Looking at various facets of Euroscepticism: A good platform to find the best way forward in Europe Review to the book: Euroscepticism in Small EU Member States Dr. Viljar Veebel, researcher, University of Tartu

The “waves” of Euroscepticism have been an integral part of the European integration for more than 20 years. The EU-critical views have spread before the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, and before the conclusion of the subsequent Treaties, the Treaty of Nice, the European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, in the 2000s. The disaffection with the actual outcomes of the EU among Europeans has gone hand in hand with the widened scope of the integration project. However, although the spread of Euroscepticism has decelerated the European integration in quite a few cases, it has up to now not prevented Europeans from moving forward.

In the light of the recent developments in Europe, it is not surprising that the concerns about sustainability and success of the European Union (EU) have been growing even in these EU member states which have traditionally shared pro-European views. The latest developments, from the recent financial crisis and the hibernation of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to the European refugee crisis and Brexit, have provided the grounds for being somewhat skeptical about the Union's ability to successfully meet both the current problems and the challenges ahead. The current situation in the EU is certainly more complicated than it has been over the last 20-30 years in terms of how to move forward in an integration process in Europe. In this light, the book “Euroscepticism in small EU member states” which offers a valuable insight into the various facets of Euroscepticism in seven small EU member states, definitely contributes to the better understanding of the roots of Euroscepticism in the EU, as well as helps to determine in what direction should the European integration process go in the nearest future.

What I particularly like in the book is that in all chapters where country-specific cases are investigated, a “broader picture” to the processes is presented. To bring some examples, the Irish chapter presents the overall context of the Irish-EU relationship; the chapter dealing with Portugal describes both the historical influence of the economic and financial dimensions belonging to the EU as well as the role of Greece as a negative example; the Finnish chapter analyses the country's stance on European integration from historical perspective and also adds some comparison with Sweden and Denmark; the Latvian chapter presents an intriguing insight into the psychological aspects of “being Europeans”, the fragmentation in people's attitudes towards the EU, the role of Russian propaganda in Latvia and the economic background; the chapter about Bulgaria discusses the role of geopolitical arguments and economic issues; and the Croatian chapter presents the historical, psychological and economic background of the spread of Euroscepticism. Each chapter offers interesting examples, trends and highlights on the issues related to Euroscepticism at the national level. The country- specific chapters also include sections (if not subchapters) about security and foreign policy arguments related to the Euroscpeticism in “old” and “new” small EU member states. This clearly emphasizes how important are security issues for small EU member states in the current security environment. To sum up, all these abovementioned topics have to be viewed with special concern to understand the roots of Euroscepticism in small EU countries.

However, without underestimating the contribution of this book to the discussions on the recent rise in Euroscepticism among the policy makers, in academic circles and in public debates across Europe, more systematic analysis, new knowledge and clarifications would be appreciated in the book. To bring some examples, in some cases the authors of the chapters tend to enjoy the method of simplification when describing and analyzing the Eurosceptics without differentiating them from other groups such as anti-Europeans and Euro-pragmatists (in principle, the fundamental differentiation between “the ones who doubt” and “the ones who are against the European integration”). As I see it, more straightforward questions are needed to make sure that all the authors are “on the same page”.

As a follow-up to the current material, I personally would be interested to learn even more about the reasoning of the trends in Euroscepticism in the EU member states, focusing on the issues like how people in various EU member states understand who are Eurosceptics, what they want to achieve and how their attitudes and perceptions differ across Europe. However, I clearly realize that this needs further analysis and is, therefore, most likely not the subject of the current book, but maybe finds its way to reader in upcoming books of LIIA.

To conclude, I would like to return to the idea presented in the first section of this book review. As the rise in Euroscepticism has gone hand in hand with the ongoing debate about European integration, having doubts about the European Union should not be treated with ostracism or ignorance in the society. In this light, also the recent wave of Euroscepticism should not be treated like a “black elephant” in the room. By definition, sceptic means “the one who doubts” and, thus, the Eurosceptics are not the opposite versions of the pro-Europeans or the Euro-idealists. Actually, they are somewhere “in the middle” and as far from the pro-Europeans than from anti- Europeans. However, despite it the Eurosceptics are today often seen as “evil, blind or angry persons”, voting and debating against all the initiatives developed at the European level. Refusing to recognize the role of the Eurosceptics in the European integration definitely increases the gap between the European elite and the hopes and needs of the European citizens. It is obvious that the European integration would, sooner or later, fail if both the national parliaments and the European Parliament would consist only of Euro-optimists, whereas in real terms there are some ambivalent attitudes towards the European integration among the Europeans itself. In the end, the European integration should remain a process that majority of the citizens of the European Union understand, recognize and support on a voluntary basis, and even the most skeptical persons need ways of being heard. Thus, the “positive program” is needed, where the focus is not on the statements like “we don't need Eurosceptics”, but on the questions how much Euroscepticism we need, what kind of Eurosceptics we would like to have in the Europe of the future, and how the Eurosceptics could contribute to a more sustainable European Union? To answer these questions, we need even deeper analysis of the Euroscepticism in Europe, particularly of how we define the essence of the Euroscepticism, how we differentiate between the sceptics who just have some doubts about the current developments or the integration models and those, who are clearly aligned opponents of the European project; and what good could come out of the ideas of Eurosceptics for the EU as a whole. I, therefore, fully recognize the contributions of the authors of the book “Euroscepticism in small EU member states” to the discussions related to questions about Euroscepticism. Moreover, I wish every success to the authors and editors of the book in covering further facets of such an intriguing phenomenon like Euroscepticism. To cite a famous quote from the recent past, “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste”.