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Affairs, Office of Management and DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY consider and Federal agencies to consult Budget, Attention: Desk Officer for before the Secretary may conclude that Treasury, New Executive Office Finding That JSC CredexBank Is a a jurisdiction, institution, class of Building, Room 10235, Washington, DC Financial Institution of Primary Money transaction, or type of account is of 20503, or email at OIRA_Submission@ Laundering Concern primary money laundering concern. The OMB.EOP.GOV and (2) Treasury PRA statute also provides similar procedures, AGENCY: The Financial Crimes Clearance Officer, 1750 Pennsylvania Enforcement Network (‘‘FinCEN’’), i.e., factors and consultation Ave. NW., Suite 8140, Washington, DC Treasury. requirements, for selecting the specific 20220, or at [email protected]. special measures to be imposed against ACTION: Notice of finding. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: the primary money laundering concern. Taken as a whole, section 311 Copies of the submission(s) may be SUMMARY: Pursuant to the authority provides the Secretary with a range of obtained by calling (202) 927–5331, contained in 31 U.S.C. 5318A, the options that can be adapted to target email at [email protected], or the entire Secretary of the Treasury, through his specific money laundering and terrorist information collection request maybe delegate, the Director of FinCEN, finds financing concerns most effectively. found at www.reginfo.gov. that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that JSC CredexBank is a Through the imposition of various Bureau of the Public Debt (BPD) financial institution of primary money special measures, the Secretary can gain more information about the OMB Number: 1535–0012. laundering concern. jurisdictions, institutions, transactions, Type of Review: Extension without DATES: The finding made in this notice is effective as of May 25, 2012. or accounts of concern; can more change of a currently approved effectively monitor the respective FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: collection. jurisdictions, institutions, transactions, Regulatory Policy and Programs Title: Request by Fiduciary for or accounts; or can prohibit U.S. Division, FinCEN, (800) 949–2732. Reissue of United States Savings Bonds. financial institutions from involvement Form: PD F 1455. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: with jurisdictions, institutions, Abstract: Used by fiduciary to request I. Background transactions, or accounts that pose a distribution of U.S. Savings Bonds to money laundering concern. A. Statutory Provisions the person(s) entitled. Before making a finding that reasonable grounds exist for concluding Affected Public: Individuals or On October 26, 2001, the President that a financial institution is of primary Households. signed into law the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing money laundering concern, the Estimated Total Burden Hours: 8,850. Appropriate Tools Required To Secretary is required to consult with OMB Number: 1535–0013. Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of both the Secretary of State and the Type of Review: Revision of a 2001 (the ‘‘USA PATRIOT Act’’), Public Attorney General. The Secretary is also currently approved collection. Law 107–56. Title III of the USA required by section 311, as amended, to Title: Claim for Lost, Stolen or PATRIOT Act amends the anti-money consider ‘‘such information as the Destroyed U.S. Savings Bonds and laundering provisions of the Bank Secretary determines to be relevant, Supplemental Statement For U.S. Secrecy Act (‘‘BSA’’), codified at 12 including the following potentially 2 Securities. U.S.C. 1829b and 1951–1959, and 31 relevant factors:’’ • The extent to which such financial Form: PD F 1048; PD F 2243. U.S.C. 5311–5314 and 5316–5332, to promote prevention, detection, and institutions, transactions, or types of Abstract: Used by owner or others prosecution of international money accounts are used to facilitate or having knowledge to request substitutes laundering and the financing of promote money laundering in or securities or payment of lost, stolen or terrorism. Regulations implementing the through the jurisdiction, including any destroyed securities. BSA appear at 31 CFR Chapter X. The money laundering activity by organized Affected Public: Individuals or authority of the Secretary of the criminal groups, international terrorists, Households. Treasury (‘‘the Secretary’’) to administer or entities involved in the proliferation Estimated Total Burden Hours: the BSA and its implementing of weapons of mass destruction or 24,000. regulations has been delegated to the missiles; • Director of FinCEN.1 The extent to which such OMB Number: 1535–0136. Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act institutions, transactions, or types of Type of Review: Revision of a (‘‘section 311’’) added 31 U.S.C. section accounts are used for legitimate currently approved collection. 5318A to the BSA, granting the business purposes in the jurisdiction; Title: Application for Refund of Secretary the authority, upon finding and • Purchase Price of United States Savings that reasonable grounds exist for The extent to which such action is Bonds for Organizations. concluding that a foreign jurisdiction, sufficient to ensure, with respect to Form: PD F 5410. institution, class of transactions, or type transactions involving the jurisdiction and institutions operating in the Abstract: Used by an organization to of account is of ‘‘primary money jurisdiction, that the purposes of this request refund of purchase price of laundering concern,’’ to require subchapter continue to be fulfilled, and United States Savings Bonds. domestic financial institutions and financial agencies to take certain to guard against international money Affected Public: Private Sector: laundering and other financial crimes.3 Businesses or other for-profits. ‘‘special measures’’ against the primary money laundering concern. Section 311 If the Secretary determines that Estimated Total Burden Hours: 50. identifies factors for the Secretary to reasonable grounds exist for concluding Dawn D. Wolfgang, that a financial institution is of primary Treasury PRA Clearance Officer. 1 Therefore, references to the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury under section 311 of the 2 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2). [FR Doc. 2012–12776 Filed 5–24–12; 8:45 am] USA PATRIOT Act apply equally to the Director of 3 See Section II,D below for an additional factor BILLING CODE 4810–39–P FinCEN. relevant to this action.

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money laundering concern, the its name to Northern Investment Bank States Government (‘‘USG’’) in recent Secretary is authorized to impose one or on April 5, 2006, and then to the current years to take action to protect the U.S. more of the special measures in section name of JSC CredexBank on February financial system from abuse by the 311 to address the specific money 12, 2007. Credex is 96.82% owned by Belarusian government. In 2006, the laundering risks. Section 311 provides a Vicpart Holding SA, based in Fribourg, President signed Executive Order range of special measures that can be Switzerland.9 With 169 employees 10 (‘‘E.O.’’) 13405, which blocks the imposed individually, jointly, in any and a total capitalization of property and interests in property of combination, and in any sequence.4 approximately $19 million,11 the bank Belarusian President Alexander Before imposing special measures, the currently ranks as the 22nd largest in Lukashenko and nine other individuals statute requires the Secretary to consult total assets among 31 commercial banks listed in the Annex, as well as with appropriate federal agencies and in Belarus.12 Credex has six domestic authorizing subsequent designations of other interested parties 5 and to consider branches and one representative office other individuals and entities the following specific factors: in the Czech Republic.13 While the determined to be responsible for or to • Whether similar action has been or majority of its correspondent banking have participated in public corruption, is being taken by other nations or relationships are with domestic banks, human rights abuses, or political multilateral groups; Credex maintains numerous 20 • oppression. Pursuant to this E.O., the Whether the imposition of any correspondent relationships with U.S. Department of the Treasury particular special measures would Russian banks, and also single (‘‘Treasury’’) in November 2007 create a significant competitive correspondent relationships in Latvia, designated the state petrochemical disadvantage, including any undue cost Germany, and Austria.14 According to conglomerate, Belneftekhim, for being or burden associated with compliance, available public information, Credex controlled by President Lukashenko.21 for financial institutions organized or does not have any direct U.S. Separately, Treasury in April 2006 licensed in the United States; 15 correspondent relationships. issued an advisory highlighting abuse • The extent to which the action or the timing of the action would have a C. Belarus and theft of public resources by senior Belarusian regime elements, including significant adverse systemic impact on The concentration of power in the senior executives in state-owned the international payment, clearance, hands of the Presidency and the lack of enterprises.22 Furthermore, in April and settlement system, or on legitimate a system of checks and balances among 2004, Treasury identified Infobank, business activities involving the the various branches of government are particular jurisdiction; and the greatest hindrances to the rule of Minsk (later renamed PJSC Trustbank) • The effect of the action on the law and transparency of governance in as a primary money laundering concern United States national security and Belarus.16 In particular, economic under section 311 for laundering funds foreign policy. decision-making is highly concentrated for the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein.23 At the time of that action, B. JSC (‘‘Joint Stock Company’’) within the top levels of government, and CredexBank financial institutions have little autonomy.17 Corruption Perception Index (http:// JSC CredexBank (‘‘Credex’’) is a archive.transparency.org/content/download/64426/ Under Belarusian law, most 1030807). Belarus ranked 143 out of 182 countries, depository institution located and government transactions and those with 1 being least corrupt. licensed in the Republic of Belarus that sanctioned by the President are exempt 20 ‘‘Treasury Targets Lukashenko-controlled primarily services corporate entities.6 from reporting requirements.18 This is Petrochemical Conglomerate,’’ U.S. Department of Originally established on September 27, the Treasury, 11/13/2007 (http://www.treasury.gov/ particularly worrisome given well- press-center/press-releases/pages/hp676.aspx.); 2001, as Nordic Investment Bank documented cases of public corruption INCSR (2011), p. 46. In June 2006, President Bush Corporation by Ximex Executive in Belarus,19 which has led the United issued Executive Order 13405, ‘‘Blocking Property Limited (‘‘Ximex’’),78 the bank changed of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus’’ (http:// 8 Bankers Almanac (2012). www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2006-06-20/pdf/06- 4 Available special measures include requiring: 9 Id. CredexBank’s Web site lists Vipcart’s 5592.pdf). E.O. 13405 blocks the property and (1) Recordkeeping and reporting of certain financial ownership as 98.82%. See ‘‘Business Card,’’ interests in property of the ten individuals listed in transactions; (2) collection of information relating to CredexBank Web site (http://en.credexbank.by/ the Annex to the E.O. and individuals or entities beneficial ownership; (3) collection of information bank/general/businesscard/). determined, inter alia, to be responsible for, or to relating to certain payable-through accounts; (4) 10 Bankers Almanac (2012). have participated in, actions or policies that collection of information relating to certain 11 Id. correspondent accounts; and (5) prohibition or undermine democratic processes or institutions in 12 National Bank of the Republic of Belarus, conditions on the opening or maintaining of Belarus; to be responsible for, or have participated Information on Banks Functioning in the Republic correspondent or payable-through accounts. 31 in, human rights abuses related to political of Belarus and Their Branches, as of January 20, U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)–(5). oppression in Belarus; to be senior-level officials, 2012 (http:www.nbrb.by/engl/system/banks.asp). 5 Section 5318A(a)(4)(A) requires the Secretary to family members of such officials, or persons closely 13 Id. consult with the Chairman of the Board of linked to such officials, who are responsible for, or 14 Governors of the Federal Reserve System, any other Id. See also ‘‘International settlements,’’ have engaged in public corruption related to appropriate Federal banking agency, the Secretary CredexBank (http://www.en.credexbank.by/entities/ Belarus. To date, there are 16 individuals and 9 of State, the Securities and Exchange Commission settlements/). entities listed on OFAC’s Specially Designated (‘‘SEC’’), the Commodity Futures Trading 15 Id. Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List as Commission (‘‘CFTC’’), the National Credit Union 16 ‘‘2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy blocked under the Belarus sanctions program. Administration (‘‘NCUA’’), and, in the sole Report (INCSR)—Volume II Money Laundering and 21 Id. discretion of the Secretary, ‘‘such other agencies Financial Crimes Country Database,’’ May 20, 2011. 22 ‘‘FinCEN Advisory: Guidance to Financial and interested parties as the Secretary may find to (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ Institutions on the Provision of Financial Services be appropriate.’’ The consultation process must also 164239.pdf), pp. 45–47. to Belarusian Senior Regime Elements Engaged in include the Attorney General if the Secretary is 17 Id. Illicit Activities,’’ April 10, 2006 (http:// considering prohibiting or imposing conditions on 18 ‘‘2010 and 2011 International Narcotics Control www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/ domestic financial institutions opening or Strategy Reports (INCSR)—Volume II Money advisory_belarus040706.pdf). maintaining correspondent account relationships Laundering and Financial Crimes Country 23 ‘‘Imposition of Special Measure Against with the targeted entity. Database,’’ March 1, 2010 and May 2011, Infobank as a Financial Institution of Primary 6 Bankers Almanac (2012). respectively. (http://www.state.gov/documents/ Money Laundering Concern, Notice of Proposed 7 ‘‘Belarus on a Roll,’’ Business New Europe, July organization/141643.pdf), p. 48. Rulemaking,’’ Federal Register/Vol. 69, No. 163, 22, 2009 (http://www.bne.eu/story1701/ 19 Id. For other example of public corruption in August 24, 2004. Moreover, a publicly available Belarus_on_a_roll). Belarus, see also Transparency International’s 2011 Continued

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Infobank was widely reported to be a transparency contributes to considerable addresses were subsequently transferred bank specializing in financial uncertainty surrounding Credex’s through Credex to suspected shell transactions related to arms exports, beneficial ownership. Taken as a whole, corporations that also shared the same including procuring and financing the lack of transparency associated with formation addresses in various weapons and military equipment for Credex indicates a high degree of money jurisdictions. Specifically, between June several nations deemed by the United laundering risk and vulnerability to and July 2007, two shell corporations States to be State Sponsors of other financial crimes. The factors located at known company formation Terrorism.24 relevant to this finding are detailed addresses in the United Kingdom Since January 2011, in response to the below: (‘‘UK’’) and the British Virgin Islands repression of democratic activists (‘‘BVI’’) made multiple payments A. The Extent to Which Credex Has following fraudulent presidential totaling millions of U.S. dollars by Been Used To Facilitate or Promote elections in Belarus, the European utilizing accounts at Credex and another Money Laundering in or Through the Union (‘‘EU’’) has imposed a series of foreign financial institution for the Jurisdiction increasingly stiff sanctions against benefit of a separate BVI company. Belarus, including a travel ban and Information made available to the Overall, numerous suspicious assets freeze extending to some 200 USG shows that since 2006, Credex has transactions (1) occurred in spurts for a Belarusian officials and an assets freeze engaged in highly questionable patterns brief period, in repetitive patterns, and of three companies closely associated of financial transactions that are then ceased without explanation, (2) with President Lukashenko.25 Most indicative of money laundering. Such were for unrelated goods and services recently, on March 23, 2012, the EU activity includes: high volumes of that did not correspond to an apparent reinforced restrictive measures against transactions involving foreign shell business relationship between the the Belarusian government by adding 12 corporations incorporated and operating transacting parties, and (3) were individuals and 29 entities to the in high risk jurisdictions; remitted through multiple foreign banks sanctions list for their role in supporting disproportionate and evasive with U.S. correspondent accounts with the regime.26 transactional behavior; and nested vague payment details. These patterns account 28 activity. II. Analysis of Factors strongly suggest a failure of anti-money The facts surrounding these laundering/countering the financing of Based upon a review and analysis of transactions are consistent with typical terrorism (AML/CFT) controls at Credex the administrative record in this matter, ‘‘red flags’’ regarding shell company and/or willfulness by the bank in consultations with relevant Federal activity identified in most banking carrying out transactions on behalf of agencies and departments, and after standards, including wire transfer shell corporations. consideration of the factors enumerated volumes that are extremely large in Furthermore, Credex has engaged in in section 311, the Director of FinCEN proportion to the asset size of the bank; high volumes of transactions that are has determined that reasonable grounds transacting businesses sharing the same significantly disproportionate to the exist for concluding that Credex is a address, providing only a registered bank’s level of capitalization. For financial institution of primary money agent’s address, or having other address example, from January to March 2010, laundering concern. In addition to the inconsistencies; and frequent information made available to the USG bank’s location in a high risk involvement of multiple jurisdictions or shows that Credex transferred nearly $1 jurisdiction, FinCEN has reason to beneficiaries located in higher-risk billion to shell corporations in multiple believe that Credex (1) has engaged in offshore financial centers.29 jurisdictions—a substantial amount of high volumes of transactions that are For example, large-dollar transactions wire activity for a bank of Credex’s size. indicative of money laundering on originated from multiple shell From 2007 to 2009, Credex averaged behalf of shell corporations; and (2) has corporations located at shared formation approximately $10 million in a history of ownership by shell capitalization.30 In addition, Credex corporations 27 whose own lack of are easy and inexpensive to form and operate. wire transaction customers during this Additionally, ownership and transactional information on these entities can be concealed from period were mostly parties sending source indicates that Trustbank and Credex regulatory and law enforcement authorities. See money from Credex accounts. However, maintain a correspondent relationship. ‘‘U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment’’ U.S. there were no observable corresponding 24 Id. Money Laundering Threat Assessment Working inflows, which one would expect at a 25 ‘‘Council Conclusions on Belarus,’’ January 31, Group, December 2005 (http://www.treasury.gov/ 2011, (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/ legitimate commercial bank. cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119038.pdf). mlta.pdf), pp. 47–49. Information made available to the 26 Press Release: ‘‘Council Reinforces Restrictive 28 Nested accounts occur when a foreign financial USG also shows that Credex engages in Measures against Belarusian Regime,’’ Council of institution gains access to the U.S. financial system evasive conduct in a significant portion The European Union, March 23, 2012, (http:// by operating through a U.S. correspondent account of its financial transactions. In some www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/ belonging to another foreign financial institution. pressdata/EN/foraff/129230.pdf). Since 2004, the Thus, these third-party financial institutions can instances, critical information EU has imposed sanctions against Belarus that effectively gain anonymous access to the U.S. identifying Credex as the originating include a travel ban and asset freeze on President financial system. See ‘‘Correspondent Accounts financial institution was omitted from Alexander Lukashenko and other Belarusian (Foreign)—Overview,’’ Federal Financial the wire transaction details, or the officials. For details on EU’s restrictive measures Institutions Examination Council Bank Secrecy Act against the Belarusian regime, see ‘‘Factsheet: The Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual,’’ stated purpose of the transaction European Union and Belarus’’, March 23, 2012, (‘‘FFIEC Manual’’) (http://www.ffiec.gov/ involving Credex accountholders was (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/OLM_047.htm). inconsistent with the expected business _ cms Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129232.pdf). 29 See ‘‘Money Laundering Red Flags: Wire profile of those companies. Such 27 The term ‘‘shell corporation,’’ as used herein, Transfers,’’ Federal Financial Institutions refers to non-publicly traded corporations, limited Examination Council (http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_ disproportionate volumes of activity liability companies (LLCs), and trusts that typically aml_infobase/documents/red_flags/Wire_Trans.pdf) compared to the bank’s size, coupled have no physical presence (other than a mailing and ‘‘Appendix F: Money Laundering and Terrorist with evasive behaviors, strongly suggest address) and generate little to no independent Financing ‘Red Flags,’ ’’ FFIEC Manual (http://www. that Credex is vulnerable to money economic value. As noted in the 2005 U.S. Money ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/OLM_ Laundering Threat Assessment, shell corporations 106.htm). See also ‘‘FinCEN Guidance: Potential laundering and other financial crimes. have become common tools for money laundering Money Laundering Risks Related to Shell and other financial crimes, primarily because they Companies,’’ November 9, 2006. FIN–2006–G–14. 30 Bankers Almanac (2012).

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Credex maintains a total of 66 any legitimate use of Credex is characteristics of a shell corporation. correspondent accounts,31 including significantly outweighed by the Listed at 12–16 Clerkenwell Rd, more than 20 U.S. dollar accounts, apparent use of Credex to facilitate or London, United Kingdom,38 Ximex almost exclusively with Russian and promote money laundering and other shares the same mailing address as Belarusian financial institutions.32 This financial crimes. another firm—whose primary activities number of correspondent accounts is are formation and servicing of highly disproportionate relative to C. The Extent to Which Such Action Is international business companies, as Credex’s size—the bank’s total assets Sufficient To Ensure, With Respect to well as tax and financial planning.39 were approximately $46 million as of Transactions Involving Credex, That the Ximex is owned by ‘‘Imex Executive, the end of 2010.33 For example, the Purposes of the BSA Continue To Be Limited,’’ a company registered to the largest bank in Belarus—whose assets Fulfilled, and To Guard Against address of a BVI company formation number more than $14 billion—only has International Money Laundering and agent.40 Additionally, Ximex is listed by a total of 18 correspondent accounts.34 Other Financial Crimes the UK’s Financial Services Authority This indicates the intent to obfuscate As detailed above, FinCEN has (‘‘FSA’’) among firms and/or individuals the movement of funds; there is no reasonable grounds to conclude that who are not authorized to conduct logical explanation or purpose for Credex is being used to promote or regulated investment activities.41 The maintaining so many correspondent facilitate international money FSA is an independent body that accounts while incurring the laundering, and is therefore an regulates the financial services industry operational costs and fees associated institution of primary money laundering in the UK.42 43 with them. concern. Currently, there are no Since October 2009, Credex has been According to available public protective measures that specifically owned by Vicpart Holding SA information, Credex does not have target Credex. Thus, finding Credex to (‘‘Vicpart’’), based in Fribourg, direct correspondent relationships with be a financial institution of primary Switzerland.44 Publicly available U.S. financial institutions.35 However, money laundering concern, which information about Vicpart reveals information made available to the USG would allow consideration by the significant inconsistencies and gaps that indicates that transactions involving Secretary of special measures to be raise concerns about the true nature and U.S. dollars are conducted via multiple imposed on the institution under purpose of the company. Vicpart shares ‘‘nested accounts’’ with European banks section 311, is a necessary first step to the same address with more than 200 and money service businesses 36 that prevent Credex from facilitating money other companies, some of which are in allowed indirect access to the U.S. laundering or other financial crime liquidation.45 These companies in financial system. For example, of 91 through the U.S. financial system. The liquidation merit particular scrutiny wires totaling approximately $10 finding of primary money laundering because at least one Financial Action million conducted through Credex, 69 concern will bring any criminal conduct Task Force (‘‘FATF’’) study has wires totaling $9 million involved occurring at or through Credex to the identified the practice of dissolving apparent nesting activity via U.S. attention of the international financial companies rapidly after creation as a correspondent accounts, and the community and will further limit the risk factor signaling the potential misuse remaining 22 wire transfers totaling over bank’s ability to be used for money of corporate vehicles.46 The Vicpart $1 million were sent by order of, or for laundering or for other criminal Web site is currently inaccessible to the the benefit of, shell-like entities, some of purposes. public. Prior to its shutdown, the Web which were also involved in the 69 site stated that the purpose of the nested wires. D. Other Relevant Factor: Lack of company is the management of Given this evasive conduct, U.S. Transparency financial institutions remain As outlined above, the pervasive lack 38 See ‘‘Ximex Executive Limited,’’ (http:// particularly at risk of indirectly of transparency surrounding Credex’s www.biz-info.co.uk/ximex+executive+limited_ 04605867.html). providing Credex with anonymous business activities—including its high access to the U.S. financial system. 39 See ‘‘Carrington Accountancy,’’ (http:// volume of suspicious transactions with www.freeindex.co.uk/profile(carrington- B. The Extent to Which Credex Is Used shell corporations, the substantial accountancy)_277286.htm). See also ‘‘Carrington for Legitimate Business Purposes in the uncertainty surrounding the transacting Corporate Services Limited,’’ (http://www.biz- info.co.uk/carrington+corporate+services+limited_ Jurisdiction parties and purposes involved in those 03160163.html). transactions, the bank’s evasive The lack of transparency—regarding 40 Dun & Bradstreet, Global Reference Solution conduct, and its operation in a high risk the jurisdiction, beneficial ownership of (2011) (www.dnb.com). jurisdiction—makes it virtually 41 ‘‘Unauthorized firms/individuals,’’ Financial the bank (discussed in Section II (D), impossible to discern the extent to Services Authority, November 4, 2010 (http:// below), and transactional activity with which the bank is engaged in legitimate www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Doing/Regulated/Law/ shell corporations—makes it difficult to Alerts/unauthorised.shtml). business, and most importantly, to assess the extent to which Credex is 42 ‘‘What We Do,’’ Financial Services Authority evaluate its capacity to identify and engaged in legitimate business. Thus, (http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/what/ mitigate risk and illicit finance. This index.shtml). situation is exacerbated by a similar lack 43 ‘‘Warnings & alerts,’’ Financial Services 31 These appear to be ‘‘nostro’’ accounts, which Authority, November 4, 2010 (http:// are commonly used for currency settlement. of transparency in the bank’s www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Doing/Regulated/Law/ 32 Bankers Almanac (2012). ownership, which has passed from one Alerts/index.shtml). 33 Id. shell corporation to another, creating 44 Bankers Almanac (2012). 34 Id. considerable uncertainty as to the 45 Analyst Search of Dun & Bradstreet, Global 35 Bankers Almanac (2012). identity of the true beneficial owner(s). Reference Solution (2012). (www.dnb.com) (search 36 Additionally, according to Credex’s Web site, Credex’s original registered owner, for ‘‘Rue St Pierre 18 Fribourg Switzerland’’). 46 the bank performs transfers through international 37 ‘‘The Misuse of Corporate Vehicles, Including money transfer services (Anelik, Leader, Western Ximex, displays numerous Trust and Company Service Providers,’’ FATF Union, and Moneygram) without opening an (http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/ account. See ‘‘General Information,’’ CredexBank 37 ‘‘Belarus on a Roll,’’ Business New Europe, July reports/Misuse%20of%20Corporate%20 Web site (http://www.en.credexbank.by/bank/ 22, 2009 (http://www.bne.eu/story1701/Belarus_on_ Vehicles%20including%20Trusts%20and%20 general). a_roll). Company%20Services%20Providers.pdf), p. 33.

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financial, industrial, and commercial The ambiguity surrounding Vicpart’s agencies to take this opportunity to participation, as well as real estate ownership is particularly concerning comment on a continuing information operation.47 Separately, a global because the company also exhibits collection, as required by the Paperwork business registry indicates that Vicpart several indicators of typical shell Reduction Act of 1995. An agency may is registered as a joint stock company corporation activity, and owns a bank not conduct or sponsor, and a whose primary line of business is that has been engaged in highly respondent is not required to respond investment management.48 However, questionable patterns of transactions to, an information collection unless it Credex is listed as its only holding.49 that are indicative of money laundering. displays a currently valid OMB control Adding to these concerns are For example, while Vicpart’s Web site number. The OCC is soliciting comment allegations of criminal involvement by states that the company was concerning its information collection Vicpart’s management. According to incorporated in 1999,53 it does not titled, ‘‘Registration of Mortgage Loan information made available to the USG, appear to have been active until June Originators.’’ The OCC is also giving two former Vicpart board members were 2009—four months prior to acquiring notice that it has sent this collection to charged with criminal activity, Credex from another shell corporation, OMB for review. including document forgery. These Ximex in October 2009.54 This long DATES: Comments must be received by individuals may have used companies period of dormancy followed by June 25, 2012. registered to Vicpart’s current address as involvement in a major transaction ADDRESSES: Communications Division, part of their alleged criminal activity. bears the hallmark of Vicpart being a Office of the Comptroller of the Meanwhile, aside from the listing of a ‘‘shelf company.’’ 55 Additionally, Currency, Mailstop 2–3, Attention: single individual as both a Vicpart Vicpart’s financial statements at the 1557–0243, 250 E Street SW., director and the sole authorized time of acquisition showed no balance Washington, DC 20219. In addition, signatory for the company, there is no sheet assets except for 100,000 Swiss comments may be sent by fax to (202) other publicly available information on Francs (estimated $108,000) in share 874–5274 or by electronic mail to the current composition of Vicpart’s capital.56 [email protected]. You may board of directors.50 III. Finding personally inspect and photocopy Although the Credex Web site comments at the OCC, 250 E Street SW., currently states that the single Based on the foregoing factors, the Washington, DC 20219. For security individual listed as a Vicpart director is Director of FinCEN hereby finds that reasons, the OCC requires that visitors also the ‘‘beneficial owner’’ of the Credex is a financial institution of make an appointment to inspect company,51 the USG has concerns about primary money laundering concern. comments. You may do so by calling the accuracy of this information. Dated: May 22, 2012. (202) 874–4700. Upon arrival, visitors According to publicly available Peter S. Alvarado, will be required to present valid information, the individual named as Deputy Director, Financial Crimes government-issued photo identification Vicpart’s beneficial owner has also been Enforcement Network. and to submit to security screening in identified by global business registries [FR Doc. 2012–12742 Filed 5–24–12; 8:45 am] order to inspect and photocopy as being involved with at least 30 BILLING CODE 4810–02–P comments. different companies, many of which are Additionally, please send a copy of in liquidation and list the individual’s your comments by mail to: OCC Desk personal residence as their address.52 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Officer, 1557–0243, U.S. Office of This involvement with a large number Management and Budget, 725 17th of companies, many of which are in Office of the Comptroller of the Street NW., #10235, Washington, DC liquidation and/or share the same Currency 20503, or by fax to (202) 395–6974. address, raises concerns that the Agency Information Collection FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: You individual may function purely as a Activities: Proposed Information can request additional information or a formation agent or nominal owner Collection; Submission for OMB copy of the collection from Mary H. whose identification as a company’s Review Gottlieb, OCC Clearance Officer, (202) owner in public sources may be 874–5090, Legislative and Regulatory intended to shield the true beneficial AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the Activities Division, Office of the owners from scrutiny. Currency (OCC), Treasury. Comptroller of the Currency, 250 E ACTION: Notice and request for comment. Street SW., Washington, DC 20219. 47 See Vicpart Web site (http://vicpart.ch/en/ SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The OCC about) (accessed 1/19/12, but no longer accessible SUMMARY: The OCC, as part of its is requesting extension of OMB as of 5/21/12). continuing effort to reduce paperwork 48 approval for this collection. There have Dun & Bradstreet, Global Reference Solution and respondent burden, invites the (2011) (www.dnb.com). been no changes to the requirements of general public and other Federal 49 See Vicpart Web site (http://vicpart.ch/en/ the regulations, however, they have about) (accessed 1/19/12, but no longer accessible been transferred to the Bureau of as of 5/21/12). 53 See Vicpart Web site (http://vicpart.ch/en/ 50 Dun & Bradstreet, Global Reference Solution about) (accessed 1/19/12, but no longer accessible Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) (2012) (http://www.dnb.com). as of 5/21/12). pursuant to title X of the Dodd-Frank 51 ‘‘Business Card,’’ CredexBank Web site (http:// 54 Id. Wall Street Reform and Consumer www.en.credexbank.by/bank/general/ 55 The term ‘‘shelf company’’ is typically applied Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, businesscard). See also Dun & Bradstreet, European to a company which, among other things, has 124 Stat. 1990, July 21, 2010 (Dodd- Report (2012) (http://www.dnb.com), which does inactive shareholders, directors, and secretary; and not provide any indication that the single is left dormant—that is, sitting ‘‘on a shelf’’—for the Frank Act), and republished as CFPB individual is the company’s beneficial owner but purpose of being sold. See ‘‘Puppet Masters: How regulations (76 FR 78483 (December 19, indicates that he has been the sole authorized the Corrupt Use Legal Structures to Hide Stolen 2011)). The burden estimates have been signatory since June 2009. Assets and What to Do About It,’’ The World Bank revised to remove the burden for OCC- 52 Dun & Bradstreet, Global Reference Solution and UNODC, 2011, p. 37. (www.worldbank.org). (2012) (http://www.dnb.com). See also 56 See Vicpart Web site (http://vicpart.ch/en/ regulated institutions with over $10 ‘‘Moneyhouse’’ (http://www.moneyhouse.ch/en). about) (accessed 1/19/12, but no longer accessible billion in assets, now carried by CFPB as of 5/21/12). pursuant to section 1025 of the Dodd-

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