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Scanned Document (;:S(;-t:.t'L-ts~' uu~ NATIONAL COMPUTER SECURITY CENTER "\ FINAL EVALUATION ·REPORT OF HON.EV-WELL MlJt Tl€S FINAL EVALUATION REPORT HONEYWELL INFORMATION SYSTEMS MULTICS MRll .O NATIONAL COMPUTER SECURITY -CENTER 1 aa.o.o Savage R.Q&1 . ~ George G..... Meade Maryland ·2Q755- 6000 June 1,... 1986 CSC- EPL- 85/003 Library No. 8227,783 Final Evaluation Report Honeywell Multics MRll.O CSC-EPL-85/003 Library No. S227 , 783 FOREWORD This publication, the Final ~valuation Report Honeywell Information Systems, Multics MRll.O, is being issued by the National Computer Security Center under the authority of and in accordance with DoD Directive 6125.1, "Computer Security Evaluation Center". The purpose of this report is to document the results of the formal evaluation of Honeywell 's Multics MRll . O operating system. The requirements stated in this report are taken from DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA (CSC-STD-001-83) dated 15 August 1983. Approved: June 1, 1986 Eliot Sohmer Chief , Standards and Products National Computer Security Center - iii - June l, 1986 Final Evaluation Report Honeywell Multics MRll.O ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ~ Members Team members· included the following individuals, who were provided by the following organizations: The Aerospace Corporation Los Angeles, California Deborah D. Downs National Computer Security Center Cornelius J. Haley Fort Meade, Maryland Grace Hammonds David J. Lanenga First Information Systems Group Maria M. Pozzo The Pentagon W. Olin Sibert Eric J. Swenson The MITRE Corporation Grant M. Wagner Bedford, Massachusetts Oxford Systems, Inc. Arlington, Massachusetts Further Acknowledgements Technical support was also provided by F. Patrick Clark, Mindy D. Makuta, Sammy Migues, and Jay Steinmetz. ~cknowledgement is given to the following individuals for their contributions. to this document: Walter s. Bond, Ann Marie Claybrook, Virgil D. Gligor, Jaisook Landauer, and Paui Woodie. June l, 1986 - iv - Final Evaluation Report Honeywell Multics MRll.O CONTENTS Page Foreword . iii Acknowledgements iv Executive Summary ix Section 1 Introduction l Evaluation Process Overview 1 Document Organization 2 Section 2 System Overview . 3 Background and History . 3 Multics System Architecture 4 Multics Hardware . 5 Major Hardware Components . 5 CPU - Central Processing Unit 6 SCU - System Control Unit and Memory 6 IOM - Input/Output Multiplexer . 7 MPC - Microprogrammed Controller . 7 FNP - Front- End Network Processor 8 Hardware Protection Mechanisms 9 Per-Segment Access Control . 9 Effective Ring Number in Addressing 10 Gates and Ring Changing 11 Privileged CPU Instructions 13 IOM Protection Mechanisms 14 MPC Protection Mechanisms 15 Software Architecture 16 Software Ring Usage . 17 Ring Zero TCB Functions 18 Ring One TCB Functions 22 D~dicated TCB Processes 24 TCB-Protected Resources 26 Objects Implemented by the TCB 27 Segments . 27 Directories 28 Message Segments 28 Messages . 28 Non-System I / O Devices, Disk and Tape Volumes . 29 Communication Channels . 29 System Disk Volumes (Logical Volumes) . 30 Processes· (Interprocess Communication) 30 Object Access Modes . 31 Segment Access Modes . 31 - v - June 1, 1986 Page Directory Access Modes . 32 Message Segment Extended Access Modes . 34 RCP Access Modes . 36 Logical Volume Access Modes 37 Communication Channel Access Modes 38 Process Access Modes . 38 Discretionary Access Controls . 39 Mandatory Access Controls . 41 TCB Protection Mechanisms . 43 Use of Hardware Protection Mechanisms 43 Use of CPU Protection Mechanisms 43 Use of I/O Protection Mechanisms 44 Software Protection Architecture 46 Access Revocation 48 Audit Message Logging 49 Parameter Validation . 49 The Validation Level . 61 Mandatory Access Control Privileges 6 1 Software Recovery From System Failure . 62 Object Reuse - Segments . 63 Object Reuse - Non- Segment Objects 56 Safe Shutdown and the File System 56 File System Salvaging and Consistency . 56 Covert Channel Management 57 Section 3 Evaluation as a B2 system . 61 Discretionary Access Control . 61 Additional Requirement (B3) 62 Object Reuse . 63 Labels . .. 64 Label Integrity . 66 Exportation of Labeled Information 66 Exportation to Multilevel Devices 67 Exportation to Single-Level Devices 69 Labeling Human-Readable Output 69 Subject Sensitivity Labels . .. 71 Device Labels . 72 Mandatory Access Control . 72 Identification and Authentication 74 Trusted Path . 76 Audit . 77 System Architecture 79 System Integrity . 81 Covert Channel Analysis 82 Trusted Facility Management 83 Security Testing . 83 Design Specif!cation and Verification 86 June 1, 1986 - vi - Page Configuration Management 86 Security Features User's Guide 87 Trusted Facility Manual . 88 Test Documentation . 90 Design Documentation 91 Section 4 Software Testing 93 Functional Testing . 93 Penetration Testing 94 Test Results . 95 Section 5 Evaluators' Comments 97 Overall Impressions 97 Protected Subsystems . 97 Reconfiguration 98 Denial of Service 98 Appendix A Evaluated Hardware Components A-1 Scope of Hardware Evaluation A-1 List of Evaluated Components A-1 Central System Combinations A-2 Additional CPUs and CPU Enhancements A-2 Additional IOMs and IOM Enhancements A-3 Additional SCUs and Memory . A-3 Disk MPCs and Options . A-3 Tape MPCs and Options . A-4 Unit Record MPCs and Options . A-4 Communication Processors and Options A-4 Peripheral Equipment (not evaluated) A-5 Appendix B Evaluated Software Components . B-1 Scope of Software Evaluation B-1 Multics Central System TCB . B-1 Ring Zero TCB . B-1 Ring One TCB . B-2 TCB Support Code B-2 Dedicated TCB Processes . B-3 System Administration B-3 System Initialization B-4 TCB I nterfaces . B-5 Gates . ~ . B-5 Other TCB "rnterfaces B-6 MPC Firmware . B-7 FNP Software . B-7 Non-Evaluated Software . B-7 Functions Excluded from the TCB B-7 Ring Two Non-TCB Software . B-8 Remainder of Multics Software . B-8 - vii - June 1. 1986 This page intentionally left blank. Final Evaluation Report Honeywell Multics MRll.O Executive Summary EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The security protection provided by the Honeywell Multics MRll .O operating system, with the B2-specific changes(l) applied, configured according to the most secure manner described in the Trusted Facility Manual, and running on the Honeywell Level 68/DPS or Honeywell DPS 8/ 70M multiprocessor has been evaluated by the National Computer Security Center (NCSC). The security features of Multics were evaluated against the requirements specified by the DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (the Criteria) dated 15 August 1983. The NCSC evaluation team (see page iv, "Team Members") has determined that the highest class at which Multics satisfies all the specified requirements of the Criteria is class B2 and therefore, usirig the specified hardware (see page A- 1, "Scope of Hardware Evaluation"), Multics MRll.O (see page B- 1, "Scope of Software Evaluation"), configured. in the most secure manner described in the Trusted Facility Manual, has been assigned a class B2 rating. A system that has been rated as being a class B2 system provides a TCB that is based on a clearly defined and documented formal security policy model that requires the discretionary and mandatory access control enforcement be extended to all subjects and objects in the ADP system. In addition, covert channels are addressed. The TCB must be carefully structured into protection-critical and non-protection-critical elements. The TCB interface is well-defined and the TCB design and implementation enable it to be subjected to more thorough testing and more complete review. Authentication mechanisms are strengthened, trusted facility management is provided in the form of support for system administrator and operator functions, and stringent configuration management controls are imposed. The system is relatively resistant to penetration. A system that has been rated as being a B division system provides a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) that preserves the integrity of sensitivity labels and uses them to enforce a set of mandatory access control rules. The system developer has I I (1) A set of "security critical fixes", distributed by Honeywell, must be applied to make the standard MRll .O release fully B2-compliant, because of minor inconsistencies discovered during security testing. - ix - June 1, 1986 Honeywell Multics MRll.O provided the security policy model on which the TCB is based and furnished a specification of the TCB and evidence that the reference monitor concept ~as been ~mplemented. The Honeywell Multics system consists of the Multics operating system running on Honeywell Level· 68/DPS or DPS 8/70M mainframes . These systems include Multics-specific hardware to support the Multics system architecture and protection mechanisms. A large Multics system may be configured with up to six processors and can support three hundred to four hundred users. Multics can be used in a wide variety of environments . The Multics operating system is a general- purpose time-sharing system with strong security features . Multics has three basic security mechanisms . The hardware supported protection rings and segmentation provide tightly controlled separate domains of execution. The Access Isolation Mechanism (AIM) provides mandatory access control. The Access Control Lists (ACLs) provide discretionary access controi. June 1, 1986 - x - Final Evaluation Report Honeywell Multics MRll.O Introduction INTRODUCTION In December 1982, the National Computer Security Center (NCSC) began a formal product evaluation
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