The Architecture of Brunelleschi and the Origins of Perspective Theory in the Fifteenth Century Author(S): Giulio Carlo Argan and Nesca A
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The Architecture of Brunelleschi and the Origins of Perspective Theory in the Fifteenth Century Author(s): Giulio Carlo Argan and Nesca A. Robb Source: Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, Vol. 9 (1946), pp. 96-121 Published by: The Warburg Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/750311 Accessed: 22/01/2010 23:03 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=warburg. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The Warburg Institute is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes. http://www.jstor.org THE ARCHITECTURE OF BRUNELLESCHI AND THE ORIGINS OF PERSPECTIVE THEORY IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY By Giulio Carlo Argan r | ahe invention of perspectiveand the discovery of antiquity: these two 1 eventshave for long been held to markthe beginningsof the Renaissance. Modern criticism has sharply limited the importance of both events, and above all of the second: so profounda transformationof the artisticconscience could not clearly have been caused by external circumstances. It is not so much needful to decide how far the artists of the early Quattrocentohad penetratedinto the objectiveunderstanding of space (if indeed one can speak of such an objectiveunderstanding) or into the knowledgeof the documents relating to antique art, as it is to discover the internal necessitythat urged them to seek that knowledge. In fact the same inwardimpulse is common to both activities: the search for a more exact knowledgeof space and that for a more exact knowledge of antique art are inseparable,until such time at least as the study of antique art assumes,as it does in the full maturity of humanisticculture, an independentexistence as the science of antiquity. It is well known that the new ideal of beauty was defined, classically,as a harmonyof parts,in other wordsby meansof the idea of proportion,which, according to Vitruvius, is the same thing as the Greek 9axovLoc;and it was with this same word that Euclid describedgeometrical congruity, which is the fundamentalprinciple of perspective. If perspectiveis the process by which we arrive at proportion,that is to say, at beauty or the perfectionof art, it is also the process by which we reach the antique which is art par excellence or perfect beauty. The classicaltradition had been neither lost nor extinguishedthroughout the whole of the Middle Ages; on the contrary, it had been diffused and popularized. To set oneself the task of rediscoveringthe ancients, meant setting oneselfto determinethe concretehistorical value of the achievements of ancientart, as distinguishedfrom its mediaevalcorruptions and populariza- tions. The activity by which we recognizevalue is judgment, and judgment is an act of the total consciousness. Enthusiasmfor, or faith in antiquity, impulseswhich had had, during the Middle Ages their moments of genuine exaltation,are henceforthinsufficient: the formulationof judgment, since it implies a definitionof the value of consciousness,implies also a definitionof the value of reality, because such a judgment is a judgment of being and not-being, of reality and non-reality. What was sought for in ancient art was thereforenot a transcendental value, but, in oppositionto mediaevaltranscendentalism, an immanentvalue, a conceptionof the world. The touchstoneby which we recognizevalues is reality: not a limitless and continuousreality which can be graspedonly in the particular,and in which man himselfis absorbed,but nature as a reality conceived by man and distinct from him as the object from the subject. 96 THE ARCHITECTURE OF BRUNFT.T.FjSCHI 97 Nature is the form of reality, in so far as it reveals and makes it tangible in its full complexity: the laws of form are also the laws of nature, and the mental processby which we arrive at the conception of nature is the same as that which leads to the conception of form, that is to say of art.l The Renaissance begins, so far as the figurative arts are concerned, when to artisticactivity is added the idea of art as a consciousnessof its own act: it is then that the mediaeval ars mechanicabecomes ars liberalis. "Ancient art- writes D. Frey2-appears to the Btesternmind as nature, with a heightened significancewhereby the natural becomes the expressionof a profoundtruth and of perfection. Thus in the Westevery tendencyto naturalisticor rational- istic developmentis always referableto a classicalsource." The formulationof a common law for nature and for artistic form lies in perspective:which may in general terms,be definedas the method or mental procedurefor the determinationof value. In the writersof the Quattrocento exceptingnaturally in Cennini and Ghiberti we see clearly the belief that perspectiveis not simply a rule of optics which may alsobe applied to artistic expression,but a procedurepeculiar to art, which in art has its single and logical end. Perspectiveis art itself in its totality: no relation is possiblebe- tween the artist and the world except through the medium of perspective, just as no relation is possiblebetween the human spirit and reality short of falling back upon the mediaevalantithesis of conceptualismand nominalism unless we assume the conceptionof nature. Hence proceedsthat identity of perspective-paintingand science, clearly aErmed by the theoristsof the Quattrocento. The starting point of the controversybetween modernistsand tradition- alistsat the beginningofthe Quattrocentoseems to me to be notablyindicated in a passage, probably not devoid of polemical intentions, in the Pitturaof Alberti: "no man denies that of such things as we cannot see there is none that appertainethunto the painter: the painter studieth to depict only that which is seen." On the other hand, accordingto Cennini, a typical representativeof the traditionalistschool, the painter'stask is "to discoverthings unseen, that are hid beneath the shadow of things natural." The exact interpretationof the passage, which has been variously explained,3 is to be found in Chapter lxxxvii of the same "Libro dell'Arte," where it is suggested to the painter that: "if thou wouldst learn to paint mountainsin a worthy manner, so that they be like nature, take great stones which be rough and not cleansed and draw them as they are, adding light and shade as it shall seem fit to thee." Since the result to be aimed at is a symbol of the mountain, the object (the stone) has no value in itself, apart from its external configuration, 1 For the nature-formrelation in Renais- 3 E. Panofskyin Idea(Teubner ed., Berlin, sance thought see E. Cassirer, Individuoe I924), p. 23 and note 94 has given a Neo- Cosmo,tr. Federici,Florence, La Nuova Italia Platonic interpretation of this passage of ed., p. 25I. Cennini; it is, however, a question of 2 D. Frey, L'Architetturadella Rinascenza,mediaeval Neo-Platonism in the Plotinian Rome, I924, p. 7. tradition. 98 GIULIO CARLO ARGAN analogousto that of the mountain. The analogy is purely external,morpho- logical; but the difference,which consistsin the situation of the mountain in space, is of no interest to the painter because the formal motive of his picture is not spatial, and indeed takes no account of space. He will link that image with othersin obedienceto a rhythmicor narrativecoherence but principallyin obedience to a "manner"acquired through long discipleship with his masters,that is, with tradition. From the perceptionof the material datum (the stone) the artisticprocess is still a long one: and since its end is in infinity or in abstraction,of what significancecan the distance between the neighbouringstone and the far-offmountain be when comparedwitll that? When, on the other hand, Alberti affirmsthat the visible is the domain of the painter, he does not refer to the mechanicalperception of the eye and the limited notions that derive from it, but to a full, total, sensory experience. The eye may be consideredas a mechanicaland impersonalinstrument, a recordingmechanism: instead the senses are already consideredas a grade of intelligence. Alberti, though he denies that the mental domain of the painter can extend beyond the limits of the domain of the senses,yet affirms that the artisticprocess does not begin, as it does for Cennini,with the data of visible things,only to end in an abstraction,but takesplace wholly within the sphereof sensoryexperience as a processof understandingand investigation: that very experiencewill not be complete and fully defined until after such reflection. Cenninirestricted the painter'scontact with reality as far as he could, so as to leave the widest possible margin for tradition. Alberti, by making the limits of reality coincide exactly with those of the sensorypowers, refuses any value to tradition considered as a complex of ideas learned without referenceto direct experience. It is true that Cenninialso demandsa contact with reality (the stone which is copied as a symbolof the mountain): but that is only because tradition is transmittedthrough moments of reality, which are the lives of men.