8 Totalist Movements. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2016, p. 259*. 9 89 10 Hilberg R. The Destruction of the European Jews. Bosto & New York: Lynne Rienner, 11 1985, vol III, p. 801. 12 90 ň 13 Niž anský E. Expropriation and Deportation of Jews in Slovakia. In: Kosmala B and 14 Tych F (eds) Facing the NS Genocide: Non-Jews and Jews in Europe. Berlin: Metropol, 2004, 15 pp. 205–30. 16 91 17 Steinberg J. Types of Genocide? Croatians, Serbs and Jews, 1941–5. In: Cesarani D (ed) 18 The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation. London and New York: Routledge, 1996, 19 pp. 175–93; and All or Nothing:For ThePeer Axis and Reviewthe Holocaust, 1941–1943. London and New 20 York: Routledge, 2002. More generally, see Bloxham D. Organized Mass Murder: 21 22 Structure, Participation, and Motivation in Comparative Perspective. Holocaust and 23 Genocide Studies 2008; 22/2: 203-45. 24 92 25 Haynes R. Romanian Policy Towards Germany, 1936-40. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2016, pp. 26 43-67; Ioanid R. The sacralised politics of the Romanian Iron Guard. Totalitarian 27 Movements and Political Religions 2004; 5: 419-453; Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, 261-96. 28 29 93 Wohnout H. A Chancellorial Dictatorship with a ‘Corporative’ Pretext: the Austrian 30 Constitution Between 1934 and 1938. In: Bischof G, Lassner A and Pelinka A (eds) The 31 Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A Reassessment. London & New York: Routledge; 32 33 2017, pp. 143-62; Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, 207-36. 34 94 Both G. The Coming of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Regime and the Stages of it 35 36 Development. In: Pinto and Kallis (eds.), Rethinking fascism and dictatorship in Europe, 37 121-53. 38 95 39 Thorpe, ’Austrofascism’, 321; Gerlich P and Campbell D F J. Austria: From 40 Compromise to Authoritarianism. In: Berg-Schlosser D and Mitchell J (eds) Conditions of 41 Democracy in Europe, 1919–39. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, pp. 40-58. 42 43 96 Kallis, ’’Fascism’, ‘para-fascism’ and ‘fascistization’’, 236-42. 44 97 45 Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, 117. 46 98 ‘Introduction’, in Pinto and Kallis (eds.), Rethinking fascism and dictatorship in Europe, 1- 47 48 11; Newman J. P. War Veterans, Fascism, and Para-Fascist Departures in the Kingdom 49 of Yugoslavia, 1918–1941. Fascism 2017; 6: 42-74. 50 99 51 Griffin, The Nature of Fascism 128-41; Paxton, ’The five stages of fascism’, 16-17. 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 35 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ehq European History Quarterly Page 36 of 36

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