ISSN 1392-1126. PROBLEMOS 2016 89 ABOUT PRACTICAL PROBLEM SOLVING Arto Mutanen Adjunct Professor Finnish National Defence University P.O. Box 7 FI-00861 Helsinki, Finland E-mail: [email protected] Abstract. Knowledge is, by definition, reliable and, hence, it can be applied to a variety of different problems. Nevertheless, in practical problem solving, we do not rely on mere truthful knowledge, but also on information which frames the practical acceptability. We are not looking for truthful solution but an optimal solution. Optimal solution is found out by optimizing some given (practical) parameters. The optimization is both theory based and practice based process. That is, practical problem solving is a human deliberation that interconnects theoretical and practical knowledge. So, the philosophical foundation of practical problem solving interconnects theoretical and practical philosophy. Especially ethical deliberation plays – or should play – central role in practical problem solving. The complexity of the advanced scientific knowledge needed in solving present day practical problems separates the people who know, from the people who do (decide). The situation makes immediate that we need some deeper pedagogical conviction: we need ecological education. Keywords: knowledge, practical reasoning, practical syllogism, responsibility The notion of knowledge has been under to recognize when we achieve knowledge. philosophical discussion since Plato. The So, Hintikka (2007) speaks about informa- classical notion of knowledge, which tion and knowledge as becoming an ideal originates from Plato’s dialog Theatetus, end state. In this sense it would be adequate says that knowledge is a well justified true to speak about information needed in prob- belief. The classical notion has been under lem solving. extensive philosophical discussion. In par- The notion of knowledge discussed in epistemology has been “so called” proposi- ticular, the truth condition and the justifica- tional knowledge, i.e. knowledge that can be tion condition have been philosophically expressed linguistically. This emphasis has interesting ones. The notion of truth is far implied that the problems of epistemology from clear; in realistic tradition, truth has consider the special problems of truth and been understood as a fundamental semantic justification conditions. All this, of course, notion, and in pragmatist tradition, truth has has been very interesting and important. been understood as an epistemic notion. It However, the connection of knowledge to is not clear at all what kind of justification human practical life has not been close. proper knowledge supposes. In fact, justifi- How is knowledge related to human prac- cation is an unending process. It is not easy tical life? What kind of activity is human 85 practical life? What is knowledge? It is best (uncertain) information we have. Still, obvious that knowledge is related to the hu- propositional knowledge has a positive man activity, but, at the same, it is obvious role in human practical activity. Human that “so called” propositional knowledge practical activity is not a “blind” activity, is not very closely connected to human but a deliberating activity. The notion of activity (ibid.). deliberation is essential here. What kind of Knowledge as a propositional knowl- deliberation is there under human activity? edge can be expressed in the form “A knows How knowledge is related to the delibera- that p’, where A is an agent of knowledge tion process? and p is a statement, or a proposition, which Sometimes humans act reactively, which expresses the content of the knowledge. For does not allow any deeper deliberation or example, “John knows that snow is white”, reflection: the agent is John and the sentence “snow is And so what we do without reflection, we do white” expresses the content of the knowl- quickly. For when a man actualizes himself in edge. However, it is important to recognize relation to his object, either by perceiving, or that the propositional knowledge is “subject imagining or conceiving it, what he desires, he does at once. For the actualizing of desire centred”, in the obvious sense: the definition is a substitute for inquiry or reflection. I is related to the agent of knowledge. In this want to drink, says appetite; this is drink, obvious sense, propositional knowledge is says sense or imagination or mind: straight “subjective”. However, it is also important away I drink. (Aristotle, On the Motion of to recognize that propositional knowledge Animals: Part 7) is not language dependent. Even if we are Such a quick action without deliberation saying that the content of the knowledge – in is sometimes called intuitive. Moreover, principle – can be expressed linguistically, such action does not separate humans from the content is not language-dependent: it (other) animals. There are several kinds of does not make the difference which lan- non-deliberating or intuitive actions (Booth, guage we use in expressing the content. This Rowbottom 2014). We intuitively do such language independence is in need of deep and such things. One class of intuitive ac- philosophical analysis, which has been one tions is acts that we have learned to do and research area in epistemology. the action has become automatic (Goldman How can such linguistically expressible 1970). Kahneman (2011: 20–24) separates knowledge be related to human practice? system 1 and system 2. System 1 is intuitive The relationship between practical activity and fast. In everyday contexts, this system is and propositional knowledge is not easily working well. However, we also need a slow characterized: Human practice is neither and calculating system 2, when we have something which is based on linguistically to guarantee that the result will be the one expressed knowledge nor it is not mediated intended. If we take a closer look at human by linguistically expressed knowledge. activity, we recognize that there is proper Moreover, it is not possible to wait that deliberation behind it. The discussion about the (unending) justification process justi- deliberation is connected to Kahneman’s fies the knowledge, but we have to use the separation of system 1 and system 2, but it 86 is not the same. Such deliberation can be in this, he will often fail to cure; for it is the characterized as practical inference: individual that is to be cured. (Aristotle, Metaphysics: Book I, Part 1) But how is it that thought (viz. sense, ima- gination, and thought proper) is sometimes The role of knowledge is not just seen by followed by action, sometimes not; some- looking at the practical action. Knowledge times by movement, sometimes not? What gives a reason why something happens. happens seems to be parallel to the case of Knowledge gives an understanding, which thinking and inferring about the immovable objects of science. There, the end is the truth makes an experienced agent a master. Mere seen (…), but here the two premises result in experience gives knowledge about a singu- a conclusion which is action – for example, lar case at his or her hands, but not general one conceives that every man ought to walk, knowledge; mere experience tells that the one is a man oneself: straight away one walks; case is such-and-such, but not why it is so. or that, in this case, no man should walk, one is a man: straight away one remains at rest. There is proper need for general knowledge (Aristotle, On the Motion of Animals: Part 7) about reason: Aristotle says that the conclusion in But yet, we think that knowledge and un- derstanding belong to art, rather than to such a practical inference is action. This experience, and we suppose artists to be separates the practical inference from the wiser than men of experience (which implies theoretical inference, in which the conclu- that Wisdom depends in all cases, rather on sion is a statement. However, Aristotle says knowledge); and this is because the former that practical and theoretical reasoning are know the cause, but the latter do not. For men of experience know that the thing is so, but parallel processes. As a conclusion, the do not know why, while the others know the action is, or should be, a conclusion from ‘why’ and the cause. (ibid.) some set of premises. Aristotle’s examples Aristotle assumes that the agent needs demonstrate that practical reasoning is causal knowledge, which tells why some- an “incomplete” inference, i.e. not all the thing happens or is the case. How this causal premises are explicated. However, we have knowledge is connected to the activity, is to study the character of the inference more not obvious. We have to study practical closely. What kind of reasoning is in ques- inference more closely and how knowl- tion? What is its “binding power”? We have to consider the interconnection edge is connected to it. Moreover, we also of knowledge (theory) and action more have to more closely consider what kind of closely. According to common opinion knowledge causal knowledge is and how it intuition, or Kahneman’s system 1, is good is related to practical reasoning. More gen- enough, that is mere experience is enough, erally we are considering practical human which is “justified” by stories how an reasoning which is related to the dynamic experienced agent acts just as well as and turn in logic (van Eijck; Visser 2012; Go- even better than a knowing agent. This was chet 2002; Rebuschi, M., 2006). In the fol- already noted by Aristotle: lowing we will consider practical syllogism and generalize it in order to see how the very If, then, a man has the theory without the experience, and recognizes the universal, fundamental conceptual ideas allows us to but does not know the individual included understand more complex practical problem 87 solving situations. In the paper we follow To get a better grasp, let us consider von Wright’s ideas very closely.