CHAPTER 12

Introduction

This chapter presents a gripping account of the mounting tension during the days before the battle of Adrianople. On the Roman side the emperor himself had arrived in Thrace at the head of a considerable army. He needed a military success badly in order to match up to his young fellow-Augustus Gratian and his general Sebastianus (§1). The Goths on their side, led by the competent and shrewd commander Fritigern, were spoiling for a  ght, because they were angry about the way in which they had been treated by the Romans. When the emperor was informed that the Goths planned to cut of his army’s food supplies, he promptly took the requisite measures to deal with this threat (§2). On hearing that Fritigern was heading for the statio Nice, not far from Adrianople, with no more than ten thousand men Valens decided on an impulse to go and meet him. He pitched camp close to Adrianople, where he received the general Richomeres, sent by Gratian with a letter in which Gratian implored him not to engage in battle with the Goths before he had arrived (§3–5). During a staf meeting Sebastianus strongly advised Valens to join battle immediately.Another general, Victor, urged restraint and asked the emperor to wait for the arrival of Gratian and his reinforcements. Valens, however, did not want to share the glory of a victory, which in his opinion was a certainty, with his fellow Augustus. He therefore chose to attack (§6–7). According to Ammianus the skirmishers had seriously underestimated the numerical strength of the Goths, thus causing to a large extent Valens’ ill-considered decision. However, it is a real possibility, that the information provided by the skirmishers was correct, but that Valens wanted to attack the Gothic army under Fritigern before the return of the cavalry under Alatheus and Safrax, who had gone out on a separate mission and were expected to rejoin Fritigern soon. During the preparations for battle, Fritigern sent a Christian priest to ofer permanent peace in exchange for permission for the Goths to settle in Thrace. In a secret letter Fritigern demanded that the emperor should show his army to his countrymen in order to intimidate them, as this was the only way to tame their warlike spirit. Ammianus clearly intimates that 196 commentary

these proposals were not to be trusted. In any case Valens sent the envoys back empty-handed (§8–9). On the ninth of August, at daybreak, Valens advanced against the enemy. It was a hot day, and the soldiers had to march for eight hours along rough roads before they caught sight of the Gothic laager. They were received with the usual barbaric war-cries. While the Romans changed the deployment of their troops from a marching column into line of battle, the din of arms so frightened the Goths, who were still waiting for the cavalry under Alatheus and Safrax, that they sent a second delegation to negotiate with the Romans. Again Valens deemed the delegates of insu cient calibre to strike a  rm deal with them. These talks led to a new delay of the  ghting; meanwhile the Roman soldiers were exhausted by the long march and sufered from heat and hunger (§10–13). In a  nal efort to ward of a battle Fritigern ofered to come in person to negotiate with Valens on condition that a high-ranking Roman would come to the Gothic camp as hostage. When the cura palatii Equitius refused to go, Richomeres volunteered to undertake this dangerous mission (§14– 15). However, while he was on his way to Fritigern, the Roman commanders Bacurius and Cassio began a skirmish with the enemy. This put the spark to the tinder. In the ensuing chaos Richomeres was unable to carry out his mission, and suddenly the cavalry of Alatheus and Safrax appeared on the scene, creating havoc among the Roman infantry (§16–17).

12.1 Isdemque diebus exagitatus ratione gemina Valens, quod Lentienses comper- erat superatos quodque Sebastianus subinde scribens facta dictis exagger- abat, e Melantiade signa commovit As in 31.10.21, isdemque diebus marks the transition from the actions of one commander to another. See ad 27.6.14 (p. 155) for exagitare “concitando in inquietum, turbatum, aictum sim. sta- tum inducere” (TLL V 2.1151.69–70). It is not in Valens’ favour that he was disturbed by the victories of his fellow Augustus and the general whom he himself had asked to come to the East (see for the magister peditum Sebas- tianus ad 31.11.1, p. 184). The victories over the Lentiensian Alamanni, won  rst by Gratian’s generals, then by Gratian himself, were reported in chapter ten; the western Augustus had informed his uncle of these successes by let- ter (31.11.6). Sebastianus’ annihilation of some Goths along the river Hebrus near Adrianople was mentioned in 31.11.4. The ‘twofold reason’ for the fact that Valens had felt upset is in fact one: he was jealous of the achievements of Gratian and Sebastianus (but, as appears in §4, he nevertheless waited impatienter for Gratian to arrive). As to Valens’ feelings towards Sebastianus, Zos. 4.23.5 says this: φθόνος ἐξανίσταται κατ’ αὐτοῦ µέγιστος· οὗτος δὲ ἔτι-