Life after State House

Addressing Unconstitutional Changes in West Africa

UNOWA ISSUE PAPERS MARCH 2006

UNOWA ISSUE PAPERS United Nations Office for West Africa

Addressing Unconstitutional Changes in West Africa

March 2006

Table of Contents

Preface I. The Challenge of Coups d’état in West Africa

A. West Africa’s “Leadership” in Unconstitutional Overthrow of Governments B. Coups d’état in West Africa: A Paradoxical Picture 1. Coup-prone Environment and “Coup Vulnerability” 2. Bad Governance and Potential for Violence 3. Poor Civilian-Military Relations and Potential for Coups 4. The Missing Link between Coup Prohibition and Coup Proliferation C. Prevention First

II. Condemning Unconstitutional Overthrow of Government : Towards a New Consensus

A. Prohibiting Coups d’état by Decree B. The Limits of the Policy of Decreed Prohibition

III. Coups d’état: A Threat to Regional Security IV. When Democratically Elected Leaders Themselves Turn into a Threat to Democracy

A. Case Study: Guinea Bissau B. The Coup and the Lesson

V. Addressing the Challenge of Coups d’état in West Africa : Key Questions and Ways Forward

A. Key Concerns 1. Intervention, Authority and Legitimacy 2. Intervention, Diplomacy and Institutions B. Ways Forward: Towards a Policy of Coup Prevention 1. Indicators 2. Mechanisms 3. Thresholds 4. The Risk of Political Instrumentalization 5. Checks and Balances

VI. Conclusion

5 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE Tables

• Table 1. Coups Distribution in West Africa, 1960-2005

• Table 2. Preventing Coups in West Africa: Issues and Areas of Action

• Table 3. Corruption Perceptions Index 2005: West African States

Boxes

• Box 1. What Is an Unconstitutional Change of Government?

• Box 2. The Causes of Conflict and Coups in Africa

• Box 3. Prevention Indeed

• Box 4. A Long-awaited Coup d’état

• Box 5. Life after Power

• Box 6. Addressing Coup Vulnerability

• Box 7. Conflict and Coup Prevention

6 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE Acronyms

AHG Assembly of Heads of State and Government APRM African Peer Review Mechanism AU African Union CODESRIA Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa CPI Corruption Perceptions Index ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EU European Union NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe OAU Organization of African Unity PRS Partido da Renovação Social SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General UN United Nations UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire UNOGBIS United Nations Office in Guinea-Bissau UNOWA United Nations Office for West Africa

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 7

The nature of political power in many African States, together with the real and perceived consequences of capturing and maintaining power, is a key source of conflict across the continent […]. Where there is insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, political control becomes excessively important, and the stakes become dangerously high […]. In extreme cases, rival communities may perceive that their security, perhaps their very survival, can be ensured only through control of State power.

Kofi Annan Secretary-General of the United Nations1

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 9

Preface

Until the end of the Cold War, changes alternation of power is a key indicator of of government in West Africa tended to the good health of a democratic system. be neither smooth nor peaceful. Coups On the other hand, a violent overthrow d’état, the preferred and often predicted of government is too often not the way of replacing political leaders, were cause but rather the symptom and the encouraged, internally and sometimes consequence of a deeper breakdown, externally, while their legitimacy and which is usually the illegitimate exercise legality were rarely called into question. of power.

Nowadays, perpetrators of new coups This Issue Paper seeks to address d’état are more likely to be treated as the question of how to prevent un- pariahs, vigorously condemned and constitutional changes of government subjected to sanctions. The underlying in West Africa and, related to this, to causes of coups d’état, well understood encourage incumbent leaders to leave during the Cold War era, seem RIÀFH SHDFHIXOO\ DW WKH HQG RI  WKHLU ignored today. However, coups may WHUPRI RIÀFH not disappear from the scene, unless improved modes of governance and 2YHUWKHSDVWÀIWHHQ\HDUV:HVW$IULFD power succession are institutionalized has seen welcome progress towards nationally and supported by the multi-party democracy, enhanced res- international community. pect for human rights and commitment to accountable governance and the rule With the end of the East-West of law. confrontation, the democratic space has opened up in Africa as a whole. However, this progress has been uneven. The promotion and consolidation of Some states now have established democratic governance are increasingly effective multi-party democracies which UHFRJQL]HGDVWKHPRVWHIÀFLHQWPHDQV have successfully passed the test of RI  SUHYHQWLQJ FRQÁLFW DQG HQVXULQJ holding free and fair elections and a stability. Peaceful and constitutional peaceful transfer of power: Benin,

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 11 Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali and Senegal This Paper is premised on the as- among others. Sadly, however, some sumption that regrettable though they are, elected governments have failed to live coups d’état are almost never spontaneous up to expectations, and have held on to phenomena. Well before a coup d’état happens, power, usually often by manipulating there are usually “signs”, “messages”, or “calls”, constitutions and rigging elections. warning that if nothing is done the country may This opens the way for their violent or ZLWQHVV XQVSHFLÀHG EXW FOHDU  GHYHORSPHQWV. 7KHFRXSVRI 'HFHPEHULQ&{WH unconstitutional removal. In the most d’Ivoire and September 2003 in Guinea unfortunate cases, such as Liberia, Bissau are typical examples of dramas political upheavals have brought about that were repeatedly announced well external intervention as the only practical in advance. Consequently, reactions way to avert still greater disasters. such as merely condemning coups d’état and imposing sanctions on the These developments point to three perpetrators after the event are not general conclusions: enough. Prevention appears to be a PRUH HIIHFWLYH DOEHLW PRUH GLIÀFXOW • Peaceful multi-party democracy is option. The conditionality-oriented attainable in West Africa, and provides DSSURDFKHV RI  WKH (8 $UWLFOH  RI  by far the best way for its states to the Cotonou Convention), the USA achieve stability and development. (Section 508 of the Foreign Assistan- ce Act), and our Organization, the • Lessons from success stories in the United Nations, need to be revisited to sub-region should be learnt, and used ascertain their effectiveness. as a guide for improving the peaceful transfer of power in states that have For the past ten years African leaders so far failed to match them. KDYH EHHQ FRPPHQGDEO\ ÀUP LQ denouncing and outlawing coups • However, it cannot be assumed that d’état on the continent. However, a RQH VL]H ZLOO ÀW DOO 'LIIHUHQW VWDWHV common characteristic of the policies in West Africa have had different and declarations by African and historical trajectories, and some may international organizations, directed adapt to democratic governance against illegal seizures of power, is that more readily than others. Beyond their focus has been on condemning preventing violent seizure of power, the coup itself as a legally reprehen- one of the challenges is how to help sible act. Little attention has been paid to states that have embarked on the road the prevention of the basic underlying causes to democratic governance continue of coups d’état. It is now clear that this to operate successfully, in peace and narrowly constitutionalist approach security. is not enough. If the development,

12 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE security and welfare of African societies Africa, with recommendations for are to be achieved, there is a need to move addressing preventively the issue of beyond post-coup condemnation, and violent change of power. to put in place appropriate institutions and mechanisms of governance that I wish to express my sincere would remove much of the incentive thanks to all UNOWA’s partners who for carrying out an unconstitutional helpfully participated in the broad FKDQJH RI  UHJLPH LQ WKH ÀUVW SODFH consultations that led to the produc- Commenting on the 2003 military tion of this Issue Paper. These included coup d’état in Guinea Bissau, the UN the ECOWAS Secretariat, the UN peace Secretary-General emphasized that “the missions in West Africa (UNOCI, recent removal of the democratically UNAMSIL, UNMIL and UNOGBIS), elected President in Guinea-Bissau, WKH 2IÀFH RI  3UHVLGHQW 2OXVHJXQ however reprehensible, should not be Obasanjo of Nigeria, the International seen as a single event interrupting an Crisis Group, Wilton Park, Human ongoing democratic process, but as the 5LJKWV :DWFK WKH &RQÁLFW 3UHYHQWLRQ culmination of an untenable situation DQG 3HDFH )RUXP &2'(65,$ WKH during which constitutional norms were African Leadership Forum, the Goree UHSHDWHGO\ YLRODWHGµ .RÀ $QQDQ WKHQ Institute, Lancaster University, and invited “the international community the College of Wooster (Ohio). to consider how to deal preventively with […] situations, where governments, Finally, I would also like to address my although democratically elected, defy special thanks to all colleagues at the FRQVWLWXWLRQDORUGHUÁRXWEDVLFSUDFWL 'HSDUWPHQWRI 3ROLWLFDO$IIDLUV '3$  ces of governance and thus become an in New York for the good spirit of added source of instability”. collaboration between Headquarters and UNOWA, particularly to Under- Failing to address these problems Secretary-General Ibrahim Gambari, seriously would prolong the misun- for his unabated support and derstanding between populations and encouragement. Governments, which are perceived as being removed from domestic concerns Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah and relying on external powers to Special Representative remain in place. Continued failure of the Secretary-General will also do nothing towards restoring for West Africa SHRSOH·V IDLWK LQ WKH HIÀFDF\ RU JRRG faith of the international community. This issue Paper offers practical guidelines aimed at consolidating constitutional governance in West

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 13 14 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE I

The Challenge of Coups d’état in West Africa

When it comes to the unconstitutional violent change of political regimes in overthrow of government, West Africa West Africa has been an unfortunate has an unfortunate leadership position role model on the continent.4 on the African continent. No other sub- region has been so prolific and inventive in the enterprise of coups d’état. A A. West Africa’s “Leadership” in recent analysis of West African coups Unconstitutional Overthrow of and conflict shows that, Governments

[b]eginning in January 1955 (in Among all sub-regions of the continent, the case of Liberia) or with the date West Africa has indeed borne the of independence of the other fifteen unenviable reputation and position of states, by the end of 2004 […], West leader as regards the frequency of coups African states had experienced forty- d’état; this is so in a number of ways: four successful military-led coups d’état, forty-three often-bloody failed • West Africa sets the standard for coup attempts, eighty-two reported independent coup plots by elements of the military, Africa. The very When it comes to and as many as seven terrible civil first bloody the unconstitutional wars. Indeed, being overthrown or overthrow of a overthrow of killed in a coup or civil war has been government in government, West by far the most frequent way West independence- Africa has an African leaders have lost power, which era Africa took unfortunate leadership is another reason to examine coups place in a position on the and violent conflict in the region.2 West African African continent. country: Togo. Since studies have demonstrated the In 1963, Sylvanus Olympio, the great tendency of a coup in one country first president of the country, was to inspire new coups in other countries,3 overthrown and murdered following it could be maintained that for the past a military coup d’état.5 45 years, the unchallenged epidemic of

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 15 • West Africa challenges the new hold public office”. 9 Unfortunately, Organization of while this new faith in the rule of On 24 December 1999, African Unity law was being proclaimed, West five months after the (OAU - now the African constitutional order was African leaders’ declaration African Union repeatedly under assault by various on the unconditional since July 2002). rebel movements. The new eruption robust prohibition of the The very first of insurrectional violence affected challenge to the many countries, including Liberia, coming to power through OAU’s radical de- Sierra Leone, Mali, Guinea Bissau unconstitutional means, cision to oppose and Nigeria. Some of the rebellions President Henri Konan Bedié unconstitutional either degenerated or escalated into was removed from office by changes of power civil wars, among the bloodiest on the elements of the Ivorian on the continent African continent, as were indeed the armed forces came from Côte cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone.10 d’Ivoire. On 24 December 1999, five months after the African leaders’ declaration on the unconditional robust Box 1. What Is an Unconstitutional prohibition of the coming “to power Change of Government? through unconstitutional means”, 6 In order to give practical effect to the President Henri Konan Bedié was principles we have enunciated, we have removed from office by elements of agreed on the following definition of the Ivorian armed forces following a situations that could be considered as mutiny turned into a coup d’état.7 situations of unconstitutional change of government:

• West Africa belies the Great Expecta- i) Military coup d’état against a demo- tions of a Post-Cold War “New cratically elected Government; Era of Peace and Democracy”. The international community celebrated ii) Intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected the end of the Cold War as “a new era Government; of democracy, peace and unity”. 8 Likewise, meeting in Abuja (Nigeria) iii) Replacement of democratically elec- at the very dawn of this “new era” ted Governments by armed dissident groups and rebel movements; (1990), African leaders recommitted themselves “to the further demo- iv) The refusal by an incumbent go- cratization of our societies and to vernment to relinquish power to the the consolidation of democratic winning party after free, fair and institutions in our countries”. They regular elections. reaffirmed their determination African Heads of State and Government, to work together with a view to OAU Summit, 2000 “permitting a political environment which guarantees human rights and the observance of the rule of law […] particularly on the part of those who

16 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE The following table gives a distribution in time and space of coups d’état in West Africa, from to 1960 to 2005.11 Table 1. Coups Distribution in West Africa: 1960-2005

Date Benin Burkina Cape Verde Côte d’Ivoire Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea Liberia Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo (1960) Faso (1960) (1975) (1960) (1965) (1957) (1958) Bissau (est.1847) (1960) (1960) (1960) (1960) (1960) (1961) (1960) 1960 1961 1962

1963 Oct-63 Jan-63 1964 1965 Dec-65

1966 Jan-66 Feb-66 l-66 1967 Dec-67 Mar-67 & Jan-67 Mar-67 1968 Jul-68 Nov-68 Apr-68

1969 Dec-69 Sept- 69 1970

1971 1972 Oct-72 Jan-72 1973

1974 Apr- 74 1975 Jul-75

1976 1977 1978 Jul-78 Jul-78

1979 Jun-79 1980 Nov-80 Nov-80 Apr-80 Jan-1980 1981 Dec-81

1982 Nov-82 1983 Aug-83 Dec-83 1984 Apr-84 Dec-84

1985 Aug-85 1986 1987 Oct-87

1988 1989 Dec-89

1990 1991 Mar-91 1992 Apr-92

1993 Nov-93 1994 Jul-94 1995

1996 Jan-96 Jan-96 1997 May-97

1998 1999 Dec-99 May-99 Apr- 99 2000

2001 2002 2003 Sep-03

2004 2005 Aug-05 Feb- 05 Date Benin Burkina Cape Côte d’Ivoire Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea Liberia Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo (1960) Faso (1960) Verde(1975) (1960) (1965) (1957) (1958) Bissau (est.1847) (1960) (1960) (1960) (1960) (1960) (1961) (1960) (1973)

The table above takes into consideration unsuccessful coups attempts are only successful coups, which means considered, this already dark panorama “a full-blown seizure of [government] even appears bleaker. Within the first control vesting leadership in a four decades of African independence, military [or civilian] cabinet”.12 When one notices also a great concentration of

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 17 coups in the period 1980-2001. It is worth The analysis recognizes that potential mentioning that this period coincides coup-prone environments may include with both the deepening of the economic a combination of factors where a crises in many West African states and violent unconstitutional change of the progressive liberalization of national government may seem unavoidable. political spaces – which was labeled the However, if early measures are ta- era of “democratic transitions”. ken to ease tension and mediate over potentially explosive situations, the Today, it is increasingly obvious that inevitable may become avoidable. faced with the “unabated prevalence of military coups in Africa since the early In terms of coup prohibition, Africa 1960s”, it has become necessary for presents a paradoxical picture: African states to develop policy tools “designed to prevent military coups” a) There is unanimity among African and help reduce “the long-term coup governments, the international com- vulnerability of these states”.13 munity and civil society in strongly and unequivocally condemning an unconstitutional overthrow of B. Coups d’état in Africa: government as an unacceptable mode A Paradoxical Picture of political change.

This report is an analysis of the challenge b) However, even as the coup d’état of coups d’état in West Africa. Its is being roundly and vehemently fundamental objective is to examine condemned for its debilitating the various complexities that explain impact on government efficiency, the gap between the condemnation of state stability and internal security, illegal seizure of there is a noticeable resurgence of There is unanimity power in West unconstitutional changes of govern- among African govern- Africa on the one ment across the continent, including ments, the international hand and, on countries that had hitherto enjoyed community and civil the other hand, a longstanding reputation for peace society in strongly and the perpetuation and stability, such as Côte d’Ivoire. unequivocally condemning and perpetration an unconstitutional of coups d’état Hence, in spite of manifest efforts overthrow of government in this sub-region. aiming at prohibiting unconstitu- as an unacceptable mode of More specifically, tional removals of governments, political change. the report seeks there are reasons to believe that given to create a format their specific national circumstances through which to evaluate potential and occasionally good leadership, coup-prone factors and environments many African countries would with a view to generating early hardly stand out as exceptions to the dialogue on possible political and inevitability of coups d’état. In his diplomatic means of preventing coups report on the causes of conflict in and political disorder from taking place. Africa, the Secretary-General of the

18 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE United Nations drew attention upon overthrow of government; this concern: • Secondly, the relationship between bad governance and escalation of The nature of political power in violence; many African States, together with • Thirdly, poor civilian-military rela- the real and perceived consequences tions and potential for coups; of capturing and maintaining • Fourthly, the gap between coup power, is a key source of conflict prohibition and coup proliferation. across the continent. 1. Coup-prone Environment and “Coup More specifically, the Secretary-General Vulnerability” rightly observed that: There are combinations of factors as Where there is insufficient accounta- well as circumstances that may increase bility of leaders, lack of transparency the vulnerability of a state to a coup in regimes, inadequate checks and d’état and render balances, non-adherence to the rule a coup almost There are combinations of law, absence of peaceful means to unavoidable, offactorsaswellas change or replace leadership, or thereby making it circumstances that may lack of respect for human rights, merely a foregone increase the vulnerability political control becomes excessively conclusion to a of a state to a coup d’état important, and the stakes become woeful state of and render a coup almost dangerously high.14 socio-political affairs. Such unavoidable, thereby Trends in Africa in general and West combina-tions of making it merely a Africa in particular show that the factors underpin foregone conclusion to question of the “absence of peaceful a coup-prone a woeful state of socio- means to change or replace leadership” environment. For political affairs. is crucial in this context: relevant instance, actual political actors who, in an open or even perceived massive corruption and democratic system, may legitima- in high offices, coupled with deepening tely aspire to gain power, are now left mass poverty, unequal or discriminatory with only two options; either to violently distribution of resources, gross violation overthrow the government or to start a of human rights and massive repres- civil war. sion, and the appropriation of power by one social or ethnic group, can often This analysis revolves around four fun- be the originating causes of a violent damental relationships or connections: overthrow of a government. They are typically cited as justifications for a • Firstly, the relationship between coup. specific circumstances that weaken state’s institutions and make it When, in addition to all these factors, more vulnerable to coups and the there are considerable levels of youth inevitability of an unconstitutional unemployment, with seemingly no

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 19 prospects whatsoever for a decent life d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and when there is a security sector in and Mauritania among others). urgent need of reform, the coup-prone environment becomes a fertile ground 3. Poor Civilian-Military Relations and for civil war. Potential for Coups

African leaders themselves recognize Civilian supremacy has always been that “indeed, experience has shown a contested concept in Africa even as that unconstitutional changes are coups d’état and military governments sometimes the culmination of a political became the rule, rather than and institutional crisis linked to non- the exception. With the wave of adherence to […] common values and democratization starting in the 1990s, democratic principles”. 15 most states in West Africa did not pay sufficient attention to redesigning their civilian-military relations and their 2. BadGovernance and Potential for security sector governance. Most have Violence not adapted them to the new political

In a coup-prone environment, when there is a strong feeling that although Box 2. The Causes of Conflict and change is necessary, the government lacks Coups in Africa the political will for reform, there is great danger that key stakeholders - among I encourage ECOWAS to formulate preventive measures to deal with which the armed and security forces, conflicts created by governments which, the unemployed although duly elected, violate constitu- Although the youth and the tional norms and flout basic principles international community opposi t i on of good governance, thus adding to political parties instability in the subregion. seems to be comfortable The international community, and with the imposition rank high - may particularly the countries in the region, consider that of sanctions as a are right to condemn coups d’état which the situation bring immense suffering to so many punitive measure on can no longer countries in Africa. At the same time, coup perpetrators, we should not be silent when faced with be tolerated poor standards of governance, which evidence suggests that and the only are sometimes the principal cause of the effectiveness of means of e ffecting those coups d’état. This is particularly such sanctions can be an immediate the case when governments allow no change is opportunities for peaceful transition, extremely limited. for example, by canceling or rigging insurrectional elections. Good governance is essential violence, through either an not just for political stability in the re- unconstitutional change of power gion, but also for development, econo- or a civil war. The recent history of mic growth and investment. the unconstitutional overthrow of Kofi Annan governments in West Africa illustrates Secretary-General of the United Nations this reality (Guinea Bissau, Côte

20 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE dispensation - multiparty democracy means of pressure - a critical ingredient of which is the on the ostracized Clearly, there is a subordination of the security apparatus government. missing link between the to all branches of the constitutional conditions in which a authority and the insulation of the Another criticism coup-prone environment armed forces from politics. As a of post - coup is being created and consequence, the old flawed civilian- sanctions is the time the post-coup military relations (the military that the popu- sanctions are imposed on considered and considering itself as a lation, not the coup perpetrators. legitimate player in politics) and security government, sector mismanagement (unchecked often suffers the use and abuse of armed and security worst effects of them - even though the forces by the executive) have persisted. use of so called “smart” or “targeted” This legacy has only added another sanctions strives to remedy this layer to the mix of coup vulnerability loophole. Liberia (or Somalia in the conditions prevailing in most West Horn of Africa) is a good example of African states. the unmet expectations from sanctions in a specific kind of political and 4. TheMissing Link between Coup geopolitical environment.16 Today, Prohibition and Coup Proliferation credible studies are increasingly concluding that sanctions are much A strongly advocated way to combat more about “feeling good” (“something coups d’état is the imposition of is being done”) than really “doing good” sanctions on coup perpetrators. How- (achieving the objectives for which ever, experience shows that it can be sanctions are imposed).17 ineffective to impose sanctions on coup perpetrators when no preventive In some cases, the message associated measure was imposed on those whose with sanctions has been erroneously bad governance in the first place interpreted by the population, notably provoked their unconstitutional over- as an incitation to uprising, which, throw from power. instead of containing violence and bringing the situation back to normalcy, Although the international community fuels violence and makes the condition seems to be comfortable with the of the ordinary citizen even worse.18 imposition of sanctions as a punitive measure on coup perpetrators, evidence Clearly, there is a missing link between suggests that the effectiveness of such the conditions in which a coup - prone sanctions can be extremely limited. environment is being created and In some cases, sanctions have even the time the post - coup sanctions proven to be counter - productive. This are imposed on coup perpetrators. is notably the case when sanctions, Even beyond this missing link, post - once imposed as a first rather than a sanctions climates oftentimes call into last resort, end up depriving the question the sanctions regime itself. international community of any further This is plainly and truly because when

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 21 coup perpetrators remained in power Annan reminds that “by not averting” months or years after sanctions were violence in Africa, both African leaders applied, they end up claiming, though and the international community “have dubiously, a political, even a moral failed African people”.20 Given the victory over the international com- increasing propensity of armed conflicts munity which applied the sanctions in in Africa to turn into “colossal human the first place. In such circumstances, tragedies”, he emphasizes that “conflict coup perpetrators even succeed in in Africa poses a major challenge to turning their long-suffering disaffected United Nations efforts designed to populations against the international ensure global peace, prosperity and community for the ill effects of the human rights for all”; therefore, sanctions they applied. What is the “preventing such wars” has become “a conclusion to draw from this dilemma? matter of defending humanity itself”.21 International sanctions are a double- edged sword, and must be applied with Indeed, determined violent efforts care and skill, based upon a guarantee to overthrow some illegitimate or of effectiveness. undemocratic governments in West Africa have led to some of the most horrendous human tragedies on C. Prevention First African soil as we witnessed in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Consequently, while In his report on the “Prevention of it is important to work towards the Armed Conflict”, the UN Secretary- prohibition of unconstitutional changes General observes that “perhaps the most of power, it is equally imperative to pitiful lesson of the past decade has been strive for the prevention and eradication that the prevention of violent conflict is of those conditions that create coup- far better and more effective than cure” prone environments and increase “coup and “the cost of not preventing violence vulnerability”.22 is enormous”.19 Concerning Africa, Kofi

22 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE II.

Condemning Unconstitutional Overthrow of Government: Towards a New Consensus

A. Prohibiting Coups d’état by takes place, the African union (AU) Decree “should immediately and publicly condemn such a change and urge for the To combat the coup epidemic on the speedy return to constitutional order”. continent, African Heads of State and In case of “resistance”, sanctions seeking Governments have solemnly declared to ostracize the illegal government from war against the unconstitutional seizure the rest of the African community should of power. They have expressed their be imposed.26 determination to “immediately and publicly condemn such a change and The unconditional rejection of the urge the speedy return to constitutional unconstitutional overthrow of regimes order”. 23 Accordingly, during the July is enshrined as one of the fundamental 1999 Summit of the OAU in Algiers, principles of the African Union. African leaders strongly condemned Indeed, Article 4 of the Constitutive violent changes of government, which Act of the Organization reiterates the destabilize and threaten the development of the continent, and urged OAU “Member nations, whose governments came to power through unconstitutional Box 3. Prevention Indeed means [...] to restore constitutional 24 We have to get more pre-emptive, anti- legality”. Three years later, in July cipate… Regrettably, we have not shown 2002, these leaders, “gravely concerned” the courage and the determination to about “the resurgence of coups d’état in move in a timely fashion to prevent si- Africa”, in spite of the July 1999 solemn tuations of crisis from deepening. And declaration, conveyed “a clear and when it has gotten out of hand, it has cost us in the subregion and the wider unequivocal warning to the perpetrators international community much more to of unconstitutional change that, under resolve the crisis then. no circumstances will their illegal action be tolerated or recognized by the OAU”. 25 Mohamed Ibn Chambas Executive Secretary of ECOWAS They reiterated that whenever an unconstitutional change of Government

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 23 “condemnation Still more damaging, massive outbreaks Sadly, given the strong and rejection of of civil conflict have occurred in a obstacles to democratic unconstitutional number of states, most obviously Côte governance still to be changes of d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and overcome in many states governments” by Sierra Leone, causing horrendous levels in the sub-region, one all AU Members of suffering, death and destruction, and cannot claim that this rash States. necessitating large-scale intervention by peace-keeping forces, drawn from inside of coups d’état is coming Similarly, the and outside the region. to an end. leaders of the Economic Sadly, given the strong obstacles to Community of West African States democratic governance still to be (ECOWAS) recommend “zero tolerance overcome in many states in the sub- for power obtained or maintained by region, one cannot claim that this rash of unconstitutional means”.27 coups d’état is coming to an end. Recent examples in Mauritania, Côte d’Ivoire or Togo illustrate this concern. B. The Limits of the Politics of Decreed Prohibition

In spite of the official robust rhetoric prohibiting any violent and unconstitutional change of government in West Africa, data on political change in the sub-region show that the tradition of coups d’état remains vibrant.

For the past decade and a half, the region has experienced numerous successful military coups d’état and credible unsuccessful coups attempts.28 Coups and coup plots afflicted thirteen of the region’s sixteen states during this period, leaving only Cape Verde, Ghana and Senegal unaffected. Successful coups took place in Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

24 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE III.

Coups d’état, a Threat to Regional Security

The devastating effects of coups and financing the violence in West Africa are not limited coup plotters. The devastating effects of to the boundaries of the states in This shows coups and violence in West which they occur. On the contrary, that violent sei- Africa are not limited to the their contagion spreads very rapidly zure of power boundaries of the states in to neighboring states and the region or attempts which they occur. as a whole. to violently change a Coups are first and foremost a national government constitute a threat to challenge to security and stability. regional harmony and stability; However, in West Africa, a violent change of power in one country usually has b) Even when a coup d’état succeeds, it strong regional implications: becomes a divisive factor regionally. West African history shows that each a) When a violent seizure of power time a coup d’état succeeds in the sub- aborts, the perpetrators (at least those region, the regional community is who were not captured or killed) leave divided into at least two antagonistic their country and flee to neighboring groups of states: Those who are states. The case of Ivorian coup considered to be “friends” of the plotters finding safe havens in Côte overthrown leader, thus becoming the d’Ivoire’s neighboring states is a good foes of the new regime, and those who illustration of such circumstances. are sympathetic to the new regime, Likewise, each time rumors of coup and are maybe perceived as having attempts have shaken a state in the been accomplices of the coup sub-region, the first reaction of its perpetrators. political authorities has almost always been to accuse its neighbors. During c) Some coup attempts degenerate into the August and September 2004 coup civil wars. This was the case in the attempts in Mauritania for instance, September 2002 coup attempt in the Mauritanian authorities openly Côte d’Ivoire, or the violent attempt accused Libya and Burkina Faso of to overthrow Samuel Doe in Liberia,

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 25 initiated in December 1989 from of coups or coup attempts on the continent neighboring Côte d’Ivoire. in which neighboring states have not been either involved or accused rightly or falsely In general, whatever its ultimate outcome of being accomplices. The April 2004 trial – successful, failed, or transformed into a of the authors of an alleged coup attempt civil war – a coup d’état in Africa is almost in Burkina Faso is a good illustration of always a regionally divisive event and a that fact.29 threat to stability. There are few instances UNMIL/ERIC KANALSTEIN

Liberia: In January 2006, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was sworn in as President, taking over from outgoing Chairman Gyude Bryant.

26 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE IV.

When Democratically Elected Leaders Themselves Turn into a Threat to Democracy

Granted that, as argued above, it is African and international communities obvious enough that leaders who during the near three-year government come to or remain in power through of President Kumba Yala in Guinea- fraudulent elections will most probably Bissau. create conditions inviting coups, a particularly sensitive issue relating to governance emerges when leaders who A. Case Study: Guinea Bissau were democratically elected become a threat to national peace and regional In January 2000, after more than two security, through their undemocratic years of violence and constitutional and unconstitutional behavior, once in stalemate in Guinea Bissau,30 Kumba power. Yala was overwhelmingly elected President, with 72% of the ballots. The When an elected leader becomes part of elections were unanimously praised as the problems the state is facing, how can democratic, that is, all-inclusive, free, one prevent an unconstitutional seizure fair, and transparent. of power or a violent breakdown of the state (civil war)? How should we react A few months when, amidst the threat of anarchy or after his swearing Owing to the undemocratic chaos fuelled by the erratic and irrespon- in as Head of behavior of the democratically sible behavior of a head of state, the latter State, Kumba elected president, Guinea is unconstitutionally but expectedly Yala increasingly Bissau very rapidly relapsed removed from power? appeared to be into tension and turmoil, with both a factor of alleged coup attempts being These are critical questions that have instability for to be courageously faced if we are to be the country and regularly denounced by the serious in addressing the challenge of a great dilemma government. coups d’état in West Africa, especially in for democracy. preventing coup-prone environments The President’s “style of leadership” from taking root. These questions ignited a destabilizing process that represented a tough challenge for the led his own Prime Minister to accuse

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 27 him publicly of being the “sole person On 9 June 2003, stressing again on the behind instability in the country”. “increasingly volatile political climate” Owing to the undemocratic behavior in Guinea Bissau,32 Kofi Annan, once of the democratically elected president, more, sounded the alarm bell: Guinea Bissau very rapidly relapsed into tension and turmoil, with alleged I regret to say that […] the overall coup attempts “aimed at overthrowing situation in Guinea-Bissau has not the democratically elected government improved. In fact, it has worsened. in Guinea Bissau” being regularly Amid political and institutional denounced by the government. instability, electoral uncertainty has continued to generate tensions On 16 December 2000, the Economic […]. The lack of progress in Community of West African States the constitutional and electoral (ECOWAS) deplored in a statement the spheres has been mirrored by climate of instability in Guinea Bissau. a general deterioration in the political climate. Opposition The Authority [of Heads of State leaders have continued to accuse and Government of ECOWAS] the Government of arbitrary strongly condemned the attempt executive decisions, restrictions to overthrow the democratically imposed on independent media, elected government of Guinea harassment of political opponents Bissau, and insisted on the need to by security officials, the imposition respect constitutional order and the of travel bans on prominent rule of law in order to strengthen the personalities and limitation of democratic process in that country. access to the mass media by political parties.33 Eighteen months later, the growing deterioration of the situation in Guinea Ultimately, on 14 September 2003, Bissau led the UN Secretary-General Kofi President Kumba Yala was removed Annan to raise awareness of the threats from power by a military coup d’état. to peace and security presented by the This event appeared to many as a logical ongoing “constitutional impasse”: conclusion to the tragic degeneration of the legitimate power vested in the […] the constitutional impasse has, democratically elected President, a regrettably, persisted, generating situation that was progressively bringing in turn increased tensions among Guinea Bissau to the brink of disaster. the various organs of government, especially between the executive, on The military declared that they had seized the one hand, and the judiciary and power in order to save the country from the legislature on the other […]. anarchy and to “preserve democracy”. President Yala himself was criticized The name chosen by the new junta, the for contributing to this atmosphere “Military Committee for the Restitution of generalized apprehensions and of the Democratic and Constitutional tension.31 Order”, was emblematic of both the

28 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE circumstances of the coup and the Bissau Guinean reasons of the unconstitutional entry of political parties Both the African and the the armed forces into the political arena. and civil society international communities For most observers, the feeling was organi zati ons condemned in principle the that Guinea Bissau had been teetering reached the unconstitutional seizure on the brink of implosion from which conclusion that of power. However, off the it was saved thanks to the “salutary” “the coup d’état” record, there was unanimity intervention of the armed forces. was “the best that the unconstitutional solution against removal of president Yala As far as the occurrence of the coup the reign of from power was a necessary itself was concerned, nobody was chaos in Guinea evil for the preservation of really surprised at it happening, Bissau”. 34 Three stability in the West African precisely at that moment under those days after the sub-region. specific circumstances. Bissau Guinean putsch, more than political parties and civil society 5,000 people marched in the streets of publicly declared their support to the Bissau, the capital city, as “an expression military junta and praised the armed of support” to the military. forces for having released the country from a great threat of chaos. After a Both the African and the international meeting with the new military leaders, communities condemned in principle the unconstitutional seizure of power. However, off the record, there was unanimity that the unconstitutional Box 4. A Long Awaited Coup d’état removal of president Yala from power Kumba Yala’s ill-fated three and a half was “a necessary evil for the preservation year term as president came to an end on of stability in the West African September 14th when he was deposed in sub-region”. 35 Many African leaders a bloodless military coup led by the army chief of staff. and political authorities did not The coup was not unexpected as there hesitate to recognize – in private was growing consensus, both domes- – that the democratically elected but tically and abroad, that Mr. Yala had “unpopular” Kumba Yala had been become a severe liability to his country and unable to “promote democracy in his that there was little chance of an exit from 36 this malaise while he remained in office. country”. The Economist Intelligence Domestic reaction to the coup was near Unit observed that “Mr. Yala had grown universal relief, and even his own Partido increasingly unpopular. His disruptive da Renovação Social (PRS) party signed style of leadership included frequent a declaration supporting it, together with all the other political parties. cabinet reshuffles and government His presidency had been marked by dismissals […]. There were continued incompetent governance and steadily threats and intimidation of opposition deteriorating political and economic parties […]. Prior to the coup, there had conditions. been clear evidence that Mr. Yala had 37 The Economist Intelligence Unit, been preparing to rig the elections”. December 2003 Embarrassment over the coup d’état in Guinea Bissau was perhaps most evident

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 29 in the reaction of the ECOSOC Special The recent removal of the democra- Advisory Group on Guinea Bissau. tically elected President in Guinea While the Advisory Group stressed Bissau, however reprehensible, should that “the international community not be seen as a single event in- has condemned the unconstitutional terrupting an ongoing democratic seizure of power”, it also called on process, but as the culmination this same international community of an untenable situation during to increase its assistance to Guinea which constitutional norms were Bissau, especially at that moment when repeatedly violated. I would like to Bissau Guineans were striving to put in invite the international community place “a credible government”.38 to consider how to deal preventively with post-conflict situations, where governments, although democratical- B. The Coup and the Lesson ly elected, defy constitutional order, flout basic practices of governance Three months after the coup, in his and thus become an added source of report to the Security Council on instability.39 the situation in Guinea Bissau, the UN Secretary-General analyzed and explained the nature of the relationship between constitutional legitimacy and democratic governance:

30 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE V.

Addressing the Challenge of Coups d’état in West Africa: Key Concerns and Ways Forward

Unfortunately, destabilizing forces A. Key Concerns continue to represent a great impediment to the consolidation The question of of a democratic culture in Africa. how to bridge the Unfortunately, Impediments such as rigged elections, gap, in a realistic destabilizing forces massive corruption, political discri- way, between coup continue to represent mination and exclusion as well as prohibition and a great impediment to gross violation of human rights are coup proliferation the consolidation of a continually derailing democratic in West Africa democratic culture in transition and inevitably lead to the underpins this Africa. dereliction of political authority report. Particular and the weakening of national and emphasis is put on the practical regional stability. assessment of the combined reality of the deficit of good governance, In addition, experience has shown that the proliferation of unconstitutional when such obstacles persist and deepen changes of power, the inflation of civil without any chance for a peaceful change, wars in the sub-region and the legitimacy those who are the victims are inclined to of external preventive intervention. think that “only violence can solve the Issues of power legitimacy and power- problem”40 or that “the only solution left sharing, resource distribution, rule of is a coup d’état”. 41 law and human rights constitute the heart of the analysis. Democratic legality is therefore not only a matter of holding regular elections, 1. Intervention, Authority and even if these are characterized as being Legitimacy “free and fair”. Elections occur only once every five years or so, whereas Experience shows that conflict democracy, much more importantly, prevention calls necessarily for a policy reflects the conduct of government, and of intervention, whether internal or the latter’s relationship to the people external. The question of intervention whom it represents. usually poses the challenge of legitimacy,

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 31 especially given the high risk of political benevolent these latter may be. If not, instrumentalization. then national sovereignty loses to external interventionism. In a world of sovereign states – and sovereign leaders – the question of how One key feature of democracy is that it is to deal preventively and pre-emptively a learning process. Voters have to discover with coup-prone behaviors and for themselves whom they can and cannot circumstances logically implies these trust, and which policies do and do not two others: work. This learning process has to be established through regular participation, • Who is endowed with the legitimate both through elections and in other ways, authority to establish what is “wrong” as a result of which people can adapt or and what is “right” in the behavior reverse previous decisions that turn out of a sovereign leader, and in what to be in need of amendment. The central circumstances? function of any monitoring process must therefore be to ensure that the people of • According to what institutional arrange- the country concerned retain the ability ments (international community, regio- to adapt or reverse decisions; it is not for nal organizations, civil society ...) and the monitors to step in as soon as they feel formalities should the decision to act that the people have made a bad decision. preventively or pre-emptively be taken and implemented? These complex and multifaceted questions underpin the dilemma and Ultimate legitimate threats contained in a pre-emptive Experience shows that authority can approach to unconstitutional changes conflict prevention calls rest only with the of power. Indeed, a “censor-approach” necessarily for a policy people of the state to a policy of coup prevention must of intervention, whether concerned. The be handled very carefully, within the internal or external. The basic principle context of clearly defined thresholds question of intervention of democracy is and benchmarks, in order to make that the people of impossible any instrumentalization of usually poses the a country should what, in principle, appears to be a noble challenge of legitimacy, be the arbiters of ambition but which, in practical terms, especially given the their own destiny. could become a powerful and perverse high risk of political It is for them, not tool in the service of external interests instrumentalization. for anyone else, to and hidden agendas. decide who their rulers should be, and to judge whether 2. Intervention, Diplomacy and those rulers are indeed governing on their Institutions behalf. The objective of any externally established procedures and criteria Both the African Union and ECOWAS, must be to help those people exercise as already mentioned, have established their rights, not to substitute them for the principle that, under circumstances imposed or imported criteria, however in which the people of the state

32 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE concerned have been deprived of the fundamental ability to determine their own destiny, questions at Democratic legality is the appropriate international institutions least pertaining therefore not only a have the right to become involved, in order to indicators or matter of holding regular to assist in the restoration of democratic benchmarks, elections, even if these legitimacy. The institutions endowed mechanisms, are characterized as being with this authority are at a global level, thresholds, “free and fair”. the United Nations; at a continental level, political the African Union; and at the regional instrumentalization as well as checks level, the Economic Community of West and balances. The following table African States. While exercising this gives what could be considered as the ultimate authority, these may engage the key components of a policy of coup assistance of other institutions or actors as prevention and the critical questions they judge appropriate. that need to be addressed as appropriate in each area. The responsibilities of these institutions in the event of clearly illegal seizures of 1. Indicators power have already been established. The following guidelines are designed Priority should be given to the to suggest criteria according to which determinant factors of instability, they may operate under circumstances, which, if not promptly addressed, prior to such an illegal seizure of power, can ultimately lead to violence and a in which a coup-prone environment likely unconstitutional overthrow of can be clearly identified and “coup government. The relevant factors of vulnerability” easily assessed. instability taken into consideration include:

B. Ways Forward: Towards a Policy of Coups Prevention

The issues raised have many complexities that need to be addressed. A credible policy of coup prevention calls for five

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 33 Table 2. Preventing Coups in West Africa: Issues and Areas of Action

• The manipulation of Constitutions for • Threats against the media; personal interest, notably the changing of constitutional • Breach against the independence of Constitutions may not be provisions to allow the legislative power; considered wholly legitimate, the incumbent especially if written by non- leader the oppor- • The existence of widespread democratic governments. tunity to benefit corruption; from an additional term in power when, in fact, he/she • The patent use of armed and security has served his\her constitutional forces against the opposition; term limit; • Patent ethnic manipulations. • The rigging of elections in order “to win at all costs”; The following indicators are suggested, in order to identify the presence of a • The politics of exclusion and discrimi- coup-prone environment: nation in the sharing of national power and wealth; a) Blatant Breaches of Constitutional Principles • The appropriation of power by a social or ethnic group;

34 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE As the analysis in this report shows, there Box 5. Life after Power is a growing consensus that it is important to rule out unconstitutional changes. Since the onset of political transi- However, we should be aware that: tion (in Africa in early 1990s), positive examples of peaceful successions and of political relinquishing power are Constitutions may not be consi- increasing (…). This new trend in dered wholly legitimate, especially African politics raises questions of the if written by non-democratic role and status of former leaders, as governments. This can be well as the support provided to them. One of the hallmarks of functioning particularly problematic if the democracies is that provision for constitutional successor to the political leaders once they leave of- head of State is not considered to fice is both made and respected. This have democratic legitimacy. In stands in contrast to the tendency since independence for former leaders in some cases «constitutionalism» - a Africa, whether they are virtuous or respect for the principles of legality vicious, and regardless of constitutional and consensus - needs to take indemnities and other settlements, precedence over a strict adherence to suffer marginalization, vilification, 42 humiliation, persecution, and even to the text of the constitution. at times imprisonment and death by execution. With democratization, Fortunately, the surge of constitution- there is increasing recognition that making in West Africa over recent years those incumbents leaders who accept has seen the key elements required for democratic change should be eligible for the same sort of benefits, privileges stable democratic rule entrenched, and protections that former heads of formally at least, in the great majority of state and government in other countries the region’s national constitutions. Some enjoy. of the more important provisions are: Many African countries have made constitutional and legal provisions for • Guarantees of free political former heads of state (…). At a mini- organization, ensuring the rights of mum they guarantee former presidents opposition political parties; security, provide them with diplomatic privileges and immunities and make some arrangements for their material • Guarantees of an independent well-being (…). Reaching agreement judiciary and electoral commission; on the degree to which the financial and material needs of former leaders and • Term limits for the head of state or their dependent will be met by the state is part of the democratization process. government; Whatever arrangements are instituted should be linked to the office, and not to • The incorporation of human rights individual incumbents. Moreover, stipu- into the constitution; lating such provisions in constitutions provides some protection against future reversals. • Provisions to ensure that the government is accountable for its Global Coalition for Africa, 1999 actions, through open procedures enforced by independent arbiters.

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 35 The first line of defense against arbitrary In West Africa, even, or indeed especially, rule should therefore be to encourage in those countries of the region that states within the region to ensure that appeared to have achieved a stable and their constitutions incorporate “best effective government, such as Côte practice” provisions, such as those d’Ivoire under President Houphouët- noted above, and Boigny or The Gambia under President Term limits, by which the to monitor the Jawara, the failure to establish sound head of state or government government’s processes of renewal made possible by a can serve at most only adherence to change of leadership proved, in the long two terms of four or those provisions; run, to undermine the achievements five years each, are a key convincing that those leaders appeared to have evidence that established. In other cases, such as benchmark for constitutional governments are Benin, Ghana or Mali, the incumbent governance. flouting their president’s retirement opened the way own constitutions provides the most for a more democratic election than had important early warning of future he continued indefinitely in power. Any trouble. attempt by incumbent rulers to change term limits, even if accompanied by Term limits, by which the head of state or apparent expressions of popular demand government can serve at most only two (which are almost invariably orchestrated terms of four or five years each, are a key by the government or groups close to benchmark for constitutional governance. the power), should immediately trigger There is now abundant evidence that external concern. regular alternation to high office improves the quality of governance, and greatly In his speech just mentioned above, increases the effectiveness of democracy. Kofi Annan, referring to the necessity of In his address to the 2004 Summit of “institutional balance” in the functioning the African Union’s heads of State and of the state, emphasized: Government, the UN Secretary General, speaking of the need for a “new spirit This institutional balance cannot of democratic empowerment in Africa”, be achieved without the peaceful emphasized that, and constitutional change of power. There is no truer wisdom, and no [i]n every African country […] clearer mark of statesmanship, than politics must be inclusive, and a knowing when to pass the torch to a careful institutional balance must new generation. be preserved - including regular free and fair elections, a credible b) Rigged or Suspect Elections opposition whose role is respected, an independent judiciary which Since democratic elections are the single upholds the rule of law, a free and most important and visible means independent press, effective civilian through which the people express their control over the military, and a legitimate authority, it is essential that vibrant civil society. these take place in an atmosphere that is

36 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE fully free and fair. Elections throughout Governments and West Africa are already monitored by a political parties The existence of widespread large number of organizations, the most are likewise corruption, especially in important of which are internal to the commonly societies beset by mass poverty states concerned. For most purposes, it distinguished by and very high levels of youth will therefore be necessary only for different levels unemployment, has a deeply responsible international and regional of identifica- corrosive effect on trust in institutions to ensure that these organi- tion with such government and contributes zations are themselves able to monitor groups. Processes immeasurably to crime and elections in a free and responsible manner, of exclusion or and to take notice of their findings. Clear discrimination political disorder. evidence of rigging or manipulation, in the sharing or breaches of internationally accepted of national power and wealth electoral procedures, should therefore between groups, taking account of trigger external concern. their circumstances and needs, play a correspondingly important part c) Breaches of Human Rights and Civil in alienating excluded groups from Liberties national life, and leading not only to a coup-prone environment, but to levels The clearest indicator of the development of social division that can radicalize of a coup-prone environment outside parochial identities and readily trigger periods of elections is provided by intense levels of communal violence. systematic and continuing breaches of Clear evidence of such discrimination human rights, as evidenced by respected should therefore trigger external concern. and credible national, regional and international human rights monito- Secondly, one significant source of ring organizations. Arbitrary arrests, political problems throughout the West attacks against the media, torture, African region is that of citizenship: the “disappearances” and state-sponsored rules according to which individuals are killings are amongst the most important judged to belong, or not to belong, to a abuses that should trigger external particular national polity. This problem concern. has arisen for a number of reasons:

In addition to these individual rights, • The failure to address as appropriate two further major indicators of concern state boundaries inherited from relate to the discriminatory treatment colonization, which leads to the of identifiable groups of people within division of indigenous societies West African states. between national territories;

Firstly, as the result of the circums- • The high level of migration within the tances of their formation, West African region, over many generations; states characteristically encompass groups of people who may be identified • The association of the idea of by criteria of religion, ethnicity or race. citizenship with the territorial unit

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 37 from which an individual’s ancestors same time obliging them to abandon ultimately derive, regardless of where their claim to citizenship of other states that individual may have been born or with which they had some association; brought up; and but they would also deny states the right to disown individuals who were • The use of citizenship rules for personal judged to be their own citizens. Evidence benefit, especially by politicians see- of the manipulation of citizenship king to exclude particular individuals or residence rules within particular or groups from political participation. West African states must therefore be The instrumentalization of citizenship a source of regional concern. Besides, is to a significant extent a problem one of the fundamental objectives of of democratization, since it seeks to ECOWAS is to move towards a collective deprive individuals of the rights that identity and community citizenship, democracy would with rights and privileges attached to The clearest indicator of the otherwise give them. this new status. development of a coup-prone Today’s Côte d’Ivoire environment outside periods is a good example d) High and Continuing Levels of of elections is provided by of the difficulties of Corruption systematic and continuing and ambiguities on breaches of human rights, as the issue of citizen- Since their inception West African states evidenced by respected and ship and nationality have been facing corruption as a major credible national, regional and in West Africa, a problem. Corruption has its origins in a international human rights region with a long combination of many factors, ranging monitoring organizations. tradition of cross- from the perverse and discriminatory border movements way in which the region has been of persons and incorporated into the global economy, important ethnic and cultural inte- through to the sense of personal and ractions across states’ boundaries; social obligation which many people understandably feel towards those who • Deepening poverty which increases are most closely connected with them. In pressure on land and resources and in some cases, however, it has attained levels turn exacerbates xenophobia. of gross and egregious theft, for which no possible moral or historical justification Considering the specific geopolitical can be advanced, and which has played context of West Africa, the question a major role both in the impoverishment of citizenship and national identity of the region as a whole, and specifically lends itself to a regional solution, in the alienation of its peoples from ideally within the context of ECOWAS, rulers; the latter and the coterie connected by which regional states would agree to them are justly regarded as enriching on common rules to determine who themselves at the expense of the ordinary “belongs” to each of them. Such rules people for whose benefit they are supposed might well require marginal individuals to govern. The existence of widespread to decide in which state they wished to corruption, especially in societies beset exercise their citizenship rights, at the by mass poverty and very high levels

38 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE of youth unemployment, has a deeply and as can be appreciated from the table corrosive effect on trust in government below, West African states feature at the and contributes immeasurably to crime bottom end of ranking of corruption, and political disorder. Transparency with low marks out of a maximum of 10, International, the global coalition indicating low levels of trust or high levels against corruption, recently published its of perceived corruption. Corruption Perceptions Index for 2005,

Table 3. Corruption Perceptions Index 2005: West African States

Country rank Country 2005 CPI score* Confidence range** Surveys used*** (among 158 countries assessed )

65th 3.5 3.2-4.0 8 Ghana

70th 3.4 2.7-3.9 3 Burkina Faso

80th 3.2 2.8-3.6 6 Senegal

89th 2.9 2.1-4.0 5 Benin

94th 2.9 2.3-3.6 8 Mali

103th 2.7 2.3-3.1 7 Gambia

127th 2.4 2.2-2.6 4 Niger

129th 2.4 2.1-2.7 3 Sierra Leone

142th 2.2 2.1-2.3 3 Liberia

152th 1.9 1.7-2.1 4 Côte d'Ivoire

154th 1.9 1.7-2.0 9 Nigeria

Source : Transparency International43

While levels of corruption are difficult keep a close eye on apparent corruption to assess, and measures such as those levels within the region, and to take provided by organizations such as appropriate action when these raise issues Transparency International can be no of concern. To this extent, international more than approximations, regional and development partners could: international institutions are entitled to

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 39 […] assist ECOWAS in the preparation of annual reports on Box 6. Addressing Coup Vulnerability transparency in each of its member states. Independent bodies, including First, control strategies are likely to decrease vulnerability to coups when audit firms and appropriate civil they recognize and promote the society organizations, such as distinctive institutional interests and local chapters of Transparency autonomy of the military. Second, International, could be sub- control strategies are likely to decrease vulnerability to coups when they do not contracted to undertake much of the insidiously manipulate or interfere with necessary research for these reports the internal affairs of the military. Third, which would highlight progress control strategies are likely to decrease in the fight against corruption vulnerability to coups when they do and point out where additional not use the military against the political opposition. Logically, when a state’s work is needed. In addition, the control strategies lack these characteris- accountancy profession should be tics, its long-term coup vulnerability is promoted at universities and, as part likely to increase. Similarly […], when of corporate responsibility programs, the control strategies entail the exercise of power without the consent of the major international accountancy people, the use of undemocratic means firms might consider mentoring to retain power, and the violation of aspiring young accountants in rights and neglect of the needs of West Africa to build up the region’s citizens, coup vulnerability will increase. capacity in this area.44 Babacar N’Diaye, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Civilian Control 2. Mechanisms

Wherever possible, It would be difficult to the mechanisms ensure transparency and good governance devise any mechanism for through which to within the states concerned, and these ensuring good governance assess the conduct provide the first means through which in the region that did not of elected leaders to regulate the conduct of governments, enjoy the support of key must be domestic and ensure peaceful succession to high regional intergovernmental ones. Given the office. It is only when these provisions organizations fragility of demo- are inadequate, or have clearly failed to cracy in the region, operate in the way intended, that other however, these domestic actors may well mechanisms are required. need support, both from within the region and beyond. Key mechanisms b) Political Parties correspondingly include: Political parties are inherently competitive a) Domestic constitutional mechanisms and self-interested organizations, and should have no direct role in establishing The constitutions of the great majority the conditions for good governance. of states within the West African region Thought needs to be given, however, to already contain provisions intended to arrangements for ensuring that opposition

40 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE parties enjoy a stable role within the linkages have been political system, which encourages them instrumental in Thought needs to be given, to behave constructively – without, for helping both to however, to arrangements example, seeking to exacerbate divisions build up regional for ensuring that opposition within the society, or “knocking on the “best practice” parties enjoy a stable role door of the barracks” to encourage mili- policies, and to within the political system, tary intervention. A number of countries protect groups, which encourages them to in the sub-region have established a legal in particular behave constructively framework that regulates the existence countries, of opposition and political parties, their against harassment by their home functioning, with rights and duties, as governments. They have however well as the nature of the interaction been very weak in Africa, where each and relationship with the Government. group has tended to operate within its Mali has adopted a “Charter of political own national setting, showing little parties”.45 Benin both such a Charter and concern for developments elsewhere, a “statute of the opposition”.46 which (in keeping with common African assumptions about national c) Domestic Civil Society “sovereignty”) have been regarded as beyond their proper remit. Accordingly, Domestic civil society organizations, and civil society organizations should be notably human rights monitoring groups, encouraged to think and act regionally have a key role in checking on the behavior in promoting compliance with good of governments. Such groups have governance norms. In this area West proliferated in recent years, and perform African civil society organizations with a valuable service. To a very large extent, relevant expertise in governance issues they depend on the personal courage, civic could play an important role. responsibility and professional integrity of a small number of often extraordinarily e) Global Civil Society dedicated individuals, several of whom have lost their lives as a result. The critical “Global” civil society organizations, such requirement here is to ensure that they as Amnesty International, Human Rights retain an independent voice and perform Watch, Transparency International, their functions effectively and impartially, Oxfam or Global Witness, among without being “captured” either by others, are in practice based in Western government or opposition political democratic states, even though many of forces. them have made serious efforts to broaden their base, through the recruitment of d) Regional Civil Society leading members of their permanent staff and their supervisory councils, In other democratizing regions of the on a worldwide basis. They remain world, notably central Europe and heavily dependent on their own sense of south/central America, effective linkages professional commitment, rather than on have been forged between civil society any formalized system of accountability. groups in neighboring countries. Such They remain unequalled, both as sources

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 41 o f g e n e r a l l y principles” are to be “shared by all Member Unconstitutional and reliable informa- States”. The principles include: violent governance as well as tion, and as unconstitutional and violent lobbying agencies, • Separation of powers – the Executive, change of government are notably with the Legislative and Judiciary; among the most important governments of causes of armed conflict in developed indus- • Empowerment and strengthening of West Africa. trial states. It is parliaments and guarantee of parlia- questionable, mentary immunity; however, whether they should have a formal role in mechanisms to be devised • Independence of the Judiciary: Judges for ensuring constitutional rule in West shall be independent in the discharge Africa or for that matter in any other of their duties; sub-region. • The freedom of the members of the f) Regional Intergovernmental Bar shall be guaranteed; without Organizations prejudice to their penal or disciplinary responsibility in the event of contempt It would be difficult to devise any of court or breaches of the common mechanism for ensuring good gover- law. nance in the region that did not enjoy the support of key regional intergovern- As far as the issue of peace and constitu- mental organizations, either in terms tional transition to power is concerned, of the general criteria to be employed, the West Africa organization makes it or much more problematically with clear that “every accession to power regard to specific cases to which these must be made through free, fair criteria were to be applied. On the other and transparent elections” and West hand, governments and intergovern- Africa should apply “zero tolerance mental institutions tend to have a strong for power obtained or maintained by tendency to favor fellow governments unconstitutional means”. against opposition arising from the domestic society. In West Africa, the two The African Union represents a regional organizations whose support supplementary layer of accountability would be required are ECOWAS and the in governance issues. According to the AU, both of which are formally committed African Heads of State and Government, to maintenance of high standards of the adoption by all members states of governance. the AU’s “principles as a basis for the articulation of common values and The ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and principles for democratic governance Good Governance47 establishes a number in our countries (...) will considerably of “constitutional convergence principles” reduce the risks of unconstitutional and modalities for appropriate demo- change on our Continent”. The Pan- cratic governance. ECOWAS stresses African organization’s principles that these “constitutional convergence include:

42 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE • “Adoption of a democratic Cons- Likewise, NEPAD, especially under its titution: its preparation, content Democracy and Political Governance and method of revision should be in Initiative acknowledges that “develop- conformity with generally acceptable ment is impossible in the absence principles of democracy; of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance” and • Respect for the Constitution and recommends “a series of commitments adherence to the provisions of the by participating countries to create or law and other legislative enactments consolidate basic governance processes adopted by Parliament; and practices”. Therefore, NEPAD has established “global standards of • Separation of powers and indepen- democracy, the core components of dence of the judiciary; which include political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several • Promotion of political pluralism political parties and workers” unions, or any other form of participatory and fair, open and democratic democracy and the role of the African elections periodically organized to civil society, including enhancing enable people to choose their leaders and ensuring gender balance in the freely; these standards would help political process; avoid the overthrow of governments through violence. This is “in line with the • The principle of democratic change principles of democracy, transparency, and recognition of a role for the accountability, integrity, and respect opposition; for human rights and promotion of the rule of law”. These are clearly defined • Organization of free and regular Objectives, Standards, Criteria and elections, in conformity with existing Indicators of good governance, as part texts; of its peer review mechanism.

• Guarantee of freedom of expression Unconstitutional Should a situation likely and freedom of the press, including and violent gover- to lead to a coup d’état or guaranteeing access to the Media for nance as well as a breakdown in civil order all political stake-holders; unconstitutional and violent change persist, despite informal • Constitutional recognition of of government are efforts to deal with the fundamental rights and freedoms among the most problem, it may then become in conformity with the Universal important causes necessary for regional and Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 of armed conflict international institutions and the African Charter on Human in West Africa. to take formal notice of the and Peoples’ Rights of 1981; These conflicts situation, in order to prompt are no longer public and official efforts • Guarantee and promotion of Human limited within the at conflict prevention and Rights”. borders of a given state. Their impact management.

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 43 and consequences The ultimate sanction would reverb erate Box 7. Conflict and Coup Prevention then be some kind of recall across borders procedure, under which an and destabilize The primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national Govern- individual who consistently the whole sub- ments, with civil society playing an failed to govern in accordance region. This places important role. The main role of the with publicly recognized the necessity to United Nations and the international address the issue community is to support national ef- criteria, upheld both by the beyond the sole forts for conflict prevention and assist in constitution of the state building national capacity in this field capacity of regio- (…). concerned and by the regional nal organizations. One of the principal aims of preventive ac- and international communities, The UN is hailed tion should be to address the deep-rooted would be deprived of the right as an important socio-economic, cultural, environmental, institutional and other structural causes to rule. actor: “Conflict that often underlie the immediate political in Africa poses symptoms of conflicts (…). a major challenge to United Nations Governments that live up to their efforts designed to ensure global peace, sovereign responsibility to resolve peacefully a situation that might dete prosperity and human rights for all. riorate into a threat to international pea- Although the United Nations was ce and security and call on the United intended to deal with inter-State warfare, Nations or other international actors it is being required more and more often for preventive assistance as early as nee- to respond to intra-State instability and ded, provide the best protection for 48 their citizens against unwelcome outside conflict”. interference. In this way, preventive action by the international community The UN, operating through the Security can contribute significantly to strengthe- Council, must be the ultimate arbiter ning the national sovereignty of Member States. of the legitimacy of remedial action, in The time has come to translate the collaboration as necessary with regional rhetoric of conflict prevention into organizations and other institutions. concrete action (…). I am under no illusion that preventive strategies will be easy to implement. The 3. Thresholds costs of prevention have to be paid in the present, while its benefits lie in the distant International action in pursuit of global future. The main lesson to be drawn from standards of good governance may past United Nations experiences in this re- be taken at different levels, for each of gard is that the earlier the root causes of a potential conflict are identified and effec- which an appropriate threshold needs to tively addressed, the more likely it is that be devised. the parties to a conflict will be ready to engage in a constructive dialogue, address a) Informal Engagement the actual grievances that lie at the root of the potential conflict and refrain from the use of force to achieve their aims. The first level occurs when the behavior of a government arouses sufficient concern Kofi Annan to draw the problem to international Secretary-General of the United Nations attention, at which point it may be

44 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE helpful to take action at a confidential • Rigging of elections, and and informal level through the United Nations or, where appropriate, through • Disregard of informal warnings and other informal contacts. The Special pressures on all parties concerned to Representative of the Secretary-General bring about an improvement in the for West Africa is indeed explicitly situation. mandated to undertake such missions which, being themselves informal, do At this point, which was for example not require any formal threshold to clearly reached in the cases of Guinea- trigger their operation, and depend on Bissau, Liberia and Mauritania, the the personal judgment of the Special appropriate international institutions Representative. Given the sensitivity of (which would normally be ECOWAS, issues of this kind, and the often deep acting in close collaboration with the resentment of governments at having African Union and, when necessary, the their behavior publicly criticized, the United Nations), would be empowe- informal stage is in practice judged to be red to undertake the most likely effective course of action missions designed Just as in the sphere of to pursue. to bring the domestic democratic seriousness of the governance, therefore, the b) Formal Engagement situation to the actions of the regional and attention of the Should a situation likely to lead to a coup parties concerned, international communities d’état or a breakdown in civil order persist, and to mediate in in dealing with these despite informal efforts to deal with the or arbitrate over very sensitive issues must problem, it may then become necessary the crisis in order be guided by the twin for regional and international institutions to find solutions. principles of transparency to take formal notice of the situation, in and wide participation. order to prompt public and official efforts c) Sanctions at conflict prevention and management. The threshold for intervention at this In cases where, despite the attempts of the stage would be appropriately determined regional and international community to in the light of: resolve problems of governance in specific regional states in the ways outlined above, • Evidence of serious Human Rights and where these problems constitute abuse, signaled by domestic or a clear and present danger to the international monitors; stability of the region and especially of neighboring states, the relevant regional • The flouting by the government of and international institutions would be its own constitution, or attempts to empowered to impose sanctions, as a change that constitution to the benefit preventive measure, equivalent to those of the incumbent regime; that are already authorized for dealing with cases of illegal seizures of power. • Serious breakdown of public order, which can plausibly be ascribed to the Though this is a drastic and exceptional behavior of the government; step, it should be noted that it has

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 45 already been taken with regard to one 5. Checks and Balances democratically elected West African President, Charles Taylor of Liberia. In Exactly the same principles apply to that case, this action resulted not only from the need to assess the objectivity and Taylor’s abuse of office within Liberia, but impartiality of those, in the regional also from his demonstrable involvement and international communities as well in the promotion of conflict within as within the countries concerned, who neighboring states, and his indictment for seek to impose sanctions and controls human rights abuses by the international on leaders who are deemed to have tribunal for Sierra Leone. become a threat to their own people, or to the peace and stability of the region 4. The Risk of Political as a whole. Objectivity and impartiality Instrumentalization are not normal features of the political process, domestic or international. One danger of any mechanism that National and regional leaders, and may prompt a change of government is indeed international institutions, have that it may be hijacked for personal gain their own interests and agendas, and are or other selfish purposes by individuals subject to strong pressures which often who stand to benefit from it. This is in emanate directly or indirectly from the some degree inevitable. Politicians most powerful actors in modern global everywhere seek self-serving goals, politics. No institution or procedure notably power and prestige, and in this can be wholly insulated against these respect democratic political systems are pressures. not different from any other. One cannot take the politics out of what is necessarily Just as in the sphere of domestic a highly political process. democratic governance, therefore, the actions of the regional and international The critical thing about democracy, communities in dealing with these very however, is that politicians are obliged sensitive issues must be guided by the to seek power within an open and twin principles of transparency and wide competitive setting, in which success participation. When, for example, an issue depends on attracting public support, threatens to become a source of division notably in the form of votes.The way to between West African states, it may be ensure that the forms of accountability helpful to involve the African Union more with which we are concerned are not fully in the process. In cases where the used for personal gains or hidden appropriate criteria for judging a regime agendas is firstly to ensure that any are called into question, the Objectives, exercise of accountability is backed by Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the popular support and validated through African Peer Review Mechanism49 may be free and fair elections, and secondly that used to provide guidance, even in cases free media are able to subject it to the that are not subject to the APRM process scrutiny necessary to reveal the hidden itself. In other cases, as in Sierra Leone, agendas of its supporters. evidence provided through internationally

46 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE authorized legal processes may be of from a failure to take necessary preventive considerable value in helping to resolve action at the appropriate time, must be contested issues. the ultimate criterion.

At all times, the welfare of West Africa’s people, and the immense amount of human misery that is likely to follow

Senegal: In April 2000, Maître Abdoulaye Wade was sworn in as President.

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 47 48 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE VI.

Conclusion

Inasmuch as the question of incumbent heads of state. It depends, unconstitutional change of power in not only on the ability to entice and West Africa is concerned, this study has sustain good governance norms and strived to provide what the UN Secretary- expectations, but also, if need be, on General called in his report on the causes the political will to correct policies and of conflict in Africa, “a clear and candid behavior that deviate from acceptable analysis” of the issue at stake. The central norms. There are already in existence, at argument of the document has been that the continental and sub-regional levels, the most effective way to put an end to regimes that enable the monitoring and the perpetration and perpetuation of correction of policies and behaviors unconstitutional changes of power in of member states. Relevant clauses of West African states must go beyond the African Union Peace and Security post-coup condemnation and sanctions. Council Protocol and the NEPAD Peer It must focus on preventing the creation Review Mechanism, as well as the 2001 of coup-prone environments and ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and eliminating coup-provoking or coup- Good Governance to a large extend precipitating policies and behavior. provide the appropriate monitoring The report encompasses a range of and corrective frameworks. For greater practical guidelines and policy actions certainty of practice, aspects of these aimed at bringing about conditions frameworks need to be strengthened to that help definitely turn the page on fulfill more effectively their monitoring unconstitutional and violent changes and corrective potential. However, they of power in the sub-region. Such a new present the advantage of being already policy of coup prevention supposes a in existence as part of the norms-setting multi-pronged approach, elements arsenal of the continent and the sub- of which are already suggested in the region. The voluntary (and thus limiting) report. Peer Review Mechanism instituted by NEPAD constitutes a propitious avenue As the analysis makes clear, the reduction through which West African states can of coup vulnerability will greatly depend pursue the creation of conditions that on the policies and the behavior of will reduce coup vulnerability.

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 49 These states should adopt the NEPAD the AU Commission and the Council process as it currently stands, but they to “anticipate and prevent disputes and should add a missing critical aspect: conflicts, as well as policies that may lead a compulsory peer review once every to genocide and crimes against humanity.” year. Regular scrutiny will enable the The same article stipulates that these identification and correction of coup decision-making organs can “institute producing environments, behavior or sanctions whenever an unconstitutional policies. change of government takes place in a Member State, as provided for in the While most African states have so far Lomé Declaration.” chosen to abstain from voluntary peer review, it is very likely that given the The ECOWAS Protocol, similarly, in its proper campaign and the leadership article 45 provides for (limited) sanctions (and pressure) of the leaders of states to be imposed on a member state where that have already volunteered for it, a “democracy is abruptly brought to an end sub-regionally binding instrument could by any means or where there is massive be accepted. The institutionalization violation of human rights.” In both of a West African annual peer review the AU and ECOWAS protocols, as this and its fair and responsible exercise will Paper makes clear, the missing element, immeasurably improve governance, in which needs to be added to strengthen addition to providing a ready instrument what is evidently a willingness to ad- to prevent bad situations from reaching dress resolutely situations in breach of crisis proportions. democratic norms, is to extend sanctions - and preventive actions - against the Pertinent aspects of the AU Peace and unconstitutional exercise of power, and security Council Protocol is another against policies and behavior that in the avenue for monitoring and bringing opinion of the international community needed corrections to the policies and endanger peace and security, stability behavior of states that could endanger and the welfare of member states and domestic as well as regional peace and sub-regions. stability and lead to coups d’état. Article 3 of the Protocol states that its objectives One approach to creating required are, among others, to “promote peace, conditions must be to provide security and stability in Africa” (which is incentives to incumbent heads of states also one of the areas where the Council to leave power gracefully when their performs its functions) and to “anticipate constitutional mandate ends and to and prevent conflicts.” Another critical resist the temptation and pressure to objective of the protocol is to “Promote amend the constitution, and while in and encourage democratic practices, power to pursue policies, and conduct good governance and the rule of law, themselves in a way consistent with the human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance regimes set up by sub- respect for the sanctity of human regional and continental instruments. life…”. Furthermore, in its article 7, the Such incentives must include complete Protocol empowers the Chairperson of immunity from prosecution by national

50 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE courts and tribunals for acts and contribution to aspects of national life decisions made as head of state, with the they may care sincerely about for a variety noticeable exception of crimes of war of reasons. However, to avoid any conflict and crimes against humanity. Often, it of interests, this participation in national is for fear of prosecution, humiliation, life should be on the condition that the or retaliation that many heads of state role played by former heads of state would choose to remain in power indefinitely not hinder his or her successor’s work and and at all cost. The systematization of potentially create tension. For instance, immunity in national constitutions will former heads of state should not remain ease these fears, prevent incumbents from as chairmen of a political party especially carrying out acts pertaining to crimes of when that party is too dominant. war and crimes against humanity and, when time comes, encourage them to These recommendations can be relinquish power. Whatever the incentive incorporated in regional instruments or “package” chosen, it must remain clear in the national legislation of individual that amnesty is without prejudice states in the form of a Statute of Former to international jurisdictions and Heads of State. This Statute could specify other national jurisdictions retaining the conditions required to qualify for its their competence in certain criminal benefits and privileges. These conditions matters and that this amnesty cannot could center on the strict respect for extend to gross violation of human constitutional term limits and other rights anyway. minimum governance benchmarks. It could be updated and adapted as changes Furthermore, outgoing heads of state in respective countries and the sub-region should be guaranteed financial security warrant. through a pension system to ensure that their legitimate financial needs are met Finally, as this report points out, once they leave power. Other arrange- amendments to a democratic cons- ments should be made in accordance with titution to enable an incumbent to specific national political and institutional run again for office when an existing settings to involve former heads of state constitution makes him/her ineligible on a continuing basis in national political is often an unmistakable sign of trouble life and bestow on them membership ahead. Amending the constitution is not in consultative and/or decision-making necessarily contrary to democracy, indeed, bodies at the highest level of the state. it enables democracies to adapt to new This will serve to send strong signals that realities, to be more responsive to the “there is life after State House” and that evolving needs of a country, and become even after leaving power a head of state stronger. However, when an amendment remains relevant to the national life and to a constitution is self-serving and is his/her views are taken into consideration. muscled through a political system in Such measures will go far beyond the spite of strong opposition and the clear symbolic recognition and meet the desire dangers of instability it often provokes, it of many former leaders to continue to becomes corrosive to democracy. To avoid bring what they believe to be a still needed such self-serving amendments, it should

LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE - 51 be a general rule and indeed a specific Such a rule, when adopted on a regional provision in constitutions of the sub- basis will contribute significantly to region that amendments to a constitution the reduction in the tendency to raid that involve the change in term limits or constitutions in order to remain in office any major aspects of the powers of the indefinitely or acquire exorbitant powers. executive shall not benefit the incumbent.

52 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE Notes and references

1 “The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa”, Report of the Secretary-General, A/52/871 – S/1998/318, 13 April 1998. 2 Patrick J. McGowan, “Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004”, Armed Forces and Society, vol. 32, No 1, October 2005, p. 5. 3 Commenting for instance on the political crisis in his country after the coup August 2005 coup in Mauritania, a prominent Guinea opposition leader stressed that after the coup in Mauritania, in Guinea, «nous maintenons la possibilité du coup de force que nous ne refuserons pas….», in “Ba Mamadou: sortir de la crise”, interview with Afriques, novembre 2005, pp. 32-34. 4 The “leadership” and “role model” function of the 1963 coup in Togo is underlined by Atsutsé Kokouvi Agbobli, Sylvanus Olympio: un destin tragique, Dakar (Senegal): NEA Sénégal, 1992. 5 See Atsutsé kokuvi Agbobli, Op. cit., p. 160. On the same issue, see also Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, Yale, Yale University Press, 1990, p. 213. 6 OAU 35th Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Algiers, 12-14 July 1999, Decision AHG/Dec.141 (XXXV); on a detailed analysis of the overthrow and assassination of the first president of Togo, see Atsutsé Kokouvi Agbobli, Sylvanus Olympio: un destin tragique, Dakar (Senegal): NEA Sénégal, 1992. 7 On the coup, see for instance Kwame N’Goran, Coup d’état en Côte d’Ivoire, Paris : Editions Klanba, 2000 ; Marc Le Pape et Claudine Vidals (ed.), Côte d’Ivoire, l’année terrible 1999-2000, Paris : Karthala, 2002. 8 OSCE, “Charter of Paris for a New Europe”, November 1990. 9 OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, “Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes taking place in the World”, 1990. 10 Stephen Ellis, The Mask for Anarchy, New York, New York University Press, 1999; Prince Yomi Johnson, The Rise and Fall of Samuel K. Doe, Lagos (Nigeria), Pax Cornwell Publishers, 2003; Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War, Boulder, Co., Lynne Rienner, 2002; David E. A. Omuru, The Coming of the Killers: Operation Burn Freetown, Freetown, (no editor’s name), 1999; William Shawcross, Deliver Us from Evil: Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict, London, Bloomsburry, 2000; Ibrahima Abdullah, “Bush Path to Destruction: the Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United front/Sierra Leone”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 36(2), 1998, pp. 203-235. 11 For details, see for instance: Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, Yale, Yale University Press, 1990; A. B. Assensoh and Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh, African Military History and Politics: Coups and Ideological Incursions, New York, Palgrave, 2002. 12 This definition is from Claude E. Welch, Jr, Soldier and State in Africa : A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 17. 13 Boubacar N’Diaye, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Civilian Control: Botswana, Ivory Coast and Kenya in Comparative Perspective, New York, Lexington Books, 2001. 14 “The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa”, Report of the Secretary-General, A/52/871 – S/1998/318, 13 April 1998. 15 OAU’s Declaration AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) on the Framework for an OAU au Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government. 16 See for instance: “For a Few Dollars More: How Al Qaeda Moved into the Diamond Trade”, A report by Global Witness, April 2003. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/diamond/2003/Liberia-GW.pdf; Abdulqawi Yusuf “Somalia’s Warlords: Feeding on a Failed State”, International Herald Tribune, January 21, 2004. Somalia is another one, to cite just one more example from the African continent. 17 See for instance Ernest H. Preeg Feeling Good or Doing Good with Sanctions: Unilateral Economic Sanctions and the U.S. National Interest (Washington, D.C., CSIS, 1999). 18 On UN and the issue of Sanctions, see Security Council Working Group on General Issues on Sanctions: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/sanctions/documents.htm 19 Kofi Annan, “Prevention of Armed Conflict”, United Nations document S/2001/574, 7 July 2001. 20 Kofi Annan, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa”, UN document A/52/871 – S/1998/318, 13 April 1998. 21 Ibid. 22 The concept of “coup vulnerability” is developed in Boubacar N’Diaye, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Civilian Control: Botswana, Ivory Coast and Kenya in Comparative Perspective, New York, Lexington Books, 2001. 23 OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, “Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes taking place in the World”, 1990.

53 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE Notes and references

24 AHG/Dec.142 (XXXV). 25 OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, “Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes taking place in the World”, 1990. 26 AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI), 12/07/200. 27 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. 28 See Patrick J. McGowan, ‘African military coups d’état, 1956-2001 : frequency, trends and distribution’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.41 No.3, 2003. 29 Elimane Fall et Alpha Barry, «Abidjan et Lomé au banc des accusés», Jeune Afrique/L’Intelligent, 18-24 avril 2004, pp. 77-80. 30 The era of armed instability was inaugurated on 7 June 1998 when an insurrectional group of soldiers led by Brigadier general Ansumane Mane attempted a coup against President Joao Bernardo Vieira, in power since 1980. 31 “Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in that country”, United Nations document S/2002/1367, 13 December 2002. 32 Ibid. 33 “Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in that country”, United Nations document S/2003/621, 9 June 2003. 34 Ibrahima Dramé, « Le coup d’état met fin au ‘règne’ du président guinéen », SaphitNet.Info, 18 septembre 2003. 35 Habibou Bangré, « Le putsch cautionné », in Afrik.com, 16 septembre 2003. 36 Ibrahima Dramé, « Le coup d’état met fin au ‘règne’ du président guinéen », SaphitNet.Info, 18 septembre 2003. 37 “Guinea Bissau Politics: After the Coup”, The Economist Intelligence Unit, December 2003. 38 « Déclaration du Groupe Consultatif Special de l’ECOSOC sur la Guinée Bissau », Communiqué de presse ECOSOC/6046, 19/09/2003. 39 “Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in that country”, S/2003/1157, 5 December 2003. 40 These words are from a Guinean (Conakry) opposition leader, Bâ Mamadou (Président du bureau exécutif et porte-parole du Front pour l’alternance démocratique en Guinée Conakry) : «Seule la violence pourra régler le problème guinéen», Fraternité Matin , 5 Janvier 2004. 41 M.K. Sylla, « Un coup d”état militaire […] reste le salut pour la Guinée ». Quoted in Guinea Forum, 42 Wilton Park Roundtable WPS05/27, “Sovereignty and Transition in West Africa”, organized in partnership with the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), Dakar, 7-8 March 2005. 43 Figures extracted from worldwide table of 158 countries assessed in www.transparency.org/..cpi/2005. *CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). **Confidence range provides a range of possible values of the CPI score. This reflects how a country’s score may vary, depending on measurement precision. Nominally, with 5 per cent probability the score is above this range and with another 5 per cent it is below. However, particularly when only few sources (n) are available, an unbiased estimate of the mean coverage probability is lower than the nominal value of 90%. ***Surveys used refer to the number of surveys that assessed a country’s performance. 16 surveys and expert assessments were used and at least 3 were required for a country to be included in the CPI. NB: Figures / assessments not available for Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania. 44 United Nations office for West Africa, “Youth Unemployment and Regional Insecurity in West Africa”, UNOWA Issue Paper, December 2005, pp. 15-16. 45 République du Mali, Ministère chargé de l’Administration Territoriale, « Charte des partis politiques », loi, n° 00-045 / DU 07 juillet 2000. 46 Loi n° 2001-036 portant statut de l’Opposition, Journal officiel de la République du Bénin, 15 mars 2004 ; Loi n° 2001–021 portant Charte des partis politiques, Journal officiel de la République du Bénin, 15 mars 2004. 47 This Protocol was adopted by ECOWAS Head of State and Government in Dakar on December 2001; it is a Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. 48 Kofi Annan, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa”, UN document A/52/871 – S/1998/318, 13 April 1998. 49 NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2003/APRM/Guideline/OSCI, 9 March 2003

54 - LIFE AFTER STATE HOUSE

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