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Amerimuncvi BG SK-3Hrt.Pdf © 2018 American University Model United Nations Conference All rights reserved. No part of this background guide may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means whatsoever without express written permission from the American University Model United Nations Conference Secretariat. Please direct all questions to [email protected] Joshua Loiselle & John McAndrew Chair Welcome 여보세요! Hello all, my name is Joshua Loiselle and I will be your chair for the committee of the South Korean Cabinet. Here’s a little bit about me: I am from a medium sized town called Holden, Massachusetts. I attended a private college preparatory school called Saint John’s in Shrewsbury, MA. I am currently an undergraduate student in the School of International Service and my focus is on national security in Northeast Asia. I also plan to minor in Chinese which I have studied for four years. As you can infer, this topic is quite pertinent and important to me and my studies. Academics aside, I have done MUN for four years and have attended conferences at Chicago, Brown, and Northeastern University (don’t worry this did not make me hardo about parli pro). Outside of MUN, I have quite the list of hobbies and passions that encompasses everything from archery, service trips to Haiti, rowing crew, and horseback riding. So, if you have any questions regarding college, MUN, language studies, or foreign I would love to share my insight(questions are not limited to these, I’m easy going so just ask!). I am very excited to meet you all and see how you all will approach this now rising issue in northeast Asia. Hey everybody, my name is John McAndrew and I’ll be your chair for the committee of the South Korean Cabinet. I’m from the same town as my co-chair, Josh, good ol’ Holden, Mass., but neither of us met each other until we came to AU. That was primarily because I went to Wachusett Regional, a public school absolutely superior in every way to St. John’s, and don’t let anyone tell you different. Lame one-sided rivalries aside, I’m also an undergraduate studying International Relations with an intended focus on the Middle East. I have only a year of Model UN experience - my school’s club was closed down for reasons I shouldn’t say here - so if you’re still figuring out this whole “etiquette and procedure” thing, well, so am I. Feel free to ask me questions about anything and everything, and I’ll do my best to answer them. Outside of MUN, I enjoy running, reading, video games, playing frisbee, and making lists about myself for other people to read. I can’t wait to meet all of you, and let’s make this a great conference. Good luck in your preparations. Feel free to email us with any questions, comments, or concerns! See everyone in February! Best, John & Josh 01 STATE COUNCIL of THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ABOUT SOUTH KOREA In June 1950, 75,000 North Korean troops invaded the Republic of Korea. This all out attack by the North caught the South completely off guard and resulted in the South Korean government being unable to reorganize a counter attack until the United States and the United Nations came to to their aid months later. As ministers of the State Council of the Korea faces in reality and more broadly, Republic of Korea, you are acting as the by your imagination. Be sure to adjust embodiment of your country’s interests your responses to represent realistic and aspirations for the Pacific theater. reactions, performances and outcomes Some of your most important policy that would be expected for goals should include trade liberalization representatives of the Republic of within Southeast Asia, maintaining Korea. Your work should not diverge stable relations with North Korea, and so far from the realm of possibility as to fostering strong bilateral be absurd in the context of South economic-political relationships with Korean diplomatic relations. As a the United States and China. regional peacekeeper and oasis of Paramount to all these goals, however, stability for diplomacy and economic is ensuring peace and prosperity for growth, you should be working towards Republic of Korea overall. As a key greater collaboration and prosperity in regional ally of the United States as well the region while acting strategically to as a growing economic and political engender support from other player in the international arena, the international actors. By embracing the Republic of Korea has a unique role rich heritage shared by all Koreans in when it comes to negotiations between the peninsula and by demonstrating the the Western and Eastern powers. skilled diplomacy that characterizes the Republic of Korea, you can ensure the Your State Council is limited only by the best for your people and country. same restraints that the Republic of In short, addressing the crisis in the Pacific theater will be your main topic 02 of concern in attempting to further the 30th, however, American soldiers were domestic and foreign policy interests of deployed to Korea along with a South Korea. Please use this 16-nation UN initiative under the Background Guide as a basis for your command of General MacArthur. If it further research and exploration of weren’t for the United States’ quick South Korean politics and global decision in June 1950, the rest of South current events in order to better Korea would have probably fallen. It prepare your positions for the was at this point that the war shifted conference. from a defense of what remained of the Republic of Korea to the reclamation of Historical Context former territory. On September 15th, UN In June 1950, 75,000 North Korean forces executed an amphibious assault troops invaded the Republic of Korea. on Inchon leading to the recapture of This all out attack by the North caught Seoul. With the aid of the 8th army in the South completely off guard and the south, MacArthur proceeded to cut resulted in the South Korean off the supply lines of North Korean government being unable to reorganize army forcing the North Korean army to a counter attack until the United States retreat. This reinvigorated the failing and the United Nations came to to their morale of the South Korean army as aid months later. Yet prior to the Seoul was both a psychological and outbreak of full out war, skirmishes strategic goal for South Korean, between North and South had been American, and UN army. very common; over ten thousand North and South Koreans had been killed by After Seoul fell to UN armies, these skirmishes prior to the invasion. What triggered the actual invasion is still up for debate, however, as the war drew on, it became clear that the North had been preparing for such an invasion for a long time. The South Korean army under dictator Syngman Rhee was far less trained and frightened by the sudden attack by the North Korean army. Within the first few months of the invasion, the North Korean army pushed past the 38th parallel to the capital of the Republic of Korea, Seoul. By the third day, Seoul fell and by early August, the remaining South Korean and U.S forces were forced into the southeastern corner of the peninsula. Cornered and low on supplies, South Korean and U.S forces established a defensive perimeter around the port city of Pusan. On June 03 STATE COUNCIL of THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 04 Less than six weeks earlier this force had been struggling to hold onto the last position in South Korea; now they sat in the capital of the north. MacArthur turned his attention towards the initial and ultimative offer leading maintaining the offensive, and to the UN to pass a resolution for the eventually pushing into North Korean reunification of Korea led by General territory. The UN Security Council MacArthur. advised President Truman to halt now that they had achieved success in As a result, General MacArthur retaking South Korea. Truman’s Chiefs combined the 8th Army division and the of Staff argued, however, for the 1st Marine division with Korean army destruction of the North Korean army. recruits and began to push into the President Truman agreed, and then North Korean territory. By September proceeded to launch an offensive to 29th, the coalition forces had captured unite both Koreas under the leadership the port city of Wonsan. However, the of President Rhee. International advance along the rest of the 38th response was almost immediate; China parallel had been slow as North Korean declared any forces near border would forces had dug themselves in all along be considered a threat to the nation. the line. On October 14th, the 1st Following suit, the Soviet Union called cavalry division captured Kumchon and for a ceasefire on the peninsula and opened the road for the rest of the India argued that UN and American forces to push into Pyongyang. Less forces should not cross the 38th than six weeks earlier this force had parallel. On October 1st, MacArthur been struggling to hold onto the last demanded that the North Korean army position in South Korea; now they sat in lay down their weapons and return all the capital of the north. The coalition UN prisoners to prevent any further forces were now poised to push past bloodshed and destruction to the the Yalu river and tributaries in the peninsula. North Korea refused both north for what would 05 STATE COUNCIL of THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA have been the end of the war.
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