Non-Causal
Agent-Causal
Daring Soft Libertarianism Soft Daring
Soft Libertarianism Soft
Soft Causality Soft
SFA
Cogito
Libertarianism
Event-Causal
Indeterminism
Modest Libertarianism Modest
Broad Incompatibilism Broad
Incompatibilism
(Alternative Sequences) (Alternative
Leeway Incompatibilism Leeway Soft Compatibilism Soft
This chapter on the web chapter This
Soft Determinism Soft
Compatibilism
Semicompatibilism
Soft Incompatibilism Soft
Narrow Incompatibilism Narrow
Determinism
(Actual Sequence) (Actual
Source Incompatibilism Source
of Free Will Free of
Two-Stage Model with Limited Determinism and Limited Indeterminism Limited and Determinism Limited with Model Two-Stage Two-Stage Models Models Two-Stage Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free
informationphilosopher.com/freedom/two-stage_models.html
Valerian Model Valerian Hard Determinism Hard
160 Impossibilism
Chapter 1211 Illusionism Hard Incompatibilism Hard Hard Incompatibilism Impossibilism Illusionism
Hard Determinism Valerian Model
Two-Stage Model with Limited Determinism and Limited Indeterminism
Source Incompatibilism (Actual Sequence)
Determinism
Narrow Incompatibilism
Soft Incompatibilism Semicompatibilism Compatibilism Soft Determinism
Soft Compatibilism
Leeway Incompatibilism (Alternative Sequences)
Incompatibilism
Broad Incompatibilism
Modest Libertarianism Two-Stage ofFree Models Will Sedley Robert Kane philosophers(1968, 1982),the physicist(1965, 1977),the and philosopher ematician philosopher(1931, 1955),the Poincaré problem of among will, free them thinkers developed who two-stageseveral solutions to classical the 1 consider his choice for home walking aftertalk. his it is his choice that “grants consent” to one of them. chance is not direct cause the of actions. James makes it clear that notdoes inany way limit his choice to one of For them. James, possibilities makes William James(1884) since 1970’s, the next inthe chapter. discussed andbe will cist and biologist (2004), Alfred Mele Indeterminism In our problem of history will free the (Chapter 7),we found In 1884 James asked some Harvard Divinity students School to As James biographer Richardson Robert puts it, The chance generation of such The genius theof first two-stagemodel that is will of free James My own word for freedom.” world that is random. It means realizing that chance is another “Accepting possibility the of chance not does mean accepting a indeterminism (1987), James (2010)p. 21. John Searle
Event-Causal Jacques Hadamard (about physicist 1906),the Cogito ” and “ambiguous futures.” (1985), the classicists (1985),the (1995),
Libertarianism Roger Penrose Roger Martin Heisenberg two-stage indevelopment has model been (2007),and most recently, neurogeneti the 1 the source the for what “ he calls
Cogito Benjamin Libet
SFA Mortimer Adler , the philosopher, the alternative possibilities for action Daniel Dennett (1989), William James
Soft Causality Anthony Long Arthur Holly Compton (2009). and and Two-Stage Models Soft Libertarianism Julia Annas
Daring Soft Libertarianism Henry Margenau Stephen Kosslyn
(1961), the math (1961),the Agent-Causal (1884), Karl Popper (1978)and
and and Non-Causal alternative (1990), Henri David - -
161
Chapter 1211 - - - - - 2 , a condition which is regarded regarded which is , a condition
3 alternative possibilities followed by an an by followed possibilities alternative same circumstances same ., p. 155. ., p. James (1056) “The Dilemma of Determinism,” p. 149. (1056) “Theof Determinism,” Dilemma James ibid ity somewhere involved in it. But looking outwardly at these at outwardly looking But in it. involved somewhere ity accidental and the which impossible is say you can universes, if the necessary I doubt and one? which the rational and one, the slightest have could you among determinist ironclad most this point.” on light glimmer of spectators, look on and see the two alternative universes,--one universes,--one see alternative and the two look on spectators, the it, in Avenue Divinity walking me them through with of Now, Street. Oxford walking me through the same with other to these universes of believe one you determinists are if you been have to believe it you impossible: eternity been from have accidental or irrationality the intrinsic because of impossible “Imagine that I first walk through Divinity Avenue, and and then Avenue, Divinity walk I first through that “Imagine ten annihilate the universe governing the powers that imagine set at back me and contained, it all time with that of minutes made. was the choice before I was as this hall just of the door make everything then that, I now else being the same, Imagine as passive You, Street. Oxford traverse and choice different a “What is meant by saying that my choice of which way to walk to which way of choice my that saying by meant is “What chance?...It of matter and ambiguous is lecture the after home called are Street Oxford and Avenue both Divinity that means shall be chosen.” one, either one that and one, only but Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free James’s two-stage model effectively separates chance (the inde chance separates model effectively two-stage James’s 2 3 James also asked the students to imagine his actions repeated repeated actions his imagine to the also students asked James With this simple example, James was the first thinker to enun thinker the first was James example, this simple With terministic free element) from choice (an arguably determinate determinate arguably (an choice from free element) terministic and values, character, one’s from causally follows that decision in exactly the libertarian the to free will.In challenges the great of one as today modern philosophi of much anticipates James passage, following universes. multiple theories of physical and cal modal reasoning ent time of random alternatives, leading to a choice which grants which grants a choice to leading alternatives, random time of ent ambiguous equivocal an transforms and possibility one to consent temporal is a There past. simple and unalterable an into future undetermined of sequence a factor. longer no is chance where determined choice adequately ciate clearly a two-stage decision process, with chance in a pres chance with process, decision a two-stage clearly ciate 162 Chapter 1211 types oftypes decision. In first, the the reasonabletype, 1890 book feelingsespecially and desires at moment the of decision). In his preserving.” There is “nothingthe under sun.”new no genuinely creative new is Determinism “information- acts. imply.logically Note that inadeterministic universe, there are allows us to dosomething beyond what given the reasons would - we build up astock of possibilities inour memory. of results the experiences others, the these all of chanceserving From -initially involuntary past experiences and later from ob 5 4 In kind fifth decision, the of seesroom James for Where dothe thus the first prerequisite of the voluntary life in the memory by experiences of their involuntary performance is “ end, and deliberately willed. ory, movement the then desired can again, be proposed as an flex, or involuntary way, has left an image of the in mem itself movement,a particular having once inarandom, occurred re “We our all possibilities learn by way the of When experience. doubt is at an end.” isaction which afixed and stable part of our Ego, our state of we hit upon aconception letsus which apply some principle of ceiving doing the or not doing of inpoint. act the The moment consists turning inthe over ofpossible the of modes all con It may said ingeneral be that deliberation a great of part every free,being inthat we are devoid of any feeling of coercion…. owe nothing to our We will. have, however, of sense aperfect us appearingdecide to flowfrom in the nature things,of and to surance to we ourselves seem almost passive; reasons the which of one alternative…. In transition easy this from doubt to as selves mind inthe and to end by leaving aclear balanceinfavor “arguments for and against agiven to them course settle seem A supply of ideas of the various movements that are possible left James (2007)p. 487-8.The areitalics the in original James (2007)p. 531 The Principles of Psychology, alternative possibilities for actioncome from? 4 Two-Stage ofFree Models Will James said there were five ”.” 5 creativity that ------163
Chapter 1211 - - - - 6 7 James (2007) p. 534. (2007) p. James 441. (1880) p. James “And I can easily show...that as a matter of fact the new of con a matter as easily show...that I can “And are which evolve tendencies active and emotions, ceptions, fancies, images, random of in the shape produced originally thein functional variation spontaneous of out-births accidental brain.” human instable the excessively of activity taneous variation,” as the producer of changed forms, and the and forms, changed of the producer as variation,” taneous in hold not did destroyer, their preserver as and environment, the parallel with in a word, if, as progress; mental the case of obtain... Darwinism longer no might in whatever hesitation no all these of facts, I have in spite “But, firmto the Darwinianhere... holding distinction even and order of its conceptions; which, in a word, thinks that all thinks that word, a which,in conceptions; its of order and changes, a series adaptive of from result must progress mental accordingly, might, word...It of that defined thein sense already this; than other agency any for room no were seem if there as so useful between found “spon have we if the distinction as obtains between the facts of social evolution on the one hand, hand, the one on between social the facts of obtains evolution Darwin on Mr. by expounded as zoölogical of evolution and the other... sight first seem at would it if anywhere, evolution], mental [“In passively the mind be which makes right school must if that as the form of productive actively the environment and plastic, the act discharge; in the latter by a kind of creative contribution contribution creative of kind a by thein latter theact discharge; work.” which does a reason’s a reason of instead something of which I think been parallel, never has noticed, remarkable “A “In the fifth and final type of decision, the feeling that the feeling the finaland of the decision, fifth type “In balanced the books, has may reason that evidenceall is and in, in decid case feel, we in either But absent. or present be either wilful own the beam; act our inclined by ourselves if we as ing, of weight to the effort living our adding case by in the former make to seems powerless the which, logical taken alone, reason Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 6 7 James’ “mental evolution” was clearly inspired by Charles Dar Charles by inspired clearly was evolution” “mental James’ win’s biological evolution. biological win’s 164 Chapter 1211 work broad was also inphysics, philosophy, and psychology. was a great contributor many to so fields in mathematics, but his PoincaréHenri (about1906) book, Hadamardbook, quoted Valéry poet the (as didDennett later), unconscious the which generates random combinations. In his Henri Poincare in 1936organized to study creativity. The conference on focused cal Field Jacques Hadamard (1945) process of random alternatives followed by of selection one choice. definite conscious process of validation. perhaps by initially also an unconscious process, but bythen a scious way with chance involved, are among, they then selected combinations and possibilities are generated, some in an uncon mathematical problems. He insight had critical the that random Theresome is sign of direct influence. liam James read Poincaré and great the James knew thinker work. 8 In his 1945book Poincaré was thus second to the thinker propose two-stage the Poincaré on speculated how his mind works he when is solving Henri Poincaré discipline and to disorder of born chance.” liberty,call if one could give name this to mere the absence of subliminalthe ego, on contrary, the there reigns what Iwould thuswill give opportunity the them of becoming conscious… In oncewhich, aroused, direct our attention will upon and them, geometrician’sthe sensibility special Ihave of; speaking been once andcapable be beautiful, useful and will of they affecting sciousness… Afew only are harmonious, and consequently at only are which interestingtheir find way intothe field of result of automatic the actionof subliminal the ego, but those combinations…fruitful combinations the all are formed as a prolonged of unconscious period work are and generally useful to mind the inakindof sudden illumination aftersomewhat a “It that is certain combinations the present which themselves Poincaré (2003) , Hadamard Synthèse the conference described inParis ’s two-stage approach to problem solving, in was called the “last the universalist” was called he because Psychology of Invention in the Mathemati Two-Stage ofFree Models Will 8 con - Wil - - - 165
Chapter 1211 - - William William 9 This very remarkable conclusion appears appears conclusion very This remarkable Hadamard (1945) p. 30. (1945) p. Hadamard ’ temporal sequence of random chance (“free”) followed by by followed (“free”) chance random of sequence ’ temporal To Invent Is to Choose. Choose. to Is Invent To “What we call genius is much less the work of the first one than one than the first of the work less much is call we genius “What has what of the value grasp to one the second of the readiness choose to it.” him and been before laid “ writes Valéry Paul what with it compare striking we if themore any invent to takes two “It Revue Française: thein Nouvelle chooses, one other the up combinations; makes one thing. The him in the to important is what and wishes he what recognizes him.” to imparted has which the the things former of mass certain extent, at random, so that the role of chance is hardly hardly is chance of the role so that random, at certain extent, process. mental of the step in this first doubtful numer of up building this process, this first that obvious is “It we even, as creation, the beginning of only is combinations, ous choice. discernment, is it...Invention to preliminary say, should “However, to find these, it has has it beennecessary find these, to to construct the “However, which the useful among combinations, possible very numerous be to found. are ones a to place, take operation this first that be avoided cannot “It “...it is obvious that invention or discovery, be it in mathematics mathematics in be it discovery, or invention that obvious is “...it ideas. combining by takesplace else, anywhere or Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 9 In 1931, Nobel prize-winning physicist Compton championed championed Compton physicist prize-winning 1931, Nobel In Although Valéry describes two persons, this is clearly describes this clearly is persons, two Valéry Although the idea of human freedom based on quantum uncertainty and and uncertainty based quantum freedom on human the idea of quantum of microscopic amplification of the notion invented rather his In world. the macroscopic into chance bring to events James are choice and chance James, For (“will”). choice a determining mind. a single part of Arthur (1931, 1955) Holly Compton summarizing the conference opinion. For Hadamard, it captured captured it Hadamard, For opinion. the conference summarizing ideas is random of the combination how of description Poincaré’s not is alone Chance the best combination. of a choice by followed enough. 166 Chapter 1211 in an his amplifier, anticipatingSchrödinger’sthe Cat paradox. bizarre mechanism, he imagined sticks of dynamite attached to caused cause of decision the it makes.” self, i.e., on plane the of natural or finitecauses, selfthethe un is exercise acausal influence the on making the decision;of to cause, no matter what other antecedent or concurrent factors one of it which was simultaneously within power the of self the is always one of anumber of alternative possible decisions any foreseen or predicted with certitude; knowledge of relevantperfect all causes, decision the cannot be at least two of three the following points are affirmed: marize understandingthe of self-determination.” It is “only when fromdecides prior alternative possibilities. a cause our so actions are “ explicitlywhich includes Adler revisits of idea the anatural freedom of self-determination, Adler (1961) Mortimer 11 10 “(iii)that decision the flowsfrom thecausal initiative the of “(ii)that decision the is not necessitated, i.e., decision the “(i)that decision the is intrinsically unpredictable, i.e., given “We have employed following the descriptive formula to sum In second the volume of his massive book Years later, Comptonthetwo-stage clarified nature of his idea actor himself that he is free.” edge that hedoing is infact what he intends to dothat tells the onlyin his act working the of physical law. It is inner the knowl known only to person himself. the From outside the one can see thus himself determining what occur. will Thatso is he does adding afactor not supplied by physical the conditions and is When one exercises freedom, by of his act choice he is himself events from among event occur. some which particular will insofar known, can be as they define instead arange possibleof precisely what aforthcoming conditions, event These be. will “A of set known physical conditions is not adequate to specify
Atlantic Monthly Adler (1961)p. 225. Compton (1967) articlein1955. alternative possibilities Two-Stage ofFree Models Will up to us 10 .” Note that uncaused the self 11 The The of Idea Freedom and as self the - - - , 167
Chapter 1211 - - - - that par two-stage modeltwo-stage Memorial Lecture in 1965. in 1965. Lecture Memorial quantum mechanics as being no help help being no as mechanics quantum , especially when Popper was selected to give the selected was give to , especially when Popper medium betwixt chance and an absolute necessity’. necessity’. absolute an and betwixtmedium chance ‘the removal’ of what he called ‘physical necessity’ must must necessity’ called he ‘physical what of removal’ ‘the objects must As chance. with thing same in ‘the result always any of admit to impossible ‘tis . . . not, or be conjoin’d either Arthur Holly Compton Holly Arthur “Hume’s and Schlick’s ontological thesis that there cannot exist exist cannot there that thesis ontological Schlick’s and “Hume’s seems determinism and between chance intermediate anything doctrinaire) but say to (not highly dogmatic only not me to the assumption on only understandable is it and absurd; clearly amplifies the effect of a single quantum jump in such a way that waythat a such in jump quantum a single of effect the amplifies necessary the relay destroy or explosion an cause either may it quan single one this way In about. the explosion bringing for in my But decision. a major to be equivalent may jump tum decision, rational any to similarity no the model has opinion uncertainty. quantum involving and being probabilistic to be the reason why these models are so very these are models unsatisfactory. why beto the reason did not he though a model, designed himself such “Compton the and indeterminacy, uses quantum It particularly it. like a human a model of as jump, a quantum of unpredictability which amplifier an of consists It moment. great of decision “I shall later argue against this important doctrine according to to doctrine according this important against argue shall later “I I must Yet chance. sheer is determinism to which the alternative the the doctrine quantum- good that for hold seemsadmit to at been or designed explain, to which have models theoretical This freedom. seems human of the possibility illustrate, to least chance was taken over by Schlick, together with many of his his of many with Schlick, together by taken over was chance who asserted that Hume, from theviews subject, on “The idea that the only alternative to determinism is just sheer just is to determinism “Theonly alternative the idea that Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free Compton’s work was no doubt closely read by philosopher philosopher by read closely doubt no was work Compton’s dismissed Popper first At with free will, but later he describes he a later free will,with but being proba mutations genetic with allels Darwinian evolution, lec Compton his In uncertainty. quantum involving and bilistic idea amplifier Compton’s criticizes he tures, Karl Popper (1965, 1977) (1965, Karl Popper Popper Karl first 168 Chapter 1211 explain freedom, though not yet explicitly intwo stages with ran selection ofselection as of ideas amodel will. free theory. Second, he had come to accept random the variation and was not selection ural a“tautology” that made it an unfalsifiable by aphilosopher) about two things. First he now thought that nat Mind of lege, Cambridge. He it called and makes comparison the with evolution and natural selection, finally per formulatesthetwo-stage ina model temporalsequence, dom chance before controlled the decision. 13 12 In 1977PopperCol Lecture, gave first the Darwin Darwin at In with his 1977book Popper for called acombination of randomness and control to repertoire may an of be act choice, evenan of Iam act will. free selection kind of a behaviorof “The out of arandomly offered arewhich not acceptable to mind.” the dure eliminates which proposals those and possibilities those brain. there On these operatesthen a kind of proce selective proposals, as it were -of possibilities brought forward by the probabilistic and quantum mechanically of characterized set “That is say,to a range possibilitiesof is brought about by a sions, and similar things. a similar process and withto ideas respect deci new to free-will eliminates inappropriate mutations. Now we could conceive of on there them subsequently operates natural which selection listic and not in themselves or adequate,originally selected but (including radiation effects). Accordingly, they are also probabi it brought seems, about by quantum theoretical indeterminacy let us for look amoment at genetic mutations. Mutations are, “New have ideas similarity to astriking genetic mutations. Now, something like arestrictive or control.” selective interplay something between almost random or haphazard, and “freedom is not just chance but, rather, result the of asubtle has no status except as asymptom of our ignorance.” inacompletethat believed they determinism chance in which ibid Popper (1972)p. 227ff.. . In it he said he had changed his mind (arare admission . John Eccles Two-Stage ofFree Models Will Natural Selection and the Emergence , TheSelf and its Brain 13 12 , Pop , ------169
Chapter 1211 - - - Sci - 14 William James James William . Margenau embraced embraced . Margenau A choice process may may process A choice 2 indeterminism I have often often I have indeterminism quantum mechanics leaves our body, our our body, our leaves mechanics quantum for the amplification of something like, say, say, like, of something the amplification for 1 Margenau and Leshan (1982) p. 240. (1982) p. Leshan and Margenau
with a predetermined probability. Freedom involves two com two involves Freedom probability. a predetermined with and alternatives) set of a genuine of (existence chance ponents: shall we and the chance, provides mechanics Quantum choice. selecting (not by the choice make can the mind only that argue courses.” future the possible among enforcing) energetically “Our thesis is that that is thesis “Our its (because of numerous with in a state moment any at brain, each futures, possible innumerable) say might we complexity be a selection process, and the selection may be from some some be from the selection may and be a selection process, turn. in its being random without events, random of repertoire our of one to solution promising a offer to me to This seems causation.” downward by one and problems, vexing most an indeterminist; and in discussing in discussing and indeterminist; an indeterminacy does not quantum that out pointed regretfully us; seemhelp to lead human to not would processes radioactive disintegration movements. random to only action, but even animal action or this issue. on mind my changed have “I Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free While he is a confirmed compatibilist, in “On Giving Liber Giving “On in compatibilist, a confirmed is he While 14 Then in 1982, with co-author Lawrence LeShan, Margenau Margenau LeShan, Lawrence co-author in 1982, with Then 2. See p. 540 of J. C. Eccles and K. R. Popper, The Self and Its Brain. Its and The Self K. R.and C. Eccles Popper, J. 540 of 2. See p. the Wimmer give to invited was Margenau 1968, physicist In 1. Cf. my Objective Knowledge, chapter 6, pp. 226-29. 6, pp. chapter Knowledge, Objective my 1. Cf. Daniel Dennett (1978) his 1978 of 15 book chapter Want,” They They Say What tarians arates “free” and “will” in a temporal sequence, as as sequence, in a temporal “will” and “free” arates “choice.” by followed “chance” them simply naming done, had indeterminism as the first step toward a solution of the problem problem of the a solution toward step the first as indeterminism freedom. human of heretofore had what to called free will model of his a “solution” very sep neatly He illusion.” and beenhad “paradox seen mere as Henry (1968, 1982) Margenau was topic His College in Pennsylvania. Vincent St. at Lecture Freedom Human and Indeterminism entific 170 Chapter 1211 the poet Paul poet the Valéry, tookin a who 1936 conference part in Paris forcase atwo-stage better of model than will any free libertarian. Brainstorms that say want. libertarians they determinism and himself acompatibilist. calls liam James himself. Ironically, Dennett remainsbeliever in afirm persuasive than any other philosopher or scientist, including he defends it with sixexcellent reasons. His arguments are more with 16 15 Dennett gives strong reasons why is kindof this the will free Dennett makes his version of clear. atwo-stage very model And Dennett named his of model decision-making “ making should occur in this way.”making inthis should occur is just more efficient the and in end more rational thatdecision point 3.“Third...fromthe view of of engineering, biological it for ifthere is libertarian, the aright place at all.” 2.“Second, it Ithink installs intelligence makingdifference.” the of considerations the thatto subject the is amatter dooccur of 1.“First...The intelligent selection, andrejection, weighing decision.” ultimately as predictors serve and explicators of agent’s the final and agent ifthe is main inthe reasonable, considerations those ble on bearing decision the figure then ina reasoning process, that are by agent selected the as having amore than negligi agentthe (consciously or unconsciously). considerations Those maywhich of course immediately be as rejected irrelevant by undetermined produces of considerations, aseries some of a consideration-generator output whose is to some degree lowing feature: we when are with faced an important decision, model of decision “The I making am proposing thehas fol tions; other the one chooses.” “It two takes to invent anything. The one makes up combina
Jacques Hadamard Dennett (1978)p. 295 Dennett (1978)p. 293 , Tufts philosopher 16 Two-Stage ofFree Models Will . He quotes Valéry, 15 Daniel Dennett indeterminism right inthe place articulated the the articulated Valerian” after - - - Wil - 171
Chapter 1211 - - - - 18 Kane carefully consid carefully Kane Free Will and Values and Will Free 17 Dennett (1978) p. 295-7. (1978) p. Dennett 165. (1985) p. Kane
“that any construction which escaped confusion and emptiness emptiness and whichescaped confusion construction any “that - aspira libertarian some aspirations fall of to short likely was be fulfilled.” ultimately I believe cannot that tions that I decided in error, but with the acceptance of responsibility responsibility of the acceptance with but I decided in error, that case.” in any our sense of ourselves as responsible free agents, roughly in the roughly free agents, responsible as ourselves sense of our make, to decision important way: faced an with I am following myself: to I say of deliberation, amount a certain after and I’m now and enough matter this considered I’ve enough. “That’s considered have I could in the full that knowledge act,” to going prove may the eventualities in the full that knowledge further, free will than the prior decisions affecting our deliberation pro our deliberation affecting decisions free will the prior than further, any consider to not instance, for the decision, itself: cess certain lines ignore to the decision or deliberation; terminate to inquiry. of I to think, subsidiary contribute, “Theseand decisions prior decisions.” of the multiplicity to points the model I propose 6. “Finally, in that suggests and decisions moral our encircle that decisions act less to is which way to as decision ultimate cases our many sense of our to contributor a as phenomenologically important 4. “A fourth observation in favor of the model is that it per it that the model is of observation fourth in favor 4. “A making all without a difference, make to education moral mits the difference.” of thing important most the I and think is - this perhaps 5. “Fifth of account some provides this model - it of beto in favor said moral our of the authors are we that intuition important our Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 17 18 Kane was actually quite bleak about the possibilities for a for the possibilities bleak about actually quite was Kane In his 1985 book1985 his In satisfactory libertarian model. He felt, satisfactory libertarian He model. ered the work of Compton, Popper, Eccles, and Dennett. He says says He Dennett. and Eccles, Popper, Compton, of the work ered in the but Dennett, model before two-stage own his developed he because the two- Dennett endorse or it publish did not he end enough.” far go not model “did stage Robert Kane (1985) 172 Chapter 1211 choice is by chance, explainedcould be by agent the giving his reasons. Even ifthe The choice rationalpart was in indeterministic.part and in It or chocolate), but didnot play arole inmoral or prudential “torn” provide enough freedom for decisions practical everyday (vanilla eration of possibilities first inthe so free.stage), are libertarian determined piece overall inthe puzzle offreedom.” alibertarian He has said that two-stage the was model merely a“significant “self-forming actions” (SFAs) on depend which agent’s the efforts. not capture fully notionthe of ultimate responsibility (UR) during of it not will, free does go far enough for Kane it because does andtial important part” of any adequate conception libertarian Unfortunately, neither was happy. determinists both model, andthis so would libertarians happy. be 21 20 19 Kane had previously accepted that two-stage the model could Kane agrees that choices these would not have been Although two-stage the of model earlier thinkers is an “essen Kane hoped to combine some rationality with some freedom in His first was a model choicebetween “relativisticalternatives.” determined when they are they when determined made.” ing factors were formed of past, inthe all our choices would be that now determine our choice however because determin the were responsible for forming some of determining the factors freedom evenifsome libertarian chancebe events past in the choices are at determined of time the choice that would not agentthe has control over at of time the choice. If of all our tors, final the choice so is determined by factors, none which of combination of chance the and part other determining fac trol of agent the and “will” the by determined is fully part a thatreason is “The the chance (“free”) part is notthe con in basis by agent, the whichever way it goes.” is goingis, selection the so’ to be ‘willed to be on aprovisional outcome and to endorse reasons for way. it inaspecial That “the agent has agreed beforehand to accept chance the selected
Personal communication. Kane (1985)p. 104. Kane (1985)p. 96. from before chance the events past gen inthe (the Two-Stage ofFree Models Will 21 19 20 - - - pre- - - 173
Chapter 1211 - - - - determination by by determination , and when the choice when the choice , and 23 self-determination 22 . p. 26. . p. “Libertarianism,” in Fischer (2007) p. 26. (2007) p. in Fischer “Libertarianism,” ibid
correspond physically to the opening of a window of oppor of a window of the opening to physically correspond complete off screens temporarily that tunity of the past. influences “stirring up of chaos” in the brain that makes it sensitive to to sensitive it makes that in the brain chaos” of up “stirring uncertainty The level. the neuronal at micro-indeterminacies of moments soul-searching such at feel we tension inner and our of in indeterminacy reflected the thus is self-formation experience we internally What themselves. neural processes then would occasions such do on to what about uncertainty as “In all such cases, we are faced with competing motivations and and motivations facedcompeting with are cases, all we such “In to do something temptation overcome to effort an make to have uncertainty and tension is There want. alsoelse we strongly that times, I suggest, such do at to what about minds in our movement by brains our of regions appropriate in reflected is a kind of — in short, equilibrium thermodynamic from away between competing visions of what we should do or become. become. or do should we what of visions betweencompeting acting or thing the moral between doing torn are we Perhaps long- and desires between powerful present or ambition, from have we for which faced difficult with tasks are we or term goals, aversions.” “Now I believe these undetermined self-forming actions or or actions I believe these self-forming undetermined “Now torn are we when life of those occur difficult times at SFAs Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 22 23 But when the two-stage model does not narrow down the alter down narrow model does not when the two-stage But Today Kane sees that two-stage models may generate the generate may models two-stage seesthat Kane Today is moral or prudential, Kane says that his introduction of indeter of introduction his that says Kane prudential, or moral is than more” “something provides itself the decision into minism him. with agree I now and model, the two-stage efforts. Kane now agrees that the agent has libertarianhas freedom agent the agrees that now Kane efforts. the and option one just model produces even when the two-stage be can described “self-determined.” as agent act a single to of natives decisions between what the agent believes ought to be done and and be to done believes ought the agent between what decisions do. to desires or wants the agent what So they motives. and based character on SFAs, his of alternatives pruden and moral in motives conflicting the agent’s explain may the) agent’s for the (reasons theyeven explain and tial choices. 174 Chapter 1211 indeterminism involved. agent’s efforts are morethecause decisionthe final of than the to provide indeterminism. the But he emphasizes that the work work Anthony Long and responsibility whichever way she chooses. of loss of control, but Kane says agent the can to decide assume 25 24 Anthony Long and To Kane’s SFA’s critics, the Kane agrees that ever-present the noise brain inthe is enough acter who,acter inmy is case, myself.’” of writing an unfinished andstory forming an unfinished char for that matter). author the Like of novel, the Iam process inthe I was not formed a fully person before I chose (and am still not, conclusive reasons, that’s because, like heroine the of novel, the responsibilitytake for. If reasons these were not sufficient or sons for choosing as Idid, I’m which to willing stand by and way.’ might They reply.‘True enough. But Idid have rea good did since you had viable also reasons for choosing other the have sufficient or conclusiveprior reasons for choosing as you “Suppose we were to say to such persons: ‘But you look, didn’t uncaused. They arecaused the by agent’s efforts. agent’sSelf-forming effort. choices are undetermined, but not mean outcome the happened merely by chance and not by the ceding arguments that presence the of agent’s prior uncertainty about what to do. from pre the Recall processes of an agent preceding choice corresponding to the not some be to do. Nothing insuch a description implies that there could resolves uncertainty and indecision mind inthe about what formationthe of an intention to or dosomething. It purpose there is no reason to assume such a claim A choice is true. is merely happen and therefore cannot somebody’s be choice. But is undetermined, one might argue that outcome the must “If
The The Hellenistic Philosophers indeterminism is involved inaprocess that so its outcome ibid “Libertarianism,” inFischer (2007)p. 33 , pp. 41-2. indeterminism deliberation inthe and neural David Sedley speculated in their master intheir speculated David Sedley Two-Stage ofFree Models Will David (1987) Sedley indeterminism raises objection the that that 25
indeterminism does notindeterminism does Epicurus’ of the swerve 24 - - - - 175
Chapter 1211 - - - - alternative alternative
27 26 Cicero, that that Cicero, alternative possibilities possibilities alternative alternative possibilities provided randomly randomly provided possibilities alternative for action, from which the mind’s power of volition volition of power which the mind’s action, from for Long and Sedley 110. and Long (1987) p. Long and Sedley 110. and Long (1987) p. Epicurus’ critics, made plausible by concentrating on the on concentrating by plausible made critics, Epicurus’
at random and without the intervention of volition.)” volition.)” of the intervention without and random at to the laws of physics alone. But it is still, on the swerve theory, the swerve still, is on theory, it But alone. physics of the laws to therefore might which volition one, possible intrinsically an swerves be are objected that may about..(It bring be to held inference an only was but...that uncaused; be to entirely meant by indeed occur must it there function...for cosmogonic swerve’s physics, but by choosing between choosing the by but physics, of group a large this way In open. leave physics of which the laws a new pattern be into diverted simultaneously might soul atoms the body. of the motion radically redirect thus and motion, of numer of does the coincidence it as requiring event, an Such according improbable most be swerves, statistically would ous “It does so, we may speculate, not by overriding the laws of of the laws overriding by not speculate, may we does so, “It trajectory of every atom. There is a minimal degree of physical physical of is a minimal degree There trajectory every of atom. any at may — the swerve. unimpeded atom indeterminism An equally may but trajectory, present its continue moment given parallel trajectories. the adjacent of one into `swerve’ the swerve was introduced. The evident power of the self and and of the self power The evident the swerve introduced. was soul and of processes in the physical intervene to volitions its suffi were alone laws if physical bebody inexplicable would There trajectory every the of precise determine to atom. cient precise the to determine sufficient not are laws physical fore “Here at last a significant role for the swerve leaps to the eye. to swerve the eye. the for leaps role a significant last at “Here to according this question, just answer to is it For Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 26 27 Long and Sedley assume a non-physical (metaphysical) ability ability (metaphysical) Sedley and a non-physical Long assume idea that a physical volition chooses - (consistent with and ad and with chooses - (consistent volition a physical idea that and desires its and values and character its determined by equately among from feelings) plausible. quite - is the atoms by of the volition to affect the atoms, which is implausible. But the But is implausible. which atoms, affect the to the volition of atoms might be limited to providing undetermined undetermined providing to be limited might atoms possibilities desires values, and character reflects that choosecould in a way feelings. and 176 Chapter 1211 the firstthe step. thinking His followsthat of a two-stage process but is skeptical of value the of randomness in PenroseRoger (1989) ancients, especially or maybejust coming to same the conclusions from reading the ofmodel will. free possibilities to which select,” between anticipating two-stage the no pointbe inhaving ifthere were will free no genuinely open tive possibilities for from. to choose will She the says, “there would action. But clearly she sees that randomness can provide finds it hard howsee to randomcan help swerves to explainfree Julia Annas (1992) and 28 Perhaps influenced Long,by andher classicistSedley colleagues In her 1992book, In his 1989book swerve before every free action...random free before would swerve swerves seem every explain action.Wefree can scarcely there arandom to be expect “...since are swerves random, it is hard how to help see they to view.”trary process; but Iam aware that many others might hold to acon issuethe of originality, rather than unconscious the putting-up conscious shooting-down (judgement) process that is central to ments of consciousness. wakeful the In my opinion, it is the mind, but rarely judge only critical the very survive dothey vive. In dreams, for example, unusual may ideas come easily to only with ideas areasonable those chance of sur success will anneeds effective procedure for forming judgements,thatso But,all. just by itself, procedure this would have little value. One effective putting-up process, one would have ideas no new at scious and shooting-downthe largely conscious. Without an process. Iimagine that putting-up the largely could be uncon factors involved, namely a‘putting-up’ and a‘shooting-down’ originality should raised. It be to seems me that there are two “In relation to question the this, of what constitutes genuine Henri Poincaré
Penrose (1989) p. 422. 28 Epicurus and Annas his swerve, says. The Emperor’s New Mind , who he has discussed in the previous in the he, who has discussed pages. The Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind Two-Stage ofFree Models Will Jacques Hadamard , Penrose suggests , Annas Annas , alterna - - - - -
177
Chapter 1211 ------Daniel Dennett and and Dennett Daniel alternative possibilities for for possibilities alternative , pp. 184-88 , pp. 29 Alfred Mele, clearly influenced by influenced clearly Alfred Mele, The Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind of Philosophy Hellenistic The
“it might be worth exploring the possibility of combining a combining of the possibility be exploring worth might “it issuing a process parts of the later of conception compatibilist incom an action with intentional deliberative, in full blown, eral ways... provide of swervesto is “The role in hav be point no would there choose to between, for volitions be possibilities open genuinely no free will were ing if there select.” tween which to “Another kind of suggestion is that swerves are not the causes of of the causes not swerves are that is suggestion kind of “Another whereby the process into they come all. Rather, at free actions explain to supposed are Swerves about. brought are free actions works, it how free and agency of the nature about something causal across cutting (by free actions cause they do not but in developed be can sev suggestion This example). for chains, ibility that is required. Such an account avoids the problems the problems avoids account an Such required. is that ibility free action, swerves into brings that account any to attaching very the evidence; to the closely answering not of the cost at but in some swerves are that certainly suggests passage Lucretius action. of the point at relevant way that goes beyond mechanical response to stimuli. We act freely act freely We stimuli. to response mechanical goes beyond that spontaneous, and flexible are that characters have because we whichswerve atoms of composed are because we this is and be to fre have swerves do not On this account, occasionally. action; one of mechanism any part of not they since are quent, flex character the kind of for enough soul is swerve in your to produce, if anything, random actions; we still lack any clue as as clue still any we lack actions; random anything, if produce, to free. which are actions they produce could how to problems these avoids of modern thought line influential “An be a there that demand evidencedoes our not that arguing by the swerves explain Rather, each free [Furley]. action swerve for reaction and change of capable characters have people factthat Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 29 In 1995 In a compatibilist control phase. control a compatibilist Albert Mele (1995) a two-stage Libertarianism,” “Modest his proposed Robert Kane, by followed phase early incompatibilist an combines that process 178 Chapter 1211 to decision the and subsequent action. by hypothetical the intervener at aplace linked deterministically decision process -to locate a indeterminism comes at an early stage of overallthe deliberation- ing control. In any Dennett Fischerthe -that case, uses idea the responsibility, given especially itself is compatiblewill or incompatible with determinism. compatible with determinism. Fischer is agnostic on free whether ofidea on Fischer (1995) John Martin for one of or luck. good bad This is a not a problem forfree will, but it is matter of luck. Since chance real, many is very things are result the events inour causal mean history that many of our actions are a The Problem ofLuck in away that helps and not does harm agent control. ism, problem the of where and when 31 30 Fischer is most concerned to establish control the for needed in 1995, Also Mele has written extensively about question the chance whether Mele concerned about is very location the of any Mele that sees chance not direct cause need the be of action. Daniel Dennett responds to it.” notmind does entail that agent the has no control over how he aconsideration“That causedis indeterministically to come to sive better judgments.” place for inprocesses indeterminacy leading to proximal deci action inacompatibilist way and finding theoretically a useful process from proximal decisive better judgment through overt erable measure of nonultimate agential control by treating the possible tobe gain “ultimate control” aconsid preserving while patibilist conception of earlier For the parts. example, it might
Mele (2006)p. 10.. Mele (1995)p. 212. semicompatibilism moral responsibilitymoral John Martin Fischer 31 ’s 1978work. Fischer known is best for the 30 Two-Stage ofFree Models Will , the idea that idea , the . Frankfurt-style “priorFrankfurt-style sign” needed Frankfurt-style examplesFrankfurt-style challeng indeterminism could occur indeterminism could occur argued for a model based moral responsibility is indetermin - - - - 179
Chapter 1211 - - is moral . Here is is . Here Daniel Dennett Dennett Daniel moralresponsibility semicompatibilism alternative possibilities for action is is action for possibilities alternative and his own own his and . Otherwise be ethical an fallacy. would it determination along the sequence that issues in the issues the that sequence along determination context of the issues under discussion here. In his article, “On “On article, his In here. discussion under the issues of context Want,” They They Say Libertarians What Giving necessarily doeshe not approaches; of this family presented has “I do not have the space here to lay out this second family of of this family second out lay to the space here have do not “I sketch I shall simply But carefully. fully or libertarian accounts the of the content of enough that hope ideas and the main this family that the reader convince to will emerge approach serious libertarian a minimally plausible, views constitutes of in the evaluation and further - worth elaboration approach of causal causal of this approach that out I shall point And action). (and decision be can morally agent also an lead the seems view to to that have not could he even though a choice making for responsible choice. a different time) made relevant any (at “I wish to develop (in an extremely sketchy way) another sort another way) sketchy extremely (in an develop to wish “I the relationship approach, thisof kind libertarianism; on of the subsequent and “signal” or “sign” between the relevant lack a nevertheless is there but deterministic, causally is choice Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free Fischer hopes to develop “another sort of libertarianism.” He He libertarianism.” sort of “another develop to hopes Fischer Fischer’s main criticism of of criticism main Fischer’s alternative possibilities alternative idea. main his of sketch Fischer’s Dennett. He says “Dennett argues that it is the only sort of lib sort of theonly is it that argues “Dennett says He Dennett. min least at is it I believe that and plausible, is ertarianism that Fischer libertarianism.” is it alsoI believe that plausible. imally place a libertarianism constructing a built-in with be simply may of the absence support to order in theintervener, Frankfurt for is completely independent of, and merely a prerequisite to, to, a prerequisite merely and of, independent completely is responsibility of family “second his out lay theto space have does he not says from differs it how very us on gives little and libertarian accounts,” that it is implausible to suppose that one’s one’s that suppose to implausible is it that a certain judgment sort of forming of the possibility on grounded there something doing behalf of on best: is a judgment what about good is doing for responsibility The do. to goodno reasons are freewill that Note bad. doing of thein possibility grounded not 180 Chapter 1211 a role for a that are on our based character and values -“what one is.” He sees chaotically by nondeterministic processes, followed by decisions two-stage of model alternative choices that are constructed inpart implying multiple possible alternative actions. suggests RPmight Libet the book, includethe multiple initiatives, Chapterdecision See to act. 17for details. At the one point in initiates experiments, he inwhich claimed aReadinessPotential (RP) Libet Libetand StephenBenjamin Kosslyn (2004) 33 32 In afew brief paragraphs of foreword, the Kosslyn proposed a In 2004, also believe that believe also it is libertarianism.” plausible, and that Ibelieve it is at least minimallyplausible. I Dennett argues that it is only the of that sort libertarianism is here to lay fully out (or of or view set this views) to defend it. ing of adecision). me emphasize Let that Iam not inaposition as to what and is best formation the of an intention (or mak the deliberation, but nojudgment the such between lack link inthe involves some lack of causal “So Dennett’s picture suggested on of behalf libertarian the optionbest (under circumstances). the deliberation that to leads agent’s the judgment as to what is the of causal determinism (of within process the sort) a certain of of intention....” Rather, Dennett argues that there lack can be some earlier point, prior to ultimate the decision or formation “Clearly, what has inmind is libertarian the among one’s alternatives and subsequent the choice. He says, is not judgment the between is best the act that aparticular atinstalled appropriate the place, and Dennett argues that this “What to Dennett’s is crucial is that be view indeterminacy versionpealing of libertarianism. endorse view, the but presents it as most the plausible and ap
’s book Libet (2004),p.Libet 148. Fischer (1995)p. 125 an actionwell before conscious the is aware will of the causa sui causa Stephen Kosslyn Mind TimeMind . . The book Libet’sbook summarized . The famous Two-Stage ofFree Models Will wrote aforeword to determination process inthe of 32 indeterminism at 33
Benjamin - - 181
Chapter 1211 ------34 Kosslyn, in Libet (2005) p. xii-xii. in Libet (2005) p. Kosslyn,
es and how one makes decisions in the future. Thus, with time with Thus, in the future. decisions makes one how es and is. one what construct decisions one’s plays a key role in the processes that construct the alternatives, the alternatives, construct that in the processes role a key plays “what addition, In consequences. anticipated and rationales, And the decisions. actually makes one how governs is” one experiencing the actual consequences and decision that making one how affectsboth which then is,” one “what modifiesin turn consequenc anticipated and rationales alternatives, constructs speaking, to use [Galen] Strawson’s term, which includes one’s one’s term, which includes speaking, use [Galen] to Strawson’s beliefs).” and values, goals, knowledge, which in memory, information in part of consists is” one “What terministic processes.) Our thoughts, feelings and behavior are are behavior and feelings Our thoughts, processes.) terministic “second as well as insights novel have can determined; we not thoughts.” consequences, anticipated and rationales, the choices, “Given (mentally is” one “what the of basis do on decides what one just thinking about, the brain is in a different “start state” (i.e., (i.e., state” “start in a different is the brain thinking about, just associa different is partially activated, information different anticipat and rationales constructs when one primed) are tions decides.one (Note which — willhow affect ed consequences a step: back the problem move this idea simply doesthat not nonde of in part was thinking a result itself just was one What “Rather, one constructs rationales and anticipated consequenc anticipated and rationales constructs one “Rather, con This hand. at the specific situation for appropriate as es, Such processes. chaotic in part on rely may struction process history learning one’s determinedby entirely not are processes was one on what genes)... Depending one’s by filtered (even as “The rationales and anticipated consequences — and and even, — consequences anticipated and “The rationales action of courses the alternative the situation, on depending been stashed having memory, in up” “looked simply not — are encounters. previous after a file in notes like away Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 34 Here Kosslyn considers a second stage of willed decisions that willed that of decisions stage a second considers Kosslyn Here Here Kosslyn considers a first stage of free creation of alterna of creation free stage a first considers Kosslyn Here are determined by our goals, values, and beliefs - and values, goals, our determined by are tive courses of action, of courses tive 182 Chapter 1211 describes his “Hypothesisdescribes 2”for will. free sequence model. followedbe action.The by result willed two-stage,is a temporal- generation of these important to place “gap” the or will: two things, which correspond to twothe discussions of untilsee, now, point the of introducing terminism is arequirement for positive factor. Indeed, he goes as far as to say that quantum more directly and for firstthe time embraced book short His position rarely changed over but decades, the inhis recent sciousness and almost always reflects the on problem free will. of (2007) John Searle 36 35 He says three things are necessary: Then ina2007lecture (available Google at on “open” describes Searle alternative courses of action.It is very In abreakthrough admits of Searle that sorts, he could never John Searle mechanics must enter into explanation the of putably established of as afact nature...it follows that is only the indeterminacy form of indeterminism and rationality...Second we know that quantum First we know that our of actioncontain experiences free both not.” self-contradictionbest that conceived has been far.” so Maybe inStrawson,ed 1994,p. 15)commented, “The unique to eachsituation —ourselves. Nietzsche (1886,as quot tered by our genetic make-ups. We bring something novel and “We are not simply accumulators of environmental events, fil
ibid Searle (2007)p.Searle 74-75 35 ., p. xiii-xiv. Freedom and Neurobiology consciousness and Now will. free he says we know has written extensively on problem the of alternative possibilities for deliberation to Two-Stage ofFree Models Will consciousness. causa sui causa indeterminism that is indis he has tackled the problem the he has tackled quantum mechanics into before or during the requirements for free indeterminism consciousness.” causa sui is the YouTube), Searle quantum quantum inde 36 - - - con as a - - 183
Chapter 1211 - - - indeter without being being without 37 consciousness is needed, is consciousness above, consciousness must inherit the inherit must consciousness indeterminism must be involved, but at “a “a at but be involved, must indeterminism (son of physicist Werner), chair of the of chair Werner), physicist of (son .” [Popper’s italics] [Popper’s .” Karl Popper Karl Heisenberg (2009) p. 164 (2009) p. Heisenberg
modulated by sensory receptors, enabling the bacterium to find find thebacterium to enabling sensory by receptors, modulated temperature.” the right food and stimuli — can be found in unicellular organisms. Take the way the way Take organisms. in unicellular be — can found stimuli that a flagellum has It the moves. bacterium Escherichia coli one direction: in either axis longitudinal its around rotate can tumble to it causes the other the bacterium forward, drives way for ready in a new direction facing up ends it so that random at can be walk’ ‘random This motion. forward of phase the next “Evidence of randomly generated action — action that is dis is action — action that generated randomly of “Evidence external depend upon does not because it reaction tinct from “A choice process may be a selection process, and the selection and be a selection process, may process choice “A events, random of repertoire some be from may turn its in random 1. some quantum quantum 1. some level,” lower of explanation 2. a quantum of 3. the higher-level the randomness. inheriting without but minism, Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 37 Since the indeterminacy principle was his father’s work, work, father’s his was the indeterminacySince principle The most recent thinker to describe a two-stage modelis to describe thinker recent a two-stage most The Compare Drosophila, on which he is a world expert. Heisenberg argues for for argues expert. Heisenberg a world is which he on Drosophila, more by bacteria, even in unicellular followed randomness some food. toward moving as such behaviors lawful Heisenberg’s position that the physical universe is no longer de longer no is universe the physical that position Heisenberg’s as comes unpredictable inherently is nature that termined and of finds evidence Heisenberg that is unusual is What surprise. no as such ones very some simple including in animals, free behavior Martin (2009) Heisenberg Heisenberg Martin neurobiology and BioZentrum genetics Würzburg’s of University section. 184 Chapter 1211 vival value,vival and would likely incorporated be organisms. inhigher generate and new unpredictable behaviors would have great sur do arandom creating walk options for action.Thecapability to libertarian libertarian liberties undetermined earlier two-stage models of will. free solvesmodel some of problems the that have about raised been James would have pleased. been two-stage model, but now we have for evidence it inmany animals. some “lawful” behavior much very looks like 38 showI also how extended can model to the be include In next the chapter, explain Iwill how my Heisenberg’s combination of some randomness followed by In organisms, higher brain the may still include elements that experiments show that actively they initiate behaviour.” evolutionarythe of has history solved species the before. Our actions.cantheir solve They problemsthat no individual fly in tered, expectations their about can modify consequences the of onstrated that flies,insituations fruit havethey never encoun cannot reduced be to responses. For example, my lab has dem gated. But there is plenty of that evidence an animal’s behaviour physiology “The of howthis happens littlebeen has investi long-term consequences. figuretheir options, evaluateand possibletheir short-term and of random continuously walk, preactivate, discard and recon have to findthat a module is adaptive. Their brains, kind ina equipped, insufficiently informed and short time, of animals play chance between and lawfulness brain. inthe Insufficiently “the activation of behavioural on modulesinter isthe based
Heisenberg (2009) p. 165. Robert Kane and Self-Forming the Actions of the . Two-Stage ofFree Models Will Cogito William James two-stage 38 ------’ 185
Chapter 1211