Operation Zala () An investigation into call handling and information sharing prior to the death of Mr Spencer Ashworth on 27 September 2017

> Independent investigation report >Investigation information

Investigation name: Operation Zala (West Midlands Police)

IOPC1 reference: 2017/093436

Investigation type Conduct matter

IOPC office: Cardiff

Lead investigator: Amanda Trevett

Case supervisor: Ian Andrews

Director General delegate Derrick Campbell (Decision Maker):

Status of report: Final

Date finalised: 15 June 2018

The primary purpose of this report is to provide information to the appropriate authority (AA) and decision maker to allow them to perform their obligations under the PRA. Although this report may be disclosed to other parties, its primary audience is stakeholders who have knowledge of the complaints system. Therefore, IOPC/police responsibilities or the detail of the misconduct system will not be explained in this document. For cases using this template, complainants and interested parties will be updated separately in a plain English outcome letter supported by a document explaining the IOPC and the complaints system processes.

In conduct investigation reports, the role of the designated investigator is to provide an accurate summary of the evidence, and attach or refer to any relevant documents for the decision maker. On receipt of the report, the decision maker will make their CPS referral decision. The decision maker will also reach an opinion2 about whether there is a case to answer for misconduct, gross misconduct or unsatisfactory performance in respect of any person serving

1 On 8 January 2018, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) became the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC). We have referred to ourselves as the IOPC within this report. 2 The legislation that sets out what information needs to be included in an investigation report has changed. There is no longer a requirement for the investigator to give their opinion on whether any subject of the investigation has a case to answer for misconduct or gross misconduct, or no case to answer, within the report. Instead, the delegated decision maker will give their opinion on a separate opinion document.

with the police. The report and DM’s opinion will then be sent to the AA; upon receipt of the AA’s proposals, the decision maker will make their other determinations in accordance with the legislation.

> The investigation

1. I was appointed by the IOPC to carry out an independent investigation into call handling and information sharing by West Midlands Police (Central Motorway Policing Group3) prior to the death of Mr Spencer Ashworth at The Hundred, Portishead on 27 September 2017.

2. Mr Ashworth died following contact with and Police armed response officers, when they responded to a further, similar, emergency call made to Avon and Somerset Police in relation to concerns regarding Mr Ashworth’s behaviour. The involvement of Avon and Somerset Police with Mr Ashworth prior to his death is subject to a separate report.

3. This matter came to the attention of the IOPC on 18 October 2017 as a DSI4 referral. The IOPC was originally made aware of the referral on 27 September 2017 but decided the matter should be referred back to West Midlands Police to be dealt with in any manner they determined. As the IOPC investigation into the involvement of Avon and Somerset Police with Mr Spencer prior to his death progressed, the IOPC invited West Midlands Police to voluntarily re-refer their involvement.

4. During the course of this investigation there was an indication that a may have breached their Standards of Professional Behaviour, and their conduct was investigated during this investigation.

> Terms of reference

5. The terms of reference for this investigation set out the following points that the investigation has addressed: To investigate actions and decisions by officers and/or police staff of the Central Motorway Policing Group (CMPG), specifically:

3 Central Motorway Policing Group (CMPG) is responsible for policing the M5, M6, M6 toll, M42, M50, M54 and the Aston Expressway. They operate 24 hour patrols from three bases around the region. The headquarters is in Perry Barr, Birmingham with bases in Worcestershire and Staffordshire. 4 Death or serious injury

Operation Zala – West Midlands Police – Final report for publication 3 a) to review how the information provided by was recorded, handled and shared with other police forces b) the urgency with which the information was dealt with c) to determine whether this information was appropriately referred to CMPG supervisory staff

6. The evidence relating to each of these matters will be presented in this report.

> Other investigations

7. The IOPC has also conducted investigations into the involvement of both West Mercia Police and Avon and Somerset Police with Mr Ashworth prior to his death on 27 September 2017. These are subject to separate IOPC investigation reports, under reference numbers 2017/092381 and 2017/092422 respectively.

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> Subjects

Name and role Brief description of alleged breach of Severity Date Standards of Professional Behaviour5 notified PC E It was alleged PC E failed to Misconduct 23 January appropriately risk assess the 2018

5 Full background details are provided in the notice of investigation.

Operation Zala – West Midlands Police – Final report for publication 4 Police Constable information provided to him by the West Mercia Police call handler. In addition, it was alleged he failed to raise the incident with a supervisory officer and failed to transfer the incident details to other police forces in a timely manner and by appropriate means.

> Policies, procedures and legislation considered

Source Content

9. College of Policing The APP states the National Decision Model (NDM) is Authorised suitable for all decisions and should be used by everyone in Professional policing. It can be applied: Practice (APP) –  to spontaneous incidents or planned operations National Decision  by an individual or team of people

Model6  to both operational and non-operational situations The NDM has six key elements. Each component provides the user with an area for focus and consideration. The element that binds the model together is the Code of Ethics at the centre:

6 https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/national-decision-model/the-national-decision-model/

Operation Zala – West Midlands Police – Final report for publication 5

> Summary of the evidence

> Timeline of events on 27 September 2017

Approx. Event time 8.37am 10. Ms D, West Mercia Police call handler, telephoned Central Motorway Policing Group (CMPG) and spoke to PC E. She informed him she had received a call from Mr C who had told her he was driving southbound on the M5, near junction 8, heading towards Gloucester, when another car pulled up next to him and “he believes has got him to pull his window down, pointed a gun at him.” She provided a description of the vehicle, including that it was possibly an old Renault, and the registration number V5 KAW, but informed PC E this may have been incorrect as it belonged to a white Mercedes.

8.37am PC E opened an incident log and described the “Incident 11. details” as “reporting having a gun pointed at caller. Offending vehicle possibly old red Renault. V5 KAW or similar,” and recorded the vehicle was travelling between junction 7 and 8. He also recorded the West Mercia incident log number – 93S. 8.38am Glos Pol 12. PC E further recorded the vehicle was probably in “ by now”. 8.39am 13. PC E telephoned Gloucestershire and spoke to Temporary Sergeant F, who was performing the role of control room sergeant. PC E informed PS F, “we’ve been passed it by West Mercia, potentially there’s a red, an old style red Renault travelling southbound on the five through junction eight now, whereby the driver of said vehicle pointed a handgun at the caller who has left the motorway at junction eight.” PC E explained he had a registration number for the vehicle but it was incorrect. He provided PS F with the registration number V5 KAW, and stated it was similar to this. PC E provided PS F with his contact number, and PS F stated “Right I’ll get someone to ring you straight back so we can create an incident and put it out all right?”

8.41am GLOS POL 14. PC E recorded on the incident log “ CALLING BACK TO TAKE DETAILS.” 8.42am 15. A call handler from Gloucestershire Constabulary telephoned CMPG and spoke to PC E. He did not have some of the

Operation Zala – West Midlands Police – Final report for publication 6 information requested by the call handler and informed the call handler he would call Mr C, the original caller, back. 8.47am 16. PC E recorded the Gloucestershire Police incident log number on the CMPG incident log. 8.48am 17. PC E recorded he had attempted to telephone the original caller but it went to voicemail and he left a message. 8.50am An entry on the incident log at 8.55am recorded that the user 18. of terminal ‘MPS1’, a supervisor terminal, requesting PC E to re-contact the caller and ascertain full details, and confirm whether or not the item was a gun. It also recorded PC E was to liaise with RTI7 to attempt to identify the VRM8 and vehicle. He was also to consider any PND9 checks and update the incident log accordingly. 8.54am 19. The Gloucestershire Constabulary call handler, on behalf of her inspector, telephoned West Mercia call handler, Ms D to request additional information. Ms D provided a description of the car, and a description of the driver. 9.14am 20. PC E telephoned Gloucestershire Constabulary and spoke to PS F. He informed her ANPR10 checks identified the closest vehicle registration to that provided by the original caller as V52 KAW, a red Suzuki Swift registered to Mr Ashworth who “lives in so it’s heading in the right direction”. PC E informed PS F that “he’s got no firearms markers but he’s got violent markers, mental health, suicidal, he’s got an impending for XXXXXXXXXXX and a constable. The assault a constable is Gloucester, Gloucester Mags.” PS F said to PC E “as far as we’re concerned the vehicle is still in your force area isn’t it.” After clarifying the original caller had left at junction eight of the M5 and the Suzuki Swift was believed to have continued south bound on the M5, PS F asked PC E “have you let Bristol know?” to which PC E replied, “Not yet.” PS F said to PC E “I take it you’ll make contact with Avon and Somerset to let them know as well?”, and PC E said “Yeah if you want me to, unless you want to do it?” PS F told PC E “No cos it’s been reported to you, it’s your job isn’t it so if you could let them know.”

9.20am 21. Avon and Somerset Police received an emergency telephone call from Mr J. Mr J informed the call handler he was following a red Suzuki vehicle, registration V52 KEW southbound on the M5, as it had “just took a shot” at him.

7 Real time intelligence. 8 Vehicle registration mark. 9 Police National Database. 10 Automatic Number Plate Recognition.

Operation Zala – West Midlands Police – Final report for publication 7 [The response of Avon and Somerset Police is documented in a separate IOPC investigation report, reference number

2017/092422] 9.24am 22. PC E telephoned Avon and Somerset Police switchboard and spoke to Mr G. PC E asked to speak to somebody in the

control room “in relation to a potential firearms incident that's coming down the motorway”. Mr G asked if it was an emergency, and PC E said, “No, more so for observations, cos I haven't been able to get back to the person who called it in, to be fair… So we've just done some enquiries in relation to the vehicle he reported… as someone pointed a gun at him while he was travelling on the M5 south. Potentially he's gonna be on you now.” Mr G responded, “Oh right… erm … I mean could… surely this might be an emergency?” and PC E said “Yeah, I just need to pass observation message through on to the control room if I could please.” Mr G informed PC E there were 15 people in the queue, and

PC E asked Mr G for the hailing group11 for Avon and Somerset Police. Mr G explained he did not know what a hailing group was, and provided PC E with the extension number for the control room before placing his call in the queue.

> Other evidence

Summary

23. Account of Inspector X, CMPG

24. Inspector X explained CMPG is funded by Staffordshire, West Midlands and West Mercia Police, and are responsible for policing the M5, M6, M6 Toll, M42, M50, M54 and the Aston Expressway. He stated CMPG have a Regional Control Centre (RCC) in Quinton, Birmingham. Inspector X explained CMPG does not have any armed policing capability, CMPG control room personnel do not have any firearms

11 See account of Superintendent AA, below.

Operation Zala – West Midlands Police – Final report for publication 8 training, and supervisors are not trained as ‘Force Incident Managers’ with strategic or tactical firearms capability. He stated any incident potentially requiring an armed response should be managed and resourced by whichever force is appropriate in the circumstances. He stated he would not expect CMPG to take control of any incident requiring an armed response. He added that, in the event of a firearms incident on a motorway, CMPG staff would contribute insofar as making the motorway safe by preventing public access or in an observational or supportive role. Inspector X explained Resource Allocation Dispatchers (RADs) are trained to undertake risk assessments using the THRIVE model before dispatching CMPG resources in accordance with their risk assessment. He further explained RADs raise incidents, record known information, grading, decisions made, and actions taken. Inspector X explained the CMPG control room does not receive telephone calls from the public; their calls are directed to the local force control room who decide how best to deal with any given occurrence and inform CMPG for information or for CMPG to take control of the incident. Inspector X stated he would expect all trained permanent RADs within CMPG control room to be familiar with the appropriate method of contacting bordering (or any other) police forces. He stated each force has its own radio channel which is readily accessible and should be used in cases of urgency. In relation to this incident, Inspector X stated the incident referred to CMPG by West Mercia Police occurred at or near to junction 8 of the M5 which is the southernmost border of the area covered by CMPG.

25. Account of Superintendent Z

26. Superintendent Z explained all CMPG Resource Allocators and Dispatchers (RADs) are West Midlands Police employees and receive the same systems training as West Midlands Police RADs who work in West Midlands Police contact centres. He stated that, as he understood, CMPG RADs do not receive call handler training as they do not answer emergency calls from the public and, therefore, there is no specific CMPG call handling policy. Superintendent Z explained 101 and 999 calls from members of the public are routed to and handled by the forces CMPG work with, depending on the location of the caller. He stated the calls are triaged by the receiving force who then pass the incident log or information to CMPG as necessary. Superintendent Z stated West Mercia Police systems are not compatible electronically with CMPG systems so CMPG would receive information by telephone or Airwave message from them before a CMPG OASIS incident log was created. He further explained each force can deploy other resources to respond with CMPG, or request other emergency services or agencies as

Operation Zala – West Midlands Police – Final report for publication 9 necessary based on threat and risk. Superintendent Z stated CMPG do not have firearms capacity and he would have expected West Mercia Police to be thinking about their response to the information they had received while sharing it with CMPG as the vehicle was on the motorway. 27. Superintendent AA, National Airwave User Assurance Co-ordinator 28. Superintendent AA explained she represents and provides assurance to all police forces in England, Wales and Scotland regarding their operational use of the Airwave network. Superintendent AA confirmed technical facilities such as one-touch phone communication and radio communication are broadly similar across all police force control rooms regarding ongoing cross-border incidents, including emergencies and non-emergencies. She explained all force control rooms use the Airwave network to communicate with any control room in the country. Superintendent AA explained a telephone call between forces for non- urgent matters would usually be delivered into a call handling environment that deals primarily with calls for service from the public. She stated that, in her experience, in an emergency the best way for a control room operator to contact another force control room operator is by using what is known as a Mandated Talk Group on the Airwave network. Superintendent AA stated all police forces have Mandated Talk Groups of their own, predominantly for police use but also for some inter-agency working. She explained that, for example, if Gloucestershire Constabulary control room wanted to contact Avon and Somerset Police in an emergency they could select the Avon and Somerset Police Hailing Talk Group from any Airwave radio in the Gloucestershire control room, if the Avon and Somerset Police talk groups were not configured in the Gloucestershire Constabulary control room. This call would be picked up by an operator in the Avon and Somerset Police control room and the emergency message could be passed from one force to another. Superintendent AA explained Police “Hailing” Talk Groups are Mandated Talk Groups, and national guidance dictates all Mandated Talk Groups for all forces should be programmed into every Airwave handset across the country, as well as configured appropriately in police control rooms to allow for cross-border communications. She stated that, in her experience, it is good practice for control room operators to have an Airwave handset at their disposal, to allow them to select the Hailing Talk Group of another force which may not be configured in their own control room set up. She stated Hailing Talk Groups must be monitored by all control rooms 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Superintendent AA stated it is good practice, and local procedures should dictate, that control rooms would have direct telephone numbers for neighbouring control rooms at the very least, to avoid the call initially being answered in a force contact centre before being transferred to

Operation Zala – West Midlands Police – Final report for publication 10 the control room, but this may not always be the case. Superintendent AA explained that, even though CMPG are based in Birmingham, they should have the technical capability to make contact with Avon and Somerset Police control room via their Airwave radio handset or through a talk group configured for use through the control room. Superintendent AA stated that, in her view, CMPG should not have had to ask anyone for the Hailing Talk Group details given they follow a strict alpha tag naming convention12 for every police force in the UK.

29. Account of Inspector BB, Gloucestershire Police Control Room 30. Inspector BB stated the telephone number used by CMPG to call Gloucestershire Police control room on that day did not provide the most efficient transfer of information in an urgent situation. He explained it would have been more efficient to contact using either:  the urgent telephone line – a telephone number provided to other emergency services which has priority above 101 calls but below 999 calls, or  the Airwaves hailing channel – used by the force control room to contact other forces and are also a means for them to contact Gloucestershire Police control room 31. Account of Ms H

32. Ms Rowan Mackenzie, a member of the Avon and Somerset Police Telephony Team explained the telephone call from PC E connected to the Avon and Somerset Police contact centre at 09:22:40am, and PC E would have heard a welcome greeting, which lasted 49 seconds. She explained PC E’s call was connected to Mr G 67 seconds later at 09:24:39am. Ms H stated the call lasted until 09:26:43am before the call was transferred to Mr G’s colleague in a secondary 101 call queue. Ms H explained PC E would have heard a greeting lasting 26 seconds following the initial transfer. Ms H stated PC E remained on the line for 143 seconds before he disconnected the call at 09:29:32am.

Account of PC E 33.

34. PC E explained he was working in the CMPG Regional Control Centre (RCC) on 27 September 2017. He stated that, XXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX [he] commenced his role at the RCC in January 2017, having received a number of training courses to enable him to carry out the role. He stated his responsibilities were taking telephone calls from officers and

12 For police, the tag always begins with P, then a four letter acronym particular to the force, then HG1 e.g. for Avon and Somerset Police PAVONHG1.

Operation Zala – West Midlands Police – Final report for publication 11

members of the public, opening incidents, managing open incidents, and resourcing the incidents, including dispatching officers, arranging the recovery of vehicles, and undertaking people and vehicle checks. PC E explained that, at approximately 8.35am on 27 September 2017, he received a telephone call from West Mercia control room and they stated a caller had complained a male driving a red old-type Renault had pointed a gun at him while he was travelling southbound by junction 8 on the M5. PC E stated he created an incident log and completed a PNC check using the registration number he had been given, V5 KAW. He explained this registration number belonged to a white Mercedes van, which was not the vehicle that had been described. PC E stated he attempted to contact the caller, Mr C, on his mobile number, but it went to answerphone so he left a message asking for him to call back as soon as possible. PC E explained he made his supervisor, XXXXXXXXXX aware of the incident, who asked him to re-contact Mr C to obtain more information regarding the gun, and to liaise with the real-time intelligence officer, XXXXXXXXXX, to check the ANPR to establish the correct registration number. PC E stated he then contacted Gloucestershire Constabulary, as he believed the driver would now be in their force area. He stated he asked them whether they would contact Avon and Somerset Police but they asked him to do so. PC E explained he attempted to contact Avon and Somerset Police using the 101 number, but there were a lot of people waiting so he hung up and contacted them via the Airwaves hailing group, using channel 752. He stated they were already aware of the incident and told him they were dealing with it. PC E stated he re-contacted Mr C, and updated the West Midlands Police incident log with the information provided. PC E explained he was subsequently informed by [the real-time intelligence officer] that the correct registration number was V52 KAW, and carried out a PNC check attaching the results of the check to the incident log, which included the registered keeper being Mr Ashworth. PC E stated he re-contacted Avon and Somerset Police to provide the additional information Mr C had provided and was informed they had stopped the vehicle and the incident was ongoing. He explained a short time later he became aware of a shooting incident in Avon and Somerset Police from the news, and believed the red vehicle being shown on the news was the same one as the one involved in the incident he had been dealing with. PC E explained he believed he had dealt with the incident as quickly as possible and passed information to a number of police forces as soon as he could. He explained that, when not speaking to staff in other forces, he was liaising with colleagues in the RCC to gather as much information possible to provide timely updates to the relevant forces and providing support to the original caller.

Operation Zala – West Midlands Police – Final report for publication 12 > Analysis of the evidence

The recording, handling and sharing of information provided by West Mercia Police with other police forces

35. PC E explained he had been in his role at the CMPG Regional Control Centre for approximately nine months when he was involved in this incident. He stated he had received a number of training courses to enable him to carry out the role.

36. The evidence indicates PC E immediately recorded the information provided by Ms D, West Mercia Police call handler, on the CMPG incident log, but recorded the vehicle was between junctions 7 and 8 rather than it being at junction 8 heading towards Gloucester. It also indicates PC E recognised the vehicle could have entered Gloucestershire Police force area, and telephoned their control room two minutes later. He spoke to PS F and provided her with the details he had been provided by Ms D. PS F informed him she would get someone to call him back to create a Gloucestershire Police incident log.

37. Having received a telephone call from a Gloucestershire Police call handler a few minutes later, PC E attempted to telephone Mr C to obtain additional information 11 minutes after he had received the telephone call from West Mercia Police, but was unable to speak to him and left an answerphone message.

38. PC E stated he made his supervisor, XXXXXX, aware of the incident, and [his supervisor] asked him to complete a number of tasks. This is supported by an entry at 8.50am, from MPS1, a terminal used by a supervisor, on the incident log. This evidence indicates PC E’s supervisory staff were aware of the incident within 13 minutes following PC E having received the initial call from West Mercia Police.

39. It will fall to the Decision Maker to determine whether PC E appropriately alerted supervisory staff of the incident.

40. The evidence indicates PC E telephoned PS F, Gloucestershire Police, at 9.14am, to inform her of the results of intelligence checks he had completed. PS F queried whether PC E had informed Avon and Somerset Police, the next force area the vehicle could enter, and she told PC E it was his job to do so.

Operation Zala – West Midlands Police – Final report for publication 13 41. Eight minutes later, at 9.24am, PC E’s telephone call connected to Avon and Somerset Police, and it was answered by Mr G at 9.24am13, 47 minutes after PC E had received the initial call from West Mercia Police.

42. The evidence indicates PC E was held in a queue until 9.29am, when he disconnected the telephone call.

43. It will fall to the Decision Maker to determine whether, in their opinion, PC E adequately risk assessed the information provided to him, and whether he dealt with the incident in a timely manner and by appropriate means. They may wish to consider whether PC E should have contacted Avon and Somerset Police sooner, given the reported direction of travel, and whether his use of the 101 non- emergency telephone number to contact Avon and Somerset Police, where he was held on the line for seven minutes, rather than a Mandated Talk Group, where he could have contacted a control room operator directly, was appropriate in the circumstances.

44. The Decision Maker may wish to consider PC E’s view that he believed he dealt with the incident as quickly as possible, and passed information to a number of police forces as soon as he could. He explained that, when not speaking to staff in other forces, he was liaising with colleagues in the RCC to gather as much information possible in order to provide timely updates to the relevant forces and providing support to the original caller.

45. When making their determination, they may also wish to consider:  CMPG RADs do not receive call handler training as they do not answer emergency calls from the public, and there is no specific CMPG call handler policy.  PC E had been conducting the role for approximately nine months, and had received training courses to enable him to carry out the role.  Inspector X’s evidence that any incident potentially requiring an armed response should be managed and resourced by whichever force is appropriate in the circumstances.  Superintendent AA, Inspector X and Inspector BB’s evidence that the best way for a control room operator to contact another force in an emergency would be to use a Mandated Talk Group on the Airwave network.

46. The Decision Maker may also wish to consider that West Midlands Police have taken steps to strengthen internal process for sharing information with other forces by preparing a National Police Control Room Directory, which includes call signs,

13 Avon and Somerset Police had dispatched armed officers at this time, after receiving a separate emergency call regarding Mr Ashworth at 9.20am from another motorist on the M5.

Operation Zala – West Midlands Police – Final report for publication 14 PNC codes, Airwave tags, contact telephone numbers, including ones to use in an emergency, and contact email addresses for all police forces in England and Wales.

> Criminal offences

47. On receipt of the report, the Decision Maker must decide if there is an indication that a criminal offence may have been committed by any person to whose conduct the investigation related.

48. If they decide that there is such an indication, they must decide whether it is appropriate to refer the matter to the CPS.

49. I have not identified any offences for the Decision Maker to consider.

> Summary for publication

50. The following summaries are of the incident and our investigation. If the decision is made to publish the case on the IOPC website, this text will be used for that purpose.

Section of Text summary Summary of incident At 8.37am on 27 September 2017, West Midlands Police Central Motorway Policing Group (CMPG) received information from West Mercia Police that they had received an emergency telephone call from a member of the public reporting a man in a vehicle had pointed a gun towards them while they were travelling southbound near junction 8 of the M5.

The call was received by a police officer at the CMPG Regional Control Centre.

The police officer contacted Gloucestershire Police at 8.39am to make them aware of the incident, and made his supervisory officer aware of the incident. He was tasked to complete a number of actions including requesting intelligence checks, telephoning the original caller, and obtaining additional information from

Operation Zala – West Midlands Police – Final report for publication 15 West Mercia Police.

The police officer subsequently contacted Avon and Somerset Police at 9.24am to inform them of the incident.

Summary of During the investigation, investigators obtained an account from the investigation call handler, obtained witness statements, reviewed police documentation and audio recordings, and reviewed local and national policies and procedures.

The call handler believed they dealt with the incident as quickly as possible, and passed information to a number of police forces as soon as they could. They explained when not speaking to staff in other forces, they were liaising with colleagues in the RCC to gather as much information possible in order to provide timely updates to the relevant forces, and providing support to the original caller.

Having obtained the views of the Appropriate Authority, the Decision Maker must decide whether there is a case to answer or unsatisfactory performance for each person to whose conduct the investigation related, and whether disciplinary proceedings should be brought (and if so, the form of those proceedings)14

14 This section of the summary to be completed once final decisions on outcomes are made.

Operation Zala – West Midlands Police – Final report for publication 16