Restructuring Medicaid Through a Swap: an Alternative to a Block Grant

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Restructuring Medicaid Through a Swap: an Alternative to a Block Grant Restructuring Medicaid through aT Swap:ITLE An Alternative to a Block Grant Authors John Holahan Date April 2011 Medicaid will clearly contribute to the ongoing Introduction federal deficit problem. The United States is now engaged in a major In response to the deficit problem, Congressman policy debate about the future of entitlement Paul Ryan has proposed that Medicaid be turned programs, including the Medicaid program. There into a block grant with fixed allocations of federal is a widespread belief that these programs are funds to states. The block grant would be based contributing to growing federal debt and without on current expenditures in 2012 and grow at the some reform will continue to do so for a long time. rate of the consumer price index plus population. Both the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid This is about 3.0 percentage points each year Services studies (CMS actuaries) and the below the expected rate of increase in Medicaid Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project spending. A block grant would clearly save money Medicaid spending to continue growing faster than at the federal level but would shift a large share of the economy. CMS actuaries project Medicaid the cost of Medicaid programs to states. States spending to increase by about 7 percent per year have generally controlled spending per enrollee at from 2010 to 2019, with the exception of an rates that are favorable in comparison to other 18 percent growth in 2014, when the Medicaid payers. Most Medicaid spending growth has been expansion component of the Affordable Care Act 1 due to enrollment growth, particularly during the (ACA) is implemented. two economic recessions of the past decade and medical care inflation. States will have a difficult The CBO projections are harder to interpret time controlling spending on a per enrollee basis because they assume the Medicaid expansion 2 significantly more than they have, even with the would be phased in between 2014 and 2016. The increased flexibility they ask for. This will likely CBO projects Medicaid spending to increase by mean that states will have to spend more of their 6.9 percent between 2016 and 2020. Spending in own money or that they will reduce coverage. the CBO baseline is virtually unchanged between This will mean a rising number of uninsured; it will 2010 and 2014 as the nation exits the economic also mean more uncompensated care that state downturn. Beginning in 2014 and continuing until and local governments must finance with no 2016, spending increases for all groups but federal matching payments. particularly for adults because of the ACA. After the large increase in enrollment due to the ACA, As part of its many recommendations for deficit Medicaid enrollment is projected to grow at about reduction, the Bipartisan Policy Center Debt 1.3 percent per year. This yields a projected Reduction Task Force in November 2010 growth in spending per enrollee of about 5.5 proposed a major change in federal and state percent. The growth rates in spending projected by responsibilities for Medicaid (a swap), designed to both CMS actuaries and the CBO are faster than address incentives with the current matching rate growth in gross domestic product (GDP) over the structure that have led to state efforts to ―game‖ same period, 4.6 percent. Assuming the CMS and the system, that is, bringing in new federal CBO Medicaid spending projections are accurate, spending with little or no real state matching © 2011,© 2011, The TheUrban Urban Institute Institute Health Health Policy Policy Center Center • www.healthpolicycenter.org • www.healthpolicycenter.org page 1 expenditures. 3 The proposal would greatly reduce matching dollars with little or no state the incentives for gaming and reduce federal expenditures. The President’s Commission spending but has serious distributional effects— argued such activities be reduced and eventually there would be large winners and losers among eliminated.6 The Bipartisan Policy Center states. proposal took a stronger stand against these gaming practices, calling the Medicaid system This paper presents an approach that would dysfunctional.7 It argues that states have restructure Medicaid with a form of a swap that searched for and have found a wide range of would build upon the coverage expansion in the ways of bringing in federal dollars. It also Affordable Care Act, largely eliminate incentives contends that as long as the federal matching for creative financing, mitigate problems that the rates structure is in place, the incentives for recessions cause for the current system, and gaming remain and it will be difficult for the strengthen incentives for cost containment. The federal government to control Medicaid spending proposal would not have the distributional effects levels. The Bipartisan Policy Center argued that that a straightforward swap proposal would have. there should be a complete shift in responsibilities The proposal would provide savings by greatly with some program responsibilities being shifted reducing the ability to use ―creative financing,‖ entirely to states and the remainder to federal and have some effect on reducing spending government. The Center suggests this could be growth. How much would be saved is uncertain done by population groups; for example, one level because, as noted, Medicaid expenditures have of government taking over the care for the elderly not grown significantly over and above enrollment and disabled and the others taking over families. growth and inflation, particularly compared with Alternatively, there could be a swap of acute and other payers. long-term care. Background There is a wide range of ways in which Medicaid gaming has taken place.8 Generally, Two prominent commissions charged with arrangements are variants of the following: If a entitlement reform, the President’s National state wants to increase the money going toward Commission on Fiscal Responsibilities and hospitals, it can raise reimbursement rates by say Reform and the Bipartisan Policy Center Debt $100. Hospitals would pay a tax of $50. Assuming Reduction Task Force, have made proposals to a 50 percent matching rate, the federal curtail Medicaid spending. Both commissions government would contribute a matching recommend placing dual eligibles in Medicaid contribution of $50. The tax payment made by the 4 managed care. The need for coordination and hospitals would be returned to them; hospitals management of the care of these extremely would be better off by the amount of the federal expensive individuals is indisputable, but whether payment and the state would pay nothing. In it should be a federal Medicare initiative or left to some cases, a portion of the federal payment Medicaid is not clear. The Bipartisan Policy would also be returned to the state, in which case Center argues that Medicaid has far more the state has actually gained money in the experience with managed care. This may be true transaction. but not necessarily for such a medically complex population like dual enrollees, and certainly not in States have used these arrangements for many all states. Federal savings may be greater if years. They began with states making responsibility for duals was a federal initiative, for disproportionate share payments to hospitals that example, led by Medicare. Most savings from were funded by provider taxes. Subsequent limits chronic care management programs are in acute on the ability and the amount of money that could care (e.g., reduced hospitalizations, fewer be spent through disproportionate share readmissions, better drug management) and thus payments led to the development of supplemental would be realized by Medicare not Medicaid.5 payment programs. Constraints on the use of Both commissions also addressed the problem of provider taxes led to intergovernmental transfers states’ ―gaming‖ the Medicaid matching rate and certified public expenditures. In supplemental system, that is, state efforts to bring in federal payment programs, reimbursement rates could be © 2011, The Urban Institute Health Policy Center • www.healthpolicycenter.org page 2 increased up to Medicare levels but with the state not real spending but funds essentially making a share financed through, say, intergovernmental round trip from provider (or locality) to state and transfers with local funds sent to the state but back to provider (or locality) without adding to the subsequently returned to the original source. money spent for health care. Since the state These efforts have been carried out in many spending level is overstated, the total amount other ways, particularly when the ultimate spent on Medicaid is also overstated. provider was a state or local entity. These policies are legal and have been approved by the federal The incentives in the ACA will likely exacerbate government under both Democratic and the problem of Medicaid gaming. For example, Republican administrations. While legal, they under reform, the increase in a provider tax certainly undermine the spirit of the matching rate needed to leverage additional federal dollars will structure in Medicaid law and have increased be substantially lower, at least for new eligibles federal spending considerably. According to the for whom the federal matching rate will begin at Government Accountability Office (GAO), these 100 percent and phase down to 90 percent. efforts are continuing to emerge; from 2009 to A relatively small new provider tax will allow a 2010, 38 states reported introducing new provider state to generate federal matching payments of taxes, 35 reported new or increased use of 90 percent. For example, a provider could pay a intergovernmental transfers, and 35 new certified tax of $10; the state could increase provider public expenditure programs.9 payments to $100. The federal government would make matching payments of $90. The provider States have also brought many state-funded gains by $90, the federal government spends $90 services into Medicaid.10 While this is legitimate, and the state pays nothing. If the state wishes, it the states have expanded the reach of the can keep some of the gain by increasing the Medicaid benefit package to allow it to fund many provider tax.
Recommended publications
  • The Fiscal Framework 07 November 2016 16/88 Anouk Berthier
    The Scottish Parliament and Scottish Parliament Infor mation C entre l ogos. Financial Scrutiny Unit Briefing The Fiscal Framework 07 November 2016 16/88 Anouk Berthier This briefing explains the agreement between the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government on the Scottish government's fiscal framework. This includes how the block grant will be calculated, what new borrowing powers will be available to the Scottish Government and the arrangements for independent fiscal scrutiny. The briefing also discusses the block grant adjustment for 2016-17 set out in the Draft Budget 2016-17. CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................................. 3 BACKGROUND............................................................................................................................................................ 4 THE SCOTLAND ACT 2016 .................................................................................................................................... 4 A “REVISED” FISCAL AND FUNDING FRAMEWORK FOR SCOTLAND .............................................................. 5 FISCAL GOVERNANCE IN SCOTLAND BEFORE AND AFTER THE FISCAL FRAMEWORK............................... 6 START DATES FOR THE POWERS ........................................................................................................................... 9 BLOCK GRANT AND ADJUSTMENTS ...................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • A Proposed Cost-Based Block Grant
    A Proposed Cost Based Block Grant Model for Wyoming School Finance Submitted by Management Analysis & Planning Associates, L.L.C. Submitted to Joint Appropriations Committee of the Wyoming Legislature James W. Guthrie Gerald C. Hayward James R. Smith Richard Rothstein Ronald W. Bennett Julia E. Koppich Ellis Bowman Lynn DeLapp Barbara Brandes Sandra Clark April 1997 TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents i List of Figures ii Acknowledgments iii Executive Summary 1 I. Introduction 8 II. What the Court Decreed and How The Legislature Responded 14 III. The Model's Purposes 17 IV. Caveats: What This Report Does Not Cover 21 V. The Report's Analytic Procedures 22 VI. Structure of Wyoming's Current Education System 26 VII. Wyoming's Present School Finance Arrangements 31 VIII. A Strategy for Inferring "Costs" from Spending 36 IX. Model Components and Their Imputed Costs 40 X. Legislative Discretion 63 XI. Implementation Considerations 73 XII. Accounting and Information Collection Implications 75 XIII. Simulations 78 Appendix 81 LIST OF FIGURES Figure One: School District Size and Enrollment Distribution 27 Figure Two: Elementary School Size and Enrollment Distribution 28 Figure Three: Middle School Size and Enrollment Distribution 29 Figure Four: High School Size and Enrollment Distribution 30 Figure Five: Comparison of Current Wyoming Foundation Plan and Proposed Proposed Cost Based Block Grant 34 Figure Six: Proposed Grade Grouping and Enrollment Size Prototypes 41 Figure Seven: Cost Based Block Grant Model Costs Components 43 Figure Eight: Calculating Classroom Teacher Total Compensation Package 44 Figure Nine: Computation of Teacher Salary Adjustments for Units and Steps 45 Figure Ten: Teacher Salaries in States Neighboring Wyoming (1995-96) 46 Figure Eleven: Personnel Costs (Annual Salary and Fringe Benefits) Per FTE Position 47 Figure Twelve: Supply, Material and Equipment Costs 47 Figure Thirteen: School District Operations Costs 49 Acknowledgments This report is submitted to the Wyoming Legislature by Management Analysis & Planning Associates, L.L.C.
    [Show full text]
  • IMPLEMENTING the CHILD CARE and DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT REAUTHORIZATION: a GUIDE for STATES National Women’S Law Center & CLASP
    EXPANDING THEPOSSIBILITIES EXPANDING Implementing the Child Care and Development Block Grant Reauthorization: A Guide for States Hannah Matthews, Karen Schulman, Julie Vogtman, Christine Johnson-Staub, and Helen Blank THE CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (CLASP) advocates for public policies that reduce poverty, improve the lives of poor people, and create ladders to economic security for all, regardless of race, gender, or geography. CLASP targets large-scale opportunities to reform federal and state programs, funding, and service systems and then works on the ground for effective implementation. CLASP’s research, analysis, and advocacy foster new ideas, position governments, and advocate to better serve low-income people. THE NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER (NWLC) is a non-profit organization working to expand the possibilities for women and their families by removing barriers based on gender, opening opportunities, and helping women and their families lead economically secure, healthy, and fulfilled lives—with a special focus on the needs of low-income women and their families. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This guide would not have been possible without the generous support of the Alliance for Early Success and the Foundation for Child Development. We are also grateful to the Annie E. Casey Foundation, Early Childhood Funders’ Collaborative, Ford Foundation, George Gund Foundation, Heising-Simons Foundation, Irving Harris Foundation, JPB Foundation, W.K. Kellogg Foundation, Moriah Fund, David and Lucile Packard Foundation, and an anonymous donor for their support of the child care and early education work at CLASP and NWLC. Karen Schulman is Senior Policy Analyst at the National Women’s Law Center; Hannah Matthews is Director of Child Care and Early Education at CLASP; Julie Vogtman is Senior Counsel & Director of Income Support Policy at the National Women’s Law Center; Christine Johnson-Staub is Senior Policy Analyst at CLASP; and Helen Blank is Director of Child Care and Early Learning at the National Women’s Law Center.
    [Show full text]
  • Wales's Fiscal Future
    101 Wales’s Fiscal Future Eurfyl ap Gwilym In this paper I give a high-level description of how the revenue of government in Wales, and in particular the Welsh Government, is raised, the pattern of public spending, and sources of taxation. I then go on to anticipate the fiscal changes that could well take place in Wales in the coming years. Constitutional developments Fiscal developments in Wales, and by this is meant developments in taxation and public spending, cannot be divorced from the wider context of constitutional changes. Such developments are by their nature slow but, as will be seen, measured against the wider sweep of Welsh history, the last sixty years have witnessed rapid and accelerating change. In 1951, David Maxwell Fyffe was appointed as the first United Kingdom government minister with responsibility for Wales. In 1964, James Griffiths, the veteran MP for Llanelli, become the first Secretary of State for Wales with a seat in the United Kingdom cabinet. Initially, the responsibilities of the Secretary of State were very limited but over time, as so often happen in such cases, additional responsibilities were devolved. However, while the Welsh Office was responsible for spending on decentralized programmes, the Secretary of State had no powers over taxation or borrowing. The funds allocated by the United Kingdom government to pay for decentralized public services were the result of negotiations between the Treasury and the Welsh Office. Thus the arrangements were similar to that for other United Kingdom departments of state where every year departmental ministers would negotiate their budgets with the Treasury, which had responsibility for the overall macroeconomic framework.
    [Show full text]
  • First Annual Report on the Implementation And
    SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION OF PART 3 (FINANCIAL PROVISIONS) OF THE SCOTLAND ACT 2012 Second Annual Report on the Implementation and Operation of Part 3 (Financial Provisions) of the Scotland Act 2012 Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 33(1)(b) of the Scotland Act 2012 Presented to the Scottish Parliament pursuant to Section 33(1)(c) of the Scotland Act 2012 May 2014 SG/2014/53 © Crown copyright 2014 You may re-use this information (excluding logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence v.2. To view this licence visit www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/2/ or email [email protected]. Where third party material has been identified, permission from the respective copyright holder must be sought. This publication is available at www.gov.uk/government/publications and on our website at www.gov.uk/scotland-office Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at [email protected] Print ISBN 9781474102773 Web ISBN 9781474102780 Printed in the UK by the Williams Lea Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ID 2641447 05/14 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum CONTENTS Chapter Page Foreword 6 1. Introduction 8 2. Scotland Act 2012 Implementation Programme 10 3. Scottish rate of income tax 13 4. Scottish tax on land transactions 17 5. Scottish tax on disposals to landfill 19 6. Borrowing powers 21 7. Power to devolve further existing taxes and create new devolved taxes 23 8.
    [Show full text]
  • Scotland's Finances: Key Facts and Figures
    Scotland’s Finances Key facts and figures for 2019-20 Competent, financially prudent Scottish Government Our financial system in 2019-20 THIS PART OF THE GUIDE SETS OUT KEY INFORMATION ABOUT HOW THE SYSTEM STANDS IN 2019-20. THE NEXT PART SETS OUT HOW IT IS CHANGING. DEVOLVED FINANCES SCOTTISH BUDGET l The Scottish Government is accountable to the Scottish Parliament and the people in Scotland for its use of public money. IN 2019-20 IS l Scottish Ministers decide spending plans that have to be approved by Holyrood. l Since 2009-10, the Scottish Government has produced its accounts on the basis of international accounting standards. £42.6 BILLION l The Scottish Government’s latest l For financial year 2017-18 the BARNETT FORMULA published accounts are for Scottish Government, its Executive 2017-18 and they were given a Agencies and the Crown Office clean bill of health by Audit and Procurator Fiscal Service Scotland. This was the 13th made 98.2% of all payments consecutive year they received an within 10 days. unqualified opinion. The 2018-19 l For all taxes set, raised or accounts will be published in assigned in Scotland, WESTMINSTER DECIDES HOW MUCH IT WILL SPEND IN September 2019. the block grant is reduced. ENGLAND ON PUBLIC SERVICES. HOLYROOD IS AUTOMATICALLY ALLOCATED A POPULATION SHARE OF CHANGES IN SPENDING TAXES SET IN SCOTLAND IN 2019-20: ON PUBLIC SERVICES DEVOLVED TO SCOTLAND. SCOTTISH NON-DOMESTIC MONEY IN THE MONEY OUT INCOME TAX RATES BLOCK GRANT, SCOTTISH SPENDING ON PRIORITIES EU FUNDS, CONSOLIDATED INCLUDING SCHOOLS,
    [Show full text]
  • Block Grants: Perspectives and Controversies
    Block Grants: Perspectives and Controversies Updated February 21, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R40486 Block Grants: Perspectives and Controversies Summary Block grants provide state and local governments funding to assist them in addressing broad purposes, such as community development, social services, public health, or law enforcement, and generally provide them more control over the use of the funds than categorical grants. Block grant advocates argue that block grants increase government efficiency and program effectiveness by redistributing power and accountability through decentralization and partial devolution of decisionmaking authority from the federal government to state and local governments. Advocates also view them as a means to reduce the federal deficit. For example, the Trump Administration’s FY2020 budget request recommended that Medicaid be set “on a sound fiscal path ... by putting States on equal footing with the Federal Government to implement comprehensive Medicaid financing reform through a per capita cap or block grant.... [the proposal would] empower States to design State-based solutions that prioritize Medicaid dollars for the most vulnerable and support innovation.” The Trump Administration’s FY2021 budget request added that “Medicaid reform would restore balance, flexibility, integrity, and accountability to the State-Federal partnership.” Block grant critics argue that block grants can undermine the achievement of national objectives and can be used as a “backdoor” means to reduce government spending on domestic issues. For example, opponents of converting Medicaid into a block grant argue that “block granting Medicaid is simply code for deep, arbitrary cuts in support to the most vulnerable seniors, individuals with disabilities, and low-income children.” Block grant critics also argue that block grants’ decentralized nature makes it difficult to measure their performance and to hold state and local government officials accountable for their decisions.
    [Show full text]
  • Funding in Education
    Published on Eurydice (https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice) Funding for education at all levels in Wales is provided by the Welsh Government [1], which determines overall spending priorities. The Welsh Government has four main sources of funding: funds which are allocated to it by the UK Government money raised in Wales through taxation and other charges borrowing (e.g. by local authorities (LAs) [2] and other public bodies to finance their capital spending) money received from the European Union up to the end of UK’s EU membership UK Government funding for all three devolved administrations [3] (DAs) (Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) is determined as part of the regular Spending Review, and in accordance with the policies set out in the Statement of Funding Policy (2020). [4] Funds are allocated as a block grant and each devolved administration is free to determine how this grant is allocated in its own budget. Since the late 1970s, annual changes in the block grant have been determined by the ‘Barnett Formula [5]’. The UK Government provides other grants outside the block grant. These are for less predictable demand-driven spending. Changes in these grants are not determined by the Barnett Formula, but are negotiated by the UK and Welsh Governments. The block grant is paid to the UK Government’s Secretary of State for Wales, who retains the funding needed to run the Wales Office [6] and transfers the balance to the Welsh Government. This forms the Welsh Consolidated Fund and the Welsh Budget sets out how this Fund will be spent.
    [Show full text]
  • Community Services Block Grant (CSBG) Policy & Procedure Manual
    WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH COMMUNITY SERVICES PROGRAM Community Services Program Guidance Manual November 2019 Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction 4 1.1: CSBG Overview 4 1.2: WY Dept. of Health, Public Health Division, Community Services Program 4 1.3: Grantees and Sub-grantees 5 1.4: Purpose 6 1.5: Application for Funds 7 Chapter 2: Funding 7 2.1: Funding 7 2.2: Discretionary Funding 8 2.3: Limitations on the Use of Funds 8 2.4: Purchase and Distribution of Funds 8 2.5: Depletion of Funding 9 2.6: Termination and Reduction of Funding 10 2.7: Expenditure Reports 10 Chapter 3: Administration 11 3.1: Non-Discrimination Clause 11 3.2: CSBG Act 11 3.3: Documentation and Record Keeping Processes 11 3.4: Confidentiality of Client Information 12 3.5: Suspension and Debarment 12 3.6: Conflict of Interest 12 3.7: Title VI and HIPAA Compliance 12 Chapter 4: Reporting 12 4.1: Performance Management 12 4.2: Organizational Standards 13 4.3: Results Oriented Management and Accountability 14 4.4: National Performance Indicators 14 4.5: Community Needs Assessment Planning Implementation 15 4.6: Community Action Plan 15 4.7: Annual Report 16 Chapter 5: Program Eligibility 17 5.1: Application for Services and Eligibility 17 5.2: Method of Eligibility Determination 18 5.3: Financial Eligibility 18 5.4: Verification of Income 18 5.5: Verification for Zero Income Households 19 5.6: Eligibility Period 19 5.7: Changes in Circumstance 20 5.8: Case Closure 20 Chapter 6: Grievance and Appeals 20 6.1: Grievances 20 6.2: Fair Hearing Process 20 6.3: Appeals
    [Show full text]
  • Fifth Annual Report on the Implementation of the Scotland Act 2016
    FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCOTLAND ACT 2016 NINTH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION OF PART 3 (FINANCIAL PROVISIONS) OF THE SCOTLAND ACT 2012 Fifth Annual Report on the Implementation of the Scotland Act 2016 Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Scotland by Command of Her Majesty March 2021 Ninth Annual Report on the Implementation and Operation of Part 3 (Financial Provisions) of the Scotland Act 2012 Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 33(1)(b) of the Scotland Act 2012 Presented to the Scottish Parliament pursuant to section 33(1)(c) of the Scotland Act 2012 March 2021 © Crown copyright 2021 This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3. Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. This publication is available at www.gov.uk/official-documents. Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at [email protected] ISBN 978-1-5286-2463-3 CCS0321136086 03/21 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum Printed in the UK by the APS Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office CONTENTS Chapter Page Foreword 1 Part 1: Scotland Act 2016 2 1. Introduction 3 2. Implementation Progress 5 3. Income Tax 11 4. Other tax powers and fiscal provisions 14 5. Borrowing powers 16 6. Welfare powers 17 7.
    [Show full text]
  • Block Grants: a Comparative Analysis
    - - Block Grants: A Comparative Analysis ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS Washington, D.C. 20575 October 1977 For sale by the Superintendant of Documents, U.S. QovenunentPrhtlng OBBce, Washington, D.C. 20402 Preface Pursuant to its statutory responsibilities authorized in Section 2 of Public Law 86-380, passed during the first session of the 86th Congress and approved by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on September 24, 1959, the Commission singles out for study particular problems that impede the effectiveness of the federal system. The current intergovernmental grant system was identified as such a problem by the Commission in the Spring of 1974. The staff was directed to probe four features of this system: categoricals, the range of reform efforts that stop short of consolidations, block grants, and the changing state servicing and aid roles. This report is the eleventh in the 13-volume series on the grant system. It is a comparative analysis of experiences under the health, crime control, manpower, and community development. block grant. The report explores the lessons derived from those programs concerning the design and implementation of the block grant instrument and the implications for policymakers interested in grant reform. This report and the recommendations herein were approved at a meeting of the Commission on May 5,1977. Robert E. Merriam Chairman Acknowledgments This volume was prepared by the governmental structure and functions section of the Commission's staff. Carl Stenberg had major responsibility for its preparation. David Beam, J.H. Fonkert, Richard Gabler, Bruce McDowell, and Albert Richter provided valuable advice and criticism during the writing of the report.
    [Show full text]
  • Wales Fiscal Analysis Welsh Budget Outlook 2020
    Welsh Budget Outlook 2020 BRIEFING REPORT Wales Fiscal Analysis DECEMBERWales Fiscal 20 Analysis20 │ Welsh Budget Outlook 2020 1 Preface Declaration of funding Wales Fiscal Analysis is hosted by the Wales Governance Centre and the School of Law and Politics at Cardiff University, and funded through a partnership between Cardiff University, the Welsh Government, the Welsh Local Government Association and Solace Wales. The programme continues the work of Wales Public Services 2025 hosted by Cardiff Business School, up to August 2018. About us Wales Fiscal Analysis (WFA) is a research body within Cardiff University’s Wales Governance Centre that undertakes authoritative and independent research into the public finances, taxation and public expenditures of Wales. The WFA programme adds public value by commenting on the implications of fiscal events such as UK and Welsh budgets, monitoring and reporting on government expenditure and tax revenues in Wales, and publishing academic research and policy papers that investigate matters of importance to Welsh public finance, including the impact of Brexit on the Welsh budget and local services, options for tax policy, and the economics and future sustainability of health and social care services in Wales. Working with partners in Scotland, Northern Ireland, the UK and other European countries, we also contribute to the wider UK and international debate on the fiscal dimension of devolution and decentralisation of government. Contact details Guto Ifan [email protected] 029 2087 4626 Wales Fiscal
    [Show full text]