DOCSLIB.ORG

Plutarch and the Philosophical Dialogue by Anne I. Mcdonald B.A

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Plutarch and the Philosophical Dialogue by Anne I. Mcdonald B.A Plutarch and the Philosophical Dialogue By Anne I. McDonald B.A., University of Kansas, 2007 M.A., University of Bristol, 2008 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Classics at Brown University PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND MAY 2015 © Copyright 2015 by Anne I. McDonald This dissertation by Anne I. McDonald is accepted in its present form by the Department of Classics as satisfying the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Date __________________ ______________________________________ Stratis Papaioannou, Chair Recommended to the Graduate Council Date ___________________ ______________________________________ Mary Louise Gill, Reader Date ___________________ ______________________________________ David Konstan, Reader Date ___________________ ______________________________________ Frederick Brenk, Reader Approved by the Graduate Council Date ___________________ ______________________________________ Peter M. Weber, Dean of the Graduate School iii CURRICULUM VITAE Anne McDonald was born in Manhattan, Kansas in 1984 and spent her childhood in Lawrence, Kansas. As a National Merit Scholar at the University of Kansas, she wrote an honors thesis on St. Augustine’s reception of Virgil and won awards for nonfiction writing and translation from Latin and Greek. She earned B.A. degrees in Classical Languages and English with highest distinction in 2007. Anne continued her studies at the University of Bristol in Bristol, England, where she earned her M.A. in Classics and Ancient History with distinction in 2008, writing a dissertation entitled, “Augustine against the Clock: Time, Language, and the Economics of Salvation.” She began the Ph.D. program in Classics at Brown University in 2008. While at Brown, she won the Captain William McGinn scholarship for participation in the Classical Summer School of the American Academy in Rome, taught and assisted in numerous language and literature courses, and delivered papers on Augustine, Plato and Plutarch. After completing her Ph.D., Anne will teach as a Visiting Lecturer at Brown in the spring of 2015. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation would not have been begun or finished without the guidance and assistance of many teachers, advisors, and mentors. I owe first thanks to Anne Shaw and Stanley Lombardo, who provided a firm foundation and inspiration for future study of the classics. At Brown, I was fortunate to benefit from the guidance of David Konstan from my first years in the graduate program. Many enjoyable and challenging classes and conversations on Plato with Mary Louise Gill were formative for my research and remain one of the best parts of my experience at Brown. Stratis Papaioannou has been a wonderfully supportive advisor throughout the dissertation process, and I am deeply grateful for his guidance and encouragement. The careful reading and criticism of Frederick Brenk, who graciously served as an outside reader, have greatly improved the final form of this dissertation. It has been a privilege to work within the Classics Department at Brown, an extraordinarily collegial scholarly community. I am indebted to its faculty and to my fellow graduate students for careful consideration of many works in progress and countless lively conversations over the years. Susan Furtado deserves thanks for her cheerful and expert assistance with many details attending the completion of this project. The constant support of friends and family members has sustained me through many years of study and the final stages of the dissertation process. I am grateful first of all to my father, Bruce McEnroe, my first and most faithful reader, and to my mother, Michelle Tamburini. Emily and Scot Lange, the McDonald Family, Gail McEnroe, Anne and Kyle Rabe, and Rebecca and Keith Fairbank have provided assistance in many forms, very often unasked. I am humbled and inspired by their generosity. v I dedicate this dissertation to my husband, Joe McDonald, whose unfailing love, patience and good sense made its completion possible, and to Johnny, who has made the past year of work the best of my life. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1 Chapter One Philosophical Discourse in Plutarch 22 Chapter Two Seeing and Believing: Dramatic Detail in 68 Amatorius, De genio Socratis, and De defectu oraculorum Chapter Three Wondering from the Path: Sightseeing in 121 De sera numinis vindicta, De genio Socratis, and De Pythiae oraculis Chapter Four Plutarch’s Personae and the Construction 164 of Identity Conclusion 208 Bibliography 211 vii INTRODUCTION Plutarch is well known as a biographer and essayist, but he is rarely remembered as a dialogist. Despite the fact that more of his dialogues remain to us than of any other classical author after Plato, his position in the history of the form has largely been ignored or incompletely considered, even amid a recent efflorescence of interest in the ancient dialogue.1 The relative paucity of scholarship on Plutarch as a dialogist is likely in part an unfortunate consequence of the inclusion of his dialogues within the catchall category of the Moralia, which includes a great deal more variety than the title suggests. The variety within the subset of Plutarch’s dialogues has likely further discouraged consideration of Plutarch as a practitioner of the form. Sixteen texts within the Moralia nominally qualify as dialogues in the minimal sense that they represent a discourse among multiple interlocutors.2 A number of these texts, however, are no more dialogical than this basic criterion requires. In several, a brief initial exchange between interlocutors gives way to a monologue by a single character who goes on to dominate the remainder of the text. These texts, not genuinely dialogical in form, often display a 1 Goldhill (2008) and Cameron (2014) are representative. Hösle (2012) is both an incitement and guide to the study of the entire tradition of the philosophical dialogue. Lamberton (2001), 146 has observed the neglect of Plutarch’s dialogues in modern times. 2 These are (in the order in which they appear in the Lamprias catalogue): De tuenda sanitate praecepta, Septem sapientium convivium, De E apud Delphos, De Pythiae oraculis, De defectu oraculorum, De cohibenda ira, De sera numinis vindicta, De genio Socratis, Quaestiones convivales, Amatorius, De sollertia animalium, De facie in orbe lunae, Gryllus, De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, and Adversus Colotem. 1 polemical spirit, aiming to refute the views of a particular philosophical school rather than cultivate a discursive exchange of ideas that works towards the discovery of truth. 3 Apart from these works, the nine books of Plutarch’s Quaestiones convivales constitute a sizeable subgenre of his dialogues. Though highly discursive in spirit, representing lively discussions in which contributions by all participants are politely welcomed, these dialogues are not well described as philosophical; the “atmosphere of social decorum and kind politeness”4 that dominates these texts does not lend itself to serious, focused philosophical investigation.5 In addition to all-but monological and sympotic works, the corpus of Plutarch’s dialogues also includes a number of texts that are both genuinely dialogical in form and spirit and represent serious investigation of a philosophical problem. Given the variety of Plutarch’s dialogues, it is perhaps unsurprising that the most ambitious studies of Plutarch’s dialogues, those of Hirzel and Kahle, have undertaken to impose some order on the entire group, describing and comparing them with particular attention to their themes, influences, and formal characteristics.6 Recently, the nine books of the sympotic Quaestiones convivales, a subset of the dialogues explicitly described by Plutarch as a unified group, has gained a good deal of overdue attention, particularly with respect to their social, cultural and historical dimensions.7 The 3 E.g. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum and Adversus Colotem. 4 Van der Stockt (2000), 94. 5 Hösle (2012), 42-45 distinguishes between “serious discussion dialogues” and “chat dialogues”; he places the majority of ancient symposion and deipnon literature in the latter category. 6 Hirzel (1985, repr. 1963), Kahle (1912). 7 See especially Klotz and Oikonomopoulou (2011) and König (2012), Saints and Symposiasts: The Literature of Food and the Symposium in Greco-Roman and Early Christian Culture. 2 philosophical dialogues, however, have been neglected or, at times, deemed unworthy of consideration as such.8 Indeed, scholars have drawn vastly different conclusions regarding the philosophical and literary importance of these dialogues within the tradition of the form. Is Plutarch “the most important writer of philosophical dialogues in later Antiquity”9, or do the conversations reported in these texts amount to no more than chat?10 This dissertation proposes, to begin with, that Plutarch does indeed have an important place within the history of the dialogue, and in particular of the philosophical dialogue. Drawing on the work of recent scholars attempting to improve upon previous taxonomies of Plutarch’s dialogues, I identify seven of Plutarch’s dialogues that are both genuinely dialogical and committed to serious philosophical inquiry: De defectu oraculorum, De E apud Delphos, De Pythiae Oraculis, De sera numinis vindicta, Amatorius, De genio Socratis, and De facie in orbe lunae. I undertake to examine these texts
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Online Library of Liberty: the Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 1
    The Online Library of Liberty A Project Of Liberty Fund, Inc. Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, vol. 1 [387 AD] The Online Library Of Liberty This E-Book (PDF format) is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a private, non-profit, educational foundation established in 1960 to encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals. 2010 was the 50th anniversary year of the founding of Liberty Fund. It is part of the Online Library of Liberty web site http://oll.libertyfund.org, which was established in 2004 in order to further the educational goals of Liberty Fund, Inc. To find out more about the author or title, to use the site's powerful search engine, to see other titles in other formats (HTML, facsimile PDF), or to make use of the hundreds of essays, educational aids, and study guides, please visit the OLL web site. This title is also part of the Portable Library of Liberty DVD which contains over 1,000 books and quotes about liberty and power, and is available free of charge upon request. The cuneiform inscription that appears in the logo and serves as a design element in all Liberty Fund books and web sites is the earliest-known written appearance of the word “freedom” (amagi), or “liberty.” It is taken from a clay document written about 2300 B.C. in the Sumerian city-state of Lagash, in present day Iraq. To find out more about Liberty Fund, Inc., or the Online Library of Liberty Project, please contact the Director at [email protected].
    [Show full text]
  • Anselm's Cur Deus Homo
    Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo: A Meditation from the Point of View of the Sinner Gene Fendt Elements in Anselm's Cur Deus Homo point quite differently from the usual view of it as the locus classicus for a theory of Incarnation and Atonement which exhibits Christ as providing the substitutive revenging satisfaction for the infinite dishonor God suffers at the sin of Adam. This meditation will attempt to bring out how the rhetorical ergon of the work upon faith and conscience drives the sinner to see the necessity of the marriage of human with divine natures offered in Christ and how that marriage raises both man and creation out of sin and its defects. This explanation should exhibit both to believers, who seek to understand, and to unbelievers (primarily Jews and Muslims), from a common root, a solution "intelligible to all, and appealing because of its utility and the beauty of its reasoning" (1.1). Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo is the locus classicus for a theory of Incarnation and Atonement which exhibits Christ as providing the substitutive revenging satisfaction for the infinite dishonor God suffers at the sin of Adam (and company).1 There are elements in it, however, which seem to point quite differently from such a view. This meditation will attempt to bring further into the open how the rhetorical ergon of the work upon “faith and conscience”2 shows something new in this Paschal event, which cannot be well accommodated to the view which makes Christ a scapegoat killed for our sin.3 This ergon upon the conscience I take—in what I trust is a most suitably monastic fashion—to be more important than the theoretical theological shell which Anselm’s discussion with Boso more famously leaves behind.
    [Show full text]
  • Agorapicbk-17.Pdf
    Excavations of the Athenian Agora Picture Book No. 17 Prepared by Mabel L. Lang Dedicated to Eugene Vanderpool o American School of Classical Studies at Athens ISBN 87661-617-1 Produced by the Meriden Gravure Company Meriden, Connecticut COVER: Bone figure of Socrates TITLE PAGE: Hemlock SOCRATES IN THE AGORA AMERICAN SCHOOL OF CLASSICAL STUDIES AT ATHENS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 1978 ‘Everything combines to make our knowledge of Socrates himself a subject of Socratic irony. The only thing we know definitely about him is that we know nothing.’ -L. Brunschvicg As FAR AS we know Socrates himselfwrote nothing, yet not only were his life and words given dramatic attention in his own time in the Clouds of Ar- istophanes, but they have also become the subject of many others’ writing in the centuries since his death. Fourth-century B.C. writers who had first-hand knowledge of him composed either dialogues in which he was the dominant figure (Plato and Aeschines) or memories of his teaching and activities (Xe- nophon). Later authors down even to the present day have written numerous biographies based on these early sources and considering this most protean of philosophers from every possible point of view except perhaps the topograph- ical one which is attempted here. Instead of putting Socrates in the context of 5th-century B.C. philosophy, politics, ethics or rhetoric, we shall look to find him in the material world and physical surroundings of his favorite stamping- grounds, the Athenian Agora. Just as ‘agora’ in its original sense meant ‘gathering place’ but came in time to mean ‘market place’, so the agora itself was originally a gathering place I.
    [Show full text]
  • EPISTEMIC CIRCULARITY: MALIGNANT and BENIGN Michael Bergmann
    EPISTEMIC CIRCULARITY: MALIGNANT AND BENIGN Michael Bergmann Consider the following dialogue: Juror #1: You know that witness named Hank? I have doubts about his trustworthiness. Juror #2: Well perhaps this will help you. Yesterday I overheard Hank claiming to be a trustworthy witness. Juror #1: So Hank claimed to be trustworthy did he? Well, that settles it then. I’m now convinced that Hank is trustworthy. Is the belief of Juror #1 that Hank is a trustworthy witness justified? Most of us would be inclined to say it isn’t. Juror #1 begins by having some doubts about Hank’s trustworthiness, and then he comes to believe that Hank is trustworthy. The problem is that he arrives at this belief on the basis of Hank’s own testimony. That isn’t reasonable. You can’t sensibly come to trust a doubted witness on the basis of that very witness’s testimony on his own behalf.1 Now consider the following soliloquy: Doubter: I have some doubts about the trustworthiness of my senses. After all, for all I know, they are deceiving me. Let’s see ... Hey, wait a minute. They are trustworthy! I recall many occasions in the past when I was inclined to hold certain perceptual beliefs. On each of those occasions, the beliefs I formed were true. I know that because the people I was with confirmed to me that they were true. By inductive reasoning, I can safely conclude from those past cases that my senses are trustworthy. There we go. It feels good to have those doubts about my senses behind me.
    [Show full text]
  • Semi-Colonized: Malebranche, Freire and My Summer in Nanjing Shannon Dea, Dept
    Shannon Dea Dept. of Philosophy Semi-Colonized: Malebranche, Freire and My Summer in Nanjing Shannon Dea, Dept. of Philosophy University of Waterloo [email protected] The opportunity Two dialogues Nicolas Malebranche, 1708 Paulo Freire, 1968 Malebranche’s dialogue • Chinese philosopher versus Christian philosopher • “insular eurocentrism” (Mungello, 1980) • Origins in mission work: an asymmetrical pedagogy Freire • “Banking model” of colonizer and colonized • Student-centred education • Conscientization • Dialogics What we did (two dialogues) • Critiqued Malebranche • Small groups in Chinese • “Li” translation • Oral dialogues A worry • What if dialogic pedagogy is more insidious than Malebranche’s? • What is the cost of effective teaching? Resistance is futile! When we make ourselves “accessible” to the students, we make it harder for them to resist us. Generalizing the worry… • Not just Chinese students • Not just Philosophy classes Why shouldn’t we colonize our students? • Because colonization creates intellectual monocultures • Because they are persons not objects. • Because, historically, colonialism has been the source of injustices. • Because we ought not to treat the future as a resource to be exploited. • Because this system of power is not worth reproducing just as it is. A question: How much should our students resist us? (And should we be the ones to decide?) Resistance vs. openness Semi-colonized? Even if our role as colonizers is inescapable, perhaps awareness of that fact, and resistance to it helps us to avoid the worst consequences of colonialism. Thank you! This talk would have been impossible without the intellectual generosity of Nicholas Ray and Rockney Jacobsen, who are jointly responsible for all of the good ideas and none of the bad ones.
    [Show full text]
  • Excerpts from David Hume=S Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
    (4) Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. a. Text. Pubic domain. Excerpted, edited and annotated by A. C. Kibel Excerpts from David Hume=s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion ANatural Religion@ was a phrase appropriated to the notion of religious knowledge that did not depend upon a Revelation by GodCthe sort of religious doctrine that human beings could reason out for themselves without divine assistance. One assumption of Christianity had been that humanity was either too weak or too corrupt in mind (or both) to think clearly about religious fundamentals and that God in his mercy had revealed these fundamentals in the form of holy scriptures, whose interpretation conveyed doctrine about the nature of deity. Since the sixteenth century, however, the idea grew steadily that mankind could infer certain features of God=s existence by use of unaided reason in the study of the natural universe and its laws; this idea (associated with the view that God was immanent in the created world) was designated Atheism@ in the eighteenth-century. Closely allied with theism was the view of deism, which held that reason could establish the existence of God, quite apart from knowledge of his characteristics; this idea sometimes carried with it the notion that the fact of his existence was all we could know about him without divine revelation. Hume=s dialogue was composed in the decade before 1651 but was not published until after his death, in 1779, and the belief of most scholars is that he thought the doctrines it espoused were too radical to be exposed to the general public during his lifetime.
    [Show full text]
  • Supplementary Anselm-Bibliography 11
    SUPPLEMENTARY ANSELM-BIBLIOGRAPHY This bibliography is supplementary to the bibliographies contained in the following previous works of mine: J. Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972. _________. Anselm of Canterbury: Volume Four: Hermeneutical and Textual Problems in the Complete Treatises of St. Anselm. New York: Mellen Press, 1976. _________. A New, Interpretive Translation of St. Anselm’s Monologion and Proslogion. Minneapolis: Banning Press, 1986. Abulafia, Anna S. “St Anselm and Those Outside the Church,” pp. 11-37 in David Loades and Katherine Walsh, editors, Faith and Identity: Christian Political Experience. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. Adams, Marilyn M. “Saint Anselm’s Theory of Truth,” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, I, 2 (1990), 353-372. _________. “Fides Quaerens Intellectum: St. Anselm’s Method in Philosophical Theology,” Faith and Philosophy, 9 (October, 1992), 409-435. _________. “Praying the Proslogion: Anselm’s Theological Method,” pp. 13-39 in Thomas D. Senor, editor, The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995. _________. “Satisfying Mercy: St. Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo Reconsidered,” The Modern Schoolman, 72 (January/March, 1995), 91-108. _________. “Elegant Necessity, Prayerful Disputation: Method in Cur Deus Homo,” pp. 367-396 in Paul Gilbert et al., editors, Cur Deus Homo. Rome: Prontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo, 1999. _________. “Romancing the Good: God and the Self according to St. Anselm of Canterbury,” pp. 91-109 in Gareth B. Matthews, editor, The Augustinian Tradition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999. _________. “Re-reading De Grammatico or Anselm’s Introduction to Aristotle’s Categories,” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, XI (2000), 83-112.
    [Show full text]
  • Notes on Dialogue, St. John's College
    Notes on Dialogue by Stringfellow Barr Perhaps the first obstacle to writing even these random notes on dialogue is that the very word, dialogue, has been temporarily turned into a cliché. Everybody is loudly demanding dialogue, and there is not much evidence that most of us are prepared to carry one on. Indeed, to borrow a traditional phrase from professional diplomats, conversations have deteriorated. But both radio and television, whether public or commercial, remind us daily that a lonely crowd hungers for dialogue, not only for the dialogue of theatre but also for the dialogue of the discussion program. * * * There is a pathos in television dialogue: the rapid exchange of monologues that fail to find the issue, like ships passing in the night; the reiterated preface, "I think that . .," as if it mattered who held which opinion rather than which opinion is worth holding; the impressive personal vanity that prevents each "discussant" from really listening to another speaker and that compels him to use this God-given pause to compose his own next monologue; the further vanity, or instinctive caution, that leads him to choose very long words, whose true meaning he has never grasped, rather than short words that he understands but that would leave the emptiness of his point of view naked and exposed to a mass public. There is pathos in the meaningless gestures: the extended chopping hands, fingers rigidly held parallel and together, the rigid wayward thumb pointing to heaven. A knowledgeable theatrical director would cringe at these gestures and would perhaps faint when the extended palms, one held in front of the other, are made to revolve rapidly around each other, thereby imitating and emphasizing the convolutions of a mind that races like a motor not in gear.
    [Show full text]
  • University of Reading Thesis Cover
    Plutarch’s Pythian Dialogues: a Literary Approach PhD Classics Caitlin Prouatt December 2017 Declaration I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged. Caitlin Prouatt Abstract This thesis takes a literary-theoretical approach to Plutarch’s three so-called Pythian dialogues, De E apud Delphos, De Pythiae Oraculis, and De Defectu Oraculorum. It explores the texts from the perspective of their literary qualities: their genre, their unity as a group, and the narrators and narratees they construct. It argues that the three works occupy an important position in the largely Platonic genre of philosophical dialogue, both advertising their Platonic elements to benefit from such associations, and innovating within the genre’s bounds. In his innovations, the author moves beyond what is typically expected of a dialogue, emphasising the works’ unusual Delphic setting, and using this as a starting-point for philosophical discussion. The thesis contends that the three works form a coherent series, not just because of their shared setting and subject matter, but because they all function as protreptics to philosophy, providing readers with a clear guide to practising philosophy by turning to their own surroundings. Finally, this thesis examines, through a study of the works’ dedicatees, the kind of readers Plutarch anticipated. It suggests that the ideal reader of these works, a city-dwelling, career-minded man is deliberately contrasted in the texts with their more philosophical narrators (including Plutarch himself), portrayed as natives of Delphi, affected by both its fortunes and the intellectual preoccupations of its god, Apollo.
    [Show full text]
  • Dialogue on Babbitt and Epistemology
    Dialogue on Babbitt and Epistemology Babbitt, Literary Positivism, And Neo-Positivism A. Owen Aldridge University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign In a recent issue of this journal Professor Claes G. Ryn has raised the question of the legitimacy of classifying Irving Babbitt as an adherent to the method of literary criticism known as positivism.1 His remarks were stimulated by my own advocacy of restoring to common use a critical methodology, positivism, widely designated under that name, which Babbitt looked upon with favor. Labelling my renewed version neo-positivism, I described it as “a method of objective description allowing for esthetic and moral evaluations and welcoming multicul- turalism as represented by Babbitt at the beginning of the century and Etiemble at its end.” 2 Seeking a compromise between ap- proaches based on analysis of technique and those on culture, I pro- posed that “such a neo-positivism could embrace both stylistically- oriented studies and those tending toward history.” I also described Babbitt as “a self-proclaimed positivist.” Professor Ryn objected to my proposal on two principal grounds: 1) that positivism is a system appropriate to the natural sciences, but not to the humanities; 2) that Babbitt used the terms “positivist” and “positivism” loosely and that he did not in his own practice follow positivistic methodology. Before venturing an opinion on whether Professor Ryn’s objections are well founded, I shall give a brief sketch of the meaning of positiv- ism in history and a somewhat more extensive sketch of Babbitt’s treat- 1 “How We Know What We Know: Babbitt, Positivism and Beyond,” 8:1 (1995), 6- 25.
    [Show full text]
  • Illinois Classical Studies
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Illinois Digital Environment for... 11 Piety, Dogs and a Platonic Reminiscence: Philo, Quod Deterius 54-56 and Flsdo, Euthyphro 12e-15a JOHN GLUCKER ectv n.ev ovv fiq einov EKotTepov "kaxw tv^Tiq aioSrioli; te xal vovc,, dvdyKTi xov Kexpimevov d|i,(poTEpoi(; ejie euepYExeioGai- edv 5e Jioppco Tov Xoyov djio VOX) Kai aioSrioecoq dnayayajv nxxzipa ^ev xov yevvTioavTa <t6v> k6o|j.ov, [ir\iipa 5e xriv oocpiav, 5v' fiq amicXtaQx] xb Tidv, Ti|ifi(; d^icocrriq, auxoc; t\> miar] 5eixai ydp o-uSevoq" ouxe 6 7iX,TipT|<; GeoQ oiSxe ti axpa Kai navxeXtiq enicxrmri, oSoxe xov Gepajie'oxvKov'' xovjxcov )if| xoix; Gepanc'uoiievo'uq dvev5e£i<; ovxai; dX^' ea-uxov ^dXioxa axpeXeiv.'^ injciicn ^ev ydp koI 0K-uXaKe\)xiKTi, enioxtmri Gepaneiaq fi fiev iTtTtcov Ti 5e oK\)X.dKcov o^oa,** nopi^ei xoic; ^cooiq xd axpeXv^a,* cbv EKeiva SEixav*^ |ifi nopi^o-ooa 5£ djieX^iv dv 5oKo{r|. xfiv 5e etjoePeiuv 0Eot) 0Epan£iav vnapxovaav^ ov Bejik; nopioxiKTiv EinEiv xcov cb(p£A.Tio6vx(ov x6 Geiov" (i)(p£>.£ixai ydp vn o\)5£v6(;,' dxE ^tjxe evSee^ ovJ iiTjXE xivoq x6 £v dnaoiv a\)xot» KpEixxov nz(px>K6xoc, ovfjoai, xo-ovavxiov bk xd oiijinavxa ovvExcbq Kai anavoxatc, cocpeX.ev.'' oSoxe oxav xfiv E\)a£Peiav Xeyco^iev eIvqi Geov 0Epa7t£iav,8 {)7tTip£ciav xivd' xoiaiJXTiv (pa|i£v, onoiav 5o\)Xx)i 5£a7i6xai(; x6 keXe-oojievov doKvcoq noiEiv EyvcoKOXEi; unripExovai.'" SioiOEi 5e TcdXiv, oxi ol |j.ev btanoxai -OTtTipEoiac; evSeeic;, 6 be Qcbq ov xp£^o<;'" woxe ekeIvok; ^ev xd oxpE^Tiaovxa a\)xo\)(; {)nrip£xo\)ai., xqj 5' ovSev e^co (piA.o5Eon6xo\) yva))a.Tiq napE^o-oai- PeXxicoooi |I£v ydp ovSev Evprjaouai," xcov 6£(jnoxiKcc)v ndvxcov e^ dpxfjq ovxcov dplaxcov, jiEydXa 5' aiixo'ix; 6vr|oo-oav yvcopioOfivai Geco 7rpO)j.Ti0ov))j.£voi.
    [Show full text]
  • Genuine Dialogue and a Rhetoric of Virtue Daniel Anthony Grano Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, [email protected]
    Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 2003 The means of ignorance: genuine dialogue and a rhetoric of virtue Daniel Anthony Grano Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations Part of the Speech and Rhetorical Studies Commons Recommended Citation Grano, Daniel Anthony, "The means of ignorance: genuine dialogue and a rhetoric of virtue" (2003). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 3079. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/3079 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please [email protected]. THE MEANS OF IGNORANCE: GENUINE DIALOGUE AND A RHETORIC OF VIRTUE A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of Communication Studies by Daniel A. Grano B.A., University of Memphis, 1995 M.M.C., Louisiana State University, 1997 August 2003 DEDICATION This is for Dee, who sustained me with love, support, patience, and turkey sandwiches. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A special thanks goes to my mother and father, Lucille and Anthony Grano, for teaching me the values reflected in this study, and what it means to work hard on things that matter. I am also grateful for a blessed relationship with my brother, Ken. My deepest gratitude goes to Dr.
    [Show full text]