Indigenous Territorial Demands in Post-Dictatorship Chile by Kelly

Policy Implementation and Contentious Action: Indigenous Territorial Demands in Post-Dictatorship Chile

by Kelly Bauer

B.A. in History, Political Science, and Spanish, May 2008, Carthage College

A dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 31, 2015

Dissertation directed by

Cynthia McClintock Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Kelly Bauer has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of

Philosophy as of July 31, 2015. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

Policy Implementation and Contentious Action: Indigenous Territorial Demands in Post-Dictatorship Chile

Kelly Bauer

Dissertation Research Committee:

Cynthia McClintock, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director

Henry Hale, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member

Emmanuel Teitelbaum, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member

Abstract

Policy Implementation and Contentious Action: Indigenous Territorial Demands in Post-Dictatorship Chile

When and how will a government respond to contentious political action through institutionalized policy procedures? Institutionalized political institutions are set up to transparently manage societal conflict, yet contentious action has the potential to dynamically reshape these institutions. Conceptual and theoretical challenges complicate analysis of the outcomes and consequences of social movements, leaving us with the general expectation that governments respond to the perceived threat posed by contentious action; do these expectations apply to the implementation of institutionalized public policy? This interaction between citizens and the state is a crucial expression of democratic citizenship, particularly for historically marginalized groups, who more frequently rely on extra-institutional forms of political action, and in Latin America, where leaders have promised to deepen democracy and redefine citizenship despite prioritizing extractivist development models.

My dissertation explores these questions in the context of indigenous political action surrounding territorial demands in Chile. Known for its removed and technocratic style of governance, Chile is a least likely case in which contentious action would be expected to drive implementation decisions. Why are some Mapuche communities more successful than others in utilizing Chile’s land policy to acquire territorial rights?

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I argue that when a democratic government uses institutionalized public policy to respond to contentious action, it is trapped between preserving stability and preserving the transparency of institutional procedures. Using contentious action, groups can acquire leverage, defined as a tool to exercise power, over how the government balances between those competing ways of preserving governability. The effect of this leverage is conditioned by both the presence of powerful, local interests and the degree of policy institutionalization. Quantitative analysis of an original dataset of instances of contentious action in 266 communities over 20 years reveals that the government is aware of and responding to local instances of both violent and nonviolent contentious action, as well as to regional economic interests. Interviews with government officials and indigenous leaders highlight the government’s persisting motivation to use land policy to appease political tension over four presidential administrations; over time, however, the institutionalization of procedures limits politicians and bureaucrats’ ability to do so. Extensive secondary research reveals that the acquisition of territorial rights in

Bolivia is similarly determined. These interventions into policy implementation procedures set a problematic precedent for patterns of governance and interest articulation in the region.

This research highlights the persisting strength of powerful economic stakeholders, reinforcing historic patterns of exclusion and undermining the broad exercise of indigenous rights. Yet, this research also highlights that indigenous communities have been able to leverage political elites at the expense of powerful competing interests across time, country, demand, political ideology, and institutional strength; the state,

usually seen as something to be resisted, can become a point of leverage for historically marginalized groups who participate in policy through both institutional and extrainstitutional strategies. Building on an emerging body of literature on the micro- dynamics of deepening democracy in Latin America, these insights into the dynamics of minority demands and state responses provide valuable conclusions about link between the development of the state and the empowerment of historically underrepresented groups.

Table of Contents

Abstract of Dissertation...... iii

List of Figures...... vii

List of Tables...... viii

List of Abbreviations...... ix

Chapter 1: Introduction...... 1

Chapter 2: Literature Review...... 36

Chapter 3: Situating Mapuche Territorial Demands within Expectations of Chilean Governance………...... 55

Chapter 4: Bureaucratizing Territory: Translating Indigenous Demands into Land Policy...... 94

Chapter 5: Quantifying Contentious Action and Land Purchases…...... 124

Chapter 6: Land for Peace: Processing Pressure through Public Policy…...... 150

Chapter 7: Leveraging and Threatening Allies...... 193

Chapter 8: Bolivia...... 217

Chapter 9: Conclusion...... 261

Bibliography...... 274

Appendices...... 296

List of Figures1 Figure 1...... 7 Figure 2...... 59 Figure 3...... 294 Figure 4...... 295 Figure 5...... 295 Figure 6...... 296 Figure 7...... 296 Figure 8...... 297 Figure 9...... 298 Figure 10...... 299 Figure 11...... 301 Figure 12...... 302 Figure 13...... 129 Figure 14...... 134 Figure 15...... 307 Figure 16...... 312 Figure 17...... 199 Figure 18...... 314 Figure 19...... 315 Figure 20...... 316 Figure 21...... 320 Figure 22...... 320

1 Figures are numbered in the order that they appear in the text; some are found in the respective chapter’s appendix.

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List of Tables2 Table 1...... 128 Table 2…...... 306 Table 3...... 308 Table 4...... 141 Table 5...... 143 Table 6...... 186 Table 7...... 214 Table 8...... 317 Table 9...... 318 Table 10...... 319

2 Tables are numbered in the order that they appear in the text; some are found in the respective chapter’s appendix.

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List of Abbreviations

ADI Áreas de Desarrollo Indígena AIOC Autonomía Indígena Originario Campesina APG Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní ATM Alianza Territorial Mapuche AWNg Aukiñ Wallmapu Ngulam, also CTT CAM Coordinadora de Comunidades Mapuche en Conflicto Arauko-Malleko CASEN Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional CEPI Comisión Especial de Pueblos Indígenas CIDDEBENI Centro de Investigación y Documentación para el Desarrollo del Beni CIDOB Confederación Indígena del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonia de Bolivia COB Central Obrera Bolivia COICA Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica CONADI Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena CONAF Corporación Nacional Forestal CORMA Corporación Chilena de Madera CSUTCB Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia CTT Consejo Todas las Tierras DIPOLCAR Dirección de Inteligencia Policial de Carabineros ENDESA Empresa Nacional de Electricidad Sociedad Anónima ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia IACHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights IDB Inter-American Development Bank ILO International Labor Organization INDAP Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario INE Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas INKA Instituto Nacional Kollasuyo-Andino-Amazónico INRA Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria INTI Ley del Instituto Nacional de Tierras ITL Identidad Territorial Lafkenche LAPOP Latin American Public Opinion Project LMAD Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización MAS Movimiento al Socialismo MIDEPLAN Ministerio de Planificación MIR Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria MLAR Market-led Agrarian Reform MNR Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario PACMA Pacto Mapuche por la Autodeterminación PDC Partido Demócrata Cristiano PDI Policía de Investigaciones PNAT Proyecto Nacional de Administración de Tierras PNUD Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo PPD Partido por la Democracia PRSD Partido Radical Social Demócrata

PS Partido Socialista RN Renovación Nacional SEGPRES Ministerio Secretaría General de la Presidencia SNA Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura SOFO Sociedad de Fomento Agrícola TCO Tierras Comunitarias de Origen TIOC Territorio Indígena Originaria Campesina UDI Unión Demócrata Independiente UNDRIP United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

Chapter 1 Introduction

12 April 2013

It was a frigid, rainy April morning in Temuco, the regional capital of the

Araucanía region in southern Chile. I was awake early to attend an indigenous march, scheduled to descend from the top of Cerro Ñielol into the city, asserting indigenous demands with the assistance of trutrukas (a long horn made of bamboo and a carved-out cow horn) and kultruns

(ceremonial drum). Cerro Ñielol is a historically significant hill overlooking downtown Temuco. On November 10th, 1881, Mapuche leaders ceded land to Chilean colonists, ending the Chilean armed forces’

Pacification of the Araucanía campaign that pursued the territorial continuity of the country and space for agricultural development on previously unconquered Mapuche land. For some, the Parliament and resulting agreement ushered in peace and the founding of the regional capital. For others, the agreement solidified the military conquest of the

Mapuche nation and initiated persisting patterns of subordination and marginalization. The exact location of the agreement, la Patagua, serves as a central meeting point to conduct Mapuche politics; even General

Augusto Pinochet was presented a toki-kura (stone pendant symbolizing the authority of chief) from allied Mapuche organizations in 1986.

This April march was a continuation of recent events. In January 2013, assailants, assumed to be Mapuche, set fire to the house of a wealthy elderly couple. The couple owns one of the largest and historically conflictual plots of land in the region; a young Mapuche activist had been killed after being shot in the back by a police officer during a land occupation on their land five years prior. By the time the police arrived, the house was destroyed and the couple was dead. The husband shot and injured one of the attackers, the only one to be detained; literature from a radical Mapuche organization was reportedly found at the scene, but no individual or group claimed responsibility for the attack. The government responded quickly. By noon the following day, President Sebastian Piñera arrived to the region, announcing plans to improve security by declaring a security zone, allocating additional police forces, and creating a specialized police force. The Minister of the Interior went further, suggesting the need to declare a state of emergency. Officials called for the assailants to be charged with terrorism under a controversial, Pinochet- era law that has only been applied since the return to democracy to

Mapuche activists charged of committing acts of arson. In the following week, there were nine additional arson attacks, prominent landowners spoke of creating armed self-defense groups, truckers blocked the Pan-

American highway protesting the uncertain security situation, and NGOs criticized the application of the terrorism law.

For Mapuche activists, the government’s security-focused response was

insufficient and myopic; if Mapuche individuals were responsible, the

violence was an expression of broader structural conditions. The

government needed to recognize the Mapuche as indigenous peoples with

internationally-recognized rights to self-determination and autonomy. For

Mapuche activists, the January events highlighted the need for a

historically-splintered movement to clearly articulate the demands of a

united Mapuche community. Diverse organizations and prominent

Mapuche leaders formed the Pacto Mapuche por la Autodeterminación

(PACMA, Mapuche Pact for Self-Determination). At their first meeting in

January 2013, PACMA announced plans to assert their rights to self-

determination and autonomy. On April 11th, PACMA organized their first

conference on self-determination, bringing together leaders to discuss

specific demands, proposals, and processes; the April 12th march would

3 present these decisions to the government.

We arrived to la Patagua by 8am, as PACMA leadership had publicized

on social media. The few people who had arrived poked at a small fire and

passed around steamed chestnuts, waiting for the crowds and leadership to

arrive. Several prominent lonkos (chief, “head” in Mapuzungun) arrived

by mid-morning, overseeing traditional ceremonies and a long discussion

3 Pacto por la Autodeterminacion Mapuche, "Primera conference sobre autodeterminación Mapuche y manifestación pública " https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=505260792869008&id=463354517059636

about whether to follow through on the march as scheduled (Figure 1).

PACMA had a crafted a letter declaring the group’s intentions to self- govern, but everyone was concerned that a 100 person march would not demand sufficient attention. Ultimately, leaders and attendees agreed that

PACMA leadership would present the letter to the government and hold a press conference, but postpone the march. Concerned about presenting any semblance of a weak march, everyone dispersed and descended the hill in small groups.

I walked down the hill perplexed. PACMA was the initiative of some of the most prominent and experienced Mapuche leaders who certainly know how and when to put together a powerful march. There were no signs of repression beyond what is expected at similar events; a few policemen in riot gear stood awkwardly at the exit of the hill and a pesky old reporter from the conservative newspaper circulated through the ceremony taking pictures of everyone in attendance. While the march was broadly publicized, leadership seemed eager to cover it up. Why did the march dissipate overnight?

Thankfully, a friend pieced together details from conversations throughout the morning. In an effort to cripple the planned march and any momentum for Mapuche self-determination demands, the government organized ceremonies throughout the region to present resources to indigenous

communities. While many Mapuche leaders had planned to attend the

march with their communities, they stayed to receive the politicians and

participate in the ceremonies. This was all organized at the last minute;

PACMA only learned of the government’s plans late the night before and

scrambled to avoid appearing as if the organization and call for self-

determination lacked broad Mapuche support.

I scoured the internet for confirmation. The intendente (appointed

governor) of the Los Lagos region and the Subsecretary of the Servicio

Nacional de la Mujer (National Women’s Service) presented subsidies

and fishing equipment totaling $184 million pesos to more than 500

Lafquenche fishermen in Castro, Chiloe.4 The National Director of

CONADI (National Corporation of Indigenous Development,

Corporación Nacional de Desarollo Indígena) held a press conference to

announce two public lotteries that would promote development and

productivity in the Araucanía region, totaling $680 million pesos.5 In

Valdivia, the subdirector of CONADI and intendente of the Los Ríos

region announced the 87 families in the region to receive a subsidy to

purchase land.6 On the day of the planned march, the government

coordinated for prominent politicians to allocate more than $1.4 million

4 "CONADI entregó aparejos de pesca y buceo a pescadores Lafquenche de Chiloé," CONADI, http://www.conadi.gob.cl/index.php/noticias-conadi/980-conadi-entrego-aparejos-de-pesca-y-buceo-a- pescadores-lafquenche-de-chiloe. 5 "CONADI lanzó concursos por $680 millones para apoyar la productividad de las tierras Mapuche de la Araucanía," CONADI, http://www.conadi.gob.cl/index.php/2-noticias/975-conadi-lanzo-concursos-por- 680-millones-para-apoyar-la-productividad-de-las-tierras-mapuche-de-la-araucania/. 6 "La CONADI entregó $1.740 millones en subsidios de tierra a familias Mapuche," soyvaldivia.cl 2013.

USD to Mapuche individuals and communities, in addition to an

undetermined amount for the subsidies for land purchases.

This government strategizing explained the bizarre unfolding of events on

April 12th. Neither government officials nor Mapuche leadership were

surprised that the government strategically implemented policies and

program at a particular moment to weaken mobilization and the

articulation of indigenous demands for self-determination; as Sidney

Tarrow highlights, “Much of the history of movement/ state interaction

can be read as a duet of strategy and counterstrategy between movements

activists and power holders.”7 Yet, because the government’s response

came under the guise of implementing institutionalized policies, these

dynamics were never reported; how much of the contestation between

Mapuche communities and the state is left off the record? This research

tells the story of the unspoken maneuvering, structured by public policy,

that conditions future engagement between historically marginalized

communities and Latin American states.

7 Sidney Tarrow and Tollefson, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Figure 1: Reunion at la Patagua, Cerro Ñielol, Temuco, April 12th, 2013

From left to right: Manuel Painiqueo: leader of Comunidades Mapuche de Lumaco (Mapuche Communities of Lumaco), former mayor of Lumaco (2004- 2012)

Victor Quiepul: Lonko (head) of the Comunidad Autónoma de Temucuicui (Autonomous Community of Temucuicui), a Mapuche community that has maintained one of the most emblematic conflicts with the Mininco forestry company

José Santo Millao: President of Ad- Mapu, known for activism surrounding indigenous demands and opposition to the Pinochet dictatorship during the late 1980s, former indigenous representative to CONADI

Aucan Huilcaman Paillama: Werken (spokesperson) and founder of Consejo de Todas las Tierras (Aukiñ Wallmapu Ngulam, Council of All Lands), former leader of Ad-Mapu (1980s), presidential candidate (2005), known for land takeovers in the 1990s and international activism

When and how will a government respond to contentious action through institutionalized policy procedures? Institutionalized political institutions are set up to transparently manage societal conflict. Yet, the broad range of violent and nonviolent extrainstitutional forms of political participation falling within the category of contentious action has the potential to dynamically reshape these institutions. This largely unexplored arena of contestation is crucial for both governments’ calculations of how to respond to contentious action and organizations’ calculations of how to successfully engage with and reshape the state. These local, bureaucratic decisions are hidden from most empirical and theoretical discussions, leaving few expectations of if, when, or how governments intervene in institutionalized policy implementation procedures to respond to contentious action.

These questions are particularly relevant in the context of recent indigenous mobilization in Latin America. Marginalized communities more frequently articulate demands through extrainstitutional forms of political action, a trend that is further pronounced given the persisting exclusion and inequality in Latin America. Social movements in Latin America strike a comparatively tighter link with the state; public policy is a consequential result of social movements’ efforts to acquire political power and influence within the state. Recently, public policy responses have become even more relevant considering recent opposition to the neoliberal project; groups’ demands for both representation in and autonomy from the state are extended through public policy. These trends are perhaps best characterized by mobilization around indigenous demands for rights recognitions, a necessary but insufficient means of acquiring both political power and self-determination. While the recognition of indigenous rights is a crucial advance,

the meaningful exercise of these rights depends upon policy implementation, which is often undermined by the presence of powerful extractive industries whose interests trump the protection of indigenous rights. Does contestation affect how Latin American governments implement recognized indigenous territorial rights?

This dissertation research addresses this gap, generating and testing hypotheses of government responses to contentious action through institutionalized public policy to add theoretical and empirical insight into a persisting source of tension between states and historically marginalized communities. Literature on how states respond to social movements and dissidents offers general expectations that governments respond to the perceived threats posed by contentious action; will a democratic government intervene in institutionalized policy procedures to do so? While most research is limited by the methodological challenges of causally linking broad social movement demands to specific government responses, this research isolates these dynamics, focusing in on one government’s response to the specific demands of one community through one policy.

I argue that government responses to contentious action are distinct when a democratic government uses institutionalized public policy. Rather than responding proportionately to threat, democratic governments are trapped between preserving stability in the region and preserving the transparency of institutional procedures. Using contentious action, groups can acquire leverage, defined as a tool to exercise power, over how the government balances between those competing ways of preserving governability. The effect of this leverage is conditioned by both the presence of powerful, local interests and the degree of policy institutionalization, defined as the process through which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. Specifically, the more

powerful the interests of local stakeholders and the more institutionalized the policy implementation procedures, communities need more leverage over political elites who trump these interests and procedures. These implementation patterns highlight that public policy, particularly less institutionalized public policy, is a tool through which governments seek to demobilize and disarticulate contentious action, undercutting the significance of rights recognitions and inhibiting the equitable exercise of rights. These insights into if, when, and how governments respond to contentious action through policy provide valuable conclusions about the future patterns of development, participation, and empowerment in Latin America. As will be discussed in detail at the end of this chapter, this research finds mixed results in support of this argument, suggesting significant nuance in how governments respond to contentious action through institutionalized policy and highlighting the impact of policy institutionalization on patterns of implementation.

This introductory chapter highlights the importance of studying the dynamic interaction between contentious action and the implementation of institutionalized policy.

After discussing why historically marginalized groups more frequently rely on extrainstitutional forms of political action, the chapter reviews recent patterns of contentious action in Latin America and situates indigenous mobilization within these trends. It then provides an overview of recent research interpreting the causes and significance of this recent wave of indigenous mobilization, arguing that while prominent activists and scholars call attention to the persisting brecha de implementación

(implementation gap) between the recognition and exercise of indigenous rights, scholars

have not explored if or how policy implementation can explain this gap. The chapter then introduces the Chilean and Bolivian cases under analysis and research methodology.

Political Action of Historically Marginalized Groups

This research builds on a broad literature exploring the political action of historically marginalized groups. Historically marginalized groups face significant barriers to resolving grievances through traditional forms of political action, creating inequalities in how different groups participate in the political system.8 As Claudio

Holzner concluded of the Mexican case, “the poor are less and less able to afford the increasing costs of political action, are increasingly pessimistic about their ability to influence the decisions and actions of their government, and more and more often are choosing political strategies that do not enhance their political voice.”9

Considering these forms of inequalities, scholars have explored unexpected ways in which historically marginalized groups affect the political systems. James Scott draws attention to weapons of the weak, defined as the disguised, deniable, ambiguous, anonymous, and usually uncoordinated actions that do not outwardly defy the state, but have the aggregate potential to “make an utter shambles of the policies dreamed up by their would-be superiors in the capital.”10 Kevin O’Brien’s research agenda observes rightful resistance, which operates at the boundaries of the state by instrumentally utilizing state policies and laws to pressure officials who ignored those commitments.11

8 Sidney Verba, Norman H Nie, and Jae-on Kim, Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison (University of Chicago Press, 1978). 9 Claudio A Holzner, "The Poverty of Democracy: Neoliberal Reforms and Political Participation of the Poor in Mexico," Latin American Politics and Society 49, no. 2 (2007): 91. 10 James C Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (Yale University Press, 1985), 36. 11 Kevin J O'Brien, "Rightful Resistance," World Politics 49, no. 01 (1996). Kevin J O'Brien et al., Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 2006).

Finally, citizen-initiated contact, or political demand making, is instrumentally “… aimed at extracting certain types of benefits from the political system by influencing the decisions of incumbent government officials”; individuals only participate when they have a specific need, see the government as capable of addressing the need, and perceive a means of influencing the government.12

This dissertation contributes to this research on everyday, direct, and local forms of political action, calling attention to forms of political action and contestation that occur within public policy. Political action in public policy at the local level is frequently the only contact point between historically marginalized groups and the state, 13 setting a strong precedent for future engagement with the state.

Social Movements in Latin America

The political action of historically marginalized groups is particularly important in

Latin America, where historic patterns of exclusions have entrenched inequitable patterns of political participation. Because of these patterns, social movements in Latin America have struck a comparatively tighter link with the state, directing mobilizations and demands towards the state to influence the shape of political, economic, and social development agendas.

Current discontent and mobilization in Latin America is rooted in the region’s neoliberal transition starting in the 1970s. After the inflation and stagnation of the 1980s, countries throughout the region implemented structural adjustment and austerity

12 Wayne A Cornelius, "Urbanization and Political Demand Making: Political Participation among the Migrant Poor in Latin American Cities," American Political Science Review 68, no. 03 (1974). Also see: Peter K Eisinger, "Protest Behavior and the Integration of Urban Political Systems," The Journal of Politics 33, no. 04 (1971). Bryan D Jones et al., "Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initiated Contacts: Environmental Enforcement in Detroit," American Political Science Review 71, no. 01 (1977). 13 Paul W Posner, "Local Democracy and the Transformation of Popular Participation in Chile," Latin American Politics and Society 46, no. 3 (2004).

programs that privatized state-owned industry, reduced government spending, and liberalized trade. The poor were disproportionately affected by both the economic downturn in the 1980s and the resulting reforms, exacerbating existing economic inequalities. Furthermore, this economic program was accompanied by political and social reforms. Reforms were often implemented by technocrats in bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, leaving policymaking isolated from political pressures and popular demands. Latin American governments also employed the “politics of antipolitics,” dismantling and demobilizing labor unions and leftist parties to prevent politics from undermining restructuring efforts.14

While democratic political transitions in the 1980s and 1990s increased political participation, the pacted nature of many of the transitions often cemented elite privileges.15 The persisting technocratic, neoliberal governance model did not meaningfully respond to demands for equitable citizenship, representation, and participation.16 The potential for collective action was further undercut as neoliberal reforms decreased leaders’ accountability and reduced the state’s role as distributor of social goods. Scholars warned of the emergence of delegative democracy, in which presidents were held limitedly accountable by weakened intermediary organizations.17

14 Thomas Davies and Brian Loveman, The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997). 15 Frances Hagopian, "The Compromised Consolidation: The Political Class in the Brazilian Transition," Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (1992). Kurt Weyland, "Neoliberalism and Democracy in Latin America: A Mixed Record," Latin American Politics and Society 46, no. 1 (2004). 16 Marcus J Kurtz, "The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open Economy: Lessons from Latin America," World Politics 56, no. 02 (2004). Manuel Antonio Garretón, Incomplete Democracy: Political Democratization in Chile and Latin America (UNC Press Books, 2003). Eduardo Silva, Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 17 Guillermo A O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (1994).

This double transition to democratization and neoliberalism prompted an unexpected wave of mobilization responding to how the technocratic, neoliberal governance model incorporated popular sectors. This post-neoliberal agenda called for recognition of the failures of the neoliberal project, in favor of alternative economic, political, and social policies that could reshape the state.18 In contrast with the Latin

American left of the mid 20th century, the post-neoliberal left called for the state to work with the market and private sector to promote and reshape development. This was often seen in the construction of a social safety net, particularly in the areas of social security, health, and education, and often incentivized through conditional cash transfer programs.

Post-neoliberalism also calls for a re-envisioning of the link between the state and citizens, using institutional innovations to implement a more decentralized form of governance in which citizens would directly and collectively deliberate over public policy, allocation of resources, and government monitoring.19

Scholars argued that these movements, characterized as New Social

Movements,20 were much more than a class-based reaction to shifts in objective economic conditions. Previous class-based mobilization organized by national-level peasant or labor organizations splintered into women’s, indigenous, landless,

18 Kurt Weyland, Raúl L Madrid, and Wendy Hunter, Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings (Cambridge University Press, 2010). Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M Roberts, The Resurgence of the Latin American Left (JHU Press, 2013). 19 See, for example, Benjamin Goldfrank, Deepening Local Democracy in Latin America: Participation, Decentralization, and the Left (Penn State Press, 2011). Donna Lee Van Cott, Radical Democracy in the Andes (Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 2008). 20 For additional discussion on new social movements, see Hanspeter Kriesi, New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, vol. 5 (U of Minnesota Press, 1995). Joseph R Gusfield, New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity (Temple University Press, 2009). Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," Social Research (1985). Alberto Melucci, "The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach," Social science information 19, no. 2 (1980).

environmental, Afro-American and religious interests, demanding a different relationship with the state. They represented individuals constituting themselves as political subjects with collective social identities. While class-based labor or peasant mobilization traditionally sought to acquire and redefine political power, these new movements operated “over and above - and in spite of – institutions,”21 pursuing participation in yet autonomy from the political arena.22 These organizations were characterized for being more pluralistic, horizontal, and decentralized; more autonomous from traditional political parties; more focused on the use of direct struggle (usually non-violent political protest such as road blocks, occupations) rather than the political and electoral processes; and more strategic in utilizing transnational linkages. Because of the historic patterns of marginalization described above and the fragmented, decentralized nature of these demands, the resulting powerful mobilization was quite unexpected.

Accumulating opposition to the neoliberal project prompted a region-wide shift to the left. A wave of left-leaning presidents came to office as a direct result of social mobilizations (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador) or because of the electoral support of social movements (Brazil). This “left tide” started with the election of Hugo Chavez in

Venezuela in 1998; followed by Luis Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva in 2002 in Brazil, Nestor

Kirchner in Argentina in 2003, Evo Morales in Bolivia since 2005, and a number of others. Broadly, these presidents recognized and prioritized the international and domestic market and its limitations, working to moderate macroeconomic growth with

21 Fernando Calderón, Alejandro Piscitelli, and José Luis Reyna, "Social Movements: Actors, Theories, Expectations," The Making of Social Movements in Latin America (1992): 20. 22 John Burdick, Philip Oxhorn, and Kenneth M Roberts, Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America?: Societies and Politics at the Crossroads (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M Roberts, "Latin America's' Left Turn': A Framework for Analysis," The Resurgence of the Latin American Left (2011). Todd A. Eisenstadt, Latin America's Multicultural Movements : The Struggle between Communitarianism, Autonomy, and Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

equity and deepen democracy to create a more inclusive, participatory form of democratic governance and citizenship.

These leaders’ elections raised complicated empirical and theoretical questions about the nature of government-movement relations and the quality of democratic governance in the region. Would the government consider the social movement to be a partner in the government? Would social movement leaders be incorporated into the government? Would the government incorporate social movement demands? Or, would demands be tempered? Would social movements continue to rely on contentious action if demands were not sufficiently or promptly met? And, could this wave of social movements reshape citizenship and governance while maintaining degrees of political autonomy?

Indigenous Rights during Neoliberalism and Post-Neoliberalism

These questions of the nature of the link between social movement and the state are particularly consequential in the context of recent indigenous mobilization. Falling within this categorization of new social movement, indigenous communities organized around a collective identity in pursuit of rights recognitions that would facilitate both the acquisition and restructuring of political power. While there is certainly diversity in indigenous demands across the region, coalescing international standards for recognizing indigenous rights have resulted in remarkable similarities.23 Perhaps most fundamentally, indigenous activists and organizations challenge the notion of a unitary, homogenous

23 The international coordination of distinct indigenous movements was first evident in the 1982 UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Decade of Indigenous Peoples (1993-2003). Two key international conventions on indigenous rights set minimum standards (1989 International Labor Organization’s Convention 169 and the 2006 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples). Most Latin American countries have signed onto ILO 169.

nation, calling for recognition of indigenous communities as ‘peoples,’ setting a legal precedent for indigenous communities to articulate rights to self-determination and degrees of autonomy within a plurinational state. In practice, this frequently translates into demands for rights to degrees of autonomy in the use of land, resources, judicial and administrative space at the local or regional level.24 Self-determination also implies creating space for indigenous conceptualizations of democracy, which rejects the separation of public and private spheres of association in favor of consensual, direct, collective, and accountable decision-making embedded within kinship relations and cultural identity.25 This style of governance most closely maps onto Western conceptualizations of radical democracy, which prioritizes direct participation, open assemblies, and the incorporation of voluntary organizations into decentralized government decision-making. As Donna Lee Van Cott summarizes, “There is a long tradition that the people govern themselves in these territories, these families. There they resolve their conflicts, they make accords and decisions. That is to say, there is a strong political participation and also exercise of democracy and governability, which doesn’t happen in an urban-mestizo neighborhood of Western culture, where all are individuals.

They [urban people] are neighbors but they are not citizens.”26 Indigenous mobilization does not necessarily seek to restructure the government according to this vision of governance, but rather pursues rights recognitions that create space for the exercise of this form of governance.

24 Rachel Sieder, Multiculturalism in Latin America (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 7. 25 Van Cott, Radical Democracy in the Andes, 22. 26 Ibid., 14.

Like other forms of mobilization at the time, indigenous mobilization was a backlash to the neoliberal project. Economically, cuts of state-provided services disproportionately affected on economic vulnerability in indigenous communities.27

Neoliberalism also brought land reform back to the policy agenda, calling for the regularization of individual property rights to strengthen land markets and provide investment security.28 This focus of individual property rights removed restrictions on the sale of indigenous land, dismantled formal recognitions of indigenous communities’ collective rights, and titled land than indigenous communities had informally owned or controlled. Furthermore, Latin American countries promoted national development strategies that infringed on indigenous communities’ land.29 Often referred to as the

Commodities Consensus, governments prioritized the export of primary products, encouraging the development of extractive industries; because the state maintains all subsoil rights, indigenous communities are usually unable to prevent the expansion of the extractive industries on or surrounding indigenous land.30

27 Sieder, Multiculturalism in Latin America, 3. 28 William C Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises: Agrarian Reform and the Latin American Campesino (Westview Press, Inc., 1995). Cristóbal Kay, "Latin America's Agrarian Reform: Lights and Shadows," Land Reform, Land Settlement and Cooperatives (FAO) Reforme Agraire, Colonisation et Cooperatives Agricoles (FAO) Reforma Agraria, Colonizacion y Cooperativas (FAO) (1998). Klaus Deininger, "Making Negotiated Land Reform Work: Initial Experience from Colombia, Brazil and South Africa," World Development 27, no. 4 (1999). ———, Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction (World Bank Publications, 2003). Henry Veltmeyer, "The Dynamics of Land Occupations in Latin America," in Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, ed. Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros (New York: Zed Books, Ltd, 2005). 29 ———, "The Natural Resource Dynamics of Postneoliberalism in Latin America: New Developmentalism or Extractivist Imperialism?," Studies in Political Economy 90 (2013). 30 Henry Veltmeyer and James Petras, "The New Extractivism in Latin America," (Zed Books, London, 2014). Derrick Hindery, From Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia (University of Arizona Press, 2013). Roger Merino Acuña, "The Politics of Extractive Governance: Indigenous Peoples and Socio-Environmental Conflicts," The Extractive Industries and Society 2, no. 1 (2015). Juliet S Erazo, Governing Indigenous Territories: Enacting Sovereignty in the Ecuadorian Amazon (Duke University Press, 2013). Emiliano López and Francisco Vértiz, "Extractivism, Transnational Capital, and Subaltern Struggles in Latin America," Latin American Perspectives (2014). Maristella Svampa, "Resource Extractivism and Alternatives: Latin American Perspectives on Development," Beyond Development (2013): 117. Julian S Yates and Karen Bakker,

Neoliberalism also restructured state-society relationship. Under prior corporatist regimes, state-society relations were structured by state-sponsored, class-based organizations, allowing indigenous communities to carve out de-facto local, autonomous spaces.31 As these state-sponsored organizations were dismantled and citizenship was reformulated on an individual basis, indigenous communities lost both formal access to the state and de-facto autonomous spaces. Furthermore, neoliberal multicultural reforms called for the state to be recognized as multicultural and ethnically heterogeneous, with civil and political rights extended to individuals, not groups. Activists and scholars quickly called attention to the inherent tension between recognizing, incorporating, and encouraging indigenous participation, and the potential for these “politics of difference” reforms to become “empty rituals of recognition” without accompanying shifts in the distribution of economic and political power.32 Charles Hale’s work in Guatemala found that elites (ladinos) endorsed “modernizing” multicultural reforms to the extent that the reforms did not challenge “the productive regime or state power.” Privileging non-

"Debating the ‘Post-Neoliberal Turn’in Latin America," Progress in Human Geography (2013). Hans- Jürgen Burchardt and Kristina Dietz, "(Neo-) Extractivism–a New Challenge for Development Theory from Latin America," Third World Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2014). Håvard Haarstad, New Political Spaces in Latin American Natural Resource Governance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). John-Andrew McNeish, "Extraction, Protest and Indigeneity in Bolivia: The Tipnis Effect," Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies 8, no. 2 (2013). 31 Deborah J Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 32 Edmund T Gordon and Charles R Hale, "Rights, Resources, and the Social Memory of Struggle: Reflections and Black Community Land Rights on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast," Human Organization 62, no. 4 (2003): 379. Charles R Hale, "Más que un indio: Racial Ambivalence and the Paradox of Neoliberal Multiculturalism in Guatemala," School of American Research Press: Santa Fé (2006). Bret Gustafson, "Paradoxes of Liberal Indigenism: Indigenous Movements, State Processes, and Intercultural Reform in Bolivia," The Politics of Ethnicity: Indigenous peoples in Latin American States (2002). Nancy Grey Postero and Leon Zamosc, "Indigenous Movements and the Indian Question in Latin America," The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America (2004). Nina Laurie, Robert Andolina, and Sarah Radcliffe, "Indigenous Professionalization: Transnational Social Reproduction in the Andes," Antipode 35, no. 3 (2003). Nancy Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia (Stanford University Press, 2007). Charles R Hale, "Does Multiculturalism Menace? Governance, Cultural Rights and the Politics of Identity in Guatemala," Journal of Latin American Studies 34, no. 03 (2002).

threatening expressions of indigeneity (the “indio permitido,” permitted indian) over more radical expressions of Indianness, neoliberal multicultural reforms reinforce the power relations.33 Neither changing structural inequalities nor opening up spaces for democratic participation, “neoliberal multiculturalism holds out the promise of both equality and cultural recognition, but grants only the latter, and then promotes intercultural exchange anyway. Under these conditions, multiculturalism produces mutual incomprehension and strife…”34

The convergence of these economic, political, and social changes “spurred on” indigenous mobilization throughout the region.35 In 1990, indigenous communities from both the Bolivian eastern lowlands and Andean highlands participated in the 70 day

“March for Territory and Dignity” march to La Paz, successfully pushing the government to officially recognize indigenous territories. As one observer noted of the 1990 levantamiento in Ecuador, “this marked the first time in Ecuadorian history that an indigenous movement forced the government to enter into serious dialogue about national politics.”36 In 1992, coined to be “500 Years of Indigenous Resistance” or 500 years “of something,” indigenous communities across the continent mobilized to call attention to the treatment of indigenous peoples since the arrival of the Spanish. As the decade progressed, indigenous groups took increasingly prominent positions in national politics.

In Ecuador, indigenous organizations were key political actors in the events leading up

33 José Antonio Lucero, Struggles of Voice: The Politics of Indigenous Representation in the Andes (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 130. 34 Hale, "Más que un indio: Racial Ambivalence and the Paradox of Neoliberal Multiculturalism in Guatemala," 38. 35 Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, 54, 65-71, 80. 36 Roberta Rice, The New Politics of Protest: Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America's Neoliberal Era (University of Arizona Press, 2012), 56.

the ousting of President Bucaram in 1997, the formation of the 1997 Constituent

Assembly and its resulting 1998 Constitution, and the failed military coup in Ecuador in

2000; Correa’s successful 2006 presidential campaign promised to end neoliberal adjustment. Throughout the region, indigenous communities demanded that states constitutionally recognize indigenous peoples, leading to constitutional reforms in

Colombia (1991), Peru (1993), Bolivia (1994), Ecuador (1998), followed by most of the rest of the region.

Persisting Indigenous-State Tension

Most academic research is optimistic about the potential for indigenous mobilization and indigenous rights recognitions to improve the quality of democracy and citizenship in the region.37 Authors highlight that mobilization empowered a historically marginalized group to articulate alternative visions of political recognition, representation, and participation;38 the potential impact of these demands was bolstered by the overlap between indigenous demands and post-neoliberalism’s focus on decentralizing democracy.

While advances in constitutional recognitions and policy frameworks prompted optimism about the potential for profound changes, formal recognitions and policy initiatives have fallen short of movement demands.39 The most prominent international

37 See Raúl L Madrid, "Indigenous Parties and Democracy in Latin America," Latin American Politics and Society 47, no. 4 (2005). And ———, The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2012). for additional discussion of these concerns. Van Cott is one of the few authors who includes a discussion of the “value subtracted” by indigenous parties, referring to extremism, disregard for individual rights, unexamined inequalities within the parties (226-230). Van Cott, Radical Democracy in the Andes, 226-30. 38 Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia, 7. 39 Donna Lee Van Cott, The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000). Hale, "Más que un indio: Racial Ambivalence and the Paradox of Neoliberal Multiculturalism in Guatemala.", Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia. Patricia Richards and Jeffrey A Gardner, "Still Seeking

observers of indigenous rights highlight the persisting brecha de implementación

(implementation gap)40 between these formal recognitions and the meaningful exercise of indigenous rights.41 Rodolfo Stavenhagan concludes, “some… fear that the new legislation is not really meant to be implemented and represents more of a cosmetic tinkering with the constitutional system than a real thorough change of power relations,”42 asserting:

“…the open question is how the new legislation will be implemented and how Indian communities will benefit. The answer is not at all clear. Complaints are constantly heard that the new laws are not being implemented as they should be, or that secondary legislation has not been adopted after general principles were laid down in the new constitutions.”43

Scholars have observed these patterns throughout the region; Yashar reviews that, “The issues of land and communal rights were now constitutional, but not yet fully realized.

…the institutional success of the ‘indigenous reforms’ has depended on the political will of Bolivian presidents to promote them and the institutional capacity of the state to

Recognition: Mapuche Demands, State Violence, and Discrimination in Democratic Chile," Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies 8, no. 3 (2013). 40 UN Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous Issues: Human rights and indigenous issues, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Addendum, 17 January 2006, E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.5. 41 Rodolfo Stavenhagan, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People - 2006. 2006 Report to the Commission on Human Rights. See also: Charles R Hale, "Resistencia Para Que? Territory, Autonomy and Neoliberal Entanglements in the ‘Empty Spaces’ of Central America," Economy and Society 40, no. 2 (2011). Jason Tockman and John Cameron, "Indigenous Autonomy and the Contradictions of Plurinationalism in Bolivia," Latin American Politics and Society 56, no. 3 (2014). 42 Qtd in Sieder, Multiculturalism in Latin America, 36. 43 Willem Assies, "Land, Territory, and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights.," in Current Land Policy in Latin America: Regulating Land Tenure under Neo-Liberalism, ed. Gemma van der Haar E. B. Zoomers (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 2000), ix.

implement them.”44 Sieder similarly observes that the “‘the discourse of ‘participation’ has not yet translated into effective oversight mechanisms in practice.”45

Most literature on indigenous politics, however, focuses on the emergence of indigenous organizations as national political actors, as summarized above, how these movements transition into the formal political arena, and how these transitions into formal politics impacted the recognition of indigenous rights.

Recently, many scholars explicitly explore the challenges movements face when transitioning into parties. Authors commonly point to the decline of traditional parties on the left, the strength of indigenous mobilization, and institutional reforms that facilitated party formation. For example, Yashar suggests that as a movement transitions into electoral politics, the movement is left with less capable leadership, elected activists often cannot follow through on their campaign promises, successful movement leaders are not necessarily effective politicians, and the movement is susceptible to divisions.46 Van Cott argues that institutional changes, party system changes (most notably the strength of the left), and social movement factors shaped the formation of ethnic parties.47 Roberta Rice argues that the emergence of ethnic parties is shaped by domestic political institutions and patterns of popular political incorporation; indigenous mobilization and parties are more common in inchoate party systems in which popular sectors and not represented; the Bolivian and Ecuadorian movements were more successful than their Peruvian or

Chilean counterparts in achieving their identity, territory, and autonomy demands,

44 Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, 215-6, 19-20. 45 Sieder, Multiculturalism in Latin America, 8. 46 Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, 302-05. 47 Donna Lee Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics (Cambridge Univ Press, 2005), 48.

because of the movement’s strategy to work both within and outside the formal political system.48 Raul Madrid, shifting to explicitly explore the success of ethnic parties, concludes that success is based on the use of populist appeals and inclusionary rhetoric.49

This literature focuses on explaining how the political system shapes indigenous party formation, implicitly positing that the government policy depends on indigenous parties’ ability to assert themselves within the national political scene.

A second, more interdisciplinary body of literature explores how indigenous movements and their transitions into formal politics impacted the recognition of indigenous rights. For these authors, persisting tension between indigenous communities and the state stems from the ways in which states insufficiently recognized indigenous rights.50 Many of these arguments emerge out of research that distinguishes between the strength and type of indigenous rights recognitions. For example, Stavenhagen concludes that the 1994 Bolivian Popular Participation Law was not as effective as expected due to

“flaws in the legislation.”51 Much of this line of research was supported by analysis of cycles in the types of indigenous cycles of constitutional reforms, distinguished by the strength and type of indigenous rights recognitions.52 For example, Nancy Postero

48 Rice, The New Politics of Protest: Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America's Neoliberal Era. 49Madrid, The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America. 50 See, for example, Sieder, Multiculturalism in Latin America. Postero and Zamosc, "Indigenous Movements and the Indian Question in Latin America." Van Cott, Radical Democracy in the Andes. Eisenstadt, Latin America's Multicultural Movements : The Struggle between Communitarianism, Autonomy, and Human Rights. Raquel Yrigoyen Fajardo, Pueblos indígenas. Constituciones y reformas políticas en América Latina (Lima: Editorial Gráﬁca Kuatro, 2010). 51 Stavenhagen, 32. 52 The first cycle (constitucionalismo multicultural) focused on pluri-ethnic and cultural recognition, bringing initial recognition of indigenous land and limited forms of autonomy in the constitutions of Guatemala (1985), Nicaragua (1987), and Brazil (1988). The second generation of reforms (“constitucionalismo pluricultural”) followed the approval of ILO 169, recognizing indigenous communities as collective actors with collective territorial rights (Colombia, 1991; México 1992 y 2001; Perú, 1993; Bolivia, 1994; Ecuador, 1998). The third cycle (“constitucionalismo plurinacional”) moved from recognizing the collective rights of indigenous communities to recognizing their status as nations,

highlights that because the neoliberal reforms insufficiently expanded citizenship and did not confront structural inequalities, indigenous groups demanded a “postmulticultural citizenship.”53

As evidenced by this discussion of several authors’ conclusions, inadequate policy implementation was assumed to be the result of the definition of indigenous rights, not the processes of implementation or evaluation. By doing so, this literature only offers preliminary, cautionary conclusions about when and why the gap between norms and practice persisted; more than twenty years after a wave of indigenous mobilization in

Latin America, a significant amount of indigenous participation and engagement is directed towards institutionalized policy frameworks. If we acknowledge that recognition does not equate with the meaningful exercise of these rights, why have we not focused in on the problems that arise during policy implementation? What considerations motivate governments’ policy responses to indigenous demands?

For indigenous communities, these implementation patterns are incredibly consequential. After a central government formally recognizes indigenous rights, they are implemented and contested at the local level. This relegation of responsibility opens the potential for indigenous rights to be significantly undercut while implemented; as

Hale observed, “The neoliberal state no longer opposes indigenous autonomy in all its forms; its preferred response, rather, is to concede limited autonomy… and to draw the line there. This, in turn, shifts the grounds of the struggle…”54 Lucero similarly

bringing into question legal plurality and degrees of territorial autonomy (Ecuador 2008, Bolivia 2008). Yrigoyen Fajardo, Pueblos indígenas. Constituciones Y reformas políticas en América Latina. 53 Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia. 54 Hale, "Más que un indio: Racial Ambivalence and the Paradox of Neoliberal Multiculturalism in Guatemala," 37.

concludes of the Bolivian case that “…by breathing new life and channeling more money in the previously weak government, incentives now exist to work on local levels… The targets of indigenous political activism became local and not national.”55 As

Stavenhagen concludes, “by cutting them loose from the central state to fend for themselves, they are left to their own devices…”56 These evolving patterns of policy implementation dynamically structure how communities navigate these policies and exercise rights. This more nuanced, local arena of contestation is more challenging to observe, but arguably more consequential for the exercise of indigenous rights and indigenous-state relations. Policy implementation structures the terms on which indigenous communities interact with the state, defining rights and citizenship, setting political agendas, and driving political engagement.

Research Design

This research addresses this theoretical and empirical gap in our understandings of indigenous politics and state-movement relations in Latin America, theorizing if and how governments respond to contentious action through institutionalized policy. Chapter

2 discusses the conceptual and theoretical challenges that complicate analysis of the outcomes and consequences of social movements. While we have general expectations that governments respond to the perceived threat posed by contentious action, do these expectations apply to patterns of policy implementation governed by institutionalized procedures? Drawing on literature on social movements and state-dissident relations,

Chapter 2 theorizes how governments use policy to demobilize contentious action.

Because democratic governments are responsible for preserving both security and

55 Lucero, Struggles of Voice: The Politics of Indigenous Representation in the Andes, 135. 56 Qtd in Sieder, Multiculturalism in Latin America, 36.

transparent implementation procedures, indigenous communities can acquire leverage, defined as a tool to exercise power, over policy implementation decisions through contentious action. The specific effect of contentious action is conditioned by the interests of relevant elite stakeholders and degree of policy institutionalization.

This research addresses this methodological challenge by focusing primarily on within-case variation of one policy in one country. This approach isolates key variables under analysis, controlling for the wide range of between-country and between-group factors that usually account for variation in government responses, and facilitates detailed data collection of instances of collective action and government response. This methodological approach helps generate hypotheses, extracting causal relationships that can be extrapolated to understand when and why governments throughout Latin America use policy implementation to respond to contentious action.

The Chilean case is analytically useful for isolating the dynamics of policy implementation. As Chapter 3 outlines, Chile is known for its centralized, technocratic, institutionalized style of governance as well as for the strength by which the neoliberal project disarticulated civil society’s links with the government. After the return to democracy in 1990, the governing center-left Concertación political alliance pursued the

“resignification” of emerging civil society, folding social movement leaders and organizations into the neoliberal system and detaching movements from parties. Because of these patterns of Chilean governance and this distance between the state and society, the Chilean case is a most likely case for capable policy implementation, and least likely case in which groups would be expected to influence policy implementation.

Chile’s piecemeal policy response to indigenous territorial demands allows for nuanced analysis of specific implementation decisions. Chile’s response to Mapuche territorial demands is outlined in Article 20B of 1993 Indigenous Law 19.253.57 The 1993 law tasked the National Corporation of Indigenous Development (Corporación Nacional de Desarollo Indígena, CONADI) with implementing indigenous public policy.58 20B is one of the cornerstones of this law, with the expressed objective of responding to historic land disputes by purchasing ancestral land from a private landowner on behalf of a if and when a particular indigenous community submits the application.59 From the policy’s promulgation in 1994 to 2013, four presidential administrations have invested $303 million USD to purchase over 100,000 hectares for 11,000 families through Article 20B;

3% of all land in the region has transferred from private landholders to Mapuche communities through Article 20B, a quantity further significant considering that, when land was formally titled to Mapuche communities in the early 20th century, Mapuche

57 While I focus specifically on the Mapuche indigenous community, the policy does not exclude other indigenous communities in Chile from acquiring land through the policy. A number of plots of land have been transferred to other indigenous communities in the north and far south, yet the land policy was written in a way that prioritized the types of land recognitions granted to Mapuche indigenous communities. Other indigenous communities’ land was often recognized through legal tools that law 19.253 does not recognize; for additional information, see Aylwin 2002. Of the 499 plots of land that have been transferred to indigenous communities through 20B, only 6 of those plots of land were transferred to not-Mapuche indigenous communities in Chile. 58 CONADI is located within the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (Ministerio de Planificación, MIDEPLAN) converted to the Ministry of Social Development, (Ministerio de Desarollo Social) in 2011). 59 Article 20B gives CONADI the authority to establish. “…mechanisms allowing to overcome land issues, specially, by reason of compliance with judicial or out of court resolutions or transactions concerning indigenous lands in which there are solutions on indigenous lands or these are assigned to indigenous people, coming from land grants, or acknowledged by commisioner’s titles, or other assignments or transfers made by the State in favor of indigenous people.” Notably, there are two other paths established in the indigenous law through which indigenous communities can request land. Article 20A establishes a lottery through which individuals and communities can apply for a subsidy to purchase land; this path more directly respond to situations of poverty and conceptualizes land as an economic resource used to promote development. Article 21E allows for public lands to be passed to indigenous communities, through an agreement with the Ministerio de Bienes Públicos. 20B, however, is Chile’s direct response to territorial, historic demands and is applicable to a much broader group of communities.

communities only received titles to 500,000 hectares.60 Implementation has been less than smooth, with wide variation in which communities access land through the policy.

Of approximately 3,000 total Mapuche communities, 266 communities have received land since 1994, but more than 500 communities sit on a waiting list. Which communities successfully acquired land through 20B?

Chapter 4 details the evolution of the specific procedures governing the implementation of 20B, situated within a broader discussion of the challenges governments face to translate indigenous territorial demands into rights recognitions and specific implementation procedures. While indigenous communities call for the recognition of territory as economically, socially, politically, and historically constructed space, this conceptualization of territory becomes bureaucratically entangled within land policy. The chapter introduces both the Chilean and Bolivian cases under analysis in this research. While Bolivia has certainly advanced further than Chile in closing the gap between indigenous demands and formal recognitions, indigenous communities’ ability to meaningfully access these rights is undermined by bureaucratic procedures in both countries. This chapter details the ways in which indigenous territorial demands become bureaucratically entangled when the state recognizes indigenous communities’ territorial rights and establishes the standards governing policy implementation.

I use an integrated multi-method approach to evaluate variation in the implementation of this land policy in the Chilean case.61 This approach tries to avoid the

60 José Aylwin Oyarzún, "Los derechos de los pueblos indígenas en Chile," Santiago: LOM/Universidad de la Frontera (2003): 162, 290. Calculated from data publically available from CONADI and the 2007 Survey by the Chilean National Institute of Statistics (INE). 61 Lieberman’s concept of a unified, “nested research design” calls for the residuals of statistical analysis to guide case selection. Small-N analysis can test the results obtained from a large-N analysis, test outliers, and improve measurement strategies. Nicholas Sambanis, "Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War," Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 02 (2004). Thad Dunning, Natural Experiments in

problems of multi-method research, which usually triangulates between different methodological traditions, seeking the same answer to the same question from the different approaches.62 Instead, an integrated approach uses different methods to ask different questions, drawing on the strengths of each method to support, refine, and test specific components of a central argument. Specifically, I use quantitative analysis to test the relationship between contentious action and policy responses; case studies and historical analysis provide further evidence of the causal relation and add nuance to the mechanisms linking contentious action to policy responses. These specific approaches are introduced below and discussed in detail in each chapter.

This research was conducted over 15 months of field work in 2012 and 2013 in

Temuco, Chile. During this time, I conducted interviews with more than 70 politicians and bureaucrats in CONADI and overseeing ministries, activists, and academics. These people were selected based on their familiarity with Chile’s indigenous land policy; some were in the government at the time of the interview, but most had been previously

the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach (Cambridge University Press, 2012). Sidney Tarrow, "Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science," American Political Science Review 89, no. 02 (1995). Evan S Lieberman, "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research," American Political Science Review 99, no. 03 (2005). Furthermore, a number of authors have long called for greater integration of approaches, including: Christopher H Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 02 (1989). Tarrow, "Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science." Andrew Bennett and Bear Braumoeller, "Where the Model Frequently Meets the Road: Combining Statistical, Formal, and Case Study Methods". Michael Coppedge, "Explaining Democratic Deterioration in Venezuela through Nested Inference," Advances and Setbacks in the Third Wave of Democracy in Latin America (2005). Jason Seawright, "Multi-Method Social Science: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Tools," Unpublished manuscript (2014). 62 For details on the problems associated with multi method research, see: Amel Ahmed and Rudra Sil, "When Multi-Method Research Subverts Methodological Pluralism—or, Why We Still Need Single- Method Research," Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 04 (2012). Gitte Sommer Harrits, "More Than Method? A Discussion of Paradigm Differences within Mixed Methods Research," Journal of Mixed Methods Research (2011). Amel Ahmed and Rudra Sil, "Is Multi-Method Research Really ‘Better’?," Qualitative and Multi-Method Research 2 (2009). Vicki L Plano Clark and John W Creswell, "Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research," (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011). Ingo Rohlfing, "What You See and What You Get Pitfalls and Principles of Nested Analysis in Comparative Research," Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 11 (2008).

involved. I also conducted interviews with the leaders of eight indigenous communities to capture the experiences of specific communities and leaders’ perceptions of the policy process, described further in Chapter 7. All of the interviews were semi-structured and most were taped, when permitted. These interviews lasted between 30 minutes and two and a half hours, with the average interview lasting 60 minutes. This research was complemented by archival research at CONADI’s Archivo General de Asuntos Indígenas

(AGAI, General Archive of Indigenous Affairs) in Temuco, secondary source resources, and news reports, compiled both in the field and online.

Chapters 5 through 7 explain patterns of policy implementation in the Chilean case. Chapter 5 presents quantitative analysis of protest event data to explore the relationship between contentious action and policy implementation. This original dataset includes instances of contentious action in the 266 Mapuche communities that received land through article 20B over 20 years, collected from a number of Chilean news sources.

Analysis of repeated events modeling finds mixed results in support of the argument that the Chilean government implements land policy in response to contentious action. As expected, the perceived threat posed by the intensity of the contentious action has little impact on policy implementation, in contrast to frequently made allegations that the government prioritizes particular emblematic communities where violence is more likely.

Rather, the government is aware of and responding to local instances of both violent and nonviolent instances of contentious action, supporting the hypothesis that contentious action is a tool through which indigenous communities can acquire leverage over implementation decisions. This result is particularly pronounced after a particular community has received on land purchases; while first purchases are strictly regulated

and overseen, many of these procedures and regulations drop away for all subsequent purchases, increasing the likelihood external actors are able to affect policy implementation. Subsequent purchases are also strongly influenced by the presence of forestry companies in the district, with purchases more likely in regions where forestry companies have a greater presence. These results suggest that the Chilean government is motivated to both protect economic interests and appease communities engaging in contentious action, but that its ability to do so is constrained by the institutionalization of implementation procedures.

Chapter 6 builds on the conclusions of the statistical analysis, exploring the bureaucratic dynamics that condition how and why government officials are able to act on the motivation to respond to contentious action. The chapter finds that, across four presidential administrations spanning the political spectrum, the Chilean government is motivated to use land policy, in addition to well-documented strategies of militarization and criminalization of Mapuche protest, to demobilize (apagar incedios, put out fires) indigenous mobilization. While this motivation persists over 20 years, the government’s ability to use policy becomes constrained over time, confronting increasingly institutionalized procedures and requiring the intervention of higher-level policymakers and/ or politicians. This institutionalization is the result of CONADI officials and bureaucrats working to shield themselves from being blamed for persisting Mapuche mobilization.

Chapter 7 develops the mechanisms through which contentious action affects policy implementation, based on case studies of eight Mapuche communities in the Padre

Las Casas district outside the regional capital, Temuco. The experiences of these eight

communities further the conclusion that contentious action is a tool through which communities can acquire leverage over policy implementation procedures. This chapter develops how Mapuche communities are able to use contentious action to acquire elite allies, who are able to intervene in policy procedures on their behalf, often at the expense of powerful, competing stakeholders. If the community’s land claim does not conflict with a powerful stakeholder, communities’ strategic mobilization or use of political connections at a very local level can provide sufficient leverage over policy implementation decisions. If a community’s land demands confront the interests of powerful regional actors, however, the community must be willing and able to scale up their mobilization in a way that presents a threat sufficient to leverage an elite ally to intervene in policy procedures on behalf of the community. However, confronting these powerful stakeholders results in repression, regardless of if the community acquired land or not. All these calculations are preceded by several necessary but not sufficient conditions; communities must understand the bureaucratic processes, yet recognize that these formal procedures are insufficient and be willing to take on the risks associated with mobilizing. These stories reiterate that CONADI does see and respond to very local power dynamics. Contentious action and political connections can shape policy implementation, but CONADI will only respond in a way that undermines the interests of powerful stakeholders if a high-ranking officials calls for it. These dynamics echo prior chapters’ conclusions that the Chilean government draws on policy to respond to contentious action. Policy implementation decisions are not, however, a proportional response to perceived threats as expected, but rather shaped by a combination of bureaucratic and local power dynamics. This chapter also expands the scope of the study,

incorporating Mapuche communities who have sought, but have yet to receive land through the government.

Chapter 8 extends this argument to the Bolivian case. The Chilean case uses the assumption of institutionalized, transparent policy implementation to generate hypotheses about when, why, and how contentious action can affect patterns of implementation; do stronger rights recognitions, a stronger indigenous movement, and a weaker bureaucracy affect when and why a government responds to indigenous communities’ territorial demands? Drawing on primary and secondary reporting on three of the most public and substantial instances in which the Bolivian government responded to indigenous communities’ demands, resulting in the cumulative recognition of more than 18% of

Bolivia’s surface as indigenous territory, this chapter supports the conclusions of the

Chilean case. Through contentious action, indigenous communities are able to leverage political elites to intervene on their behalf to overcome the powerful economic and political stakeholders that supersede indigenous communities’ demands for land and territorial rights. As evidenced by the Chilean case, indigenous communities usually acquire this leverage through mobilization; the Bolivian case highlights that indigenous communities can acquire political elite allies through both mobilization and political alliances.

While the concluding chapter of this dissertation highlights the broader contributions and significance of this research, it is important to highlight the empirical contribution of this research of the Chilean government’s policy responses to indigenous demands. There is a growing body of research on Mapuche-state relations since Chile’s return to democracy in 1990, much of which highlights the Chilean state’s repeated

efforts to disarticulate and demobilize Mapuche mobilization.63 The conclusions of this research reiterate the prevalence of these motivations, yet this research is unique for its examination of the micro-dynamics of if, how, and when four presidential administrations are able to pursue this objective as it implements one of the cornerstones of Chilean indigenous policy for a broad range of Mapuche communities. By exploring this interaction of the development of the state and contentious action, this research uncovers patterns of political engagement previously shielded by the technocratic, centralized post-Pinochet Chilean government.

63 Among the most prominent recent work, see: Joanna Crow, The Mapuche in Modern Chile : A Cultural History (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2013). Piergiorgio Di Giminiani, Tierras ancestrales, disputas contemporáneas : Pertenencia y demandas territoriales en la sociedad Mapuche rural (2012). Diane Haughney, Neoliberal Economics, Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in Chile (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006). Thomas Miller Klubock, La Frontera: Forests and Ecological Conflict in Chile’s Frontier Territory (Duke University Press, 2014). Hector Llaitul and Jorge Arrate, Weichan, Conversaciones con un weychafe en la prisión política (Santiago de Chile: CEIBO, 2012), Florencia Mallon, Courage Tastes of Blood: The Mapuche Community of Nicolás Ailío and the Chilean State, 1906–2001 (Duke University Press, 2005). José A. Marimán, Autodeterminación : Ideas políticas Mapuche en el albor del siglo XXI (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2012). Pablo Mariman et al., "¡… Escucha, Winka…," Santiago: Lom (2006). Fernando Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013 (Santiago: Pehuén, 2014), Eduardo Mella Seguel, Los Mapuche ante la justicia la criminalización de la protesta indígena en Chile (Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, Observatorio de Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas, 2007), Domingo Namuncura, Ralco, Represa o robreza? (Lom Ediciones, 1999). Jorge Pinto Rodríguez, "La formación del estado y la nación, y el pueblo Mapuche. De la inclusión a la exclusión," Santiago: Dirección de Bibliotecas Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana (2003). Patricia Richards, Race and the Chilean Miracle: Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Indigenous Rights (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013). Tito Tricot, Autonomía: el movimiento Mapuche de resistencia, 1o edición ed. (Santiago, Chile: CIEBO ediciones, 2013).

Chapter 2 Literature and Theory

“Because policy reform is best understood as an unfolding historical process, attention must be directed to factors that affect the willingness and ability of policy-makers to promote or frustrate an extension of a given reform’s line of policy development.”64

This chapter reviews literature that approaches how governments respond to contentious action through institutionalized policy. While institutionalized political institutions are set up to transparently manage societal conflict, contentious action has the potential to dynamically reshape these institutions. When, why, and how will a government respond to contentious action through institutionalized policy procedures?

I argue that when a democratic government responds to contentious action through institutionalized policy, it is trapped between maintaining transparent procedures and preserving economic, political, and social stability. Using contentious action, groups are able to acquire leverage over how the government balances these competing responsibilities to preserve governance. The ways in which groups acquire leverage through contentious action, however, depends on the strength of institutional procedures as well as the presence the other relevant stakeholders. This argument about the ability of contentious action to serve as a source of leverage differs from the literature’s argument that government responses to contentious action are proportionate to the threat posed by the contentious action.

This chapter proceeds by, first, introducing the theoretical puzzle of the relationship between institutionalized policy and contentious action; if institutionalized

64 Eric Patashnik, "After the Public Interest Prevails: The Political Sustainability of Policy Reform," Governance 16, no. 2 (2003): 211.

political institutions manage and control societal conflict, under what conditions can contentious action influence and reshape those institutions? I draw on literature on social movement-state and dissident-state relations to generate hypotheses of when, how, and why states respond to contentious action. Literature on social movements struggles to causally link social movement demands with success and outcomes, and, to the extent it does, usually remains focused on theorizing how the government’s response affects mobilization. Related literature on state- dissident relations more explicitly considers how governments respond to the threat posed by contentious action, arguing that governments are expected to respond to the perceived threat posed by contentious action. While neither body of literature applies these expectations to consider the implementation of institutionalized policy, I use these expectations to develop hypotheses of when, how, and why governments use policy to respond, focusing specifically on how indigenous communities can use contentious action to acquire leverage over the government’s response.

How do Institutions Manage Contentious Action?

Political institutions are one of the primary ways that states control, manage, and stabilize conflict as society becomes more diverse and complex. The effectiveness of these institutions to do so depends on the extent which political institutions are institutionalized, defined as the “process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.”65 As Madison argued, “…you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”66 Huntington argues that degree of institutionalization distinguishes developed and developing

65 Samuel P Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968), 12. 66 James Madison, "The Federalist No. 51," November 22, no. 1787 (1787).

countries, describing “society with weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires… A society with highly institutionalized governing organizations and procedures is more able to articulate and achieve its public interests.”67 More recently, Fukuyama reiterated the imperative of state building in the form of strengthening the state, defined as “ability of states to plan and execute policies, and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently.”68

While institutions are a key way of mediating societal conflict, contentious action dynamically adjusts and reshapes these institutions. There is an inevitable link between contentious action and the development of the state. As the scope of the state expanded, it more regularly impacted lives and opened up more access points, simultaneously increasing the likelihood of grievances and providing citizens more spaces to present their demands.69 This relationship of pressure and reform incrementally constructed the modern state; as Johnson describes, “…Just as established state structures tend to protect existing power alignments, throughout history popular pressure has increasingly challenged and pushed, step-by-step, these states to open up access- although this has occurred unwillingly, slowly, and often fitfully.”70 This strategic engagement with institutionalized procedures is becoming an increasingly conventional repertoire of participation and states have “learned to control it and, through this control, begun to domesticate the social movement within the political process.”71

67 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 24. 68 Francis Fukuyama, "The Imperative of State-Building," Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004): 22. 69 Charles Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834 (American Mathematical Soc., 1995). Hank Johnston, States and Social Movements (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2011). 70 ———, States and Social Movements, 25. 71 David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997). Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1994). Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834.

While the institutionalization of political institutions can streamline the government's ability to objectively process and respond to societal conflicts demands, these institutions rarely remove all subjectivity from decision-making. Several authors make this argument, analyzing how the bureaucracy acts as an intervening or intermediate variable between policy creation and policy outcomes. As Schneider summarizes of the importance of this perspective:

Those who analyze strategies of state-led development are really writing about a composite of thousands of decisions and political battles…. However, some of the most neglected subjects of comparative research are the mechanisms that motivate, coordinate, and facilitate these myriad decisions and the factors that determines who wins in the bureaucratic politics…72

Scholars studying land policy similarly conclude that “At the same time that land tenure regulation is being contested as the state’s exclusive domain …land tenure regulation is contested at the level of policy implementation, that is, how regulation at different levels in society undoes or reworks state efforts to regulate land tenure in accordance with policy objectives.”73 The tension between contentious action and policy implementation is resolved by these local, bureaucratic, and political calculations.

These questions are particularly important in Latin America, where assumptions of a capable, efficient bureaucracy “travel less well.”74 There is significant subnational variation in state strength, with areas lacking state capacity often referred to as “brown

72 Ben Ross Schneider, Politics within the State: Elite Bureaucrats and Industrial Policy in Authoritarian Brazil (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), 4. 73 Gemma van der Haar. “The Contested Nature of Land Tenure Regulation.” In Current Land Policy in Latin America: Regulating Land Tenure Under Neo-Liberalism. Annelies Zoomers and Gemma van der Haar, Ed. (Royal Tropical Institute, Netherlands. 2000), 285. 74 Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo, "Building Institutions on Weak Foundations: Lessons from Latin America," in Reflections on Uneven Democracies: The Legacy of Guillermo O'donnell, ed. Daniel Brinks, Marcelo Leiras, and Scott Mainwaring (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Forthcoming), 2.

zones.”75 Relegating policy implementation to particular often exposes further gaps in state capacity, potentially strengthening clientelistic networks,76 increasing social conflict,77 and reinforcing patterns of unequal access to power. Schneider posits argues that the will and capacity of second and third levels of bureaucracy drove patterns of industrialization in Brazil;78 Grindle similarly finds that weak institutions both open space for good leaders to innovate at the local level, but simultaneously challenges the sustainability of these innovations.79 Scholars studying land policy have argued that,

“…it is conceivable, even likely that power at the local level is more concentrated, more elitist and applied more ruthlessly against the poor than at the centre…”80 Ultimately, holes in state capacity create the potential for actors to utilize specific policy implementation in ways that can undercut or encourage policy success.

This dissertation is situated between these two conversations about the development of the state; while institutionalized political institutions mediate societal conflict, contentious action dynamically adjusts and reshapes these institutions. When, how, and why do governments respond to contentious action through institutionalized policies? This research contributes to this body of literature that seeks to bring politics

75 Ibid. See also: Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries," World Development 21, no. 8 (1993). Levitsky and Murillo, "Building Institutions on Weak Foundations: Lessons from Latin America." 76 Andrew D Selee and Enrique Peruzzotti, Participatory Innovation and Representative Democracy in Latin America (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009). 77 Roberto Laserna, "Decentralization, Local Initiatives, and Citizenship in Bolivia, 1994-2004," in Participatory Innovation and Representative Democracy in Latin America, ed. Andrew D. Selee and Enrique Peruzzotti (2009). Laserna, Roberto, Jesús Ortego, and Douglas Chacon. 2005. Conflictos sociolaborales en Bolivia. La Paz: Organization of American States. 78 Schneider, Politics within the State: Elite Bureaucrats and Industrial Policy in Authoritarian Brazil, 6. 79 Merilee Grindle, Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization, and the Promise of Good Governance (Princeton University Press, 2007). 80 Saturnino M Borras, "Questioning Market‐Led Agrarian Reform: Experiences from Brazil, Colombia and South Africa," Journal of Agrarian Change 3, no. 3 (2003).

back into the bureaucracy, focusing on these local, bureaucratic, and political patterns of policy implementation.

How does a government respond to contentious action?

While contentious action has never been very removed from institutionalized forms of interest articulation, relatively little research theorizes if governments respond to contentious action through institutionalize policies. This section reviews two bodies of literature that more broadly consider government responses to contentious action, in order to generate expectations of when, why, and how states respond through policy.

Social Movement-State Relations

Within social movement research, most research explores when, why, and how a

mobilized group exerts exert pressure on a particular target (commonly referred to as the

resource mobilization model). To reach the government, instrumental, rational groups

must overcome the collective action problem of converting a shared demand or

grievance into a sustained effort, drawing on framing, organizational structure, and

opportunity structures. 81 Repertoires of contention, or the established and available

means of protest for organizers for making claims, are also important for understanding

how much pressure the group exerts on the government. This mobilization stage,

facilitated primarily by the internal resources and structure of the social movement, is

traditionally the focus of social movement literature.

81 Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (McGraw-Hill New York, 1978). David A Snow, Sarah A Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (John Wiley & Sons, 2008). Doug McAdam, John D McCarthy, and Mayer N Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

The political process approach critiqued this focus on the internal characteristics

of social movements, arguing that the emergence and persistence of social movements

depended much more on external conditions, including government responses. This

approach prompted authors to explore how mobilization is structured by political

contexts, including links with political parties, patterns of enforcement, and

centralization, presence of alliances/ opposition, and how social movement

organizations perceive related threats and opportunities created by these structures.

Political opportunity structures became a primary focus of this agenda. For example,

authors argue that a more tolerant political regime facilitates the movement's actions,

while more repression simultaneously deters the masses and fuels more radical sections

of the movement. This literature starts to explore the impact of the government's

response on a movement’s collective action problem,82 but the focus remains on

explaining how these structural, external factors drive mobilization, without directly

theorizing the government's response.

The introduction of the dynamics of contention approach to studying social

movements pushed the literature to adopt a more relational approach to studying social

movements. Rather than view mobilization and its effect as a particular instance,

scholars called for social movements to be studied as episodes of contention, in which

claim-making and challenges to the state evolve through sustained engagement.83

Notably, this perspective broadened the scope of the literature from social movements to

82 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution. ———, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (Russell Sage Foundation, 1984). Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (University of Chicago Press, 1982). 83 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, "Dynamics of Contention," Social Movement Studies 2, no. 1 (2003).

contentious politics, defined as “collective activity on the part of the claimants-or those

who claim to represent them- relying at least in part on noninstitutionalized forms of

interaction with elites, opponents, or the state.”84 By situating social movements within

contentious politics literature, this shift conceptually combined research on groups

challenging existing power arrangements through both formal and informal contestation.

Despite this increased recognition of the links between social movement and the

state, there continues to be a scarcity of literature exploring social movement success.

While scholars are quick to point out this gap in the literature, studying social

movement success requires defining fixed goals for organizations with heterogeneous,

evolving objectives.85 Beyond the challenges of defining success, scholars also call for

distinguishing between specific outcomes and indirect and/ or unintended consequences.

Responding to these challenges, scholars have worked to recognize this complexity and

avoid conceptualizing a social movement as a unitary actor; Andrews focuses on

'outcomes,' while Gamson explores success either in terms of the movement’s ability to

obtain new advantages or society's acceptance of the movement's claims as legitimate or

acceptance of the movement as representative.86 Gamson (1990) perhaps most directly

measures success, exploring if movements gained new advantages or acceptance of

demands in national discourse, resulting in the four outcomes of full response,

preemption, co-optation, and collapse.87 This research agenda has expanded to explore

84 Tarrow and Tollefson, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. 85 Kenneth T. Andrews, “Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty, 1965 to 1971” American Sociological Review Vol. 66, No. 1 (Feb., 2001). 86 William A Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest (Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1990). 87 Ibid. Also see Edwin Amenta, Bruce G Carruthers, and Yvonne Zylan, "A Hero for the Aged? The Townsend Movement, the Political Mediation Model, and Us Old-Age Policy, 1934-1950," American Journal of Sociology (1992). Mario Diani, "Social Movements and Social Capital: A Network Perspective on Movement Outcomes," Mobilization: An International Quarterly 2, no. 2 (1997). Marco

social movement success in several ways: individual, institutional, cultural, and political

change. Analysis of these processes, however, tends to stop at the point of agenda

setting and/or policy promulgation, assuming that policy implementation follows

transparent, institutionalized bureaucratic procedures.88

As most scholars expect, there is a strong correlation between highly organized

groups and success, as well as between groups that use violence or disruptive tactics and

success (disruption-moderation debate). Specifying the conditions under which the use

of violence produces success, Button finds that violence produces changes when

demands are limited and clearly defined, violent actions are frequent enough but not

severe and combined with other peaceful strategies, resources are available to respond

to the demands, and outsiders are sympathetic.89 Despite these conclusions, authors

continue to disagree about when and why violence is effective in some cases, but not

others. More recent work has challenged these conclusions, arguing that the outcomes of

social movements depend not on factors internal to the movement, such as the

movement’s use of violence, but rather on the broader environment in which the

movement is acting. For example, Goldstone argues that the timing of external crises is

crucial to understanding why some social movements are successful while others are

not. There is also a growing body of literature that explores how challengers will situate

their demands, based on the institutional environment. For example, Kitchelt finds that

G Giugni, "Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements," Annual Review of Sociology (1998). Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, How Social Movements Matter, vol. 10 (University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 88 This stems from the expectation that political elites, seeking a broad electoral base, should ignore particular interests from interest groups or social movements in favor of responding to the claims of the majority. This expectation is strengthened in states with more institutional capacity. Paul Burstein, "Interest Organizations, Political Parties, and the Study of Democratic Politics," Social Movements and American Political Institutions (1998). 89 Button 1978

the outcomes of antinuclear power movements in four countries depended on the

implementation capacity of the state’s bureaucratic infrastructure. Amenta and Caren

further document that:

…challengers also benefit by targeting their actions to fit the administrative or legislative context. If the relevant state bureaucratic actors are present and their supportive or neutral and the political regime is not supportive of the challenger’s group, collective action will be the most productive if it focuses on elected officials. Such action might induce those who would otherwise be indifferent or hostile to legislation to support it or at least not to challenge it. If the political regime is supportive or neutral and domestic bureaucrats are either absent or hostile to the challenger’s constituency, bureaucratic capabilities must be created or existing bureaucratic actors must be sanctioned.90

While some of this literature starts to consider government responses, these responses

are studied for their impact on mobilization tactics and success; policy implementation

decisions are assumed to be constant and are not theorized. Most social movement

scholars tend to assume that policy implementation is not contested. Rather, if a social

movement is largely considered to be successful if its demands are institutionalized to

the point that collective goods are accessible in a defined way to a defined group of

eligible people. As Amenta (1998) describes, at this point the issue “is removed from

the political agenda. For the situation to change, some other person or group must

challenge the institutionalized benefits.”91

State-Dissident Relations

Related literature on state-dissident relations also explores how governments

respond to contentious action. The state-dissident literature focuses on how a

90 Edwin Amenta and Neal Caren, "The Legislative, Organizational, and Beneficiary Consequences of State-Oriented Challengers," in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, ed. David A Snow, Sarah A Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (John Wiley & Sons, 2004), 474-5. 91 Qtd in ibid.

government responds to specific demands of a mobilized movement, group, or

individual. Relying largely on rational choice assumptions, the state is generally

assumed to be most interested in reducing perceived threats to its ability to govern;92 the

more threatening the groups’ demands, the more likely they will prompt a government

response. The government’s perception of the threat is based on the group’s goals,

levels of participation, duration of challenge, and choice of tactics, as well as the

characteristics of the government, such as regime type.93

The choice between these responses depends on the costs of each, expected to

vary based on the regime type and state’s inclinations to draw on particular responses or

combinations of responses.94 Different responses, then, will be the result of the

government’s analysis of how to maximize governability. Social movement literature

makes similar calculations, considering how government responses reduces the

likelihood of collective action by altering the costs of action, costs of mobilization, risks

and incidence of repression.95 There are numerous conclusions in the literature about

when a government will use repression, largely pointing to the influence of external

variables such as levels of democracy, economic and political situations, and coercive

92 Ted Robert Gurr and Mark Irving Lichbach, "Forecasting Internal Conflict a Competitive Evaluation of Empirical Theories," Comparative Political Studies 19, no. 1 (1986). Jack A Goldstone and Charles Tilly, "Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State Response in the Dynamics of Contentious Action," in Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics, ed. Ronald Aminzade (2001). James C Franklin, "Contentious Challenges and Government Responses in Latin America," Political Research Quarterly 62, no. 4 (2009). Will H Moore, "The Repression of Dissent a Substitution Model of Government Coercion," Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 1 (2000). Karen Rasler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution," American Sociological Review (1996). Maria Josua and Mirjam Edel, "To Repress or Not to Repress—Regime Survival Strategies in the Arab Spring," Terrorism and Political Violence, no. ahead-of-print (2014). 93 Gurr and Lichbach, "Forecasting Internal Conflict a Competitive Evaluation of Empirical Theories." 94 Ibid. Christian Davenport, "Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions," American Journal of Political Science (1995). 95 Ronald Aminzade, Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 181.

capabilities.96 Other authors incorporate the impact of the actor presenting the demands

on the government’s decisions, arguing that to understand the government’s response, it

is necessary to explore the behavior of the actors presenting the demands.97 In most

circumstances, governments are expected to use more repression when the threat posed

by protests increases.98 Della Porta (1995) presents a comparatively rare analysis of the

specific elements that impact policing of protests in Germany and Italy including

constitutional features; legislation on public order, democracy, police rights, and civilian

rights; cultural understandings of civil rights and police power; interactions between

political parties, interest groups, and movement organizations; pressure from law and

order coalitions; and internal bureaucratic dynamics. These factors are not causally

linked with specific state decisions regarding policing, however. The focus remains on

how general trends in repression or toleration impact the movement, rather than on the

government's response itself. 99

A notable expansion of this argument suggests that the state will draw on multiple strategies. The government’s response will depend not just on the protesting group, but also on dynamics and splits within the protesting group. Research on the radical flank effect argues that when there are splits between radical and moderate sections of a

96 Specifically, Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) find that past levels of repression, democracy, population size, economic standing, and threats most strongly determine a country’s repression levels. Davenport (1996) points to levels of democratization, coercive capabilities, and political and economic situations of a state. 97 Sabine C Carey, "The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression," Political Research Quarterly 59, no. 1 (2006). 98 Specifically, Gupta, Singh, Sprague (1993) and Gurr and Lichbach (1986) argue that governments will use more repression as protest becomes more widespread. Moore (2000) focuses on what factors will prompt a government to substitute repression for accommodation, suggesting that governments will tend to use more repression if faced with increases in protest levels. 99 Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 58. Della Porta also notes that most social movement literature categorizes policing as “tough repressive” or “tolerant control.” To expand upon this, she classifies police response according to repressive/ tolerant; selective/ diffuse; preventive/ reactive; hard/ soft; and dirty/lawful (57-58).

movement, the government will reward the moderate group in order to isolate and moderate the radical group’s demands and tactics.100 Often, states take advantage of the heterogeneous nature of social movements, strategically calculating responses to strengthen moderate branches and weaken radical ones. As Tilly highlights of Great

Britain’s response to social movements, the state simultaneously employed several tactics, including monitoring and directing the movement, bargaining with more moderate branches, granting concessions, coopting leaders, and repressing radical groups;

Tarrow similarly concludes that, “by negotiating with some elements among a spectrum of contenders, governments encourage moderation and split off the moderates from their radical allies.”101 Related literatures on patronage politics, charismatic populism, or corporatist negotiations similarly highlight states’ formal and informal strategies to take advantage of these splits in movements, with the objective of demobilization.

Several complications arise when theorizing the nature of the government response, however. First, because it is unclear how the group will respond to particular government responses, governments have imperfect information about how to best respond. For example, literature on government repression diverges on whether repression causes protesters to substitute violent protest for nonviolent (Moore 1998,

2000, Lichbach 1987), temper their demands (Franklin 2009), increase their demands

(Khawaja 1993, Gupta et al 1993), or has uncertain or varying effect (Rasler 1996,

Franklin 2013).102 Second, debates persist over whether the government’s response and

100 Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834, 309-10. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. 101 Tarrow and Tollefson, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics, 309-10. 102 Moore, "The Repression of Dissent a Substitution Model of Government Coercion.", ———, "Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing," American Journal of Political Science (1998), Mark Irving Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent," Journal of Conflict Resolution 31, no. 2 (1987). Franklin, "Contentious

motivation are driven by qualities of the government (internal factors), or qualities and strategies of the group (external factors).103

Ultimately, both social movement and state-dissident literatures punt on theorizing if and how governments respond to contentious action through institutionalized public policy. While the social movement literature recognizes the complexity of social movements and explores the impact of factors both internal and external to the movement, including government responses, the focus remains on how these factors affect mobilization strategies and outcomes. State-dissident literature more directly theorizes when and why a government will respond, arguing that government responses shift depending on the extent to which group actions are perceived as a threat.

Some portions of the movement, then, will be more or less successful depending on how the government perceived their actions. Neither literature theorizes if, when, or why a government will respond to contentious action through public policy.

My Approach to Theorizing Public Policy Responses

This project seeks to fill that gap in the literature to better understand

government responses to contentious action through institutionalized policy procedures.

The null hypothesis is that democratic governments with sufficient accountability,

Challenges and Government Responses in Latin America." Marwan Khawaja, "Repression and Popular Collective Action: Evidence from the West Bank" (paper presented at the Sociological Forum, 1993). Dipak K Gupta, Harinder Singh, and Tom Sprague, "Government Coercion of Dissidents Deterrence or Provocation?," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 2 (1993). Rasler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution." James C Franklin, "Repertoires of Contention and Tactical Choice in Latin America, 1981-1995," Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 35 (2013). 103 Carey, "The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression." Specifically, Gupta, Singh, Sprague (1993) and Gurr and Lichbach (1986) argue that governments will use more repression as protest becomes more widespread. Moore (2000) focuses on what factors will prompt a government to substitute repression for accommodation, suggesting that governments will tend to use more repression if faced with increases in protest levels. Gupta, Singh, and Sprague, "Government Coercion of Dissidents Deterrence or Provocation?." Gurr and Lichbach, "Forecasting Internal Conflict a Competitive Evaluation of Empirical Theories."

transparency, and institutional capacity maintain institutionalized policy implementation

procedures, and there is no relationship between contentious action and policy

implementation. Three alternative hypotheses capture the ability of particular actors, in

this context indigenous communities and economic stakeholders, to influence the shape

of policy implementation; the first hypothesis tests the literature’s assumption that

responses are relative to the threat posed by contentious action, while the second and

third test if external actors, in this case indigenous communities and economic

stakeholders, are able to leverage policy implementation decisions.

Ho: Policy implementation is transparent and removed from the interests of particular stakeholders

HA: Policy implementation is driven by the interests of particular stakeholders

HA1: Government responds to instances of contentious action based on the relative threat posed by the mobilization to reduce the threat posed to governability.

HA2: Government responds to leverage acquired by communities through contentious action.

HA3: Government protects the interests of powerful economic stakeholders.

I argue that when a democratic government responds to contentious action with

policy, it is trapped between multiple roles and responsibilities related to maintaining

governability. This democratic context requires the state to balance multiple roles of

being an authoritative organization, an arena for social conflict, and representative of the

collective good of the society.104 While intervening in policy procedures presents one

104 Peter B Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge University Press, 1985). Peter B Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Cambridge University Press, 1995).

sort of threat to governability in a region, continued contentious action presents a

different threat to governability.

By trapping the government between these different responsibilities, groups can

acquire leverage over policy implementation decisions, swaying the government’s

calculations. I define leverage as a tool to exercise power, building off of Dahl’s

conceptualization of power as “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do

something that B would not otherwise do.”105 This conceptualization requires

intentionality on the part of actor A, a conflict of interest between actors A and B, and

that A’s success depends on particular resources. Furthermore, it also requires a

relationship between the two actors, as there is “no action at a distance.”106 Barnett

classifies this form of power as compulsory power, or “direct control by one actor over

the conditions of existence and/ or the actions of another,” a conceptualization which

emphasizes the agency of the actors, conditioned by structural constraints.107 Leverage,

then, is a tool used in attempt to exercise power over an actor.

105 Robert A Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957). This conceptualization of power is often described as the first face of power, with others offering much more expansive definitions of power. For example, Bennett defines power as “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate,” highlighting that different conceptualizations of power are rooted in different understandings of if power can be possessed or is socially constructed. As Peter Digeser (1992: 980) summarizes of the various faces of power, “under the first face of power the central question is, ‘who, if anyone, is exercising power?’ under the second face, ‘what issues have been mobilized of the agenda and by whom?’ under the radical conception, ‘whose objective interests are being harmed?’ Under the fourth face of power the critical issues is ‘what kind of subject is being produced?’” Peter Bachrach and Morton S Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review 56, no. 04 (1962). Peter Digeser, "The Fourth Face of Power," The Journal of Politics 54, no. 04 (1992). Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, vol. 1 (London Macmillan, 1974). 106 Dahl, "The Concept of Power." 107 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, Power in Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

While several fields within political science use the concept of leverage,108 I draw on Keck and Sikkink’s conceptualization of leverage as a tool for less powerful actors to acquire power over a more powerful actor when coercion is not possible;109 one author summarized that this conceptualization of leverage invokes the idea of “small moving big.”110 When detailing how and why transnational advocacy networks are effective,

Keck and Sikkink describe leverage politics as one tool through which “weak groups gain influence far beyond their ability to influence state practices directly.”111 Tarrow similarly summarizes that these networks “help resource-poor domestic actors to gain leverage in their own societies.”112

This conceptualization of leverage as a tool for less powerful actors is particularly useful in understanding the outcomes of contentious action. Discussions of contentious

108 The concept of leverage is used in several fields. Friman describes the politics of leverage as “the ways in which actors combine instruments … to purposefully influence the behavior of targets and the conditions under which these combinations are more likely to be effective.” H Richard Friman, "Conclusion: Exploring the Politics of Leverage," in The Politics of Leverage in International Relations: Name, Shame, and Sanction, ed. H. Richard Friman (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 201, ibid. Literature on bargaining similarly explores how the combination of capabilities, means, and contexts, at both the domestic and international level can translate to present or future leverage (Evans et al 1993; Fearon 1995; Putnam 1988; Snyder 1989). For example, Levitsky and Way (2006, 2007) describe of the leverage of the West is a contributing cause of democratization. They conceptualize that the West’s leverage depends on the size and strength of the state and economy, competing Western policy objectives, and the presence of a competing powerful state, summarizing that, “Where countries lack bargaining power and are heavily affected by Western punitive action, leverage is high. Where countries possess substantial bargaining power and/or can weather Western punitive action without substantial harm, leverage is low.” Lucan A Way and Steven Levitsky, "Linkage, Leverage, and the Post- Communist Divide," East European Politics & Societies 21, no. 1 (2007). Steven Levitsky and Lucan A Way, "Linkage Versus Leverage. Rethinking the International Dimension of Regime Change," Comparative Politics (2006). 109 Keck and Sikkink explicitly highlight this power imbalance in their definition of leverage as “the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence. Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, vol. 6 (Cambridge University Press, 1998). ———, "Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics," International Social Science Journal 51, no. 159 (1999). 110 Friman, "Conclusion: Exploring the Politics of Leverage," 202. 111 Keck and Sikkink, "Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics." 112 Sidney Tarrow, "Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics," Annual Review of Political Science 4, no. 1 (2001).

action frequently employ concepts of power, as contentious action is a tool through which a less powerful actor strives to coerce a particular response. As Tarrow concludes:

…contentious action serves as the basis of social movements, not because movements are always violent or extreme, but because it is the main and often the only recourse that most ordinary people possess to demonstrate their claims against better-equipped opponents or powerful states… under certain conditions, even small and temporary groups of collective actors can have explosive effects on powerful states.113

Because of the group’s relative position of weakness, contentious action strives for, but is unlikely to result in the coercive power implied by Dahl’s definition of power as the ability to force one actor to do something in another’s interest. Tarrow, for example, tempers his expectations of the impact of contentious action by saying that “ordinary people often try to exert power by contentious means…”114 Amenta and Caren highlight the striving intentions of contentious action, summarizing:

To secure new benefits, challenges will typically need help or complementary action from like-minded state actors, including elected officials, appointed officials, and state civil servants. And so challengers need to engage in collective action that changes the calculations of relevant institutional political actors, such as elected officials and state bureaucrats, and challengers need to adopt organizational forms that fit political circumstances. State actors need in turn to see a challenger as potentially facilitating or disrupting their own goals- which might range from augmenting or cementing new electoral coalitions, to gaining in public opinion, to increasing the support for the missions of government bureaus.115

Contentious action is a means of acquiring leverage that seeks to coerce a response.

113 ———, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. 114 Ibid. 115 Amenta and Caren, "The Legislative, Organizational, and Beneficiary Consequences of State-Oriented Challengers," 473.

I argue that the effect of this leverage depends on degrees of policy

institutionalization. I adopt Huntington’s definition of institutionalization as the

“process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability,”116 with

the level of institutionalization depending on the adaptability, complexity, autonomy,

and coherence of organizations and procedures. The more institutionalized the policy,

the less likely that bureaucratic and political actors could intervene in the process on

behalf of particular interests and the more likely that implementation transparently

follows established, regulated, and overseen procedures.

I argue that the implementation of institutionalized public policy is determined by actors navigating institutional and other constraints. This process-oriented approach understands policy implementation to be the “final outcome of a long series of interactions and negotiations among members of different interest groups, and of outside events often unrelated to any particular program of capacity strengthening.”117 By doing so, this approach highlights how the interaction between types of policy deviations and the agency particular actors is mediated by capacity-strengthening activities; the specific hypotheses under analysis are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

116 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 12. 117 Grindle, Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization, and the Promise of Good Governance, 67.

Chapter 3 Situating Mapuche Territorial Demands within Expectations of Chilean Governance

“Mapuche remembrances serve to maintain a continuity of struggle, whereas the memories of local Chilean elites often serve to justify their relative wealth and presence in the region.”118

Chile is usually excluded from analyses of indigenous politics in Latin America.

As highlighted in the introductory chapter, most research on indigenous politics focuses on explaining more dramatic or successful instances of indigenous mobilization, resulting in a “distorted picture of indigenous politics in Latin America.”119 There is certainly tension between indigenous communities and the Chilean state; in recent years, police shot and killed several activists during land takeovers, political prisoners charged with terrorism staged multiple hunger strikes attracting international condemnation, and journalists and politicians reference “red zones of conflict” and “our little Chiapas.” Yet, indigenous communities in Chile have not emerged as actors on the national political scene as they have in other Latin American countries, leaving indigenous demands to be contested through very different strategies at very different levels of government.120

Focusing on the Chilean case expands the scope of research on indigenous politics in

Latin America.

Furthermore, the Chilean governance model is analytically useful to explore if, when, and why governments respond to contentious action through public policy. As will

118 Richards and Gardner, "Still Seeking Recognition: Mapuche Demands, State Violence, and Discrimination in Democratic Chile," 34. 119 Donna Lee Van Cott, "Indigenous Peoples' Politics in Latin America," Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010): 400. 120 Lucero calls attention to the need for additional analysis of indigenous politics in countries where indigenous groups comprise a minority of the population, observing that lowland indigenous communities in Ecuador prioritized negotiation over institutional rights. Lucero, Struggles of Voice: The Politics of Indigenous Representation in the Andes, 107.

be discussed throughout this chapter, Chile is regionally known for its centralized, technocratic style of governance, creating the expectation of distance between state and popular demands. This expectation is strengthened by the nature of Chile’s return to democracy in 1990 and post-transition governments’ capacity to disarticulate social discontent and mobilization. These governance patterns make Chile a most likely case for capable policy implementation according to institutionalized procedures, and least likely case for social groups to be able to exert leverage over policy implementation.

To highlight the continuity of the Chilean governance model, this chapter details the traditions of technocratic rule, centralization, elitism, and removed state-society relations in the post-Pinochet period. It then situates Mapuche demands and historic indigenous-state relations within these governance traditions, and concludes by introducing the Araucanía region under analysis.

Chilean Governance: Continuity

Compared with its Latin American counterparts, Chilean governance is characterized by its continuity and stability. While the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990) violently interrupted the country’s democratic tradition, it reinforced many of Chile's political traditions; the 1980 constitution increased the powers of the executive and the dictatorship separated the government from popular influences. Since the return to democracy, parties and coalitions drawing on pre-dictatorship social roots have dominated the political environment.121 In the return to democracy, the incoming government was severely constrained by the 1980 Constitution left by the authoritarian government, which preserved the influence of the armed forces and limited space for

121 Mariano Torcal and Scott Mainwaring, "The Political Recrafting of Social Bases of Party Competition: Chile, 1973–95," British Journal of Political Science 33, no. 01 (2003).

democratization at the regional and local levels. These “authoritarian enclaves” constrained the newly democratic government into what has often been called a “tutelary democracy.”122 Fuentes describes that “… the [elite, pacted] nature of the transition imposed a clear agenda related to the country’s legacy rather than to new, emerging social conflicts.”123

Much of the recent continuity in Chilean governance can be attributed to the continuation of the neoliberal economic model implemented during the 1970s. Drawing on the technical support of a group of technocrats trained at the Chicago School of

Economics, the Pinochet regime implemented a series of market-oriented economic restructuring policies that privatized and deregulated the market and the provision of social services. Chile became one of the most open economies in the world, with impressive economic results; after the economic crisis of the early 1980s, the Chilean economy grew more than 6 percent per year for 15 years. The Concertación did not challenge this economic model in their pragmatic approach to the transition; Alejandro

Foxley, Minister of Finance from 1990 to 1994, described:

“…the main thing we had to do was to make sure that there was an equilibrium between change and continuity. Mature countries are countries that don’t always start from scratch. We had to recognize that in the previous government the foundations had been established for a more modern market economy and we would start from there, restoring a balance between economic development and social development.”124

122 Rhoda Rabkin, "The Aylwin Government And'tutelary'democracy: A Concept in Search of a Case?," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs (1992). 123 Enrique Peruzzotti and Catalina Smulovitz, Enforcing the Rule of Law: Social Accountability in the New Latin American Democracies (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 153. 124 Adriela Fernandez and Marisol Vera, "The Bachelet Presidency and the End of Chile’s Concertacion Era," Latin American Perspectives 39, no. 4 (2012).

This continuity in macroeconomic policy was accompanied by an increased focus on addressing inequality through social policy, prompting poverty rates to drop from 50% in

1990 to less than 10% in 2006. Furthermore, the center-left Concertación coalition held the presidency from 1990-2010, allowing for policies to be implemented and gradually adjusted over two decades. The combination of a solid fiscal foundation, efficient administration, and sufficient institutionalization improved the stability and sustainability of the Concertación’s approach to transition.

This stability and consistency has made Chile a regional example of good governance, often ranking closer to the United States and United Kingdom than its regional counterparts. Since 2003, Chile has scored a 1 (scale 1-7, with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom) on both of Freedom House’s measures. Transparency

International’s (TI) 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Chile 22nd of 177 countries, placing it 5th in the hemisphere behind Canada, Barbados, United States, and

Uruguay. Chile also ranked in the 91st percentile in control of corruption in TI’s 2010 measure.125 These trends stand in contrast to the portrayal of Latin American governments as “paper Leviathans: imbued with enormous powers in theory, but unable to make use of them in practice.”126 Figure 2 provides evidence of the quality and stability of Chilean governance, based on the World Bank’s Governance Indicators data from 1996 to 2013.

125 Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2013," (2013). 126 Miguel A Centeno and Agustin E Ferraro, State and Nation Making in Latin America and Spain: Republics of the Possible (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

FIGURE 2: Measures of Chilean Democracy127

127 The blue line shows Chile’s percentile rank and the orange lines show the margins of error. Graphs generated based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators, available at www.govindicators.org. Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues

Chilean Governance: Technocracy

Chile’s tradition of technocratic governance dates back as far as the 1920s and persists through both authoritarian and democratic political regimes.128 Technocrats, isolated from the influences of popular participation or political negotiation, implement cohesive and consistent policy decisions based on professional expertise and experience; by depoliticizing policy decision-making and implementation, administrations are able to improve policy efficiency and effectiveness.129 This degree of autonomy distinguishes technocrats from other actors, including technicians, technopoliticians (Grindle 1977), political technocrat (Camp 1985), technopols (Dominguez 1994).130

During the Pinochet dictatorship, a group of technocrats referred to as the

“Chicago Boys” were appointed to prominent positions and largely responsible for the implementation of the dramatic neoliberal economic restructuring project. Technocratic rule remained on the policy agenda, offering stability to the negotiated, uncertain return

128 Patricio Silva, In the Name of Reason : Technocrats and Politics in Chile (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008). For a discussion of the Chilean bureaucracy throughout the 20th century, see: ———, "Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the Cieplan Monks," Journal of Latin American Studies 23, no. 02 (1991). Alfredo Rehren, "Clientelismo político, corrupción y reforma del estado en Chile," Libros Reforma de Estado 2 (2000). 129 It is largely assumed that technocratic rule requires particular political alliances in order to avoid resistance to policy decisions from those most affected by economic restructuring. In fact, literature on technocratic governance in the 1970s focused on how the link between technocratic rule and authoritarianism facilitated dramatic economic restructuring. Since the third wave of democratization, technocratic rule has been decoupled from authoritarianism and more frequently associated with neoliberal economic policy reform. For technocrats to be effective, however, they still frequently rely on political alliances to provide relative political stability and limit the potential for social conflict to impede policy implementation. Jorge I Domínguez, Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s (Penn State Press, 2010). 130 Jean Meynaud, Technocracy (New York: Free Press, 1969), 29. Collier expands on this minimal definition, describing technocrats as “individuals with a high level of specialized academic training which serves as a principal criterion on the basis of which they are selected to occupy key decision- making or advisory roles in large complex organizations- both public and private.” Fernando Henrique Cardoso, The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton University Press, 1979), 403. There is a significant discussion of the differences between technocrats, bureaucrats, technicians, intellectuals, and politicians, with most authors concluding that technocratic governance is that in which technocrats are at higher levels of decision-making with more control over the directions of policy programs. Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (Penn State Press, 2010), 34-6.

to democracy in 1990; as Silva summarizes, “the positioning of the technocracy vis-à-vis democracy … has been conditioned by the permanent middle-class fear of the masses and chaos, and its desire for order and, at the same time, by its wish for social justice and the value it assigns to personal effort.”131 Despite an increased focus on social problems in recent years, most observers argue that these policies were incorporated into the established economic program.132 Technocrats’ role was strengthened as the international community called for “second-stage reforms” strengthening state capacity after neoliberal reforms shrunk the size of the state.133 Bureaucratic and administrative modernization projects worked to promote oversight, evaluation, and bureaucratic professionalization in hopes of further distancing bureaucrats from politics.134 The creation of the General Secretariat of the Presidency further distanced policymakers from popular demands.135 Technocrats have maintained prominent positions since the return to

131 Silva, In the Name of Reason : Technocrats and Politics in Chile, 17. 132 Stephan Haggard and Robert R Kaufman, Development, Democracy, and Welfare States: Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe (Princeton University Press, 2008), 295. 133 First generation reforms focused privatization and deregulation, scaling back the role and size of the state, while second generation reforms focused on increasing administrative capacity through administrative reform. Ben Ross Schneider and Blanca Heredia, Reinventing Leviathan: The Politics of Administrative Reform in Developing Countries (North-South Center Press Miami, FL, 2003), 5. Also see the World Bank’s 1997 World Development Report: The State in a Changing World and Domínguez, Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s. 134 Schneider and Heredia, Reinventing Leviathan: The Politics of Administrative Reform in Developing Countries, 137. See also: Alfredo Rehren, La evolución de la agenda de transparencia en los gobiernos de la Concertación (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Vicerrectoría de Comunicaciones y Asuntos Públicos, 2008). 135 Kurt Weyland, "Economic Policy in Chile's New Democracy," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 41, no. 3 (1999).

democracy,136 to the point that Garretón argued that the modernization of the state during the Frei administration was more consequential than democratization.137

Chilean Governance: Centralization

Historically, Chile is one of the most centralized Latin American governments.

Chile’s executive branch is one of the strongest in the region, arguably leaving the legislative and judicial branches with more informal than formal power.138 At the local level, political leaders historically had limited power and resources, and many of these traditions have reemerged as local politics was redemocratized after 1990.

Before the dictatorship, local politics were broker politics, dominated by competition between national level political parties.139 As Valenzuela documents, the

136 These patterns are a bit distinct during the Bachelet administration, who worked to implement her promise to promote a more participatory form of government by avoiding expected political appointments and appointing technocrats that did not have political backing. There were several unexpected results of this approach; Valenzuela and Dammert point out by not cutting deals with coalition partners, Bachelet did not have the political capital to quickly respond (Arturo Valenzuela and Lucía Dammert, "Problems of Success in Chile," Journal of Democracy 17, no. 4 (2006). Joignant, however, argues that the role of technocrats significantly diminished during the Bachelet administration (2006-2010), due to her emphasis on social welfare reform and a more participatory form of governance. In exploring the role of technopols during the four Concertación administrations from 1990-2010, Joignant argues that technopols had an “important and stable presence” from 1990-2000 during the Aylwin and Frei, a smaller role in the Lagos administration from 2000-2006, and a very small role under Bachelet, based on the nature of the policy agenda implemented by each successive administration. Alfredo Joignant, "Tecnócratas, technopols y dirigentes de partido: Tipos de agentes y especies de capital en las elites gubernamentales de la Concertación (1990-2010)," in Notables, tecnócratas y mandarines: Elementos de sociología de las elites en Chile (1990-2010), ed. Alfredo Joignant and Pedro Güell (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales, 2011), 538. Silva, In the Name of Reason : Technocrats and Politics in Chile, 17. 137 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 145. 138 Peter Siavelis, "Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Pinochet Chile: A Preliminary Assessment," Presidentialism and democracy in Latin America (1997). ———, "Disconnected Fire Alarms and Ineffective Police Patrols: Legislative Oversight in Postauthoritarian Chile," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42, no. 1 (2000). ———, "Exaggerated Presidentialism and Moderate Presidents: Executive-Legislative Relations in Chile," Legislative Politics in Latin America 50 (2002). Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 1997). Matthew Soberg Shugart and Stephan Haggard, "Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems," Presidents, parliaments, and policy (2001). 139 Arturo Valenzuela, Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized Polity (Duke Univ Pr, 1977). Alfredo Rehren, "Corruption and Local Politics in Chile," Crime, Law and Social Change 25, no. 4 (1996).

“lack of resources in the society as a whole contributed to the trend of the more powerful political forces in the center taking over an increasingly large share of the nation’s resources for central dispensation.”140 Local leaders were responsible for implementing national projects, but spent most of their time channeling local demands up through national networks to ensure local electoral success. Local officials were “individual political entrepreneurs,” utilizing petty cash to satisfy the “vicio de los chilenos,”141

(Chilean vices) particularly in the allocation of state jobs and social benefits.142 In 1969, one study found that half of petitions to municipalities originated from the bureaucracy itself and half sought particular, individual benefits.143 Groups did petition the government, but pursued specific benefits rather than broader change; as one local politician from the Socialist party argued, “All [the people] think of is the political favor.”144 Valenzuela summarized that, “…very simply, Chilean politics were broker politics. Vertical network of brokerage cluster extended from all of the nation’s communities to the center. Local brokers interacted with their followers and the national broker, who in turn interacted with the local broker and government bureaucrats and ministers…”145

During the Pinochet regime, these vertical brokerage networks were reworked into a form of bureaucratic brokerage. Local government managed the distribution of resources and services after decentralizing reforms tasked municipalities with the

140 Valenzuela, Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized Polity, 80. 141 Ibid., 73, 89. 142 Federico Guillermo Gil, "Political System of Chile," (1966). Valenzuela, Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized Polity. Agustín Ferraro, "Friends in High Places: Congressional Influence on the Bureaucracy in Chile," Latin American Politics and Society 50, no. 2 (2008). 143 Rehren, "Corruption and Local Politics in Chile." 144 Valenzuela, Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized Polity, 78. 145 Ibid., 159.

intermediating local interests, as was previously done by political parties. Local politicians no longer needed to extract resources from the center, but rather acted as

“bureaucratic activists within the administrative apparatus of the state.”146 This shift distanced citizens from national to local policy debates, referred to as the “la alcaldización de la política” (mayor-ization of politics).147

After the return to democracy, local elections were restored with limited consequence. The Concertación, severely limited by reforms put in place by the Pinochet regime, sought to centralize power in Santiago,148 leaving administrative and financial structures largely intact. The combination of centralization and privatization left local politicians with fewer resources to distribute; between 1987 and 2007, local government expenditures account for, on average, 12.5% of total governmental expenditures.149

Taxes are collected by the central government and distributed back to local governments, leaving the central government less interested in recuperating lost local tax revenue and in control of the local government’s capacity to respond to local demands.150 These patterns left local organizations in primarily advisory roles, with little incentive to encourage participation.151

As early as 1996, the limited power of local leaders and government prompted observers to conclude that many “local political practices have been partially restored,”

146 Alfredo Rehren, "El impacto de las políticas autoritarias a nivel local: Implicancias para la consolidación democrática en Chile," Estudios Públicos 44 (1991). 147 Verónica Valdivia, Rolando Álvarez, and Karen Donoso, "La alcaldización de la política. Los municipios en la dictadura Pinochetista," Santiago: Editorial Lom (2012). 148 Kent Eaton, "Designing Subnational Institutions Regional and Municipal Reforms in Postauthoritarian Chile," Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 2 (2004). 149 Bettina Horst, "Fuentes de financiamiento para fobiernos subnacionales y descentralización fiscal," Un mejor estado: Propuestas de modernización y reforma”, Consorcio para la Reforma del Estado, Santiago de Chile http://www. reformadelestado. cl (2009): 215. 150 Posner, "Local Democracy and the Transformation of Popular Participation in Chile." 151 Ibid.

returning to be an arena for competition between centralized political parties.152

Candidates for municipal councilors were chosen by national party leaders according to pacts between allied political parties; the mayor was chosen from these councilors.

Regional councilors were also indirectly elected by the municipal council. Intendentes

(regional executives), to date, are directly appointed by the president, acting as both the head of the regional government and the representative of the national government.153

While decentralization has advanced, local governments have yet to acquire financial and administrative authority.

Despite these shifts, there are indications of persisting, albeit reconfigured, brokerage politics. After privatization, the state no longer exercised control over contracting and financing investments, opening up space for business interests to develop tight relationships with politicians, particularly at the local level. Rehren notes the

“penetration of the locality by the market and the introduction of private enterprises as a new component of local political machines and clientelistic networks.”154 Johnston reaches similar conclusions that privatization reconfigured Chilean politics, merging previous forms of “clientelism and patronage” politics with more recent forms of

“interest group bidding” politics in the form of market corruption.155 Political openness has also increased allegations of corruption, often related to these local patterns of interest mediation.156 Rehren finds that 66% of the allegations were directed at mayors and 24% at municipal councilors, suggestive of the persistence of clientelism. He

152 Rehren, "Corruption and Local Politics in Chile." 153 Eaton, "Designing Subnational Institutions Regional and Municipal Reforms in Postauthoritarian Chile." 154 Rehren, "Corruption and Local Politics in Chile." 155 Michael Johnston, "Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democracy: When Politics and Corruption Meet," Corruption and the Global Economy 83 (1997). 156 Rehren, "Corruption and Local Politics in Chile."

summarizes that, “It is plausible that the accusations of corruption are nothing less than a manifestation of well-entrenched clientelistic networks operating within the local political process.”157 Some parties seemed more likely to be involved in corruption allegations; of the mayors charged between 1990 and 1996, 42% belonged to PDC and

28% to PPD.158 Notably, Rehren does not find evidence that the local community can exercise control over instances of corruption, due to the isolation and lack of information about municipal institutions and decision-making.159

Chilean Governance: Elitism

Continuity in Chilean governance is reinforced by the persisting strength of a closed, strategic, self-aware elite. Traditionally, elites were those who acquired large tracts of land (haciendas) through land grants and encomiendas during colonization.

Through independence, the 19th century, and half of the twentieth century, these elites maintained and protected their tight connections to the state. With growth of the urban middle class, traditional elites preserved their influence by allowing the promotion of industrial development in exchange for the preservation of landed estates. In 1969, Petras described that:

the Chilean elite was singularly adept at shaping historical circumstances and institutions to further its own particular interests- chief of which are economic and social stability….To a considerable degree, representative political institutions became agencies for the transaction of business by the elite; the political structure was forged into a mechanism for maintaining the elite’s power and wealth.160

Another observer summarized in 1975:

157 Ibid. 158 Ibid. 159 Ibid. 160 James F Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Univ of California Press, 1969), 84, 93.

Ownership of land has always been the ultimate status symbol in Chile and the most prestigious families since colonial days have been associated with the large estates of the Central Valley. These 150 to 200 families were the unchallenged masters of Chile…Not only did they control their own personal fiefs in the Central Valley but they also supplied the leadership of the Conservative and Liberal parties, ran the banks and a good deal of real estate, and were strongly represented in almost all of the Cabinets until the Christian Democrats came to power in 1964. It is quite clear that this ‘traditional oligarchy,’ as it has been called, has been forced to share power with other groups… Instead of trying to eliminate them as an archaic social force, middle class leaders have tended to play by the rules drawn up by the oligarchy in the hope of gaining admission to the inner sanctum.161

Radcliff observes “networks of inter-related families and clans combining positions of wealth and power in potentially divergent sectors of the economy to an extent that indicates the dominance of a single, unified, self-conscious elite.”162

These patterns continued during the dictatorship, particularly around consolidation of the neoliberal development model. While originally in opposition, traditional elites came to support the reforms as a means of reestablishing lost power.163

The relationship between technocrats and the elites during the dictatorship is particularly revealing of the elites’ ability to incorporate additional sectors into their own interests.

While the state was historically controlled by the conservative elite, the emerging middle class of the early 20th century came to see the state “as a formidable institution from which a series of radical changes could be introduced in Chilean society.”164 The dictatorship incorporated technocrats into prominent positions, constructing an emerging technocratic elite tightly aligned with the neoliberal project despite lacking a similar

161 Jean Carrière, "Conflict and Cooperation among Chilean Sectoral Elites," Boletín de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe (1975): 19. 162 Ibid. 163 Sebastián Madrid, "Elites in Their Real Lives: A Chilean Comment on Robinson," Critical Sociology 38, no. 3 (2012). 164 Silva, In the Name of Reason : Technocrats and Politics in Chile.

political background.165 As Silva summarizes, “Although most of the Chicago Boys also had middle-class roots, the openly pro-business polices they deployed rapidly eliminated any trace of self-identification of this social sector with the state technocracy.”166

In the return to democracy, political elites from the left and right converged to protect the uncertain transition, preserving and consolidating the neoliberal model.167 The

Concertación struck a number of deals after the transition with right wing veto players, agreeing to consider the economic and political interests of the right and to govern a democracia de los acuerdos (democracy by agreement) rather than by popular consensus or through congress.168 Furthermore, the Concertación largely continued these policies through four successive administrations over 20 years,169 prompting concerns about the oligarchization and lack of vertical integration in the elites.170 Another prominent observer concludes that “the authorities prefer to keep things secret, are not in favour of granting access to information, and have no culture of transparency.”171

Recent research has reconfirmed the cohesion among a small and relatively isolated elite. Torche finds that Chilean society is comparatively fluid and mobile, except within the elite classes.172 Elites come from similar class backgrounds; Espinoza (2010) highlights the role of elite private schooling, finding that 60% of the members of the

165 ———, "Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the Cieplan Monks." 166 ———, In the Name of Reason : Technocrats and Politics in Chile, 221. 167 Madrid, "Elites in Their Real Lives: A Chilean Comment on Robinson." 168 Silva, "Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the Cieplan Monks." Peter Siavelis, "Elite-Mass Congruence, Partidocracia and the Quality of Chilean Democracy," Journal of Politics in Latin America 1, no. 3 (2009). 169 Madrid, "Elites in Their Real Lives: A Chilean Comment on Robinson." 170 Ibid. 171 Alan Angell, Democracy after Pinochet : Politics, Parties and Elections in Chile (London: Institute for the Study of the Americas, 2007), 295. 172 Florencia Torche, "Unequal but Fluid: Social Mobility in Chile in Comparative Perspective," American Sociological Review 70, no. 3 (2005).

lower chamber, 77% of Ministers of Finance since 1973, and 84% of the CEOs of top

100 companies attended one of the elite private schools that comprise 7% of all schools.173

Chilean Governance: State-Society Relations

Since the Pinochet dictatorship, both institutional and extrainstitutional forms of political participation have been deactivated. Because over-politicization was seen as a precipitating cause of the 1973 coup, the Pinochet dictatorship outlawed political parties, labor unions, and strikes, particularly targeting the socialist and communist parties. In the uncertain return to democracy, political deactivation was seen as necessary to preserve the transition. The opposition focused on elite consensus and electoral contestation in the

1988 plebiscite and 1989 election and, once in office, reached formal and informal power-sharing agreements with the right. Furthermore, the privatization of health, education, social security, and labor replaced collective organization with individual demands and consumption, further depoliticizing Chilean society. As de la Maza summarizes, “the military coup of 1973 destroyed not only democracy, but also the state model and its relations with political and social organizations. The state separated itself from the nation…”174 Silva concludes that, “Probably nowhere else in Latin America has the objective of political deactivation been pursued so consciously and tenaciously by authoritarian as well as by democratic governments as in the case of Chile.”175

173 Madrid, "Elites in Their Real Lives: A Chilean Comment on Robinson." 174 Gonzalo de la Maza, "Construcción democrática, participación ciudadana y políticas públicas en Chile" (Department of Languages and Cultures of Latin America, Faculty of Humanities, Leiden University, 2010), 96. 175 Patricio Silva, "Doing Politics in a Depoliticised Society: Social Change and Political Deactivation in Chile," Bulletin of Latin American Research 23, no. 1 (2004).

Political parties have remained prominent after the return to democracy, serving more as stabilizing forces. Siavelis goes as far as to classify Chile as a partidocracia, in which politics is dominated by political parties. Party leaders demobilized popular organizations and detached parties from civil society,176 leaving the post-dictatorship party system based personalities and nonideological issues. The continuation of the binomial electoral system from the 1980 Constitution until 2014 preserved this distance between constituents and political parties, preserving a two coalition system in which elites often pick which party and coalition will win particular congressional races.177 It is important to note the shift in the role of political parties before and after the dictatorship; while political parties acted as brokers between constituents and the government before

Pinochet, these ties have been cut, and political parties now serve a tool to diffuse societal discontent; reforms are negotiated between the governing and opposition parties.178

While the institutionalization of Chilean political parties provided economic and political stability, it is also at the root of Chileans’ apathy and dissatisfaction towards the political system.179 In the 2013 presidential elections, 49% of the population voted in the

176 Siavelis, "Disconnected Fire Alarms and Ineffective Police Patrols: Legislative Oversight in Postauthoritarian Chile." 177 Peter Siavelis and Arturo Valenzuela, "Electoral Engineering and Democratic Stability: The Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Chile," Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America (1996). Siavelis, "Exaggerated Presidentialism and Moderate Presidents: Executive-Legislative Relations in Chile." The proportional representation system elects two congressional representative from each district, but for a party to win both seats, it must win 66% of the vote. Effectively, the system preserves a two coalition system, making it unlikely that one party will obtain both seats from a particular district, but simultaneously makes it unlikely that one coalition would be able to construct a majority in Congress (Navia 2005). Juan Pablo Luna and Rodrigo Mardones, "Chile: Are the Parties Over?," Journal of Democracy 21, no. 3 (2010). 178 Haughney, Neoliberal Economics, Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in Chile, 213-4. 179 Siavelis, "Elite-Mass Congruence, Partidocracia and the Quality of Chilean Democracy."

first round and 41% in the second round,180 after a 2012 law switching voting from voluntary inscription and mandatory voting to automatic registration and voluntary voting. 60% of 18-34 year olds abstained from voting and, as of 2010, only 21% of

Chilean identified with a party.181 As Silva concludes:

…both the repressive nature of the Pinochet regime and the socioeconomic effects of economic neoliberalism in the country, … the consensus-based nature of Chilean democratic rule since 1990, the good performance of Chilean economy since the early 1980s to the late 1990s, and the rapid modernisation of Chilean society at large have further reduced the importance politics has today for the large majority of the Chilean population.182

Facing these trends, successive presidents have made participation a key political debate since the 1990s. De la Maza argues that promoting participation was the politically correct political agenda of the time, but produced no concrete political or institutional change in participation. Michelle Bachelet returned the idea of a participatory government (gobierno ciudadano) to the political agenda during her 2005 campaign. This was a response to the brief emergence of student protests, and Bachelet promised gender parity and shifts away from traditional party elites. Because Bachelet did not develop the mechanisms to implement these promises, however, change has been limited.

This apathy towards the formal political system has been accompanied by an increase in extra institutional forms of participation. Social movements played a prominent role in the transition to democracy, particularly after the 1983 economic crisis.

By 1986, support converged around the Democratic Alliance, which negotiated with the

180 www.idea.int 181 Luna and Mardones, "Chile: Are the Parties Over?." 182 Silva, "Doing Politics in a Depoliticised Society: Social Change and Political Deactivation in Chile."

dictatorship in hopes of reforming the constitution, but settled for the 1988 plebiscite on the continuation of Pinochet’s rule. As Boeninger summarizes, this transition represented

“…the end of social mobilization… Social organizations recognized the primacy of politics, supporting the new political-electoral strategy that was eminently conciliatory in nature.”183

Mobilization has taken on a distinct form since the return to democracy, noted for patterns of disenchantment and disengagement.184 While the transition was the result of the convergence of civil society and political actors,185 civil society was largely folded into the transition as the Concertación pursed the “resignificaction” of civil society,186 defined as:

transforming urban popular movements that articulate claims, which if adopted would expand the state’s role in addressing redistributive social demands, into associations that purse largely apolitical goals that assist the state in implementing social policies that are in part designed to adjust popular organizations into neoliberal reality.187

Much of this was the effect of how the “compulsive modernization” through the neoliberal project undercut the potential for mobilization.188 One government official stated the government’s objective to:

mobilize popular organizations, not to transform the neoliberal system, but rather to mobilize them to support and deepen the neoliberal system… We didn’t create spaces so that they could penetrate and change the state,

183 Edgardo Boeninger, Democracia En Chile: Lecciones Para La Gobernabilidad (Andrés Bello, 1997), 370. 184 Silva, "Doing Politics in a Depoliticised Society: Social Change and Political Deactivation in Chile." Posner, "Local Democracy and the Transformation of Popular Participation in Chile." 185 de la Maza, "Construcción democrática, participación ciudadana y políticas públicas en Chile", 92. 186 Ibid. See also Kenneth M Roberts, Deepening Democracy?: The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru (Stanford University Press, 1998). Paul W Posner, "Development and Collective Action in Chile's Neoliberal Democracy," Political Power and Social Theory 18 (2007). Silva, Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America. 187 Gary Prevost, Carlos Oliva Campos, and Harry E. Vanden, Social Movements and Leftist Governments in Latin America: Confrontation or Co-Optation? (London: Zed Books, 2012), 100. 188 Qtd in ibid.

those spaces were created in order to rebuild linkages, to penetrate their networks, and to provide a platform through which to transform them.189

Participation shifted “from the classes to the masses.”190

Ultimately, by pulling social movements into the state at very local levels, social movements could not scale up their efforts. NGO also suggested movements focus on

“conquering the comuna.”191 As the leader of one neighborhood council describes:

The government’s strategy is to divide and conquer the working class and the poor. It has been this way ever since the dictatorship. This is why popular movements seem to have disappeared. In reality, popular movements did not disappear. Many were absorbed into municipalities, which turned them into small organizations that chase after the little projects that are offered by the government, and that really doesn’t change our reality. Those few who continue to resist or who don’t play by the rules are marginalized and either worn down or repressed.192

While this mobilization was significant in reorganizing civil society, it continued to be directed towards the state, with the effect that “demands can be neutralized and depoliticized by processing them in a selective, piecemeal, and particularistic fashion, micro-movements have had a difficult time building strong cross-communal linkages.”193

While social movements in most of Latin America called for a swing away from the neoliberal project, mobilization in Chile is characterized by focusing on deepening rights and reforming institutions.

Because of this restructuring, mobilization has been largely ineffective at prompting meaningful change. A number of highly visible education, environmental,

189 Ibid., 101. 190 Manuel Antonio Garretón, Popular Mobilization and the Military Regime in Chile: The Complexities of the Invisible Transition (University of Notre Dame, The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 1988). 191 Prevost, Oliva Campos, and Vanden, Social Movements and Leftist Governments in Latin America: Confrontation or Co-Optation? , 108. 192 Ibid., 109. 193 Ibid., 111.

labor, and indigenous protests have been unable to find the political space to affect policy change because “social problems are translated into technical terms.”194 After education protests in 2006 and 2011 education protests, political change was limited by “the relative weakness of wider social actors and the Concertación’s emphasis on institutional representation, particularly through political parties in Congress.”195 In 2006, Bachelet campaigned on promises to create a more participatory form of governance, yet, as one author concludes, “…In reaching for the tools to build a better, more inclusive and just society, they came up against the barrier that the technocratic, right-of-center

Concertación had set up.”196 These trends have prompted analysts to warn that Chilean democracy is threatened by competitive oligarchy, in which there is space for competition, but no participation.197

Indigenous Social Movements in Chile

This dissertation project focuses specifically on territorial demands of the

Mapuche indigenous community, for which I argue the distance between state and society is even more stretched than described above. Based on the 2012 census, 1.5 million people (10% of the total Chilean population) self-identify as indigenous; the

Mapuche community of southern central Chile (700 miles south of Santiago) comprises

88% of the indigenous population in Chile.198 The Mapuche community is the focal point of indigenous-state relations between the Chilean government and indigenous communities after internationally-publicized disputes called attention to Chile’s

194 Guy Burton, "Hegemony and Frustration: Education Policy Making in Chile under the Concertación, 1900—2010," Latin American Perspectives 39, no. 4 (2012): 22. 195 Ibid., 35. 196 Fernandez and Vera, "The Bachelet Presidency and the End of Chile’s Concertacion Era," 18-19. 197 Luna and Mardones, "Chile: Are the Parties Over?." 198 INE 2012

insufficient recognition of indigenous rights. As one academic summarized, “Chilean interest in the Mapuche focused exclusively on regulating contact; in other words, the most important question was always, ‘What to do with the Mapuche?’199 This section outlines historic patterns of indigenous-state relations, focusing specifically on territorial demands.

The Mapuche consider themselves to be people of the land (mapu- land, che- people); the strength of the Mapuche identity is dependent upon the health of the land and the peoples’ relationship to it.200 Because the Mapuche often did not hold formal titles to the land they lived on, Mapuche communities and individuals increasingly lost claimed land to both public and private developmental efforts. Accordingly, territorial demands are one of the community’s most salient demands, calling for the government to recognize that the utility of land is not defined by its productive value, but rather emerges from a deeper, mutually constitutive relationship between indigenous peoples and territory.201 Eduardo Castillo, a participant of the CEPI project, summarized that:

Without any doubt, the clearest and most significant point for the indigenous is that land has not only economic, but also cultural and political connotations. For indigenous communities, land has profound significance because that is where culture is developed. …This is opposed to Western conceptualizations of land as a resource with an exchange value, susceptible to being marketed.202

199 Marimán, Autodeterminación : Ideas políticas Mapuche en el albor del siglo XXI. 200 For further discussion of the construction (or, reconstruction or re-articulation) of Mapuche territorial identities, as structured by Chilean state policy, see the discussions of Aylwin and Le Bonniec in Roberto Morales Urra, "Territorialidad Mapuche en el siglo XX," Serie Investigación, Programa Mapu Territorialidad, Instituto de Estudios Indíegnas, Universidad de la Frontera. Concepción: Escaparate Ediciones (2002). Andrew Webb, "Articulating the Mapu: Land as a Form of Everyday Ethnicity among Mapuche Youth of Chile," Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies 9, no. 3 (2014). Mariman et al., "¡… Escucha, Winka…." 201 Shelton H Davis and Alaka Wali, "Indigenous Land Tenure and Tropical Forest Management in Latin America," Ambio (1994). 202 Eduardo Castillo, Pueblo, tierra, desarrollo: Conceptos fundamentales para una nueva ley indígena (Programas Derechos Humanos y Pueblos Indígenas: Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos, 1992).

Territorial rights demands, as discussed in Chapter 4, invoke claims for recognition of this conceptualization of land as well as for jurisdiction or control over this conceptualization of territory. As most commonly expressed, these demands converge around claims to historically-occupied land, land sufficient to fulfill economic and social functions, protection of claimed land from the state or private actor, environmental protection, rights to adjacent or subsoil resources, and degrees of autonomy or self- government within the claimed land.203

The Mapuche community has a long history of mobilization and resistance in defense of territorial demands. The Mapuche were the only indigenous group to resist incorporation into the Incan empire, and were granted autonomy in numerous formal treaties with the Spanish between 1641 and 1803.204 After Chile declared independence from Spain in 1818, the government attempted to colonize the ‘indigenous zone’ of Chile by increasing the power of the government, in a military campaign known as the

Pacification of the Araucanía. After being militarily defeated in 1883 by Chilean forces, the Chilean government surveyed the land and left Mapuche communities with the land they were currently residing on, resulting in the organization of the Mapuche into 3,000 reservations by 1927, 6.39% of the land originally claimed by the Mapuche.205 The boundaries of these reservations, as drawn out in a título de merced issued between 1883

203 Donna Lee Van Cott, Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 17. 204 These agreements came after a series of uprisings, beginning in 1592 and culminating with the destruction of all Spanish forces, forts, and settlements south of the BioBio River in 1598. The Mapuche community was the only to resist incorporation and receive autonomy from the Spanish crown in Central and South America. 205 See Bengoa 1985; Aylwin 2002; Pinto 2003; Correa and Mella 2009) Guillaume Boccara, "The Mapuche People in Post-Dictatorship Chile," Études rurales, no. 163/164 (2002). Patricia Rodriguez and David Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State," Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe/European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies (2008): 4.

and 1929, form the basis for most present-day land demands and policy under analysis.

During the 19th and 20th centuries, Chile promoted chilenidad, a form of mestizaje that called for racial mixture and assimilation.206 Indigenous communities were seen to be

‘non-nationals’ who did not naturally fit into the homogenizing nation-building project.

During the political and economic swings from the 1950s to 1970s in Chile, indigenous demands were largely subsumed into class-based demands.207 Until the 1960s, rural politics were separated from the national political arena; power was internally organized through the latifundia system, “sealed off from the direct influence of the state and was considered outside the bounds of legitimate party competition.”208 This structure, however, was increasingly pressured by external forces as the emerging urban upper class acquired rural land, increasing the number of absentee landowners.209 This system began to fall apart with an economic crisis in the 1960s, blamed in part on the inequitable distribution of land. The agricultural sector of the economy was considered to be, according to reports from the UN and Chilean government, characterized by

“extreme irrationality” due to inefficient land use and low output.210 Mapuche communities recovered over 152,000 hectares during agrarian reforms from 1962-1973, largely mobilized through alliances with Chilean political parties adopting similar positions of property ownership of indigenous land.

206 José Bengoa, Historia del pueblo Mapuche : (Siglo XIX y XX), 2a. ed., Colección Estudios Históricos (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Sur, 1987). Pinto Rodríguez, "La Formación Del Estado Y La Nación, Y El Pueblo Mapuche. De La Inclusión a La Exclusión." 207 Martín Correa, Raúl Molina Otárola, and Nancy Yáñez Fuenzalida, La reforma agraria y las tierras Mapuches: Chile 1962-1975 (Lom ediciones, 2005). 208 Robert R Kaufman, The Politics of Land Reform in Chile, 1950-1970: Public Policy, Political Institutions, and Social Change (Harvard University Press, 1972), 26. 209 Ibid., 22-3. 210 Ibid.

Pinochet-era reforms had a particularly strong impact on indigenous communities’ access to ancestral land, privatizing collectively-held land and encouraging the development of industries relying on natural resources.211 Because private property was the key to the productive use of land and the economic development of the country, the Pinochet declared “indigenous lands and indigenous landowners do not exist, because there are only Chileans,” eliminating the need for communal property on the basis of ethnicity.212 Most Mapuche did not have titles or monetary resources to formally purchase these lands, allowing for the growth of large farms in the region. More than

2200 communities were divided onto no more than 6.4 hectares of land per family.213 The

1980 Constitution declares that “The Chilean State is unitary” (Article 3) and does not mention indigenous communities.

Mapuche protest against the military regime reemerged in 1978 in response to these actions. Under the protection of the Catholic Church, Centro Culturales Mapuches served to remobilize Mapuche efforts, changing its name to Ad-Mapu in 1982 to emphasize its autonomy from the Church. As many recognized that Decree 2568 did not necessarily mean that subdivided land would be seized, the effort split into diverse groups. While failing to change any of these policies, the diverse mobilization efforts were effective in putting indigenous rights on the agenda of the center-left. By the end of the 1980s, the diverse groups, aided with international assistance, reached an agreement

211 José Aylwin Oyarzún, Políticas públicas y pueblo Mapuche, Serie Seminarios (Concepción, Chile: Instituto de Estudios Indígenas Ediciones Escaparate, 2001). Correa, Otárola, and Fuenzalida, La reforma agraria y las tierras Mapuches: Chile 1962-1975. 212 Aylwin Oyarzún, Políticas públicas y pueblo Mapuche. Correa, Otárola, and Fuenzalida, La reforma agraria y las tierras Mapuches: Chile 1962-1975. 213 Aylwin Oyarzún, Políticas públicas y pueblo Mapuche. Eduardo Silva and Patricio Rodrigo, "Contesting Private Property Rights: The Environment and Indigenous Peoples," The Bachelet Government: Conflict and Consensus in Post-Pinochet Chile (2010). Mariman et al., "¡… Escucha, Winka…."

with Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin, who would be the first democratically elected president after the dictatorship. The Acuerdo de Nueva Imperial (Nueva Imperial

Agreement) asserted that Aylwin would constitutionally recognize Chile’s indigenous and create a state agency and special commissions to voice indigenous demands within the government.214 Due the difficulty of amending the 1980 constitution, the demands in this agreement were enumerated in 1993 Indigenous Law 19.253. The resulting bill was modified seven times between introduction in 1991 and promulgation in 1993. These modifications made it clear that elected officials sought to address indigenous demands within a framework of neoliberal multiculturalism; government officials characterized the policy as one that recognized “diversity within one nation” and promoted “development with identity.”215 Specifically, the law recognizes “Chile indigenous races… [as] an essential part of Chilean Nation roots” (Article 1) and subsequently refers to “ethnic group of indigenous communities” or “indigenous populations,” after the opposition argued that the concept of ‘peoples’ was reserved for the Chilean people. Most of these modifications were made due to conservative sectors of Congress’ fears that affording territorial rights to indigenous communities would result in fragmentation.216 These significant changes prompted Jose Aylwin, one of the most prominent indigenous rights observers in Chile, to conclude that “…there is no doubt that the legislation is ‘far behind’ the minimum international standards of indigenous rights,”217 indicative of “the

214 David Carruthers and Patricia Rodriguez, "Mapuche Protest, Environmental Conflict and Social Movement Linkage in Chile," Third World Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2009): 4. 215 Haughney, Neoliberal Economics, Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in Chile, 203. 216 Aylwin Oyarzún, Políticas públicas y pueblo Mapuche. Jorge Iván Vergara, Rolf Foerster, and Hans Gundermann, "Más acá de la legalidad. La CONADI, la Ley Indígena y el pueblo Mapuche (1989- 2004)," Polis. Revista Latinoamericana, no. 8 (2004). 217 http://www.mapuche.info/azkin/az_domingo3.pdf. Notably, the law project did distinguish between 9 different indigenous communities in Chile, reversing the policy of grouping all indigenous communities

incapacity of the Chilean society to accept the existence of sociopolitical groups that pre- date the Chilean state and are distinct from the rest of society.”218 While the law project was limited, there was initial optimism about the potential for the effort to improve indigenous- state relations through a space where indigenous communities would be represented in the state.

As is discussed in additional detail in Chapter 6, 1997 is often referenced as a point of departure in indigenous-state relations, after which indigenous activists and communities realized that institutional paths would not sufficiently respond to their demands.219 These expectations were gradually frustrated by executive intervention in

CONADI, particularly during the construction of the Ralco hydroelectric dam in 1997 on ancestral Mapuche land. Two National Directors of CONADI were removed after they refused to cast the deciding vote to grant the government approval to construct the dam, making it clear that CONADI responded to the central government and, in the opinion of many, “is the most perverse result of the Mapuche struggle.”220

There has been significant tension as Mapuche communities turned to extrainstitutional strategies in the late 1990s and 2000s. Several activists have been shot and killed by police during land takeovers, political prisoners charged with terrorism staged multiple hunger strikes attracting international condemnation, and journalists and politicians reference “red zones of conflict” and “our little Chiapas.” One activist summarizes that, “from that point forward, the idea of ‘conflict’ spread; people from

into one, and it recognized cultural and linguistic rights, reversing previous assimilationist policies (IEI 2003, 10, 13). 218 Aylwin Oyarzún, "Los derechos de los pueblos indígenas en Chile," 16. 219 See, e.g, Carruthers and Rodriguez, "Mapuche Protest, Environmental Conflict and Social Movement Linkage in Chile." Namuncura, Ralco, Represa O Pobreza? Tricot, Autonomía: El movimiento Mapuche de resistencia. 220 Rice, The New Politics of Protest: Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America's Neoliberal Era, 111.

indigenous communities were no longer considered ignorant and backward people, but rather active.”221

Mobilization has escalated, particularly in the form of arson attacks on forestry company plantations, machinery, landowners’ homes, tourism cabins; land takeovers; and confrontations with police.222 In the late 1990s, much of this shift was associated with the emergence of the Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM), a more radical Mapuche organization that sought to change the strategy of political engagement from one of

“symbolic land recoveries” to “body to body” conflict with police.223 One of the founders of the CAM summarized that the vision was to arrive to a plot of land, tear down the existing infrastructure of the landowner, and plant crops; these initial steps would work towards establishing political autonomy, and eventually Mapuche national liberation, through self-defense of Mapuche territory.224 This escalation in direct action has been accompanied by a convergence of collective rights demands, based in Mapuche demands as a nation.225 A group of prominent Mapuche activists and academics published a 2008 book presenting a Mapuche perspective of the history of state-Mapuche relations, asserting that, “The nation-state does not negotiate its project- it denies legitimacy and rights… As Mapuche, we have articulated a political discourse of our unity as a nation, present in a territory subject to the jurisdiction of two bordering states.”226

221 Llaitul and Arrate, Weichan, Conversaciones con un weychafe en la prisión política, 130. 222 Fernando Pairicán and Rolando Álvarez, "La nueva guerra de Arauco: La Coordinadora Arauco Malleco en el Chile de la Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (1997-2009)," Revista izquierdas. www. izquierdas. cl 10 (2011): 67. 223 Ibid., 75. 224 Ibid., 73-4. 225 Marimán, Autodeterminación : Ideas políticas Mapuche en el albor del siglo XXI. 226 Mariman et al., "¡… Escucha, Winka…," 221, 25.

This portion of the Mapuche movement is frequently contrasted with a portion of the movement that pursues the same goals through political means, mobilizing within institutionalized paths to create spaces of autonomy (through municipal and congressional elections, pushing for the promulgation of ILO 169 and constitutional reforms). In 2005, a group founded the Wallmapuwen (citizens of Mapuche country)

Political Party, pursuing decentralization of the regional government in the short term to the end of creating an autonomous region. In 2006, they declared “the necessity of taking a leap forward in the organized struggle of our peoples through the formation of a

Mapuche Political Party, of nationalistic and autonomist character.”227 The party elected

4 mayors in the 2009 elections, arguing that the institutional path is most effective, as “It makes no sense for the Mapuche movement to escalate violence when our people have to pay for the costs of a conflict that can only have political solutions.”228

Despite this escalation of demands and tension since the 1993 law, there have been relatively few advances in the formal recognition of indigenous rights. As of 2014,

Chile has yet to constitutionally recognize indigenous communities. The 1980 constitution, written during the Pinochet dictatorship, does not incorporate indigenous demands; the state is not recognized as multiethnic, pluricultural, or plurinational, and indigenous land is not addressed. Furthermore, Chile was one of the last Latin American countries to ratify ILO 169 in 2008, nearly 20 years after the bill was first introduced to congress. The lag was due to suspicion of and direct opposition to the concept of

‘peoples.’ Implementation has been limited; as one observer concludes, “… the failure to

227 Partido Mapuche Wallmapuwen,“La violencia colonial en Wallmapu” November 9, 2009, http://www.wallmapuwen.cl/news_nov09.htm. 228 Ibid.

implement this right not only violates Chile’s international legal obligations, but also perpetuates distrust between indigenous peoples and the Chilean government, fueling conflict between the two.”229

Furthermore, the state has responded to Mapuche protest with repression in the form of criminalization and militarization. The Chilean government has charged hundreds of Mapuche leaders and protesters with terrorism, processed under Anti-Terrorism Law

19.027 created in 1984 during the Pinochet dictatorship. Arson and land seizures qualify to be processed under this state security law, which allows for multiple exceptions to due process including prolonged detention (up to a year in pre-trial proceedings), anonymous witnesses, harsher punishments (three times criminal sentences for arson and land seizures), and double jeopardy. As of 2010, an estimated 200 Mapuche have been arrested on charged related to these conflicts; 141 related to CTT and 27 to CAM.230 The government has also alleged ties between radical Mapuche organizations and the

Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/ Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia) and Spanish ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna/ Basque

Homeland and Freedom). In addition to allegations of terrorism, the government has also responded to the community’s demands with other forms of repression. In 2004, the

Subsecretary of the Interior, Jorge Correa, recognized the existence of Operación

Paciencia (Operation Patience), which sought to destroy the autonomous Mapuche movement and its mobilization efforts. In recent years, militarized Chilean police killed

229 Cristián Sanhueza, No nos toman en cuenta: Pueblos indígenas y consulta previa en las pisciculturas de la Araucanía (Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales, 2013). Van Cott (2006) characterizes Chile as having weak recognitions of multicultural policies (defined to include rhetorical recognition, collective land rights, self-governance rights, cultural rights, customary law, representation/ consultation in central government, affirmation of distinct state, ratification of ILO 169, and affirmative action). 230 Mella Seguel, Los Mapuche ante la justicia la criminalización de la protesta indígena en Chile, 179.

two protestors and injured numerous others during separate land occupations.

Communities frequently report mistreatment treatment of children and elderly during raids in communities, prompting the international community to condemn the use of force in response to legitimate mobilization. The evolution of these dynamics of contention is discussed in additional detail in Chapter 6.

International observers have been increasingly critical of Chile’s record on indigenous rights. In 2003, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous

Peoples Rodolfo Stavenhagen first visited, concluding that “one element that would help highlight the State’s expressed interest in the situation of indigenous peoples is the adoption of effective measures to establish the legal basis of this recognition.”231 Less than a year after ILO 169 was ratified in 2008, UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of

Indigenous Peoples James Anaya expressed concern over the lack of indigenous consensus over a constitutional reform on indigenous rights in the Chilean Senate, asserting that "… it is crucial to carry out a consultation process regarding the constitutional reform that conforms with international standards" (emphasis added,

A/HRC/12/34/Add.6). Ben Emmerson, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, was particularly critical after visiting the region, criticizing the systematic use of excessive force by the Chilean police and warning that “The situation in the Araucanía and Bío Bío regions is extremely volatile. … In the absence of prompt and effective action at a national level it could very quickly escalate into widespread disorder and violence” (UNHR 2013).

231 Aylwin Oyarzún, "Los derechos de los pueblos indígenas en Chile," 436.

Expectation of Chilean Governance in Araucanía

This research focuses on the Bío Bío (IIX), Araucanía (IX), and Los Lagos (X) regions of Chile, the historic base of the Mapuche indigenous community. Political scientists have only recently began exploring sub-national variation in Chilean politics; in

2012, the LAPOP survey oversampled the Araucanía region, justifying the need to

“problematize the supposed homogeneity of sub-national political attitudes, considering the possible influence of local context on political attitudes,”232 particularly considering that the “news agenda that sees the Araucanía a situation of high politicization, discontent, and social conflict.”233 Because the Araucanía region only recently became the focus of scholarly analysis, this review assumes that the three regions under analysis are analytically comparable. Figure 3 in the Chapter 3 Appendix show the region under analysis.

The region has the reputation of being more politically and socially conservative than the rest of Chile. Recent surveys have found that party affiliations are stronger (25% of people claim strong party affiliations in Araucanía, compared to 14% in Chile), there is less participation in protest (4.3% Araucanía, 11.1% Chile), more confidence in local government (60.8% Araucanía, 58.4% Chile), and higher levels of interpersonal confidence (88.7% Araucanía, 63% Chile).234 Local patterns of interest mediation are relatively unexplored, but the few existing studies suggest that local leaders instrumentalize social linkages in pursuit of votes. Several scholars have found that

232 Americas Barometer, "Marginalización y democracia en las Américas: Evidencia de la ronda 2012 del barómetro de las Américas," (2013), http://www.cienciapolitica.uc.cl/images/stories/investigacion/chile_lapop_2012.pdf. 233 Ibid. 234 Ibid.

politicians, particularly in rural areas, maintain strong clientelistic relations with voters.235 Socially, 48% agree that men should have priority in acquiring a job (42% in

Chile), and 57% agreed that homosexuals should be able to apply to political positions

(63% nationally). 39% of say religion is very important and 38% somewhat important

(32% and 34%, respectively, nationally).236

The 2012 LAPOP survey concluded that political culture of the region is shaped by the interaction between ethnicity and rural/urban dynamics. 31.9% of the population self-identifies as Mapuche;237 Figure 4 in the Appendix charts the percentage of the population identifying as Mapuche by district in 2002.238 The Mapuche community is much more rural than the rest of the region; 67.28% of Mapuche in the region are rural, compared to 17.45% of the rest of the population.239 The 2012 LAPOP survey concluded that political culture of the region depends on the interaction between ethnicity and rural/urban. Furthermore, surveys suggest significant discrimination; 36% of people in

Araucanía agree that people with dark skin are not good leaders, compared to 34% in

Chile, the highest in Latin America. Surveys have revealed significant differences

235 Emmanuelle Barozet, "Movilización de recursos y redes sociales en los neopopulismos: Hipótesis de trabajo para el caso chileno," Revista de Ciencia Política 23, no. 1 (2003). Vicente Espinoza, "Los nuevos agentes políticos locales: Revisión estructural de la tesis de Arturo Valenzuela¿ Cómo se articulan el nivel de representación local con el nacional en la arena local y qué papel juegan el gobierno central y las políticas públicas?," Revista Mad, no. 14 (2006). Sergio Toro Maureira and Nathalie Jaramillo-Brun, "Despejando mitos sobre el voto indígena en Chile: Preferencias ideológicas y adhesión etnica en el electorado Mapuche," Revista de ciencia política (Santiago) 34, no. 3 (2014). John Durston, "El clientelismo político en el campo Chileno (primera parte): La democratización cuestionada," Ciencias Sociales Online 2, no. 1 (2005). ———, Comunidades Campesinas, Agencias Públicas Y Clientelismos Políticos En Chile (Lom Ediciones, 2005). 236 Barometer, "Marginalización y democracia en las Américas: Evidencia de la ronda 2012 del Barómetro de las Américas." 237 CASEN 2009. 238 The Chilean census is conducted every 10 years. In 2012, however, methodological errors produced massive irregularities and the census failed to survey approximately 10% of the population. Outside observers advised the government to annul the results. 239 Toro Maureira and Jaramillo-Brun, "Despejando mitos sobre el voto indígena en Chile: Preferencias ideológicas y adhesión etnica en el electorado Mapuche."

between Mapuche and non-Mapuche residents of the region; 67% of Mapuche have confidence in the police (compared to 72% of Chileans).240

Often, research and public opinion assumes that the Mapuche community is conservative. Cayuqueo argues that this stems from a series of historic alliances between

Mapuche organizations and conservative parties (2006); Mariman (1990) argues that these links with conservative parties are not the result of political allegiances, but rather a useful and tactical vote for political parties capable of delivering resources. In this sense, the same clientelistic logic explains the ties between Mapuche individuals and politicians.

As one scholar summarizes, “The indigenous and poor peasantry, tend to be politically linked with those they believe can best solve their problems.”241 This relationship may stem from cultural norms; as one activist and academic describes, this stems from

“Reciprocity towards those who help, and personal relationships that do not distinguish between political divides, but rather recognize authority and mutually beneficial relationships.”242 Recent research has suggested that this assumption is merely an extrapolation of electoral results from the region, which consistently votes for the right compared the national averages.243 As prominent observers conclude, “the Mapuche vote, and until today I am not otherwise convinced, is not an ethnic vote.”244 In fact, a 2014 study found that Mapuche individuals are more liberal than their regional counterparts;

Mapuche place at 5.4 a 1-10 placement of political ideology, while non-Mapuche

240 Barometer, "Marginalización y democracia en las Américas: Evidencia de la ronda 2012 del Barómetro de las Américas." 241 Qtd in Toro Maureira and Jaramillo-Brun, "Despejando mitos sobre el voto indígena en Chile: Preferencias ideológicas y adhesión etnica en el electorado Mapuche," 12. 242 ibid. 243 Mauricio Morales Quiroga and Jaime A González, "Tendencias electorales de los grupos indígenas en Chile," EURE (Santiago) 37, no. 110 (2011). Toro Maureira and Jaramillo-Brun, "Despejando mitos sobre el voto indígena en Chile: Preferencias ideológicas y adhesión etnica en el electorado Mapuche." 244 Rolf Foerster and Javier Lavanchy, "La problemática Mapuche," Análisis del año (1999).

residents of the region place at 6.1. 22% of Mapuche in Araucanía reported to vote for

Piñera, compared to 30% regionally.245 Rural, non-Mapuche were significantly further to the right than both urban and rural Mapuche; urban Mapuche were further left than other sub-groups.246

It is important to note efforts to translate Mapuche demands to the formal political arena through the election of Mapuche representatives. As discussed above, the

Wallmapuwen political party was formed in 2005 to organize demands. The party has had limited success, however, and Mapuche candidates usually run as independents associated with the lists of a particular political alliance.247 In most cases, however, these candidates have been unsuccessful. One analysis of the 2009 regional elections found that while political parties presented more Mapuche candidates on ballots, those candidates received lower percentages of the vote.248 These challenges stem from the lack of support from traditional parties, lack of experienced Mapuche leaders, and persisting clientelistic links to other candidates. 249

Economically, the region falls far behind national patterns of economic development. Since 1992, the region has been the poorest in the country; 22.9% of the region lives below the poverty line and the inequality is higher than national standards

(0.57 GINI). 17% of the region receives social assistance, compared to 14% nationally.

Mapuche individuals are disproportionally affected by levels of economic development in

245 Barometer, "Marginalización y democracia en las Américas: Evidencia de la ronda 2012 del Barómetro de las Américas." 246 Toro Maureira and Jaramillo-Brun, "Despejando mitos sobre el voto indígena en Chile: Preferencias ideológicas y adhesión etnica en el electorado Mapuche." 247 Cayuqueo 2006 248 Andres Jouannet, "Participación política indígena en Chile: El caso Mapuche," Participación Política Indígena y Políticas Públicas para Pueblos Indígenas en América Latina (2011). 249 Ibid. Toro Maureira and Jaramillo-Brun, "Despejando mitos sobre el voto indígena en Chile: Preferencias ideológicas y adhesión etnica en el electorado Mapuche."

the region, a situation further exacerbated by the higher percentage of Mapuche individuals who live in rural areas with weaker schools and rely primarily on subsistence farming.250

Extractivism historically and presently plays a prominent role in development plans for the region. The Pacification of Araucanía was justified to acquire land for agricultural production; after the formal acquisition of Mapuche territory, the state promoted colonization to the region, granting significant portions of land to colonos. As

Bengoa documents, the Chilean government offered colono families 62 hectares of land,

30 additional hectares for each son over the age of 10, free passage to Chile, board, nails,

2 oxen, cow and calf, plow, cart, trunk-removing machine, monthly pension for a year, and medical care for 2 years.251 Mapuche communities were seen as obstacle; one newspaper going as far as to assert that the region was the “most beautiful and fertile part of our territory, inhabited by savage hordes.”252 Fraudulent purchases and “spontaneous colonization” by colonos informally encroached on Mapuche land through “corridas de cerco” (fence running) and trades in bars, utilizing their connections in government to legitimize the transactions.253 As described above, Mapuche communities were allocated land through a series of documents; land that Mapuche communities historically occupied but lost rights to was auctioned off to latifundistas and colonos.

250 For details on how education furthers these inequalities, see: Andrew Webb and Sarah Radcliffe, "Whitened Geographies and Education Inequalities in Southern Chile," Journal of Intercultural Studies 36, no. 2 (2015). ———, "Mapuche Demands During Educational Reform, the Penguin Revolution and the Chilean Winter of Discontent," Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 13, no. 3 (2013). 251 In Richards, Race and the Chilean Miracle: Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Indigenous Rights. 252 In ibid., 38. 253 Bengoa, Historia del pueblo Mapuche : (Siglo XIX y XX). Pinto Rodríguez, "La formación del estado y la Nación, y el pueblo Mapuche. De la inclusión a la exclusión." Richards, Race and the Chilean Miracle: Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Indigenous Rights.

These perceptions and focus on extractivism continued into the 20th century.

Klubock argues that ecological crises in southern Chile were indicative of the

“incomplete history of colonization in the southern frontier territory,” which prompted officials to “assert their authority over both natural resources and property relations, elaborating forest regulations to stimulate the development of scientific forest management and commercial forestry.”254 Mapuche communities were a hindrance to these development plans; in the 1940s, Mapuche communities were known as “suicide belt” on the country, serving as the “barrier against greater progress in the regional economy.”255 As one elite argued, “How is it possible that it is permitted that the most fertile lands in these provinces, which are Chile’s granary, remain in the hands of Indians and that they produce absolutely nothing?”256

These efforts to govern the southern regions through extractivism continued into the Pinochet dictatorship. 1979 Decree 2568 ended the restriction on the sale of indigenous land, opening up communal property to land market in hopes of improving productivity and addressing indigenous poverty. Decree 2568 divided more than 2000 communities, leaving families with an average of 6.4 hectares. By 1990, Mapuche communities had titles to 300,000 hectares of land, 40% less than established in títulos de merced.

In Araucania, the Pinochet dictatorship specifically promoted the expansion of forestry companies. Previous administrations promoted pine plantations as a solution to ecological challenges in the region and means of expanding the territorial reach of the

254 Klubock, La Frontera: Forests and Ecological Conflict in Chile’s Frontier Territory, 18-9. 255 Richards, Race and the Chilean Miracle: Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Indigenous Rights, 57. 256 Ibid.

state,257 but after 1973, privatization opened up land well below market value and the industry was not strongly regulated. 1974 Decree 701 actively encouraged the expansion of forestry companies in 8th through 12th regions of Chile. Subsidies covered more than

75% (raised to 90% during the economic crisis in the 1980s) of the costs of establishing plantations on unused land. These subsidies restructured the local political, economic, and social environments. Because of economic restructuring, many landowners were willing to sell to logging companies that were tightly affiliated with national and international capital;258 the ties to international capital were strengthened during the

1980s debt crisis as Chilean investors turned abroad. These favorable policies resulted in the rapid expansion of the industry, as shown in Figure 5. In 1965 an estimated 418,000 hectares of land (1.4% of sown land in Chile) was tree plantations; by 1997, the industry accounted for more than 1,098,500 hectares (4.1% of sown land). Importantly, these forestry companies planted pine and eucalyptus, replacing between 400,000 and 900,000 hectares of native forests between 1985 and 1994;259 Monterey pine alone accounts for an estimated 85% of all tree plantations in Chile.260 By the middle of the 1990s, logging was the third largest export (after mining and export agriculture), accounting for an estimated

10% of Chile’s total export revenues, after exports of forest products tripled from 1989 to

1997.261

257 Klubock argues that these conditions were in place in the early 20th century, as the Chilean government saw forestry policy as a solution to drought, climate change, and soil erosion. Klubock, La Frontera: Forests and Ecological Conflict in Chile’s Frontier Territory. 258 Haughney, Neoliberal Economics, Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in Chile, 57. 259 Ibid. 260 Klubock, La Frontera: Forests and Ecological Conflict in Chile’s Frontier Territory, 2. 261 Ibid., 270.

Today, these development patterns strongly affect the regions under analysis. The region has frequently been at the center of the Chilean government’s developmental plans to expand already developed international hydroelectric or forestry companies. In the

Araucanía region, as much as 87% of sown land is tree plantations (See Figures 6, 7, and

8). Two of Chile’s largest forestry companies, Forestal Arauco and Forestal Mininco own

1.7 million hectares, four times the amount owned by the Mapuche community, and the majority of which is ancestrally claimed.262 Extractivism is often at the root of contention between indigenous communities and the state. In the Arauco Province, an estimated

60,000 hectares held by forestry companies are in conflict.263 As Klubock summarizes,

“the Mapuche land invasions of the 1990s made it clear that, while pine generates jobs in forestry and the paper and pulp industries, its most significant impact has been to expel campesinos from the countryside, swelling the ranks of southern Chile’s underemployed and unemployed.”264 The most recent of these state-directed efforts is Plan Araucanía, announced in 2010 by President Piñera to create a water reservoir and deep water port to boost the region's agricultural productivity and export capacity.265

The extractive industry has created a distinct nature of local elites. While there are few analyses of what groups of people make up the local elite class. In a 2010 study,

Richards considers local elites to be medium-scale colono farmers of European descent who arrived to the region in the late 1800s and early 1900s.266 Some had both regional and national political influence, in addition to at the local level, while most colono

262 José Aylwin Oyarzún, "Los conflictos en el territorio Mapuche: Antecedentes y perspectivas," Revista Perspectivas en Política, Economía y Gestión 3 (2000): 286. 263 Ibid., 286-7. 264 Klubock, La Frontera: Forests and Ecological Conflict in Chile’s Frontier Territory, 7. 265“Chile: Plan Araucania to develop region by 2020.” Esmerk. 28 June 2010. 266 Richards focuses on local elites who have been the target of Mapuche land recoveries.

farmers had seen their regional influence drop in recent years, but maintain status because of their names and family histories.267

Conclusions

Not only is Chile an analytically useful case to study how governments respond to contentious action, better understanding state-society relations is crucial to Chile’s democratic future. Many authors conclude that Chile’s ability to address these participation and representation challenges is crucial. As Luna and Mardones conclude:

If Chile can find a way to promote participation and renew its party system while remaining stable, it will avoid the snares—seen all too vividly in other Latin American countries’ experiences—of ‘competitive oligarchy’ followed by a possible slide toward ‘participatory hegemony’ or the mire of ‘low-intensity democracy.’268

This research contributes to understandings of patterns of participation and engagement, drawing on the example of the Mapuche community in the Araucania region.

267 Patricia Richards, "Of Indians and Terrorists : How the State and Local Elites Construct the Mapuche in Neoliberal Multicultural Chile," Journal of Latin American Studies 42, no. 1 (2010). Richards and Gardner, "Still Seeking Recognition: Mapuche Demands, State Violence, and Discrimination in Democratic Chile." 268 Luna and Mardones, "Chile: Are the Parties Over?."

Chapter 4 Bureaucratizing Territory: Translating Indigenous Demands into Land Policy269

This chapter traces out how indigenous territorial demands are translated into bureaucratic, institutionalized land policy, establishing the procedures through which the policy under analysis (20B) should be implemented. While land policy historically conceptualizes of land as property with economic utility, indigenous communities’ territorial demands call for land to be reconceptualized as economically, socially, politically, and historically constructed spaces. Most Latin American countries have formally recognized these territorial rights since 1990, in what is frequently referenced as the “territorial turn.” Yet, this tension between different conceptualizations of land is exposed as bureaucratic offices implement territorial rights through land policy; these choices define policy implementation procedures, structuring how indigenous communities can acquire territory through land policy.

The chapter starts by reviewing how land is historically conceptualized in policy, contrasting this conceptualization with that of territory, as recently articulated by indigenous communities in Latin America. It then traces out how the tension between land and territory is bureaucratically resolved in the cases of Bolivia and Chile, the two cases under analysis in this dissertation project. It is important to note that while Bolivia has evolved through a number of legislative reforms since 1993, Chilean bureaucracies have reformed the procedures regulating the implementation of one 1993 law. Data for both cases is based on policy documents and extensive secondary research; analysis of

269 A portion of this chapter appears in: Kelly Bauer, "Land Versus Territory: Evaluating Indigenous Land Policy for the Mapuche in Chile," Journal of Agrarian Change (2015).

the Chilean case also incorporates interviews with past and present public officials associated with the implementation and oversight of the policy from the Subnational and

National CONADI offices in Temuco, the Ministry of Social Development, and the

Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency. The implementation procedures outlined here set the standards for transparent, uniform policy implementation.

Land Policy in Latin America

Government land policy traditionally conceptualizes land as an economic resource capable of facilitating development. Dating back to the Mexican land reform and persisting across authoritarian, liberal reformists, and revolutionary regimes, land reform seeks to shift the productive use of land to promote long-term development, reduce rural unrest, and encourage agricultural efficiency.270 While there have certainly been swings in perceptions of how to best accomplish these objectives, economic interests are paramount in these instances of government efforts to reshape patterns of land tenure.

Land reform was particularly prominent on Latin American political agendas in the 1960s. Hoping to avoid a repeat of the 1959 Cuban Revolution and supported by the

1961 Alliance for Progress, 19 Latin American countries passed land reform legislation and 12 countries enacted reforms between 1960 and 1964.271 Under import substitution industrialization programs, land tenure was blamed for lags in agricultural output; land reform could supply inexpensive, domestically-produced food to growing urban

270 Annelies Zoomers and G van der Haar, "Introduction: Regulating Land Tenure under Neo-Liberalism," (2000): 19. Veltmeyer, "The Dynamics of Land Occupations in Latin America," 290. 271Peter Dorner, Latin American Land Reforms in Theory and Practice: A Retrospective Analysis (Univ of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 33.

populations, reducing the country’s reliance on imports.272 Furthermore, reform would prompt agricultural efficiency by transferring unproductive land to new owners, often in the form of cooperatives or collectives. Effectively, land reform was a tool to benefit the nonreformed sector; by selling less productive land, landowners would keep their most productive agricultural lands and acquire capital to reinvest in new technology.273

As the region shifted away from ISI policies and state-directed economic policies,

Latin American countries adopted a neoliberal developmental model. Beginning with the

Pinochet dictatorship in Chile and accelerating with the worldwide recession following the 1982 petroleum crisis, concerns about the distribution of land and agrarian reform were subsumed into macroeconomic concerns about debt, tariffs, and inflation.274 The government’s role in the agricultural sector was reduced and land redistribution efforts were halted and often reversed, often referred to as the ‘reform of the reform.’ Land titles were returned to previous owners and communal or state-owned land was separated into constituent parts under Washington Consensus structural adjustment programs.

While removing restrictions limiting land markets was seen to be the most appropriate way of facilitating rural development in the first stages of implementing neoliberal reforms, the inadequacies of this approach brought the ‘land question’ back to the policy agenda in the 1990s.275 While the focus remained on promoting land markets, government adopted a more active role, in an approach referred to as negotiated or

272 Annelies Zoomers and G van der Haar, Land in Latin America: New Context, New Claims, New Concepts (Royal Tropical Institute, KIT Publishers, 2000), 60. 273 Alain De Janvry, The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). 274 Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises: Agrarian Reform and the Latin American Campesino, 13. 275 Kay, "Latin America's Agrarian Reform: Lights and Shadows."

market-led agrarian reform (MLAR).276 This neoliberal approach shifted how the state would be involved in land politics; rather than selecting, acquiring, and redistributing land, the government would facilitate the functioning of the land market by providing access to credit and abolishing communal lands to increase the quantity of available land as well as to ensure the most efficient producers would have access. Land reform, then, would be completed through a willing buyer- willing seller transaction. The promotion of free markets and private enterprise, accomplished through land titling and registration, would encourage profit-maximizing behavior, efficiency, and rural development. This policy shift is seen most prominently in the focus on land titling programs. Formal land titles facilitate land transfers, provide a source of credit, encourage investment in the land, and ensure security for the landholder.277 Governments would also set up land taxation programs, encouraging the productive use of land, generating government revenue, and improving public records. By the early 1990s, every Latin American country had shifted its approach to land reform in accordance with this neoliberal policy agenda, enacting constitutional reforms to eliminate communal lands and entitlements for small landowners and freeing up land for the land market.278

While there has been recognition of nuances in these recommendations, there is notable continuity in promotion of land markets. The 2003 World Bank report, “Land

Policy for Growth and Development,” recognizes the utility of communal tenure arrangements in particular situations and the potential for meaningful community-based reform based on buyer-willing, seller-willing transactions. By doing so, it acknowledges

276 Deininger, "Making Negotiated Land Reform Work: Initial Experience from Colombia, Brazil and South Africa." 277 ———, Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction. 278 Veltmeyer, "The Dynamics of Land Occupations in Latin America," 300.

that land sales were previously overemphasized, considering the systematic exclusion of many living in situations of poverty.279 While addressing these exclusions, the objective continues to be the integration of historically excluded groups into land markets, facilitating the exchange and distribution of land and improving land allocation and utilization.

As evidenced, land reform efforts in Latin America are motivated by economic interests. Reform is driven either by the explicit desire to improve economic productivity or to avoid the social ramifications of an unequitable distribution of wealth. Even as a significant body of literature has emerged critiquing the underlying assumptions and effectiveness of neoliberal land policy,280 this research does not question the overall objective of promoting rural development through land policy. Throughout these swings in perceptions of ideal approaches to land policy in recent Latin American history, land is conceptualized as an economic resource.

Indigenous Territorial Demands

Running counter to this conceptualization of land as property is the region-wide increase in indigenous mobilization making territorial demands. Indigenous communities have articulated that the utility of land is not economic, but rather emerges from a deeper, mutually constitutive relationship between indigenous peoples and land.281 As the

President of the Central Organization of Indigenous Peoples and Communities of Eastern

Bolivia (CIDOB) expressed at the 1985 meeting of the UN Working Group on

279 Klaus Deininger and Hans Binswanger, "The Evolution of the World Bank's Land Policy: Principles, Experience, and Future Challenges," The World Bank Research Observer 14, no. 2 (1999): 248-9. 280 Borras, "Questioning Market‐Led Agrarian Reform: Experiences from Brazil, Colombia and South Africa." Thomas Sikor and Daniel Müller, "The Limits of State-Led Land Reform: An Introduction," World Development 37, no. 8 (2009). Jennifer C Franco, "Contemporary Discourses and Contestations around Pro‐Poor Land Policies and Land Governance," Journal of Agrarian Change 10, no. 1 (2010). 281 Davis and Wali, "Indigenous Land Tenure and Tropical Forest Management in Latin America."

Indigenous Populations:

Our defense of the land and natural resources is for the cultural and human survival of our children, and is the foundation of a moral security for peoples who have different languages and customs… We indigenous peoples think and plan in terms of the territory, not only the individual plot; in this way, we assure the access of the community to the diverse resources of the forest (wood, soil appropriate for agriculture and cattle, and wild fauna)… We indigenous peoples know that without land there can be no education, there can be no health and there can be no life.282

Special Rapporteur Jose R. Martinez Cabo similarly emphasized, “It is essential to know and understand the deeply spiritual special relationship between indigenous peoples and their land as basic to their existence as such and to all their beliefs, customs, traditions and culture... land is not merely a possession and a means of production... Their land is not a commodity which can be acquired, but a material element to be enjoyed freely.”283

For indigenous communities, this reconceptualization of territory is the fundamental first step to acquire power, autonomy, and self-determination.284 Because territory is the “… natural or immutable basis for the socio-spatial configuration of power relations,”285 and, accordingly, the origin of indigenous communities’ historical exclusion, territorial demands call for a reconfiguration of the relationship between space and state. As Bryan summarizes, “the concept of territory provided a means of contesting state-sanctioned practices of racialized exclusion that denied indigenous peoples and

Afro-descendants full membership in national societies while subjecting them to the

282 Qtd in Roque Roldán Ortega, Models for Recognizing Indigenous Land Rights in Latin America (World Bank, Environment Department, 2004), ix-x. 283 qtd in International Labor Organization. "Indigenous & Tribal Peoples’ Rights in Practice: A Guide to Ilo Convention No. 169." (Place Published: International Labor Organization, 2009. 284 Karl H Offen, "The Territorial Turn: Making Black Territories in Pacific Colombia," Journal of Latin American Geography 2, no. 1 (2003). ———, "Narrating Place and Identity, or Mapping Miskitu Land Claims in Northeastern Nicaragua," Human organization 62, no. 4 (2003). 285 Joe Bryan, "Rethinking Territory: Social Justice and Neoliberalism in Latin America’s Territorial Turn," Geography Compass 6, no. 4 (2012).

sovereign authority of the state.”286 As most commonly expressed, these demands converge around claims for recognition of this conceptualization of land as well as jurisdiction or control over this conceptualization of territory. Specifically, this takes the shape of rights to historically-occupied land, land sufficient to fulfill economic and social functions, protection of claimed land from the state or private actor, environmental protection, and degrees of autonomy or self-government within the claimed land.

Additional concerns arise over rights to adjacent or subsoil resources and the protection from violent conflict over land if the state does not enforce land rights. One observer conceptually clarifies that indigenous territorial demands call for both space (territory as a set of resources, invoking demands for use and control of those resources) and processes (territory as a jurisdictional space, invoking demands for autonomy and/or control over related processes).287

The adoption of this territorial rights model and strategy was interconnected with the region-wide emergence and articulation of the broader indigenous identity and agenda. While indigenous territorial demands were largely subsumed into class demands for property rights through agrarian reform in the 1960s and 1970s, ethnicity reemerged as a prominent nexus of political organization in the 1980s and 1990s, partly in response to the implementation of neoliberal reforms.288 Politically, neoliberal reforms entailed a liberalization of relations between state and society towards individual, rather than group

286 Ibid. 287 Gerardo Zuñiga Navarro, "Los procesos de constitución de territorios indígenas en América Latina," Nueva Sociedad 53 (1998). 288 Sieder, Multiculturalism in Latin America. Postero and Zamosc, "Indigenous Movements and the Indian Question in Latin America." Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge.

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or corporate rights.289 Neoliberal economic policies had a particularly significant impact on indigenous land holdings, encouraging the development of industries that drew on natural resource extraction and restructuring of land markets around individual rather than collective land titles. In response to these shifts, indigenous territorial rights were first discussed at the 1984 meeting of the Coordinating Body of the Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon (COICA), during which the strategy of claiming land not for its productive value, but rather for its political, cultural, and social significance was discussed and adopted.290 Amazonian indigenous communities advanced territorial demands as “an integral part of an indigenous political project”;291 this decolonizing project later spread to the highlands and throughout the region.292

These demands were bolstered by strengthening international legal standards. The

1989 International Labor Organization’s Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal

Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169), the most significant and only binding international law on indigenous rights, recognizes that “governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship” (emphasis

289 Sieder, Multiculturalism in Latin America, 2. Postero and Zamosc, "Indigenous Movements and the Indian Question in Latin America," 21. 290 Kevin Healy, Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 81. Lucero, Struggles of Voice: The Politics of Indigenous Representation in the Andes, 92. 291 ———, Struggles of Voice: The Politics of Indigenous Representation in the Andes, 105. 292 Healy, Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia, 393. As is further discussed in Chapter 7, this distinction between highland and lowland indigenous demands is argued to be linked to the history of land tenure and agrarian reform in the respective regions. See Lucero (2008), Assies (2000), and Zuniga (1998) for a discussion of the construction of territorial demands and the potentially exclusionary and inappropriate “territorial model” of recognizing indigenous land rights.

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added).293 The recognition of territory as the “the total environment of the area” represents a significant conceptual shift from the first international convention on indigenous rights (ILO 107, 1957), which called for indigenous communities to have a

“land reserve adequate for the needs of shifting cultivation.” ILO 169 also recognizes indigenous rights to land beyond that necessary for subsistence, stating that “… measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities.” Importantly, this right is recognized regardless of if these lands were ever formally recognized or documented by the state.

ILO supervisory bodies have repeatedly emphasized that this clause should not be interpreted as requiring “regular and permanent presence” as governments sometimes interpret, ruling in favor of indigenous communities rights to land based on traditional land tenure, and recent rather than historical occupation.294

293 While ILO 169 is the most prominent statement on the rights of indigenous communities, it is not alone in its conceptualization of indigenous territory. Articles 25 and 26 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), adopted in 2007, establishes that: “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regard…. (1) Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or other-wise used or acquired. (2) Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. (3) States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.” 294 This has been confirmed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Mayagna (Sumo) Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua 2001, and by ILO supervisory bodies that concluded, “The fact that land rights have originated more recently than colonial times is not a determining factor. The Convention was drafted to recognize situations in which there are rights to lands which have been traditionally occupied, but also may cover other situations in which indigenous peoples have rights to lands they occupy or otherwise use under other conditions.” Governing Body, 276th Session, November 1999, Representation under article 24 of the ILO Constitution, Mexico, GB.276/16/3, para. 37. Also relevant are: Committee of Experts, 73rd Session, 2002, Observation, Peru, published 2003, para. 7 and Governing Body, 276th Session, November 1999, Representation under article 24 of the ILO Constitution, Mexico, GB.276/16/3, para. 37. For further discussion, see ILO 2009, 94.

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This convergence of trends resulted in the recognition of black and indigenous communities’ communal property rights across the region, in what is frequently referred to as the territorial turn. Somewhat unexpectedly, the World Bank was a key supporter and financial backer of these recognitions.295 Indigenous territorial rights recognitions were folded into the neoliberal restructuring project’s priority of regularizing property rights regimes; collective rights recognitions facilitated and strengthened market reforms.

Overall, Latin American governments recognized more than 200 million hectares of land.296

As expected, there is broad variation in the recognition and implementation of these rights. Most authors note a chronological evolution in how countries have recognized indigenous territorial rights, evolving from only recognizing limited forms of autonomy (Guatemala 1985, Nicaragua 1987, Brazil 1988), to recognizing indigenous communities as collective actors with collective rights (Colombia 1991, México 1992,

2001, Perú 1993, Bolivia 1994, Ecuador 1998) to recognizing indigenous communities’ status as nations with rights to degrees of legal plurality and territorial autonomy

(Ecuador 2008, Bolivia 2009).297 Often, the strength of the recognition of indigenous territory is often evaluated by the “four Is”: inalienable (not subject to sale or transfer), indivisible (not divisible), imprescriptible (not subject to a period of limitations, non- lapsable), and inembargable (not subject to embargo, seizure); the stronger these four

295 Offen, "The Territorial Turn: Making Black Territories in Pacific Colombia.", Ortega, Models for Recognizing Indigenous Land Rights in Latin America. 296 Bryan, "Rethinking Territory: Social Justice and Neoliberalism in Latin America’s Territorial Turn." 297 Aylwin Oyarzún, "Los derechos de los pueblos endígenas en Chile." Yrigoyen Fajardo, Pueblos indígenas. Constituciones y reformas políticas en América Latina. María Clara Galvis Patiño, Ángela María Ramírez Rincón, and Fundación para el Debido Proceso, "Digesto de jurisprudencia latinoamericana sobre los derechos de los pueblos indígenas a la participación, la consulta previa y la propiedad comunitaria," (2013).

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guarantees, the less likely indigenous land will be reincorporated into land markets.298

The following section details how territorial rights have been translated into land policy in Chile and Bolivia.

Chile

Chile has only recently incorporated indigenous territorial demands into policy.

Pinochet-era land reforms worked to undo land reform carried out throughout the 1960s and 1970s, privatizing collectively-held land and encouraging the development of industries relying on natural resources. Because private property was the key to the productive use of land and the economic development of the country, the Pinochet declared “indigenous lands and indigenous landowners do not exist, because there are only Chileans” and opened up communal land to privatization in 1979 Decrees 2.568 and

2.750.299 Most Mapuche lacked the titles or monetary resources to formally purchase these lands, allowing for the growth of large farms in the region as more than 2200 communities were divided onto no more than 6.4 hectares of land per family.300

Largely due the difficulty of amending the 1980 constitution, indigenous demands were enumerated in the 1993 Indigenous Law 19.253. The law project was modified seven times during Congressional debate, severely weakening the law’s recognition of territorial rights. Specifically, “indigenous peoples” was changed to “ethnic group of indigenous communities” (pueblos indígenas to etnias de comunidades indígenas) and

298 Roger Plant and Soren Hvalkof, "Titulación de tierras y pueblos indígenas," (Inter-American Development Bank, 2002), 217. Ortega, Models for Recognizing Indigenous Land Rights in Latin America. 299 Aylwin Oyarzún, Políticas públicas y pueblo Mapuche. Correa, Otárola, and Fuenzalida, La reforma agraria y las tierras Mapuches: Chile 1962-1975. 300 Aylwin Oyarzún, "Los derechos de los pueblos indígenas en Chile." Mariman et al., "¡… Escucha, Winka…." Silva and Rodrigo, "Contesting Private Property Rights: The Environment and Indigenous Peoples."

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“territories of indigenous development” to “areas of indigenous development” (territorios de desarrollo indígena to áreas de desarrollo indígenas); a stronger recognition of indigenous land would have given the community preferential rights to natural resources on the land.301

Title II of the 1993 law specifies state policy on the recognition, protection, and development of indigenous land. It recognizes that an indigenous community can collectively hold the land title, but does not recognize that the relationship between an indigenous person and their land is in any way distinct from that of a nonindigenous person. Territorial rights are not recognized and there is no discussion of control or consultation regarding the use of natural resources or subsoil resources on indigenous land. Land considered to be indigenous land is protected as imprescriptible and inembargable, but is not inalienable or indivisible, except within individuals or communities of the same ethnicity (Article 13). While the law grants indigenous peoples the right to pursue traditionally-held land, this land can only be defined as such if it was formally-titled as indigenous land in accordance with a number of laws dating from 1823 through 1979. Effectively, indigenous communities do not have the right to pursue land without proof it had previously been formally defined as such.

It is important to note that some Mapuche organizations, communities, and individuals rejected the CEPI project, seeking a broader definition of territorial demands.

Rather than focus on state-documented indigenous land, several organizations demanded

301 Aylwin Oyarzún, "Los conflictos en el territorio Mapuche: Antecedentes y perspectivas." ———, "Los derechos de los pueblos indígenas en Chile." Vergara, Foerster, and Gundermann, "Más acá de la legalidad. La CONADI, la Ley Indígena y el pueblo Mapuche (1989-2004)."

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access to ancestral land, resources, and spaces that were never recognized by the state.302

Many of these organizations rejected the 1993 Indigenous Law, for the fact that it

“recognized the division of the land, accomplishing the main objective of DL 2.568

(1979) that Mapuche organizations have rejected for more than a decade, calling not only for its repeal, but demanding the annulment but also its negative effects …” (emphasis added).303 These broader territorial claims were legally supported by treaties signed with the Spanish crown in the 18th century, as well as by UN Special Rapporteur Miguel

Alfonso Martínez’s study that concluded that colonizers "… aimed at divesting those

[indigenous] nations of the very same sovereign attributes and rights, particularly their land rights."304

While this law represented a significant step forward for indigenous rights in

Chile, activists maintain that the law does not meet the terms of the Nueva Imperial agreement, in which the incoming Aylwin administration agreed to recognize indigenous territorial rights. The law project articulated indigenous territorial rights recognitions, yet the changes to the law project suggest that the Aylwin government and Congress understood indigenous land issues as an agricultural or economic issue. However, because the implementation and regulation over the Fund were left largely undefined in

302 Most commonly, these demands came from Ad Mapu, Fundación Instituto Indígena, the Centros Culturales Mapuche and Consejo de Todas las Tierras. Rodrigo Míguez Núñez, "Estado chileno y tierras Mapuche: Entre propiedades y territorialidad," in Derecho Y Pueblo Mapuche: Aportes Para La Discusión, ed. H. Olea Rodríguez (Santiago: Centro de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad de Diego Portales, 2013), 45. 303 qtd in Fernando Pairicán Padilla and Rolando Álvarez, "La nueva guerra de Arauco: La Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco y los nuevos movimientos de resistencia Mapuche en el Chile de la Concertación (1997- 2009)* Arauco’s New War: The Coordinadora Arauco Malleco and the New Movements Mapuche in Chile, 1997-2009," Izquierdas, no. 10 (2012): 113. 304 UN Special Rapporteur Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Study on Treaties, Agreements and other Constructive Arrangements between States and Indigenous Populations, Second Progress Report, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/27, 31 July, 1995, para. 131. Miguel Alfonso Martínez, Erica-Irene A Daes, and Ribot Hatano, Final Report of the Study on Treaties, Agreements and Other Constructive Arrangements between States and Indigenous Populations: Draft Decision (UN, 1999).

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both the indigenous law regulatory policy, the potential for the law to address territorial demands remained open. The only requirement, as suggested by the final wording of the law, was historical documentation of the indigenous community’s relationship with the plot of land.

Decree 395, passed in November 1993, established implementation procedures to regulate the Indigenous Land and Water Fund. It defines the scope of the Fund to be one of financing mechanisms for the solution of land problems (Article 1). Article 6 of the

Decree regulates this objective, further emphasizing the importance of historic documentation of the community’s connection to the land; the policy only extends to land claims supported by títulos de merced and other state-issued recognitions of indigenous land. The National Director of CONADI is to resolve each request based on the number of people, severity of the social situation, and the antiquity of the land conflict.305 While these regulations appear to be insufficient in hindsight, they suggest that the high demand and resulting controversy over implementation were unforeseen. One CONADI public official understood that officials only expected 40 cases to be resolved through 20B; as a result, the policy did not necessitate significant administrative oversight or regulation

(Interview, October 2012). The requests of 89 communities were processed in the first five years, involving 2025 families and 22,747 hectares.

The first clarification of these implementation procedures came in 1999, when

CONADI released “Land Policy,” acknowledging that 20B had “low efficiency in its implementation due to errors and omissions.”306 The study cites that the lack of valid

305 Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación (MIDEPLAN) Government of Chile, "Decreto 395: Aprueba reglamento sobre el Fondo de Tierras y Aguas Indígenas," (Temuco, Chile: 1993). 306 Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación, "La política de tierras de la Corporación Nacional De Desarrollo Indígena," (Santiago, Chile: 1999).

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initial studies that objectively quantified the number of expected claims, resulting in a high demand that was not budgeted for. The conflict between land and territory appeared to motivate much of the controversy addressed in the 1999 policy. The policy cites confusion between the concept of “land (an economic concept)” and “territory (a political concept),” suggesting that “the populism of the period” wrongly disseminated the idea that the land eligible for restitution was defined by the collective memory of the community elders. Responding directly, the policy states that “…it is not possible to reconstitute ancestral territory through land purchases at market prices because there is not sufficient public funding to buy them and because often the current owner does not want to sell them.” It concludes asserting that “the irresponsible dispersion of these ideas motivated significant pressure towards CONADI and a great frustration from communities and individuals who cannot have their expectations met.” To address this pressure and frustration, the 1999 policy clarifies implementation procedures to “prevent price speculation and external interferences in the organization.” The policies developed in this document mark a significant shift in the goals 20B is working to serve. As one

CONADI employee expressed, the document develops the “grounds for decision- making” (Interview November 2012).

This 1999 document also includes the first written expression of CONADI’s objective to use 20B as a means of promoting socioeconomic development. As the document justifies:

While it is possible that land problems will continue to be important for the rural indigenous population in the next decade, economic and social change will undoubtedly demand that indigenous communities broaden their economic base beyond agriculture. This has occurred with nonindigenous peoples in all countries. With this perspective, it is likely that education, development of indigenous human resources, and

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commodification of economic activities will be some of the strategic work for the next millennium.

To this end, CONADI prioritized communities with higher incidences of poverty and that the quantity of land will be determined by the productive capability of the plot of land. While acknowledging that land is also important for cultural development, the addition of this socioeconomic perspective marks the beginning of a shift in the policy away from one of resolving historic land conflicts.

This shift towards a socioeconomic development perspective is accompanied by a de-emphasis of indigenous elements of territory. For example, the 1999 document confirms that the policy applies to land, not territory, asserting that CONADI interprets the scope of the law to be finite. It estimates that principal land conflicts will be resolved by 2010, as “the mechanism was designed from the perspective that there are solutions to land problems … that is, land problems are not eternal.” Indicative of criticisms,

CONADI asserts it will not respond to illegitimate sources of pressure, such as land grabs, and that it will only pay up to 10 per cent more than the estimated value of the land. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, CONADI also began to buy alternate land if the land the community lost was too expensive and/or if the landowner was not willing to negotiate with the government (Interview November 2012). Each of these transitions limited the ability of CONADI to respond to historic land claims.

Resolution 878, “Manual for the Application of Procedures for Land Purchases through Article 20 Letter B of the Land and Water Fund of CONADI,” was introduced in

2003 to further clarify the regulatory procedures governing the implementation of 20B.

Focusing on establishing technical procedures, it represents a significant point of departure from previous implementation procedures in that it establishes four stages of

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the land purchase process: applicability, feasibility, viability, and completion. Moreso than any previous description of the decision-making process, 878 establishes specific procedures to be carried out by specific offices. For example, the process is initiated when a community’s leadership submits a written request to their respective Subdirection of CONADI; the office will “create a numbered folder to contain all the presented records duly foliated and ordered consecutively in agreement with the logical development of the process. The first document of the folder should be the community’s request, foliated and stamped with the date received by the reception office.”307 This level of specificity continues for each step of the process outlined in the document and, notably, is the first instance in the history of the policy in which this level of specificity is outlined for the implementation of 20B. Notably, there is no discussion of which cases are to be prioritized over others in terms of CONADI’s limited time and resources.

While not directly appearing in Resolution 878, interviews with current and former CONADI employees revealed that the clarification of these procedures also brought the size of the land transfer into question. While previous land transfers processed through 20B were determined by the quantity of land documented in the community’s título de merced, 878 clarified that CONADI officials needed complete social, occupational, and judicial/ administrative reports specific to each community; the social report would include levels of poverty in the community and the number of children and young adults that would soon be requesting land from their parents. With these studies, CONADI began to, ideally, allocate 10 productive hectares of land per

307 Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación (MIDEPLAN) Government of Chile, "Resolución 878: Manual para la aplicación de procedimiento para la compra de tierras a través del programa subsidio Artículo Letra B del Fondo De Tierras Y Aguas Indígenas de la Conadi," (2003): 2.

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family (Interview, November 2012). While 20B was regulated by 395, the number of people and quantity of land did not affect the land transfer; only ancestral land lost before

1993, based on the título de merced, was bought.

One of the most significant documents affecting the implementation of 20B was a survey of indigenous lands carried out by the Centro EULA, the Center for

Environmental Sciences at the University of Concepción. The final evaluation, “Model of Supply-Demand for Indigenous Waters, Land, and Irrigation,” had the explicit objective of “improving efficiency and equality in the functioning of the Land and Water

Fund.”308 The study concludes that Chile has an excess supply of land for indigenous communities, based on the study’s calculations of the current and future land needs of the indigenous population. It cites that indigenous communities in Chile have historic claim to 1,239,289 hectares of land, 42.8 per cent of which were already registered to indigenous individuals or communities in CONADI’s Registry of Indigenous Lands.309

The Mapuche community in the Araucanía region would require 510,664 hectares of workable land;310 the study offers that if land was substituted for pensions to heads of households older than 60, the demand for land would fall to 193,844 hectares. The study estimates the supply of land in the region to be 1,503,857 hectares, leading to the conclusion that there is an excess of supply.311

While the introduction and conclusion of the study recognize the importance of the relationship between indigenous culture and territory,312 the report focuses on

308 Centro EULA, "Proyecto catastro de tierras, aguas y riego para indígenas, informe final modelo de oferta-demanda de tierras, aguas y riego," (2004). 309 Ibid., 121. 310 Ibid., 131. 311 Ibid., 135. 312 Ibid., 172.

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calculating land demand to promote development in indigenous communities. This perspective is evident in the inclusion of ways to lower land demand through more cost- effective policies, such as providing pensions rather than land to elderly community members. This shift also brings the price of land into question; because the relationship between the community and a particular section of territory was not prioritized, the government was able to regularize the prices it would be willing to pay.

CONADI’s interpretation of these results had a significant impact on the management of 20B and the Land and Water Fund. One official described that the survey created evaluative goals and an end to the policy, calculated based on the remaining land demand and price per hectare the government would pay. After the government resolved a certain number of requests corresponding to a certain investment and quantity of hectares, the land demand will be fulfilled and the program would no longer be needed.

The prevalence of this perspective remains in 2012; CONADI has gradually established guidelines for the prices it will pay for particular sections of land, currently not to exceed

$5 million per hectare. Usually, the government spends approximately $3 million per hectare; this makes it nearly impossible, regardless of a community’s historic claim to the land, to acquire land of higher quality or from large landowners or companies demanding a higher price (Interviews, November 2012).

The incoming Bachelet administration took explicit steps to reach the policy goals established from the land survey. Her full indigenous policy is outlined in the 2008 document “Re-Conocer: Social Pact for Multiculturalism,” discussed in detail in Chapter

5. While reformulating indigenous land policy was not the primary focus of this policy document, it worked towards “improving and optimizing the public response to land

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demands” by specifying the order in which communities’ claims should be processed.

The cases of 115 communities were prioritized, on the basis that the case had already been documented, studied and approved through the established requirements. An additional 308 communities were placed on a waiting list, comprised of communities that had submitted their documents, but CONADI had not yet studied if the case qualified.

In 2010, the first external evaluation of the Land and Water Fund commissioned by CONADI and conducted by the Universidad de la Frontera. The study, “Social-

Productive Evaluation Study of Lands Acquired by the Land and Water Fund of

CONADI,” is justified by the assertion that despite the policy being responsible for transferring more than 100,000 hectares of land over more than 10 years at a high cost to the government, there has not been a thorough study of the benefits of the program.313

Nearly 70 per cent of the communities that benefitted from the program between 1994 and 2009 were interviewed to explore the social, cultural, productive, and economic effects of the program. One of the strongest findings of the report was that only 40 per cent of the acquired land was occupied, and families moved to the acquired land, on average, 21.7 months after the transfer.314 A CONADI official emphasized that this statistic highlighted the need for the program needs to be reconsidered for not producing more substantial results. Throughout this conversation, ‘results’ were defined as increases in economic production and improvements in standards of living. As he explained, land transfers could be replaced by much more cost-effective, targeted socioeconomic development programs (Interview, November 2012). By quantifying the

313 Universidad de la Frontera Instituto del Medio Ambiente, "Estudio evaluación socio-productiva de tierras adquiridas por el Fondo De Tierras Y Aguas de CONADI," (2011). 314 Ibid.

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indigenous land demand in Chile, CONADI has gradually transitioned away from processing land requests based on the history between the community and the territory.

As evidenced by this overview, the norms and procedures regulating the implementation of 20B have become increasingly specific over time. The Chapter 4

Appendix includes a series of documents that establish the current requirements for policy 20B, acquired from the subnational CONADI office in Temuco in 2013. Figure 9 presents the checklist of requirements for communities to progress through the first two stages of the process. The first stage requires the community to document their claim based on juridical documents (Figure 10) and to compile the history of the community

(see Figures 11 and 12).

Bolivia

In contrast to the Chilean case, Bolivia has progressed much further in the strength of its territorial rights recognitions. This following section details how successive policy reforms in Bolivia have translated territorial demands into increasingly strong territorial rights recognitions.

For much of Bolivian history, Bolivia’s land policy did not address territorial rights. The 1952 Revolution and successive 1953 Land Reform set a strong precedent for future debates over land policy in Bolivia; most analysts conclude that recent policy

“preserved and reinterpreted” the 1952 reforms.315 As the MNR developed their political agenda, they studied the agrarian indigenous situation, “…with the aim of incorporating the millions of peasants that until now have been marginalized from it into national life

315 Willem Assies, "Land Tenure in Bolivia: From Colonial Times to Post-Neoliberalism," in Legalising Land Rights: Local Practices, State Responses and Tenure Security in Africa, Asia and Latin America, ed. Andre J. Hoekema Janine M. Ubink, Willem J. Assies (Leiden University Press, 2009), 294.

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and to achieve an adequate organization of the agrarian economy in order to obtain maximal output.”316 After the revolution, peasant demands were organized through the

Ministry of Campesino Affairs, prioritizing class-based identities and banning use of the word indio.317 The 1953 and subsequent reforms did not address ethnicity-based indigenous demands; class-based identities would supersede indigenous identities as they assimilated as peasants into the national economic project through land reform and corporatist peasant unions.318

Land reform returned to the policy agenda as part of Bolivia’s neoliberal restructuring in the 1990s. Particularly after a 1992 scandal exposed massive irregularities in land titles,319 President Sanchez de Lozada initiated debate over agrarian policy, in conjunction with the WB’s National Project for Land Administration

(PNAT),320 seeking to remove restrictions on the sale of land, allow for land to be used as a source of credit,321 and improve the institutional stability of land markets and titles. In

1994, Sánchez de Lozada presented an initial proposal, ‘INTI’ (Ley del Instituto Nacional de Tierras), quickly countered by peasant and indigenous organizations’ ‘INKA’ law

316 Qtd in ibid., 298. 317 Van Cott, The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America, 127. 318 Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, 156. 319 President Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-93) illegally transferred more than 100,000 hectares of land to the Education Minister Hedim Cespedes and his Brazilian associates, through the two government agencies responsible for implementing the 1953 land reform. For additional details, see: Irene Hernaiz and Diego Pacheco, Ley INRA en el espejo de la Historia: Dos siglos de reformas agrarias, ed. Fundación TIERRA, Taller De Iniciativas En Estudios Rurales Y Reforma Agraria (La Paz, Bolivia: Artes Gráficas Latina, 2000), 128. Miguel Urioste et al., "Land Market in a New Context: The Inra Law in Bolivia," Current land policy in Latin America: regulating land tenure under neo-liberalism (2000): 260-1.) Willem Assies, "Land Tenure Legalization, Pluriculturalism, and Multiethnicity in Bolivia" (paper presented at the symposium At the Frontier of Land Issues: Social Embeddedness of Rights and Public Policy, May, 2006).) 320 Penelope Anthias and Sarah A Radcliffe, "The Ethno-Environmental Fix and Its Limits: Indigenous Land Titling and the Production of Not-Quite-Neoliberal Natures in Bolivia," Geoforum (2013). 321 Urioste et al., "Land Market in a New Context: The Inra Law in Bolivia," 260-1.

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(Ley del Instituto Nacional Kollasuyo-Andino-Amazónico).” 322 As a result of pressure from the numerous stakeholders and organizations involved in the reform process, the law became “an unusual combination of neoliberal and social justice measures.”323

The resulting 1996 INRA Law (Ley INRA- National Institute for Agrarian

Reform, 1715) worked to clarify institutional instability underpinning land tenure and land scarcity primarily through saneamiento (regularization; literal translation: cleansing of land titles). It set a target date of 10 years from the promulgation of ley INRA to clarify all of Bolivia’s land titles. It established several types of land ownership, including subsistence plots, small plots, medium plots, agricultural enterprise, and communally held plots (for both indigenous and non-indigenous peoples). Ley INRA clarifies between property that fulfills social functions (including solar campesino/ peasant housing plot, small plots, communal property, and TCOs that cannot be divided, alienated, mortgaged or taxed) with those that fulfill social-economic functions (medium and larger plots of land that pay tax, can be sold and mortgaged).324 Redistribution, then, would come from land that was expropriated (if not fulfilling a socioeconomic value or needed for public utility, owner compensated according to declared value) or reverted (if land was abandoned/ taxes had not been payed, owner not compensated) to the state; peasants and indigenous were prioritized to benefit from this redistribution. Importantly, the state, not peasants through occupation, had to prove the land’s productivity.

322 Assies, "Land Tenure in Bolivia: From Colonial Times to Post-Neoliberalism," 298. 323 Carmen Diana Deere and Magdalena Leon, "Institutional Reform of Agriculture under Neoliberalism: The Impact of the Women's and Indigenous Movements," Latin American Research Review (2001): 37. 324 Assies, "Land Tenure in Bolivia: From Colonial Times to Post-Neoliberalism," 298. ———, "Land Tenure Legalization, Pluriculturalism, and Multiethnicity in Bolivia".

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The law addressed indigenous demands in two ways. First, it established that indigenous and peasant organizations would be prioritized to receive land that had been expropriated or reverted to the state for not fulfilling a social or socioeconomic function.325 Second, the law also recognized territorial demands by establishing the new category of Communal Indigenous Lands (Tierras Comunitarias de Orígen – TCOs), which were declared to be indivisible.326 While certainly a step for the recognition of indigenous land, Ley INRA was criticized for conceptualizing land as an economic resource and insufficiently responding to indigenous territorial demands.327 Ley INRA prohibited new development activity in TCOs, but allowed existing private landholders to stay if they could prove productive use.328 Highland indigenous communities also rejected much of Ley INRA for its confirmation of the patterns of land tenure resulting from the 1953 reforms and for destroying the traditional ayllu organization by recognizing TCOs as the only tenure model for indigenous communities.329 Furthermore, because the saneamiento process prioritized regularization and titling in TCOs, third

325 Problematically, however, the socio-economic function of land was based on taxation of the land based on the value of the land, as declared by the owner; using their political power, landholding elite created tax loopholes that made it nearly impossible to prove whether land was fulfilling a socio-economic function. ———, "Land Tenure in Bolivia: From Colonial Times to Post-Neoliberalism," 298. 326 Miguel Urioste and Diego Pacheco, "Las tierras bajas de Bolivia a fines del siglo XX," La Paz: PIEB (2001): 263-4. 327 Anthias and Radcliffe, "The Ethno-Environmental Fix and Its Limits: Indigenous Land Titling and the Production of Not-Quite-Neoliberal Natures in Bolivia." Bryan, "Rethinking Territory: Social Justice and Neoliberalism in Latin America’s Territorial Turn.", Joel Wainwright and Joe Bryan, "Cartography, Territory, Property: Postcolonial Reflections on Indigenous Counter-Mapping in Nicaragua and Belize," cultural geographies 16, no. 2 (2009). 328 Anthias and Radcliffe, "The Ethno-Environmental Fix and Its Limits: Indigenous Land Titling and the Production of Not-Quite-Neoliberal Natures in Bolivia." Hindery, From Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia, 116. 329 John Crabtree, Patterns of Protest: Politics and Social Movements in Bolivia, vol. 4 (Latin America Bureau, 2005), 79.

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parties who held land formally or informally within TCOs acquired titles because of their overlaps with indigenous communities.330

More substantially, Ley INRA did not address the administration of property, avoiding autonomy claims. Authorities avoided references to territory in formulating ley

INRA, concerned about the potential for the Balkanization or fragmentation of the country if the law established sub-national degrees of autonomy.331 One activist described that, “Even if we thought about culture, our principles, our projection as a nation, those technical procedures [of TCO titling] made [territory] in some way lose its essence, and made it into something predominantly agrarian...So now the substantial change is that we’re changing from a way of thinking based on the agrarian aspect, to now thinking about Land-Territory in the plain of political power, and that’s where we talk about autonomy.”332 Like many reforms of the early 1990s, the project exchanged weak

“recognition of multicultural rights in return for endorsement, implicit or otherwise, of the broader political project of neoliberalism.”333

While not explicitly address degrees of autonomy, the creation of the TCO status in Ley INRA opened a space for both highland and lowland indigenous communities to acquire defacto autonomy. Highland communities took advantage of the creation of the

TCO status to facilitate ayllu development,334 arguing that INRA “not only applies to the ethnic groups of the Oriente (eastern Bolivia) or Bolivian Amazon but also to the indigenous peoples of the occident of our country, given the principle of generality of the

330 Urioste and Pacheco, "Las tierras bajas de Bolivia a fines del siglo XX," 395. 331 Assies, "Land Tenure in Bolivia: From Colonial Times to Post-Neoliberalism," 298. 332 Qtd in Anthias and Radcliffe, "The Ethno-Environmental Fix and Its Limits: Indigenous Land Titling and the Production of Not-Quite-Neoliberal Natures in Bolivia." 333 Hale, "Más Que Un Indio: Racial Ambivalence and the Paradox of Neoliberal Multiculturalism in Guatemala," 110. 334 Assies, "Land Tenure Legalization, Pluriculturalism, and Multiethnicity in Bolivia".

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law.”335 In 1999, the first highland indigenous communities presented a TCO claim; by

2003, 103 groups claimed TCO status for more than 12 million hectares in the highlands.336 This strategy was facilitated by the 1994 Popular Participation Law, which allowed for the creation of indigenous municipal districts that could serve a basis to establish autonomy when merged with property titles. By the middle of the 2000s, communities acquired de-facto degrees of autonomy through this “dual strategy of territorialisation.”337 TCOs created “archipelagos of land.”338

In 2006, the Morales government sought to streamline ley INRA by centralizing the titling process and strengthening the central government’s authority to expropriate land. While sold and portrayed as a radical reform, the 2006 reforms did not represent a significant departure from Ley INRA, but rather strengthened the government’s ability to

“dismantle bases of power in the East rooted in large-scale speculative or illegal landholding.339 Specifically, the 2006 reforms reconfirm that land needs to fulfill a

“social economic function” (FES), subjecting idle and land to expropriation. Tax payments, however, were no longer sufficient proof of the land’s FES. Idle land was subject to expropriation, to be benefit of indigenous peoples and campesinos.

These 2006 reforms were reconfirmed in the 2009 Constitution. It reconfirms that land is subject to expropriation if not fulfilling a productive or socioeconomic function, and reprioritizes indigenous and peasant communities to benefit from expropriations.340

335 ———, "Land Tenure in Bolivia: From Colonial Times to Post-Neoliberalism," 298. 336 Ibid. 337 Ibid. 338 Qtd in Hindery, From Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia, 116. 339 Bret Gustafson, "When States Act Like Movements Dismantling Local Power and Seating Sovereignty in Post-Neoliberal Bolivia," Latin American Perspectives 37, no. 4 (2010). 340 There was significant controversy surrounding the drafting of the 2009 constitution. Evo’s party MAS controlled 137 of 255 seats, falling short of the 2/3 majority required to amend the Constitution. To

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Moving beyond the 2006 reforms, the 2009 Constitution establishes that future landholdings cannot exceed 5000 hectares; if expropriated, the government must fairly compensate owners.

The Constitution made significant advances in recognizing territorial demands, creating paths for indigenous communities to establish degrees of autonomy in response to indigenous demands that the boundaries of administrative control should coincide with political administrative boundaries. The Constitution declares the state to be unitary, decentralized, and with four types of autonomies: departments, provinces, municipalities, and TIOCS (article 269). Indigenous autonomy could be established through three routes

(Article 44 of Autonomy Law). First, the Constitution renames TCOs as TIOCs

(Original Peasant Indigenous Territory, Territorio Indigena Originaria Campesina), defined to “be understood as areas of production, use and conservation of natural resources, and spaces of social, spiritual and cultural reproduction” (Article 403 II).

While TCOs were territorial demarcations that did not establish administrative authority,

TCOs that converted to TIOCs could detach from the municipality to become an AIOC

(Autonomía Indígena Originario Campesina, Peasant Farmer Native Indigenous

Autonomies). Second, existing municipal structures can convert to AIOCs by referendum, a path only feasible where indigenous peoples would vote as a majority in a particular municipality. Third, two or more municipalities could convert to AIOCs.

further complicate the amendment process, a referendum to grant a number of departments more autonomy was held concurrently. The departments seeking autonomy were those in opposition to MAS’s proposed constitutional amendments. Conflict escalated to the point that the opposition boycotted the constitutional negotiations, causing MAS to avoid the 2/3 requirement by sending the unresolved debates to Congress and ultimately a referendum. MAS moved to impeach members of the Constitutional Tribunal, preventing the opposition from appealing the procedures. As is evident by this process, it is unlikely the expanded incorporation of indigenous land rights in the 2009 Constitution would have been possible had the MAS not gone to potentially undemocratic lengths to enact it.

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AIOCs are governed according to the statutes approved by both the TCP and a local plebiscite, with authority similar to municipalities with jurisdiction over local issues as well as degrees of authority over judicial and electoral systems. These regional autonomies do not establish precedent for self-determination demands, but rather create spaces of indigenous self-governance within the Bolivian state. Many authors equate the

2009 reforms as recreating the 1994 reforms that empowered municipalities,341 describing AIOC status as nothing more than “putting a poncho on the municipality.”342

Like previous efforts to advance the recognition of indigenous autonomies, these formal definitions fell short of international standards. The specific details about what

AIOC status entails are unclear; as one analyst concluded, “the description of the powers of AIOCs is very poor, reduced to something cultural-folkloric.”343 Furthermore, while the Constitution broadly established indigenous peoples’ right to autonomy and self- determination, these rights can only be realized in areas recognized as AIOCs.344 Yet, large portions of territory are restricted from acquiring AIOC status by the procedures established in the July 2010 Ley Marco de Autonomias y Descentralizacion (LMAD, Ley

031). For example, TIOCs were considered “inviable autonomies” if they had fewer than

1000 people or were discontinuous;345 more than 50% of the TIOCs in the lowlands does not comprise more than 1000, and 70% of TIOCs are discontinuous. Furthermore, more than 75% of indigenous territories cross over two or more municipal boundaries, 16%

341 Tockman and Cameron, "Indigenous Autonomy and the Contradictions of Plurinationalism in Bolivia." 342 Linda C Farthing and Benjamin H Kohl, Evo's Bolivia: Continuity and Change (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2014), 125. 343 Fundacion TIERRA, Nuestra Tierra, no. 9 (2009). 344 ———, "Diversos obstáculos impiden el avance de las autonomías indígenas en Bolivia," (September 2012). 345 Nicole Fabricant and Bret Darin Gustafson, Remapping Bolivia: Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational State (School for Advanced Research Press, 2011), 168.

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cross between departmental boundaries, and some are protected areas, requiring territories to complete procedures in each municipality or department. Finally, more than

80% of the TIOCs in the lowlands are still in the saneamiento process; without formal titles, these TIOCs cannot start the AIOC process.346 Observers have noted that restrictive eligibility requirements resulted in the:

…creeping presence of a legalistic and ‘municipalist’ managerial logic that appears to constrain the scope of how local participants conceive of indigenous autonomy. Indeed, whether intentionally or not, técnicos generally have managed to focus discussions in autonomy assemblies on the compliance of autonomy statutes with the constitution and secondary laws—thus effectively limiting rather than expanding discussions of what indigenous autonomy might entail.347

Finally, as discussed in additional detail in Chapter 8, as of 2015, no AIOC has finalized the AIOC process, leaving significant uncertainty about the significance of acquiring

AIOC status.

As evidenced, the Bolivian government has gradually created strong protections of indigenous territorial rights. There is a long precedent that land needs to fulfill an economic or socioeconomic function. Over time, this precedent has created the conditions under which the Bolivian government can expropriate land if not fulfilling that function. Furthermore, the government has increasingly recognized indigenous territory, first with communal property titles, then as territorial spaces, and most recently with the potential to establish autonomous indigenous governments. Moving beyond indigenous rights recognitions of its regional counterparts, Bolivia has grafted degrees of autonomy

346 Tierra, "Diversos obstáculos impiden el avance de las autonomías indígenas en Bolivia." 347 Tockman and Cameron, "Indigenous Autonomy and the Contradictions of Plurinationalism in Bolivia." Cameron 2010.

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and political on top of demarcated indigenous territory, significantly closing the gap between international standards on indigenous rights and Bolivian policy.

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the complications that countries face as they translate indigenous territorial demands into territorial rights recognitions and later implementation procedures. Bolivia has certainly advanced further than Chile, passing successive reforms that gradually approach international standards on the recognition of territorial rights. In contrast, Chile’s recognition of indigenous territorial rights in 1993 fall significantly short of international standards, yet the procedures governing the policy’s implementation have been increasingly clarified. Subsequent chapters examine the extent which implementation patterns match these procedures in the Chilean case.

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Chapter 5 Quantifying Contentious Action and Land Purchases

“…they realized that the land policy was a political tool to resolve conflicts with the Mapuche community. They realized its potential and radically changed its management, buying land to apagar incendios (put out fires). … the state is not really buying is not really land, but a solution to a conflict.”348 Mapuche activist and academic Introduction

Do governments respond to contentious action through institutionalized policy procedures? As developed in Chapter 2, I posed that democratic governments with sufficient accountability, transparency, and institutional capacity are motivated to preserve governability by both responding to threats posed by contentious action and maintaining implementation procedures. I argue that how a government mediates between these responsibilities, depends on the presence and strength of institutionalized procedures, which structure the extent to which external actors are able to influence policy implementation procedures. Specific to the case under analysis, the stronger the procedures governing the implementation of 20B, the less likely the government will implement the policy in response to external interests, in this case, indigenous communities and forestry companies.

This chapter tests the argument that the institutionalization of policy procedures conditions the extent to which indigenous communities and forestry companies exert leverage over policy implementation, drawing on an original repeated events dataset of land purchases on behalf of 266 Mapuche communities from 1994 to 2013. The analysis takes advantage different policy procedures regulating the government’s first land purchase on behalf of a particular community from all subsequent land purchases for that

348 Personal interview, 18 July 2013.

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community; while there are significant regulations and oversight over the approval of a community’s land claim and the first purchase, most of these procedures drop away for all subsequent purchases. Do these shifting regulations condition if and how indigenous communities and forestry companies exert leverage over policy implementation?

This chapter finds mixed results for the argument that Mapuche communities and forestry companies exert leverage over patterns of policy implementation, conditioned by the presence and strength of institutionalized policy procedures. As expected, there is little evidence that the threat posed by contentious action affects policy implementation.

There is evidence that both Mapuche communities and forestry companies exert leverage over the policy implementation process, but in nuanced ways. Specifically, the leverage of both Mapuche communities and forestry companies has a curvilinear impact on patterns of policy implementation, conditioned by the different regulations governing first and all subsequent purchases. As expected, Mapuche communities and forestry companies have a greater impact on less-regulated subsequent purchases, with the government more likely to respond to communities that have engaged in contentious action and more likely to respond in districts where forestry companies have a greater presence. These results suggest that the Chilean government is motivated and able to appease particular interests, particularly when it is not constrained by institutional procedures and oversight; future research will further explore these dynamics.

Research Design

As introduced in Chapter 2, this analysis explores if governments respond to contentious action through policy. The null hypothesis (Ho) is motivated by the expectation that democratic governments with sufficient accountability, transparency, and

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institutional capacity should maintain institutionalized and transparent policy implementation procedures. If true, there should be no substantively or statistically significant relationship between the actions or presence of particular actors and patterns of policy implementation.

I argue that policy implementation is not neutral, but rather driven by the interests of particular actors. I test three specific components of this argument. First, I test the literature’s assumption that governments use policy implementation to demobilize the threat posed by contentious action (HA1). If true, communities that use more threatening forms of contentious action should be more likely to receive land purchases. Second, I test the argument that policy implementation does not function relative to the threat posed by contentious action, but that contentious action can still serve as a source of leverage

(HA2). If true, I expect that a broader definition of contentious action, including very local, nonviolent forms of contentious action, affects policy implementation. Finally, the third alternative hypothesis tests the influence of economic stakeholders on policy implementation (HA3). Because I argue that the government is motivated to maintain stability, I expect that land purchases are more likely in districts with a greater presence of economic stakeholders as a means of appeasing the potential for future mobilization and protecting economic investments.

Ho: Policy implementation is transparent and removed from the interests of particular stakeholders

HA: Policy implementation is driven by the interests of particular stakeholders

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HA1: Government responds to instances of contentious action based on the relative threat posed by the mobilization to reduce the threat posed to governability.

HA2: Government responds to leverage acquired by communities through contentious action.

HA3: Government protects the interests of powerful economic stakeholders.

Because I argue that the degree of institutionalization conditions the government’s response, I expect to find a significant difference between the government’s first response to indigenous communities and all subsequent responses. Implementation procedures largely surround the approval of a community’s claim to a plot of ancestral land, but

CONADI is often unable to purchase the full quantity of land in one year. Subsequent purchases, then, are necessary to finalize negotiations with a particular landowner or purchasing other plots of land to return the full number of claimed hectares to the community. Because there are few procedures regulating these subsequent purchases, I expect that these subsequent purchases are more likely to be more influenced by outside actors, including both indigenous communities and forestry companies, as is discussed in detail below.

Underlying each of these alternative hypotheses is the assumption that the government is motivated to maintain stability and governance in the region. This can be accomplished by responding to contentious action, maintaining transparent implementation procedures, and preserving economic investments and productivity in the region. The specific means of doing so, however, is conditioned by the degree of institutionalization, captured in this case by the distinction between the first and subsequent purchases.

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Dependent Variable

To test these hypotheses, this analysis examines the implementation patterns of

Chile’s main indigenous land policy, Article 20B of the 1993 Indigenous Law. As discussed in previous chapters, land demands are one of the most salient demands of the

Mapuche community. Because Article 20B is one of few paths through which Mapuche communities are able to acquire ancestrally claimed land, mobilization often targets the policy, making it an appropriate means of studying when, why, and how a government would respond to contentious action through policy. Of nearly 3000 Mapuche indigenous communities, what explains why 266 have received land through article 20B?

I use survival analysis of an original time-series cross-sectional dataset to explore the likelihood that a Mapuche community receives a land purchase is a particular year.

Data on which communities receive land in which years is publicly available through the

CONADI website and was restructured as discrete time duration data to capture if each of the 266 communities received a land purchase in each year (1994 to 2013, 5,320 total observations).

The dataset includes all of the Mapuche communities in the Araucanía and Bío

Bío regions of Chile that received a land purchase between 1994 and 2013. As discussed above, some communities received multiple purchases over the twenty years; of the 266 communities included in the dataset, 195 received a land transfer in one of the 20 years under analysis, 50 communities received purchases in 2 years, 17 communities in three of the years, and 4 communities in four years. Some communities received multiple purchases in a particular year; these are collapsed into one year. Figure 13 and Table 1 summarizes these purchases.

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FIGURE 13: CONADI Land Purchases

Total Investment per Community Article 20B $6m

$4m

$2m

Total Investment

USD, 2008 constant

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year Source: CONADI. Each dot represents a land purchase in the Araucania or BioBio Region

Table 1: Summary of 20B (1994-2013) 380 total purchases for 266 communities Total Average Hectares 105,679 231 Investment (USD $303m $798,000 2008) Price per Hectare $2,869 Families 11,525 30 It is important to note that this analysis only includes the 266 communities that

received a land purchase between 1994 and 2013. Unfortunately, there is no data

available on communities still working through the process, those which qualify but have

not applied, or those which have been rejected, limiting the potential to construct a

dataset that would include the communities that have yet to receive a land purchase (right

censored observations). Survival analysis avoids many of the complications arising from

these limitations; the dependent variable is the time until the event, introducing variation

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on the dependent variable. Chapter 6 conducts case studies of 8 Mapuche communities who are at various stages of the policy process to explore if the argument travels to communities have yet to receive a land purchase.

Key Independent Variables

The first key independent variable under analysis is contentious action, defined to include the broad range of violent and nonviolent political action that falls outside of institutionalized forms of political participation.349 Direct action is a common and consequential repertoire of contention for indigenous communities in Latin America, most commonly in the form of social protest or armed rebellion.350 Authors causally link direct action with indigenous movements’ effectiveness, particularly when utilized in conjunction with negotiations. Particularly surrounding the 500 years “of something” in

1992, prominent marches pushed indigenous demands onto national political agendas throughout the region. One observer described the 1990 levantamiento in Ecuador as

“…the first time in Ecuadorian history that an indigenous movement forced the government to enter into serious dialogue about national politics.”351 Direct action continued to be a prominent strategy as indigenous movements moved on national political scenes and shifted from the “politics of influence” to the “politics of power.”352

349 Contentious action is a broad category of “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interest, in which governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties,” including research on protest, social movements, insurgency, political violence, and rebellion. Charles Tilly, Contentious Performances (Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 2008), 5. 350 Guillermo Trejo, "Religious Competition and Ethnic Mobilization in Latin America: Why the Catholic Church Promotes Indigenous Movements in Mexico," American Political Science Review 103, no. 03 (2009). 351 Rice, The New Politics of Protest: Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America's Neoliberal Era, 56. 352 Nancy Grey Postero and Leon Zamosc, "The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America," Journal of Latin American Anthropology 11, no. 1 (2006). Importantly, indigenous mobilization does not necessarily invoke ethnic claims; Trejo defines indigenous ethnic mobilization as “a process of social contestation against state authorities under taken by indigenous populations, in which ethnic claims become the critical demand.” Trejo, "Religious Competition and Ethnic Mobilization in Latin America: Why the Catholic Church Promotes Indigenous Movements in Mexico."

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This is also true of the Mapuche indigenous community, as outlined in Chapter 3.

Frustrated by the lack of institutional responsiveness to Mapuche demands, communities turned to extra-institutional strategies to prompt institutional responses. A prominent observer concluded, “… Mapuche communities and organizations see mobilization and direct land takeovers as the way to force the State to expand their land..."353 While there are certainly Mapuche activists, communities and organizations that call for more radical paths, this policy is often instrumentally utilized as a means of reconstructing and exercising autonomy over Mapuche territory. This takes the form of arson attacks on forestry company plantations, machinery, landowners’ homes, tourism cabins; land takeovers; road blocks; hunger strikes; marches; and confrontations with police.354

I coded contentious action in two ways, in order to test two hypotheses about the impact of contentious action. To test the hypothesis that the policy is implemented in response to the threat posed by contentious action (HA1), I created a variable that captures the perceived intensity of each community’s engagement with the government. This variable is coded as the number of times the community’s name appeared in El Mercurio between 1994 and 2013, fixed over the 20 years. El Mercurio is Chile’s largest and oldest national newspaper, with a reputation of having well-established ties to the right; El

Mercurio’s owner collaborated with the CIA to destabilize the Allende administration, and supported the Pinochet dictatorship and structural adjustment program.355 A

353 Mella Seguel, Los Mapuche ante la justicia la criminalización de la protesta indígena en Chile, 135-6. 354 Aylwin Oyarzún, "Los conflictos en el territorio Mapuche: Antecedentes y perspectivas," 278. Pairicán and Álvarez, "La nueva guerra de Arauco: La Coordinadora Arauco Malleco en el Chile de la Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (1997-2009)," 67. Richards and Gardner, "Still Seeking Recognition: Mapuche Demands, State Violence, and Discrimination in Democratic Chile," 262. 355 See Tomás Moulian, Chile actual: Anatomía de un mito (Lom ediciones, 2002). Maria Olivia Monkeberg, Los magnates de la prensa: Concentración de los medios de comunicación en Chile (Penguin Random House, Grupo Editorial Chile, 2011). Patricio Navia, Rodrigo Osorio, and Francisca Valenzuela, "Sesgo político en las lunas de miel presidenciales: El Mercurio y La Tercera, 1994–2010,"

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prominent Mapuche historian summarized El Mercurio’s reporting as “…predominantly political and in opposition to the fundamental rights of the Mapuche. The newspaper has been important in reconstructing the historical processes that it narrates, sometimes overemphasizing acts of violence. For years, El Mercurio has essentially presented a vision of violent, non-rational subjects, inherited from the 19th century.”356 This variable takes advantage of biases in El Mercurio’s reporting to capture relative differences in the perceived threat posed by contentious action between different communities, from the perspective of a national, conservative newspaper.357 If this variable has a statistically significant and positive effect on policy implementation, the result supports the null hypothesis that government responds proportionately to threat posed by contentious action. I expect that this variable will not be statistically significant, as democratic governments must mediate threat with a number of competing interests.

To test the argument that contentious action serves as an important source of leverage for Mapuche communities (HA2), I created a second variable that more broadly captures local, nonviolent instances of contentious action using protest event analysis.

Protest event analysis, one of the most prominent methods in social movement research,358 conceptualizes a social movement as a collection of events, defined as

Intermedios. Medios de comunicación y democracia en Chile. Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales: Santiago (2013), Patricio Navia and Rodrigo Osorio, "El Mercurio Lies, and La Tercera Lies More. Political Bias in Newspaper Headlines in Chile, 1994–2010," Bulletin of Latin American Research (2015). Ken Dermota, Chile inédito: El periodismo bajo democracia (Santiago: Ediciones B, 2002). 356 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 28. 357 Jennifer Earl et al., "The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action," Annual Review of Sociology (2004). 358 Pamela E Oliver, Jorge Cadena-Roa, and Kelley D Strawn, "Emerging Trends in the Study of Protest and Social Movements," Research in Political Sociology 12, no. 1 (2003). See review articles by John T Crist and John D McCarthy, "'If I Had a Hammer': The Changing Methodological Repertoire of Collective Behavior and Social Movements Research," Mobilization: An International Quarterly 1, no. 1 (1996). Dieter Rucht and Friedhelm Neidhardt, "Methodological Issues in Collecting Protest Event Data: Units of Analysis, Sources and Sampling, Coding Problems," Acts of Dissent. New Developments in the

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“nonroutine, collective, and public acts that involve claims on behalf of a larger collective.”359 Content analysis, usually of newspaper reports, translates “words to numbers” to capture characteristics of the event.360 I relied on several news sources to document the presence of contentious action for each of the 266 communities under analysis for each of the 20 years (1994-2013). To address potential biases in reporting, I triangulated between multiple sources to capture a more nuanced, detailed, and complete record of the instances of contentious action in each community.361 In addition to reporting in El Mercurio as described above, I also relied on a number of local websites and blogs to capture less violent, local instances of contentious action. Most prominently,

I used the new stories available at http://paismapuche.org/ and http://mapuexpress.org/, both of which publicize indigenous communities’ demands and actions that would normally not appear in national press. With all three sources, I used a half-automated selection strategy, searching the website’s online search engine for the name of the indigenous community and reviewing each of the results to eliminate results that were not instances of contentious action.362 Table 3 in the Appendix documents news stories for

Study of Protest, Maryland, Rowman/Littlefield Publisher (1999). Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg, Methods of Social Movement Research, vol. 16 (University of Minnesota Press, 2002). 359 See Jeffrey Paige, Agrarian Revolution (New York: Free Press, 1975). Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution. Susan Olzak, "Analysis of Events in the Study of Collective Action," Annual Review of Sociology (1989). While PEA traditionally focuses on observing a ‘protest event,’ more recent research has expanded to capture a broader set of activities including ‘political claims’ or ‘core sentences’ or ‘semantic triplets’ or ‘ideal-typical claim,’ because as Rucht et al 1998 summarized, “unlike other forms of social and political activities, eg electoral behavior, protest is by its very nature a very complex phenomenon.” Swen Hutter, "Protest Event Analysis and Its Offspring," in Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research, ed. Donatella Della Porta (Oxford University Press, 2014), 343. 360 ———, "Protest Event Analysis and Its Offspring." Roberto Franzosi, From Words to Numbers: Narrative, Data, and Social Science, vol. 22 (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 361 Beissinger suggests using multiple sources in politically unstable environments. Mark R Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 362 Kriesi, New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Bruno Wueest, Klaus Rothenhäusler, and Swen Hutter, "Using Computational Linguistics to Enhance Protest Event Analysis," Available at SSRN 2286769 (2013).

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one community from 1994 to 2013. 67 out of 266 communities included in this analysis used contentious action at some point over the analysis period; the first transfer to a community that had previously engaged in contentious action was processed in 1998.

Figure 14 below shows the count of the instances of contentious action per year over the twenty years of analysis. This documentation of the events was transformed into a count of the number of years since 1994 in which a community has engaged in contentious action.

FIGURE 14

I expect this broad measure of contentious action to have a curvilinear impact on a community’s likelihood of receiving a land purchase, shifting depending on which land purchase the community is pursuing. Specifically, I expect contentious action to have no or very limited impact on the likelihood of first land purchases, but to increase the likelihood of subsequent purchases. Because the first purchases are governed by a significant number of regulations and procedures, a positive effect of contentious action would suggest disregard for these procedures. After a community’s land claim has been

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approved and the first land purchase processed, however, many of these procedures and regulations drop away, increasingly the likelihood that contentious action could increase the likelihood of a purchase.

While protest event analysis of newspaper accounts is a common method of studying contentious action, it is important to note potential biases that stem from collection strategies, characteristics of the news agency (space limitations, reporting norms, and editorial concerns), and characteristics of the issue and the event.363 I address these concerns in several ways. First, I collected the entire population of events for each community under analysis from 1994 to 2013, rather than making decisions about how to sample from newspapers.364 Second, I used news reports to capture the “hard news” (the when, what, where, and why details of an event), which research has found to be relatively unbiased in comparison to “soft news” that is based on journalists’ perceptions of the event.365 Finally, I took advantage of the biases of various sources. To capture

363 There are a number of reviews of research using newspaper event data, including Roberto Franzosi, "The Press as a Source of Socio-Historical Data: Issues in the Methodology of Data Collection from Newspapers," Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History 20, no. 1 (1987). Olzak, "Analysis of Events in the Study of Collective Action." Earl et al., "The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action." Rucht and Neidhardt, "Methodological Issues in Collecting Protest Event Data: Units of Analysis, Sources and Sampling, Coding Problems." Ruud Koopmans and Dieter Rucht, "Protest Event Analysis," Methods of Social Movement Research 16 (2002). Specifically, scholars have argued that some events are considered to be more “newsworthy,” based on the location, size, intensity, violence, and/or presence of opposition. See, among others, José Barranco and Dominique Wisler, "Validity and Systematicity of Newspaper Data in Event Analysis," European Sociological Review 15, no. 3 (1999). Peter Hocke, Determining the Selection Bias in Local and National Newspaper Reports on Protest Events (WZB, 1996). John D McCarthy, Clark McPhail, and Jackie Smith, "Images of Protest: Dimensions of Selection Bias in Media Coverage of Washington Demonstrations, 1982 and 1991," American sociological review (1996). Pamela E Oliver and Daniel J Myers, "How Events Enter the Public Sphere: Conflict, Location, and Sponsorship in Local Newspaper Coverage of Public Events 1," American Journal of Sociology 105, no. 1 (1999). Pamela E Oliver and Gregory M Maney, "Political Processes and Local Newspaper Coverage of Protest Events: From Selection Bias to Triadic Interactions1," American Journal of Sociology 106, no. 2 (2000). Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction (John Wiley & Sons, 2009). 364 Earl et al., "The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action." Doug McAdam and Yang Su, "The War at Home: Antiwar Protests and Congressional Voting, 1965 to 1973," American Sociological Review (2002). 365 Earl et al., "The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action."

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instances of contentious action, I relied on multiple sources; to capture the perceived intensity of the contentious action, I relied on reporting by el Mercurio.366

Furthermore, several problems arise specific to the news reporting on instances of contentious action in Mapuche communities. First, news reports often attribute instances of contentious action to a homogenous, violent Mapuche movement, making it challenging to attribute specific events to specific groups. While there is certainly part of the movement willing and able to use more radical strategies (the “via rupturista a la autodeterminación,” disruptive path towards self-determination, or the “movimiento

Mapuche de resistencia,” Mapuche resistance movement367), the vast majority of the movement is nonviolent.368 Only an estimated 2.4% of communities partake these more radical forms of protest, yet headlines document “Alert in Arauco, Fearing Wave of

Mapuche Violence,” “The Mapuche Intifada : The Indigenous Uprising Worsens,”

“Mapuches Threaten” and “Indigenous Communities on the War Path.”369 Much of this reporting is a representation of the Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM, Arauco

Malleco Coordinating Committee), the most publicized and radical portion of the

Mapuche movement. Formed in 1997, the organization strives to increase consciousness of the reality of Mapuche life to the end of increasing combativeness, expressed primarily

366 Davenport’s 2009 study on the Black Panther Party intentionally relied on sources with particular biases. Christian Davenport, Media Bias, Perspective, and State Repression: The Black Panther Party (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 367 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 23. 368 This portion of the Mapuche movement is frequently contrasted with a portion of the movement that pursues the same goals through political means, mobilizing within institutionalized paths to create spaces of autonomy (through municipal and congressional elections, pushing for the promulgation of ILO 169 and constitutional reforms). Ibid. The most notable expression of this strategy is the Wallmapuwen political party, pursuing decentralization of the regional government in the short term to the end of creating an autonomous region. 369 Richards, "Of Indians and Terrorists : How the State and Local Elites Construct the Mapuche in Neoliberal Multicultural Chile," 75.

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through illegal land occupations, acts of arson on state and corporate properties, and violent encounters with state police. They pride themselves in its visible opposition to the

Chilean state, going as far as declaring war on Chile in October of 2009.370 Many authors and activists elaborate that this representation constructs the Mapuche movement as unitary and violent;371 Pairican describes that “by drawing the subaltern as an aggressive oddball who is creating an unexplained and unilateral conflict, public opinion- and often the colonized subject themselves- has the repulsive image that the Mapuche movement is the mad, primitive, criminal, and terrorist enemy of the rule of law, social peace, civilization, and progress.”372 The two operationalizations of contentious action described above respond to these complications; one variable draws exclusively on reporting by El

Mercurio to capture these perceptions of contentious action from a national, conservative point of view. A separate variable draws on a broader range of sources to avoid focusing exclusively on the more radical and violent instances of contentious action.

Beyond this representation of the Mapuche movement in the news, it is uncertain if some of the more violent events can even be accurately attributed to Mapuche individuals, communities, or organizations. In several cases against Mapuche activists, the state was unable to substantiate its charges. Most problematically, in 2014 a Mapuche activist revealed that he had acted as an undercover agent since 2009. Raul Castro

Antipan was active in the Mapuche movement and became close with CAM in 2007, but

370 “Prorroga de la Ley 26.160,” Instantáneas del origen: Pueblos originarios siglo XXI, November 23, 2009, http://instantaneasdelorigen.blogspot.com/search/label/mapuches; “Página oficial de la Coordinadora de Comunidades Mapuche en Conflicto Arauco- Malleco,” http://www.weftun.cjb.net/. 371 The “Mapuche movement” is often referred to as if it were a unitary actor. See, for example, Haughney (2006), Boccara (2002) and (2006). Several authors do deconstruct this image; see, for example, Terwindt (2009) and Saavedra (2002). Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 28. 372 Ibid., 16.

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was recruited as a secret informant for the DIPOLCAR (Dirección de Inteligencia

Policial de Carabineros, Police Intelligence Service) in exchange for leniency on charges of the possession of marijuana and the misappropriation of war material related to his military service. Tasked with infiltrating and disarticulating Mapuche activist groups,

Castro admitted to carrying out four arson attacks with other Mapuche activists, including the 2009 Tur Bus and Peaje Quino cases (see Chapter 5 for further discussion). Castro also revealed that he informed DIPOLCAR of activists’ plans for the TurBus attack the day before. His anonymous testimony was used in more than 30 trials of Mapuche activists, resulting in the incarceration of 14 since 2009. This testimony was released during the trial of two indigenous activists accused of involvement with the 2009 attacks and, despite being minors at the time of the attacks, were being detained under Chile’s controversial anti-terrorism legislation.373 Courts threw out the cases based on Castro’s testimony, including that of Rodrigo Melinao, found shot dead in August 2013. As of

2014, responsibility for his death has been yet be determined, but his community and family places responsibility on the police. His younger brother sought diplomatic protection in Venezuela, reporting his life was repeatedly threatened by paramilitaries and police.374 Pedro Cayuqueo, a prominent Mapuche journalist concluded, “We have a clear violation of due process, a type of Olympic gymnastics by the prosecutors to twist the law and use it to secure convictions against leaders who, in many cases, have no

373 Joel Keep, "Terror Case Collapses as ‘Activist’ Witness Admits Being Informant," The Santiago Times, http://santiagotimes.cl/terror-case-collapses-activist-witness-admits-informant/. Oriana Miranda, "Quién es y cómo cctuó Raúl Castro Antipán, El “terrorista Mapuche” infiltrado por carabineros," DiarioUChile, 13 February 2014 2014. 374 "Exclusivo: Hermano de Mapuche Rodrigo Melinao pide asilo a Venezuela tras recibir amenazas de muerte ", Verdad Ahora, http://verdadahora.cl/exclusivo_hermano_de_mapuche_rodrigo_melinao_pide_asilo_a_venezuela_tras_r ecibir_amenazas_de_muerte.html.

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responsibility in these acts of violence” (emphasis added).375 Leaders from several emblematic Mapuche communities have made allegations of police infiltration, but

Castro’s testimony documented the state’s efforts to infiltrate and provoke conflict from within Mapuche communities and organizations.376

For the purposes of this research, these details highlight the complexity and uncertainty surrounding attributing responsibility for specific events to specific people.

Not only are instances of contentious action attributed to a unitary “Mapuche movement,” but it is unclear if the state is inaccurately attributing blame to Mapuche activists. Acknowledging the potential limitations of these coding strategies, this research responds to these concerns by adopting a broad definition of contentious action, and does not attempt to code the number of participants, type of organization involved, duration of the conflict, or type of conflict, as protest event analysis usually does. These challenges also limit the potential to objectively capture levels of intensity.

Finally, to test the argument that powerful economic stakeholders affect policy implementation, I code for the presence of forestry companies by district (see Figures 6 and 7, in the Chapter 3 Appendix). In ancestral Mapuche territory, forestry companies hold 1.5 million hectares, three times what is held by Mapuche communities. One company alone, Forestal Mininco, holds 350,000 hectares, the majority of which

Mapuche communities claim as ancestral land.377 In the Arauco Province, an estimated

375 ———, "Quién es y cómo actuó Raúl Castro Antipán, el “Terrorista Mapuche” infiltrado por carabineros." 376 Victor Quiepul, lonko of the Temucuicui community and uncle of one of the activists, was detained based on Castro’s testimony. Jorge Molina and Ivonne Toro, "Caso infiltrado: La dura declaración en que Raúl Castro Antipán implica a la Dipolcar en atentados incendiarios," The Clinic, 14 February 2014 2014. 377 Aylwin Oyarzún, "Los conflictos en el territorio Mapuche: Antecedentes y perspectivas," 286.

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60,000 hectares held by forestry companies are in conflict.378 Many Mapuche organizations reference the presence of forestry companies in justifying their mobilization; CAM explained that “the decision to carry out a struggle for territory and autonomy, that is because out of all our lands and private forestry companies who only have our wealth from poverty and oppression ... We propose, first, Mapuche resistance to the capitalist system and oligarchy in our ancestral territory, seen in forestry investments, hydroelectric companies, tourism…”379 Many of the “flashpoints for the sharpest conflict” are concentrated around development projects.380 Because I expect that the government is motivated to respond to preserve stability in the region, I expect land purchases to be more likely in districts with a higher presence of forestry companies.

Often, forestry companies are aware (or suspect) that significant portions of their land could be legitimately claimed by Mapuche communities. Considering that forestry companies hold expansive plots of land with varying land value, I expect that both the government and forestry companies calculate that a quick sale of a small, less productive plot of land preserves the stability of the forestry company’s investment and productivity and prevents neighboring communities from learning of the legitimacy of their claim. I expect that the difference between first and subsequent purchases also applies to the influence of forestry companies, as the policymakers, politicians, and bureaucrats are limited in their ability to prioritize the interests of forestry companies for the first purchases, which are more strictly regulated.

Control Variables

378 Ibid., 286-7. 379 Mella Seguel, Los Mapuche ante la justicia la criminalización de la protesta indígena en Chile, 85. 380 Carruthers and Rodriguez, "Mapuche Protest, Environmental Conflict and Social Movement Linkage in Chile," 8.

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I include several district-level variables to control for political, economic, and social variables. I controlled for the percentage of the population that voted for a right- wing candidate, per congressional election. I control for the percentage of people that self-identify as Mapuche, the percentage of the district that is rural, the concentration of land by district, and included fixed effects for the district. Table 2 in the Appendix includes a full description and the sources of the variables under analysis.

Model Specification

This data is treated as time duration data in order to model the likelihood a community will receive a purchase in a particular year using a conditional gap time, or conditional risk set.381 The stratified Cox model is a semiparametric cox model that does not make an assumption about the shape of the hazard ratio over time. It also directly analyzes repeated events; while conventional event history models drop observations after the first failure, this approach preserves subsequent observations to model multiple failures. Because second and subsequent purchases are likely to be influenced by yet different from the first, treating repeated events as independent would incorrectly estimate standard errors and assume the effects of the covariates to be constant regardless of the event number.382 This model assumes that repeated events affect the variance of the

381 This model was first proposed by Prentice, Williams, and Peterson (1981), and later recommended by Kelly and Lim (2000), Bowman (1996). Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2002) conclude that the conditional risk set model is likely to be most useful for questions of interest to political scientists, measuring time to each event from the time of the previous event, resetting to zero after each failure. Janet M Box-Steffensmeier and Christopher Zorn, "Duration Models for Repeated Events," The Journal of Politics 64, no. 04 (2002). Ross L Prentice, Benjamin J Williams, and Arthur V Peterson, "On the Regression Analysis of Multivariate Failure Time Data," Biometrika 68, no. 2 (1981). Patrick J Kelly and Lynette L‐Y Lim, "Survival Analysis for Recurrent Event Data: An Application to Childhood Infectious Diseases," Statistics in medicine 19, no. 1 (2000). 382 Janet M Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S Jones, Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists (Cambridge University Press, 2004). Mario Cleves, An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using Stata (Stata Press, 2008).

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estimates (rather than biasing the estimates themselves), correcting the variance estimates after model estimation (variance-correction models). Allowing the baseline hazard to vary, the estimates of the covariates vary by strata, or the event a community is likely to receive, allowing for heterogeneity for the different events.383 In this data, the policy was first implemented in 1994, so communities fall in strata one before they have received their first purchase. After receiving a first purchase, communities fall into the second strata, meaning the model estimates the likelihood that a community receives its second purchase. Table 4 shows the number of observations falling into each strata.

Table 4: Event Strata (266 communities over 20 years) Strata Frequency of Events Percent 1 2,980 56.02 2 1,916 36.02 3 328 6.17 4 92 1.73 5 4 0.08 Total 5320 100.00 Note: Strata refers to the event that a communities is next to receive; a community falls in strata 1 before receiving its first purchase, strata 2 after receiving its first purchase and before receiving its second purchase, etc.

Analysis

The results for these various model estimations, reported in Table 5, highlight mixed support of the expectations discussed above. First, there is strong evidence that

383 This adopts many authors’ recommendations against only considering the occurrence of the first event. Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N Katz, and Richard Tucker, "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross- Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable," American Journal of Political Science (1998). Usha Barai and Nick Teoh, "Multiple Statistics for Multiple Events, with Application to Repeated Infections in the Growth Factor Studies," Statistics in Medicine 16, no. 8 (1997). Janet M Box- Steffensmeier, Suzanna De Boef, and Kyle A Joyce, "Event Dependence and Heterogeneity in Duration Models: The Conditional Frailty Model," Political Analysis 15, no. 3 (2007).

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different dynamics drive the first and subsequent purchases. As shown in Model 1, none of the three variables of interest (perceived intensity of conflict, number of instances of contentious action, and presence of forestry companies) are statistically significant when the analysis includes all of the observations, but many become substantively and statistically significant when estimate separate models for separate purchases. This highlights that the impact of particular variables varies dramatically depending on the purchase number, as is discussed below.

I estimate separate models for the first and all subsequent purchases, in order to test the argument that the regulations and procedures governing the first purchases limit the impact of external actors, including indigenous communities and forestry companies.

Because there are very few observations for higher ranked events (Table 4), standard errors are larger for subsequent purchases, making the estimates more unstable and imprecise; Figure 15 in the Appendix separates out the default baseline survivor curve for each event number, highlighting that while there are similar baseline risks across the event numbers, there is limited data for higher ranked events. I collapse events 2-5 into one model, assuming that the government’s first response is distinct from all subsequent responses, as discussed above. Neither the key independent variables nor the full model violate the Cox model’s proportional hazards assumption; I use the efron method to address potential tied durations, in which communities have the same duration

(particularly common as several communities receive land purchases in 2 or more subsequent years). I also include dummy variables for 33 of the 34 districts (comunas) and cluster standard errors by community to account for potential heteroskedasticity.

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Table 5 reports the coefficients from the various model estimations; a positive coefficient increases the likelihood of a purchase. Interpretations in the following section are based on hazard ratios, which facilitate interpretation by translating coefficients into the percentage increase or decrease in the likelihood of a purchase caused by a one unit shift in one variable, all other variables held constant.

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Table 5: Alternate Model Estimations Note: Models that list Strata =1 present the determinants of the first purchase; Strata>1 refers to all subsequent purchases Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6: Model 7: Full Model Strata=1 Strata>1 Strata=1 Strata>1 Strata=1 Strata>1 Perceived Intensity of 0.00132 -0.00772 -0.00353 -0.00127 -0.00825 Conflict (0.00428) (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.00496) (0.00976) # Instances of Conflict -0.00225 -0.229** 0.0976** -0.228** 0.112*** (0.0465) (0.108) (0.0386) (0.109) (0.0383) Number of Families 0.0411*** 0.0363*** 0.0706*** 0.0373*** 0.0693*** 0.0373*** 0.0700*** (0.00311) (0.00304) (0.00881) (0.00297) (0.00867) (0.00300) (0.00903) % Rural 0.0911 0.237 0.299*** 0.234 0.294*** 0.234 0.292*** (0.0906) (0.159) (0.0268) (0.166) (0.0267) (0.166) (0.0272) % Mapuche -0.130*** -0.216*** -1.516*** -0.219*** -1.509*** -0.219*** -1.506*** (0.0424) (0.0814) (0.0257) (0.0845) (0.0257) (0.0846) (0.0257) Vote for the Right -0.00828 -0.00718 -0.0248 -0.0104 -0.0334** -0.0105 -0.0338** (0.00784) (0.00865) (0.0172) (0.00938) (0.0169) (0.00942) (0.0168) % of forestry land in district 0.889 2.200 1.792*** 2.176 1.785*** 2.168 1.784*** (0.858) (1.527) (0.0291) (1.589) (0.0285) (1.591) (0.0291) Land Concentration -0.169 -0.710 3.440*** -0.693 3.411*** -0.689 3.405*** (0.390) (0.676) (0.0203) (0.704) (0.0199) (0.705) (0.0202) Observations 5,320 2,980 2,340 2,980 2,340 2,980 2,340

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Models 2 and 3 test the hypothesis that the government is likely to respond to communities perceived to be more threatening (HA1). The perceived intensity of contentious action in the community does not have a significant impact on the likelihood of a purchase in any of the model estimations. Because this coding of perceptions of the intensity of contentious action captures a national, conservative point of view, the results highlight that the government is not prioritizing land purchases for emblematic communities who are often sensationalized in national press.

This is not to say that contentious action does not matter, however. When the analysis considers a broader measure of contentious action, a count of the number of years a community has engaged in both violent and nonviolent contentious action appearing in local and national press, contentious action has a substantively and statistically significant impact on patterns of policy implementation (Models 4 and 5).

This reiterates that a security-focused consideration of relative levels of threat is not sufficient to understand patterns of policy implementation. Rather, more local, nonviolent instances of contentious action have a more significant impact on policy implementation. Many of these events are only visible at local levels and captured in this analysis because the community publicized their actions in local Mapuche news reports.

The substantive and statistical significance of this broader coding of contentious action highlights that government officials making implementation decisions are aware of and responding to a much broader range of locally publicized, non-violent actions, rather than just those that pose the greatest threat at the national level.

As expected, the specific impact of these more local, nonviolent instances of contentious action shifts dramatically from the first to subsequent purchases. While I

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expected to find that contentious action had no impact on the first purchase, each additional year of contentious action decreases the likelihood of a purchase by 21%. For all subsequent purchases, however, contentious action has the expected effect, with each additional year of contentious action increases the likelihood of a purchase by 10%. Once the government is aware of the community, has approved their land claim, and has responded once, the continuation of contentious action facilitates subsequent purchases.

From the perspective of Mapuche communities, these results highlight that local, nonviolent instances of contentious action can influence implementation decisions, depending on the procedures and regulations that govern the policy’s implementation.

There is also evidence that forestry companies exercise leverage over implementation procedures, particularly after the first purchase. The presence of forestry companies in a particular district does not have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood that the government purchases the first plot of land for a particular community in any of the models that estimate the first purchase (Models 2, 4, 6). But, the presence of forestry companies has a substantively and statistically significant impact on all subsequent purchases. By prioritizing regions with a greater presence of forestry companies, the government appears to be motivated to demobilize the threat posed to these economic interests by purchasing small portions of the company’s land to appease a

Mapuche community. Particularly for subsequent purchases that are governed by fewer implementation procedures, CONADI favors districts with a greater presence of forestry companies.

The shifting impact of control variables further highlights that different dynamics drive the first and subsequent purchases. District-level variables become much more

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consequential after the first land purchase. For the first purchase, only the percentage of the population identifying as Mapuche and the percentage of the population that voted for the right are statistically significant; the higher percentage Mapuche in a particular district, the less likely a purchase and the higher percentage support for the right, the less likely a purchase. For the second purchase, district level variables are much more substantively significant. The higher the percentage of the population that identifies as

Mapuche remains negative and statistically significant. The higher the percentage of the population that is rural in the region, the less likely a purchase. The percentage of land in plots of land smaller than 10 hectares has an extremely strong, positive effect on the likelihood of a purchase. These district-level variables suggest that, for the second land purchase, the government able to be much more strategic in its considerations of what land is involved.

Conclusions

This chapter explores if and how the Chilean government has responded to contentious action through public policy. Drawing on within-case variation in the implementation of Chile’s indigenous land policy, this analysis finds that external actors, including indigenous communities and forestry companies, have influenced patterns of policy implementation. This analysis presents some unexpected and nuanced ways in which leverage works through institutionalized policy procedures. Perhaps most prominently, there is a significant difference between the determinants of the first and second purchases. Indigenous communities and forestry companies exert limited leverage over the first land purchase, arguably because implementation procedures are more strictly defined and regulated. Subsequent purchases have fewer institutionalized

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procedures and oversight, suggesting the government’s motivation to protect economic interests in particular districts. This shift between first and subsequent purchases highlights that there is the motivation, space and precedent for external actors to drive policy implementation, but that institutionalized policy procedures temper the potential for that effect.

This analysis provides important new insight into the dynamics driving how governments respond to contentious action through public policy. Implementation procedures are not necessarily neutral, but rather dynamically adapted to both respond to contentious action and protect economic interests, particularly when implementation procedures are less institutionalized. This suggests that the government is aware of and responding to local, nonviolent instances of contentious action, as well as to regional economic interests; the national-level perception of the intensity of contentious action in particular communities has little impact on policy implementation, in contrast to frequently made allegations that the government prioritizes particular emblematic communities. These results suggest that clarifying and overseeing policy implementation procedures can limit the impact of external actors, underlying incentives remain.

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Chapter 6 Land for Peace: Processing Contentious Action through Public Policy

The previous chapter argued that when a government responds to contentious action through public policy, the response is not proportional to the threat posed by contentious action. Yet, contentious action still serves as a point of leverage for indigenous communities, particularly when implementation procedures are less institutionalized, as highlighted by the significant difference between first versus subsequent land purchases. This chapter explores if effect persists over time, exploring how and why four presidential administrations responded to contentious action.

This chapter highlights that, across four presidential administrations spanning the political spectrum, the Chilean government is motivated to use public policy to demobilize indigenous mobilization. Land policy, in addition to well-documented militarization and criminalization of Mapuche protest, is a key component of the Chilean government’s effort to demobilize contentious action. While the central government’s motivation to use land policy to demobilize threat persists over the twenty years under analysis, its ability to do so becomes constrained over time as politicians confront increasingly institutionalized procedures; this institutionalization is the result of

CONADI shielding itself from blame for the escalation of Mapuche mobilization.

Clarifying and strengthening these implementation procedures shifts how the government uses the policy. Initially, the new and under-regulated office broadly interpreted its responsibility to respond to Mapuche demands, using the land policy to respond directly to mobilization pressure. Blamed for the escalation of Mapuche mobilization in the late

1990s and early 2000s despite being insufficiently funded, however, CONADI gradually

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shielded itself by institutionalizing implementation procedures, requiring the intervention of higher-level policymakers and politicians who could push the case through. This fundamental tension between political interests and institutionalization has yet to be resolved; politicians’ efforts to accomplish both undermine the significance of the rights recognitions.

Based on qualitative analysis of policy implementation, this chapter documents when, how, and why successive presidential administrations responded to contentious action. For each of the five administrations, this chapter explores administrations’ use of these policy implementation strategies as one of many ways of responding to contentious action. The chapter concludes by discussing the broader significance of these patterns, reiterating the need to explicitly consider ways in which public policy implementation affects social movement-state relations.

1990-1994: Aylwin

While the land policy under analysis was not implemented under the Aylwin administration, his administration sets a key precedent for the future of indigenous policy and indigenous-state relations. Aylwin came to office after Pinochet lost the 1998 plebiscite over the continuation of his presidency. The resulting 1989 elections were contested between the center/ center-left Concertación coalition (Coalition of Parties for

Democracy, including the Christian Democrats, PDC, Socialist Party, PS, the Party for

Democracy, PPD, and the Radical Social Democratic Party, PRSD)384 and the right-wing

Alianza (Alliance for Chile) coalition, comprised of the National Renewal Party (RN) and

384 Some authors refer to the Concertación as a right of center coalition. (Fernandez, Vera 2012). Importantly, the Socialist Party cemented its ties with the center left, breaking its Unidad Popular alliance with the Communist Party.

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the Independent Democratic Union (UDI), and some more extreme rightwing groups, including Homeland and Liberty (Patria y Libertad).

Indigenous demands had been incorporated into the Concertación’s “No

Campaign” against the continuation of Pinochet’s term in the late 1980s. After significant

Mapuche mobilization, Mapuche leadership and future president Patricio Aylwin signed the Acuerdo de Nueva Imperial in 1989, agreeing to address territorial land disputes, constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples, and the adoption of ILO 169 if elected.

Many authors note that despite this agreement, the administration’s commitment to indigenous demands was tenuous, at best. One author outlines that the Acuerdo de Nueva

Imperial emerged largely due to several key connections between indigenous leadership and the Comision Chilena de Derechos Humanos de Temuco.385 Further indicative was that some prominent Mapuche leadership refused to participate in the agreement. Some authors go as far as suggesting a more malicious intent behind the agreement, in that it required “Indigenous peoples, specifically the Mapuche people, had to commit to channel their demands through institutional paths, forgoing using land recoveries as an instrument of political pressure."386

Once elected, President Aylwin created the Special Commission for Indigenous

Peoples (Comisión Especial de los Pueblos Indígenas, CEPI) to create a law project.387

The commission was comprised of ten indigenous representatives, ten government representatives, and a three person directorate dominated by the government; this

385 Vergara, Foerster, and Gundermann, "Más acá de la legalidad. La CONADI, la Ley Indígena y el pueblo Mapuche (1989-2004)," 8. 386 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 64. 387 Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State."

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structure set a strong precedent and expectation of future indigenous-state relations.388

Approximately 100,000 indigenous peoples indirectly participated in the legislation project lead by CEPI; 2,800 community assemblies elected 3000 representatives to attend one of fifteen Provincial Congresses held throughout 1990.389 Each of the Provincial

Congresses elected 10 delegates to attend the culminating National Congress of

Indigenous Peoples in 1990.

Despite broad participation, the indigenous movement’s ability to acquire indigenous rights was constrained by the choice to engage with the state through this institutional path. For example, land and territorial demands were one of the principal topics of debate and the mobilization and resulting CEPI project sought to end the land divisions initiated by Pinochet and defend indigenous lands, as documented by títulos de merced. As a result, land acquisition would be based on well-documented, historic documents rather than historically occupied land; while defensive, the strategy was the minimum to be able to survive.390 A more ambitious project pursuing territorial rights as understood by the Mapuche community was not possible considering the political climate during the return to democracy; as one member of the CEPI project stated, “At the time, no one expected to recover lands. That would be absurd.”391 Indeed, the bill introduced to parliament in December 1990 was modified seven times before being passed in 1993, largely due to the influence of the Right in congress.392

388 ibid. 389 “Historia de la Ley 19.253,” 1993, 4, 66. 390 Ibid. 391 Personal interview 12 October 2012. 392 Interview 12 October 2012.

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Despite these limitations of the bill, CONADI was created in 1993 by Indigenous

Law 19.253 and tasked with “…promoting, coordinating, and executing, as the case may be, State actions in favor of integral development of indigenous persons and communities, specially, in relation to economic, social, and cultural aspects, and to encourage their involvement in national life.”393 For the first time in Chilean history, one office was tasked with responding to indigenous demands through coordinated policy programs. Furthermore, it was also the first time in which indigenous people would elect representatives to a state institution.394 Motivated by the widespread participation and representation of the Nueva Imperial agreement and CEPI project, CONADI’s National

Advisory board is comprised of eight elected indigenous representatives, 8 appointed representatives, and a national director, appointed by the president, who would serve as a tie-breaker.

Most indigenous communities, activists, and organizations saw this participation and representation within the state as a significant victory, understanding CONADI to be a representation of indigenous interests to the state. As one Indigenous Councillor, José

Santos Millao, argued “I will be 100 per cent behind our communities, and I will not give in so easily when the intention [of political participation] is for us to make concessions to the government.”395 Similarly, the first National Director of CONADI situated that:

“CONADI must support an initial process of development, but in the future indigenous groups must decide themselves on their own development. CONADI will also embrace

393 Title VI, Article 38. Indigenous Law 19.253. Government of Chile, Ministry of Planning and Cooperation. 394 Carruthers and Rodriguez, "Mapuche Protest, Environmental Conflict and Social Movement Linkage in Chile," 746. 395 Qtd in Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State."

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the missions of dignifying the original peoples, stimulating their participation, and contributing to tolerance and respect for ethnic differences.”396 One observer summarizes that, “Indeed, leaders and citizens alike adopted a proprietary sense, thinking of CONADI as an institution of their own.” 397

This optimism, however, was short lived as the central government quickly exerted control over the new office. CONADI was located within the powerful Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (Ministerio de Planificación, MIDEPLAN), “…raising additional concerns about its independence and capacity for implementation, particularly for policies that would require cooperation with other ministries.” 398 It is the only agency of the Chilean government whose national office is not in Santiago; the national office of

CONADI is in Temuco, Chile. Subnational offices of CONADI are found in each region.

While activists wanted CONADI to be based in Temuco, national politicians called for

Santiago, preventing CONADI from working on its inauguration date. 399 As one observer summarizes of these tensions, “...this organism was born with a fundamental, paralyzing contradiction. The problem is that the law does not clarify whether this institution represents the State against the Indians or Indians against the State.”400

The initial functioning of CONADI was also limited. In 1994, the director estimated that CONADI would need 14 billion pesos, but was only allocated 3.5 billion, most of which was dedicated to administration, infrastructure, services, technical support,

396 Qtd in ibid. 397 Ibid. 398 Ibid. 399 Ibid. 400 qtd from von Baer 2003: 23. Vergara, Foerster, and Gundermann, "Más acá de la legalidad. La CONADI, la Ley Indígena y el pueblo Mapuche (1989-2004)," 7.

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soil productivity, and education.401 While tasked with responding to land demands,

CONADI was not allocated the appropriate budget or technical capabilities to follow through on this responsibility.

While most of the Aylwin administrations’ indigenous platform was structured by policy implementation through CONADI, the Aylwin government also responded strongly to indigenous mobilization. As some groups, particularly the CTT, became frustrated with the Aylwin government’s limited response to territorial demands, they returned to these extrainstitutional strategies to publicize their demands for territory, self- determination, and autonomy.402 In 1991, the CTT started a wave of land takeovers that lasted 13 days, culminating with leaders traveling to Santiago to inform President Aylwin that the takeovers “were a means of recovering the territory that ‘historically belongs to us.’”403 The government’s response set a strong precedent for future administrations. The

Aylwin government charged 144 protestors under the antiterrorism law created under the

Pinochet regime for their participation in land takeovers404 and, specifically, ‘conspiracy.’

The leader of CTT, Aucan Huilcaman, was jailed for presenting a “threat to society.”405

Furthermore, the government openly discredited the legitimacy of the demands, particularly at the regional level. For example, the intendente Fernando Chuecas objected that the Mapuche people could not be considered “peoples,” as they were not “native” to

401 Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State." 402 Martín Correa et al. "Las razones del illkun/enojo memoria despojo y criminalización en el territorio Mapuche de Malleco." (Place Published: LOM Ediciones : Observatorio de Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas, 2010). 403 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 77. 404 Haughney, Neoliberal Economics, Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in Chile, 72. Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State." 405 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 77.

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Chile, and were “ethnic minorities” organized into family groups.406 The Minister of the

Interior at the time, Enrique Krauss, concluded that the “Mapuche activists were nothing more than a group of common delinquents.”407 It is crucial to note that the land takeovers did not result in the acquisition of any land.408

1994-2000: Frei

1997 is often referenced as a point of departure in indigenous-state relations. 409

Two particular events exacerbated indigenous leaders’ and communities’ frustration towards the state. First, the construction of the Ralco hydroelectric dam required

CONADI approval, as it would require evicting Pehuenche (subgroup of the Mapuche community living in the Andes) communities from recognized ancestral land. To obtain

CONADI approval, the Frei administration removed two national directors of CONADI who would not cast the deciding vote. Huenchulaf, the first director of CONADI, summarized when resigning in 1997:

I became an obstacle to the implementation of a political-economic path that does not take into consideration the damage it can signify to the indigenous population… Those in government who believe that this institution is simply another instrument for the state to accommodate a diversity of interests are wrong… [the president’s intervention] will only provoke an end to the pact between the state and indigenous peoples. 410

In 1998, two government appointees in CONADI switched their vote, aligning with the elected indigenous representatives in opposition to the construction of the dam. Frei

406 Haughney, Neoliberal Economics, Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in Chile, 72. 407 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 77. 408 Qtd in ibid., 80. 409 See, e.g, Carruthers and Rodriguez, "Mapuche Protest, Environmental Conflict and Social Movement Linkage in Chile." Namuncura, Ralco, Represa o pobreza? Tricot, Autonomía: El movimiento Mapuche de resistencia. Pairicán and Álvarez, "La nueva guerra de Arauco: la Coordinadora Arauco Malleco en el Chile de la Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (1997-2009)." 410 Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State."

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immediately replaced them with two representatives who allegedly swore to support the construction of Ralco.411 With the vote once again split between elected indigenous representatives and political appointees, the deciding vote fell to the new National

Director, at the time Domingo Namuncura, a Mapuche politician from Santiago known for his involvement in human rights campaigns during the end of the dictatorship, not his involvement in the Mapuche movement. Frei asked for his resignation when learning he would not support the construction, replacing him with Rodrigo Gonzalez, the first non-

Mapuche National Director; Namuncura noted that he has been the only director of

CONADI whose appointment and resignation was protested by the same group of people.

These interventions by the executive had a significant impact on indigenous- state relations; one observer summarized that “Ralco generated bitter disillusionment.

Revealing vestiges of an enduring, autocratic style of politics, the executive had

‘usurped’ and ‘de-indianized’ ‘our CONADI,’ and reconfigured it as a development agency rather than an entity for indigenous voice.” 412

As it became clear that CONADI would not be a meaningful space through which communities could present and resolve demands, communities increasingly looked to extra-institutional strategies and direct action. As Pairican summarizes, “this megaproject represented a major political defeat for the Mapuche people, which in turn supported the most radical arguments of a section of the movement. The autonomist, utopian portion was strengthened, discursively replacing the 'institutional political strategy’ in the government.”413

411 Ibid. 412 Ibid., 9. 413 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 126.

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The most visible expression of this turn towards extra-institutional strategies occurred in October 1997, when the Mapuche communities Pichiloncoyan and PilinMapu in Lumaco occupied ancestrally claimed land held by the Bosques Arauco forestry company.414 Both communities had submitted paperwork to CONADI, but the lack of government response pushed communities to look for solutions outside of institutional procedures.415 In December 1997, 3 trucks were burnt by a group of Mapuche after hearing a police transmission; while “the burning trucks in Lumaco was not planned or part of a subversive plan. Immediately after, Lumaco was militarized…”416 These initial strategies spread; by September 1998, 473 indigenous families and several forestry companies disputed 15,000 hectares.417 In the late 1990s, much of this shift was associated with two organizations: the established Aukiñ Wallmapu Ngulam or Consejo de Todas las Tierras (CTT) and the emerging Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM).

Mariman argues that these first instances of direct action revealed that, “for the first time since the end of dictatorship, Mapuche desperation erupted in violence; for the second time in one year, the Concertación government ... took the side of Chilean business interests. ...That year triggered a spiral of violence and protests against the state, logging companies and the economic model.”418 One activist summarizes that, “from that point forward, the idea of ‘conflict’ spread; people from indigenous communities were no longer considered ignorant and backward people, but rather active.”419

414 Mariman et al., "¡… Escucha, Winka…," 244. 415 Mella and Correa, 2009. 416 Llaitul and Arrate, Weichan, Conversaciones con un weychafe en la prisión política, 133. 417 Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State," 10. 418 Mella Seguel, Los Mapuche ante la justicia la criminalización de la protesta indígena en Chile, 87. 419 Llaitul and Arrate, Weichan, Conversaciones con un weychafe en la prisión política, 130.

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A prominent observer concluded, “… Mapuche communities and organizations see mobilization and direct land takeovers as the way to force the State to expand their land..."420 Consejo Todas Las Tierras (CTT), arguably the most prominent organization during the late 1990s, participated in a number of highly publicized takeovers of ancestral land. These takeovers were targeted and extremely instrumental; the CTT knew which communities qualified for 20B, helped prepare their paperwork, coordinated mobilization, and informed CONADI of the mobilization.421

This shift in the patterns of Mapuche mobilization was concerning for the central government, resulting in a multifaceted response. It is important to note the broader political context driving how the central government interpreted and responded to this shift in mobilization. The Concertación political coalition showed visible signs of internal divisions (autocomplacientes y autoflagelantes), particularly after parts of the

Concertación sided with the opposition and private interests while pursuing Pinochet’s extradition to Chile after he was arrested in London in 1998. Combined with the economic crisis, these internal splits within the Concertación required the coalition to appease private economic interests, increasingly at the expense of indigenous rights. One of the most powerful organizations in the region, CORMA, argued in 1997 that the actions were “clearly criminal, with characteristics of terrorism," which "could have disastrous consequences for the national development and foreign investment.”422

420 Mella Seguel, Los Mapuche ante la justicia la criminalización de la protesta indígena en Chile, 135-6. 421 Interview with Lautaro Loncon. 422 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La Rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 106.

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More violent instances of mobilization, including land takeovers and road blocks, were largely met with repression with the primary objective of containing Mapuche protest.423 As one author describes of the government’s militarization strategy:

the presence of additional squadrons of police in zones of conflict, police escorts of caravans of logging trucks, police roadblocks to check identity papers, and searches of public transport led both indigenous community members and visitors to complain of a de facto state of siege…. To end land occupations or to conduct searches in Mapuche communities, the police resorted to intimidating and violent search-and seizure operations, using helicopters, busloads of police, guanacos (armored vehicles), and tear gas.424

Crucially, these police strategies meant direct confrontation between the police and

Mapuche community members.425 Indigenous activists strongly criticized the government’s security-focused response to indigenous mobilization, accusing the government of militarizing the region; some activists went into hiding to avoid repression and criminal charges.

Militarization was accompanied by criminalization of Mapuche protest. In 1999, the intendente of the Araucanía region, Oscar Eltit, presented a request for the Ley de

Seguridad Interior del Estado to be applied to the Mapuche communities provoking territorial conflicts with forestry companies.426 One official concluded that the “visible faces within these movements were dealt with solely by the Ministry of Interior, the police, and the judiciary.”427

423 Mella Seguel, Los Mapuche ante la justicia la Criminalización de la protesta indígena en Chile, 173. 424 Haughney, Neoliberal Economics, Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in Chile, 199. 425 Mella Seguel, Los Mapuche ante la justicia la criminalización de la protesta indígena en Chile, 173. 426 Ibid., 89. Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 93. 427 Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State."

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The Frei administration initiated some negotiations with indigenous representatives, conditional on the communities agreeing to stop using extrainstitutional strategies.428 These negotiations were strongly criticized for prioritizing private interests,429 and the government showed no disposition to discuss the broader demands of autonomy and self-determination.430 Furthermore, it is crucial to point out the interconnected nature of the government’s response and the link between strategies of criminalization, repression, and negotiations; one activist strongly challenged these negotiations, accusing the government of negotiating with the wrong people: “What dialogue are we talking about? With whom does the government suppose it is dealing, if the principal grassroots leaders, who have initiated the mobilization, are in jail?”431 While most organizations participated in these negotiations with Quintana (excluding CAM), the CTT and ITL mobilized two months later after the government did not follow through on the agreements.432

More broadly, the Frei government proposed several policy reforms towards the end of his administration. The “Pact for Citizen Respect” was proposed a series of programs that would distribute resources to Mapuche communities over 3 years. Again, the overlapping nature of the government response is evident in the President’s discourse, which was “framed as violation of public order and social peace by small, violent groups that did not represent the majority of the rural Mapuche communities, rather than as a grassroots mobilization by a variety of organizations expressing a widely held sentiment

428 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 115. 429 Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State." 430 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 164. 431 Haughney, Neoliberal Economics, Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in Chile, 205-6. 432 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 164.

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of having suffered wrongs.”433 As Pairican describes of this pact, it “called for discarding violence as an instrument to resolve demands and for creating a ‘fraternal space that we call Chile.’”434

The Frei administration also proposed constitutional reform to recognize indigenous communities, calling for recognition of ethnic diversity within a singular

Chilean nation (rather than the stronger recognition of Chile as a multinational society).435 Many of these proposals would be directed through CONADI. Economic development seemed to be the central government’s preferred response to mobilization and long-term solution to indigenous demands. Through their control of the budget,

MIDEPLAN prioritized these economic development projects over more short-term and controversial policies, most prominently land acquisitions. The entirety of these policies, including both repression and accommodation, had the intentions to, as the Minister of the Interior at the time concluded, “‘deactivate future conflicts and avoid the political exploitation of the Mapuche’s own demands.’”436 Indigenous leaders concluded that the effort was “nothing more than a distortion of the underlying themes” and a “show put on by the government”.437

While the Frei administration preferred addressing the “Mapuche problem” with long-term development plans, it also utilized the land acquisition policy as a means of incentivizing communities and organizations to work through established, institutionalized policies. As Pairican describes, during the final years of the Frei

433 Haughney, Neoliberal Economics, Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in Chile, 208. 434 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 173. 435 Haughney, Neoliberal Economics, Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in Chile, 208. 436 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 155. 437 Ibid., 173.

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administration, he sought to “reposition Coandi as a legal instrument of PPII after its loss of legitimacy after Ralco.” 438 The central government made rhetorical promises that

CONADI had the capabilities to respond to indigenous land demands. “MIDEPLAN

Minister Germán Quintana made regular press announcements to address the crisis, calling for a national consensus on indigenous issues, and assuring the public that

CONADI would have sufficient money to satisfy Mapuche land demands (Diario Austral

1999a).” 439 Importantly, however, the central government formally and informally tasked

CONADI with responding to indigenous territorial demands through the land acquisitions, but preferred other solutions to Mapuche land demands, thus undercutting

CONADI’s capacity to respond.

Facing this convergence of responsibilities with limited resources, CONADI responded to the communities engaging in direct action, funneling their demands through institutional procedures. Miguel Diaz, Director of the FTAI (Fundo de Tierra y Agua

Indígena, the Fund tasked with implementing the land policy) from 1999-2000, describes that:

During the Frei government [1994-2000], the central government intervened in CONADI. It was very worried about the emergence of the indigenous movement…. The Minister of the Interior called us every Monday morning for news of Aucan’s land takeovers with the people of Malleco. On the other side, on the set list of communities [those formally approved by the policy], nothing happened. … We negotiated a lot with communities that were associated with the Consejo Todas las Tierras and bought 7 pieces of land. Generally we used that strategy; when there was sufficient conflict and sufficient legal motivations, we designed, we used a policy that allowed us lower the levels of conflict. Why? The Fund was conceived of as a valve to decompress conflict. If the valve functioned

438 Ibid., 155. 439 Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State."

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poorly, it generated pressure, pressure, pressure. This indicates that we diffused, through purchases, the principle focal points of land conflict.440

Gonzalez, National Director of CONADI from 1998-2000, further described of this strategy:

With communities that opted for direct action, we had a working relationship with them to incentivize their application to the institutional route. … The CTT wanted to pressure, to bend back the hand of CONADI and the ministry. We went to the community itself [rather than the organization] and ask if they wanted to submit papers. Usually, they applied. They used non-violent actions to generate publicity. We could call the leaders. Everyone ended up negotiating with the government.441

It is important to the gap in how the central government and CONADI understood the nature of the land takeovers at the time. From CONADI’s perspective, many of these land takeovers represented communities’ instrumental effort to acquire land. Rodrigo

Gonzalez, National Director of CONADI from 1998-2000, describes that many of these protests were “…land grabs via fax …CTT sent a fax to the media and said ‘We have taken over this land!’ Sometimes I took CONADI’s truck to the plot and no one was there. They had just been there in the morning with a reporter.”442

CONADI was very aware that they were increasingly caught in the center of controversy emerging surrounding indigenous-state relations. CONADI was simultaneously responsible for responding to indigenous demands and, accordingly, responding to indigenous territorial demands, but undercut by having insufficient resources and institutional capacity. CONADI attempted to clarify the processes to avoid controversy. In 1999, CONADI released “Land Policy,” justifying that, “it is very

440 Interview with Miguel Diaz. 441 Interview with Rodrigo Gonzalez. 442 Interview with Ricardo Gonzalez.

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unlikely that current land problems in southern Chile can be solved if it is not possible to work in an environment free of pressure and if there is not a program for land solutions within a span of a few years.”443 The resulting procedures acknowledged that 20B had

“low efficiency in its implementation due to errors and omissions,”444 and sought to clarify implementation procedures “to prevent the price speculation and external interferences in the organization.”445 Social, productive, legal, and anthropological studies would be completed for each community and a number of employees with technical capacities were also hired as part of this institutionalization process.446 The policies developed in this document mark a significant shift in the goals 20B is working to serve. As one CONADI employee expressed, the document develops the “grounds for decisionmaking,”447 making a particular effort to clarify the quantity and cost of land.

The author of the 1999 Land Policy and director of the FTAI suggests similar tension, asserting that, “many indigenous people or indigenous leaders who had constructed small corrupt practices with the land owners rejected the changes. They provoked conflict [to pressure a response from CONADI]…”448

These efforts, however, were fully susceptible to the central government’s prerogatives. Allegations of mismanagement first emerged in 1998. 449 As these tensions expressed themselves, Representative Tuma said in July 1999, “CONADI should become an exclusively statist technical organization that could function in unison with another

443 Ibid. 444 Cooperación, "La política de tierras de la Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena." 445 Ibid. 446 Interview with Miguel Diaz. 447 Interview 14 November 2012. 448 Cooperación, "La política de tierras de la Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena." 449 Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State."

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indigenous entity that would resemble an indigenous parliament. That is the only form of legitimate representation of the demands of these peoples, since its hybrid character today enables the opinions of the government always to take precedence over those of indigenous community representatives.450

By the end of the Frei administration, the shape of state-indigenous relations and, specifically, the nature of government responses to indigenous mobilization, were established. 1997 represented a point of departure not only in indigenous mobilization strategies, but also in the shape of government responses to Mapuche mobilization. From this point forward, the government strategically combined repression, most prominently in the forms of militarization and criminalization, with the strategic implementation of public policy to disarticulate Mapuche mobilization and restructure demands through institutional, piece-meal procedures.

2000-2006: Lagos

These patterns of responding to indigenous demands intensified during the Lagos administration. While the Frei administration openly used both policy and repression to respond to contentious action, the Lagos administration began to clarify specific conditions under which these policy responses were acceptable. While the government hoped to negotiate land for peace as a means of demobilizing contention, it could not ensure that the community would disavow contentious action. As a result, the Lagos administration increasingly worked to hide the reality that the land policy was used to respond to contentious action.

450 Ibid.

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These tensions in the Lagos’ administration’s indigenous politics agenda were previewed during the 1999 presidential campaign. After a tight run-off election against right-wing candidate Joaquín Lavín, Lagos became the first socialist president since

Salvador Allende (1970-1973). His election, however, was uncertain as the Concertación faced internal divisions, a strengthened political opposition, an economic crisis, and concerns about a socialist president. To appease concerns, Lagos presented himself as a

“new Socialist” who would pursue “growth with equity,” similar to other moderate socialists calling for a “Third Way” that simultaneously embraced freemarket economics and redistributive social policy.451

Lagos articulated a similarly paradoxical indigenous policy platform. While campaigning in the south, Lagos worked to appease security concerns, promising to

“respect the rule of law against any threat to property, like the land takeovers carried out by violent groups.”452 Lagos also promised to return 150,000 hectares of land to indigenous communities, prompting concern among agricultural elites of a “new form of agrarian reform.” He also called for eliminating restrictions on the sale of indigenous properties to open up a significant amount of land to the market, raising the number of indigenous representatives in CONADI and constitutionally recognizing indigenous peoples. For Lagos, economic demands were at the root of indigenous demands and mobilization, which could be addressed through effective ‘development with identity’ policies.453 As one observer describes of the 1999 campaign, the Concertación presented a “gesture of openness to the demands of rural Mapuche communities while they

451 Fernandez and Vera, "The Bachelet Presidency and the End of Chile’s Concertacion Era." 452 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 185. 453 Richards, "Of Indians and Terrorists : How the State and Local Elites Construct the Mapuche in Neoliberal Multicultural Chile."

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repressed organizations that challenged capital interests and raised territorial political demands… The Concertación government continued to conceive of the solution to the conflict in terms functional to the major economic interests.”454

These tensions continued after Lagos’ election. One of the cornerstones of his adminstration’s indigenous policy agenda was the Comision de Verdad Historica y Nuevo

Trato (Commission of Historical Truth and New Deal). Led by former President Patricio

Aylwin, the appointed commission was tasked with reviewing Chile’s treatment of indigenous peoples and offering "…a new relationship between Indigenous Peoples,

Chilean society, and the State.”455 The final 2003 report recognizes that:

Both processes-the denial of the existence and identity of indigenous peoples in favor of the formation of a single national identity, and of appropriation of their territory for the consolidation of national territory- although successful in their objective of serving to form the Chilean nation state, had consequences, in some cases disastrous, for indigenous peoples...456

The Commission called for the government to constitutionally recognize indigenous peoples and establish procedures for self-determination.

Without underscoring the importance of rhetorical recognition, the Commission had limited impact. As Jose Llancapan expressed after the report was published, “I’m worried it will have no practical implication. The last word is with the Executive.”457

Indeed, Lagos did not take the Commission’s recommendation to address rights to self- determination, constitutional recognition, territorial rights, or increase indigenous representation. In an interview, Krauss asserted that the Commission was “the effort by

454 Haughney, Neoliberal Economics, Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in Chile, 205, 10. 455 Aylwin Oyarzún, "Los derechos de los pueblos indígenas en Chile," 442. 456 Ibid., 440. 457 Leslie Ray, Language of the Land: The Mapuche in Argentina and Chile, vol. 119 (IWGIA, 2007), 141.

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the government to define a project that incorporates the demands of indigenous groups about recognition, as a kind of “halfway” between national integration and recognition of autonomy and territorial independence.”458 Reynaldo Mariqueo went as far as renaming the effort the “commission of historical truth and a new mistreatment (commission de

Verdad Historica y Nuevo Maltrato)”459

The other cornerstone of Lagos’ indigenous platform was Programa Origenes.

Announced in 2001, the development project promoted community development and entrepreneurship through health, education, community, and development programs, in part funded by a US $140 million load from the Inter-American Development Bank. The program was critiqued for being created without indigenous participation “reproducing classic verticalism.”460 Its slogan, “Mira el future desde tu origen” (Look towards the future from your origins), reinforced that development would resolve Mapuche demands.461 Notably, the program did not allocate money towards land purchases, arguably at the center of Mapuche demands and mobilization. The program was further criticized for how it incorporated a number of indigenous leaders into the program’s management; as one author summarized, “This does not contribute to the strengthening of the indigenous organization concerned and, less still, to the strengthening of the movement. On the contrary, it creates mechanisms of division within the communities

458 Qtd in Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State." 459 In Ray, Language of the Land: The Mapuche in Argentina and Chile, 141. 460 Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State." 461 Richards, "Of Indians and Terrorists : How the State and Local Elites Construct the Mapuche in Neoliberal Multicultural Chile."

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and conflict within the indigenous organizations, particularly if we consider the large remunerations available.”462

Similar to the Frei administration, the Lagos administrations also utilized antiterrorism and internal security laws. While the Frei administration charged Mapuche activists under the Ley de Seguridad Interior del Estado, the Lagos administration began applying the Ley Antiterrorista. Hundreds of activists were charged under this law over the course of his administration, prompting many to conclude that militarization took on a more “permanent and systematic character, whose objective exceeded repression and evictions” (emphasis added).463

The criminalization of Mapuche protest was accompanied by increased militarization of the region; as Mella describes “police presence in communities became permanent, Chilean prisons admitted hundreds of Mapuche, and protest was responded to with criminalization.”464 This strategy became more explicit as the Lagos administration developed Operación Pacienca, a police operation requested by the Ministerio Publico de la Araucanía in December 2002 to destroy the autonomous indigenous movement

(described in further detail in Chapter 4). The operation focused primarily on detaining the activists associated with the attacks on property reported to have been carried out by

CAM since 2000 and constructing them as terrorists, both in public opinion and legally.465

462 Qtd in Ray, Language of the Land: The Mapuche in Argentina and Chile, 140. 463 Mella Seguel, Los Mapuche ante la justicia la criminalización de la protesta indígena en Chile, 173. 464 Ibid., 100. 465 Ibid., 101. Alfredo Seguel, "Crónicas de desencuentros: Gobierno de Ricardo Lagos versus movimiento social Mapuche," http://www.mapuexpress.net/content/publications/print.php?id=282. This prompted a range of responses by Mapuche activists, most visibly in the campaigns of detained Mapuche activists who framed their demands as political prisoners. For further discussion of the range of ways that activists responded to criminalization of protest, see Mella Seguel, Los Mapuche ante la justicia la criminalización de la protesta indígena En Chile, 163.

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The Lagos administration also openly and formally prioritized a strategy of negotiating “social peace for land.”466 During the Frei administration, there was a presumed link between communities that did not accept government negotiations and the escalation of repression and criminalization; the Lagos administrations hoped to provide material incentives to communities willing to abandon contentious action in favor of dialogue and negotiation. As Pairican summarizes, “the government would not permit – and did not want- new mobilization like that which rocked Eduardo Frei in 1999. … it was urgent to reinstate and institutionalize the Mapuche question. The government’s proposal for abandoning mobilization seemed to be a threat, or perhaps a political negotiation, towards the organizations.”467 An explicit condition of these negotiations was that the community would abandon the use of violent mobilization. As activist described, “executive officials, to discourage occupations, argued ‘predio tomado, predio no negociado.’ The [state] organizations were beginning to mark the difference between

‘good and bad Mapuches.’”468

Publically, this “land for peace” policy demanded demobilization; in practice, however, the government strove for demobilization and initiated negotiations with some of the most emblematic organizations and communities. Alejandra Krauss, Minister of

MIDEPLAN during the Lagos administration and daughter of a famous Chilean politician and former Minister, initiated many of these negotiation processes to resolve land demands.469 There are reports of concrete offers to communities associated with

466 Iván Fredes, "El premio del gobierno a los Mapuches rupturistas," El Mercurio 18 June 2002. Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State." 467 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 207. 468 Seguel, "Crónicas de desencuentros: Gobierno de Ricardo Lagos versus movimiento social Mapuche." Predio tomado, predio no negociado refers to the government’s policy that if the community took over a plot of land, the government would not negotiate for that plot of land. 469 Ibid.

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CTT (Fundo Alaska), Asociacion Nankuchew de Lumaco, and, after October 2001, communities in Collipulli.470 Victor Ancalaf, former leader of Coordinadora Arauco-

Malleco (CAM), publicized that he had participated in a number secret negotiations with representatives of the Ministry of the Interior in January 2001 over four plots of land in

Collipulli that had seen repeated arson attacks, occupations, and armed ambushes. The agreement promised an end to violence in return for 1,625 hectares of land for 5 communities, including 262 hectares for his community Choin Lafquenche,471 but he warned that “if the government does not comply with the terms of the agreement, we will break the negotiations and continue with … mobilizations and land occupations.”472

Cecilia Perez, Minister of MIDEPLAN after Krauss, finalized the agreement. Ancalaf also referred to the case of the Ignacio Quiepul community, who reached a signed agreement with the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (MIDEPLAN) after more than

20 violent confrontations on two of the most emblematic and contested plots of land.473

The government hoped that these working tables and negotiations would effectively demobilize more violent and radical organizations and communities. Yet, the government became frustrated as these communities broke the “land for peace” agreements; in the case of the Ignacio Quiepul community, the community was reported to have broken the agreement 14 times with land occupations, arson, damage, and hijacking of a bus, prompting Forestal Mininco to present four complaints to the district court.474 Critiques also emerged from within the government. In October 2001, El

470 Ibid. 471 Fredes, "El premio del gobierno a los Mapuches rupturistas." 472 “Acuerdos secretos con los Mapuche.” El Mercurio, 25 October 2001. 473 Ibid. 474 Fredes, "El premio del gobierno a los Mapuches rupturistas."

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Mercurio reported that anonymous sources within both CONADI and MIDEPLAN, criticized that negotiations were “altering the logic” of the government’s indigenous policy response.475 Frequently, allegations emerged that the government used these agreements to protect economic interests in the region. Jaime Andrade, the appointed government negotiator of the Malleco region in 2001 and later MIDEPLAN Director, negotiated deals with forestry companies to protect operations and with indigenous communities, who would receive land in other regions.476

Ultimately, the government underestimated that radical mobilization strategies were often the expression of more radical demands that could not be fulfilled by the government; land was not sufficient when the organization sought autonomy or self- determination. As Pairican summarized, “Lagos, in his symbolic offensive, had managed to institutionalize the discontent of some of the organizations calling for self- determination, but CAM showed it was willing to continue its national liberation project and more strongly assert their actions.”477

This left the government in the complicated situation of publically calling for land for peace negotiations, while denying that it engaged in unsuccessful negotiations with emblematic communities. Minister Krauss denied that these agreements took place, repeatedly stating that violent Mapuche groups were never favored while she was responsible for CONADI and reiterating the ministry would dialogue with Ancalaf and the communities he represented if they respected the rule of law and abandoned

475 Fernando Rivas and Iván Fredes, "Politica indigena beneficios estatales: Mapuches le doblan la mano al gobierno," El Mercurio 18 October 2001. 476 Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State." 477 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 237.

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violence.478 Yet, there is evidence of several exceptions. MIDEPLAN Subsecretary

Andrade confirmed a number of agreements, referring specifically to negotiations with 5 communities in Collipulli and confirming that Ancalaf participated in the reunions led by

MIDEPLAN and CONADI officials.479 A spokesperson of the Alianza Territorial

Mapuche (ATM, discussed below) said that their organization vaguely knew of these agreements signed in the early 2000s, saying “Ministers reached an agreement with these communities. I am not sure if it is public, but they did it… what is the name of the daughter of Krauss? She came to sign everything with them in Villarica and Traigen. We don’t know the details, but they happened.”480 In January 2002, the Lagos administration officially “closed the doors on the negotiations of ‘land in conflict’”481 and, in March, made it official policy that communities that use violence as a means of pressure would lose everything they gained.482 The newly appointed Coordinator of Indigenous Politics,

Jaime Andrade, backtracked, arguing that the agreements were finalized before President

Lagos formalized the policy in 2002 and that particular cases were exceptions.

As during the Frei administration, CONADI was aware of these tensions with the central government and worked to clarify implementation procedures. Resolution 878,

“Manual for the Application of Procedures for Land Purchases through Article 20 Letter

B of the Land and Water Fund of CONADI,” was introduced in 2003, representing a significant point of departure from previous implementation procedures by establishing four stages of the land purchase process (applicability, feasibility, viability, and

478 Ivan Fredes and Fernando Rivas, "Diálogo con Mapuches: Contradicción en Mideplan," El Mercurio, 26 October 2001. 479 Ibid. 480 Interview with MM. 481 Mella Seguel, Los Mapuche ante la justicia la criminalización de la protesta indígena en Chile, 96. 482 Fredes, "El premio del gobierno a los Mapuches rupturistas."

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completion) to be carried out by specific offices. CONADI would also conduct social, occupational, and judicial/ administrative reports for each community. The social report would include levels of poverty in the community, the number of children and young adults that would soon be requesting land from their parents, prompting CONADI to, ideally, allocate 10 productive hectares of land per family.483

During this period, CONADI officials had differing motivations behind their implementation policies. As one CONADI official described:

Many times we are able to negotiate with communities that are in conflict, establishing what the price of the land will be… But many times, we have direct orders from the president that we must keep the noise down in the most conflictive communities… We understand that our struggle is permanent, we compete with intelligence agencies… we try to take control so that [the conflict] is not addressed with the involvement of police forces.484

Yet, as the policies became more institutionalized, CONADI officials became increasingly frustrated when politicians would force deviations from these procedures.

One director of the FTAI described his departure from office, summarizing that, “Leaders of the social party, landowners, and indigenous leaders called me. A minister of Lagos tried to force me to give priority to one land purchase and I said no. ‘You will have to leave,’ They said. ‘Yes, I’ll leave. No problem.’”485

Many of the CONADI officials tasked with implementing the policy were dismissed, as responsibility for failed negotiations jumped between levels of government.

One National Director of CONADI Edgardo Lienlaf was asked to resign in March 2002 when the Lagos administration formally announced it would not negotiate with

483 Interview 6 November 2012. 484 Rodriguez and Carruthers, "Testing Democracy's Promise: Indigenous Mobilization and the Chilean State." 485 Interview

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communities involved in violence. Lienlaf attributed his resignation to a lack of support from the government; his relationship with MIDEPLAN became strained after he announced that CONADI did not fulfill promises signed by the minister of MIDEPLAN with communities in Lumaco in August 1999.486 Lienlaf was often accused to have prioritized conversations and negotiations with more radical and violent Mapuche communities, particularly those in conflict with forestry companies in Collipulli and

Lumaco. From the perspective of the economic power of the political right, the prioritization of these relationships was inappropriate. Indeed, Lienlaf was censored by the government during his term as the Director of CONADI for denying his links with communities.487 In many ways, his resignation was unsurprising as position was tasked with implementing what the central government was claiming not to do.

The Lagos administration’s response to indigenous mobilization was “through the end of his term, characterized by tension and contradiction.”488 At the start of Lagos’ administration, land for peace negotiations sought to demobilize violence in the region.

Because the administration could not guarantee that communities demobilized, however, the administration was correctly accused of negotiating with violent communities.

CONADI officials were caught between these procedures; sometimes tasked with implementing negotiated agreements and sometimes tasked with implementing policy procedures, officials left and were removed as they did not fall in line with the central government’s policies.

486 "Denuncia nuevas irregularidades en compra de tierras," La Tercera 12 March 2002. 487 "¡Conadi demanda a uno de sus ex directores!," Tiro al Blanco, http://tiroalblanco.cl/index.php?not=14054&do=muestra. 488 Pairican Padilla, Malon: La rebelión del movimiento Mapuche, 1990-2013, 189.

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2006-2010: Bachelet

Lagos left office with a 70% approval rating, facilitating Michelle Bachelet’s election and, for the first time since the return to democracy, a Concertación majority in both houses. Bachelet called for a “citizens’ government” that would incorporate citizens’ demands into policy making. While continuing the focus on indigenous development,

Bachelet’s administration was successful in advancing indigenous rights recognitions, ratifying ILO 169 in 2008.

Bachelet’s initial indigenous politics platform was characterized by distance and centralization. When Parra was appointed National Director of CONADI in November

2006, he asserted that:

While we certainly have to take care of conflicts and seek solutions, the director of CONADI should not mediating between communities or resolving specific conflicts. As a director I shall advise the Minister and all domestic agencies that require it, but the solution to the conflicts do not go through CONADI, but rather through political dialogue established between the government and Mapuche organizations.489

There was little movement on indigenous politics during the first portion of Bachelet’s administration. When Parra resigned in May 2007, indigenous counselors criticized that

CONADI had only used 6% of its budget and failed to buy any land; everything

CONADI had accomplished had been put in place during the Lagos administration.

This dramatically changed in 2008 after a Mapuche activist was shot in the back by a police officer (carabinero) while participating in a land takeover on January 4th,

2008. The Bachelet administration took explicit steps improve the management of indigenous policies, articulated in the ‘Re-Knowing: Social Pact for Multiculturalism’

(Re-Conocer: Pacto Social por la Multiculturalidad). Establishing new priorities for the

489 Pedro Cayuqueo, "Entrevista a Director Nacional de la Conadi " Azkintuwe 18 December 2006.

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second half of her administration, Bachelet justified that “The 1989 Pact between the

State and indigenous has expired, and the public institutions created in 1993 are in crisis.”490 The plan calls for constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples within the

Chilean state, pursuing “the full integration of indigenous peoples, while respecting their differences and particularities, generating cultural changes in all citizens that inhabit our territory.”491 While the plan uses the language of indigenous peoples, inferring recognition of collective rights, the scope of these promises is clearly delimited; these rights recognitions pursue integration into one nation. The policy also prioritizes development, calling for “a new and productive relationship between indigenous peoples, the State, and the rest of the national community.”492

The plan also restructured CONADI. Rodrigo Egaña, an economist and specialist in public management, was appointed Presidential Commissioner for Indigenous Affairs and tasked with improving the management of indigenous policies by coordinating of indigenous policies between various government offices. Marifil was also appointed

Director of CONADI with the explicit task of implementing Re-Conocer;493 one indigenous counselor critiques that he was “…the right arm of the Presidential

Commissioner for Indigenous Affairs Rodrigo Egaña… the new director did not come to prioritize commitments and demands of the communities, but rather to bleach, delay, and divert the objectives in the collective interest of indigenous peoples."494

490 Programa Orígenes, "Re-Conocer. Pacto social por la multiculturalidad," Programa Orígenes, Santiago (2008): 2. 491 Ibid., 18. 492 Ibid., 13. 493 "Álvaro Marifil fue designado Director Nacional de Conadi," El Mercurio 12 June 2008. 494 http://www.laopinon.cl/admin/render/noticia/15828

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Specific to land purchases, Re-conocer created a waiting list to specify which communities would benefit from land purchases. 115 communities were prioritized because their cases were already documented, studied and approved. An additional list of

308 communities included the communities that had submitted their documents, but had yet to be approved. The waiting list changed the way in which contentious action affected decision-making. From the perspective of preserving bureaucratic transparency,

Re-conocer was largely successful. One director of the FTAI described, “After Re- conocer, people understood. We didn’t process anything for anyone because the procedures did that. The district attorney was always on top of us. That was part of my agenda and, to me, it seemed healthy. … there was a level of annoyance because things couldn’t be invented.” 495

Despite this transparency, there was still evidence of exceptions. When asked how mobilization and political pressure affected decision-making, Egaña responded:

CONADI did not acquire one plot of land that was not part of the 115. That is, apart from 8 to 10 compromises the council of CONADI had pending. Other communities negotiated plots of land in conflict. But, the vast majority were part of the list of 115 (emphasis added).496

These exceptions came from high-level officials. At the end of the Bachelet administration in 2009, political pressure overwhelmed the policy’s capacity. Numerous communities, some organized with ATM and most on the list of 115, mobilized and participated in a number of visible land takeovers and confrontations with police. The yearly budget for land purchases was already spent and the government faced unwelcome

495 Interview with Richard Mansilla. 496 Interview with Rodrigo Egaña.

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criticism during a campaign year for not meeting its predictions, particularly problematic considering Bachelet’s emphasis on indigenous politics.

To address this mobilization during the presidential campaign in 2009, Bachelet further prioritized indigenous politics by appointing José Antonio Viera-Gallo, Minister

Secretary General of the Presidency (SEGPRES) since 2007, the Coordinating Minister of Indigenous Affairs. SEGPRES is the cabinet-level administrative office, with the

Minister of SEGPRES serving an advisory role equivalent to the president’s Chief of

Staff in the United States; the appointment of a high level official represented both the

Bachelet government’s commitment and preoccupation over the mobilization. In

September 2009, his first move was to restructure CONADI, removing 14 employees, including the Director of the FTAI, in response to allegations of irregularities in the land policy and to send “a very clear signal of the will to bring order to these instruments of the state.”497 In October 2009, Viera Gallo announced that a land bank would “prevent speculation, making purchases more transparent to avoid any suspicion of corruption,”498 removing the link between landowners and communities. All of these reforms confronted allegations that the land policy was the Concertación’s “petty cash” and “remnant of political clientelism.”499 Viera Gallo also reiterated that “If on trial, the corresponding portions of land will remain pending. If they are declared innocent, they shall have access to their fair share. If convicted, which it will surely happen in the next government, our approach is that land will be transferred after they have finished their sentence."500

497 http://www.azkintuwe.org/nov181.htm 498 Arnaldo Perez Guerra, "Cheques prueban pago de millonarias comisiones por compra de tierras a comunidades," Azkintuwe 1 October 2009. 499 Ibid. 500 El Mercurio- Domingo 25 de Julio de 2010

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While institutionalizing the land policy’s management, Viera-Gallo also worked around the exact procedures he worked to establish to responded directly to contentious action. In October 2009, Viera Gallo sought out and signed a number of agreements with the Alianza Territorial Mapuche (ATM) organization (See Figure 16). One of the two representatives of the ATM at the negotiation describes:

The government insisted on the necessity of talking and talking and then Viera Gallo arrived. His advisers called us… he was fairly explicit with us, explaining that they were at the end of the administration and the budget for the year was gone. But, they would leave it for the next year and it would certainly go through. This lasted five or ten minutes. The agreements establish that CONADI would buy particular portions of land for 82 communities in March 2010 (new government would take office in March 2010).501

Some of the communities included on this list had community members on trial at the time. Most problematically, the government agreed to return specific portions of land to communities; because the current landowners were not involved in the agreement and were not obliged to sell their land, they were likely to demand much higher than market value if they knew of the existence of an agreement. By 2009, there was heavy regulation of land purchase prices and it was nearly impossible for CONADI to pay more than 10% over market value.

Criticism came from all sides. CONADI employees condemned that political motivations had trumped administrative processes. One described that “We ran out of resources to meet our yearly goal and something had to be done… [the agreement had] zero technical accessory. …from a technical point of view, how do I say it? It didn’t make sense and had some other motivation. We were organizing the process; that was

501 "Comisión investigadora Conadi: “Ex Ministro Viera Gallo actuó con irresponsabilidad”," La Opinion 8 January 2011.

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populism…. ”502 As Egaña described, “The political objective was to lower the level of conflict. The strategy was to calm the issue, promising benefits that the government was not in the condition to follow through on.”503 A 2011 congressional investigatory committee concluded that “what the minister did was basically to put out a fire, but he put it out with gasoline,” creating expectations among communities about how the policy was implemented.504

2010-2014: Piñera

In 2009, the Right won their first presidential campaign since the return to democracy. While the left was internally divided,505 the Right offered Sebastian Piñera, who won 44% of the first round vote and 51.6% in the runoff against former Christian

Democratic president Eduardo Frei. Piñera focused on crime reduction and job growth, selling himself as a capable and efficient manager.

Sebastian Piñera proposed a constitutional reform that would recognize cultural differences, but reverted on the Bachelet’s calls for indigenous communities to be recognized as peoples. Compared to the previous left-wing presidents in office from

1990-2010, his indigenous politics platform was a more explicit form of neoliberal multiculturalism in its focus on recognition of cultural differences and integration into one state and nation. As he summarized:

“[in March 2010] we initiated a new deal with our indigenous peoples, based on four pillars. First, a constitutional reform that recognizes various ethnic entities existing within the same nation and territory. Second, replacing the strategy of assimilation with true integration…Third,

502 Interview with Richard Mansilla. 503 Interview with Rodrigo Egaña. 504 "Edwards e irregularidades en la Conadi: "Viera-Gallo apagó el incendio con bencina"," La Tercera 7 January 2011. 505 In 2009, the left was plagued by internal conflict as Jorge Arrate and Marco Enriquez-Ominami ran on other party tickets. Arrate won 6.2% of the first round vote as part of the Juntos Podemos electoral pact comprised of “Allende Socialists” and the Communist Party. MEO won over 1/5 of the first round vote.

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stimulating their economic and social development in order to reduce existing gaps. And fourth, recognition, appreciation and promotion of their history, culture, traditions and language.”506

In early 2013, Piñera reasserted that “We believe that Chile is a multicultural country.

Among these various cultures, there is one that deserves special recognition: the culture of our indigenous peoples…” When discussions of converting CONADI to a cabinet level arose, Piñera’s Minister of the Interior explicitly rejected the possibility as, “the existence of a state within another state is impossible.”507

The incoming right-wing Piñera government sought to respond to this tension by strengthening CONADI’s institutional capacity. They were not aware of the agreement

Viera Gallo had signed with the ATM. Matias Abogabir, Director of the Indigenous

Affairs Division in the Ministry of Social Development from 2011-2014, described that:

“We encountered the agreement when we arrived. … it was to win votes and was completely part of the political campaign. It was impossible to implement because [the previous administration] did not have the resources; they never had the intention of doing so. We asked those communities to be on the waiting list… We have not ratified the agreement.508

The Piñera administration intended to stop land purchases through 20B. Sebastian

Donoso, Special Advisor on Indigenous Affairs for the Piñera administration from 2010-

2011, justified, “When the new administration took office, the chaos in the land policy was so severe that it seemed that the least we could do was stop, look inward, and try to solve it.”509 To do so, the incoming government chose to not use a significant portion of

506 Rocio Alorda, 2013, “Indigenous Peoples View Chilean Government with Deep Distrust.” LatinAmerica Press, www.lapress.org 507 Charlotte Méritan, 2013, “Government to Prioritize Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous.” I Love Chile. www.ilovechile.cl 508 Interview with Matias Abogabir. 509 Interview with Sebastian Donoso.

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the 2010 budget for land purchases in order to restructure the policies: “…When we restarted the land policy, we bought land under certain parameters: 1- no violence; 2- more than 12.7 hectares per family; 3- per capita should not pass $20m (CLP); 4- 2.5/3m

(CLP) per hectare.”510

Yet, most observers note that the administration recognized its political importance and resumed land purchases. The administration choose to respect the list of the 115 communities that were prioritized by the Bachelet administration, to study the cases of the 308 communities who had been put on the list, and to create a clearly established list of which communities had presented their documents.511 As a prominent

Mapuche academic and activist interprets that, just like previous administrations, in the second year “they realized that land politics were a political tool to resolve conflicts with the Mapuche community. They realized its potential and radically changed its management, buying land to put out fires (“apagar incendios”). … What the state is buying is not really land, but rather a solution to a conflict.”512

The incoming Bachelet administration released additional evidence the Piñera administration used the policy for political interests. In May 2014, 3 months after the change of government, the new director of CONADI, Alberto Pizarro Chiñalao, that there were a number of irregularities in the land purchases finalized during the Piñera administration. He described that, “in some cases, purchases were just awaiting a final signature, but many of them did not meet minimal, basic procedures… Everything was done poorly.” 50 people were placed on administrative leave, although the severity of

510 Interview with Sebastian Donoso. 511 Interview with Matias Abogabir. 512 Interview 18 July 2013.

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their infractions was not specified.513 15 folders were handed over to the fiscal, 10 of which dealt with land purchases; the fiscal national of CONADI said the folders showed that ex-National Directors of CONADI were involved tax fraud, incompatible negotiation and influence peddling in 2011, 2012, and 2013.514

Agency of CONADI

As discussed throughout this chapter, CONADI’s role is unclear and shifting.

Tasked with coordinating and responding to indigenous demands, CONADI is, by default, the government organization responsible for the trajectory of Mapuche mobilization. This section reviews how CONADI is neither sufficiently equipped nor autonomous.

First, CONADI lacks the resources and staff to adequately respond to indigenous demands. Shortages require employees to implement policies according to alternate mechanisms to prioritize particular cases, simply due to staffing shortages. For example,

CONADI has one lawyer and three land surveyors to carry out minimal procedures.”515

During one visit to the subnational office in November 2012, one employee pulled out three communities’ administrative folders. These folders are created as soon as the community presents their initial paperwork documenting which land they are claiming.

The folder contains all additional documentation, correspondence, and formal decisions pertaining to the community’s case. She opened one folder, wondering why it was not familiar, and quickly rolled her eyes as she explained that CONADI had not heard from

513 Hugo Oviedo, "Entrevista: Alberto Pizarro, Director Nacional de Conadi," Austral Temuco 2 May 2014. 514 ———, "Fraude al interior de la Conadi sería de $ 10 mil millones," El Austral 26 May 2014. 515 http://www.azkintuwe.org/nov181.htm

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the community since 2011; the office would not complete the next study unless the community contacted them.516

Perhaps more problematically, CONADI’s organizational mission was never clearly established. As Sebastian Donoso, a prominent lawyer and Special Advisor on

Indigenous Affairs for the Piñera administration from 2010-2011, concluded of these responsibilities:

…from a policy perspective policy, CONADI was never prepared for its

task because of the way it was conceived. For most indigenous leaders,

CONADI should be of the indigenous community. But, it is a state

institution, comprised of state representatives. It is not of the indigenous

community or of the state. It is an institution cursed by a vital, internal

contradiction.517

As highlighted throughout this chapter, the central government often intervenes in

CONADI’s implementation procedures to respond to contentious action; CONADI’s institutional mission is frequently superseded by national political interests. Patricio

Sanzana, who has worked for CONADI since its creation in 1994 concluded that “There is a big problem with instability in the institution. There is no continuity between directors. They arrive through political connections, spend their first year trying to understand the office, and, when they try to implement changes in their second year, are removed from office.”518 Manuel Marileo, the president of the union in 2009, repeated

516 Carriel 517 Interview with Sebastian Donoso. 518 Inverview with Patricio Sanzana.

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that, “They have changed the director of CONADI five times in two year, with every compadre in his party adding or removing people. We are fed up of the abuses and that is what we are denouncing.”519 Manuel Namuncura, president of the National Association of CONADI Civil Servants (ANFUCO) in 2009, described: “our performance is not the best, and irregularities sometimes occur because of the instability. Those who denounce are dismissed and those who commit remain. They cut the thread at its thinnest point.”520

This imposition of national interests is perhaps most evident in the rapid turnover of National Directors of CONADI, common when National Directors oppose the direction of the central government, or when the National Director is blamed for patterns of policy implementation. Table 6 below details the duration of time that each National

Director of CONADI served, in addition to the context surrounding his resignation/ removal; many of these details are summarized in the discussion above. In 2001, the

CONADI National Communications Officer, Cecilia Amzamora, bluntly concluded that:

When the director is politically close to the President, he has more influence. In such cases he is sometimes not very popular with the Indians. [Eduardo] Frei sacked the previous director, who was against the Ralco Dam. Frei had been an entrepreneur, with links with the companies working in Ralco, so he supported the dam. Rodrigo Gonzalez, who was put in place by Frei, was actually physically attacked, with indigenous women throwing plates and eggs at him. This was very bad for his image, so he in turn resigned. CONADI is current being investigated by the courts for corruption... There is plenty of money at stake, so people are vulnerable… you might call it systemic corruption.521

Table 6: National Directors of CONADI Director Appointed Resigned/ Removed Jose Bengoa 1993 1994

519 Guerra, "Cheques prueban pago de millonarias comisiones por compra de tierras a comunidades." 520 http://www.azkintuwe.org/nov181.htm 521 Ray, Language of the Land: The Mapuche in Argentina and Chile, 139.

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Mauricio Huenchulaf 1994 Resigned, Cayuqueo April 1997 Domingo Namuncura April 1997 Government asked for resignation, August 1998 Rodrigo Gonzalez September 1998 Resigned, March 2000 Edgardo Lienlaf March 2000 Government asked for resignation, March 2002 Aroldo Cayun April 2002 March 2006 Jaime Andrade March 2006 Resigned, November 2006 Alberto Parra Salinas November 2006 Resigned, May 2007 Wilson Reyes Araya May 2007 Resigned, June 2008 Alvaro Marifil June 2008 Resigned (change of government), Hernandez March 2010 Francisco Painepán March 2010 Resigned, Jan 2011 Jorge Retamal Jan 2011 Resigned (change of government), 2014

As described throughout this chapter, CONADI responded to these interventions by clarifying implementation procedures and asserting its own decision-making capabilities. Furthermore, as Manuel Vial, a professional in the FTAI in the national

CONADI office, described, “Ministers have told us that no one cares about CONADI’s policies. Other ministries do not respect CONADI. Processes of evaluation and changes only come from within CONADI.” One CONADI employee spoke of the need to

“resguardarnos” (to shield or protect ourselves) from this external pressure, by making the process more ordered and technical.522

While the central government continued to intervene in particular cases, this institutionalization required higher and higher level political actors to make those interventions. This escalation of the level of political actors appointed responsible for

(and replaced) indigenous policy is also evident. Political Advisor replaced in 2011,

522 Interview 19 November 2012.

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2008. Ministry of Social Development/ Planning: 2002 minister. As evidenced, higher and higher levels of government are informally responsible for dealing with Indigenous

Affairs. Interventions are coming from higher and higher levels of government. "…The issue jumps between levels of the administrations, depending on how hot (incendiado) the issue is."523

This tension has yet to be resolved. Throughout CONADI’s history, a land bank has been repeatedly proposed as a way to avoid some of the controversy surrounding the land policy. CONADI would purchase and accumulate land that would then be transferred to communities that fulfil requirements, preventing the CONADI from directly negotiating over a specific plot of land for a specific community. In 2009, Viera

Gallo proposed a land bank to “prevent speculation, make land purchases more transparent, and avoid any suspicion of corruption.”524 Senator Eugenio Tuma (PPD) summarized that, "neither the previous nor current government want to make land values or land markets transparent. They always leave it open to hidden negotiations. The state should open a register of which land, with which characteristics and conditions, are on the market…"525 Yet, as the previous discussion of the Piñera administration highlighted, these discussions of removing political decisions are often overridden by the repeated motivation to use land policy in an effort to demobilize contentious action.

Conclusions

This chapter highlights continuity in the Chilean governments’ multifaceted response to Mapuche demands and contentious action. As has been documented

523 Aylwin 524 Guerra, "Cheques prueban pago de millonarias comisiones por compra de tierras a comunidades." 525 Viviana Candia, "Tierras Mapuche en conflicto: Gobierno dejará 166 comunidades en "lista de espera"," La Segunda 14 October 2013.

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elsewhere, successive administrations articulated long-term policy goals in regional development plans (ex: Origenes, Re-Conocer), understanding Mapuche demands to be, at their core, socioeconomic demands.526 When responding more specifically to contentious action, each administration used combination of public policy, criminalization, and militarization with the intent of demobilizing and isolating more radical expressions of Mapuche demands. Across five administrations, the government’s short term strategy has been to demobilize and isolate Mapuche activism; long term,

Mapuche demands and participation are assimilated into socioeconomic development programs.

Indigenous land policy is a key component of this government response.

Remarkably similar language was used to describe the government motivations that drive policy implementation across the twenty years: “we diffused, through purchases, the principal focal points of land conflict” 1994-2000, Center-Left, Frei; “the Government’s indigenous policy is to reward the most radical groups” 2000-2006, Center-Left, Lagos;

“the strategy was to calm the issue” 2006-2010, Left/Center-Left, Bachelet; “[The Piñera administration] put out fires” 2010-2014, Center-Right, Piñera. As Jose Aylwin, an expert in indigenous politics and director of the human rights NGO Observatorio

Ciudadano, summarizes, “The land policy of the state has not had any logic and has basically functioned based on pressure. Many governments… suggested that they were not going to respond to pressure from communities. In practice… the policy absolutely

526 Richards, "Of Indians and Terrorists : How the State and Local Elites Construct the Mapuche in Neoliberal Multicultural Chile."

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moves based on pressure. The occupations determine priority in assigning resources. … it is an outdated, prostituted institution.”527

As this chapter highlights, however, CONADI increasingly constrained the government’s ability to use the policy to respond to contentious action. During the initial years, the broad qualification requirements allowed CONADI and other public officials to apply the policy to communities that arrived by attracting attention through mobilization; contentious action prompted policy responses. Officials approached mobilized communities, incentivizing them to work through institutionalized procedures in ‘land for peace’ agreements implemented through CONADI. Over time, however, CONADI confronted the policy controversy by institutionalizing implementation procedures. As a result, CONADI officials were no longer able to apply the policy to fulfill political interests and filtered demands through increasingly institutional procedures. Yet, ‘land for peace’ agreements informally continue, increasingly masked and complicated by procedures, and only possible when higher level politicians intervene and push CONADI to do so. The response to Viera Gallo’s 2009 agreements is indicative of this shift. Like many of his predecessors, he negotiated with and signed an agreement to resolve the demands of a group of mobilized communities; general consensus, however, found it illegitimate to openly use the policy to respond to political pressure and bypass institutionalized procedures. This response proved the extent of the institutionalization, but also persisting room for exceptions.

527 Interview with Jose Aylwin.

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Chapter 7 Leveraging and Threatening Allies

"Before, there were eight or nine Mapuche congressional representatives. Today, that is unthinkable. How do we make them listen to the subaltern? There is no spokesperson or platform. [Mapuche] have had to seek alternatives, channels of circumstance, ways around the fort that is the Chilean political system. … There is no platform for the Mapuche through the language of words.528 Hector Llaitul, Mapuche Activist

If a community presents their demand, [CONADI] files and archives their paperwork. If the community takes action [land occupations] with the movement, CONADI feels the community."529 Mapuche Activist, Padre Las Casas

Previous chapters revealed that contentious action drives policy implementation

(Chapter 5) from 1994 to 2013, across four political administrations (Chapter 6). Local experts recognize these patterns; José Aylwin, an expert in indigenous politics and director of the local NGO Observatorio Ciudadano, summarizes, “The state has not had any logic in its land policy, other than to basically function based on pressure. The politics of [land] occupations is what determines priority in the allocation of resources. … it is an anachronistic, prostituted institution.”530 This chapter explores the mechanisms by which contentious action affects policy implementation, drawing on the experiences of eight Mapuche communities in the Padre Las Casas district outside the regional capital,

Temuco. While previous chapters only included communities that had successfully acquired land, this chapter considers broader variation in communities’ successes and failures at various stages of the policy process. Why do some communities acquire land while others stall?

528 Llaitul and Arrate, Weichan, Conversaciones con un weychafe en la prisión política, 128. 529 Interview December 5, 2013. 530 Interview June 25, 2013.

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The experiences of these eight communities reveal that contentious action creates leverage over unlikely elite allies, who are able to intervene in policy procedures to overcome the interests of powerful, competing stakeholders. If the community’s land claim does not conflict with a powerful stakeholder, communities’ strategic mobilization or use of political connections at a very local level can provide sufficient leverage over policy implementation decisions. If a community’s land demands confront the interests of powerful regional actors, however, the community must be willing and able to scale up their mobilization in a way that presents a threat sufficient to leverage an elite ally to intervene in policy procedures on behalf of the community. However, confronting these powerful stakeholders results in repression, regardless of if the community acquired land or not. All these calculations are preceded by several necessary but not sufficient conditions; communities must understand the bureaucratic processes, yet recognize that these formal procedures are insufficient and be willing to take on the risks associated with mobilizing.

These communities’ stories also highlight that CONADI does see and respond to very local power dynamics. Contentious action and political connections can shape policy implementation, but CONADI will only respond in a way that undermines the interests of powerful stakeholders if an elite actor became involved. These dynamics suggest

CONADI, on its own, is unwilling to challenge powerful interests through policy implementation decisions. But, the office is left with allegations of irregularities that arise when high-ranking officials call for CONADI to respond to escalated instances of contentious action. Repression, in contrast, is more uniformly utilized as a response to mobilization threatening political interests. These dynamics echo prior chapters’

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conclusions that the Chilean government draws on policy to respond to contentious action. Policy implementation decisions are not, however, a proportional response to perceived threats as expected, but rather shaped by a combination of bureaucratic and local power dynamics.

This chapter reiterates that communities face numerous challenges when working to acquire territorial rights. Territorial rights are formally recognized, but the costs of being awarded those rights are exorbitant; quiescent communities rarely acquire territorial rights. Second, this chapter highlights the preeminence of powerful local stakeholders. If a community confronts one of these interests, mobilization is necessary for communities to affect policy implementation. This mobilization, by posing a threat to governability in the region, results in the community acquiring unlikely elite allies who intercede in local, bureaucratic processes to restore stability.

Methodology

This chapter explores the mechanisms through which contentious action affects policy implementation, tracing out the events and conditions that link contentious action with implementation decision. I conceptualize mechanisms as causal chains of

“frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences.”531 This micro-level of analysis facilitates identification of environmental, cognitive, and relational community-level mechanisms that aggregate into the effects observed in Chapters 5 and

531 Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 2007). Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Mit Press, 2005).

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6.532 I rely on process tracing to identify why particular communities advance, tracing out

“what follows what,” as a community proceeds through these institutionalized procedures.533 Accordingly, this chapter thinks about causation in terms of necessary and sufficient causes.534

In this chapter, I define success as communities’ progress through defined policy procedures of the land purchase process, as discussed in Chapter 4. Once the community has applicability, feasibility, and viability, the community’s folder is passed to

CONADI’s National Council to determine the prioritization of the claims. The National

Council is comprised of 8 indigenous representatives elected from their respective communities (4 of which are Mapuche), 8 government officials representing various ministries, and the National Director. If the Council approves the community’s claim, the community has the right to buy land (derecho de comprar), at which point the community must find a plot of land of the appropriate size and price point. Because records are only public after a land purchase is completed, previous chapters have selected on the dependent variable, only examining the cases of communities that have

532 This classification of three types of mechanisms comes from Tilly (2001). Charles Tilly, "Mechanisms in Political Processes," Annual Review of Political Science 4, no. 1 (2001). As Elster explains, “To explain is to provide a causal mechanism, to open up the black box and show the nuts and bolts… The role of mechanisms is two-fold. First, they enable us to go from the large to the smaller: from molecules to atoms, from societies to individuals. Secondly, and more fundamentally, they reduce the time lag between the explanans and explanandum. A mechanism provides a continuous and contiguous chain of causal or intentional links; a black box is a gap in the chain.” Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind (Cambridge Univ Press, 1999), 3-5. 533 James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research," Political Analysis 14, no. 3 (2006). Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Cornell University Press, 1997), Andrew Bennett, "Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective," JM Box (2008), David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," PS: Political Science & Politics 44, no. 04 (2011). James Mahoney, "The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences," Sociological Methods & Research (2012). George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. "Methods for measuring mechanisms of contention." Qualitative Sociology 31.4 (2008): 307-331. 534 Mahoney and Goertz, "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research." Henry E Brady and David Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010).

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completed the policy process. I would normally be unaware of the experiences of communities still involved in negotiations; these case studies draw out the experiences of communities as they progress through a land demand. Figure 17 shows where the eight communities under analysis stand in this process as of December 2013, when the interviews finished. While Chapter 5 highlighted the shift in the government’s implementation of the first versus subsequent purchases, none of the communities in this analysis have received more than one purchase.

This case study is based in the Padre Las Casas municipality, adjacent to Temuco, the regional capital of the Araucanía. The Araucanía region is the poorest in Chile, with

22.9% of the population living below the poverty line in 2011, a disproportionate number

Mapuche.535 90% of the population of PLC is Mapuche, divided into 102 communities according to their títulos de merced (shown in Appendix 1). 76% of the rural sectors of

PLC pertain to Mapuche communities or individuals (294.51 km2); because of the history of land tenure in the area, the majority of these land holdings are small, nontransferable plots of land.536 The rural economy is largely peasant subsistence farming, partially oriented towards the market and heavily relying on land. The family is the basic unit of production, owning on average three hectares per family and relying primarily on the production of wheat, subsistence agriculture, and small livestock. Because of the area’s proximity to Temuco, recent decades are characterized by improvements in health and education, although still below national standards, and urbanization.

535 CASEN 2011. 536 Once recognized and registered as indigenous land, the land can only be sold to other indigenous peoples. Plan Regulador Padre Las Casas, Anexo III Comunidades y Territorio.

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Focusing on one region controls for a large number of variables, isolating differences in mobilization strategy. Most importantly, all the communities have the same potential access to politicians, organizations, institutes, and government ministries in

Temuco. Distance from Temuco poses a significant impediment for many more isolated communities, who must navigate multiple, infrequent, and expensive buses to arrive to the city. Focusing on a particular region also ensures that communities are facing similar stakeholders that could potentially exert pressure against their land claim. The region under analysis, located 10 minutes by car from Temuco, is heavily influenced by the expansion of the city. Temuco is one of the fastest growing cities in Chile, so projections about land use depend on the expansion of the city and need for accompanying infrastructure. Accordingly, there are not nearly as many large landholders or international corporations as in nearby, less densely populated regions.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with leaders of the eight Mapuche communities in the Padre Las Casas district between May and November 2013; in 7 of the 8 communities, the interview was conducted with either the lonko (traditional authority) or present or past community president; the other was conducted with an activist who played a significant role in presenting the communities’ land demand.

Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours and focused on how the community learned about the policy, the steps they took to present their demand, whether the communities have connections to civil servants/ politicians/ academics/ lawyers/ political parties, if they participated in any type of protest or mobilization while presenting their demand, how they would characterize the government’s responsiveness, their general challenges and successes navigating the policy, and their perceptions of why some

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communities were more successful than others. This information was supplemented by a range of secondary sources and, in particular, local news reports on the specific communities. These eight communities were selected for issues of accessibility in order to arrive with an appropriate connection and introduction to the project; I have no reason to expect that the experiences and perceptions of these community leaders would be distinct from other community leaders in the area.

Figure 17: 20B Policy Process, Status of Communities in Padre Las Casas as of 2013

Present Application Demand Approved after • Domingo Painevilu denied Feasibility • Juan Quintrileo denied Study • Fransisco Catrilaf denied Approved by National Council • Manuel Manquenir searching for plot Plot of land • Jose Ancavil searching for plot found and • Antonio Rapiman searching for plot purchased • Jose Jineo searching for plot Community takes • Juan Catrilaf possession

Impediments to Mobilization

Why have some communities successfully acquired land while others have stalled? This section presents three impediments to advancing through the policy process: perceptions of policy implementation, knowledge of bureaucratic procedures,

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coordinating collective action, and willingness to accept repression. Both separately and jointly, these factors are necessary but not sufficient conditions to advancing in the policy process. While the leaders of the eight communities under analysis all referenced these challenges, two were unable to overcome them.

Bureaucracy

First, communities must understand bureaucratic procedures. This is no small task, as many communities are geographically isolated in a region where the state has a weak reach that has only recently expanded into people’s everyday lives. As a result, many are unfamiliar with government bureaucratic procedures. One community president described, “we are people so, as we say, so basic, that we do not have great technical, professional knowledge” When the particular community started the process in 2006, the president said that some community members had knowledge of the existence of

CONADI and its basic responsibilities because of conflicts over the construction of the regional airport. The president explained that he had only finished high school and had little knowledge of how to relate to the government and navigate policy procedures; what he had learned came from several of his aunts who were university educated and “opened my mind about how I had to act.” He explained that, “What happened is that they domesticated us so severely that it confused us. By the time we realized, we were in a bad situation. We have to establish our right and establish our position as well…”537

Often, local organizations, nearby communities, or outside organizations help communities to overcome these initial impediments.

537 Interview 23 April 2013. “How we live among ourselves” refers to the relationships between a Mapuche individual and his or her land and community. Mapuche society was not hierarchically organized, so these relationships are constructed locally.

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Perceptions of Policy Implementation

Second, communities needed to be familiar with informal patterns of policy implementation. While the government established formal procedures, previous chapters have highlighted that contentious action has a significant impact on implementation

(Chapters 4 and 5). If communities did not recognize that these informal implementation patterns drove implementation, their claims stalled.

In interviews, several leaders argued that their land claims should be processed because of the legitimacy of their demand. Community leaders frequently referenced

ILO 169, ratified by Chile in 2009. Leaders emphasized that there has been a turning point in the history of subordination of indigenous communities and that their right to pursue the land is now internationally protected; because Chile ratified ILO 169 in 2009, the government had the responsibility enforce these rights. One community leader expressed frustration that CONADI had told him the community did not qualify for the program, as they did not have a título de merced to the plot of claimed land, justifying his right to claim land through the policy because “I don’t have a loss of land, but I do have contamination [from the airport adjacent to the community’s land].” Another community leader justified that, “We were expelled from our own territory. The historical and legal precedents are in our favor.”538 Leaders with this perception of policy implementation were frustrated that politicians “no nos pesca” (they do not catch/ pay attention to us) and

“no tienen voluntad” (they don’t have the will).

In contrast, most communities asserted that the legitimacy of the community’s demand and the government’s stated commitment to that right were insufficient. Leaders

538 Lucía Sepúlveda Ruiz, "El general de carabineros Cristián Llévenes, involucrado en una denuncia por tortura del Lonko Víctor Marilao," Rebelión, http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=92634.

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argued that the community had to create leverage if their community was to advance in the process. In interviews, these leaders referred to the need to trabajar (work), andar

(walk/ work/ go after), moverse (move/ activate/ put in motion), luchar (fight), o pelear

(fight) for politicians to listen. One president concluded that, “[politicians and government officials] have always kept us ‘just over there,’ placated. Because indigenous policies don’t consider us, we have to fight.” Another described that “it is such a bureaucratic system that asks for this document and that document that, in the end, forces the Mapuche to fight (obligan a los Mapuches a luchar po).” Another leader reflected on the list of 30 communities that were chosen to receive land purchases in 2013, concluding that the list “almost fulfills the saying that only a crying baby gets milk.”539

Many communities highlight how particular events called their attention to injustices in how the government treats Mapuche communities, informing their perceptions of how the Chilean bureaucracy responds to Mapuche demands. Many community leaders referenced the region of Ercilla, located approximately 90 kilometers directly north of Temuco. As discussed in previous chapters, this region is referenced as the ‘red zone’ of conflict between Mapuche communities and the state. In the PLC district, the events and conflict in Ercilla was referenced numerous times as awakening

Mapuche consciousness throughout the broader region. One leader described that, “when they killed peñi (Mapuche brother, referencing the killing of Catrileo in 2008), I woke up.

I got up… we are part of the them, even though they live in Ercilla.” Another community leader describes that, mobilization in Maquehue (a portion of the PLC district) started in

2004 and was motivated by communities in Ercilla; yet, “Maquehue is not a community

539 This is an expression (la wawa que no llora, no mama) roughly equivalent to english expression such as, “Those that don’t ask don’t get,” or “the squeaky wheel gets the grease.”

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like in Ercilla. We are all Mapuches, but we [Mapuche in Maquehue] are more domesticated. It was difficult to wake up... If the people from Ercilla lived here there wouldn’t be an airport.” These perceptions of the policy process are a necessary but not sufficient condition to successfully advance through the policy process. Communities that perceive the process to advance according to bureaucratic procedures do not see the need to utilize other strategies.

Community Coordination

Many communities also faced a collective action problem, inhibiting their ability to present their demand. In some cases, communities are divided; one leader described that some of the community was urbanizado (urbanized) and, accordingly, not interested in recovering land. Another leader cited that their community was too big to mobilize because there were always differences of opinions in community meetings. Several others described that the decision to proceed depends specifically on the president and his knowledge of the process. One community had prepared all the paperwork, but the community was divided, told they could not apply; the president did not know if or how to proceed and the process stalled. Another community’s president mentioned “We also got delayed because we don’t have cars… we are not well-known.”

Leveraging Elite Allies

Communities must recognize the need for contentious action and be willing and able to mobilize, but overcoming these collective action problems is necessary but not sufficient to acquire land through the policy. This section reveals how acquiring land depends on the interests of other stakeholders in the region. In many cases, communities can draw on mobilization and political connections at a very local level to create leverage

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over implementation procedures. If a community’s claim conflicts with the interests of a powerful stakeholders, however, communities must be able to leverage unlikely, national-level political elites to intervene on their behalf at the expense of the local actors. This section documents how the eight communities under analysis drew on political connections and mobilization to present their claim.

Political Influence

Communities have several ways of leveraging CONADI. First, communities construct effective political networks. The same causal mechanism is at work for both mobilization and political connections; the government responds to pressure from the most powerful stakeholder involved in the particular land claim. If a community is willing and able to become itself the most powerful stakeholder involved in the particular land claim, through either political connections or mobilization, the government responds. However, it is challenging for communities to leverage significant political influence through connections alone, particularly when facing powerful interests.

Numerous community leaders have noted that politicians and political appointees from the same party make phone calls on a community’s behalf. One particular community leader stood out for his ability to navigate bureaucratic processes for both logistical and political stages of the policy process. The community presented its paperwork in 2007 but, when the current president assumed the position in 2011, its request had not advanced. By early 2013, the community received notice that it had been given the right to buy. The community president’s political acumen was immediately obvious when he described his approach to presenting the community’s land demand:

I… quickly began to meet and greet workers at CONADI so they knew who I was and how I wanted to work with them. They opened their doors

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and wanted to talk with me. In that way I got to know the people, the authorities. After, I laid out the needs of our community, and, occasionally, brought up the issue of the land, the land recovery. So, I explained that I was new in the leadership position but the community had waited six years. Why haven’t they given us a solution? In that way, I got to know the civil servants, who told me to talk to a particular person, who directed me to another. Now, when I go to the office and they see me, ‘Hola Don José!’ That’s how it went. … I don’t know if that was why (the process moved faster)… I don’t understand much about why…

The documents were sleeping there (in the CONADI office). In the trunk. I went to wake them up. Well, and a little of persistence because I didn’t leave them alone.

[How did you know what to do to get the process moving?] First, I asked Consejo Maquehue. The leaders have been on this path for more time and they explained how things work. They asked me: ‘Why don’t you locate such and such person in CONADI or the municipality?’ Because politically, things work like that. The mayor is of the same party of the Subdirector of CONADI so I went to a public employee. She is also Mapuche and I expressed the anxieties, the necessities, of our community. Very kindly, she recommended me to another civil servant…. We invited the mayor to the community. … We asked for a hearing with the mayor. ‘Ask for a meeting with the National Director of CONADI,’ he told me. ‘You talk to him but I’ll speak to him as well.’ See? Politics.

We promised to support the mayor in his new campaign with a big ‘but.’ I said to him, ‘If you agree that you will take out projects for us in the future, we will agree for you to be mayor again. ‘I agree’ he said. ‘You have to sign’ we said. And, he won. We asked him, ‘Did you notice our support?’ Now, when we arrive they attend to us well because we have power. That is how we advanced.

Several communities recognized the importance of political connections, but were unable to leverage them. A leader from Antonio Rapiman expressed that “All the politicians pass through here, but they just pass through. We haven’t connected ourselves to them. Their purpose is to confuse the people. …” A community leader of the Jose

Ancavil community expressed that, "We have talked with [the politicians], but they,

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particularly the intendente, don’t leave the record straight. They delay and demand so much.”

Contentious Action

Indigenous communities can also mobilize to leverage politicians to respond to their demands. In PLC, most mobilization happens at a very targeted, local level in the form of land occupations, road blocks, and very rarely, occupation of the regional airport.

These occupations are usually not violent, although they usually end once the police arrive.540 Several leaders explained that mobilization forced politicians to respond to their demands. For example, the Antonio Rapiman community first presented its land claim in 2004 but advanced slowly. One leader described “we took the highway, the airport, and then they listened…. We took CONADI and then they had to attend to us.

One person in CONADI helps us because of the mobilization and the airport [occupied briefly in Nov 2012].” In early 2013 the community received the right to buy land and is currently searching for a plot of land. Of the eight communities included here, two advanced their demands by engaging in this small-scale, targeted direct action.

Because people in the region are generally aware of CONADI’s policy to buy ancestrally claimed land and its susceptibility to respond to pressure some landowners and communities engaged in a premeditated conflict to force CONADI to act more quickly and/or pay the landowner a higher price. CONADI does not have the ability to

540 In this way, mobilization is Maquehue is a bit distinct from other districts. Because of the high population density and small plots of land in the Padre las Casas district, most Mapuche communities in this region are seeking to recover land other than land historically recognized as pertaining to their community. Because CONADI looks to purchase a portion of land that allows the communities to be economically viable, most communities in this district require a plot of land larger than is available in the immediate region, requiring them to find an alternate plot of land. Because the particular demand is unknown, mobilization in Maquehue is usually less “place-based” than in other region. Blocking the highway and occupying the airport do not act on a particular space. I argue that this distinction does not drive the effect of conflict, as conflict serves to create leverage.

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expropriate land, allowing landowners to value their land at any price. CONADI does not have strict regulations stipulating how much could be spent on a particular land purchase, creating the potential for CONADI to pay above market value. As Diaz describes, “…the open market in Chile is less profitable for (small) agriculture. They

(small landowners) prefer to sell and offer their lands to CONADI. They are threatened by this policy; their land was never part of a título de merced, but they think there could be a claim to the land, a threat that the media has inflated a lot.”541 Matias Abogabir,

Presidential Adviser on Indigenous Affairs during the Piñera administration, describes that communities and landowners cooperate to create “a black market… They generate pressure on CONADI to elevate prices. Incentives are perverse … it is a vicious cycle that raises prices.”542

Economic Interests

In most instances, mobilization only needs to attract attention at the very local level, allowing CONADI to resolve the community’s demand. When communities are facing a powerful stakeholder, however, local politicians and bureaucrats do not act.

Rather, mobilization must escalate to the point that it attracts the attention of political elites who are sufficiently threatened by the mobilization.

As is commonly noted and described in Chapter 3, the neoliberal economic development model was strongly established in Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship.

Particularly in the regions under analysis, this economic project prioritized the exploitation of natural resources. With an influx of international investment after the return to democracy in 1990, the agricultural, mining, forestry, and fishing industries

541 Interview with Miguel Diaz. 542 Interview with Matias Abogabir.

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continued developing, having a particularly strong impact on land in ancestrally Mapuche regions. The Ninth Region, with the largest concentration of Mapuche individuals, has been the poorest region of Chile since 1992 and falls far behind other regions in terms of income, foreign investment, and infrastructure development. The region has frequently been at the center of the Chilean government’s developmental plans to expand already developed international hydroelectric or forestry companies, as discussed in Chapter 3.

Conflicts are often explicitly linked with the presence of particular industries.

Many Mapuche organizations reference this presence in justifying their mobilization;

CAM explained that “the decision to carry out a struggle for territory and autonomy, that is because out of all our lands and private forestry companies who only have our wealth from poverty and oppression ... We propose, first, Mapuche resistance to the capitalist system and oligarchy in our ancestral territory, seen in forestry investments, hydroelectric companies, tourism…”543 Many of the “flashpoints for the sharpest conflict” are concentrated around development projects.544 This expansion of extractive industries prompted two prominent observers to conclude that:

Perhaps the central theme of 1999 has been the shifting of the focal points of conflict. Conflicts over roads and the construction of industrial and energy infrastructure, like Ralco, have passed to a second level, while problems with forestry companies have occupied first place. This has produced a large number of land takeovers that affect more than anything companies (53%), particularly Mininco and Boques Arauco S.A; to a lesser extent, private landowners (37.6%), and a very small percentage, state land and National Parks (4.3%).545

543 Mella Seguel, Los Mapuche ante la justicia la criminalización de la protesta indígena en Chile, 85. 544 Carruthers and Rodriguez, "Mapuche Protest, Environmental Conflict and Social Movement Linkage in Chile," 8. 545 R. Foerster, and J. Lavanchy., 1999. ‘La problemática Mapuche.’ In Analisis Del Ano 1999, ed. R. Bano et al. Santiago de Chile: Departamento de Sociologia, Universidad de Chile, 67.

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Forestry companies are not as powerful in Padre las Casas. The district is much more urban than most, due to its proximity to the regional capital of Temuco. Plots of land are much smaller and the population density is much higher (see Figures 20 and 21).

While this link between Mapuche demands, powerful companies, and conflict is recognized by observers, there are no studies of if or how CONADI reacts to this tension.

In the Maquehue region, two communities presented demands that conflicted with a forestry company and a powerful, well-established landholding family. One community,

Juan Quintrileo, has been unable to scale up its mobilization and its land claim has stalled. The community holds claim to land pertaining to the Masisa forestry company

(prior to 2007, Millalemu forestry company and later Terranova SA), held by prominent

Swiss businessman and philanthropist Stephan Schmidheiny. Because the company knew that the lands were claimed by the indigenous community and that the government had the procedures in place to purchase historically-claimed lands, the company came to a

“peace agreement” with the community in 1999. The community agreed to allow the company to develop and extract materials (pine and eucalyptus, both non-native species to the region) from the land, after which the company would allow the community to use the land.546 This loan would grant the community access to the land until CONADI could finalize the purchase of the land from the forestry company. During this time, the community was allowed to reconstruct a rehue (ceremonial cite) within the forestry company.

The company drastically changed this policy in August of 2007. Police, at the request of the company, blocked community members from entering the land and

546 Alberto Dufey, "Dirigente indígena lamenta que forestales suizas hayan roto su compromiso en Chile," Swisslatin, http://www.swisslatin.ch/reportajes-0711.htm.

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destroyed the rehue, replacing it with a police checkpoint. Aucan Huilcaman, one of the most prominent Mapuche activists, denounced the company’s shift before the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights:

We were surprised when Masisa, as other forestry companies have done, requested police protection last November to protect land that was on loan, provoking the community’s reaction. The Chilean government mobilized 200 police, militarizing the conflict. ...[the company’s decision] changed course of this relationship, reopening the clashes and a continuing conflict.547 We think it has to do with the national interests... because adjacent to the forestry company are the properties of Hernán Büchi, another businessman of Swiss origin and former Pinochet minister, the property of Angel Delano, another former Pinochet minister, and the estate of Luisa Durán, the wife of former President Ricardo Lagos. We think that is where the pressure comes from, because they are powerful families in the country. If Masisa transferred land to the communities, the land of these families could be part of the same recovery process later.”548

Again in 2009, 4 community members were denied entrance to the forestry company for driving a truck without the correct paperwork. Police protection was sent. As one community member described, “...The policemen have known us for two years. They know that we have the company’s authorization… but, they denied us passage in such an intolerant way.”549 The community wrote a letter to the intendente Nora Barrientos and the company’s management, but “we have no answer. Nobody wants to hear us. We denounce that the agreements, reached over 8 years of talks, have not been met and our land continues to be usurped.”550 At the time of the interview in 2013, the community’s land claim had been denied.

547 Ibid. 548 Ibid. 549 J. Fando Serey, "Intolerancia y excesos de violencia policial," Enlace Mapuche Internacional, http://www.mapuche-nation.org/espanol/html/noticias/ntcs-392.htm. 550 Sepúlveda Ruiz, "El General de carabineros Cristián Llévenes, involucrado en una denuncia por tortura del Lonko Víctor Marilao."

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In contrast to this community, the Juan Catrilaf II community had one of the most emblematic processes of negotiations with the Chilean state, recovering nearly 500 hectares of ancestral land, for which CONADI paid the highest price per hectare in its history. The claimed plot of land, Santa Margarita, was owned by the prominent

Luchsinger family and has been a historical focal point of conflict. The Luchsinger family is known for calling for a mano duro response (hard line on crime) to Mapuche protestors; Jorge Luchsinger argues that:

… This [land takeovers, protests, mobilization] is the exact same as what happened between 1970 and 1973 [during the presidency of Salvador Allede]! It could be that military authorities will not act like they did in 1973 [referencing the Pinochet military coup], but we are going to face them because there is no other solution. If the authorities do not fulfill their duty, if there is no rule of law, if there is no protection of public or private property… this has to end badly.551

Similarly, in 2005, Luchsinger asserted that, “The Indian has never worked. The

Mapuche is a predator, lives on what nature provides, does not have intellectual capacity or financial resources. …The Mapuche is cunning, crooked, disloyal….552

The particular plot of land was one of the most historically conflictive in the region; the Ayjarewe Xuf-Xuf organization first occupied the plot of land in 1999, there were several arson attacks in 2000, and the plot has been under police surveillance since

2005. The community initiated the institutional process in 2001, when the Ayjarewe

Xuf-Xuf coordinating organization presented a formal demand on behalf of 13 neighboring communities. CONADI agreed to look into the situation of the 13 communities, declaring that the community met the policy requirements in December

551 Martin Correa Cabrera, "El fundo Santa Margarita, su origen, historia y su relacion con las comunidades vecinas y colindantes." 552 ‘El origen de las tierras en conflicto.’ La Nacion 31 Agosto 2008.

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2005. As mobilization continued, Matías Catrileo, a young Mapuche activist, was shot in the back by police during a land occupation in January 2008.

A leader of the Juan Catrilaf community described the community’s mobilization and negotiations strategy:

Our community developed a formula, a strategy, to get the government to return our lands to us. We occupied the estate, which accelerated the process- some communities have waited 10 years. We arrived to a working negotiating table with the government to deal with the issue of applicability [the first stage of the policy process], the bureaucratic issues. It was the only way the government could buy land for us from the gringos. We continued negotiating with the government while the community continued mobilizing. The government called us to La Moneda (seat of the executive in Santiago) and said they wanted an agreement that would stop the mobilizations by finalizing the land purchase. We talked, and the government accepted the conditions we presented. They started a series of processes, bureaucratic formalities… to make the agreement legally acceptable. The government found a way to invoke the antiterrorism law on me and some of the peñi. While I was detained, they couldn’t forget the land issue. After a month of being detained, they finalized the purchase. They bought three estates. Why did we reach this level of the government? The cost of the life and the community’s frustration”553

The community has record of this meeting with the Minister Viera Gallo, where he agrees to resolve the community’s demand to the land. After, Viera Gallo traveled to the

Araucanía region, announcing the purchase of 458 hectares for approximately $4.3 million USD on October 8, 2009,554 the highest price per hectare CONADI ever paid in the region.

As described, local instances of contentious action were not sufficient for

CONADI to respond to their land demand. Their demand was only addressed when the

553 Interview November 2013. 554 Comité de Seguimiento, del Conflicto Social y la Coyuntura, and Observatorio Social de America Latina Latinoamericana de Chile, "Documento De Trabajo Nº 228: Cronología Del Conflicto Social," (Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales, CLACSO, 2009).

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community escalated their mobilization to the point that it reached and threatened powerful political elites. Because of this leverage, elites intervened in the local, bureaucratic procedures to resolve the demand and deescalate the pressure generated by the community’s mobilization.

As perhaps expected, there was strong opposition from agricultural interests to the government’s intervention. Gastón Caminondo, president of the Agricultural

Development Society of Temuco (Sociedad de Fomento Agrícola de Temuco, Sofo), questioned Viera Gallo’s decision, stating “If we are talking about terrorism, this sends the wrong signal. What has to be done, and what the government has always said, is that anyone involved in terrorism or violence will have no chance of accessing land or benefits…”555 Andrés Molina, president of CorpAraucanía, an organization representing the main business associations and promoting entrepreneurship and productive development with Mapuche associations, argued that, “You cannot reward violent communities under any situation. I understand that this specific case escaped this government. There are many communities working for development and these declarations undermine their efforts.”556

Repression

Both communities presenting a demand that confronted the interests of a powerful economic stakeholder faced significant repression, regardless of if they advanced in their land claim or not.

555 "Agricultores De La Araucanía Critican Posible Entrega De Tierras a Violentistas," El Mercurio, 5 December 2009. 556 Ibid.

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Victor Marileo, the traditional leader (lonko) of the Juan Quintremil community describes that:

We were preparing to prevent them from replanting and that was when they accused me of stealing wood, but that was staged. The forestry company and the police are always looking for ways to imprison me and they have carried out operations against my life. It is satanic. They bribed another peñi to testify against me, but as lonko, who is a respected guide and man of confidence with a vision for the community, those allegations could not be true. I was arrested again on October 30, 2007, when a forestry company truck was passing through the dirt road where we were protesting. The police threw bombs and bullets. I moved towards the policy to mediate, but they ran over me with their two cars and shouted 'You deserve to die. Indians like you should be killed.' … They tortured me in the police station to disorient me, leaving me with a broken head and face. It was then they said 'We'll have to kill a Mapuche' and, shortly after, January 3, 2008, they killed Matías Catrileo.”557

I have been molested and beaten by police. They tortured me in the second police station in Temuco, handcuffed me and ignored my status as lonko. They twisted my the arm, the (at that time) highest-ranking office Cristian Llévenes ordered a policeman to put a loop around my neck, so that my arms fell. They beat me with a stick and broke three ribs. ... I want to make clear that the community where I live is militarized. I'm condemned to an injunction, I am banned from entering the land we claim on the Roble Huacho estate of the Masisa forestry company, and I cannot leave the country. I'm always controlled by police, they are installed 100 meters from my house. There is a tear gas tank, police presence, and they film everything I do. From the perspective of the forestry company, I am a threat. But they are the ones who take resources of my family and leave a desert in the community... "558

The Juan Catrilaf II community faced very similar repression. After the government agreed to purchase the community’s land, special police forces (Fuerzas

Especiales de Carabineros de la Tercera Comisaría de Padre Las Casas) violently raided the community. 20 were injured and 6 were detained under the anti-terrorism law

557 Sepúlveda Ruiz, "El General de carabineros Cristián Llévenes, involucrado en una denuncia por tortura del lonko Víctor Marilao." 558 Ibid.

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for involvement with a July 28th attack on a bus.559 One community member described being shot in the leg three times at close range, operated on under police presence, handed over to the correctional system, and released without any charges.560 Several other community members remained in preventative detention. From jail, Sergio Catrilaf expressed that, “They set up me up. Special forces came to my house, pulled me out, threw me to the ground and left me face down while others entered the house. According to them, they found weapons including thick calibrated bullets with high destructive power, fuses, cartridges, shotguns, and high-tech equipment such as GPS.” 561

The leader of the José Ancavil community specifically asserted that they were aware of the potential impact of mobilization, but that the community was not willing to accept the risks of mobilizing. He asserted that “we don’t want [a land takeover] because we are passive. We want things to be passively arranged with the authorities. We don’t want to show up fighting on TV. Often, everyone pays for what one person does. Because of that, we are slow because we are passive. It doesn’t serve us to be making scandals… that is not our reality…Things get fixed quietly."

Outcomes

As evidenced, communities are successful when they can leverage elites, through either mobilization or political networks, to the point that it supersedes the influence of other involved stakeholders. A community’s ability to access territorial rights, then, is conditioned, first, by the community’s ability and willingness to overcome the collective action problem and take on the potential repression associated with mobilization. More

559 Seguimiento, Coyuntura, and Latinoamericana de Chile, "Documento De Trabajo Nº 228: Cronología Del Conflicto Social." 560 "Graves consecuencias en allanamiento en Comunidad Catrilaf," liberar.cl 2009. 561 Ibid.. ———, "Documento de trabajo Nº 228: Cronología del conflicto social."

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consequentially, success is conditioned by the other relevant stakeholders in the region; if confronting one of these stakeholders, conflict is only effective if the community is willing to mobilize to the point that the community acquires unlikely elite allies who intervene in local, bureaucratic decisions on behalf of the community.

Table 7 how these conditions played out in the cases of the eight communities discussed in this chapter. Two communities did not overcome the initial hoop tests discussed above; their claims were rejected by CONADI and the community did not mobilize further. Of the six remaining communities, four were not presenting a demand that conflicted with a powerful local stakeholder. Each of the four communities, drawing on both mobilization and political connections, were able to leverage sufficient power within CONADI to receive a policy resolution. As discussed above, leveraging mobilization and political connections happens at a very local level; without a powerful local stakeholder, these indigenous communities only have to leverage the local

CONADI office.

Table 7 Community Overcome Powerful Successful Leverage? Status? Collective stakeholder? Action Problems? Antonio Yes No Yes Approved Rapiman Blocked highway, occupied the airport (2012) Domingo No No No Rejected Painevilu Francisco No No No Rejected Catrilaf Jose Yes No Yes Approved Ancavil Jose Jineo Yes ? Yes. Blocked highway Approved (2012)

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Juan Yes Yes- Forestry No; forestry company; Rejected Quintrileo Company significant repression; Occupied claimed land; police surveillance Juan Yes Yes- Yes- Luchsinger family. Finalized Catrilaf Luchsinger Occupied claimed land; Family 10 Accused of “assault and contempt of authority”562; detentions (2009) Manuel Yes No Yes- local political Approved Manquenir connections

Conclusions and Implications

By tracing out the conditions under which contentious action matters at the local level, I showed how the interests of various local stakeholders interact to drive policy implementation. Communities must recognize the need for contentious action, and be willing and able to utilize conflict to leverage the government. Leaders of successful communities recognize that the legitimacy of their demand is not sufficient for the ministry to act on their behalf and rarely make reference to the historical significance of the land or right to pursue its recovery. Rather, successful leaders assert that the progression of their demand depends on their community’s ability to gain political alliances and mobilize in order to exert pressure on the appropriate actors. If a community is confronting a powerful local stakeholder, it must be able to pose a threat to the state such that national-level politicians intervene in local policy implementation on behalf of the community; Mapuche communities willing and able to mobilize have acquired and leveraged political allies through threats, not affinity.

562 Aylwin Oyarzún, "Los derechos de los pueblos indígenas en Chile," 428.

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Chapter 8 Bolivia

“Bolivian democracy, as it currently exists, is incapable of processing indigenous and popular demands unless forced to do so by insurgent action.”563 Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, Bolivian activist and academic

"Those who drive this change are the social movements. The instrument is the state.”564 Álvaro Garcia Linera, Vice President of Bolivia (2006-present)

As evidenced in the Chilean case, Mapuche indigenous communities have strategically leveraged collective action to navigate Chile’s land policy, often to the detriment of the interests of powerful economic stakeholders. As noted, Chile is a least likely case in which the government would be expected to respond to indigenous communities’ territorial demands; the Chilean government has one of the weakest recognitions of indigenous rights in the region, has facilitated and prioritized the dramatic expansion of extractive industries, and is known for its technocratic, centralized, and removed style of governance that distances popular demands from policymaking. Despite these challenges, indigenous communities have acquired historically-claimed land when they are willing and able to mobilize to leverage elites on their behalf.

This chapter extends this argument to the Bolivian case. In both Bolivia and

Chile, the expansion and prioritization of extraction-based development has infringed on indigenous communities’ land and territory, prompting substantial indigenous mobilization surrounding territorial demands. In contrast to the Chilean case, Bolivia’s persisting institutional instability has made mobilization and direct action a much more prevalent and consequential strategy of political action. This is particularly true for

563 Qtd in Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia, 217. 564 Qtd in Benjamin Kohl, "Bolivia under Morales a Work in Progress," Latin American Perspectives 37, no. 3 (2010).

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indigenous communities, who comprise an estimated 40-60% of the Bolivian population and have emerged as powerful actors on the local and national political scenes. The strength of this movement has resulted in formal recognitions of indigenous rights, providing indigenous communities the legal precedent to demand autonomy over recognized indigenous land.565 Have stronger rights recognitions, stronger indigenous movement, and a weaker bureaucracy affected when and why the Bolivian government responds to indigenous communities’ territorial demands?

It is important to highlight that this chapter explores similarities in when and why governments respond to indigenous territorial demands through policy. While indigenous communities in both Bolivia and Chile have presented similar territorial demands, there are significant differences in how the Bolivian and Chilean governments have responded.

The Chilean government has always responded to indigenous territorial demands with land policy, and has not considered granting indigenous communities components of territorial rights. Because of the consistency of the Chilean government’s response to indigenous territorial demands, the government’s policy response is captured by one policy, 20B. In contrast, the Bolivian government’s response has evolved to include increasingly strong, but still deficient, territorial rights; today, debates over the Bolivian government’s response to territorial demands focus on degrees self-determination and autonomy. Chapter 4 outlines these differences in the shape of the Bolivian and Chilean

565 In Chile, there is no domestic legal precedent that establishes indigenous communities’ right to exercise degrees of autonomy over claimed land. The Chilean land policy analyzed throughout this dissertation establishes the legal procedures for indigenous communities in Chile to formally acquire property rights to ancestrally claimed land. The policy does not establish jurisdiction over this land. I argue that both the acquisition of property title and jurisdiction over that property are integral components of the acquisition of “territorial rights.” For additional discussion of specific elements in recognizing territorial rights, see chapter 4.

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governments’ response to territorial demands; this chapter explores if the same motivations underlie the implementation of territorial rights recognitions.

This chapter argues that the interaction of indigenous mobilization, elite allies, and economic stakeholders drives when and why governments respond to indigenous communities’ territorial demands; indigenous communities must leverage political elites to intervene on their behalf to overcome the powerful economic and political stakeholders that supersede indigenous communities’ demands for land and territorial rights. As evidenced by the Chilean case, indigenous communities usually acquire this leverage through mobilization; the Bolivian case highlights that indigenous communities can acquire political elite allies through both mobilization and political alliances. In a less institutionalized system of governance, the links between powerful stakeholders and patterns of policy implementation are more evident, making contentious action both more necessary and more consequential for indigenous communities.

This chapter draws on three of the most public and substantial instances in which the Bolivian government responded to indigenous communities’ territorial rights demands; these three announcements recognize more than 18% of Bolivia’s total land as indigenous territory. A 1990 march resulted in the recognition of more than 2 million hectares for three specific territories. In 1996, the combination of mobilization and political negotiation resulted in the recognition of 10 million hectares for 16 indigenous communities. When Evo Morales assumed the presidency in 2006, indigenous demands converged with Morales’s political agenda, resulting in an impressive increase in land distribution that was not explicitly triggered by mobilization. Most substantively, Morales announced the distribution of more than 7 million hectares in 2006 in Santa Cruz, the

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geographical center of his opposition. This alliance, however, was short-lived; indigenous communities’ current demands for autonomy have stalled as they no longer overlap with the political interests of the Morales administration.

This chapter, first, establishes the demands of Bolivian indigenous communities, clarifying between demands of highland and lowland indigenous communities, and details how the extractive economic model has infringed on indigenous territorial rights.

Second, it reviews expectations of Bolivian governance and the strength of indigenous organizations and territorial rights recognitions in Bolivia. Despite these drastic differences in the strength of indigenous mobilization and indigenous rights recognitions between the Chilean and Bolivian cases, the allocation of land and territorial rights are similarly determined. The three cases discussed here (recognitions announced in 1990,

1996, 2006), the most significant acquisition of territorial rights, highlight that indigenous communities acquired rights when they were able to leverage political elites to intervene on their behalf, often at the expense of private stakeholders. The chapter concludes by discussing the current status of indigenous communities’ efforts to acquire autonomy, highlighting that without leverage over political elites, these efforts have stalled.

Territorial Demands in Bolivia

As in Chile, territorial rights are among the most salient demands of indigenous communities in Bolivia. While land policy historically prioritizes the economic utility of land, indigenous groups call for broader recognition of the economic, social, political, and historical components of territory. As one activist describes:

We have discovered that the first problem is land, territory. We believe that the fundamental base is territory; without mother earth we could not have education, there could be no health, there could be no pueblo with its own cultural identity, language, religion, etc. For the indigenous pueblos

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it’s the fundamental base so that they will have life itself, so that there will be a guarantee for survival and population growth.566

Another concludes, “It falls entirely outside of the mental scheme of the Guarani that land could be negotiated and converted into an object of merchandise, any more than could air or water.”567 The recognition and exercise of these rights is integral to the indigenous rights agenda, providing the foundation for broader demands to self- determination and autonomy.568

Land plays a prominent role in Bolivia’s political and economic development; as

Malloy describes of the importance of land in the mid-20th century, land possession was

“…fundamental, almost mystical. It was through land ownership that one anchored himself to the world.”569 The 1952 Revolution and successive 1953 Land Reform set a strong precedent for future debates over land policy in Bolivia. After the military prevented the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist

Movement, MNR) from taking power after winning the 1951 election, the MNR overthrew the government in an alliance with armed peasants, promising broad reforms that would shift economic and political power, focusing on the mines and haciendas. The resulting 1953 Agrarian Reform worked to pull apart the hacienda system, transferring unused or abandoned land to the colonos, hacienda workers, and Indian communities

566 Qtd in Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, 203. 567 Qtd in Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia, 91. 568 Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge. Robert Andolina, "Colonial Legacies and Plurinational Imaginaries: Indigenous Movement Politics in Ecuador and Bolivia" (University of Minnesota, 1999). José Antonio Lucero, "Arts of Unification: Political Representation and Indigenous Movements in Bolivia and Ecuador" (Princeton University, 2002). 569 James Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970), 189.

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(communitarios). 570 Setting a precedent for future reforms, the reform declared that land belonged to the state and private property had to serve a function benefitting the national collective; as Malloy summarizes, “land was then theoretically held in usufruct, development aims overrode individual profit, and the guardian of the economy was the state.”571 Much of this was motivated by and accomplished through direct action; land takeovers after the 1952 revolution forced the promulgation of the 1953 reform, setting a precedent for peasants to occupy unused and abandoned land and present their claim to the government. Conflicts arose as landowners tried to temper the reforms by selling small plots of land to colonos to preserve control and power.572 The reforms were considered to be largely successful, freeing up the rural work force, and distributing a third of the country to poor campesinos.573

The 1953 Reform was motivated to address land scarcity in the highlands, yet had a lasting impact on land tenure in the lowlands, creating conditions that strongly promoted the development of the agriculture, coca, and hydrocarbon industries.

Particularly in the 1970s during the Hugo Banzer Suárez military dictatorship, land was distributed to those that were well-connected with Agrarian Reform Council to develop commercial sugar, rice, cattle, and soy production. In total, an estimated 25 to 30 million hectares of fiscal lands was distributed between 1967 and 1993, “leading to the emergence of junker-type corporate landholdings and large idle estates.”574 Particularly

570 Ibid., 206. 571 Ibid. 572 Ibid., 191. 573 Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, 158. For details on these trends and exceptions, see Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution. 574 Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, 195.

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during military dictatorships, overlapping titles were granted to political allies with improper paperwork. As the lowlands opened up to development, the government encouraged highland peasants to colonize the growing region.575

These patterns of land use continued as Bolivia shifted to an export-driven neoliberal model in the 1980s and 1990s. To address persisting land scarcity in the highlands, successive administrations encouraged the development of commercial agriculture, logging, and hydrocarbon production in the lowlands. An influx of international capital in the 1970s and 1980s further prompted the rapid expansion of agriculture and drug production and strengthened the position of local elites. The Morales administration has shifted towards what is often referred to as neoextractivism,

“progressive extractivism,” or “Andean-Amazonian capitalism.”576 The state plays a prominent role in attracting and developing resource extraction and primary commodity exports, works to develop industrial infrastructure to add value within the country, and uses the profits to fund domestic social welfare programs.577 According, the discourse justifying extractivism has shifted under the Morales administration, but “… the state’s rights and the pretext of collective societal interest often trump Indigenous rights and environmental protection.”578 As of 2011, Bolivia remains the most natural resource dependent economy in Latin America, with exports of primary products accounting for

95.5% of the country’s exports.579 Felipe Quispe, an Aymara activist, union leader, and

575 Reforms were to be implemented by Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria (SNRA, created in 1953) and Instituto Nacional de Colonisación (INC, 1966). 576 Hindery, From Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia, 3. 577 Veltmeyer and Petras, "The New Extractivism in Latin America," 82. 578 Hindery, From Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia, 3. 579 Veltmeyer and Petras, "The New Extractivism in Latin America," 84.

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politician, went as far as asserting that the MAS government (Movimiento al Socialismo,

Movement for Socialism) is “neoliberalism with an Indian face.”580

As in Chile, the expansion of extractive industries has infringed on indigenous communities’ territorial rights, triggering mobilization. Territorial rights were first discussed in 1984, when the Coordinating Body of the Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon

(COICA) discussed and adopted the strategy of claiming land not for its productive value, but rather for its political, cultural, and social significance.581 In Bolivia, Amazonian indigenous communities advanced territorial demands as “an integral part of an indigenous political project;”582 this project later spread to the highlands, particularly after the success of the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity.583 Territorial rights demands shifted from being a demand for land and equality to an integral component of a broader political project articulating indigenous communities’ rights to self-determination and autonomy. As Postero summarizes, “…mobilization arose to reclaim the commons.

A burgeoning wave of Indigenous and popular resistance to neoliberalism would take the form of place-based struggles over natural resources.”584

Governance and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia

As discussed, Chile is a least likely case for indigenous communities to drive the implementation of land policy, due to the technocratic, bureaucratic expectations of

580 Farthing and Kohl, Evo's Bolivia: Continuity and Change, 148. 581 Healy, Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia, 81. and Lucero, Struggles of Voice: The Politics of Indigenous Representation in the Andes, 92. 582 ———, Struggles of Voice: The Politics of Indigenous Representation in the Andes, 105. 583 This distinction between highland and lowland indigenous demands is argued to be linked to the history of land tenure and agrarian reform in the respective regions. See Lucero (2008), Assies (2000), and Zuniga (1998) for a discussion of the construction of territorial demands and the potentially exclusionary and inappropriate “territorial model” of recognizing indigenous land rights. 584 Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia. See also Hindery, From Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia, 59.

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Chilean governance and the comparative weakness of the indigenous movement and indigenous rights recognitions. Each of these expectations is flipped in the Bolivian case, making it much more likely that indigenous communities in Bolivia are able to instrumentally leverage political elites to acquire land and territorial rights; direct action has a much greater influence on national and local politics, indigenous organizations have emerged as prominent political actors, and the Bolivian bureaucracy is much weaker.

Furthermore, as was highlighted in Chapter 4, Bolivia’s implementation procedures are far less institutionalized, compared to the Chilean case.

Expectations of Bolivian Governance

Bolivia’s return to democracy in 1982 brought a certain degree of political stability for several years to national politics after more than 170 coups after independence in 1825. Electoral rules produced relatively stable votes for political parties

(3.93 ENPP from 1985 to 2002) and elected the president and legislators from the same party, encouraging cooperation between the two branches.585 Political parties and the armed forces respected succession, even when Congress elected left-wing Jaime Paz

Zamora president after finishing third in the 1989 popular vote.

This stability greatly facilitated an economic restructuring project that shifted

Bolivia’s economy from state to market-directed. In 1985, leaders signed the “Pact for

Democracy,” agreeing to work through Congress on dramatic economic reforms and use the executive branch’s force to suppress the weakened labor movement. These shifts had rapid and severe impacts on Bolivian workers as industries were privatized and state

585 The party system was structured around the National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario, MNR), the Left Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario, MIR), and the National Democratic Action (Accion Democratica Nacional, ADN) party.

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programs eliminated. In 1985, most of Bolivia’s nationalized mines were closed and 40-

45% of state miners and factory workers fired between 1985 and 1987.

These economic reforms, and elite consensus over the restructuring project, reshaped patterns of participation and representation. Previously, unions organized around specific societal demands in corporatist, class-based forms of representation, primarily through the powerful Bolivian Workers’ Central (Central Obrera Boliviana,

COB). Neoliberal restructuring pulled apart those forms of interest articulation in favor of “a more atomized or individuated set of state-society relations."586 With elite consensus over the reforms, frustration was increasingly expressed extrainstitutionally. In

2001, a prominent observer predicted that “large sections of the population may see no reason to play the game or may even be attracted to ‘antisystem’ challengers.”587 Indeed, throughout the 2000s, protests shut down the country on multiple instances, particularly during the 2000 Water Wars and the 2003 Gas Wars, culminating with President Gonzalo

Sánchez de Lozada fleeing from the country after using excessive force on mostly unarmed protesters. In contrast with prior protest in Bolivia that usually focused on the specific demands of specific groups, these waves of protest expressed broad discontent with the neoliberal project588 that cut across class, regional, and ethnic cleavages.589 The

586 Deborah J Yashar, "Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and Postliberal Challenge in Latin America," World Politics 52, no. 01 (1999): 81. See also Robert R Barr, "Bolivia: Another Uncompleted Revolution," Latin American Politics and Society 47, no. 3 (2005). 587 Laurence Whitehead, "Bolivia and the Viability of Democracy," Journal of Democracy 12, no. 2 (2001): 9. 588 Benjamin Kohl and Linda C Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal Hegemony and Popular Resistance (London and New York: Zed Books, 2006).; Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia. 589 Kohl and Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal Hegemony and Popular Resistance.; Forrest Hylton, Sinclair Thomson, and Adolfo Gilly, Revolutionary Horizons: Past and Present in Bolivian Politics (London: Verso, 2007).

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breakdown of class-based interest articulation opened space for organization by indigenous groups, neighborhood, and rural landless organizations.590

Institutional weakness persisted through these economic and political swings.

Corruption and weak of rule of law undermined economic restructuring efforts;591 in

2005, Transparency International ranked Bolivia as one of the most corrupt in the world.

One observer concluded that “… the efficient, streamlined state envisioned by neoliberalism has not yet been realized. As a result, the state in Bolivia remains weak and unable to handle the proliferation of societal demands.”592 Institutional weakness has persisted during the MAS government, and bureaucratic and legislative efficiency has been challenged by the administration’s decision to adopt the tradition of the rural unions and highland indigenous communities of using rotational service.593 One bureaucrat summarized that, “It is a government by reaction not by proposals and programs.

Everyone works to keep the boss happy, and we can’t really accomplish anything unless there is political pressure from higher in the government, the press, or from the streets.”594 Another describes the impact of the ascendance of the MAS and its social base, asserting “These new elites are concerned with occupying, rather than administering, power. So the change is that of the player not the game. The old ways of doing things in terms of corruption and inefficiency are the same as before.”595

590 Roberta Rice, "Channeling Discontent: The Impact of Political Institutions on Patterns of Social Protest in Contemporary Latin America," (2003).; Moisés Arce and Roberta Rice, "Societal Protest in Post- Stabilization Bolivia," Latin American Research Review 44, no. 1 (2009). 591Fabrice Lehoucq, "Bolivia's Constitutional Breakdown," Journal of Democracy 19, no. 4 (2008). 592 Barr, "Bolivia: Another Uncompleted Revolution." 593 Farthing and Kohl, Evo's Bolivia: Continuity and Change, 59. 594 Qtd in ibid., 62. 595 Ibid., 153.

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Indigenous Politics

Indigenous organizations have only recently emerged as prominent political actors, despite comprising a significant portion of the Bolivian population.596 In the western highlands, nearly 70% of the land-poor rural population is indigenous, primarily of Aymara and Quechua descent. Historically, highland indigenous communities framed their demands as peasants and workers (campesinizó, sindicalizó597), due to patterns of land tenure, state settlement, and incorporation projects. In the 1970s, the Aymara

Katarista movement asserted the class and ethnic-basis of indigenous oppression, and labor unions, most notably the Bolivian Unitary Syndical Peasants Workers

Confederation (CSUTCB), incorporated indigenous demands into their class-based demands. Highlands communities tend to frame demands as peasants and later as First

Nations (pueblos originarios), rather than as indigenous, conceptualizing land as belonging to those who use it productively. In the 1990s, highland communities already had strong ties with political parties, facilitating organization around rights to create autonomous political spaces.

Indigenous communities are the minority in the more sparsely populated lowlands, comprised of the eastern provinces of Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz and Tarija, often referred to as the half-moon or media luna. The lowlands account for more than two thirds of the country’s land, but only one third of the country’s population. 34 distinct lowlands indigenous groups comprise around 5% of the total Bolivian population

596 In the 2001 Bolivian census, 62% of people over the age or 15 self-identified as indigenous; in the 2012 census, 40.3% self-identified as indigenous. For additional details, see: Inter-American Development Bank, "Counting Bolivia's Indigenous Peoples," ed. Gender and Diversity Division (2014).; Luis Fernando Angosto Ferrández and Sabine Kradolfer, Everlasting Countdowns: Race, Ethnicity and National Censuses in Latin American States (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013). 597 Xavier Albó, "Bolivia: Avances y tropezones hacia un nuevo país plurinacional e intercultural," in Pueblos indígenas y política en América Latina, ed. Salvador Martí i Puig (Fundación CIDOB, 2007).

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(~500,000). In contrast to the highlands, the eastern lowland regions saw much less state involvement as the state developed and expanded. Indigenous communities were never made into peasants by the state and the MNR land reform was not implemented in the lowlands, leaving intact large plots of land. 598 As a result, lowland indigenous demands are on the basis of indigenous identity and, usually work in conjunction with NGOs rather than unions or class, as in the highlands.599 It was only in the late 1990s that lowland communities sought the attention of political parties, leveraging politicians from competing parties against each other.600

Indigenous communities have taken an increasingly prominent position in the national political scene. The salience of these demands and power of the emerging movement is evident in Sanchez de Lozada’s choice of Victor Hugo Cárdenas as the vice-presidential candidate in the 1993 presidential election. After taking office, the new government created a Sub-Secretary of Ethnic Affairs (SEA) and signed an agreement with indigenous groups to incorporate indigenous demands into legislation. The escalation of indigenous influence culminated with the election of Evo Morales in

December of 2005, representing a “historical blow against informal apartheid race relations.”601 MAS’s indigenist, Marxist, and popular nationalist platform brought together rural and urban social movements that demanded a political, economic, and

598 Irene Hernaiz and Diego Pacheco, La ley Inra en el espejo de la historia: Propuestas de modificación, ed. Fundación TIERRA, La Paz: Plural Editores (2001). 599 See Lucero, "Arts of Unification: Political Representation and Indigenous Movements in Bolivia and Ecuador", 160. 600 Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics, 72.; Andolina, "Colonial Legacies and Plurinational Imaginaries: Indigenous Movement Politics in Ecuador and Bolivia", 243. 601 Qtd in Hindery, From Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia, 148.

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social refounding of Bolivia.602 In December 2009, Morales was reelected with 64% of the vote, 8% more than in 2005.

This increasing presence has translated into one of the most advanced recognition of indigenous rights in Latin America. ILO 169 was signed in 1991. The 1994

Constitution declared the country to be “multi-ethnic and pluri-cultural,” implementing a number of reforms to address indigenous peoples’ demands.603 In 2007, Bolivia became the first country to officially recognize the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of

Indigenous Peoples (Ley 3760). The 2009 constitution declares the state to be plurinational and establishes indigenous communities’ right to political autonomy, consultation, and self-determination, approaching international standards on indigenous rights.

Bolivia’s territorial rights recognitions are also advanced. Since 1994, the constitution and accompanying regulatory framework declares communally held land to be indivisible, inembargable, inalienable, and imprescriptible, protecting this land from reincorporation into land markets. In 2004, Bolivia was classified as having advanced protection of indigenous territorial rights.604 Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution moves further to recognize territorial rights, broadly defining territory to include “areas of production, use and conservation of natural resources, and spaces of social, spiritual and cultural

602 Farthing and Kohl, Evo's Bolivia: Continuity and Change, 15. 603 Donna Lee Van Cott, "Constitutional Reform in the Andes: Redefining Indigenous-State Relations," Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity and Democracy, Nueva York (2002): 53. 604 Ortega classifies the extent to which Latin American countries constitutionally protected indigenous rights, proposing that Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru had advanced protection of indigenous rights (including the legal framework and a sufficient commitment to implementation); Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Argentina had started to make commitments, but had not sufficiently regulated or implemented these commitments; and El Salvador, Guyana, Suriname, and Uruguay had made no commitments. Ortega, Models for Recognizing Indigenous Land Rights in Latin America.

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reproduction” (Article 403). In 2010, Bolivia established the legal precedent for indigenous communities to acquire degrees of autonomy by converting either existing municipalities or TIOCs into an indigenous autonomy (referred to as AIOC status), one of four constitutionally established levels of territorial organization with degrees of autonomy. Chapter 4 further discusses the evolution of how the Bolivia government recognizes indigenous land and territory.

Acquiring Land and Territorial Rights

While Bolivia has certainly advanced much further than Chile in its recognition of indigenous territorial rights, do the same motivations underlie when and why the Bolivian government responds to indigenous communities’ territorial demands? Do competing stakeholders, often powerful economic elites, have a similarly dissuasive impact on communities’ abilities to acquire land or territorial rights? Do stronger rights recognitions translate to broader access to territorial rights? Did the election of Evo Morales provide indigenous communities an ally who could facilitate the broader acquisition of territorial rights?

This section highlights that despite swings between political administrations and policy procedures, particular Bolivian indigenous communities acquire territorial rights by leveraging elite political actors to act on their behalf, often to the detriment of powerful local stakeholders. For most of the period under analysis, leverage came from mobilization. Once elected to office, Morales’s political interests converged with indigenous demands, no longer necessitating mobilization to acquire elite allies. These interests quickly diverged, however, inhibiting indigenous communities’ ability to acquire territorial rights.

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To highlight this argument, I draw on three cases (1990, 1996, 2006) in which indigenous communities acquired land or territorial rights to significant portions of land.

These cases were chosen for being the instances in which indigenous communities acquired formal rights to significant portions of land (2 million hectares in 1990, 10 million hectares in 1996, 7 million hectares in 2006), accounting for 18% of the country’s total land mass.605 For each of the three cases, I explore the conditions that led up to the land acquisition, detailing what land or territory was being claimed by which communities or organizations, the competing interests and stakeholders, the political action of these organizations, and the conditions under which the government responded to these demands. I conclude by discussing indigenous communities’ current efforts to acquire degrees of autonomy, further highlighting the necessity of acquiring elite allies.

1990

In 1990, indigenous communities from three regions in the lowlands marched over 500 kilometers to the Bolivian capital of La Paz, returning with executive decrees declaring their rights to more than two million hectares of land. While government officials previously promised to recognize these territories, the lobbying efforts of powerful logging companies had stalled the formal recognitions. It was not until the march arrived to La Paz that President Jaime Paz Zamora signed executive decrees.

As discussed above, development and colonization in the lowlands often came at the expense of lowland indigenous communities, who held varying legal status over both

605 Certainly, indigenous communities in Bolivia have acquired substantial territorial rights, far beyond what is discussed in this chapter. Due to the challenges of finding data on the full range of these smaller, less public acquisitions of territorial rights, this chapter discusses the most prominent cases. As is discussed in the conclusion, preliminary research suggests that the same dynamics are at play in these smaller acquisitions. Future research will explore the full range of territorial rights acquisitions.

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occupied and claimed land. The march emerged, specifically, surrounding indigenous land demands over the Chimane Forest, Isiboro Sécure Park (presently Territorio

Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure, TIPNIS), and Ibiato (Lomo Alta), shown in

Figure 20 in the Appendix. The Isiboro-Sécure Park was declared a national park in 1965 by DS 07401 (1.2 million hectares), but colonization and expanding logging interests prompted indigenous communities to demand in 1988 that all of the national park be declared indigenous territory.606 As one leader of the 1990 march describes:

We the indigenous made the paths to our fields and along these same paths came the carayanas, that is, the White people. As they were knowledgeable in documents and papers, they began to consolidate the land, because they themselves were the authorities. ‘Ok, this mine. Here is my title. What do you have? Nothing, Eh?’ they would say. So we went further into the bush. We established our villages. But the White people came, so again we went further in, and again and again, until there came a time when there was nowhere else to go.607

Similarly, the 1.2 million hectare Chimane Forest had been declared a Reserva de

Inmovilización Forestal in 1978, a status that was revoked in 1986 to allow for the expansion of extractive logging and milling companies starting in 1988.608 In Ibiato, at least 11 large agricultural titles were awarded, to the point that the Sirionó indigenous community in the region almost took up arms in July 1989 before the ILO intervened.609

These neighboring lowland indigenous communities realized their shared experiences and grievances, organizing into regional coordinating committees. One activist describes this realization “We started traveling and realized our brothers’

606 Alex Contreras, Etapa de una larga marcha, ed. Asociacion Aqui Avance and Educacion Radiofonica de Bolivia, La Paz: Semanario Aqui Y Erbol (La Paz, Bolivia: Ediciones Graficas, 1991), 12. 607 Qtd in Assies, "Land Tenure in Bolivia: From Colonial Times to Post-Neoliberalism," 298. 608 "La Marcha Por El Territorio Y La Dignidad (1990)," http://www.gobernabilidad.org.bo/piocs/tierra-y- territorio/la-marcha-por-el-territorio-y-la-dignidad. 609 Ibid.

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problems… we learned that the problems in the Chimanes Forest, El Ibiato, and Isiboro

Sécure National Park were the most troubling and that it was not sufficient to address these problems by just working with the mojeña nation.”610 During the 1980s, lowland groups organized numerous marches under CIDOB (Confederation of Indigenous

Peoples of Eastern Bolivia) and established the Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni

(CPIB) in November 1989, in coordination with CIDOB.611

With this organization in place, the communities presented strong demands to the government. One activist describes the communities’ efforts at length:

Frustrated with our failure to interest the local authorities in the Chimane forest indigenous-logger conflicts, we finally approached a friend of mine, the ex-wife of the Minister of Information. … she arranged for us to have a private meeting with Victor Paz Estenssoro, the President of Bolivia, on January 12, 1988. Personal contacts and networks are always the most useful resource for making things happen in this country. …Victor Paz showed surprisingly great interest in the situation of the native groups. He probably did so because the Bolivian government had recently been criticized in a UN forum… At the meeting, President Paz expressed a serious commitment to bringing about needed changes in land tenure laws. The upshot of the meeting was his agreement to issue a presidential decree acknowledging collective rights to forest dwellers of the eastern lowlands.612

With this verbal commitment from the president, indigenous organizations returned to

Beni to draft a presidential decree and map land claims. Yet, the commission appointed by the president was unwilling to respond to indigenous demands in a way that would threaten the interests of the powerful economic interests at stake in the Chimane forest;

610 Contreras, Etapa de una larga marcha, xxiii. 611 Healy, Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia, 369. 612 Qtd in ibid., 371-2.

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maps were repeatedly drawn so that valuable mahogany forests would remain controlled by timber companies.

Activists turned to direct action to confront these interests; one leader of the 1990

March explained, “When a wild animal is wounded, cornered and has nowhere to escape to, the only thing left for it is to attack.”613 In May 1990, the organization gave the government until August 2nd to resolve their demands, threatening to march to La Paz and carry out a “…bloody struggle against those who are taking away their territory so that they stop the abuses and ridicule.”614 The portrayal of the subsequent events by Marcial, a regional leader for CEPIB, is revealing:

Threatened by our public announcement of the march, the government quickly added hundreds of thousands of hectares to the Chimanes offer but once again did little to alter the loggers’ control over the area. In response, we opted to radicalize our demands instead of modify them. From now on, we are requesting the entire Chimani Forest, the termination of forest concessions there, and the ouster of these companies from the zone. The government persisted in offering the park to us as an ‘indigenous area,’ negating our preferred term of ‘indigenous territory’ and the figures for the restitution of savanna lands were far below our demands. Thus it was time to march. In July, we issued an ultimatum to the national government: either accept our territorial demands or the march would commence on August 2nd, Bolivia’s annual Day of the Indian.615

With the inadequacy of the government’s response, 300 indigenous people started the more than 500 kilometer, 34 day march from Trinidad in the region of Beni to La Paz, referred to as the March for Dignity and Territory. Eight ethnic groups were represented among the original marchers, primarily from Chimane (SE Beni), Isiboro-Sécure (S

Beni), led by the Beni Indigenous Peoples’ Central. Nearly 400 additional marchers

613 Assies, "Land Tenure in Bolivia: From Colonial Times to Post-Neoliberalism," 298. 614 Contreras, Etapa de una larga marcha, 8, 13. 615 Healy, Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia, 375-6.

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joined along the route, as, for many, the march came to represent the government’s insufficient response to legitimate demands of historically excluded groups, not just of the lowland indigenous communities, but of the Bolivian population as a whole.

The influence of the extraction companies was evident during the march and resulting negotiations. Companies drew on political connections and economic influence, alerting politicians of the threat indigenous demands posed to private property, arguing that “The government is erasing with its elbow what it wrote by hand, irresponsibly seeking popularity.” 616 They took out newspaper ads warning that indigenous demands threatened national sovereignty with the potential creation of a state within a state.617 The links between companies and the government was visible to the indigenous marchers and leaders, one of who reported that, “negotiations are not easy, because the government is meeting with the empresarios to ensure their interests first.”618 Another described that,

“The minister offers more Chimane forest each time but the timber extraction area remains untouched. The minister tried to sweeten the pot with offers of schools and health clinics, trivial items in the context of our struggle for territories.”619 By September

12th, activists communicated that, “We will no longer accept deception from the government ... it seems that the government does not want us to get to La Paz and see the loggers and ranchers…”620 Yet, repeated negotiations only resulted in the “government

616 Contreras, Etapa de una larga marcha, 199. 617 Healy, Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia, 382. 618 Contreras, Etapa de una larga marcha, 46. 619 Qtd in Healy, Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia, 378. 620 Contreras, Etapa de una larga marcha, 116.

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hardening their position on the territorial concession for the central part of the Chimanes forest.” 621

The government’s frustration and confusion over the march was evident as negotiations continued. Vice President Luis Ossio Sanjines repeatedly made comments as to how “the indigenous are nomadic, adventurous peoples who just came to see La

Paz.”622 One government official, and former indigenous leader, recounted that, “… the

Minister of the Interior turned to me and said, ‘Let’s end this ridiculous adventure, Jorge.

It’s a lot of nonsense, and an embarrassing situation for us. It’s time to send out the police equipped with billy clubs and tear gas to break up the whole thing once and for all.’”623

Reports emerged that Bolivian elite feared the emergence of an Indian-based guerrilla movement similar to Peru’s Shining Path. While misguided, the emergence of several extremely small groups with “Katarista-sounding names” between 1987 and 1990 pushed politicians to respond to indigenous demands.624 Sanchez de Lozada went as far as to remark that choosing Victor Hugo Cardenas as his running mate in 1993 was evidence that Bolivia would respect linguistic and cultural diversity and, accordingly, there was no need to worry about the emergence of a Shining Path in Bolivia.625

As the marchers arrived to La Paz, the Chimane Forest remained the key point of contention. The government had largely agreed to recognize Isiboro- Sécure and Ibiato through executive decree, but preserved four timber extraction companies’ concessions in the central portion of the Chimane Forest without offering any requirement of

621 Ibid., 113. 622 Ibid., 83. 623 Qtd in Healy, Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia, 378. 624 Van Cott, The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America, 144. 625 Ibid.

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consultation or profit-sharing. The government had gone as far as promising that the forestry concessions would be re-located and the area re-zoned after their concessions ended, to which the marchers threated a hunger strike with the support of COB,

CSUTCB, and other popular organizations.626 It was not until the march reached La Paz on September 22nd that march leaders reached an agreement with government officials.

One government official and indigenous activist speculated at why President Paz Zamora agreed to reach an agreement despite the lobbying of the private sector:

I suspect two things were behind the president’s change of heart. International pressure was beginning to take a toll on his psyche through a bombardment of international faxes, cables, and newspaper articles landing at the national palace. Equally important, it had probably dawned on him that there was great public relations potential in signing decrees for indigenous territorial rights under the spotlight of the media in La Paz. It promised a windfall of favorable publicity. His presidential prestige would soar if he appeared as the benevolent patriarch reaching down to aid the needy and abused indigenous peoples. He’s a savvy politician and knew the palace would make a more spectacular stage set for image-making than the dusty, grubby town of Yolosa.627

It is also important to consider the shift in President Paz Zamora’s political agenda. Paz

Zamora founded the Revolutionary Left Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda

Revolucionaria, MIR), a member of the Socialist International, while exiled in the early

1970s. Both the MIR and Paz Zamora shifted away from this more radical platform in the late 1980s and, to secure the presidency after coming in third in the 1989 election, Paz

626 Contreras, Etapa de una larga marcha, 151. Arnaldo Lijerón Casanovas, De la resistencia pacifica a la interpelacion historica: Crónica preliminar de la Marcha Indígena Por El Territorio Y La Dignidad (Trinidad: Centro de Investigación y Documentación para el Desarrollo del Beni (CIDDEBENI), 1991), 21.. 627 Healy, Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia, 384.

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struck a “Patriotic Accord” with former dictator Hugo Banzar, who was part of the right- wing Nationalist Democratic Action (Acción Democrática Nacionalista, ADN).

The 1990 March for Territory and Dignity resulted in the recognition of three lowland indigenous territories by Supreme Decree (22609, 22610, 22611), signed by

President Paz Zamora on September 24th, 1990. These decrees declared the properties to be collectively owned, protected areas that are indivisible, inembargable, inalienable, and imprescriptible.628 It also resulted in the creation of a commission that would create more permanent legislation addressing the demands of lowlands indigenous communities

(22612)629 and prompted the ratification of ILO Convention 169 in 1991. These executive decrees set a precedent that the government had the capacity and willingness to respond to indigenous territorial demands, as well as the effectiveness of mobilization in attracting the attention of the government. Additional executive decrees recognized a total of 9 indigenous territories between 1990 and 1992, totaling more than 2.5 million hectares (See Figure 20 in Appendix).630 With the potential for these executive decrees to be overturned by later administrations, future mobilization sought legislation that would give more legal weight to the recognition of these territories, accomplished with the 1995

Constitutional Reforms and 1996 Ley INRA.631

Implementation of these executive decrees was plagued by the same tensions between indigenous and economic interests. Private sector interests continued to pressure the government on the legality of the decrees, on the grounds that the decrees were not

628 Hernaiz and Pacheco, La ley Inra en el espejo de la historia: Propuestas de modificación, 143. 629 Anthias and Radcliffe, "The Ethno-Environmental Fix and Its Limits: Indigenous Land Titling and the Production of Not-Quite-Neoliberal Natures in Bolivia." 630 Assies, "Land Tenure in Bolivia: From Colonial Times to Post-Neoliberalism," 298. Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, 213. 631 ———, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, 213.

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congressionally approved legislation.632 By 1995, only 50% of land in Sirino was demarcated and only 9 of 15 cattle ranchers’ plots were relocated or reduced in size; the 6 remaining ranchers had “political clout.”633 In TIPNIS, only 27% of indigenous land was demarcated. Chimane remained particularly problematic, as 6 of 7 timber companies continued to effectively operate.634 Yashar suggests that the government selectively responded to some demands, focusing on titling land where the state’s administrative capacity was the weakest.635

As evidenced by these first recognitions of indigenous rights in the lowlands, mobilization played a prominent role in indigenous communities’ ability to direct their demands to national level politicians, who responded with executive decrees.636

Politicians promised to respond to these demands, but indigenous communities became increasingly frustrated that powerful economic interests superseded their own demands.

Executive decrees only came after a national march captured national political attention; indigenous communities escalated their demands, leveraging them to prioritize indigenous demands over those of powerful economic interests.

1996

In 1996, a second indigenous march resulted in the recognition of 24 portions of land as indigenous territories and opened the door for later recognition of 16 additional

632 Healy, Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia, 389. 633 Ibid., 389-91. 634 The local mills that lost their concessions continued to function, buying from private operators. Only 78km and 39km of territory was demarcated. Ibid. 635 Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, 213. 636 Ibid., 217.

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territories, totaling nearly 12 million hectares of land.637 In contrast to 1990, indigenous territorial demands in 1996 were pulled into debates over a widely-contested land tenure reform project that pitted the interests of highland indigenous and campesino communities, lowland communities, and lowland agricultural interests against each other.

Because of these competing interests, the combination of mobilization and political negotiation was necessary to prompt the government’s response.

President Paz Zamora initiated debate over agrarian policy in 1992, in conjunction with the World Bank’s National Project for Land Administration (PNAT).638 The need for reform became evident after a 1992 scandal exposed broad irregularities in the land reform process and land titles;639 an estimated 30 to 60% of the country was titled with up to 7 overlapping titles.640 The reform would remove restrictions on the sale of land, allowing for land to be used as a source of credit.641 This would be done by clarifying the institutional instability underpinning land tenure, primarily through saneamiento

(regularization; literal translation: cleansing) of land titles. It set a target date of 10 years from the promulgation of ley INRA (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria, Law of the

National Institute of Agrarian Reform) to clarify all of Bolivia’s land titles, as a means to addressing land insecurity and land scarcity.

Because territorial demands were subsumed into debates over broader land tenure reform, multiple stakeholders were involved, turning the law into “an unusual

637 Healy, Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia, 395, Urioste and Pacheco, "Las tierras bajas de Bolivia a fines del siglo XX," 17. 638Anthias and Radcliffe, "The Ethno-Environmental Fix and Its Limits: Indigenous Land Titling and the Production of Not-Quite-Neoliberal Natures in Bolivia." 639 Assies, “Land tenure legalization, pluriculturalism and multiethnicity in Bolivia.” Colloque international “Les frontières de la question foncière – At the frontier of land issues”, Montpellier, 2006 640 Assies, "Land Tenure in Bolivia: From Colonial Times to Post-Neoliberalism," 298. 641 Urioste et al., "Land Market in a New Context: The Inra Law in Bolivia," 260-1.

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combination of neoliberal and social justice measures.”642 In 1994, Sánchez de Lozada presented an initial proposal, ‘INTI’ (Ley del Instituto Nacional de Tierras), quickly countered by the ‘INKA’ law proposal (Ley del Instituto Nacional Kollasuyo-Andino-

Amazónico) of peasant and indigenous organizations.643

For lowland indigenous communities, the proposed project offered the potential to strengthen the recognition of indigenous territories established by executive decrees after the 1990 march. Many of these demands were included in discussions of the law project; the lowland indigenous communities broke from the highland rural sector, negotiating for land titles.644 With this agreement in hand, lowland communities mobilized in support of the law project after it was delayed. 645 CIDOB called for a repeat of the 1990 march to

La Paz, organizing 500 lowlands indigenous peoples in Samaipata on a march in August

27.

While lowland communities mobilized to pressure for the approval of the law, highland indigenous communities, represented through CSUTCB and COB, were in opposition. Specifically, they opposed that the TCO (Tierras Comunitarias de Orígen,

Communal Indigenous Lands) would be the only recognized form of indigenous land tenure, to the exclusion of highland ayllu organization.646 They were also concerned that poor campesinos would lose their land if unable to pay taxes on their property.647 In an effort to negotiate the terms of the law, highland marchers joined lowland marchers,

642 Deere and Leon, "Institutional Reform of Agriculture under Neoliberalism: The Impact of the Women's and Indigenous Movements," 37. 643 Assies, "Land Tenure in Bolivia: From Colonial Times to Post-Neoliberalism," 298. 644 Latin American Weekly Report - 24 October 1996 645 Gustavo Pedraza, "Saneamiento De Tierras Comunitarias De Origen," Fundacion Tierra, http://www.ftierra.org/ft/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=882:rair&catid=130:ft&Item id=188. 646 Hernaiz and Pacheco, La ley Inra en el espejo de la historia: Propuestas de modificación, 149. 647 Fundacion TIERRA, "Bolivia: Ley de Tierras," in Encuentro ICCO- ALOP (La Paz, Bolivia: 1998), 13.

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converting it into a march in favor of indigenous interests from both the highlands and lowlands. The march from the lowlands stopped in Samaipata, while highland organizations and leaders of the lowland communities went to negotiate with leaders in

La Paz.

Pressure from all sides escalated as the march arrived to La Paz. The marchers declared a hunger strike on October 2, leading to negotiations with congress on October

4th, during which Marcial Fabricano, president of the lowland CIDOB organization, pleaded, "How are we going to return to our homes without our [land] titles?"

Simultaneously, the large landholders, working through the Bolivian Confederation of

Agriculture (Confederación Nacional de Agricultura de Bolivia, CONFEAGRO) and the civic committees of Santa Cruz and Beni, called for a block of Santa Cruz on October

4th,648 opposing the land taxes on rural property, which they argued would discourage investment and prevent using land as collateral for credit.649

Facing this convergence of pressure, the government negotiated for the approval of the law to alleviate political tension. CIDOB signed an agreement on October 4th to suspend protest in exchange for lowland territorial recognitions. On October 9th,

President Sanchez de Lozada negotiated with the Santa Cruz landowners, after the Vice

President had already conceded a 50% reduction in land tax. 650 As the government conceded and aligned itself with both lowland indigenous communities and the lowland elites, the highland campesinos were left isolated in their opposition to the law. Support

648 ———, "El proceso de aprobación de la nueva ley de tierras en Bolivia," http://www.ftierra.org/ft/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=961:rair&catid=130:ft&Item id=188. Opposing the law project, much of the organization’s publicity overlapped with that of CSUTCB and CSCB in the highlands 649 Latin American Weekly Report - 17 October 1996 650 LAWR 24 October 1996; Healy, Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia, 395.

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for their strike diminished, only resulting in an agreement to reduce the overseeing land office’s (Superintendencia Agraria) capacity to confiscate land from highland peasants.651 Because the lowland indigenous communities pulled away from the highland indigenous communities once it was clear their demands would be incorporated in the law project, the CSUTB declared Fabricano of CIDOB a traitor.652 Morales, at the time leader of the coca growers’ union, asserted that “the struggle [against Ley INRA] will continue in the rural communities. We will resist the application of this law.” 653 By appeasing the demands of the lowland congressmen (Unidad Civica Solidaridad, UCS,

Solidarity Civic Union coalition), the lower house passed the law on October 11th.

For lowland indigenous communities, Ley INRA directly responded to indigenous demands. It institutionalized the status of TCO as a legal tool for indigenous peoples to acquire land rights and, gradually, degrees of autonomy. More directly, it called for the immediate titling (without saneamiento) of the 8 indigenous territories that had been established by executive decree after the 1990 indigenous march (those listed in Table

8).654 Second, it granted territorial rights to an additional 16 communities in 33 discrete portions of land (see Table 9 and Figure 20), calling for titling and saneamiento of those territories within 60 days.655 Between these various recognitions, indigenous peoples acquiring rights to nearly 12 million hectares of land because of the promulgation of Ley

651 LAWR 17 October 1996 652 "La marcha del siglo (1996)," http://www.gobernabilidad.org.bo/piocs/tierra-y-territorio/la-marcha-del- siglo. 653 LAWR 24 October 1996. Healy, Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia, 395. 654 Urioste and Pacheco, "Las tierras bajas de Bolivia a fines del siglo XX," 397, 400. 655 Assies, "Land Tenure in Bolivia: From Colonial Times to Post-Neoliberalism," 298. Urioste and Pacheco, "Las tierras bajas de Bolivia a fines del siglo XX," 397.

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INRA.656 While the broad focus of the Ley INRA was saneamiento, a primarily bureaucratic, administrative process that did not shift land tenure, several of these indigenous territorial demands were folded into Ley INRA.

While these resolutions were certainly strong, implementation was slow. Ley

INRA set a 10 year deadline to finalize the saneamiento process for the whole country, yet by 2005, only 14% had finalized the saneamiento process (15 million hectares of 107 million hectares), 35% was still being processed (37 million hectares), and 51% had not begun (55 million hectares).657 The slow progress was in large part due to the influence of local elites.658 Large landholders thwarted titling efforts by claiming subdivision of their property and proving use by moving herds between plots of land.659 Furthermore, the only way to prove that land was not productive was by the failure to pay property taxes, prompting elites to significantly lower tax rates.660

Progress was also slow for the saneamiento and titling of indigenous land; a prominent observer concluded that Ley INRA establishes norms that promote indigenous rights, but are ultimately not applied.661 Observers highlighted that a lack of political will delayed progress, stemming from the politicization of the INRA offices in each department, insufficient funding, centralism and the strong influence of the

Viceministerio de Asuntos Indígenas y Pueblos Originarios (VAIPO), and insufficient clarification of legal and technical procedures.662 Two years after the promulgation of

656 Healy, Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia, 395. 657 Assies, "Land Tenure in Bolivia: From Colonial Times to Post-Neoliberalism," 298. 658 Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia, 53. 659 Nicole Fabricant, Mobilizing Bolivia's Displaced: Indigenous Politics & the Struggle over Land (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 38. 660 Pedraza, "Saneamiento de Tierras Comunitarias De Origen." 661 Urioste and Pacheco, "Las tierras bajas de Bolivia a fines del siglo XX," 397. 662 Pedraza, "Saneamiento de Tierras Comunitarias de Origen."

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Ley INRA, not one title had been transferred to an indigenous community in Santa

Cruz.663 By 2001, of the 47 demands presented by indigenous communities for TCO status, INRA accepted 46, was processing 23, granted 8 provision titles (those that were recognized by executive decree, Table 8), and 5 titled (600,000 hectares total).664

Notably, two of the five groups that received a title had a specific agreement resulting from the 1996 indigenous march.665 By 2006, a total of 6.5 million hectares of land was registered to indigenous communities under TCO status.666

2006

In both 1990 and 1996, indigenous communities, through mobilization, leveraged political elites to intervene on their behalf. With the election of Morales, however, mobilization was no longer necessary to acquire elite allies; indigenous demands converged with the administration’s interests and efforts to dismantle the political and economic power of the opposition. Initially, this link resulted in a dramatic increase in the pace of land reform. Most significantly, in June 2006, Morales announced the distribution of more than 7 million hectares of land; mobilization did not precede the acquisition of these rights. This convergence of interests, however, was short lived, and rights acquisitions have stalled with the increasing distance between the Morales administration and indigenous demands. This section highlights how these swings in the

663 Van Cott, The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America, 217. Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, 220. 664 Urioste and Pacheco, "Las tierras bajas de Bolivia a fines del siglo XX," 400. For additional information on how the 1996 law became a tool for indigenous communities and a place for more radical demands, see Anthias and Radcliffe, "The Ethno-Environmental Fix and Its Limits: Indigenous Land Titling and the Production of Not-Quite-Neoliberal Natures in Bolivia." 665 Urioste and Pacheco, "Las tierras bajas de bolivia a fines del siglo XX," 396. 666 LAWR 16 May 2006

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relationship between indigenous organizations and the Morales administration impacts the acquisition of territorial rights.

Evo Morales was elected on a platform of radically refounding Bolivia by incorporating popular and indigenous organizations. Morales was a coca farmer of indigenous descent who transitioned into politics through his leadership in the cocalero peasant union. He did not initially publically identify as indigenous, but increasingly embraced the discourse in the early 2000s, as “politicization of indigeneity has become an effective social movement strategy.”667 This identity was not purely instrumental, but rather an integral component of his calls to decolonize and re-found the nation; as supporters commonly asserted, “he is one of us. WE are now part of the state.” 668 His

Vice President, Álvaro Marcelo García Linera, was a founding member of the Maoist, insurgent Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army.

Land reform was a key element of Morales’s 2005 campaign platform. While Ley

INRA opened paths for indigenous communities to acquire land, progress was slow and the policy’s potential for redistribution was limited. By May 2005, only 15 million of 107 million total hectares claimed had been processed in favor of campesino claims.669

Morales called for an acceleration of land reform, particularly in eastern Bolivia, in order to “relaunch the agrarian revolution” and finish the revolution of 1952. The MAS government’s Strategic Plan (Plan Estratégico Nacional de Saneamiento y Titulación de

Tierras 2007-2013, PENSAT), set out to distribute and title 20 million hectares to indigenous and peasant communities. 670 Taking advantage of the political opportunity to

667 Fabricant, Mobilizing Bolivia's Displaced: Indigenous Politics & the Struggle over Land, 1. 668 Ibid., 2. 669 Ibid., 38. 670 Gustavo Veiga, "La reforma agraria del MAS en Bolivia," Pagina 12, 25 October 2009.

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influence the shape of future land policy, indigenous organizations, campesinos, and colonizadores turned to land invasions, strikes and blockades to pressure the government to more efficiently and effectively implement the policy.

Once elected in December 2005, Morales publically promised agrarian reform.

On May 16, 2006, he called for an agrarian revolution that would re-nationalize land and resources. This plan was detailed in a series of seven executive decrees (Los Siete

Surcos), which established that public land would be utilized exclusively for indigenous and campesino communities, declared the land titling process to be in a state of national emergency, and prompted discussion about reforming Ley INRA. This culminated in a

“public and performative declaration of an agrarian revolution”671 in Santa Cruz in June

2006, where Morales distributed land titles to 7.4 million hectares of land to 60 indigenous communities and promised to deliver an additional 20 million hectares over 5 years.672 Importantly, these proclamations were not a response to mobilization, but rather an integral part of the government’s political agenda to deliver to his constituents and dismantle the political and economic power of his opponents.673 As Morales proclaimed,

“The great landowners of the Oriente are crying. They are hysterically crying because they know that their glory days are over… We will seize their unproductive land and give it to poor campesinos.”674 One activist concluded, “He is with the poor indigenous majority. Such an event in the most conservative city of Bolivia, Santa Cruz, illustrated

671 Fabricant, Mobilizing Bolivia's Displaced: Indigenous Politics & the Struggle over Land, 140. 672 Ibid. The titles he distributed had been sitting unprocessed in INRA offices. 673 Hylton, Thomson, and Gilly, Revolutionary Horizons: Past and Present in Bolivian Politics, 137. 674 Fabricant, Mobilizing Bolivia's Displaced: Indigenous Politics & the Struggle over Land, 140.

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not only to us but to the entire nation his intention to implement laws that would benefit us.”675

When Morales announced reform, opposition in the lowlands mobilized quickly.

The opposition (PODEMOS) had the majority in the senate, preventing MAS from passing land reform legislation. They were also backed by the agricultural sector, organized by the Bolivian Confederation of Agriculture (CONFEAGRO). The prefect of

Santa Cruz, Ruben Costas, announced the Costas plan, calling for the creation of local agricultural commissions tasked with redistributing and evaluating the productive use of land.676

The government was hesitant to confront the powerful opposition, particularly when economic interests were at stake. In September 2006, the regions of Santa Cruz,

Beni, Pando and Tarija went on strike after negotiations over the constituent assembly could not be resolved. After Morales called for indigenous and peasant organizations in the lowlands to be ‘on alert’ to the opposition’s efforts to thwart the constituent assembly, these organizations sieged Santa Cruz. The central government, however, wavered in its support for the siege that coincided with the start of the Santa Cruz International Fair

(Expoferia).677 Originally, Interior Minister Alicia Munoz considered the siege a

“legitimate [...] response to the provocations of the so-called Media Luna” and a means of “protecting the democratic process.”678 She quickly changed courses, though, calling

675 Ibid. 676 LA Daily Report 9 May 2006. 677 LAWR 12 Sept 2006. 678 LAWR 19 Sept 2006.

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on protestors “not to proceed with the blockading of the Expoferia in Santa Cruz, and to keep our response from having the same intensity as theirs.”679

Without the majority in Congress, the law project stalled in the Senate in October

2006. The opposition party boycotted the session, holding 15 of 27 seats, in an effort to amend the proposal so that it would just redistribute state land, rather than just apply conditions for the reversion and expropriation of land.680 An indigenous march pushed for the law’s approval, hoping that political pressure and visibility would force approval;681 one activist summarized “…we could use such a popular form of protest to gain support through the country and eventually pressure the Senate.”682 In contrast to the marches of 1990 and 1996, the march was in support of the Morales administration; one marcher asserted: “We don’t have anything to worry about… We are with the government now.”683

As the march reached La Paz, Morales threatened to convoke even broader mobilization and approve the bill by executive decree if the senate refused to approve the bill that week.684 More than 3,000 arrived to El Alto on November 27, declaring “we are staying here in the Plaza Murillo. We aren’t going anywhere until these changes are passed.”685 On November 28th, one opposition senator returned, along with 2 assistants who were allowed to cast the vote of their respective senator, passing the quorum of

14.686 The opposition claimed that the government bribed 3 senators with US $100,000

679 LAWR 19 Sept 2006. 680 Fabricant, Mobilizing Bolivia's Displaced: Indigenous Politics & the Struggle over Land, 141. 681 Ibid. 682 Ibid. 683 Benjamin Dangl, "Land and Power in Bolivia," NACLA, https://nacla.org/news/land-and-power-bolivia. 684 LAWR 21 November 2006. 685 Qtd in Fabricant, Mobilizing Bolivia's Displaced: Indigenous Politics & the Struggle over Land, 154. 686 Dan Keane, "Bolivian Senate Oks Sweeping Land Reform," Washington Post, 29 November 2006.

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each to support the bill.687 The final law (Community-Based Redirection of Agrarian

Reform Act, la Ley de Reconducción Comunitaria de la Reforma Agraria, Law 3545) was passed, with the alternate senators at nearly midnight on November 28th. Analysts concluded that the march “made visible their claims and placed just enough pressure on senators to pass the new agrarian reform bill;”688 another concluded that “many of the senators realized that ignoring the demands of the majority indigenous population would only create greater problems.”689

The new agrarian reform law was not accompanied by the promulgation of specific land or territorial rights for specific communities; rather, it gave the administration stronger tools to implement previously thwarted land reform. The

Morales government seized land from prominent elites, prompting the Santa Cruz province to vote to stop redistributing land in 2008. In a particularly visible 2008 case, armed groups hired by prominent ranchers attacked the INRA office and held captive a land surveying team, claiming that the upcoming referendum on autonomy eliminated the government’s authority to survey the land. Yet, the government continued with planned surveying, documenting four properties totaling 36,000 hectares subject to expropriation due to allegations that Guarani workers were held in debt- servitude.690

One of the most prominent land seizures was that of Ron Larsen, a US rancher who owned 37,000 acres in the Santa Cruz province. Local landowners held government surveyors and officials hostage and blocked off the region in 2008; after the land was

687 LAWR 5 December 2006 688 Fabricant, Mobilizing Bolivia's Displaced: Indigenous Politics & the Struggle over Land, 155. 689 Ibid., 217. 690 Gustafson, "When States Act Like Movements Dismantling Local Power and Seating Sovereignty in Post-Neoliberal Bolivia."

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seized, Larsen unsuccessfully appealed his case up to the level of the Supreme Court.

More than 88,000 hectares of land holdings by former head of the Pro- Santa Cruz Civic

Committee Branko Marinkovic were also seized in 2008. These and other land seizures prompted significant opposition from ranchers who promised civil disobedience,691 but

INRA regularized more than 3 million hectares of land in 2008.692 As one observer describes of the MAS’s lowlands strategy, “In tactically engaging the East from a position of relative weakness, the MAS mobilized in and around such flashpoints as part of its efforts to assert a new kind of sovereignty over national territory.”693 Despite the controversy, the pace of reform increased dramatically during the initial years of the

Morales administration; 31.5 million hectares were surveyed and titled between 2006 and 2009, 15.7 million of which were awarded to indigenous communities and campesinos. Of the total 31.5 million, 10.8 million were made available from land taken over because of the failure of its owners to comply with the economic and social function.694

Over time, however, the relationship between indigenous organizations and the

Morales administration has become increasingly strained. While there was an initial convergence of Morales’s policy platform and indigenous demands, Morales distanced himself from his campaign platform of radically refounding the country.695 By 2012, only

3 of 21 cabinet members were indigenous and the administration was acquiring a

691 Ibid. 692 Veiga, "La reforma agraria del MAS en Bolivia." 693 Gustafson, "When States Act Like Movements Dismantling Local Power and Seating Sovereignty in Post-Neoliberal Bolivia." 694 Juan Carlos Rojas Calizaya, "Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia at Risk," Bolivia Rising, http://boliviarising.blogspot.com/2012/10/agrarian-transformation-in-bolivia-at.html. 695 For additional information on Evo’s transformation once in office, see: Nancy Postero, "The Struggle to Create a Radical Democracy in Bolivia," Latin American Research Review 45, no. 4 (2010).

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reputation for coopting social movements.696 This tension was evident not just for indigenous movements, but for most of the social movements that were trapped to,

“simultaneously defended the government against imperialism and the domestic right while challenging the administration and opting for more transformative change from below.”697

Reform slowed as the Morales government became less willing to confront the interests of economic stakeholders. One analyst concludes that this happened as early

2006, when the “MAS virtually lost control and legitimacy in the lowland parts of the region;”698 another asserted that “since 2010, the government met businesses’ exact demands to expand the agricultural frontier…”699 In January of 2011, Morales consolidated a productive alliance with the agroindustrial sector to guarantee food security for the internal market and to increase exports. In December 2011, the government agreed to suspend the verification of land’s socioeconomic purpose (FES) from 2013 to 2018. Because the FES of plots under 5000 hectares must be verified every two years, many landowners are unable to verify the land’s value and therefore unable to access credit. The law was a reaction to business demands and had the sole objective of facilitating businesses’ access to credit,700 prompting strong critiques that “powerful groups worked to stop the process of equitable redistribution of land in Bolivia.”701 By delaying FES facilitated landowners access it credit, it effectively halts the potential for

696 Farthing and Kohl, Evo's Bolivia: Continuity and Change, 58. 697 Hindery, From Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia, 160. 698 Fabricant, Mobilizing Bolivia's Displaced: Indigenous Politics & the Struggle over Land, 174. 699 "El gobierno legitima desmontes ilegales y suspende la reversión de más de 5 millones de hectáreas," BolPress, 12 January 2013. 700 Gregory Beltran, "No se revertirán las tierras ociosas," Prensa, 6 December 2012. 701 Ibid.

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land distribution, as land must be declared unused to qualify to be redistributed to indigenous communities. Debates have even suggested changing the verification of the socioeconomic function of land from every 2 years to every 5 years.702 In January 2013,

Law 337 protected nearly 12 million hectares of illegally deforested land from reverting to the state if the landowners pay a small fine. As a former INRA Director (2006-2011) describes of these shifts:

There are clear signs that not only has the process of agricultural transformation stalled, but that there is the risk of it being reversed. They include the presence of representatives of large private landholders in spheres of policy making; the strong push being made by sectors of the campesinos against collective indigenous lands; and official complicity in the occupation of tierras fiscales. … If the government agrees to proposals made by the business community that there should be a halt in the process of verification as to whether land is fulfilling the economic and social function for medium-sized and large properties, it will be giving in to practices of slash and burn used illegally on the pretext that food is being produced. Also at risk are the collective rights afforded to indigenous territories, under the argument that their populations are very small and that illegal settlements are acceptable and even that they should be promoted. This sort of regression would be equivalent to what took place in the wake of the national revolution when the state ended up doing exactly the opposite of what it promised in agrarian reform703

TIPNIS is perhaps the most prominent example of the increasing distance between indigenous organizations and the Morales administration. In fall 2011, Morales signed a pact with Brazil’s national development bank to construct a road through protected indigenous territory, asserting “whether they like it or not, we will build that road.”704 The road would better integrate the Beni and Pando regions, increasing the

702 Bolivia Information Forum, "Land and Land Reform in Bolivia: Where Are We Now?," http://boliviarising.blogspot.com/2012/10/land-and-land-reform-where-are-we-now.html. 703 Rojas Calizaya, "Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia at Risk." 704 Qtd in Hindery, From Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia, 6.

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influence of Beni’s cattle ranchers at the expense of those in Santa Cruz. More informally, constructing a highway would facilitate already expanding coca production in the zone; Morales continues to serve as president of coca growers union. Indigenous communities from TIPNIS mobilized in opposition to the government’s decision, calling for repealing the law on the grounds that indigenous communities were not consulted with. Adolfo Chavez, head of CIDOB, summarizes: “We have tried many times to contact the President and to meet with him to discuss the TIPNIS case, but they never listen to us. It was when they heard the President say, ‘whether they want it or not, we are going to build this road,’ that the [indigenous] brothers demanded this march.”705 More than 800 started marching to La Paz in August 2011; on September 25th, 500 police confronted the marchers, injuring 70, prompting two ministers and other officials to resign in opposition to the government’s use of force. Morales wavered in his response, allowing the march to continue and, when arriving to La Paz in October, signed Law 180 prohibiting additional construction.706 As one activist described, “The president is the president of the coca growers. He is not representing all of the country. He has always resented the Indigenous peoples of the eastern lowlands of Bolivia. We thought that he was going to be more sensitive toward Indigenous peoples, but we were mistaken because… we continue marching, we continue worse than before.”707

The erosion of the alliance between indigenous communities and the Morales administration is further evident in indigenous communities’ current efforts to acquire autonomy rights. Currently, indigenous territorial demands in Bolivia focus on the

705 Qtd in Fabricant, Mobilizing Bolivia's Displaced: Indigenous Politics & the Struggle over Land, 10. 706 Farthing and Kohl, Evo's Bolivia: Continuity and Change, 53. 707 Qtd in Hindery, From Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia, 2.

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acquisition of AIOC status (Autonomía Indígena Originario Campesina, Peasant Farmer

Native Indigenous Autonomies), which would match political-administrative boundaries with territorial boundaries. This right was included in the 2009 Constitution, but restrictive eligibility procedures outlined in 2010 make the majority of indigenous peoples and territories ineligible to acquire AIOC status; a Fundación Tierra report estimates that only 25% of indigenous peoples are eligible to access AIOC status.708 Of the communities that are eligible, however, the acquisition of these rights follows the same dynamics; without an elite ally, indigenous communities have been unable to acquire AIOC status.

Autonomy rights can be acquired through two paths, both of which have stalled.

To date, 8 territories with TIOC status have requested to convert from a TIOC to an

AIOC (See Figure 21).709 This is the more challenging path to acquire autonomy and all requests have stalled, as communities must to provide sufficient documentation of their territorial links to claimed land.710 Converting from a municipality to an AIOC is more feasible, particularly for highland communities where indigenous peoples comprise a majority of the population. In 2009, 12 of 187 municipalities conducted municipal-level votes on autonomy.711 The vote on pursuing autonomy passed in 11 of the 12

708 TIERRA. For more information on creating AIOC status, see Xavier Albó and Carlos Romero, Autonomías indígenas en la realidad boliviana y su nueva constitución (Vicepresidencia del Estado, Presidencia del Honorable Congreso Nacional, 2009). Fernando Garcés, "The Domestication of Indigenous Autonomies in Bolivia: From the Pact of Unity to the New Constitution," in Remapping Bolivia, Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational State, ed. Nicole Fabricant and Bret Gustafson (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 2011). Bret Gustafson, "Manipulating Cartographies: Plurinationalism, Autonomy, and Indigenous Resurgence in Bolivia," Anthropological Quarterly 82, no. 4 (2009). This is further discussed in Chapter 4. 709 LARR October 2013 710 LARR October 2013 711 TIERRA. 19 municipalities started the process, but only 12 completed the requirements according to Decreto Supremo Nº 231, del 2 de agosto de 2009.

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municipalities, 9 Andean and 2 Guarani.712 As of 2014, none of these municipalities has completed the transition that would result in the construction of an autonomous government (see Figure 22). The statutes of three municipalities have been approved, requiring small modifications and a final referendum on the statues before the government is formed.713 Two other municipalities have submitted statutes, waiting more than two years for a response.714 Some communities are discussing their willingness to mobilize in order to control the election processes in upcoming municipal elections, asserting: “In 2009, these eleven municipalities ceased to be municipalities and now we want to choose our indigenous native self-government without the participation of political parties.”715

Converting municipalities to AIOCs creates significant uncertainty for the MAS administration, motivated to preserve political power at both local and national levels, a task that is integrally connected with maintaining the extractive economic model.716 As

Cameron summarized, “If there were a massive conversion to indigenous territories, the government might lose easy access to nonrenewable resources as well as the strong political ties between the MAS and its rural indigenous base.”717 As a result, there are clear signs that MAS is working to control the AIOC process; MAS politicians spread false rumors that territories with AIOC status would be taxed higher and Morales warned

712 Fabricant and Gustafson, Remapping Bolivia: Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational State, 171. 713 LARR October 2013 714 LARR October 2013 715 "Quieren elegir autoridades por usos y costumbres en 11 municipios," http://www.erbol.com.bo/noticia/indigenas/19092014/quieren_elegir_autoridades_por_usos_y_costumbr es_en_11_municipios. 716 Tockman and Cameron, "Indigenous Autonomy and the Contradictions of Plurinationalism in Bolivia." 717 Farthing and Kohl, Evo's Bolivia: Continuity and Change, 125.

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the central government would only work with AIOCs with MAS officials.718 This influence became particularly problematic for local elections; Morales initially promised to leave elections to local customs but later required candidates to be members of political parties and recruited MAS candidates.719 In 5 of the 11 municipalities, this resulting in alliances between MAS and the local organization in favor of pursuing AIOC status. In the remaining 6, this alliance was not struck; most problematically was the case of the Charagua municipality, where the Assembly of the Guaraní People (APG,

Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní) and MAS split the vote, resulting in the election of a right-wing candidate opposed to autonomy. There are signs that the highlands, Morales’s key electoral base, has been prioritized over the lowlands, in what one analysis refers to as “campesinización” of policies that come at the expense of lowland indigenous communities.720 Ultimately, the exercise of indigenous autonomy has transformed to be

“for largely symbolic purposes.”721

Conclusion and Future Research

This chapter reiterates several arguments developed from the Chilean case. The three prominent announcements of territorial recognition instances discussed here highlight that indigenous communities can drive the acquisition of land and territorial rights by leveraging political elites on their behalf. Indigenous organizations can acquire elite allies through both mobilization and political alliances (as evidenced by the early years of the Morales administration), but these are alliances of convenience. Because the meaningful advancement of territorial rights necessitates devolving degrees of autonomy,

718 Tockman and Cameron, "Indigenous Autonomy and the Contradictions of Plurinationalism in Bolivia." 719 José Antonio Lucero, "The Paradoxes of Indigenous Politics," Americas Quarterly 2011. 720 TIERRA. 721 Tockman and Cameron, "Indigenous Autonomy and the Contradictions of Plurinationalism in Bolivia."

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these reforms present significant political uncertainty for the Morales administration; without leverage, indigenous communities’ current efforts to acquire autonomy have stalled. As suggested in each of the three cases here, Bolivia’s institutional weakness hinders the implementation of recognitions, resulting in the continued utility of direct action to both acquire and protect recognized territorial rights. Ultimately, these patterns undermine indigenous communities’ broad access to exercise of indigenous rights.

Leverage is necessary to confront economic interests, whose influence has endured through Bolivia’s dramatic economic, political, and social instability since 1990. Even when the Morales government was elected on promises to radically refound the country, going as far as calling on the international community to “eradicate capitalism,”722 this chapter reiterates that “political-economic factors related to state control of natural resources constitute the first and, currently, most serious barrier to the implementation of indigenous autonomy rights.”723

Because this chapter focused on the largest acquisitions of territorial rights, most of this analysis focuses on the lowland indigenous communities. Due to the historic patterns of land tenure in Bolivia, lowland indigenous communities lay claim to significant portions of territory, setting a strong legal precedent for land acquisitions in the less- densely populated lowland regions (1990 and 1996). Highland communities have also acquired land and territory, but often in smaller, piece-meal portions. This is evident in the 2006 case presented here, in which Morales distributed lowland land to people from the highlands; in contrast to the acquisitions by lowland indigenous communities, however, this involved a significant number of claims that were announced

722 Postero, "The Struggle to Create a Radical Democracy in Bolivia." 723 Tockman and Cameron, "Indigenous Autonomy and the Contradictions of Plurinationalism in Bolivia."

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at once. Because of the difficulty of finding reliable information on the full range of these smaller, less public acquisitions, future research is required to fully explore the full range of territorial acquisitions in Bolivia; initial research suggests that similar dynamics of mobilization and leverage drive these smaller acquisitions. For example, the MST

(Movimiento Sin Tierra, Landless Peasant Movement) is perhaps the most visible example of highland indigenous peoples’ efforts to acquire land in the lowlands on a piece-meal basis. Highland people, primarily of indigenous descent, moved to the lowlands and used land occupations to bring attention to unproductive land that fell under

INRA’s capacity to revert and redistribute to peasants and indigenous.724 When the MST formed in 2000, the president declared that land occupations were “more direct and more effective” at capturing the government’s attention.725 As previewed by the 2006 case and the efforts of the MST, evidence suggests that territorial rights acquisitions are driven by communities’ ability to leverage political elites, frequently through mobilization.

724 For more information, see Fabricant, Mobilizing Bolivia's Displaced: Indigenous Politics & the Struggle over Land.; ———, "Ocupar, Resistir, Producir: Reterritorializing Soyscapes in Santa Cruz," in Remapping Bolivia: Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational Stage, ed. Nicole Fabricant and Bret Darin Gustafson (Santa Fe: School of Advanced Research, 2011). Fabricant and Gustafson, Remapping Bolivia: Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational State. 725 Nicole Fabricant, "Between the Romance of Collectivism and the Reality of Individualism Ayllu Rhetoric in Bolivia’s Landless Peasant Movement," Latin American Perspectives 37, no. 4 (2010): 93.

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Chapter 9 Conclusion

“Historically, two basic goals have characterized indigenous policy in Chile: (1) to assimilate the Mapuche and other indigenous peoples into the Chilean nation as individual citizens and (2) to free the material resources and indigenous lands to capitalist exploitation. These goals are based upon the premises, frequently articulated by the dictatorship and left unchanged by the democracy that replaced it, that national security requires national homogeneity and capitalist economic development… It is a situation that promises more conflicts and political mobilization”726

“…recognizing and valorizing certain indigenous community’s relations with land as property …reinforces state power and deepens capitalist social relations.”727

This dissertation highlights the need to theorize if, when, and why governments respond to contentious action using institutionalized public policy, focusing specifically on the implementation of indigenous peoples’ territorial rights in Latin America. While the recognition of indigenous rights certainly offers the potential to construct a more inclusive, participatory democracy, patterns of implementation determine the extent to which indigenous peoples meaningfully exercise these rights. Most theoretical and empirical research stops at the point that indigenous rights are recognized, implying that these recognitions fall short of expectations because governments lack the political will to implement the recognitions. This research, however, has reiterated the challenges that emerge as Bolivia and Chile have tasked and equipped specific government offices to implement the rights recognitions. Insufficient implementation is not the vague result of

726 Haughney, Neoliberal Economics, Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in Chile, 203.-217 727 Wainwright and Bryan, "Cartography, Territory, Property: Postcolonial Reflections on Indigenous Counter-Mapping in Nicaragua and Belize."

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political indifference, but rather the result of very local dynamics of contention operating within specific institutionalized implementation procedures. Indigenous rights recognitions are often the result of contentious action; this research highlights that contestation also drives how these rights are translated, negotiated, and implemented.

Methodological challenges usually complicate evaluations of if or how governments respond to contentious action; this research isolates the impact of instances of contentious action on particular policy responses to generate hypotheses. The Chilean case is analytically useful for doing so, as a least likely case in which groups would affect policy implementation and a most likely case for effective, transparent implementation.

The hypotheses developed based on the Chilean case are then tested on the Bolivian case, where the assumption of institutional capacity and removed policy implementation is less likely to hold.

This research argues that when a democratic government responds to contentious action through public policy, it is trapped between preserving transparent implementation procedures and stability in the region. Because of this tension, groups are able to acquire leverage over how the government balances these responsibilities, conditioned by the degree of policy institutionalization. Statistical analysis highlights that both indigenous communities and forestry companies affect patterns of land purchases, particularly for all purchases after the first, for which there are fewer procedures and less oversight. While results are mixed, for these less institutionalized purchases, the Chilean government is more likely to purchase land for communities that engaged in contentious action and more likely to purchase land in districts where forestry companies have a greater presence. Additional case studies and historical analysis develop the mechanisms and

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conditions under which contentious action affects policy implementation. In the Bolivian case, contentious action is both more necessary and more consequential for indigenous communities pursuing territorial rights, as expected in a less institutionalized system of governance where links between the government and particular interests are more visible.

This concluding chapter explores the broader significance and implications of this research. First, it explores what these patterns of policy implementation reveal about the nature of Chilean governance. It then expands the scope to characterize Latin American governments’ responses to indigenous territorial demands. Finally, this chapter considers the extent to which indigenous communities, as a historically marginalized community, are able to acquire territorial rights by engaging with the state.

Characterizing Chilean Governance

What do these patterns of policy implementation reveal about the Chilean government and its approach to indigenous politics? Public policy is a key arena of political contestation within the Chilean model of governance, allowing for this research to provide key insights into the quality of Chilean governance. Public policy was a crucial element in the design and implementation of the pacted transition, and is perhaps the key area of public investment and political innovation;728 Chilean sociologist de la

Maza summarizes,“…, public policies were not simply a consequence of the political agreement, but one of the central ways the transition was designed and carried out…”729

As subsequent administrations work to undo legacies of the dictatorship, restore participation, and expand the quality of democracy, public policy is a central arena of contention.

728 de la Maza, "Construcción democrática, participación ciudadana y políticas pPúblicas en Chile". 729 Ibid.

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This research contributes to observations that post-Pinochet administrations have demobilized and disarticulated civil society. In the case under analysis, this is evident from policy design to policy implementation. The piece-meal structure of the land reform process necessitates that communities form their own relationships with the government to work through the policy process, disincentivizing the articulation of the collective demands of the Mapuche community. This shifts contention to very local levels, with the effect that, “pressures which might otherwise take collective form … are diverted into discrete, separable, and small-scale demands which can be met in full or in part or rejected one by one…”730 Instances of contentious action that do escalate because local officials are unable to confront powerful stakeholders are resolved, but at the price of significant repression for the community, regardless of if the community is successful or not.

The implementation patterns revealed in this research further highlight the

Chilean government’s efforts to demobilize indigenous demands and prioritize economic interests to preserve governability. As discussed in chapter 6, the Chilean government has largely responded to Mapuche demands as if they were class-based, promoting a number of socioeconomic development programs. The Chilean government has also more directly responded to contentious action by criminalizing Mapuche protest and militarizing regions perceived to be hotbeds for more radical expressions of indigenous demands; four successive administrations from across the political spectrum have used land policy to apagar incendios. While activists, government officials, and observers have made allegations that the policy functions in response to pressure, Chapter 5

730 Cornelius, "Urbanization and Political Demand Making: Political Participation among the Migrant Poor in Latin American Cities," 1146.

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presents original quantitative data supporting these allegations. These patterns are particularly prominent for subsequent land purchases, which are governed by less institutionalized procedures; the government is more likely to purchase land for communities that have engaged in contentious action and more likely to purchases land in districts where forestry companies have a greater presence.

These implementation patterns suggest that the consolidation of Chilean democracy has stagnated. Because of the state’s capacity to restructure the terms of mobilization and engagement with the state, Mapuche communities, organizations, and individuals have found little space to articulate demands for territorial rights, other than through institutionalized policies. By structuring engagement through these institutions, policymakers are trapped between preserving those institutional procedures and using the procedures to preserve governability. Furthermore, because these implementation patterns are removed from the public view, there is limited potential for critique of these patterns of decisionmaking, preserving and reinforcing the centralized, technocratic style of Chilean governance.

Within Latin America, Chile is perhaps uniquely situated to disarticulate indigenous demands. As argued throughout this research, the Chilean state is very capable of using a broad range of both overt and disguised tactics including criminalization, repression, piecemeal land reform, and socioeconomic development programs, all with the motivation of demobilizing Mapuche communities. While conducting fieldwork, this was anecdotally evident. Many Mapuche activists took monitoring and surveillance as a nuisance, sarcastically joking about why the Chilean police and government cared about their everyday life. In particular moments, however,

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this monitoring was carefully navigated. Friends and acquaintances avoided mentioning specific names or locations on the phone, instead scheduling to meet “where we always meet” or “in the place we met last” and then wandering between several places before sitting to discuss. More prominent activists reportedly moved between the houses of friends and family, regularly switching out cell phones. While these suspicions and precautions were seen as overly cautious outside of the community of Mapuche activists, the 2014 case of Raul Castro (discussed in Chapter 5) suggested the state’s ability to oversee and infiltrate some of the most emblematic Mapuche organizations and communities.

Demobilizing and Assimilating Indigenous Demands

While the strength of the Chilean state make it particularly capable of disarticulating indigenous demands through such a broad range of demobilization strategies, these motivations and actions appear to travel across Latin America. Both the

Chilean and Bolivian governments, two most different cases, have sought to disarticulate indigenous demands and potential mobilization through the implementation of indigenous land policy. In the Chilean case, this was perhaps most evident in the repeated mention that the government uses indigenous land policy to apagar incendios. In

Bolivia, the direct and visible link between indigenous marches to La Paz and the recognition of indigenous territorial rights (in evolving forms) reiterates the relationship between contentious action and policy responses.

As discussed in the introductory chapter, this divide and conquer strategy is particularly common in the context of neoliberal multicultural reforms implemented throughout Latin America. Recognizing diversity, these reforms privilege non-

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threatening expressions of indigeneity (the “indio permitido,” permitted indian) over more radical expressions of indigenous demands.731 In Chile, these trends are remarkably persistent across the political spectrum; in 2002, the Mapuche mayor of Tirua commented that:

I have been invited many times to be photographed shaking hands with the President, but this is just a game of images, I have always refused. It is a way of dividing us. There are always Mapuche puppets, used with the politicians offer patch solutions, aspirins, to solve the real problems.732

Even Michelle Bachelet’s 2013 proposed constitutional reforms were critiqued as more of a“…‘bare minimum’ policy than an effort to calmly and high-mindedly rethink the relationship with indigenous peoples. It recognizes an ‘other’ with their culture and identity, but acts with extreme caution when addressing territorial and natural resource issues, and hence the issues are not being resolved.”733

Distinguishing between good and bad expressions of indigeneity preserves the underlying economic development agenda. The neoliberal economic agenda, which

“reached highest levels of influence and greatest success” in Chile,734 continues to shape policy agendas. In the southern regions under analysis, extractivism is promoted as the key development solution; continuing this development strategy requires protecting investments and security in the region. Political and economic stability are rooted in the continuation of the economic model. Not only have successive administrations prioritized economic development as the appropriate solution to Mapuche demands, but this analysis

731 Lucero, Struggles of Voice: The Politics of Indigenous Representation in the Andes, 130. 732 Aldolfo Millabur, qtd in Ray, Language of the Land: The Mapuche in Argentina and Chile, 141. 733 Claudio Fuentes, "Pueblos indígenas: Programa de Bachelet en deuda," El Mostrador 11 November 2013. 734 Fernando Ignacio Leiva, Latin American Neostructuralism: The Contradictions of Post-Neoliberal Development (U of Minnesota Press, 2008).

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shows that policy implementation is strongly conditioned by economic interests; land purchases for Mapuche communities are more likely in regions with more forestry companies, reinforcing historic patterns of exclusion and undermining the potential for indigenous communities to acquire and exercise indigenous rights. Again, the research presented here is unique for highlighting how these patterns persist over the twenty years and four presidential administrations under analysis.

This prioritization of economic interests over indigenous territorial demands also travels to the Bolivian case. As the 1990 indigenous march in Bolivia progressed, politicians made steps towards recognizing the lowland indigenous territories in question, but boundaries were repeatedly redrawn to protect concessions in the area. During the

2000s, the Morales government was elected on promises to radically refound the country and “eradicate capitalism.”735 Yet, signs suggest the persisting influence of the extractive industry constrains indigenous communities’ potential to acquire territorial rights; both the 2011 TIPNIS march and slow advance of municipalities’ transitions to AOIC status reiterated the Morales administrations’ hesitancy to protect or expand indigenous rights recognitions when economic interests are at stake.

Gap between land and territory

It is crucial to conclude by discussing the limitations of directing indigenous territorial rights demands towards institutionalized policy. Considering the prioritization of economic interests, what are the challenges associated with how the state translates radical indigenous territorial demands into public policy? Can indigenous communities construct territorial autonomy through institutional paths?

735 Postero, "The Struggle to Create a Radical Democracy in Bolivia."

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As highlighted in Chapter 4, there is a significant gap between indigenous territorial demands and government land policy responses in both Bolivia and Chile.

Indigenous communities’ ability to acquire territory is limited by how the concepts of territory as land are misspecified as the state translates rights recognitions into bureaucratic procedures. This gap undercuts the significance of territorial rights recognitions and limits the potential for indigenous communities to acquire territory from the state. Pulling discussions of territorial rights and autonomies into the government undermines the potential for a more radical reconfiguration of the relationship between place and space; in both Bolivia and Chile, the potential strength of territorial rights recognitions is significantly undercut as bureaucracies translate territorial demands into land policy. Because policy defines the conditions and procedures through which indigenous communities are able to access territorial rights, policy structures the very nature of territorial demands. For example, because 20B is the primary mechanism through which Mapuche communities can acquire ancestrally claimed land, indigenous communities have significant incentives to construct and present demands so that they can be processed through 20B.736 Indeed, Mapuche communities and organizations have gradually come to see the título de merced (historic land title) as the necessary legal tool to support their territorial demands, despite significant gaps between traditional and historic configurations of indigenous territoriality;737 in the late 1990s, the Consejo Todas

Las Tierras (CTT) helped coordinate a number of highly publicized, instrumental

736 Importantly, because 20 B relies heavily on títulos de merced, these documents have become a key legal tool for communities. While their utility is extremely instrumental, this policy structure has directly shaped how Mapuche organizations have defined and expressed territorial demands to the state. While Mapuche organizations have shifted their political discourse in recent decades from participation to autonomy, territorial demands have dominantly remained tied to títulos de merced, rather than a broader demand for ancestral land, regardless of state recognition. 737 Míguez 2013, 45

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takeovers of ancestral land where the CTT knew the community qualified for 20B.738

While this research focuses on the experiences of communities that navigate institutionalized policy procedures to acquire territorial rights, some portions of the

Mapuche community do not qualify and others reject this narrow, state-defined conceptualization of territory, instead striving to, “through direct action, break the institutionalization that [the Chilean state] wants to impose on us.”739

This conclusion reiterates scholars’ and activists’ critiques that territorial rights recognitions offer limited potential to meaningfully address indigenous communities’ demands for power, self-determination, and autonomy. The state conceptualizes territory as a delimited socio-spatial or cartographic space with economic value. If indigenous communities pursue rights recognitions as a means of reconfiguring territoriality as a culturally-produced, relational space, they are required to work through the state for the recognition, administration, and management of territorial rights. The bureaucratic entanglement of territorial demands within the state threatens to reinforce rather than reconstruct territoriality.740 As observers have concluded of the Bolivian experience, “the policy framework and practice of indigenous autonomy increasingly appear to be restricted by the logic and the goals of the state and the governing political party...”741

Others summarize:

the risk is that the proposal of territorial ordering- the remapping of Bolivia- and of indigenous autonomies becomes simply … ‘state matter.’ That is to say, the remapping is transformed into a state reform that

738 Interview September 2013. 739 Llaitul and Arrate, Weichan, Conversaciones con un weychafe en la prisión política, 123. 740 Wainwright and Bryan, "Cartography, Territory, Property: Postcolonial Reflections on Indigenous Counter-Mapping in Nicaragua and Belize." Bryan, "Rethinking Territory: Social Justice and Neoliberalism in Latin America’s Territorial Turn." Hale, "Resistencia Para Que? Territory, Autonomy and Neoliberal Entanglements in the ‘Empty Spaces’ of Central America." 741 Tockman and Cameron, "Indigenous Autonomy and the Contradictions of Plurinationalism in Bolivia."

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deepens the mechanisms of indigenous participation in the state but does so through their subordination, without changing the structures of the state itself…742

By turning to the government, indigenous peoples confirm the government as the legitimate and sole governing authority and reproduce their position as objects of the government; as Bryan concludes:

While [indigenous movements’] stated purpose is often to challenge the processes that have left them stateless, their recourse to human rights and the law solicits new forms of state intervention… [this contradiction] shifts attention away from an emphasis on control over territory and towards a consideration of how power works through territory, the political and conceptual work that the term does, and how it shapes prospects for social justice.743

This critique more broadly overlaps with scholars’ and activists’ critiques of neoliberal multiculturalism; while rights recognitions open up space for indigenous demands, they do so only the point that indigenous communities articulate appropriate demands that do not undermine the dominant system. As Bryan concludes, “The legal and cartographic strategy thus confronts a racist and exclusionary colonial past, yet reinforces differences and inequalities in the colonial present... By recognizing and valorizing certain indigenous community’s relations with land as property, as these rulings do, these relationships are constrained. Such recognition reinforces state power and deepens capitalist social relations.”744 Recognizing the potential outcomes of pursuing territorial demands through the state is crucial; while working through institutionalized procedures can result in specific, incremental recognitions of a

742 Fabricant and Gustafson, Remapping Bolivia: Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational State, 64. 743 Bryan, "Rethinking Territory: Social Justice and Neoliberalism in Latin America’s Territorial Turn." 744 Wainwright and Bryan, "Cartography, Territory, Property: Postcolonial Reflections on Indigenous Counter-Mapping in Nicaragua and Belize."

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constrained conceptualization of territorial rights, working through the state limits the potential for the radical reconfiguration of territoriality. As Hale poses:

When these peoples struggle for rights to territory, what are the ends of their resistance and how do we make sense of the divergence between these ends and the results that their efforts yield? …‘autonomy’, the epitomizing ‘para que’ (for what) of indigenous resistance in the previous era, is losing traction as a path towards expansive political change, because it is increasingly entangled with the very structures of dominance that these communities intend to resist.745

Considering the potential outcomes of these different strategies is crucial.

While this critique of engaging with the state is key, this dissertation research highlights that there is analytical space to further understand why there is a persisting brecha de implementación before rejecting these institutional paths as insufficient. Both the Bolivian and Chilean states have prioritized economic interests, yet this research reveals space for the agency of indigenous communities within these constraints, particularly in less institutionalized environments. Across time, country, demand, political ideology, and institutional strength, indigenous communities have used contentious action to acquire leverage over the implementation of the land policy, occasionally at the expense of powerful competing interests. While future research is needed to explore government responses to more local instances of contentious action, the Bolivian government recognized more than 18% of Bolivia’s total land as indigenous territory in response to three particular instances of indigenous mobilization. In Chile, 3% of land in the regions under analysis transferred to indigenous communities, 20% of the land originally titled to Mapuche communities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

745 Hale, "Resistencia Para Que? Territory, Autonomy and Neoliberal Entanglements in the ‘Empty Spaces’ of Central America."

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Through contentious action, indigenous communities leveraged patterns of policy implementation. As Hale argues, “…we know how power works; what activists portray as resistance is best understood as constrained maneuverings, which at best yield a range of unstable, fluid and ambiguous effects.”746 In countries as different as Chile, which falls far behind international and regional standards on the recognition of indigenous rights, and Bolivia, characterized by bureaucratic and administrative instability, public policy creates openings for indigenous communities to creatively and instrumentally leverage the state. Public policy is often the primary, if not only, point of contact between historically marginalized communities and the state. These insights into the dynamics of minority demands and state responses, structured by public policy, provide valuable conclusions about link between the development of the state and the empowerment of historically underrepresented groups.

746 Ibid.

274

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Appendix: Chapter 3

FIGURE 3: Map of the Araucanía Region747

747 http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?pid=S0188-45572011000200003&script=sci_arttext

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FIGURE 4748

Percentage of Population Self-Identifying as Mapuche Angol Curacautin Alto Biobio Santa Barbara Temuco Los Alamos Collipulli Traiguen Victoria Villarrica Los Sauces Contulmo Puren Cunco Pitrufquen Canete Loncoche Lautaro Vilcun Carahue Lumaco Perquenco Teodoro Schmidt Padre Las Casas Freire Tolten Lonquimay Ercilla Tirua Curarrehue Chol-Chol Nueva Imperial Galvarino Saavedra 0 20 40 60 Percentage of Population in District data from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2002 Census

FIGURE 5749

748 Data discussed in additional detail in Chapter 4. 749 http://revista.bosquenativo.cl/volumenes/47/images/fig3_mod.jpg

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FIGURE 6:

Land Concentation Lonquimay Alto Biobio Curacautin Angol Santa Barbara Cunco Traiguen Victoria Curarrehue Los Sauces Villarrica Los Alamos Carahue Tolten Vilcun Lumaco Loncoche Perquenco Collipulli Contulmo Puren Ercilla Lautaro Pitrufquen Freire Teodoro Schmidt Tirua Canete Galvarino Nueva Imperial Chol-Chol Saavedra Temuco Padre Las Casas 0 10 20 30 40 50 Percentage of land in plots less than 10 hectares data from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2007 Survey

FIGURE 7:

Presence of Forestry Companies Alto Biobio Lonquimay Curarrehue Freire Tolten Victoria Curacautin Padre Las Casas Teodoro Schmidt Vilcun Villarrica Perquenco Cunco Saavedra Temuco Pitrufquen Lautaro Santa Barbara Chol-Chol Nueva Imperial Ercilla Loncoche Collipulli Canete Tirua Carahue Puren Traiguen Los Alamos Los Sauces Contulmo Angol Galvarino Lumaco 0 10 20 30 40 Percentage of land held by Forestry Companies data from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2007 Survey

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FIGURE 8:750

750 http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?pid=S0188-45572011000200003&script=sci_arttext

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Appendix: Chapter 4

FIGURE 9: Requirements for Stages 1 and 2 of 20B (stages distinguished in pen on right side)

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FIGURE 10: Required Documents for the Completion of the 1st (Juridical) Report

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FIGURE 11: Required Documentation of the History of the Community

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FIGURE 12: Comunidad Antonio Huenche’s Documentation of the Community’s History

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Appendix: Chapter 5

Table 2: Description of Variables IVs Source Count of Years Count of number of years in community Various online Conflict conflicted with government. searches, Min: 0, Mean:17, Mean: 0.26 secondary resources Perceived Intensity of Count of the number of times the El Mercurio Conflict community appears in El Mercurio (emol.com) between 1994 and 2013; constant across district. Min: 0, Mean: 105, Mean: 1.54 CONTROL VARIABLES Support of the Right % of vote in congressional races for Servicio candidate on the right (1994, 1998, 2002, Electoral de 2006, 2010) Chile751 Min: 3.48, Max: 61.42, Mean: 32.45 Land Concentration % of land in the region in plots of greater Instituto than 500 hectares, constant across Nacional de district. Estadísticas, Min: 0, Max; 92.84, Mean: 25.11 2007 Survey752 Presence of Forestry % of land in district held by forestry Instituto companies company Nacional de Min: 0.3, Max: 37.39, Mean: 16.64 Estadísticas, 2007 Survey753 % rural % of people in the region residing in Instituto rural districts Nacional de Min: 5.22, Max: 83.6, Mean: 47.28 Estadísticas, 2002 Census754 % Mapuche % of people in the region that self- Instituto identify as Mapuche Nacional de Min: 4.8, Max: 64.7, Mean: 29.55 Estadísticas, 2002 Census District (dummy, 34 districts across the Araucanía (IX) CONADI collapsed) and BioBio (IIX) Provinces

751 “Elecciones a Diputados 1989-2013.” http://www.servel.cl/ss/site/resultadoselectorales.html. 752“CUADRO 3: NÚMERO Y SUPERFICIE DE LAS EXPLOTACIONES AGROPECUARIAS CON TIERRA POR TAMAÑO, SEGÚN REGIÓN, PROVINCIA Y COMUNA.” http://www.ine.cl/canales/chile_estadistico/censos_agropecuarios/censo_agropecuario_07_comunas.php 753“ CUADRO 2: SUPERFICIE DE LAS EXPLOTACIONES AGROPECUARIAS CON TIERRA POR USO DEL SUELO, SEGÚN REGIÓN, PROVINCIA Y COMUNA” http://www.ine.cl/canales/chile_estadistico/censos_agropecuarios/censo_agropecuario_07_comunas.php 754 “Censo 2002” http://www.inearaucania.cl/contenido.aspx?id_contenido=13.

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Figure 15: Baseline survivor estimates by strata number

1 2 3

.99

.98

.97

.96

0 5 10 15 20

4 5

baselinesurvivor

.99

.98

.97

.96

0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20 _t Graphs by Strata

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Table 3: Coding of Instances of Contention Action for Ancapi Nancucheo community (Araucanía Region, Malleco Province, Ercilla district, 66 families, Received a total of 391 hectares, bought for a total of $1.8m USD)

Year Resolution? In conflict? Instances of Perceived Intensity of Conflict Conflict 1994 0 0 0 13 1995 0 0 0 13 1996 0 0 0 13 1997 1 0 0 13 1998 0 0 0 13 1999 0 0 0 13 2000 0 0 0 13 2001 0 0 0 13 2002 0 0 0 13 2003 0 0 0 13 2004 0 1 1 13 2005 0 0 1 13 2006 0 0 1 13 2007 0 1 2 13 2008 1 1 3 13 2009 1 0 3 13 2010 0 0 3 13 2011 1 1 4 13 2012 0 0 4 13 2013 1 1 5 13

Results from Emol.com 1. Violent house raids concern to the residents of Ercilla. Violentos asaltos a viviendas preocupan a los vecinos de Ercilla. September 2011. 2. Investigations into the death of a young Mapuche found with a gunshot wound in Ercilla. Investigan la muerte de un joven mapuche hallado con herida de bala en Ercilla. October 2011 3. Investigations into responsibility for the fire to a farm of René Urban's daughter in Ercilla. Investigan intencionalidad en el incendio a un fundo de la hija de René Urban en Ercilla. January 2013. 4. Attack on the house of district PPD president in Ercilla. Atacaron a balazos la casa del presidente comunal del PPD en Ercilla. April 2012. 5. Attack on the house of district PPD president in Ercilla.

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Atacan a balazos vivienda de presidente comunal del PPD en Ercilla. April 2012. 6. Appeal ruling declared a fugitive Mapuche free. August 2008. Apelarán fallo que dejó libre a mapuche prófugo. August 2008. 7. Quintana and Tohá dialogue with the Mapuche community of Ercilla Quintana y Tohá dialogan con comunidad mapuche de Ercilla. April 2011. 8. Government buys land from attacked farmers attacked to stop violence Gobierno compra tierras vecinas a las de agricultores atacados para detener violencia. Marzo 2009. 9. Mapuche linked to attack arrested. Detienen a mapuche vinculado a atentado. August 2008. 10. CONADI paid up to $ 15 million per hectare in Araucanía Hasta $15 millones por hectárea ha pagado la Conadi en la Araucanía. August 2009. 11. Attack on former Mapuche activist who left violent resistance to work with forestry Company. Atentan contra ex activista mapuche por dejar la vía violenta y trabajar con empresa forestal August 2008. 12. Operation in Mapuche community leaves at least two policemen wounded. Operativo en comunidad mapuche deja al menos dos carabineros heridos. August 2008. 13. Mapuches denounce desecration Of Rehue Mapuches Denuncian Profanación De Rehue August 2000.

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Image 1: Screen shot of google image search for “Comunidad Mapuche Antonio Leviqueo” (no evidence of conflict)

No results for search of “Antonio Leviqueo” on emol.com.

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Image 2: Screen shot of google image search for Comunidad Mapuche Ignacio Quiepul (evidence of conflict)

Headlines of top search results for “Ignacio Quiepul” on emol.com: - “Eviction of estate in Ercilla ends with the detention of 12 Mapuche community members.” “Con cerca de doce comuneros mapuches detenidos termina desalojo de fundo en Ercilla” - “Angol District Attorney investigates two arson attempts in Ercilla.” “Fiscalía de Angol investiga dos atentados incendiarios en Ercilla” - “Mapuches ask for preliminary injunctions before the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.” “Mapuches piden medidas cautelares ante Comisión Interamericana de DD.HH.” - “Mapuche children take tear bombs thrown by policy to the Intendencia (regional authority).” “Niños mapuches llevan a Intendencia bombas lacrimógenas lanzadas por Carabineros” - “Mapuches threaten to take René Urban’s land again.” “Mapuches amenzan nuevamente con tomarse predios de René Urban”

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Appendix: Chapter 6 FIGURE 16

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Appendix: Chapter 7 Figure 18: Map of Títulos de Merced in Padre Las Casas

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Figure 19: Título de Merced of the Antonio Rapiman community

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Appendix: Chapter 8 Figure 20: Indigenous Territorial Recognitions (1990-2009)

http://www.sogip.ehess.fr/IMG/jpg/ll_bolivie_terre_territoire_ressources_carte-a.jpg

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Table 8: Executive Decrees Recognizing Indigenous Communities (1990- 1993)755 Decree Date Recognition Resolution of Administrative Title DS 24 September Reconocimiento del pueblo indígena 11 April 1997 22609 1990 Sirionó (Ibiato) (30,000ha) DS 24 September Reconocimiento como territorio 14 May 1998 22610 1990 indígena de los pueblos Mojeño, Yuracaré y Chimán, In Territorio Indigena Parque Nacional Isiboro-Sécure (1,100,000ha) DS 24 September Se declara a la región de Chimanes 11 April 1997 22611 1990 como área indígena para la sobrevivencia y desarrollo de los asentamientos indígenas Chimanes, Mojeños, Yuracarés y Movimas. (355,000 and 420,000 ha) DS 9 April 1992 Reconocimiento del pueblo indígena 11 April 1997 23108 Araona. DS 9 April 1992 Se reconoce como territorio 11 April 1997 23110 Indigena Pilón Lajas en favor de las comunidades originarias de los Pueblos Mosetenes y Chimanes en el área de su asentamiento. DS 9 April 1992 Reconocimiento del territorio 11 April 1997 23111 indígena del pueblo Yuqui. DS 10 April 1992 Reconocimiento del territorio 2 March 1998 23112 indígena Chiquitano DS 30 July 1993 La propiedad de las comunidades 8 December 23582 indígenas de Santa Ana, Covendo y 1997 Muchane, ubicada en las provincias Larecaja, Sud Yungas y Caranavi del departamento de La Paz se declaran Territorio indígena del Pueblo Mosetén. 23500 19 May 1992 Territorio Indigena Weenhayek 23 July 1997 (Mataco) del Gran Chaco

755 Compiled from: Hernaiz and Pacheco, Ley Inra En El Espejo De La Historia: Dos Siglos De Reformas Agrarias, 143. Urioste and Pacheco, "Las Tierras Bajas De Bolivia a Fines Del Siglo Xx," 407.

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Table 9: TCO Demands responded to by 1996 Ley INRA756 Community Date of Title 1 Cavineño Beni (Ballivián y Vaca Diez) 30 March 1998 2 Chacobo-PacahuaraBeni (Vaca Diez y Yacuma) 2 March 1998 3 Yaminahua-MachineriPando (Nicolás Suárez) 27 February 1998 4 Movima Beni (Yacuma 8 February 1992 5 Baure Beni (Itenez) 13 April 1998 6 Cayubaba Beni (Yacuma) 10 June 1998 7 Moré Beni (Mamoré) 13 April 1998 8 Joaquiniano Beni (Mamoré) 8 October 1998 9 Itonama Beni (Itenez) 14 April 1998 10.1 Chiquitano-Monte VerdeSanta Cruz (Ñ.Chavez y 18 December Guarayos) 1997 10.2 Chiquitano-LomeríoSanta Cruz (N. Chavez y 2 March 1998 Velasco) 11 Yuracaré (Cochabamba - Chapare y Carrasco) 13 April 1998 12 Guarayo-COPNAGSanta Cruz (Guarayos) 8 October 1997 13 Esse Ejja-Tacana-CavineñoBeni (Madre de Dios) 25 February (Multiétnico II) y Pando (Manuripi y Vaca Diez) 1998 14 Mosetén La Paz (Sud Yungas y Larecaja) y 8 December Cochabamba (Ayopaya) 1997 15 Ayoreo Santa Cruz (G. Busch, Chiquitos, N. Chavez 22 September y Velasco) 1998 16.1 Guaraní Tapiete de 10 October 1997 Samayhuate Tarija (Gran Chaco) 16.2 Asociación comunitaria indígena Guaraní de Avatiri 29 April 1999 (Ingre-Huacareta) Chuquisaca (H. Siles) 16.3 Asamblea del pueblo Guaraní de Iti Kaaguasu Tarija 27 March 1998 (O’ Connor y Gran Chaco) y Chuquisaca (Sud Cinti) 16.4 Asociación comunitaria 31 March 1998 APG Charagua Norte Santa Cruz (Cordillera) 16.5 Asociación comunitaria 31 March 1998 zona Kaami Santa Cruz (Cordillera) 16.6 Asociación comunitaria zona Ipaguazu Santa Cruz 21 November (Cordillera) 1997 16.7 Asociación comunitaria 27 August 1998 indígena Isoso Santa Cruz (Cordillera) 16.8 Takovo Santa Cruz (Cordillera) 18 July 1997 16.9 Asociación comunitaria 31 March 1998 zona Kaaguazu Santa Cruz (Cordillera) 16.10 Comunidades indígenas 5 May 1999 guaraníes Macharetí,

756 Hernaiz and Pacheco, Ley Inra En El Espejo De La Historia: Dos Siglos De Reformas Agrarias, 149, 213.

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Ñancaroinza y CarandaitíChuquisaca (Luis Calvo) 16.11 Charagua Sur Santa Cruz (Cordillera) 2 August 1999 16.12 Pueblo indígena guaraní 3 March 1998 de Iti y CaraparirendaChuquisaca (Luis Calvo)

Table 10: Municipalities Pursuing Autonomy Status in Bolivia757 Municipality Department % Municipal Transition status Vote in Favor of AIOC conversation Chipaya Oruro 91 Statutes submitted to the TCP (23/11/12). Tarabuco Chuquisaca 91 Statutes finalised in principal but not submitted to the TCP. Mojocoya Chuquisaca 88 Statutes submitted to the TCP, (12/10/12), TCP approval. Charazani La Paz 87 Statutes finalised in principal but not submitted to the TCP. Pampa Oruro 84 Statutes submitted to the TCP Aullagas (31/10/12). Salinas de Oruro 75 Local assembly not established. Garci Mendoza San Pedro de Oruro 75 Statures submitted to the TCP Totora (or (27/08/12). TCP approval of 90% Totora Marka) of statutes (19/09/13). Chayanta Potosi 60 Local assembly not established. Jesus de La Paz 57 Statutes finalised in principal but Machacha not submitted to the TCP. Charagua Santa Cruz 56 Statutes submitted to the TCP (31/10/12). TCP approval. Huacaya Chuquisaca 54 Statutes finalised in principal but not submitted to the TCP.

757 LARR October 2013. Updated: http://www.cambio.bo/?q=se-aguarda-refer%C3%A9ndums-para-tres- aioc

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Figure 21: 11 Municipalities pursuing AIOC status

Source: http://www.territorioindigenaygobernanza.com/bov_09.html Figure 22: TIOC Conversion Status

Source: http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?_url=/suplementos/animal_politico/Avanzan-estatutos- autonomias-indigenas-alcaldes_0_1873012746.html

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