accounted for its ability to avoid . Regime Type and Civil Whereas in , the weakness of FRELIMO’s bureaucratic structures, the high War Susceptibility level of foreign intervention in the country’s The Case of and post-colonial politics and the high level of Mozambique violence preceding independence increased Mark Sizwebanzi Mngomezulu the country’s chance of being mired in civil war after independence.

The structure of the paper is as ome literature on civil war has described follows: I begin with a brief survey of the specific authoritarian regime types as literature on authoritarian regimes, with a more susceptible to civil war onset than S specific focus on the single party variant and others. It is argued that certain institutional its manifestation in post-colonial Africa. A configurations of some of these regimes methodology section follows that provides present more opportunity to rebel, whereas key operational definitions of concepts and others can keep in check the opportunity to establish theoretical parameters for the rebel. Of all the authoritarian regimes argument, then the detailed case studies of mentioned by Gurses and Mason86, for Mozambique and Tanzania. The discussion example, single party regimes are considered section will then synthesize the findings in least vulnerable to civil war because of their both cases as uncovered by the explanatory ability to monopolize power and the political model, and take stock of other possible rival space in a country. Against this backdrop, explanations. Lastly, the conclusion section this paper seeks to answer the question: why will reiterate main points and discuss the has the single party state in Mozambique implications of the study. experienced a civil war, while that of Tanzania has not? LITERATURE REVIEW Mozambique and Tanzania are one of Political regimes are defined by the few countries in Africa that openly Bratton and van de Walle as, “sets of formal pursued socialist strategies after independence procedures…that determine distribution of with power largely concentrated on the ruling power. These rules describe who may engage parties—Frente de Libertação de 87 Moçambique (FRELIMO) and the in power and how.” In theory, democratic African National Union (TANU, regimes have political platforms open to a now known as Chama Cha Mapinduzi), wider range of interests than authoritarian respectively. Also both parties have remained regimes. Pointedly, Geddes classifies regimes in power to this day. as “authoritarian if opposition parties have The paper argues that the relative been banned or subjected to serious strength of the Tanganyika African National harassment or institutional disadvantage, or if Union’s (TANU) structures in Tanzania, the the ruling party has never lost control of the less significance of foreign intervention in the executive and has controlled at least two- post-independence politics, and the lack of colonial violence preceding independence

86 Mehmet Gurses and T. David Mason. “Weak 87 Bratton, M and Van de Walle, Democratic States, Regime Types, and Civil War,” Civil Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Wars 12, no. 1 (2010), 140 – 155. Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, London, 1997), 93.

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thirds of legislative seats in all elections.”88 interests. Civil war becomes a culmination of However, authoritarian regimes also differ to that failure. the extent in which the political platform is It is also argued that the resilience of open to opposition. Some disproportionately the single party state stems from the rely on brute force to curb opposition politics, constraints that elites face in the initial stages while others balance force and other soft of the formation of the party. Facing stiff methods of rule. Consequently, authoritarian opposition from other organizations vying for regime configuration affects its ability to avoid power may propel an organization to mobilize civil war. on a broad basis. However, faced with weaker Geddes develops a typology that constraints, the party may form elite coalitions differentiates regimes into personalist, instead of tapping into an inclusive people- military, single party regimes and hybrid centered constituency.92 In short, the power regimes.89 Of these, personalist regimes— base of a single party is of utmost importance where a leader has concentrated political to its survival. power on himself or herself at the expense of The foregoing argument is important institutions—are the most vulnerable to civil because it suggests that the single party’s wars, whereas single party regimes are least longevity is not necessarily connected with the vulnerable. The single party regime can be single party per se, but that its internal loosely defined as a regime that proscribes the mechanics play a significant role in its legal operation of opposition parties. This is survival. This distinction is of essence since different from dominant party systems where these regimes have shown different levels of opposition may legally operate but be unable longevity and ability to avoid civil war. This to ascend to power.90 theory has substantial explanatory power as Single party regimes are seen as least we examine FRELIMO’s and TANU’s vulnerable to civil war because the states’ organizational origins in the case study disproportionate amount of power allows it to section. If the institutional base on which a deal harshly with opposition at its nascent specific single party forms itself is firm, it can stage.91 This regime also attempts to strike a increase its ability to co-opt rivals, further balance between the main interests of the weakening opposition.93 ruling clique, namely to remain in power, and The single party regime in the early to provide outlets for political expression post-independence years in most African which are not harmful to its overall survival. countries was justified as the only way of As a general rule, an increased reliance on carrying out the common good—that is violence signifies a failure in that balance of broad-based development for the benefit of all. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was one of its notable proponents.94 Indeed most 88 Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Castles: Theory Building and Research Design In 92 Benjamin Smith. “Life of the Party. The Origins Comparative Politics (University of Michigan, of Regime Breakdown and the Persistence of Ann Arbor, 2003), 71. Single-Party Rule.” World Politics. 57 (2005), 89 Ibid.,71 – 77. 422. 90 Beatriz Magaloni and Ruth Krichel. “Political 93 Jason Brownlee, in an Age of Order and One-Party Rule,” Annual Review of Democratization. Cambridge: (Cambridge Political Science, 13 (2010),123–143. University Press: Cambridge, 2007), 33. 91 Mehmet Gurses and T. David Mason. “Weak 94 See: Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom: A States, Regime Types, and Civil War,” Civil Statement of African Ideology (Oxford University Wars 12, no. 1 (2010),141. Press, London, 1962),117.

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independence leaders saw opposition parties domestic politics of a country, and colonial as divisive and hurtful to the development violence preceding independence. process of countries.95 And it was on this basis that many single-party states ascended to METHODOLOGY power in Africa. Operationalized definitions of the However, others have criticized the above independent variables are as follows: idea espoused by these leaders and other firstly, “strength of the party’s structures” scholars that single party regimes are more refers to the extent to which the party can stable than other types of regimes. They argue marshal support country-wide. The that the stifling of opposition and other understanding is that the more it has support political freedoms especially in de jure single- throughout the country the less chance for party regimes might sow the seeds of its own rebellion against it, and less risk of civil war. destruction. This is because a zero-sum game This is because the ruling party aims to of politics arises which only presents violence dominate the political space, leaving little or as the only option to voice political opinion.96 no room for opposition to operate. Secondly If the law stipulates that opposition is banned, the role of foreign intervention in the post- then violence is the only viable option. Others independence domestic politics of a country have suggested that in practice, the one-party refers to the extent to which foreign state in Africa was able to stem destabilizing governments support, through finances and separatist causes that are often the political armaments, opposition groups in that country. ticket of opposition.97 Thus, this view has Lastly, “colonial violence preceding insisted on the utility of this regime type independence” refers to the intensity of especially in political environments fighting among different groups vying for characterized by diversity. Yet even then, the power, five to ten years before independence, record of this regime type in Africa has been so that higher levels of fighting in this far more ambiguous. How does one account stipulated period presents a greater chance of for the overthrow of some of the earliest fighting in the newly-emergent order. single-party regimes such as Nkrumah’s This is a small-N comparative study Convention People’s Party (CPP) in 1966, and that mainly relies on qualitative data and the the resilience of other such as that of comparative historical approach. To that end, Tanzania? it focuses on mid-level theorizing using Mill’s Against this backdrop, this paper method of difference—similar origins, tackles the puzzle of occurrence of civil war in different outcomes—to answer how countries some single-party regimes in Africa and not in of similar regime types have had different others. Focusing on Mozambique and results vis-à-vis civil war vulnerability. Both Tanzania, it argues that the relative stability of Mozambique and Tanzania98 were ruled by a single party regime hinges on the strength of colonial authorities; the Portuguese and the the party’s structures, the role of foreign intervention in the post-independence 98 This case study excludes the island of Zanzibar in the analysis of Tanzania, and focuses on the mainland—Tanganyika. This is 95 Benyamin Neuberger, “Has the Single Party because Zanzibar has had a slightly different Failed in Africa?” African Studies Review. 17, political experience stemming from Oman no. 1 (1974), 173. sultanate rule that precedes any other Western 96 Ibid, 174 - 175. colonial power. That makes it almost a separate 97 Ibid, 174 – 175. case.

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British prior to their independence in 1975 colonial occupation.101 The Ngoni ethnic and 1961, respectively. Both states had ruling group from the south waged one of the parties that pursued variants of socialist earliest notable wars against the Portuguese in policies and were ruled, de facto, (and later de 1895, and were eventually vanquished.102 The jure) by single party regimes. Correlates of War Project has coded this It traces the set of causal processes episode as the “Portuguese War operationalized above to account for the of 1895”; an extra-state war.103 difference—civil war in one case This defeat signaled the growing (Mozambique) and non-occurrence in the power of , which by the start of the other (Tanzania). The period to be focused on 20th century had spread all over southern is post-independence up to the early 1990s, Mozambique.104 The growing power of the latter date demarcating roughly when both Portugal in the country was accompanied by states opened the political platform to other forced conscriptions of indigenous people parties. into workforces and stringent tax Conceptually, civil war is understood requirements on a level hitherto unknown using Small’s and Singer’s definition: “any amongst the people, which resulted in a armed conflict that involves a) military action growing resentment towards the authorities. internal to the metropole, b) the active The rise of the António de Oliveira Salazar participation of the national government, and regime in Portugal in 1932, further centralized c) effective resistance by both sides”99… “and the colonial structures in a bid to facilitate state violence should be sustained and easier resource extraction to the benefit of the reciprocated and that the war exceeds a Portuguese economy.105 Even in this early certain threshold of deaths (typically more period, there were daily resistances of colonial than 1,000)”100 This is the most commonly authorities. Yet they remained sporadic and accepted definition of civil war by scholars uncoordinated. These resistances were largely and policy organizations. organized along lines of regions, ethnic groups, and specific production sectors. These MOZAMBIQUE: COLONIALISM AND VIOLENCE. divisions were also one of the biggest issues Portuguese presence in Mozambique that FRELIMO faced even after dates circa 1498, and had been mainly limited independence. This problem that partly to the coastlines. From this period up the 1800s, the Portuguese faced stiff opposition 101 to their attempt to control many parts of the Barry Munslow, Mozambique: the Revolution country, especially, the inland. Physical and its Origins (Longman, New York, 1983), 53. 102 Ibid, 53. confrontation and “diplomacy” were part of 103 “An extra-state war involves fighting by a the strategies African polities used in resisting state system member outside its borders against the armed forces of an entity that is not a member of the interstate system.” See; Meredith and Wayman, Resort to War: 1816 – 2007 (Q.C Press, Washington D.C, 2010) Available: 99 Melvin Small and David Singer, Resort to http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW- Arms: International and civil war, 1816 -1992 war. (Cage, Beverly Hills, 1982), 210. 104 Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, 100 Nicholas Sambanis. “What Is Civil War? Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an 1900 – 1982 (Westview Press, Colorado, 1983), Operational Definition. The Journal of Conflict 27. Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004), 816. 105 Ibid, 27.

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enabled the operation of its arch-rival Mozambique).”109 However, these groups RENAMO after independence. had narrow interests that reflected ethnic and The systematic brutality of the regional biases and this hindered their Portuguese colonial regime against natives mobilization capacities. Later, with became the rallying cry of the nascent negotiations brokered in Tanzania by Julius nationalist movement from the 1930s Nyerere, these organizations reluctantly onwards. At the front of this new wave of agreed to form a united movement against the resistance were the so-called assimilado.106 This Portuguese colonial authorities. So in 25 June group, with the help of the little education 1964, FRELIMO was born “under the they had received, began to question the leadership of Dr. .”110 contradictions and double standards of the Evidently, from the beginning the structure of colonial state. They detested their separation FRELIMO was rather rickety; a compromise from ninety-nine per cent of the population necessitated by the desire to be rid of a who were not educated. This was a classic common enemy. strategy the colonial authorities had devised to After a long debate on the modus bar any form of dialogue between the operandi of the new movement—centering educated and the uneducated, the former who on the use of armed resistance or peaceful were mostly in urban areas and the latter in demonstration—coupled with a series of rural areas.107 Standing against this division, failed negotiation attempts with the early was born in Mozambique at Portuguese government, FRELIMO finally the core of which were the mestizo108 and launched an armed struggle against the assimilado. colonial authorities after September 1964. Organizationally, the nationalist “Groups had already been sent for training in movement first manifested itself in three soon after (the party’s) first groups: “UDENAMO (National Democratic congress.”111 Thus, “in the dead of the night Union of Mozambique), MANU (the on 25 September 1964, FRELIMO soldiers, Mozambican-Makonde Union), and UNAMI with logistical assistance from surrounding (National African Union of Independent population, attacked the Portuguese administrative post at Chai in Cabo Delgado 106 The assimilado were an “indigenous petty- Province…and the guerillas were able to bourgeoisie… (constituting) a tiny minority of the damage the post and kill one policeman and wider African population. To become an wound several.”112 assimilado one had to fulfil certain legal criteria. This attack set off a chain of events in One had to swear loyalty to the colonial state, which the Portuguese government hunted speak only Portuguese at home, adopt ‘European’ habits, abandon ‘heathen’ beliefs down the insurgency’s network and arrested and have a Portuguese official vouch for their character.” See: Sumich and Honwana, ‘Strong Party, Weak States: Frelimo and State Survival through the Mozambican Civil War: An Analytical 109 Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, Narrative on State-making Crisis States Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, Research Centre (2007), 6. 1900 – 1982 (Westview Press, Colorado, 1983), 107 Funada-Classen Sayaka, Origins of War in 80-81. Mozambique, A History of Unity and Division 110 Ibid, 81. (ZAF, Cape Town, 2013) at 145. 111 Barry Munslow, Mozambique: the Revolution 108 Mestizo are generally those who were a and its Origins (Longman, New York, 1983) at mixture of Portuguese and Bantu/black 84. parentage. 112 Isaacman and Isaacman, Mozambique, 84.

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about 1500 FRELIMO sympathizers.113 The factionalism and purges.”118 This had a lasting colonial authorities tried to limit FRELIMO’s impact on the popularity of the party and its advances by “relocating peasants to strategic structures countrywide. Because the ruling hamlets” and heavily patrolling the “Tanzania elites came from the north and south of the and Malawian borders,” where the insurgents country, the vacuum left at the center was were most active.114 Among the most brutal capitalized upon by those who lost out in the strategies of counter-insurgency was the early power struggles within FRELIMO, and resettlement of peasants in new villages this region became the stronghold of rebel- encircled with barbed wire. It became clear armed factions.119 Crucially, other scholars that the war would last for a long time. In have suggested that the factionalism that 1965, Salazar allowed for the repatriation of bedeviled FRELIMO at its early stages did foreign capital out of Mozambique at 100 per not necessarily revolve so much around cent rate, a policy that had lasting ethnicity, as it did around the strategy to be ramifications on the Mozambican economy. used in confronting the colonial government. He also increased cooperation with NATO Some supported negotiation with Portuguese and the white minority regimes of South authorities, and other cited the violence of the Africa and , and increased the regime as evidence that it would not number of Portuguese forces to fight the relinquish power peacefully.120 Indeed those guerillas in the country.115 of the latter opinion were to be proven right After long years of intense fighting, when in 1961 colonial military forces were resulting in the growth of liberated zones increased from 3,000 to 12,000.”121 under FRELIMO, coupled with the military The faction that supported armed coup in Portugal that toppled the Salazar struggle dominated the executive committee dictatorship, FRELIMO gained power in of the party and was able to push the agenda September 20 1974.116 The war resulted in of armed struggle with began in earnest in “more than 33,000 casualties.”117 It was in 1974.122 Those who had lost out formed this context of a violent pre-independence splinter groups which severely threatened struggle that the party came to power in 1975. FRELIMO’s grip over the country after With the defeat of the common enemy, its independence. As the armed struggle unity and exclusive rule in the country was to continued, the party faced another internal face major challenges. crisis relating to the administration of liberated zones, “military strategy and tactics FORMATION OF FRELIMO: A COMPROMISE to be pursued, the emancipation of women, Although FRELIMO had managed to education and the very definition of the wage a successful war of independence, “its enemy.”123 Here we see that even in the early early years (1962 – 1989) were filled with

118 Jason Sumich and Joao Honwana, “Strong 113 Munslow, Mozambique, 87. Party, Weak States: Frelimo and State Survival 114 Isaacman and Isaacman, Mozambique, 100. through the Mozambican Civil War: An Analytical 115 Munslow, Mozambique, 87. Narrative on State-making.” Crisis States 116 Isaacman and Isaacman, Mozambique, 106. Research Centre (2007) at 6 and 7. 117 Data Appendix for Monica Duffy Toft, 119 Ibid, 7. Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of 120 Munslow, Mozambique, 83. Civil Wars (Princeton University Press, 2010). 121 Ibid 83. https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/www.bsg.ox.ac.u 122 Isaacman and Isaacman, Mozambique, 83. k/files/documents/MTcodebook2010_0.pdf 123 Munslow, Mozambique, 104.

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period of the party, policy was highly coupled with the suspicion that contested and divisive. Also, the party lacked raised in Mozambique’s white-ruled neighbors a solid foundation and popular support from (especially in Rhodesia and ), the ordinary people. made the country vulnerable to the outbreak So when independence was gained in of another civil war. Mozambique, the party and the country were The spectacular failure of the in a state of shambles. Even excepting the country’s policies led to a shortage of goods factionalism within FRELIMO, the party and food. Also, as an unintended faced the daunting task of reconstructing and consequence, these policies benefitted wealthy uniting a country that had been ravaged by peasants who could exploit party connections, pre-independence civil war. Finnegan captures to the detriment of the majority. Furthermore, the situation aptly: the party’s abolition of traditional practices such as lobola (bride wealth), polygamy, and Frelimo was left to run an effectively religious associations,126 isolated some bankrupt country with virtually no sections of the peasantry from the party who trained people. The illiteracy rate was were against these new decrees. Although over 90 percent. There were six Isaacman and Isaacman suggest that the party economists, two agronomists, not a had implanted itself fairly securely in most of single geologist, and fewer than a the country, its dominance in the north and thousand black high school graduates south, and the increasing unpopularity of its in all of Mozambique. Of 350 railroad socialist strategies were to be the pretext on engineers working in 1975, just one which foreign intervention and attendant was black and he was an agent of the destabilization of the country were to be Portuguese secret police.124 primarily based upon.

The leadership was faced with the challenges of rebuilding the nation from FOREIGN INTERVENTION: GEOPOLITICS OF scratch and dealing with the internal problems AND THE . of the party. This dearth of human resource The geopolitics of Southern Africa and an economy abandoned by the from the late 1970s onwards may have been Portuguese who emigrated en masse, led the one of the most important contributing party to nationalize companies and pursue factors to the occurrence of civil war in interventionist strategies at a pace they had Mozambique shortly after independence. With not anticipated. In 1977, the leadership the threat posed, “by the creation of a declared the party as Marxist-Leninist socialist, black majority-run state in their pursuing scientific socialism.125 The immediate vicinity, [South Africa and subsequent failure of socialist policies, Rhodesia], with implicit approval from Western, capitalist countries, aided and abetted the formation of a counter- 124 William Finnegan, A Complicated War: The revolutionary movement, RENAMO, in the Harrowing of Mozambique (University of late 1970s.”127 A left-leaning black majority California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1992) at 30. 125 Sumich and Honwana, “Strong Party, Weak 126 Ibid at 10. States: Frelimo and State Survival through the 127 Mary H. Moran and M. Anne Pitcher, “The Mozambican Civil War: An Analytical Narrative 'Basket Case' and the 'Poster Child': Explaining on State-making,” 7. the End of Civil Conflicts in Liberia and

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state in their midst meant friendly territory for operation bases near the South-African insurgent movements that South Africa and Mozambican border.132 South African Rhodesia faced at the time. government’s funding of RENAMO made Indeed, FRELIMO had earlier openly FRELIMO helpless in stemming the growth pledged to support the “front line states” in of the new insurgent movement. The their cause to rid southern Africa of the consequence was the civil war that broke out remaining white-minority regimes.128 To that in 1979. end, independence in Mozambique brought Hanlon notes that, “for an with it a growing base of African organization with no historic roots, the MNR National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe was very effective….the main important African Patriotic Union (ZAPU) insurgent factor (for its success) was force—armed movements from Rhodesia, and also that of bands would simply kidnap hundreds of the African National Congress (ANC) and young men (and women)…those escaping Pan-African Congress (PAC) inside were killed.”133 And “by mid-1983, the rebels Mozambique.129 were operating in eight of the country’s eleven Initially, foreign intervention in provinces.”134 Besides receiving support from Mozambique was executed through their South African patrons, they also Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana capitalized on the frustration of peasants on (MNR/RENAMO) “set up by the the failure of the “new development Rhodesians to be a fifth column inside projects”.135 Mozambique. Its members were men from Moran and Pitcher note that “by the various Portuguese special forces units who mid-1980s the…war had destroyed hundreds fled to Rhodesia in 1974…these then of schools and health clinics, disrupted rural increased their numbers by raiding FRELIMO trading networks, undermined food security, re-education camps…and recruiting people killed thousands of people and dislocated with no vested interest in FRELIMO.”130 hundreds of thousands more to camps in This counter-insurgency group assisted the more secure areas of Mozambique or across Rhodesian government in hunting down borders in Zimbabwe and .”136 The rebels of the Zimbabwean African National foreign-funded insurgency obviously dealt a Liberal Army (ZANLA) and implementing its serious blow to a country still attempting to own agenda of destabilizing the newly-formed rebuild on the ruins of the war of liberation in socialist government.131 1975, and further undermined its institutional With the independence of Zimbabwe structures all over the country, especially in in 1980, “South African military intelligence central Mozambique, the stronghold of took over the MNR,” and established RENAMO. The harsh economic conditions Mozambique,” Third World Quarterly 25, No. 3 created by the drought of 1983, and increasing (2004) at 510. attacks from the insurgents led FRELIMO to 128 Isaacman and Isaacman, Mozambique, 173. 129 Ibid, 174. 130 Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: 132 Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 140. Power in Southern Africa (Catholic 133 Ibid., 141. Institute for International Relations, London 134 Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 8. 1986), 139. 135 Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 141. 131 Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa 136 Moran and Pitcher, “The 'Basket Case' and (University of Pennsylvania Press: the 'Poster Child': Explaining the End of Civil Pennsylvania, 2006), 8. Conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique,” 510.

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begin courting the West, and managed to History of Colonial Tanzania141 secure food aid. Under pressure from the Colonial rule in Tanzania began with rebels, the Mozambican state also signed the the Germans in 1885 to 1920. Thereafter the Nkomati non-aggression pact in 1984 with the British ruled the country under a League of South African government, hoping that the Nations mandate from 1920 to 1961.142 While latter would stop funding the rebels. the Germans discriminated African However, this accord turned out to be useless, populations, they did not create stratified rule as the South African government never among the different ethnic groups.143 stopped funding the insurgents.137 By this Nonetheless, their rule weakened traditional time, the government had lost full control of structures of rule among indigenous ethnic the state and was battling for survival. groups replacing them with those in line with FRELIMO could not defeat colonial interests. RENAMO in battle because its resources had A notable resistance in this period was been dissipated by the long-drawn conflict. the Maji Maji movement waged by stateless However, in the 1980s RENAMO’s resource ethnic groups, from 1905 to 1907. The tap dried out as apartheid South Africa Germans severely crushed this resistance, channeled its energy to quelling disturbances resulting in an estimated 75,000 deaths and at home.138 This resulting stalemate facilitated three years of famine.144 The Correlates of the brokering of peace talks led by the War Project codes this rebellion as an extra- Catholic Church,139 and after several months state war.145 This was the only notable of negotiations the two warring parties signed episode of physical resistance against a the “General Peace Agreement in Rome in colonial power in Tanzania’s colonial 1992.”140 This devastating civil war left an experience. Lindermann and Putzel argue that estimated 1,000,000 people dead. this defeat may be one explanation why opposition towards the British later was TANZANIA: AFRICAN SOCIALISM largely peaceful.146 The crushing defeat of the This section argues that unlike rebellion lingered in the minds of the people Mozambique, Tanzania had a peaceful so that it influenced their subsequent transition to independence, and its post- approaches toward resistance. independence politics were characterized by little or no foreign involvement. Also, the strength and popularity of TANU around the 141 country effectively stifled viable opposition. Before independence, mainland Tanzania was referred to as Tanganyika. An intersection of these variables is a 142 Stephan Lindemann and James Putzel. State sufficient cause of non-occurrence of civil war Resilience in Tanzania – Draft Analytical in Tanzanian post-colonial politics. Narrative, 1. Available from online at www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/researc h/crisisStates/download/seminars/PutzelLindem annTanzaniaApr30.pdf [Accessed 13 May 2016]. 143 Ibid at 3. 137 Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours. 144 Andrew Coulson, Tanzania: A Political 138 Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 9. Economy, (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2013) at 139 Moran and Pitcher, “The 'Basket Case' and 56. the 'Poster Child': Explaining the End of Civil 145 Sarkees and Wayman. Resort to War: 1816 – Conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique,” 511. 2007. 140 Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 9. 146Lindemann and Putzel, State Resilience, 5.

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British colonial rule in Tanganyika colony: the Tanganyika African Association emphasized indirect rule. The consequence (TAA), “the trade union movement”, and the was the invention of traditional chiefs within cooperative movement that had its base in the ethnic groups that traditionally did not have rural areas.149 Thus from its founding TANU them. However, Lindermann and Putzel argue enjoyed a geographical and class spread that that relatively speaking, the British never most nationalist movements in Africa could pursued an open policy of divide and rule only hope for. Unlike Mozambique’s among the ethnic groups even though there FRELIMO, these organizations that came to were imbalances in army recruitment.147 Thus constitute TANU were not based on ethnic or during British rule there was no physical regional interests, but on occupation, an confrontation between the ethnic groups of obstacle that was relatively easier to supplant. Tanganyika and the colonial authorities. Under the leadership of intellectuals To echo an earlier point, Omari recruited mainly from the TAA, TANU argues that the Germans had already brutally worked to produce a united front against pacified the warring ethnic tribes in British colonialism through co-opting chiefs Tanganyika, so that the British found a much in the rural areas and other agricultural-based more conducive environment.148 Whatever tribal organizations fighting unfair colonial the reasons for lack of confrontation, it is laws.150 After its successful consolidation, the clear that this non-violent approach paved a new party presented its explicit goals smoother path toward independence. The including: the end of British colonialism, discontinuity of violence associated with opposition to all forms of tribalism, the German colonialism and the Maji Maji formation of branches in all the regions of rebellion, and the relatively peaceful period Tanganyika to work hand-in-glove with the under British rule may have influenced, to a central committee of the party.151 From the certain extent, the less violent politics of post- beginning, the leadership invested on the local colonial Tanganyika. population and in the formation of representative structures. Instead of alienating ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE traditional authorities, these were TANGANYIKA AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION incorporated into party structures, and in (TANU) decision-making processes at the local level. One of the remarkable things about The increasing popularity of the party is TANU was its ability to marshal broad-based reflected in the following numbers. Between support for its cause during the British 1954 and 1957, TANU membership grew colonial era, and its popularity after from 15,000 to 200,000”152 managing to not independence as the ruling party of Tanzania. only to be a coalition of elites but mobilizing Generally speaking, the nationalist movement the peasantry as well. in Tanzania was an amalgamation of three Consequently, when the party rose to bodies representing African interests in the power as Tanzania gained independence in 1961, it was in a position of relative strength.

147 Its post-colonial political discourse was Ibid at 5. characterized by three features, namely; 148 Abidallah Omari, “Civil-military relations in Tanzania,” in eds. Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra and Diane Abrahams, Ourselves to 149 Lindemann and Putzel, State Resilience, 8. Know. Civil-Military Relations and Defence 150 Ibid, 8. Transformation in Southern Africa. (: 151 Ibid, 9. Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 93. 152 Coulson, Tanzania: A Political Economy, 151.

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“egalitarianism, mass participation in politics regional and national levels”157 Consequently, at all levels, and anti-elitism.”153 Its the structure of the party allowed a degree of commitment to ensuring broad-based autonomy at the local level. development led to its relative popularity in In following a position the party had most sectors of the society. Encouraging mass stated before independence, TANU participation, the party sought to “narrow the nationalized white settler farms and mass-elite gap and to create a sense of distributed land to peasants in a bid to responsibility on the part of citizens.”154 This counteract the power of free-hold farmers in kind of broad-based one-party state system the country.158 In part, the Arusha was carefully calibrated to give individuals a Declaration argues “every TANU and sense of belonging while at the same time government leader must be either a peasant or acting to curb elite corruption within the a worker, and should in no way be associated party’s structures.155 with the practices of or Even though Tanzania has a diverse feudalism.”159 This and the above-mentioned ethnic community, the party managed to systematic processes strengthened TANU’s promote inter-ethnic cooperation and this rule in the post-independence period. The helped to reduce the politicization of policy of balancing the political needs of ethnicity.156 Malipula argues that inter-ethnic sectors of society, and the corporatist cooperation was one of TANU’s key structure of the party, in effect, left small strategies even before independence. As a space from which opposition could recruit. result, the nationalistic bent of the party, its Also, the party was able to absorb counter- institutionalization in Tanzanian society from elites into its political program. an early period increased its popularity among That said, single-party state’s the people. This popularity further squeezed structures were not without its detractors. For recruitment base of rival parties. Opposition one, the party often formulated policies from was dealt a final blow when it was officially the top, and regional structures did not have outlawed by the Arusha Declaration of 1967. much influence on policy.160 The villagization The Arusha Declaration of 1967 program (ujamaa vijijini) was a case in point. outlined the party’s policy position and its Peasants were relocated to “newly constructed commitment to serve the common people. settlements in order to promote efficient Incidentally, it was this document that agricultural production and to facilitate the officially designated Tanzania as a single-party equitable delivery of basic services” without state, pursuing African socialism. Part of this their consent.161 The success of this project is declaration stated that “every citizen is an integral part of the nation and as the right to take an equal part in government at local, 157 Arusha Declaration. Part 1 c) Available online at 153 Patrick J. McGowan and H. K. M. Wacirah. https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nyerere/1 (1974). “The Evolution of Tanzanian Political 967/arusha-declaration.htm [Accessed 13 May Leadership." African Studies Review. 17, no. 1 2016]. (1974), 179. 158 Lindemann and Putzel, State Resilience, 14. 154 Ibid,179. 159 Arusha Declaration. Part 5 a) 155 Lindemann and Putzel, State Resilience, 160 Howard Stein, “Theories of the State in 11. Tanzania.” Journal of Modern African Studies. 156 Mrisho Malipula. “Depoliticised Ethnicity in 23, no. 1 (1985), 109. Tanzania: A Structural and Historical Narrative.” 161 Paul J. Kaiser. “Structural Adjustment and the Afrika Focus. 17, (2014), 51. Fragile Nation: The Demise of Social Unity in

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ambiguous, although it is largely considered a ideology of unity and equality.”164 However, failure. As Kaiser shows, “in the final years of this party’s divisive and partisan ideology did the ujamaa era, basic consumer goods were not sit well with the people of Tanzania who rarely available, the transportation had already internalized the ideology of unity infrastructure was collapsing, and the of all Tanzanians regardless of ethnicity and government was unable to provide many of religion, propagated by TANU. the basic health-care and education services From a geo-political and Cold War that were promised immediately following the politics standpoint, one might argue that Arusha Declaration.”162 This was a result of unlike Mozambique, whose declaration as the declaration’s shunning of foreign socialist directly threatened the survival of investment and emphasis on self-reliance, South Africa and Rhodesia as white-minority which resulted in a severe foreign exchange ruled states, TANU’s socialism could be deficit. tolerated because Tanzania’s geographical Yet, the country managed to weather location did not threaten the West’s this crisis and the subsequent IMF imposed calculations of balance of power in the region. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of Yet even taking this into account, it can be 1981 to 1995 without disintegrating into civil said with relative confidence that the colonial war. In fact, no party has yet managed to pose history of Tanzania, the commitment of the as viable opposition to TANU. The party’s party to build local infrastructure and garner institutionalization in Tanzanian society and wide support had substantial influence of the its ability to reinvent itself in times of crises longevity of its single party regime, and the and change, accounts for relative stability in lack of any civil war episode in the country’s the country’s post-colonial period, and the post-independence period. lack of civil conflict. Ultimately, Tanzania’s single party regime hinged on the relatively peaceful NEOCOLONIALISM IN TANZANIAN POST- transition, a strong party base and structures, INDEPENDENCE POLITICS? and the relative lack of foreign involvement in Literature suggests that there was no the domestic affairs of the country through systemic involvement of foreign governments arming and funding opposition groups. in the domestic affairs of Tanzania to the extent seen in the Mozambican case. The DISCUSSION British colonial administration attempted to This paper has traced three processes create a rival party in 1956 called the United in the case studies reviewed, and the findings Tanganyika Party (UTP) “composed of are largely consistent with the initial disgruntled chiefs and white settlers,”163 but it hypothesis—that civil war occurrence, or lack was too weak in the face of TANU’s thereof, in Mozambique and Tanzania was a popularity. When a split occurred in TANU product of the intersection of these factors: leadership, there emerged “the African violence preceding independence, structures National Congress (ANC) that represented and institutionalization of parties, and foreign Africans only and thereby challenged TANU’s intervention in domestic politics. Of note is that in the Mozambican case, violence preceding independence, Tanzania.” The Journal of Modern African coupled with the re-involvement of the Studies. 34, no. 2 (1996), 229. 162 Ibid., 231. Portuguese in the country’s politics under the 163 Lindemann and Putzel, State Resilience, 9 - 10. 164 Ibid, 10.

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auspices of RENAMO, and later, South skills of . This analysis has African involvement, were the two most largely eschewed the leadership argument and important factors that account for relapse into focused mainly on structural analysis of the civil war in 1979. It seems that even though parties. No doubt leadership does play a role FRELIMO did not have strong institutions in in organizational capacity. all of Mozambique, civil war would not have been possible without foreign power CONCLUSION involvement. This paper argued that the ability of a single- In contrast, the extent of rural party to avoid civil war is largely influenced by mobilization and support TANU had, even in internal and external dynamics. This times of crisis, is singularly intriguing. So was proposition was tested on two single-party its ability to fight politicization of ethnicity in regimes in Africa, and the results showed that its structures and around the country. This colonial violence preceding independence, and its official ban on opposition had the weak institutions and foreign intervention effect of casting all opposition in the eyes of increase the susceptibility to civil war. The the people, as divisive and therefore findings open up the “black-box” that is the undesirable. TANU possessed a remarkable single-party, and call for further research on ability to reinvent itself in times of crisis, a the nature of this regime type. rare quality amongst many single-party The single-party state should not be assumed regimes in Africa. to be stable at face value. Studying closely its An interesting finding was the internal dynamics, policymakers and scholars involvement of TANU in the formation of can come to understand the real basis of FRELIMO, and its support for its insurgency stability or lack thereof of this regime type. during the war of liberation. It begs the This understanding can lead to sound question therefore, as to what extent recommendations on the political stability of Mozambique learned from the lessons of its this regime type and the chance of civil war neighbor in terms of the implementation of onset. Thus the contribution of this study is socialism. Whatever the case may be, it seems largely heuristic. It has traced three processes that the African socialism of Nyerere was and found compelling evidence to support its much more homegrown than that of hypothesis. It therefore behooves other FRELIMO which has been interpreted by researchers to test this hypothesis on other some scholars as more “scientific” and cases, or come up with rival explanations Leninist. linking this regime type to civil war onset. In spite of all of this, a self-criticism is in order. Cold war realities in Southern Africa loom larger in Mozambican post- independence politics, than they did in Tanzania, and this analysis has not delved deeply into this variable. The foregoing does not falsify the argument presented by the paper, but only highlights another potential avenue of research. For one, further research could focus on the role of the Cold war powers in propping up single party regimes in Africa. Also, some have credited the stability and popularity of TANU to the leadership

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