accounted for its ability to avoid civil war. Regime Type and Civil Whereas in Mozambique, the weakness of FRELIMO’s bureaucratic structures, the high War Susceptibility level of foreign intervention in the country’s The Case of Tanzania and post-colonial politics and the high level of Mozambique violence preceding independence increased the country’s chance of being mired in civil Mark Sizwebanzi Mngomezulu war after independence. The structure of the paper is as ome literature on civil war has described follows: I begin with a brief survey of the specific authoritarian regime types as literature on authoritarian regimes, with a more susceptible to civil war onset than S specific focus on the single party variant and others. It is argued that certain institutional its manifestation in post-colonial Africa. A configurations of some of these regimes methodology section follows that provides present more opportunity to rebel, whereas key operational definitions of concepts and others can keep in check the opportunity to establish theoretical parameters for the rebel. Of all the authoritarian regimes argument, then the detailed case studies of mentioned by Gurses and Mason86, for Mozambique and Tanzania. The discussion example, single party regimes are considered section will then synthesize the findings in least vulnerable to civil war because of their both cases as uncovered by the explanatory ability to monopolize power and the political model, and take stock of other possible rival space in a country. Against this backdrop, explanations. Lastly, the conclusion section this paper seeks to answer the question: why will reiterate main points and discuss the has the single party state in Mozambique implications of the study. experienced a civil war, while that of Tanzania has not? LITERATURE REVIEW Mozambique and Tanzania are one of Political regimes are defined by the few countries in Africa that openly Bratton and van de Walle as, “sets of formal pursued socialist strategies after independence procedures…that determine distribution of with power largely concentrated on the ruling power. These rules describe who may engage parties—Frente de Libertação de 87 Moçambique (FRELIMO) and the in power and how.” In theory, democratic Tanganyika African National Union (TANU, regimes have political platforms open to a now known as Chama Cha Mapinduzi), wider range of interests than authoritarian respectively. Also both parties have remained regimes. Pointedly, Geddes classifies regimes in power to this day. as “authoritarian if opposition parties have The paper argues that the relative been banned or subjected to serious strength of the Tanganyika African National harassment or institutional disadvantage, or if Union’s (TANU) structures in Tanzania, the the ruling party has never lost control of the less significance of foreign intervention in the executive and has controlled at least two- post-independence politics, and the lack of colonial violence preceding independence 86 Mehmet Gurses and T. David Mason. “Weak 87 Bratton, M and Van de Walle, Democratic States, Regime Types, and Civil War,” Civil Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Wars 12, no. 1 (2010), 140 – 155. Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, London, 1997), 93. JPI: Spring 2016 Issue 22 thirds of legislative seats in all elections.”88 interests. Civil war becomes a culmination of However, authoritarian regimes also differ to that failure. the extent in which the political platform is It is also argued that the resilience of open to opposition. Some disproportionately the single party state stems from the rely on brute force to curb opposition politics, constraints that elites face in the initial stages while others balance force and other soft of the formation of the party. Facing stiff methods of rule. Consequently, authoritarian opposition from other organizations vying for regime configuration affects its ability to avoid power may propel an organization to mobilize civil war. on a broad basis. However, faced with weaker Geddes develops a typology that constraints, the party may form elite coalitions differentiates regimes into personalist, instead of tapping into an inclusive people- military, single party regimes and hybrid centered constituency.92 In short, the power regimes.89 Of these, personalist regimes— base of a single party is of utmost importance where a leader has concentrated political to its survival. power on himself or herself at the expense of The foregoing argument is important institutions—are the most vulnerable to civil because it suggests that the single party’s wars, whereas single party regimes are least longevity is not necessarily connected with the vulnerable. The single party regime can be single party per se, but that its internal loosely defined as a regime that proscribes the mechanics play a significant role in its legal operation of opposition parties. This is survival. This distinction is of essence since different from dominant party systems where these regimes have shown different levels of opposition may legally operate but be unable longevity and ability to avoid civil war. This to ascend to power.90 theory has substantial explanatory power as Single party regimes are seen as least we examine FRELIMO’s and TANU’s vulnerable to civil war because the states’ organizational origins in the case study disproportionate amount of power allows it to section. If the institutional base on which a deal harshly with opposition at its nascent specific single party forms itself is firm, it can stage.91 This regime also attempts to strike a increase its ability to co-opt rivals, further balance between the main interests of the weakening opposition.93 ruling clique, namely to remain in power, and The single party regime in the early to provide outlets for political expression post-independence years in most African which are not harmful to its overall survival. countries was justified as the only way of As a general rule, an increased reliance on carrying out the common good—that is violence signifies a failure in that balance of broad-based development for the benefit of all. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was one of its notable proponents.94 Indeed most 88 Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Castles: Theory Building and Research Design In 92 Benjamin Smith. “Life of the Party. The Origins Comparative Politics (University of Michigan, of Regime Breakdown and the Persistence of Ann Arbor, 2003), 71. Single-Party Rule.” World Politics. 57 (2005), 89 Ibid.,71 – 77. 422. 90 Beatriz Magaloni and Ruth Krichel. “Political 93 Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Order and One-Party Rule,” Annual Review of Democratization. Cambridge: (Cambridge Political Science, 13 (2010),123–143. University Press: Cambridge, 2007), 33. 91 Mehmet Gurses and T. David Mason. “Weak 94 See: Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom: A States, Regime Types, and Civil War,” Civil Statement of African Ideology (Oxford University Wars 12, no. 1 (2010),141. Press, London, 1962),117. JPI: Spring 2016 Issue 23 independence leaders saw opposition parties domestic politics of a country, and colonial as divisive and hurtful to the development violence preceding independence. process of countries.95 And it was on this basis that many single-party states ascended to METHODOLOGY power in Africa. Operationalized definitions of the However, others have criticized the above independent variables are as follows: idea espoused by these leaders and other firstly, “strength of the party’s structures” scholars that single party regimes are more refers to the extent to which the party can stable than other types of regimes. They argue marshal support country-wide. The that the stifling of opposition and other understanding is that the more it has support political freedoms especially in de jure single- throughout the country the less chance for party regimes might sow the seeds of its own rebellion against it, and less risk of civil war. destruction. This is because a zero-sum game This is because the ruling party aims to of politics arises which only presents violence dominate the political space, leaving little or as the only option to voice political opinion.96 no room for opposition to operate. Secondly If the law stipulates that opposition is banned, the role of foreign intervention in the post- then violence is the only viable option. Others independence domestic politics of a country have suggested that in practice, the one-party refers to the extent to which foreign state in Africa was able to stem destabilizing governments support, through finances and separatist causes that are often the political armaments, opposition groups in that country. ticket of opposition.97 Thus, this view has Lastly, “colonial violence preceding insisted on the utility of this regime type independence” refers to the intensity of especially in political environments fighting among different groups vying for characterized by diversity. Yet even then, the power, five to ten years before independence, record of this regime type in Africa has been so that higher levels of fighting in this far more ambiguous. How does one account stipulated period presents a greater chance of for the overthrow of some of the earliest fighting in the newly-emergent order. single-party regimes such as Nkrumah’s This is a small-N comparative study Convention People’s Party (CPP) in 1966, and that mainly relies on qualitative data and the the resilience of other such as that of comparative historical approach. To that