The Practical Syllogism in Context: De Motu 7 and Zoology

Pierre-Marie Morel, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lettres et de Sciences humaines, Lyon

Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es, die Erörterungen zum Praktischen Syllogismus in De motu animalium, Kapitel 7, in ihren unmittelbaren Kontext einzuordnen. Dieser Kontext ist keineswegs ein logischer. De motu ist eine psychologische oder zoo- logische Abhandlung, die in den Rahmen der Naturphilosophie gehört. Darüber hinaus kann der Praktische Syllogismus aus De motu nicht auf „praktische“, d.h. anthropologische Fälle wie akrasia eingeschränkt werden. Er ist vielmehr in eine physiologische Erörterung eingefügt, die die biologische Erklärung der Emotionen, Reaktionen und Handlungen von Lebewesen betrifft. Daher bedeutet die Notwen- digkeit der Konklusion – hier der Handlung selbst – nicht, dass die Handlungsbe- dingungen auf Propositionen oder logische Beziehungen reduziert werden könnten. Eher steht sie für die Notwendigkeit, welche die Relation zwischen Handelndem und Leidendem in der Bewegung der Lebewesen bestimmt.

Anyone who intends to explore Aristotle’s conception of the so-called practical syllogism, or practical reasoning, immediately feels embarrassed: there is neither a clear definition, nor a logical justification of this procedure in Aristotle’s texts. Moreover, Aristotle makes use of the practical syllogism in particular contexts – ethical (EN VII 5), psychological (De an. III 11), zoological (MA 7) – without explaining the general conditions of this use. This particular exegetical situation entails an obvious methodological rule: one needs, at first, to describe and analyze the immediate context of the specific uses of the practical syllogism in order to explain its meaning and theoretical function. 1 My first and foremost aim in this paper is to inscribe chapter 7 of the De motu animalium on the practical syllogism in its immediate context. I shall not propose a close reading of this chapter, but mainly analyze its argumentative function in the broader framework of the argumentation of the De motu. First, there is no doubt that this framework is by no means a logical one. De motu animalium is a psychological or zoological treatise, whose scope belongs to natural philosophy, not to logic. Admittedly, this is also true of the other versions of practical syllogism that can be found in the Nicomachean Ethics or in the De anima. However, the practical syllogism, in the De motu as well as in the other texts where it occurs, is often read as a piece of formal reasoning encapsulated in a non-logical context and appears to be some kind of meteorite, or some isolated piece, rather than a necessary step in the argument. This is particularly true of

1 Many thanks to Dimitri El Murr and Muriel Inns, who helped me to improve my English text. I would also like to thank David Charles, Klaus Corcilius and Marco Zingano for their useful remarks during the conference on the practical syllogism held in Berlin in 2007. 186 Pierre-Marie Morel the practical syllogism in the De motu, where, one must admit, its argumentative function is not immediately clear. Even more, this situation is so paradoxical that it has often influenced the interpretation of the treatise as a whole: because of this single passage dealing with practical reasoning and, accordingly, with human behaviour, the De motu has been read not only as a psychological or zoological treatise, but also as a kind of „transgenus“ treatise, bridging practical and natural philosophy. Not to mention purely logical and formal readings, it is often forgotten that the De motu deals above all with the movement of animals and only per accidens with human behaviour. While reading, e.g., M. Nussbaum’s fundamental and very useful book (21985), one could sometimes think that the De motu is as much concerned with practical philosophy as with natural philosophy. I do not mean that the practical syllogism in the De motu is absolutely deprived of implications regarding practical philosophy. Surely it is also an interesting case of logical formalisation and it probably reveals a significant aspect of Aristotle’s conception of the use of syllogisms. However, my point is that the original and fundamental scope of the practical syllogism in the De motu is zoological and psychological. I intend to show that it is even physiological, in the sense that it reveals some material and organic aspects of the life of the animal. In addition, I will end those preliminary remarks by noting that M. Nussbaum seems to have changed her mind about the scope of De motu in a paper published in 1992, which points out its physiological aspects 2. Unfortunately, Aristotle’s text is not very explicit: read in isolation from the rest of the De motu, the relevant passage is apparently exclusively devoted to the formal explanation of action. However, I would like to show that reading it in connection with the end of chapter 7 and, above all, with chapter 8 helps to cast new light on this difficult text.

1. The context in context

To begin with, I will clarify some assumptions about the aim of De motu.I shall not dwell on the question of the authenticity of the treatise, which, as I see it, is nowadays a secondary question. Nussbaum has given many convincing arguments in favour of authenticity and she is certainly right in saying that the De motu is a genuine Aristotelian treatise. I will content myself with adding that some arguments against the authenticity of the treatise rely on its alleged heterogeneity. Indeed, it may seem at first sight that the De motu has a heterogeneous content. The irruption of the practical syllogism in this context could obviously be interpreted as evidence in favour of such a reading. But it is no less obvious that if it appears that the practical syllogism has a real function in the overall argument of the De motu, a supplementary argument in favour of the authenticity of the De motu will be gained. To put it differently: the practical syllogism can be neatly inscribed in the De motu provided one assumes that its scope is neither properly logical

2 Nussbaum/Putnam, 1992. Regarding the inscription of De motu in psychological and biological con- texts, see also Morel (2007).