journal of religion and demography 6 (2019) 149-188 brill.com/jrd
Demographic and Religious Dimensions of Jewish Identification in the U.S. and Israel: Millennials in Generational Perspective
Ariela Keysar Trinity College,Hartford, Connecticut USA [email protected]
Sergio DellaPergola The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem [email protected]
Abstract
The mutual relationship between demography and religion is explored in this paper through a comparison of the two largest Jewish populations worldwide: the U.S. and Israel. Special attention is devoted to the younger adult population – the Millennials – operationalized here as ages 18 to 29 and divided into three sub age groups. Data come from the Pew Research Center’s surveys of Jewish Americans in 2013 and of Israelis in 2015. After a short review of the main demographic differences between the two Jewish populations, the paper focuses on the multiple possible meanings and con- tents of Jewishness. The paper explores age-related differences regarding indicators of contemporary Jewish identity: religiosity, peoplehood and nationalism. We discover that young Jewish adults – the Millennials – in Israel and in the U.S., especially those 18–21 years old, are more likely than their elders to view their Jewishness mainly as a matter of religion rather than as a culture or ethnicity. Emerging similarities and dif- ferentials between Jews in Israel and in the U.S. are interpreted in the light of general theories of demographic change and religious identification, and are related to specific events and developments that have affected Jews in the two countries and their mu- tual relationships.
Keywords
Jewish identification – Israel – u.s.a – religiosity – demography – Millennials
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/2589742X-00601004Downloaded from Brill.com09/28/2021 10:30:27AM via free access
Religion and demography are significantly linked (Voas 2003). Levels of reli- giosity are considered a primary factor explaining demographic behaviors in many countries (Keysar 2014b), including the United States and Israel (Keysar et al. 1992; DellaPergola 2009; Okun 2013), which are the focus of this paper. In general, higher birth rates among the more religious may increase their share within a population, thus affecting the overall religio-cultural profile of society. In turn, a population with a larger share of religious people with high fertil- ity may develop a more youthful age structure, possibly affecting population growth rates in subsequent years. Mutual relations between religion and demography are explored in this pa- per regarding Jews in the U.S. and in Israel – the two largest Jewish populations (Pew Research Center 2015; DellaPergola 2018). We address ideational and de- mographic changes that have occurred across age groups among Jews in both countries, we focus on the younger adult population aged 18 to 29 – defined as the Millennials because of their coming of age at the turn between the 20th and the 21st century. A related question is whether changing Jewish identification patterns can contribute to distancing between the two Jewish populations or their rapprochement (Cohen and Kelman 2010; Sasson et al. 2010; DellaPergola 2010; Keysar 2010). Jews constitute a small minority of the world population (Pew Research Center 2012a). Beyond the generic Jewish label, a multiplicity of meanings of what it means to be a Jew in contemporary societies has been recognized by social scientists (Herman 1977; Ben Rafael and Peres 2005; Levy et al. 2002; Kos- min and Keysar 2013; Hartman 2014; Aronson et al. 2018). Such multiple options involve similarities and dissimilarities across Jewish communities in different countries and societal contexts globally. Historians have contributed histories of the Jewish people stressing its global and transnational character, hence the need of a comprehensive interpretative approach (Baron 1952–1983). Social studies however, more often than not, have not focused on the many histori- cal threads that link Jews in different parts of the world and have for the most dealt with situations at the local and national level. This has prevented a keen assessment of the net contribution of different country experiences to the re- ligious and otherwise identificational profile of Jewish communities overall (DellaPergola 2014). The critique about a dearth of truly comparative studies of Jewish identity is well founded (Cohen E. 2010). In spite of the transnation- al nature of Jewish identity, a truly global approach to its study has not yet been fully developed. The issue is not just comparing separate findings from different countries, but rather creating an integrated perspective that would examine the nature and variation of Jewish identity by addressing the same questions to respondents dispersed worldwide. In recent years, however, some
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Data sources
In this paper, we utilize representative national data sets, the Pew U.S. Survey in 2013 and the Pew Israel Survey in 2015 (Pew Research Center 2013 and 2015).
Pew Research Center 2013 and 2015 Surveys The 2013 Pew U.S. Survey was based on a nationally representative sample of U.S. Jews, utilizing random digit dialing on both landlines and cell phones. Fo- cusing on telephone exchanges for counties where previous surveys indicated that at least some Jews reside, it is estimated to have covered more than 95% of the U.S. Jewish population. More than 70,000 screening interviews were conducted in English and Rus- sian to identify Jewish respondents in all 50 states and the District of Colum- bia. The screening incorporated four criteria: Jewish-religious identification, Jewish parent(s), raised Jewish, and considers self to be Jewish. In all, inter- views were completed with 3,126 Jews, including 2,786 Jews by religion and 340 persons of no religion but attached exclusively to Judaism. These 3,126 con- stitute the Jewish sample for the purpose of this study. Moreover, there were another 2,006 persons with some Jewish background, attachment or affinity who were also investigated and are labeled here as persons with other back- ground. These included: 349 persons of no religion who identified as partially Jewish; 1,190 people who were raised Jewish or had at least one Jewish parent, but at the time of the survey had a religion other than Judaism or said they do not consider themselves Jewish either by religion or aside from religion; 467 adults with a Jewish affinity who were not raised Jewish, did not have a Jewish parent, have a religion other than Judaism or have no religion and no direct Jewish ancestry, and consider themselves Jewish or partially Jewish. An incentive of $50 was offered to eligible respondents (Pew Research Center 2013). The reported response rate for the overall sample was 16%, cooperation rate 33% and contact rate 56%, taking into account the combined landline and cell phone sample.1 The Pew 2015 Israel Survey conducted 5,601 face-to-face interviews with adults of all religious groups in Israel: 3,789 Jews, 871 Muslims, 468 Christians,
1 Response rate is the proportion of completed interviews with eligible respondents of all completed and non-completed interviews (including refusals). Cooperation rate is the pro- portion of all cases interviewed of all eligible units ever contacted; Contact rate is the propor- tion of all cases in which some responsible member of the housing unit was reached by the survey (aapor 2015).
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Table 1 Age composition of samples in the U.S., 2013, and in Israel, 2015.
Population 18–21 22–25 26–29 30+ Total
U.S. raised Jewish 104 132 140 2,750 3,126 (% of the sample) (3%) (4%) (5%) (88%) (100%) U.S. other background 75 105 90 1,774 2,044 (% of the sample) (4%) (5%) (4%) (87%) (100%) Other background as % of all U.S. 41.9 44.3 39.1 39.2 39.5 Israel Jews 288 326 356 2,819 3,789 (% of the sample) (8%) (9%) (9%) (74%) (100%)
Source: Pew Research Center (2013 and 2015), authors’ processing
439 Druze, and 34 adults who belong to other religions or are religiously unaf- filiated. Five groups were oversampled: Jews living in the West Bank, Haredim (very religious, in Hebrew literally: “the fearful”), Christian Arabs, Arabs living in East Jerusalem, and Druze. The sample design was a multi-stage stratified area probability sampling based on Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics’ 2008 Census. The reported survey response rates varied by religious group and within each group. For example, 53% of over 5,000 in the Jewish base sample who were contacted completed the interview, while 71% of the contacted Haredi oversample did (Pew Research Center 2016). The margin of error, reported at the 95% level of confidence, was ±2.9 percentage points for all Israeli Jews (based on a sample of 3,789). The mar- gin of error was larger for smaller subgroups, such as Haredim, ±6.9 percentage points (sample size of 707). Table 1 shows the sample composition in the two countries, by age groups. It should be noted that even the finer age divisions among the Millennials have enough cases to allow detailed analyses of their characteristics. In the U.S. we distinguish between the samples of those raised Jewish and of other Americans with some Jewish background. The latter are mostly descendants of Jewish intermarriages in the two previous generations. Among those born after 1987, the relative share of other background rose as compared with those raised Jewish – as indicated by the percentage of others out of all U.S. sample, by age. The Israel sample is more strictly comparable with the U.S. raised-Jewish sample. Therefore most of the comparisons in this article are circumscribed to these two groups (see also DellaPergola, Keysar and Levy forthcoming).
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Demographic background
Basic Trends Israel looks like an anomaly from a demographic point-of-view. It has consis- tently featured high population growth rates fueled by large-scale immigra- tion during its initial years and by high gaps between a stable birth rate and a low death rate more recently. The Jewish population grew from 650,000 in 1948 to 3,383,000 in 1980 to 6,558,000 in 2018 (DellaPergola 2018). In the U.S., the estimated core Jewish population grew from less than 4.5 million in 1945 to 5.7 million in 1980 and to virtually the same figure in 2018 (DellaPergola 2005 and 2018). The U.S. Jewish population growth reflects continuing immi- gration moderated by much lower birth rates and growing death rates due to population aging, and by a negative balance of religious accessions and se- cessions (Pew Research Center 2013). These estimates pertain to a core Jewish population definition that is mutually exclusive with holding other religious identities. By adopting other broader definitions, higher estimates obtain such as the net Jewish population of 6.7 million figured out by the Pew 2012 sur- vey, or approaching 7 million Jews or above as suggested by other investigators (Sheskin and Dashefsky 2018; Saxe and Tighe 2013; DellaPergola 2018 [overall population with at least one Jewish parent]). In Israel fertility patterns have been unusually stable as compared to other developed countries, and achieved family size has been close to the family expectations expressed by the same persons when they were 10 or 20 years younger. In 2017, Israel’s Jewish total fertility rate was 3.1 children, the highest of any developed country (Population Reference Bureau 2018). This has been the case despite conspicuous postponing of the age at childbearing, peaking at 20–24 until 1960, at 25–29 until 2005, and at 30–34 in subsequent years (DellaPergola 2011a). In 2005, the number of children reported as ideal was higher than that actually achieved by couples. Women had higher ideal fertil- ity targets and expectations than men. Younger married women, mostly born in Israel, tended to hold larger completed family size expectations than older women who comprise larger proportions of foreign-born – after controlling for religiosity and socioeconomic characteristics (DellaPergola 2011a). In other words, high fertility is not the consequence of unplanned births but rather reflects the consciously divergent choices of different sections of the Jewish population. Fertility gaps by religiosity quite accurately reflect family size goals and expectations among all groups. In this respect, the demography of Haredi (very-Orthodox) Jewish minori- ties is most conspicuous. Despite exposure to a wider modern society both in the U.S. and Israel, and despite high Jewish and general educational attainment
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2008). The never-married had 0.2 children on average, pointing to a very low tendency among Jews to bear children out of marriage. Fertility levels of to- tal U.S. Jews are similar or even lower compared to the most secular in Israel and similar to those in many European countries. The most religious Jews in the U.S. are similar to the moderately religious in Israel. Explanations for low fertility have taken into account the different socioeconomic profile of Jews, generally better educated and more urbanized than others, and the additional psychological constraints and reproductive strategies related to minority sta- tus (Goldscheider 1965; Frejka and Westoff 2006). One additional crucial factor in shaping the demographic profile of Jewish populations in the different countries is the transmission of group identity through the nuclear family chain. One significant marker of such trends – the frequency of intermarriage – stood among U.S. Jews at minimal rates of 1–2% at the beginning of the 20th century, was still below 10% until the late 1950s, and subsequently rose to levels above 20% in the late 1960s, above 40% in the late 1990s, and an estimated 58% in the early 2010s (Mayer et al. 2002; Pew Research Center 2013; Phillips 2018). It is also true that intermarriage among Jews in the U.S. is high partly because the Jewish population constituted only around 2% of the total population, so many or most of the people with whom Jews come in contact are non-Jews. One important mechanism of diffusion of the overall rising trend was the tendency of the generation of Jewish-raised children of intermarriages to marry out of the Jewish origin group much more often than the generation of Jewish parents (Phillips 2018). But the crucial as- pect of the trend was the lack of a Jewish identification among a majority of children of intermarried parents. This ongoing erosion of virtual boundaries between different religious and ethnic groups in the U.S., could be construed as proof of growing cultural Americanization but also secularization of Ameri- can society (Kosmin and Keysar 2006 and 2013; Pew Research Center 2012b). In 2012, 20% of the children of intermarried couples were raised as Jews, 16% had no religion, 25% were partly Jewish and partly non-Jewish by religion, and 37% were given a definite non-Jewish religion (Pew Research Center 2013). On the other hand, recent evidence points to a growing tendency among younger cohorts of children of intermarriage, namely the Millennials, to be raised Jew- ish (Sasson et al. 2017). In Israel the conditions are completely different, because of the existence of a solid Jewish majority in the population, but also due to more traditional social and religious norms and thicker boundaries between the different reli- gious groups. Based on census data of 2008, the total frequency of religiously intermarried Jews was estimated at 3–4% of the individuals and 5–6% of the couples, most of them the product of marriages performed abroad among peo- ple who subsequently immigrated to Israel (DellaPergola 2019).
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Figure 1 Age structures of Jews in Israel and the U.S., 2013. Source: Israel cbs; Pew Research Center (2013)
The different marriage and fertility patterns in Israel and in the U.S. are re- flected in strikingly different age compositions of the Jewish populations in the two countries (Figure 1). In Israel, the pattern is a distinctly wide-based age pyramid with a regular progression from larger child and younger adult age cohorts to smaller percentages of older adults. Such a young age distribution is unique in contemporary developed societies (DellaPergola 2007; Wilson 2016). In the U.S. the age distribution recalls a reverse pyramid with a modal value at age 45–64 with a declining size of each younger cohort. Age composition has demographic consequences because it affects future population growth or decline.
Life Course Patterns of the Millennials
Beyond the noted differences in family formation patterns, the different de- mography of Israeli and U.S. Jews is reflected in their life course, especially in late childhood and early adulthood. What is the role played by the Millennial generation in these differences? We subdivided young adults aged 18 to 29 into three age cohorts. Their characteristics and experiences in the two countries are illustrated in rough approximation in Table 2.
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Table 2 Jewish Millennials: characterization of age profiles – U.S. 2013 and Israel 2015.
Age and Year of Birth U.S. Israel
18–21 Born 1992–5/1994–97 College Military service 22–25 Born 1988–91/1990–93 College, graduate College, work studies, work 26–29 Born 1984–87/1986–89 Advanced studies, work, Studies, work, marriage single (90%) (31%), children Lifetime Higher education: 90% Higher education: 71%
Source: Pew Research Center (2013 and 2015), authors’ processing; Israel cbs
The main discrepancy between the two populations is that between ages 18 and 21 a majority in Israel serve mandatory military service while in the U.S. most Jewish young adults study in college. Most of the Israelis, with the ex- ception of a majority of the Haredi group, are subject to compulsory military service of three years for men and two years for women, with longer periods for those who continue their service voluntarily becoming officers or otherwise. Americans mostly do not live the same experience, although a tiny minority perform voluntary military service. American Jewish teenagers upon finishing high school, instead, typically go to college. Between ages 22–25 – after exten- sive traveling or other experiences including some temporary work – the Israe- lis also go to college, while their American peers have already graduated and many have moved to graduate school or their first jobs. Often Israelis will fol- low suit, so that eventually the proportion having completed higher education will not be so different as it was one or two generations earlier (DellaPergola 2018). However, there are two major demographic differences. Between ages 26 and 29 in the U.S., most young adults (90%) are still single and are in the labor force (Pew Research Center 2013), frequently having completed gradu- ate and post-graduate education, with family formation still as a distant per- sonal goal. Israelis continue their studies, often while working, and many are already married (31%) and have children, even considering the already noted postponement of childbearing. Among Israelis in the civilian population aged 18–24, 67% were in the labor force in 2013 (Israel cbs 2014). Average age at marriage, though increasing in Israel over time, is much lower than in the U.S., and the proportion ever marrying is significantly higher (DellaPergola 2015). Eventually some 90% of U.S. younger Jewish adults will attain academic edu- cation versus 71% of the Israelis (Pew Research Center 2013; Israel cbs 2017).
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As a result of these different lifestyles and constraints, Millennials of the same age in the U.S. and Israel are facing entirely different life experiences and have at their disposal very different resources to face the challenging years of early adulthood. This should be kept in mind when evaluating the differences in attitudes and behaviors among Millennials discussed below.
Dimensions of Jewish Identity
Peoplehood and Religiosity Jewish religiosity and peoplehood intersect, and in fact Judaism cannot be re- duced to a mere religious phenomenon but is better represented as a cluster of variables that also includes peoplehood or nationhood and other cultural and social elements. Historically the U.S. had an exceptionally high percentage of people profess- ing a religion (Chaves 2011). The rise of American Nones – people who profess no religion or check ‘nothing in particular’ on surveys (Kosmin and Keysar 2006 and 2009; Sherkat 2014; Pew Research Center 2015) – is a relatively recent phenomenon. American Jews were first in the shift toward secularism (Mayer et al. 2001). Historically American Jews have exhibited low rates of religious be- lief and low levels of religious behavior and belonging (Wuthnow 1988; Greeley 1989; Hertzberg 1989). In Israel, too, secularism has been a prominent feature in a society where Jewish religious and national options have been competing for cultural and political hegemony (Beit-Hallahmi 2007). Whether complementary or alternative to religion, Jewish peoplehood is a concept underlying the awareness of an individual as being part of the Jewish people. Long associated with Rabbi Mordecai Kaplan (1957), the term “Jewish peoplehood” suggests an alternative path to religious aspects in order to mea- sure the intensity of Jewishness, albeit through secular lenses. This caption has become an essential indicator of Jewish identity (Cohen and Eisen 2000; Brown and Galperin 2009). Although Pianko (2015) described Jewish people- hood as an American innovation and used it as the title of his book, the roots of Jewish peoplehood are unquestionably more ancient and pertain to Jewish history since its inception. The concept involves a transnational perception of cultural and social bonds among Jews regardless of their current geographical location. Jewish peoplehood is expressed through Jewish pride and the importance of being Jewish in one’s life, by “feeling connected to the Jewish people” and by maintaining a sense of solidarity and responsibility toward Jews in need around the world. These and other aspects of Jewish peoplehood are addressed
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Figure 2 Cognitive meanings of personal Jewishness – U.S. 2013 and Israel 2015, percent- ages. (Survey question: To you personally, is being Jewish mainly a matter of religion, mainly a matter of ancestry or mainly a matter of culture?). Source: Pew Research Center 2013; Pew Research Center 2015
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60% in Israel versus 48% in the U.S., culture 43% in Israel versus 59% in the U.S., and ancestry 65% in Israel versus 60% in the U.S.
Levels of Religiosity In order to frame religiosity and peoplehood similarities and differences be- tween Jewish Millennials as compared to older age groups in Israel and in the U.S., let us first look at the entire population. The following data on religiosity for Israel and the U.S. are not homogeneous, as in Israel religiosity is operation- ally represented through self-reporting, while in the U.S. we use a proxy for religiosity through reported preference for one of the several available Jewish religious denominations. Denominations provide community-based alterna- tives to people seeking contents and lifestyles better consonant to their own persuasions (Chanes 2005). Such proxy is admittedly very imperfect and in no way should the respective percentage distributions of religiosity in Israel and denominational preference in the U.S. be directly compared. However, the or- dinal nature of the respective variables in both countries is proven by the dif- ferent frequency of adherence of persons in each category to pre-determined sets of Jewish religious beliefs and behaviors (for the U.S. see an early dem- onstration in Goldstein and Goldscheider 1968). Such ordinal ranking in both cases allows for describing parallel processes related to the meaning of religion in personal life, keeping in mind the different nature of the data. In the U.S. the Orthodox denomination fairly comprehensively covers a population that in Israel would include both the Haredi (very religious) and Dati (religious) categories. At the opposite extreme, those in the U.S. without a denomination are in their near totality seculars, likewise a large share of the Israelis. In be- tween, the U.S. Conservative denomination overlaps to a significant though not complete extent with the Masorti (traditional) sector in Israel. The U.S. Reform denomination mostly covers persons who in Israel would in part fall under the Masorti label and to a larger extent would be included in the Hiloni (secular) sector (Wertheimer 2000). Haredi Jews in Israel and, respectively, the Orthodox in the U.S. are small minorities– about 10% of total Jews – trailing at the opposite extreme of the range the secular Jews in Israel (49% on a scale of religiousness) and those with no preferred Jewish denomination in the U.S. (30% on a scale of preferred religious denominations). According to the 2015 Pew survey, the largest group is the seculars (Hebrew singular = Hiloni) with 49% of the adult population, followed by the tradition- al (Hebrew singular = Masorti) with 29%. The religious (Hebrew singular = Dati) are 13%, and the very religious 9% (Hebrew singular = Haredi; plural: Haredim). This four-fold distribution does not do justice to a distribution
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pattern that in reality is more complex and nuanced. The annual Social Survey (Israel cbs 2015) reveals the following five-fold distribution for 2015: secular 44%, traditional not-so-religious 24%, traditional-religious 12%, religious 11%, very religious 9%. An overlapping reading of the two studies teaches us that different answering options offered to the public generate similar distribu- tions but also some important distinctions. Of the 49% seculars on the Pew survey, 5% plus another 19% of the 29% Pew traditionalists would fit the Israel cbs traditional-not-religious for a total of 24%. The remaining 10% of the Pew traditionals plus 2% of the Pew religious would fit the Israel cbs category of traditional-religious for a total of 12%. The majority of the Pew religious fit the Israel cbs religious for a total of 11%, and there is no difference between the two surveys regarding the Haredi group: 9% in each case. What remains clear is the unequivocal dominance of the secular-to-moderately-traditional forms of Jewish identity in Israel. In the course of time, since inception of the Israel cbs Social Survey in 2003, there were moderate but discernible changes in the distribution by Jewish religiosity: the Haredim increased from 7% to 9% in 2015, the religious from 9% to 11%, the traditional-religious remained steady at 12%, the traditional not-religious fell from 27% to 24%, and the secular from 45% to 44%. It all boils down to a 4% net transfer from the more secular to the more religious half of the distribution – mostly through the balance of gradual and mutual passages from one category to the next. The increase in the share of the very religious is mostly explained by their already noted higher fertility. Additional evidence presented in the following indicates that such increase would be greater were it not for some lifecycle switches of Haredim to other more moderately religious types (see also Beider 2018). Turning to the distribution of Jews in the U.S. by preferred religious denomi- nation in 2013, the largest group was the liberal Reform denomination with 36%, followed by those who do not identify with any denomination compris- ing 30%. The second largest denomination was the Conservative, with 18%, followed by the Orthodox, with 10%, and the sum of several other smaller denominations with 6% (Pew Research Center 2013).
Age Patterns of Religiosity Turning to changing patterns of religiosity by age in each country, Figure 3 com- pares levels of religiosity during childhood and currently in Israel for the dif- ferent age cohorts. We observe two opposite patterns of change operating in Israeli society at the same time. Viewing each cohort according to self-reported religiosity at childhood, we observe a notable and regular progressive increase over time in the percentage reporting higher levels of religiosity. The religious are here defined as the sum of the Haredi and Dati components out of the total
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% % % % Haredi % Dati % Masorti % Hiloni % % %
% Ch. Now Ch. Now Ch. Now Ch. Now Ch. Now Ch.Now + 50–69 30–49 26–29 22–25 18–21
Figure 3 Religiosity during childhood and currently, by age, Israel, 2015. Source: Pew Research Center (2015), authors’ processing age cohort. Of those currently age 70 and over, 34% were religious in childhood, including 12% Haredi. Of those currently 18 to 21, 45% were religious in child- hood, including 24% hHredi. All age cohorts in between the oldest and the youngest display intermediate and rising percentage figures of being religious both initially and currently, with the exception of the 30–49 age cohort whose percentage of religious remained stable between childhood and now. At the same time, within the religious camp so broadly defined and with respect to each cohort, the Haredi component strengthened between childhood and the time of current observation, apparently at the expense of the Dati component, which substantially diminished. The rising level of religiosity reported as of at childhood across age cohorts seems to principally reflect the impact of higher fertility among the more religious. Figure 4 presents a synthesis of Israeli adults’ directions of religious change, namely gains and losses in religiosity from childhood to current age for each cohort, based on age-specific cross classifications of all the bi-directional categorical changes underlying the final results in Figure 3. Among the total sample and within each cohort a large majority did not change their religious identification between childhood and present age. Overall, 79% kept their childhood religious orientation, 8% became more religious and 13% became
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Figure 4 Lifetime religiosity changes by age: currently as compared to during childhood, Israel, 2015. Source: Pew Research Center (2015), authors’ processing less religious, with an absolute negative balance of -5%. Likewise, among those who underwent change, in all cohorts with the exception of the 22–25 Millen- nials the share of those becoming less religious was higher than the share of those becoming more religious. The overall negative balance was -19% among the 70 +, -9% among the 50–69, and -1% among both the 30–49. Among Mil- lennials, the net change was -4% among the 26–29, +3% among the 22–25, and -1% among the 18–21. At first sight lifetime secularization has happened less among the younger age cohorts, but the younger have more time to continue the process. It remains to be seen whether or not the process of secularization of their predecessors will actually occur. All in all, during their respective lifetime nearly all cohorts of Israeli Jews undergo a process of secularization. Among those aged 70 and over in 2015, the initial percentage of 34% reportedly religious (by combining the Haredi and Dati groups) during childhood had diminished to 22% in 2015. Among those 18–21 in 2015, the initial percentage of 49% religious during childhood had diminished to 46% in 2015. The Millennials in fact do not deviate from the secularization patterns of older age cohorts, though at a less clearly defined pace of change: in fact the 22–25 look much closer to their slightly older 26–29 peers, than to the immediately younger age 18–21 group. The only exception to this general pattern is the 30–49 age group born in 1965–1985, which displays no loss and if anything, a minimal increase in lifetime religiosity.
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Figure 5 Percent religious at childhood and currently, by current age and estimated lifetime stage, Israel, 2015. (Sum of Haredi (very religious) and Dati (religious).) Source: figure 3
The results displayed in Figure 5 assume that the change in the percent of reli- gious within each age cohort followed a linear progression over time overlook- ing other possible paths. We have no detailed information about those possible lifetime fluctuations, but we do have the information on the starting point (childhood) and ending point (current age), while the intermediate points are obtained through simple interpolation. To summarize, each cohort was born and raised more religious than the preceding one, but each cohort also under- went a lifetime process of secularization (with the exception of the 30–49 age group born 1965–1985). We also note again that the 22–25 group (born 1990–93) has a slightly lower initial and terminal level of religiosity that the two contigu- ous older and younger cohorts, but it also experienced more passages from less to more religious contrary to other cohorts. Regarding the U.S., too, we compare the composition of age cohorts by reli- gious denominations during childhood and currently (see Figure 6). The share of those who at childhood identified with the Orthodox denomination sharply diminishes between those aged 70 + (born up to 1943 – 24%) and those be- low 70, reaching a minimum of 11% among the 26–29, but recovering to 17% among the 18–21. The share of currently Orthodox is no more than 5% among
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% % % % Orthodox % Conservative % Reform % None % % %
% Ch. Now Ch. Now Ch. Now Ch. Now Ch. Now Ch.Now +
Figure 6 Jewish population by main religious denominations during childhood and currently, by age, U.S., 2013. Source: Pew Research Center (2013), authors’ processing the 70+, pointing to low retention among the elderly, but slowly and consis- tently grows among subsequent age groups with a higher value of 13% among the 18–21. The share who grew up in the Conservative movement ranges from 36% among the 50–69 to 13% among the younger Millennials aged 22–25, recovering to 23% among the 18–21. As to current preference, the smallest share of Conservatives is at age 26–29. The share raised Reform grows from 23% among the 70 + to 35% among the 22–25, but shrinking to 22% among the youngest 18–21 cohort. However, current preference goes in the opposite direc- tion, from 36% among the 70 + to a low of 21% among the 18–21. Finally, the cohort most likely to have had no denomination in childhood is those 22–25, at 41%, vs. 38% for those aged 18–21. As for currently having no denomina- tion, that increases from 29% among the 70 + to 47–48% among the Millen- nial cohorts. The overall picture is that those 18–21 display a propensity toward the Orthodox denomination, significantly deviating from the well-established trends of older cohorts.
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Figure 7 Lifetime religious denomination changes by age: currently as compared to during childhood, U.S., 2013. Source: Pew Research Center (2013), authors’ processing
The net balance of passages between stronger and weaker forms of religious identity is synthesized in Figure 7. Overall a majority of 63% kept to the denom- inational preferences they held in childhood, 10% passed to more stringent forms of Judaism, and 27% passed to less stringent forms, with a net balance of -17%. The overall negative balance was -31% among the 70 +, -18% among the 50–69, -14% among 30–49 and the 26–29. Among younger Millennials, the net change was -11% among the 22–25, and -6% among the 18–21. Based on the childhood and current denominational preferences shown in Figure 6, we represent in Figure 8 the intervening lifetime changes by age cohorts. The data refer to the combined percentages preferring the Orthodox and Conservative movement – the two upper half categories out of four options displayed here (small percentages of adherents to other very small denomina- tions are not included here). We note again that for each age cohort we know the initial and final level of denominational preference, while the intermediate values are obtained through simple interpolation. In the U.S., and likewise in Israel, all cohorts underwent a transition from more to less stringent religios- ity. This can be interpreted as secularization, although the factors at stake in denominational preferences are far more complex. While the lifetime trend toward less religiosity is the same in the two coun- tries, the starting points – religious upbringing – are quite different. In the U.S.,
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Figure 8 Percent preferring sum of Orthodox and Conservative denominations at child- hood and currently, by current age and estimated lifetime stage, U.S., 2013. Source: figure 6 each age cohort except the youngest has had a less religious upbringing than the one that preceded it. In Israel, the opposite is true. Each age cohort has had a more religious upbringing than the one that preceded it. The one exception to the pattern in the U.S. is the youngest Millennials, who appear significant- ly more traditional at childhood as well as currently than their immediately older peers, although like all other cohorts they seem to be undergoing lifetime secularization. That younger Jews are more likely to have no denominational attachment is similar to other Americans (Kosmin and Keysar 2006). And similar to Israe- lis, younger American Jews are somewhat more likely to be Orthodox because of the higher fertility of their parents (Pew Research Center 2013). Orthodox U.S. Jews also exhibit higher retention rates when comparing the current de- nomination preference with the one in which they were raised as children. The total lifetime retention rate of those raised Orthodox was 48%. The rest passed to less stringent denominations, 15% to Conservative, 11% to Reform, and 20% to other and no denomination, while 6% left Judaism. The Orthodox retention rate was only 22% of all those raised Orthodox and aged 65+ in 2013, but significantly grew to 83% among Orthodox raised Jewish adults under 30. Among those raised Conservative, the lifetime denominational retention rate was 36%. Of the rest, 4% passed to Orthodox, and 60% passed to less stringent
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Jewish denominations, including 10% who left Judaism. Among those raised Reform, the lifetime denominational retention rate was 55%. Of the rest, 7% passed to more stringent denominations, and 37% to less stringent ones, in- cluding 11% who left Judaism (Pew Research Center 2013). The group whose net gain was the greater was the one without any denomination preference. Among the latter, 50% reported they were Jews without religion (Pew Research Center 2013). Clearly through contiguous passages from one denomination to the next, a significant process of personal mobility in terms of designated personal or denominational religiosity preferences occurred both in the U.S. and in Israel. The general pattern portrayed is one of net lifetime passages from more to less stringent forms of Jewish religious identification, but retention rates of child- hood orientations are much stronger in Israel than they are among American Jews. The religious bifurcation of young Jews between a highly resilient reli- gious end and a growing secular end is at the heart of our research.
Jewish Identification: Millennials and Others
Essential Meaning of Being Jewish: Israel and U.S. Beyond generic affirmations about one’s own religiosity, it is important to de- termine more in depth and detail what is essential to being Jewish. Is there a consensus among Jews in the U.S. and in Israel? Figure 9 displays a selection of eight attributes and activities assumed (along with many others) to be associ- ated with Jewish identification that were investigated in both Pew surveys. The question was how essential these specific identification options are to being Jewish for U.S. and Israel respondents. The figure refers to all ages and for the U.S. distinguishes between persons raised Jewish and others with some kind of Jewish background or affinity. The eight indicators are ranked according to their frequency among the Israeli respondents. The eight indicators are ranked similarly in the two countries to some ex- tent, but there also are remarkable differences. Remembering the Holocaust and leading an ethical and moral life are at the top in both countries, though the former prevails among the Israelis and the latter among the Americans. Is- raeli Jews place far greater importance than American Jews on observing Jew- ish law, and far less importance on working for justice and equality in society, having a good sense of humor, and being intellectually curious. No difference appears regarding the importance of eating traditional Jewish food, which is the least mentioned option in both samples. Regarding the possible impact of the state of Israel as one essential component in defining Jewish identity,
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Figure 9 Selected identification indicators considered essential to meaning of being Jewish , U.S. 2013 and Israel 2015, percentages. Source: Pew Research Center (2013 and 2015) one should note that the question had the two different formulations in the two surveys, evidently affecting the levels of inherent commitment and re- sponse frequencies. As is, U.S. Jews attribute greater importance to caring for Israel than the Israelis do for living in Israel. Differences between the U.S. raised Jewish and U.S. with other Jewish back- ground are usually minor and smaller than might have been expected. This may indicate that the American cultural environment may influence identification perceptions, regardless of whether those perceptions concern the respondents about themselves, or about other people. We turn now to examine the variation across age groups of three of the iden- tificational options just seen, reported by the respondents as essential to de- fining one’s own Jewish identity: observing Jewish law, leading an ethical and moral life, and working for justice and equality in society. Besides considering broad age divisions (30–49, 50–69, and 70+) we subdivide the age group 18–29 (the Millennials) into three sub-groups: 18–21, 22–25, and 26–29. Age matters to what “being Jewish” means. Yet, the country context of Jewish environment seems more prominent in determining essential disparities between the U.S. and Israeli samples (Figure 10).
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Figure 10 Essentiality of three selected options in one’s own Jewish identity, by age, U.S. 2013 and Israel 2015, percentages. Source: Pew Research Center (2013 and 2015), authors’ processing
Levels and ranking of the three identificational options are relatively consis- tent across ages, but they are significantly different in the two countries. In the U.S., ethics is by far the highest, followed by justice in society and by observing Jewish law. In Israel ethics is higher, becoming eventually matched by observ- ing Jewish law, with justice in society significantly lower. Agreement on the importance of observing Jewish law is where younger Americans raised Jewish and Israeli Jews converge. Half of 18–21 Jews both in the U.S. and in Israel think that observing Jewish law is an essential part of what being Jewish means to them. Much more than older counterparts, the Millennials in each of the two countries perceive religiosity as an essential component of their Jewishness. In Israel, the intensification of religiosity among the younger has been pre- sented above, among other things, as the product of differential fertility and birth rates. Among Americans who were raised Jewish, but among whom fer- tility differentials constitute less of an explanation, sharp increases among the younger appear too. The progressive increase of religiosity at all ages in both countries is only temporarily interrupted among the Millennials aged 22–25.
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Clearly increased emphasis on the essentiality of Jewish law observance seems to contradict our previous observations about the long-term secularization trends in the U.S. and their relation to Jewish identity maintenance versus as- similation. These changes probably primarily reflect cohort effects, reinforced by some lifecycle secularization effects. On the other hand, leading an ethical and moral life and working for justice and equality in society is more essential to being Jewish in the U.S., very stable and showing some renewed increases among the Millennials, mainly those 18–21. Justice in society is essential to American Jewry far more than among the Israelis. There was an evident decline in the essentiality of this aspect in the U.S. with some recovery and stabilization among the Millennials. Among U.S. persons of other background – whose data are not displayed in Figure 10 – not surprisingly the importance of observing Jewish law is far lower. U.S. persons of other background are nearly identical to the U.S. raised Jew- ish regarding working for justice and equality in society, and moderately lower regarding leading an ethical and moral life. This provides further evidence for the argument that general societal patterns shared by Jews and others are sometimes stronger than specific identification patterns nuances within the Jewish group.
Synthetic Measures of Jewish Identification Having reviewed several indicators of the particular contents of Jewish identi- fication, we move to constructing three synthetic measures of the fundamen- tal modes of attachment to Judaism and to the state of Israel, comparing again age variations among Jews in the U.S. and in Israel. These three indexes con- cern Jewish religiosity, Jewish peoplehood, and Jewish nationalism and refer to responses to selected questions in the cognitive or behavioral sphere: Index of Jewish Religiosity
• Agree: Religion is important in my life • Agree: I believe in God or universal spirit • Weekly attendance at religious services
Index of Jewish Peoplehood
• Being Jewish is important in my life • I have a special responsibility to take care of Jews around the world • I have a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people
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Index of Jewish Nationalism
• Settlements in the West Bank help Israel’s security • God gave the Land of Israel to Jews • I do not think a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully
All three indexes are computed based on the percentages of those who agree with all the three specified statements in each instance. The results are displayed in Figure 11. The ranking of the three indexes is the same in the two countries; people- hood higher, religiosity intermediate, and nationalism lower. In each instance the index for Israeli Jews is substantially higher than that for the U.S. raised Jewish. Interestingly in many respects Millennials at age 22–25 display levels of support somewhat lower than the linear trends linking older and younger counterparts. The sense of Jewish peoplehood appears in the increase among
Figure 11 Indexes of Jewish religiosity, Jewish peoplehood and Jewish nationalism, by age, U.S. 2013 and Israel 2015, percentages. Source: Pew Research Center (2013 and 2015), authors’ processing
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American Jews, while it is somewhat declining among Israeli Jews. The gap has diminished particularly among the younger Millennials at age 18–21. Young Jewish adults are more religious than older Jews both in the U.S. and in Israel, especially those at age 18–21. Religiosity levels are higher in Israel than in the U.S. in all age groups. Yet, the Israel-U.S. religiosity gap has narrowed among younger Jews who were raised Jewish. The higher religiosity of the younger in both countries reflects the already noted differential in reproduc- tion levels and demographic growth of different groups by religiosity, and in the U.S., also the selectively stronger resilience of the more religious within the Jewish community as against the alternative of loss of interest in Jewish identity among the more secular. Israeli Jews and American Jews are quite different with regard to Jewish nationalism. Jewish nationalism, as defined here, appears to be constant- ly low among the U.S. raised Jewish – less than 10% – and was likewise low among the older Israeli age group, 70+. The distancing becomes most evident among younger Jews, especially those ages 18–21. Among the Israelis national- ism appears to be rapidly growing quite in parallel to the growing levels of the religiosity index. Unlike the convergence that can be observed regarding the indexes of religiosity and peoplehood, a significant gulf seems to be open- ing between younger Millennials in the two countries. Indeed, Israelis and Americans embrace different perspectives on some controversial political issues (DellaPergola, Levy, and Keysar 2019). Religiosity and nationalism are entangled, as shown by 60% of the Haredim in Israel and 34% of the Orthodox in the U.S. believing that “settlements in the West Bank help Israel’s security” – higher than among Jews with other religious outlooks (36% and 15%, respec- tively) (Pew Research Center 2015). Young Israelis are more likely to view the settlements as helping Israel’s security. They are skeptical about the likelihood of a Palestinian state and Israel coexisting and believe that the Land of Israel was God-given to Jews. It should be recalled that Israelis age 18–21 are mostly serving in the army, while Americans are mostly attending colleges in the U.S., where anti-Israel sentiment is quite diffused (Pessin and Ben-Atar 2018). Thus, some of the gap may be related to lifecycle circumstances and might diminish at older ages. But this might also be the beginning of a decisive clash in the political outlook of Jews in the two countries. For decades, Jews massively sup- ported center-left and liberal parties, while over the last ten years – but more decisively so in Israel – they have increasingly supported center-right and con- servative parties (Pew Research Center 2015). Among the U.S. respondents with other background (whose data are not reported in Figure 11) not surprisingly the three indexes are extremely low. This group includes mostly non-Jewish descendants of intermarriages, whereas
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Figure 12 Combined presence or absence of high indexes of Jewish religiosity and Jewish peoplehood, by age, U.S. 2013 and Israel 2015, percentages. Source: Pew Research Center (2013 and 2015), authors’ processing
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Multiple-variable Analysis: Binary Logistic Regression What, then, is the role of religion and demography in explaining Jewish iden- tification variations among Jews in the U.S. and Israel? A series of binary logis- tic regression models are presented in Table 3. They explore the likelihood of adults who were raised Jewish to view their Jewish identity mainly as a mat- ter of religion, rather than a matter of ancestry or culture (see Figure 3). In our analysis, we measure the likelihood that people will think being Jewish is mainly a matter of religion. Odds ratios bigger than 1 show a greater likelihood compared with the reference group. Odds ratios smaller than 1 indicate a lower likelihood compared with the reference group. Model 1 looks at demographics, first at six age groups (reference group: 18– 21) and gender (reference group: male). Model 2 puts in the effect of country (reference category: Israel). Model 3 introduces the peoplehood index (refer- ence group: low level). Model 4 adds the nationalism index (reference group: low level) and Model 5 inserts the religiosity index (reference group: low level). Each subsequent model enhances the explanatory power of the logistic regres- sion analysis, reaching a high of R2 = 0.27 in Model 5. The differences between Americans and Israelis who were raised Jewish per- sist in all models. The Israelis’ likelihood to view their Jewish identity mainly as a matter of religion is double that of Americans (1/0.5). The age gaps remain statistically significant especially between the youngest and the oldest, 18–21 versus 70+. Young Jews age 18–21 are significantly more likely than all other age groups to view their Jewishness as a matter of religion even when other factors are controlled for. Gender differences point to a stronger religion orientation among males – significant in all models except for Model 5.
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Table 3 Likelihood of thinking that being Jewish is mainly a matter of religion (Odds ratios), U.S. 2013 and Israel 2015.
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Age Group 22–25 0.65** 0.66** 0.70* 0.73 0.75 26–29 0.70* 0.71* 0.76 0.80 0.81 30–49 0.74** 0.77* 0.82 0.85 0.94 50–69 0.52*** 0.63*** 0.68** 0.72* 0.84 70+ 0.38*** 0.51*** 0.53*** 0.57*** 0.76 Gender Female 0.83** 0.82** 0.81** 0.82** 1.11 Country U.S. 0.52*** 0.44*** 0.48*** 0.65*** High Peoplehood 3.96*** 3.69*** 2.03*** High Nationalism 1.53*** 1.09 High Religiosity 6.22*** R2 =0.02 R2 =0.04 R2 =0.15 R2 =0.16 R2 =0.27
Reference categories: 18–21; male; Israel; low peoplehood; low nationalism; low religiosity *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
As expected, high religiosity level is associated with greater likelihood to view Jewishness in religious terms (odds ratio = 6.2 in Model 5). Jewish peoplehood also increases along with religious Jewish identity (odds ratio = 3.96 in Model 3), but when religiosity is introduced too, it takes away considerably the effect of peoplehood (odds ratio = 2.03 in Model 5). Jewish nationalism, too, seems to be largely embedded in respondents’ level of religiosity, as shown by the decreased significance of its effect (odds ratio = 1.5 and significant in Model 4), but not significant once religiosity level is introduced. An odds ratio of 1.09 in- dicates that those with high and those with low nationalism orientation share similar views on Jewishness after controlling for religiosity (Model 5). Wrestling with the finding that the age effect mostly goes away once con- trolling for other factors, we introduce an interactive variable, age group by country, creating 12 categories: 6 age groups for each country in Model 6, and adding gender and the three indexes: peoplehood, nationalism and religios- ity. The dependent variable is again the likelihood of viewing Jewish identity mainly as a religion (Table 4).
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Table 4 Likelihood of thinking that being Jewish is mainly a matter of religion – Interactive model (Odds ratios), U.S. 2013 and Israel 2015.
Variables Model 6
Age & Country 18–21 U.S. 0.90 22–25 Israel 0.74 22–25 U.S. 0.68 26–29 Israel 0.87 26–29 U.S. 0.57* 30–49 Israel 1.06 30–49 U.S. 0.58** 50–69 Israel 0.89 50–69 U.S. 0.60** 70+ Israel 0.81 70+ U.S. 0.54*** Gender Female 1.11 High Peoplehood 2.04*** High Nationalism 1.09 High Religiosity 6.21*** R2 =0.27
Reference categories: 18–21 in Israel; male; low peoplehood; low nationalism; low religiosity *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Three important patterns are discovered: first, the lack of significance related to age differences in Israel; second, the consistently significant very low odds of religious Jewish identity among American Jews, mainly among those above age 25; and third, the most surprising finding of the lack of significant differ- ences between 18–21 Israelis and Americans even after controlling for their level of belief in Jewish peoplehood and level of religiosity. This was already evident in Figure 10 regarding the essentiality of Observing Jewish law. In the U.S., in passing from older to younger age groups, the absence of focus on re- ligion tends to become less and less significant. In other words, passing from older to younger cohorts the focus on secular aspects of identity weakens, hence the focus on religion increases. Were the same trend to continue over
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Summary and Conclusion
Being Jewish is complex and it encompasses many historical and contempo- rary, religious and secular connotations. As a small minority (2 per 1,000 of to- tal population worldwide) (DellaPergola 2018), Jews struggle to preserve their Jewishness while grappling with the meaning of their ascribed identity (Mayer et al. 2002). The challenge is particularly demanding in the Diaspora, where Jews must negotiate their identities amongst other hegemonic segments of society. In Israel, on the other hand, Jews are a significant majority, but that majority – hence the state’s predominant cultural identity – is challenged by the more rapid growth of the Arab/Palestinian population. Regardless of where Jews are, Jewishness is recognized as an assortment of multiple meanings. In this respect it is interesting to read again the standard interpretation of what happened in the Jewish experience since the late 19th century:
Some of the greatest Hebrew writers of the early twentieth century re- belled against Jewish collective identity marked by religion. It was a mu- tiny against that all-embracing abstract noun, yahadut (Judaism). In so rebelling, they felt Jewish to their bones. They did not wish to convert to another faith, or to belong to another nation. Rather, in a plagued mod- ernist way, they strove to tear their existence as individual modern Jews from the bonds of traditional orthodoxy (Oz and Oz-Salzberger 2012:150).
As against this reading, we seem to be observing a significant religionization of Jewish identity in Israel and in the U.S. This involves not only return of younger Jews to more religious forms of Judaism, but also a reconfiguration of Jewish peoplehood as more strictly overlapping with Jewish religion and a growing
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Acknowledgements
The authors are indebted to Alan Cooperman and Neha Segal of the Pew Re- search Center for facilitating access to a special merged file of the two Pew surveys of the U.S. (2013) and Israel (2015); to Peter Coy for comments on a previous version of the manuscript; and to two anonymous reviewers for valu- able suggestions. Responsibility for the paper’s contents is of the authors only.
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