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Theological Determinism and the Goodness of God

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Theological Determinism and the Goodness of God Theological Determinism and the Goodness of God A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Matthew James Hart University of Liverpool September 2019 1 Abstract This thesis is a defence of theological determinism (TD) as it is expressed in a Reformed or Calvinistic context. TD is the doctrine that God determines everything that occurs. It is not a popular view amongst theistic philosophers at the present time—most theists are libertarians. That is to say, most contemporary theistic philosophers think that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism (they are incompatibilists), and that man is a morally responsible creature. Theological determinists, on the other hand, are typically compatibilists. They agree that man is a morally responsible creature, but they think this claim is consistent with determinism. My task in this thesis is to defend TD against the two signal classes of objection that have been brought against it: (i) arguments for incompatibilism that urge that TD removes human moral responsibility, and (ii) arguments to the effect that that TD calls into question the goodness, love and paternity of God on account of the closer connection between God and evil that TD posits. The structure of the thesis is as follows. In Part 1 I set the stage. In chapter 1 the different proposed analyses of determinism are laid out, and I offer my preferred understanding. I suggest that the standard definitions of determinism are inadequate. The crucial notion is not entailment, as the standard definitions suppose, but some some sort of metaphysically prior, explanatory determination The various terms of the free-will debate (compatibilism, incompatibilism, libertarianism, etc.) are explicated in chapter 2. Chapter 3 is given over to a historical centring of the debate. I don’t want to discuss theological determinism in the abstract, but in the light of the Reformed or Calvinist tradition. The two opposing schools of thought in this regard are Calvinism and Arminianism. I survey the history of the debate starting with Luther and Erasmus’s dispute over free will, and trace the formation of the two opposing points of view all the way up to the Westminster Confession. My contention is that Calvinism should be understood as a compatibilistic and deterministic viewpoint, in contrast to the incompatibilistic and indeterministic system of Arminianism. The great objections the Arminians have traditionally made are also presented. In Part 2 I begin to respond to those objections. Part 2 is given over to arguments against TD that are premised on arguments against compatibilism. Chapter 4 is my response to the Ability Argument against determinism, which has it that the ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility and that determinism removes that ability. I respond by suggesting that the relevant ‘could have done otherwise’ language might refer to compossibility, not ability, and the relevant compossibility is simply that of one’s desire-set with a different decision (intention). Thus, the 2 Calvinist may carry on assuming ‘could have done otherwise’ language is relevant to moral responsibility. Chapter 5 concerns the Manipulation Argument. This argument is a recent development, and it appeals to the intuition that if an individual causes you to do something (even if through a long and distant chain of causation), then you are not responsible for what you were thus caused to do. But TD therefore implies that no human being is morally responsible, because God is the ultimate cause of all our actions. I respond that manipulation cases don’t show us an absence of responsibility, they show us an uncertainty on the given facts, but that uncertainty can be embraced by the Calvinist, for he can appeal to divine testimony, a further fact, to justify his belief that human beings are morally responsible. I also turn the tables and offer my own manipulation argument for compatibilism. Part 3 is devoted to the Arminian accusations that Calvinism calls into question the goodness and justice of God. Chapter 6 is a discussion of the justice of Hell. Issues of predestination to damnation were revealed in chapter 3 to be of central concern in the debate. To that end, chapter 6 responds to the suspicion that Hell is unjust because it is disproportional: infinite punishment for finite sins. I rebut the charge by way of three suggestions: that the damned may continue to sin in Hell and thereby accrue more punishment; that human beings can be plausibly considered guilty for counterfactual sins, sins they would have done, and these are infinite; and I also defend the Anselmian suggestion that sins against an infinite being are of infinite gravity. Chapter 7 presents a Calvinist theodicy of Hell. If God determines everything, why would God determine a large portion of humanity to reject Christ and go to Hell? In this chapter I rely heavily on the work of Jonathan Edwards, and I suggest that the reason why God predestines many to such a fate may be on account of the a greater sense of God’s justice, power, and greater thankfulness and appreciation for their salvation the elect in Heaven have by being part of the elect few, and defend the view against objections. Chapter 8 deals with the question of divine paternity. It is objected by certain of Calvinism’s critics that for God to deterministically predestine an individual to damnation is inconsistent with God’s status as father. In this chapter I motivate Calvin's suggestion that God is the father only of the elect. I argue that if God is the father of all, then he is often in a sort of emotional paralysis, for, in any conflict between human beings, paternal duty and affection precludes him from identifying with (supporting) the interests of one party over the other. The conclusion, chapter 9, offers some suggestions for future research. 3 Acknowledgements Daniel Hill and Stephen McLeod supervised this thesis, and proved very able and helpful supervisors. Daniel was my primary, and I very much appreciate the detailed and dedicated attention he gave to drafts of the various chapters of this thesis—attention that often extended to lengthy correspondence. Portions of this thesis have already seen print. Chapter 4 is an altered version of my 2017 paper, ‘A Modest Classical Compatibilism’, published in Disputatio (45): 265–285, and I retain copyright. Chapter 7 is a modified version of ‘Calvinism and the Problem of Hell’—my chapter in the book Calvinism and the Problem of Evil, edited by David E. Alexander & Daniel M. Johnson, and published in 2016 by Pickwick Publications, an imprint of Wipf and Stock. It is used here by permission of Wipf and Stock Publishers (www.wipfandstock.com). I am very grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for a studentship which made these studies possible. I was awarded an AHRC Northwest Consortium Doctoral Studentship for the 2015–18 period (award ref. 1635247). 4 Table of Contents Abstract.......................................................................................................................................2 Acknowledgements.....................................................................................................................4 PART 1—THE GROUNDWORK.......................................................................................................8 Chapter 1—What is Theological Determinism?..............................................................................8 1.1 Species of Determinism........................................................................................................8 1.2 Is Determination Entailment?.............................................................................................10 1.3 Is Determination Causation?...............................................................................................12 1.4 Stating Theological Determinism.......................................................................................15 1.5 Other Issues.........................................................................................................................18 Chapter 2—The Free-Will Debate.................................................................................................20 2.1 Compatibilism and Incompatibilism...................................................................................20 2.2 Point of Clarification (i): The Sort of Possibility at Issue...................................................20 2.3 Point of Clarification (ii): Derivative and Non-derivative Moral Responsibility...............21 2.4 Point of Clarification (iii): The Nature of Decision............................................................21 2.5 Point of Clarification (iv): Agent Causation.......................................................................22 2.6 Point of Clarification (v): The Nature of Moral Responsibility..........................................23 2.7 Libertarianism and Hard Determinism................................................................................26 2.8 Revision to the Terminology...............................................................................................27 Chapter 3—The Free-Will Debate and Reformed Theology.........................................................30 3.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................30 3.2 The Luther-Erasmus Exchange...........................................................................................30
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