About Practical Problem Solving

ISSN 1392-1126. PROBLEMOS 2016 89

ABOUT PRACTICAL PROBLEM SOLVING

Arto Mutanen Adjunct Professor Finnish National Defence University P.O. Box 7 FI-00861 Helsinki, Finland E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract. Knowledge is, by definition, reliable and, hence, it can be applied to a variety of different problems. Nevertheless, in practical problem solving, we do not rely on mere truthful knowledge, but also on information which frames the practical acceptability. We are not looking for truthful solution but an optimal solution. Optimal solution is found out by optimizing some given (practical) parameters. The optimization is both theory based and practice based process. That is, practical problem solving is a human deliberation that interconnects theoretical and practical knowledge. So, the philosophical foundation of practical problem solving interconnects theoretical and practical philosophy. Especially ethical deliberation plays – or should play – central role in practical problem solving. The complexity of the advanced scientific knowledge needed in solving present day practical problems separates the people who know, from the people who do (decide). The situation makes immediate that we need some deeper pedagogical conviction: we need ecological education. Keywords: knowledge, practical reasoning, practical syllogism, responsibility

The notion of knowledge has been under to recognize when we achieve knowledge. philosophical discussion since Plato. The So, Hintikka (2007) speaks about informa- classical notion of knowledge, which tion and knowledge as becoming an ideal originates from Plato’s dialog Theatetus, end state. In this sense it would be adequate says that knowledge is a well justified true to speak about information needed in prob- belief. The classical notion has been under lem solving. extensive philosophical discussion. In par- The notion of knowledge discussed in epistemology has been “so called” proposi- ticular, the truth condition and the justifica- tional knowledge, i.e. knowledge that can be tion condition have been philosophically expressed linguistically. This emphasis has interesting ones. The notion of truth is far implied that the problems of epistemology from clear; in realistic tradition, truth has consider the special problems of truth and been understood as a fundamental semantic justification conditions. All this, of course, notion, and in pragmatist tradition, truth has has been very interesting and important. been understood as an epistemic notion. It However, the connection of knowledge to is not clear at all what kind of justification human practical life has not been close. proper knowledge supposes. In fact, justifi- How is knowledge related to human prac- cation is an unending process. It is not easy tical life? What kind of activity is human

85 practical life? What is knowledge? It is best (uncertain) information we have. Still, obvious that knowledge is related to the hu- propositional knowledge has a positive man activity, but, at the same, it is obvious role in human practical activity. Human that “so called” propositional knowledge practical activity is not a “blind” activity, is not very closely connected to human but a deliberating activity. The notion of activity (ibid.). deliberation is essential here. What kind of Knowledge as a propositional knowl- deliberation is there under human activity? edge can be expressed in the form “A knows How knowledge is related to the delibera- that p’, where A is an agent of knowledge tion process? and p is a statement, or a proposition, which Sometimes humans act reactively, which expresses the content of the knowledge. For does not allow any deeper deliberation or example, “John knows that snow is white”, reflection: the agent is John and the sentence “snow is And so what we do without reflection, we do white” expresses the content of the knowl- quickly. For when a man actualizes himself in edge. However, it is important to recognize relation to his object, either by perceiving, or that the propositional knowledge is “subject imagining or conceiving it, what he desires, he does at once. For the actualizing of desire centred”, in the obvious sense: the definition is a substitute for inquiry or reflection. I is related to the agent of knowledge. In this want to drink, says appetite; this is drink, obvious sense, propositional knowledge is says sense or imagination or mind: straight “subjective”. However, it is also important away I drink. (Aristotle, On the Motion of to recognize that propositional knowledge Animals: Part 7) is not language dependent. Even if we are Such a quick action without deliberation saying that the content of the knowledge – in is sometimes called intuitive. Moreover, principle – can be expressed linguistically, such action does not separate humans from the content is not language-dependent: it (other) animals. There are several kinds of does not make the difference which lan- non-deliberating or intuitive actions (Booth, guage we use in expressing the content. This Rowbottom 2014). We intuitively do such language independence is in need of deep and such things. One class of intuitive ac- philosophical analysis, which has been one tions is acts that we have learned to do and research area in epistemology. the action has become automatic (Goldman How can such linguistically expressible 1970). Kahneman (2011: 20–24) separates knowledge be related to human practice? system 1 and system 2. System 1 is intuitive The relationship between practical activity and fast. In everyday contexts, this system is and propositional knowledge is not easily working well. However, we also need a slow characterized: Human practice is neither and calculating system 2, when we have something which is based on linguistically to guarantee that the result will be the one expressed knowledge nor it is not mediated intended. If we take a closer look at human by linguistically expressed knowledge. activity, we recognize that there is proper Moreover, it is not possible to wait that deliberation behind it. The discussion about the (unending) justification process justi- deliberation is connected to Kahneman’s fies the knowledge, but we have to use the separation of system 1 and system 2, but it

86 is not the same. Such deliberation can be in this, he will often fail to cure; for it is the characterized as practical inference: individual that is to be cured. (Aristotle, Metaphysics: Book I, Part 1) But how is it that thought (viz. sense, imagination, and thought proper) is sometimes The role of knowledge is not just seen by followed by action, sometimes not; some- looking at the practical action. Knowledge times by movement, sometimes not? What gives a reason why something happens. happens seems to be parallel to the case of Knowledge gives an understanding, which thinking and inferring about the immovable objects of science. There, the end is the truth makes an experienced agent a master. Mere seen (…), but here the two premises result in experience gives knowledge about a singu- a conclusion which is action – for example, lar case at his or her hands, but not general one conceives that every man ought to walk, knowledge; mere experience tells that the one is a man oneself: straight away one walks; case is such-and-such, but not why it is so. or that, in this case, no man should walk, one is a man: straight away one remains at rest. There is proper need for general knowledge (Aristotle, On the Motion of Animals: Part 7) about reason: Aristotle says that the conclusion in But yet, we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art, rather than to such a practical inference is action. This experience, and we suppose artists to be separates the practical inference from the wiser than men of experience (which implies theoretical inference, in which the conclu- that Wisdom depends in all cases, rather on sion is a statement. However, Aristotle says knowledge); and this is because the former that practical and theoretical reasoning are know the cause, but the latter do not. For men of experience know that the thing is so, but parallel processes. As a conclusion, the do not know why, while the others know the action is, or should be, a conclusion from ‘why’ and the cause. (ibid.) some set of premises. Aristotle’s examples Aristotle assumes that the agent needs demonstrate that practical reasoning is causal knowledge, which tells why some- an “incomplete” inference, i.e. not all the thing happens or is the case. How this causal premises are explicated. However, we have knowledge is connected to the activity, is to study the character of the inference more not obvious. We have to study practical closely. What kind of reasoning is in ques- inference more closely and how knowl- tion? What is its “binding power”? We have to consider the interconnection edge is connected to it. Moreover, we also of knowledge (theory) and action more have to more closely consider what kind of closely. According to common opinion knowledge causal knowledge is and how it intuition, or Kahneman’s system 1, is good is related to practical reasoning. More gen- enough, that is mere experience is enough, erally we are considering practical human which is “justified” by stories how an reasoning which is related to the dynamic experienced agent acts just as well as and turn in logic (van Eijck; Visser 2012; Go- even better than a knowing agent. This was chet 2002; Rebuschi, M., 2006). In the fol- already noted by Aristotle: lowing we will consider practical syllogism and generalize it in order to see how the very If, then, a man has the theory without the experience, and recognizes the universal, fundamental conceptual ideas allows us to but does not know the individual included understand more complex practical problem

87 solving situations. In the paper we follow To get a better grasp, let us consider von Wright’s ideas very closely. more closely an example of practical inference. The following formulation is called Practical Syllogism practical syllogism. The first example is formulated in the first person mood (von Aristotle distinguished two kinds of infer- Wright 1983: 11): ences, namely, theoretical and practical inferences. An essential difference is that I want to make the hut habitable. Unless I heat the hut, it will not become in theoretical inference, the conclusion habitable. is a statement, and in practical inference, Therefore, I must heat the hut. the conclusion is an act. Syllogistics is the theory of theoretical inferences. However, The first premise explicates my inten- Aristotle’s treatment of the practical infer- tion; it explicates what I want to be actual- ence “is very scanty and unsystematic. The ized. The second premise explicates a mean examples, of which he gives hints without for my intention. It says what I must do in order to achieve my intention. It is essential elaborating them in detail, are rather a here that the statement is in the first person mixed bunch. Some of his general remarks form. What about the conclusion? It says on practical syllogisms, however, are of that I must heat the hut. It is not clear what great interest. They show that Aristotle was kind of relationship is between the prem- aware of the peculiar character of a type of ises and conclusion. The relationship is reasoning, which logicians after him have not logical; the conclusion does not follow tended to either ignore or misrepresent” logically from the premises. Moreover, the (von Wright 1983: 1). conclusion is not an act, but a statement It is well known that Aristotle devel- which tells me what I should do. Especially, oped his theory of theoretical inferences in as a conclusion, I do not start to heat the hut syllogistics, which is also the fundament straight away. for present day logical study. Present day The practical syllogism explicates what deductive logic is a direct generalization of Peirce later emphasized: belief is as ef- the syllogistics. There has been enormous fective as knowledge; our action is based development in logic; in particular, the on belief. Knowledge that can be seen as th development of logic in the late 19 cen- effective is not “so called” propositional th tury and early decades of the 20 century knowledge, but knowledge that is internal- were extremely progressive. Moreover, in ized, i.e. which is part of the agent’s “belief logical study, there are several different system”.1 kinds of logics that are studied in the spirit If the conclusion would be “I start to of Aristotle’s syllogistics. Let us mention, heat the hut”, then the conclusion would be for example, many valued logic, intuition- an act. In this case, the inference seems to ist logic, inductive logic and modal logic. be binding in an obvious sense: if I accept How is practical syllogistic related to these the premises, then if I would be a rational different logics? Aristotle had very general theoretical approach into which his logical 1 We are not considering the problem of belief re- theory was included (Hintikka 2007). vision; about the belief revision, see Hanson 2014.

88 person, I should start to heat the hut. The connection in which the explanation and interconnection between premises and the thing explained should be logically conclusion is not deductive, but practical, (conceptually) independent. However, the which can be characterized by the Sellars’ practical syllogism allows us to understand Lemma: If the premises of the practical the action. According to von Wright (1971; syllogism above hold, then I start to heat 1974), this makes the methodological dif- the hut here and now, provided that I am ference between the human sciences and rational, I do not change my intention and natural sciences. beliefs, and nothing prevents me from heat- ing the hut (Pietarinen 1992: 30). So, it is Objectivity of Practical Syllogism natural to say that “I must heat the hut”, The first person pattern characterizes action which is the conclusion in the inference from the actor’s point of view, which the above. Hence the conclusion expresses a practical syllogism is binding – the rational- practical necessity (von Wright 1983: 2). ity of the agent gives special validity for the The first person pattern of the practical reasoning schema. However, it is not neces- syllogism gives a natural characterization sary to take a first person point of view; we of an individual’s actions. An individual can formulate the practical syllogism from a himself or herself may make such an in- third person perspective (von Wright 1983): ference, which can be characterized by a practical syllogism, before the act he or A wants to make the hut habitable. Unless A heats the hut, it will not become she does. In this case, it is natural that not habitable. all the obvious premises are explicated. Therefore, A must heat the hut. The individual may also use the practical syllogism if he or she wants to explain his In this case, the binding power is not or her behaviour to somebody. Moreover, any more so binding as in the first person other people may use practical syllogism case. Moreover, this formulation allows us in trying to understand the behaviour of an to study, more generally, the structure of individual. Hence, practical syllogism can practical inferences. As an extreme case, be seen as a criterion of rationality of an the practical inference is possible to write agent’s behaviour: if it is possible to submit down in an “impersonal” or general point of the behavior under practical syllogism, then view, as follows (von Wright 1983): the behaviour can be understood as being One wants to attain x. rational (independently how rational or Unless y is done, x will not be attained. irrational the intended goal or the means Therefore, y must be done. actually are) (Tu, Hsiao, Wang 2015). von Wright (1983: 2) calls an inference This first person pattern interconnects of this form “a primary practical inference”. the intentions and beliefs of the agent and It is easy to see that these formulations are his or her act together. The connection is not as similarly binding as the first person practical necessity, which is a conceptual pattern is. In the first person pattern, the connection. The practical syllogism does connection between the premises and con- not give a causal explanation of the ac- clusion is, as mentioned above, conceptual. tion, since the explanation uses a causal The reason for this is that the first order

89 formulation makes the mean believed bind- the corresponding technical norm is true, ing for the agent himself or herself. In the otherwise it is false. The problem of truth or case of a third person or the general practi- falsity is an objective problem concerning cal syllogism, the second premise is not as the means-end relation. similarly binding as it is in the first person It must be recognized that this scientific case. The formulation “Unless y is done, x task is not part of the first person practical will not be attained” is “objective” in a sense inference; the agent may not know the ef- that it is natural to ask whether the actor, fectivity of the means; the essential thing who he or she in fact is, knows it. It is also is that the agent believes that the means easy to see that in the third person case, the used are effective: “I believe that …”. The second premise need not be known by the believing or not believing is a “subjective” agent A. The same holds in the general case. relation between the agent and means- There is another sense of objectivity, end relation. It is belief which makes the which is connected to all kinds of practical practical inference “binding”. Hence, it is syllogisms. Namely, whether or not the subjectivity, not objectivity, which makes means is a really good means to achieve practical inference “practically valuable”. the intended goal, which is called the prob- However, a wrong mean may be effectively lem of the effectivity of the means. The used in practical inferences. The fact that the effectivity of the means has to be studied intended goal is achieved does not tell about empirically; it is a normal scientifically the truth or falsity of the mean. However, researchable problem that can be studied the truth guarantees the success, case after using empirical or, even experimental meth- case (Hughes, Kroes, Zwart 2007). ods.2 This is a usual task in technology and Practical syllogism characterizes a in experimental science. reason why the actor does what he or she The agent may believe that a means is does. If the means is truthful, the action effective, even when it is not. This does not is successful. In an everyday context, the affect the binding power of the argument. In knowledge supposed is not scientific, but the third person or in the general case, this practical, every day causal knowledge. The problem does not occur. In the third person old technology was not based on scientific case and in the general case, it is not obvi- knowledge, but practical everyday knowl- ous that the second premise characterizes edge. Such knowledge can be understood the belief of the actor. The effectivity of the by the worker himself or herself. Hence, the means is related to the truth of the statement practical syllogism helps us to understand that expresses the connection between the the logic of old technology (von Wright means and the end. These statements are 1989). Because of the industrial production, called technical norms (von Wright 1996). the means should be truthful and hence, The truth of the technical norms refers to a the deliberation of the means-end relation causal connection between the means and cannot be done only “subjectively”, but also the end: if there is a causal connection, then “objectively”. The intention to guarantee the achieve- 2 Of course, the multitude of the possible means ment of the intended goal supposes that the would make the study more complex, but this is not studied in this paper. corresponding technical norm is true, i.e.

90 that there is the believed causal link between “in the character of a pupil who listens to the mean and the end. However, it is not everything that the teacher chooses to say, obvious what it means that there is a causal but of an appointed judge who compels the link. What is usually meant by a cause is a witnesses to answer questions which he “so called” nomic cause, for which a “rela- has himself has formulated” (Quote from tion between two terms, C and E, should Sintonen 2006: 829). satisfy at least the following two condi- Causal relation is not a “subjective” tions: (i) C and E are logically independent relation between act and reality, but an of one another; (ii) C and E are connected “objective” relation in the reality. The agent by a universal law. Whenever C occurs (in brings about the state of affairs that is the the frame or setting of some circumstances cause of the caused state of affairs. In fact, F), E follows” (von Wright 1983: 53). As the relationship between the agent’s action mentioned, in the practical syllogism, the and its result is conceptual: by opening the mean and the end are conceptually con- door, the agent, because of conceptual rea- nected, hence it does not exemplify a causal sons, brings about the opening of the door. relation. However, conceptually causation The relationship between the agent’s action “is intrinsically connected with ideas of and causation is counterfactual, in the sense human action (experiment, interference, that it is not necessary that the agent, in manipulation)” (von Wright 1974: ix). This fact, does the act needed, it is enough that manipulative notion is not subjective, but the agent, in principle, could do the act and says that the factual cause between C and the act would bring about the state of affairs E means that we can, in principle, produce that factually cause the searched result. This E by doing C (von Wright 1983). is expressed by von Wright (1974) as fol- The logic of experiment shows clearly lows: “If p causes q, then if I can produce that it means that causation is “intrinsically p, I can also bring about q. The statement connected with ideas of human action”, about action possibilities follows from the which is explicated by von Wright (1974: causal statement. So, am I not, in fact, try- 49) as follows: “causal relations exist being to reverse the logical order here?” (von tween natural events, not between agents Wright 1974: 52). and events. When by doing p, we bring Moreover, the “dependence of causa- about q, it is the happening of p which tion upon action is conceptual” (ibid.: 50). causes q to come”. In the experiment, The conceptual relation does not make the the experimenter is trying to show that a causal relation subjective. The causal rela- certain functional relationship between tion is an objective fact which can, in prin- the parameters holds. The idea is to show ciple, become known via an experimental this by doing an experiment, i.e. actively method. The experimental or “objective” making changes in the reality such that the aspects play a central role in analysing intended relationship can be seen. The ac- human practical action. The history of tive changes made by the experimenter are technological reason is rooted to everyday a carefully planned active search for the rationality, in which an individual trusts information needed in the Kantian spirit, his or her own instrumental knowledge. In such that the experimenter may not behave fact, the knowledge needed in early indus-

91 try was not properly scientific, but only an Humboldt University, science was seen as everyday instrumental knowledge: “Early a pedagogical tool; science had the value in technology, on the whole, did not generate itself, but the aim of the University was “the unintended side-effects which were harmful Bildung of a person” (ibid.: 20). Humboldt or, otherwise, a cause of concern. Techni- University was based on a common ethical cal constructions could misfire: a ship may basis: it was a pedagogical university. The sink or a bridge collapse or a steam engine pedagogical foundation was not in religion, burst. But such undesired consequences did but in science. However, science was not not affect either the human or the physical the science of antique, but a modern ex- environment much beyond the immediate perimental science. Moreover, as a result range of the constructions themselves” (von of the battle, science and scientific inquiry Wright 1989: 22.). The instrumental use of were released from the outer control (ibid.). modern natural science was fundamental The pedagogical basis of Humboldt Uni- behind the scientific-industrial revolution versity was based on modern experimental which made a revolutionary change in the science, which had several consequences. use and consequences of industrial work. As Hume’s guillotine tells us, science is Moreover, if the knowledge that is the “value-free” and, hence, knowledge and foundation of the industrial work becomes morality was separated from each other. advanced scientific knowledge, then it can- Knowledge had the role of an instrument. not any more be understood by the workers However, as an instrument it cannot be themselves. This means that the people who responsible any more: do (and decide) and the people who know Technologically oriented science has turned become separated. The separation became out to be of the greatest instrumental value evident when the problems supposed prop- for the achievement of purposes which man erly scientific knowledge. Moreover, the sets himself. This in itself is no guarantee that what is achieved is also for this good. separation enforces us to consider respon- Technology can serve purposes which are in sibility more closely. themselves either good or evil. It is a knife that cuts both ways (ibid.: 16). About Responsibility This made a huge difference. Science Western cultural tradition is based on the became an effective instrument and, at the scientific and moral tradition. The scientific same time, the scientific-industrial revolu- tradition has its roots in the scientific culture tion opened up totally new perspectives. of ancient Greece and moral tradition has Moreover, the commercialization made new religious roots. There has been fundamental insights into the picture. Science and indus- tension between the traditions. The moral try began to be commercialized: “Science tradition had long been in the dominating itself could not stay aloof of these develop- role. But eventually, science won the battle ments – leaving industry to pick up what- for freedom of knowledge. In a sense, Hum- ever fruits happened to fall from the Tree of boldt University can be seen as a result of Knowledge. The new relationship between the battle in which science had the freedom science and industry had repercussions on from the authority of moral fundament. At both parties. The ensuing changes could be

92 described as the integration of science into for truth by science, the search for new the economy of industrialized societies” values has not been very successful” (ibid.: (ibid.: 16). The scientific-industrial revolu- 21–22). Perhaps the foundation should be tion made it obvious that the knower and the sought from the balance between humanity agent, or the decision maker, are separated: and nature. If it is eventually possible to the knower becomes an objective knowl- understand humans as part of the nature: edge expert that does not make practical “New people are entering the stage and may decisions and, hence, is not responsible one day be leading in creative talent and for the consequences of the decisions. On innovative energies. Perhaps their cultural the other hand, the decision makers trust legacies will be less contradiction-loaded the advice of the knowledge experts and than ours and therefore, let us hope, make it cannot evaluate the reliability of the given easier for them to respect the natural bounds information. Moreover, decision makers that men must not transgress lest nemesis do not have any common moral or ethical revenge their hybris” (ibid.: 28). foundations. Hence, neither the decision Present day discussion about respect maker nor the knower can be responsible and responsibility, and even about dignity, for the decisions. The actor merely executes seems to be searching the moral ways of the decisions give to him or her. The re- living a good human life in this modern sponsibility seems to disappear from the messy technological world. However, the entire process. discussion seems to be rather proclaiming There is no possibility to go back to the than arguing. The deep moral value of life societies with shared (ethical) values. “The is not found out from simple proclamations, integration of science in the economy which but something which integrates us to our is in progress has changed the picture. The history, our culture and our common future. ideals of Humboldt University appear more This has to be in balance with the natural and more as a pastoral dream of bygone resources; otherwise, nature will “revenge days” (ibid.: 20). However, there is still the hybris of humans”. This can already be need for the search for the foundations of seen from the problems of global pollution the values: responsibility is based on the or climate warming. The solution cannot be fundamental values. This has been done a simple trick or conceptual bluff, but deep by the philosophers: “Western philosophy responsibility that interconnects humanity after the Renaissance has been in search of and ecological responsibility, which Värri a new ground for morality. As in science, (2012) calls ecological education. This is and inspired by its example, this ground was closely connected to Rorty’s (1980) edify- sought in reason too. But unlike the search ing philosophy.

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APIE PRAKTINĮ PROBLEMŲ SPRENDIMĄ Arto Mutanen

Santrauka. Žinojimas pagal apibrėžimą yra patikimas ir todėl gali būti pritaikytas gausybei įvairių problemų. Tačiau spręsdami praktines problemas pasikliaujame ne tik teisingu žinojimu, bet ir informacija, kuri nustato praktinio priimtinumo ribas. Mes ieškome ne teisingo, bet optimalaus sprendimo. Optimalus sprendimas pasiekiamas optimizuojant keletą praktinių parametrų. Optimizavimo procesas remiasi teorija ir praktika. Kitaip sakant, praktinis problemų sprendimas yra žmogiškasis svarstymas, susiejantis teorines ir praktines žinias. Todėl filosofinis praktinio problemų sprendimo pagrindimas jungia teorinę ir praktinę filosofiją. Svarbiausia vieta praktiškai sprendžiant problemas tenka ar turėtų tekti etiniam svarstymui. Pažangaus mokslinio pažinimo, reikalingo praktiniam dabartinių problemų sprendimui, sudėtingumas skiria žmones, kurie žino, nuo tų, kurie veikia. Situacija rodo, jog mums reikalingi gilesni pedagoginiai įsitikinimai: mums reikia ekologinio ugdymo.

Pagrindiniai žodžiai: pažinimas, praktinis svarstymas, praktinis silogizmas, atsakomybė

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