THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF

THE NEW URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Anurupa Roy, M. A.

Graduate Program in Geography

The Ohio State University

2014

Dissertation Committee:

Kevin R. Cox, Advisor

Cathy A. Rakowski

Max Woodworth

© Copyright by

Anurupa Roy

2014

Abstract

In the wake of the neoliberal turn in India, urban development is increasingly gaining importance. This is not only because of the significant rise in urban population in recent years but also because urban areas are seen as the main “engines of growth”. The creation of new urban spaces and the development of the existing ones are deemed as the means towards greater progress of the economy. Therefore, in the current context, the issue of developmental dynamics is not divorced from the urban question. Taking an historical-geographical-materialist approach, I seek to examine the political economy of the new urban development in India. I assert that urban-space making and restructuring processes in India are primarily guided by the necessity for unrestrained accumulation on a global scale mainly through dispossession, intensification of the commodification process and redistribution of surpluses. In this regard, the state—at multiple geographical scales— plays a crucial role in the formation and reproduction of the urban spaces. This, however, is a matter of contestation and is largely conditioned by the nature and course of class struggle. I further argue that accumulation by dispossession is crucial to understanding the city-making politics, however, it is not necessarily characterized by extra-economic coercion, as often claimed in the current literature. In fact, the mechanisms and strategies used for attaining accumulation by dispossession are contingent rather than necessary.

Further, in the existing literature, the new middle class in India is presented as the main

ii motivating force for the urban-space (re)making politics. It is also seen as the greatest beneficiary of neoliberal urban politics. I contend that the ascendancy of the new Indian middle class is largely a socio-economic construction that is also politically motivated. I argue that middle class politics too is much more contingent in nature than it is generally considered to be. Thus I call for a more nuanced look at the middle class politics based on spatio-temporal specificities. Additionally, this study asserts that the new urban development is not aimed at the betterment of the poor majority, as often gloriously portrayed in the mainstream arena. I demonstrate that the impacts on the poor working class are socio-spatially marginalizing, thus exacerbating the existing uneven (urban) geographies.

iii

Dedication

Dedicated to my parents, husband and my little princess

iv

Acknowledgements

I owe this work to many people, without whom this dissertation would not have been possible. First of all I am immensely grateful to all my respondents, including

Government officials of Kolkata, who despite their busy schedules cooperated with me and willingly participated in the interviews. The interviewees came mostly from poor backgrounds and for them expending time on interviews often implied missing out on valuable time to earn a daily wage, yet they readily shared their problems and life experiences with me, my heartfelt gratitude to them. In this regard, my heartfelt thanks to my initial contacts and key informants, Dr. Partho Sarathi Ray and Mrinal Bhattacharya. I am extremely thankful to Nilotpal Dutta, who shared his invaluable experiences as an activist in Rajarhat area and helped me immensely in the interview process in the New

Town. I would also like to thank Pramod Gupta, Pratip Nag, Tarit Bhattacharya, Ranajit

Kanungo, Kamal Ghosh, Ela Ghosh and Shovon as they too provided useful information and helped in recruiting some of my interviewees.

Most importantly, I would like to thank my advisor, Prof. Kevin Cox, for his guidance, encouragement and patience over the years. I owe this work to his unwavering support throughout my research. His perceptive inputs during my fieldwork helped me to explore newer areas that have proved quite useful. I cannot thank him enough for his help with my doctoral degree.

v I express my gratitude to all my teachers and professors throughout my academic life who have contributed in their own ways to my journey thus far.

I would like to thank the Mershon Center for International Security Studies (Ohio

State) for partly funding my research fieldwork.

Finally, it is the love and support of my family that kept me motivated during the time of my doctoral research. In this regard, my grandmothers, Santikana Dutta and Renuka

Roy, have inspired me with their indomitable spirit and positive outlook towards life. I thank my brother, Abhirup Roy, for being the dearest friend and guide. My gratitude towards my parents, Bithi and Tapan Roy cannot be expressed in words. It is their sacrifices and unconditional love that have helped me sail through the entire academic journey. Also, thanks to my husband, Soumya, for being with me and helping me immensely in every possible way. In this process of completing my degree, I have constantly drawn strength and inspiration from my bundle of joy—my daughter, Aishani.

vi

Vita

March, 1998…………...... G.D. Birla Center for Education.

2001……………………...... B. Sc. Geography, Lady Brabourne College, University of Calcutta, West Bengal, India.

2003…………………………..M.Sc. Geography, University of Calcutta, West Bengal, India.

2006…………………………..M.A. Geography, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada.

2006 - present……...... Graduate Student, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA.

Field of Study

Major: Geography

vii

Table of Contents

Page

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….………………………….…….. ii

Dedication………………………………………………………………………………..…………………...... ….. iv

Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………….…………………………. v

Vita…………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………….... vii

List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………………………..……. xiii

Glossary………………………………………………………………………………………………………….… xiv

CHAPTER1: Introduction…………………………….……………………………………………....……… 1

1.1 Prologue………………………………………………………………………………………………….………. 1

1.2 Research Background……………….…………………………………………………………………...... 2

1.3 Research Interest….………………….……………………………………………………………………..... 3

1.4 Context……………….…………………………………………………………………………………...……… 4

1.5 Research Questions………………….……………………………………………………………………..... 9

1.6 Theorizing the New Urban Development in India…..……………………………………...... 10

1.7 Research Method………….………….…………………………………………………….……………..... 14

1.8 Research Strategy….……………………………………………………………………..…………..….…. 16

viii 1.9 Positionality……………………………………………………………………….………..….…………...... 20

1.10 Outline of the Dissertation……….…………………………………………………………….…...... 21

CHAPTER 2: The New Urban Development in India: Historical Context and Conceptual Framework……………...... 26

2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………..…… 26

2.2 Historical Context……………………………………………………………………………………….…. 29

2.2.1 The Pre-Reform Period……………………………………………………………………..……. 29

2.2.2 The Post-Reform Period.…………….…………………..……………………………...………. 32

2.3 Historical Background and Institutional Setting of Urban Development and Planning in India …………………………………………………..……………………….……… 33

2.4 Conceptual Themes of the New Urban Development…………………………………..…... 41

2.4.1 The Mainstream Approach…..………….………………………………………………...……. 41

2.4.2 The Critical Approach……………….……………………………………………………...….…. 43

2.4.2.1 Accumulation by Dispossession…….………….…………………………….…...…. 43

2.4.2.2 Urban Entrepreneurialism………………………………………………………..….... 45

2.4.2.3 The Middle Class…………………………………………………………………….…...… 47

2.4.2.4 The Micro-Practices of Urban Subalterns………………..…………………...…. 50

2.4.2.5 The Political-Economy of Class Struggle……………..……..………….……...… 52

2.5 Concluding Remarks and Outline of My Conceptual Framework……………….……... 53

CHAPTER 3: The Politics of Urban–Space Making on the Fringes: Dispossession and Development…………….………………...……….…..……… 69

3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………..……… 69

3.2 Dispossession Politics and Urban Development: Planned and Relatively Unplanned Urban Development……………………………..….... 71

ix 3.2.1 The Politics of City Making: Planned Urban Development in Rajarhat………. 73

3.2.1.1 Contextualizing Eminent Domain…….………………………………………….…. 73

3.2.1.2 Enclosure from Above…….……………………………………………………….….…. 75

3.2.1.3 Enclosure from Below……………………………………………….………………...... 79

3.2.1.4 Social Construction of “Urban Development”….….…..……………..……...….. 81

3.2.1.5 Ideology and City Making: Fetishizing the (World) City…………………… 91

3.2.1.6 State and Capital(s): Commodification, Speculation and City Making... 94

3.2.2 “Unplanned” or Private-Developer led Urban Extension………………..….……... 97

3.3 Effects and Survival Strategies…………………………..……………………………….....….…... 101

3.3.1 Economic Impacts………………………………..…………………………………………...….. 101

3.3.1.1 Commodified Labor and Living…..……………….………………...…………..….. 103

3.3.1.2 Gender and Work in the Emerging Urban Economy……….…………..…. 110

3.3.1.3 The Beneficiaries among the Resident Population……….…..……….…... 113

3.3.2 Socio-Cultural Impacts…………………………….………………………………………...... 116

3.4 The Politics of City Making and Resistance from Below……………..……...………..…...... 122

3.4.1 Oppositions against Planned Urban Development……………………….……....…. 123

3.4.1.1 Objectives of Struggle: Adversaries and Arbitrators…….….…..…..….…. 124

3.4.1.2 Forms of Struggle……………..……………………………….……….…………….….. 129

3.4.1.3 Limitations of the Resistance Movement…………….………….…….………. 134

3.4.2 Contestations against “Unplanned” Urban Development………………………... 138

3.5 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….………………….. 139

CHAPTER 4: Urban Restructuring in Kolkata………………………………………………….. 150

4.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….…….…………. 150

x 4.2 Entrepreneurial Kolkata………………………….…………………………….……………...……… 152

4.3 Geographies of (Semi) Privatization……………………….………………………………..……. 155

4.3.1 From “Ugly Shanties” to Developed-Aesthetic Zones……….………...…..….…….. 156

4.3.2 From “Mills to Malls” and Private Enclaves……….……………..……………...…….... 162

4.4 Instruments Creating Restructured Spaces…………………….………………….……...... 168

4.4.1 Direct Coercion or Physical Force……….……………………………………..….……….. 168

4.4.2 Institutional Means……….…………………………………………………...…….………….... 170

4.4.2.1 Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act………..…………………….………….. 171

4.4.2.2 Rent Control…………….……….…………………………………………………………. 172

4.4.2.3 Taxation Policy: Property Tax…………………………..….……………………….. 174

4.4.2.4 The Land Reforms Act of West Bengal—14(z) Amendment………..…. 175

4.4.3 Discursive Means……….……………………….……………………………………………….... 176

4.4.3.1 The Dichotomy between Legal and Illegal………………………..…..…….….. 176

4.4.3.2 Consensual Mechanisms: “Moralizing” the Poor.……………...………...…. 180

4.5 Impacts: Commodification of Living………..…………………..………………………..…...... 183

4.5.1 Destroying the Spaces of Production…………………………….……………….....……. 184

4.5.2 Destroying the Spaces of Reproduction: Commodified Living and Social Costs--“It’s like living in an island”……….………………………..………...... …. 189

4.6 Responses of the Poor Working Class: Canal-Bank Dwellers.……………………...... 195

4.6.1 Coping Mechanisms……….…………………….………………………….……………….……. 196

4.6.2 Resistances……….……………………………..….………………………….…………….………. 198

4.6.2.1 Covert Practices……………………………………………………………………..…….. 198

4.6.2.2 Overt Protests.……………………….……………………………………………………. 200

4.7 Conclusion.………………………………………………………………………………….…………...... 204

xi

CHAPTER 5: The Indian Middle Class and Its Politics…………………………………….... 215

5.1 Introduction………………………………………………………….…………………………………..… 215

5.2 Tracing the (New) Middle Class…………………………………………………………….……... 216

5.3 Middle-Class Politics………………………………………………………..…………………………... 225

5.3.1 Spaces of Conflict: Exclusionary Politics…………………………..…………....………. 226

5.3.2 Spaces of Collaboration: Accommodating Politics……………………….....………. 236

5.4 The State, the Middle Class and the Working Class………………….....……….………..... 242

5.5 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….….………………. 244

CHAPTER 6. Conclusion……………………………………………………………..…………….…..…. 252

6.1 Key Theoretical Contributions.…………………………………………………………….……..… 252

6.2 Gaps in the Study and Future Research Themes……..………..……….…………..….….… 258

6.3 Political Contributions and Policy Prospects…..………………………………………...…… 260

Bibliography..……………………………………………………………………………………..…………... 267

xii

List of Figures

Figure 1 Location of West Bengal in India……………………………………………………………..… 5

Figure 2 Map of Kolkata Metropolitan Area……………………..……………………………………… 8

Figure 3 The Rajarhat New Town near Kolkata………………………………………………..……… 8

Figure 4 Location of Joka-Pailan……………………………………………….……………………..……… 9

Figure 5 A billboard for a new apartment complex in Rajarhat New Town………….……... 93

Figure 6 Canal-Bank Dwellings………….………………………………………………………………..... 158

Figure 7 Canal-Bank Dwellings………….……………………………………………………………..…... 159

Figure 8 One of the resettlement areas for the canal-bank dwellers………………...……... 185

Figure 9 A small footbridge connecting a resettlement area with a paved road………..188

Figure 10 An apartment (room) in the resettlement area………………………………….……... 192

xiii

Glossary

ABD—Accumulation by Dispossession

ADB—Asian Development Bank

BIFR— Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction

BPO— Business Process Outsourcing

BRADA— Bhangar Rajarhat Area Development Authority

BSUP—Basic Services to the Urban Poor

BUAV— Base Unit Area Value

CESC— Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation

CPI(M)—Communist Party of India (Marxist)

DFID— Department for International Development

DPCE— Daily Per Capita Expenditure

EWS— Economical Weaker Section

FDI— Foreign Direct Investment

GDP— Gross Domestic Product

GNI— Gross National Income

HIDCO— Housing Infrastructure Development Corporation

HUDCO— Housing and Urban Development Corporation

ICT— Information and Communication Technology

IDFC— Infrastructure Development Finance Company

xiv IDSMT— Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns

IIR—India Infrastructure Report

IMF— International Monetary Fund

ITES— Information Technology Enabled Services

IUDP— Integrated Urban Development Programme

JNNURM—Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission

KEIP— Kolkata Environment Improvement Project

KMA— Kolkata Metropolitan Area

KPO— Knowledge Process Outsourcing

LIG— Low Income Group

MIG— Middle Income Group

MPCE — Monthly Per Capita Expenditure

NCEUS— National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector

NCU— National Commission on Urbanization

NIMBY— Not-In-My-Back-Yard

NRI— Non-Resident Indian

NSSO— National Sample Survey Organization

PIO— Person of Indian Origin

PPP—Public-Private Partnership

SEZ—Special Economic Zone

UAA— Unit Area Assessment

UBSP— Urban Basic Services for Poor

UIG—Urban Infrastructure and Governance

ULBs—Urban Local Bodies

xv ULCRA—Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act

VAMBAY— Valmiki Ambedkar Awas Yojana (Valmiki Ambedkar Housing Project)

VRS—Voluntary Retirement Scheme

xvi

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Prologue

“There are two Indias in this country. One India is straining at the leash, eager to spring forth and live up to all the adjectives that the world has been recently showering upon us. The other India is the leash! One India says give me a chance and I will prove myself. The other India says, prove yourself first and may be then you will have a chance. One India lives in the optimism of our hearts. The other India lurks in the skepticism of our minds. One India wants, the other India hopes. One India leads, the other India follows…. With each passing day more and more people from the other India are coming over to this side. And quietly, while the world is not looking, a pulsating dynamic new India is emerging…. History is turning a page.

For over half a century our nation has sprung, stumbled, run, fallen, rolled over, got up and dusted herself, cantered, sometimes lurched on. But now in our 60th year as a free nation the ride has brought us to the edge of time’s great precipice. And one India, a tiny little voice at the back of the head is looking down the bottom of the ravine and hesitating. The other India is looking up at the sky and saying, it’s time to fly!”

“The New India”—excerpt from a promotional video on the 60th year of India’s Independence.1

1 1.2 Research Background

In recent years a growing optimism about the emerging “new” India is popularly held. The country that was previously associated with traditions and orthodoxy is suddenly considered as the land of opportunities. The land of snake charmers is now increasingly seen as the center of information technology, especially among the developing economies.

The country with karmic submissions and contentedness is supposed to be geared towards never-ending ambitions. India is envisioned as an emerging new global seat of power and is believed to be on the move towards a renaissance, and all this in the wake of neoliberal turn.

The “shining India" is registered in the high GDP growth rate since 2000, which averaged about 6%, with foreign exchange reserves showing an unprecedented rise to $106 billion.

According to McKinsey Global Institute, India’s urban population is likely to reach 590 million in 2030 from 340 million in 2008. That is a growth of almost 74% in two decades.

Today India is the fourth-largest energy consumer in the world, trailing just behind the

United States, China and Russia. At the same time, India also reflects abject poverty, as approximately 70% of the population earns less than $2 per day. The Human Development

Index is 0.554, which is quite poor thus making India’s rank 136th in 2013. India also has more than a third of world’s malnourished children (which is greater than sub-Saharan

Africa) with an average of 1.25 million children below the age of one dying every year due to various health issues. In the Global Hunger Index, India ranks 67 out of 80 countries and many economists argue that in terms of food security India is back at the state where it was in the pre-Independence period (Patnaik, 2002).

The existence of the two sides of India is a relatively known fact. However, the growing claims that the progressive India is taking over the regressive part are open to challenges. It is well established that there are significant changes sweeping across the

2 country, although we do not quite know the direction of this change. Specifically, it is important to shed light on how India is changing, i.e., the processes involved in contributing towards the changes and the implications of those changes. The face of the shining India is undoubtedly the urban sector. The creation of new urban areas and the development of existing ones are deemed the means towards greater development of the Indian economy.

In the current context, the developmental dynamics cannot be divorced from the urban question, and this calls for probing deeper into the processes of urban development and restructuring in India.

1.3 Research Interest

The idea for this research originally came about for two reasons. One was intellectual and the other a personal one. I was thus initially struck by the growing struggles over the question of urban development in India. At the same time there was a plethora of reports on the positive and glorified images of the emerging urban spaces catering to the growing middle and elite classes. The juxtaposition of India vs. India that I refer to in the beginning of the chapter is what attracted my attention. The following quotes, from newspaper and online news articles, highlight some of the crucial instances of this.

Recently, Vedic Village, an upscale resort sprawling out in Rajarhat (near Kolkata), was torched down by angry villagers. This vent of public anger was the culmination of a history of brutal land acquisition in the area, perpetrated since the 1990’s by the CPI(M).2

More than 400 people who had encroached on a state government plot in Nonadanga, off the EM Bypass, were evicted on Friday to expedite an infrastructure project. Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) officials arrived at the area, around a kilometer from Ruby hospital, with bulldozers and dumpers around 10am. When the encroachers resisted the drive,

3 police detained at least 50 of them. They were set free in the afternoon after the operation had been completed.3

Farmers from around 60 villages in Vadodara and neighboring Bharuch districts [Gujarat, India] today took out a rally against acquisition of their farmlands for upcoming developmental projects.4

Since a change in degree (quantity) often signifies a change in nature (quality)5, I was interested in understanding the changing nature of the (new) urban development in India.

What piqued my interest further were the striking spatial transformations in the landscape in and around my hometown, Kolkata. I witnessed that during my visits to the city in recent years. I was keen to study the forms, understand and unpack the underlying processes; in short examine the nature of the new urban development in India, basing it in

Kolkata and its periphery.

1.4 Context

My research focuses on the recent developmental changes unfolding in and around the city of Kolkata, which is the capital of West Bengal province, located in the eastern part of the country (Figure 1). West Bengal boasts a vibrant political history that is replete with political movements such as the Tebhaga agitation in 1946 and the Naxalite movement in the 1970s.6 Even during the colonial era, West Bengal has produced many revolutionaries in the political struggle for Independence. Based on this volatile history, it can be stated that people in West Bengal are comparatively more politically conscious and progressive than is the case in other states in India (Chatterjee, 1997).

In Kolkata too, trade union movements have had a longer history than in any other place in India. The Left Front headed by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI-M

4 governed West Bengal for almost three decades (1977-2011). The CPI-M led government was known for pro-poor and pro-worker policies. The peasants and workers formed the most important electoral base for the government. However, in recent years there has been a sea change in the ideological position of the government (partly attributable to the broader politico-economic changes at the central level) and its actions have stimulated mass oppositions and antagonisms, especially with respect to urban development and its attendant politics.7 Kolkata bears the imprint of the changes happening throughout urban

India, but it also has its own unique historical, socio-economic traits and fervid political culture, which lend a distinctive character to the political economy of urban development in this region.

Figure 1. Location of West Bengal in India8

5 The colonial legacy is evident in the fact that it was the capital of the British Raj till

1911, after which Delhi became the seat of administrative power. Yet Kolkata retained its significance as a center of trade and commerce and seat of cultural activities. It is counted as one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the country where a large number of immigrants and refugees were accommodated and assimilated, although not without contestation. Slums and squatter settlements had existed along with middle class housing without much problem. There were few high-rise buildings before the neoliberal turn and for the most part housing consisted of individually owned, single dwelling units. Markets were open and mostly found along roads in designated areas, with smaller stores all over the city. Factories existed in close proximity to residential areas and workers’ quarters or housing were also situated either within the factory premises or in some nearby locality.

However, with the liberalization of the Indian economy, the wealth of the city—in the forms of high-rises and swanky residential complexes, “new” concepts of upscale living such as golf courses, seven star hotels, luxury spas, huge shopping malls, McDonalds and

KFCs, billboards all over the city featuring BMWs, Porsches, the availability of all forms of luxurious goods— has come to vividly contrast with increasingly squalid and poor zones.

These poor enclaves too are being rapidly whisked away through multiple evictions and dispossession drives largely undertaken by the local state.

The “new” urban development currently underway in India (including in and around Kolkata) primarily takes two forms. On the one hand there is peripheral development. This pertains to the creation of new urban spaces occurring through changes in the existing land use from rural to urban, i.e., from agricultural to non-farming activities.

This is achieved through the superimposition of urban functions (including administrative and socio-economic). Urban-space making is achieved in part through the establishment of

6 planned townships in a hitherto rural hinterland focusing exclusively on particular functions such as residential or administrative, or the creation of a completely self- sustaining town rendering multiple functions. It is also seen in the extension of the city through relatively unplanned and spontaneous means by bringing at the peripheral areas of an existing city or a town within its fold.9 Another and second form of urban development is largely evident in the built-up area of the city itself through various restructuring and redevelopment processes.10

Study areas

The Kolkata Metropolitan Area [KMA] stretches over 1886.7 square kilometers on either bank of River Hooghly (a distributary of River Ganges). The population of KMA is about 17 million in 2011, which is projected to be over 21 million in 2025. The core city that constitutes the Kolkata Municipal Corporation [KMC] is about 185 square kilometers, lying entirely on the eastern bank of the river (Figure 2).

My intent has been to explore the forms and processes of urban development in

India. In part I have done this by focusing on the establishment of a township on the fringes of Kolkata, The Rajarhat New Town, located in the district of North 24 Parganas (Figure 3).

Before the township was founded, Rajarhat was an administrative block within the district, originally consisting of 55 mouzas (villages), of which 25 mouzas have been taken up for the township development. The estimated population of the region is about 355,000.

Its distance from the downtown or central business district of Kolkata is about 12 miles. I also look at the urban extension in the southern part of Kolkata in South 24 Parganas district (a part of the Joka-Pailan stretch along the Diamond Harbor Road), where relatively unplanned urban-space making is underway (Figure 4).

7

Figure 2. Map of Kolkata Metropolitan Area11

Figure 3. The Rajarhat New Town near Kolkata12

8

Figure 4. Location of Joka-Pailan13

1.5 Research Questions

This research is based on some key questions. It seeks to answer in particular the rationale behind the current form of India’s new urban development. It aims to unpack the causal relationships between the forms and processes shaping urban-space (re)making. In particular: how do material and discursive means interplay and affect the processes of urban development? How are the forces conditioning global capitalism implicated at more local levels? Also, what is the role of the state in conditioning and reorganizing urban spaces? In this regard, I intend to examine the increasing politicization of (urban) land transformations. Concurrently, who are the other actors and what is their role vis-à-vis the

9 state in influencing the nature and course of urban development? Further, how is the politics of urban restructuring and space making along multiple lines of contestation articulated? Thus this study also enquires about the socio-cultural, economic and political impacts of space production. Broadly, my work attempts to explore the possibilities of whether or not this new urbanization can be the panacea for India’s developmental problems.

1.6 Theorizing the New Urban Development in India

Urban-space making forms an integral part of the planning agenda in India today.

Following the neoliberal turn, there was a discernible shift in planning focus from rural to urban development at both national and provincial state levels. Glorified and positive accounts of urban development are abundant, especially in the mainstream approach found in policy studies, planning discourses and management studies; whereas, the critical approach examines the impacts and questions the effectiveness of an urban development, rooted in neoliberal principles, on and for the majority of the population in the country.

From an historical-materialist perspective, urban-space making is seen as a means of furthering the interests of transnational and domestic capital in the developing world.

Accumulation, in the wake of the neoliberal turn, is largely based on dispossession, using predatory means to appropriate existing resources and thus releasing uncommodified or undercommodified land and labor into the sphere of circulation (Harvey, 2001). This perspective clearly prioritizes the so-called “supply side.” On the other hand, another strand of literature sees the “new Indian middle class” as the driver of the new urban development in India. The main problem with this view is that it fails to situate this middle class demand

10 within the broader politico-economic framework. There is also the entrepreneurial city approach. This sees cities as participating in territorial competition for attracting and spatially pinning down ever-transient global capital. All these approaches are largely top- down in perspective. They stress macro-economic practices in shaping and creating urban spaces.

In contrast, the politics of subalterns and micro-practices of the dispossessed and displaced population examine the (re)negotiations of spaces with the local state. It thus examines the various informal means used by the subalterns, which fall beyond the reach of formal planning, to bargain for their rights and privileges. The focus is on the power of the urban subalterns rather than on the elites (as in the former approach). In close relation to the former approach, though, is the issue of the right to the city. It raises questions about urban citizenship rights in relation to the changing nature of urban governance.

My work situates itself broadly within an historical-geographical materialist approach, in which urban-space (re)making is explained as an object of accumulation. This is largely effected and conditioned by dispossession, intensification of commodification processes and the reorganization of surpluses. Dispossession and displacement of population are thus integral aspects of urban development politics in India today. Policy is largely based on the world city vision. The drive to “first-world”14 cities is not only based on material pressures conditioned by the forces of globalization but it is also backed up by strong rhetorical influences articulated in dominant socio-political narratives. The

Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission [JNNURM] program is a part of the broader urban restructuring process that is sweeping across Indian cities at present. The

Indian state— at various scales— has been actively mobilizing resources and organizing urban space towards this end through infrastructural and real estate developments

11 supported, in turn, by changes brought about in legal and ideological frameworks.

Accordingly, there have been a number of amendments in the existing laws and establishment of the new ones. To name a few, the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, Urban

Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act of 1976, recent changes in Foreign Direct Investment laws have all been modified and bottlenecks removed in order to assist in land acquisitions and (peri) urban land “developmental” projects. The power of eminent domain, which underlies the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, is being used indiscriminately by the state at all levels to acquire land for city making. Eminent domain gives leverage to the needs and decisions of the state over the general population, as the ultimate goal of the state is deemed to be for the “common good” or “public purpose”. The term “public purpose” is discursively reproduced to serve the needs of capital and legitimize the actions of the state. Nevertheless, the legal and institutional changes orchestrated by the state are foundational to the planning and implementation of urban-space making processes in India.

In the existing literature the “new Indian middle class” is believed to be providing significant impetus for the new developments in urban spaces. It is believed to be the torchbearer of consumption practices entrenched in world city views and ideals. The hegemonic representations of the middle class through its everyday practices and ideals supposedly provide a normative standard for the subalterns who are to aspire to the

“modern lifestyle”. The state, along with the media and civic organizations, are serving as important conduits of change and reconstitution of identities in disseminating and popularizing the dominant ideology regarding modernization. The products and practices of globalization in neoliberal India are providing marks of distinction for the middle class.

They are not only actively trying to be the agents of the change but are also asserting their rightful claims to the benefits of liberalization. By adopting “modern” values and ideals,

12 which are reflected in their transforming lifestyles, consumption patterns, behavioral traits, and overall attitudinal changes, this social group, purposefully or inadvertently, is making powerful statements. This middle class politics is not just confined to the discursive sphere but also makes its presence felt more materially through cooperation with the state and parastatal institutions and civic organizations, either through direct engagement or passive consensus in “spatial purification” 15 processes. These processes are often seen as constituting a revanchist restructuring politics leading to “interdictory spaces” 16 that exclude and discriminate against the urban subalterns. The image and realities of globalization condition the responses and identities of not only the elites and middle class but also the urban subalterns. However, this argument does not take into account the socio- economic and political construction of the middle class. I argue for a more nuanced look at the middle class politics in this regard, which is not always pro-neoliberal urban development and thus anti-poor.

There is little doubt that dispossession, eviction and displacement of people are associated with current urban–space making processes. This leads to destruction of livelihoods and spaces of (re)production. However, the impacts on the people involved and their responses to these processes are both complex and highly variable—economically, socio-culturally, politically and regionally. The socio-cultural and politico-economic impacts of urban land developmental politics are resisted at different levels. Contestation is never absent; it is violent and overt at times, but in most cases people resort to multiple survival strategies and everyday practices of resistance, which can broadly be termed as “weapons of the weak”. Depending on the underlying objectives, the strategies of opposition are shaped. Aggressive conflicts have been observed in many parts of India in the event of dispossession and displacement of people from their means of labor and spaces of

13 (re)production. The role of the state, at different geographical scales, gains importance here.

It tries to legitimize its actions in trying to accommodate conflicting class interests, appeasing any explosive opposition without jeopardizing its position. I seek to explore the fertile ground of common interests that is emerging, especially on the questions of right to the city, among the urban disenfranchised population.

1.7 Research Method

In relation to the above research questions, I use an intensive research approach.

Intensive research focuses on identifying and understanding causal, structural and substantive relations of connection between agents and conditions. “At the level of more concrete events the results may be unique, in so far as intensive methods identify particular structures into which individuals are locked. The abstract knowledge of these may be more generally applicable, although it will take further research to establish how general they are” (Sayer, 1992: 242-251).17 In trying to identify the relevant structures of relations I take an historical-geographical-materialist view. This is rooted in the principle that in order to understand the contemporary world, it is crucial to base the analysis in material conditions but as they are specific to a particular time and place. This includes the various discourses in play. Knowledge and the power emanating from knowledge are not produced in a social vacuum, but are socially conditioned and these social conditions have bases in production.

In my work discursive analysis is thus important in the overall understanding of the world

(things, forms, events, processes, actions etc.) but with a firm grounding in the material reality. An historical-geographical-materialist view of the world, therefore, not only helps in incorporating discourse analysis within its framework but it is also able to relate that to the

14 underlying material conditions with the purpose of transforming the knowledge produced into (active) radical politics.

The research also pivots on dialectical method. Intensive research largely relies on dialectics. The ontological basis of dialectical thinking is internal relations between objects and processes. One of the essential features of dialectics is change brought about by internal contradictory or conflicting forces. According to Marx’s dialectics, “things” are viewed as flows and processes, related to each other internally and externally. These flows or processes may crystallize into things or “permanences”, which although may appear as fixed are actually in flux (Harvey, 1996: 50). Internal relations refer to the necessary relations between objects.18 For example, capitalism and geographically uneven development have a necessary relationship. Capitalism produces uneven spatial development and the latter is necessary for the reproduction of capitalism. Again, labor and capital have a necessary relationship with each other; one cannot exist without the other. On the other hand there are contingent relations, which although possible are not necessary. For example, it is necessary for capitalists to accumulate; otherwise they would be extinct. But how they do that, whether through lengthening the working day or revolutionizing the production process through technological changes are contingent matters. Further, whether a capitalist is man or a woman, a black or a white, employing migrant workers or local workers are all contingent matters, albeit important.

Accordingly, in trying to understand the production of urban spaces I see them in relational terms (Harvey, 2006). Spaces are largely (re)created and sustained by human practices, which are carried out within some socio-structural framework. Space (like time) is an ahistoric concept, which attains a specific character in different historical contexts (for instance, different modes of production). Spaces are produced by material, symbolic and

15 discursive practices.19 The tension between internal (necessary) and external (contingent) relations is what characterizes the production and reproduction of (relational) space.

Therefore to understand the concept of development of a particular region in the world, it is important to examine the relation of one place to other places, and the local has to be placed within the broader global context.

Intensive research primarily relies on qualitative methods. Accordingly, I have employed interactive interviews, informal conversations, observations and group discussions. Content analysis and archival searches of print media such as newspapers and other magazines; published and unpublished documents collected from government offices, non-governmental agencies, political organizations, resistance movement groups and social activists also provided useful information and facilitated my work.

1.8 Research Strategy

I reached Kolkata to conduct my fieldwork in 2010. It was completed in two phases. The first was from January 2010 to May 2010 and the second one stretched from November

2010 to June 2011. Thus I was in the field for twelve months. Before leaving for the field, I contacted two of my informants from Columbus (Ohio) over the phone to set up the initial interviews. My first key contact was a research scientist who was also involved actively in diverse political struggles in India, especially in Kolkata. My second informant was a worker in a non-governmental organization and had been working on the issues concerning slum evictions in Kolkata. I came to know about my key contacts through my previous visits to

Kolkata, family and friends.

16 The principal method of data collection for addressing my research objective was semi- structured, interactive interviews. The selection of the interviewees was done mainly through snowball sampling. I chose snowball sampling20 over other methods for two main reasons. First, it was deliberately meant to be partly exploratory in nature, because stringent specification at the very outset of the research often makes it rigid, leaving little scope for impromptu changes on the field according to situational demands (Sayer, 1992;

2000). It started with a couple of contacts, which led to more contacts, and as the research proceeded, the network of contacts grew (Flowerdew and Martin, 2005: 117). Moreover, for my research it was important to have open and candid discussions with my respondents as they mostly belonged to the underprivileged class comprising mainly dispossessed farmers, landless laborers and residents of squatters and slums, which necessitated trust in the interviewer. A snowball sampling method thus was also chosen to overcome the problem of trust building. Thus, my initial contacts were political activists who helped put me in touch with other respondents with whom they had already established a relationship of trust through years of close interactions. This helped in surmounting the problem of initiating the interview process. Therefore, in terms of logistics and practicality as well as requirements for addressing my research objectives, snowball sampling was deemed as the most suitable method.

Since my work was based in and around Kolkata, all the interviews have been carried out in the city and the fringes, located in the adjoining districts of North 24 Parganas and South 24 Parganas. For my study, I have interviewed a wide range of people comprising dispossessed farmers (including sharecroppers who have lost their means of living), landless laborers, slum and squatter dwellers (already evicted or impending eviction), political activists, real estate developers, younger people working in new retail centers in

17 swanky shopping malls, residents of upscale neighborhood, government officials and NGO workers. On an average, each interview lasted for 60-90 minutes; interviews with government officials (including Ministers and members of Legislative Assembly) lasted for a maximum of 45 minutes. Most of the interviews were conducted in the native language,

Bengali, as that is what common people were conversant in. Occasionally, interviews with real estate developers and government officials have been carried out in English. Most of the interviews were tape-recorded with permission from the interviewees. In some cases, however, respondents were not comfortable with their interviews being recorded; in these situations, detailed notes were taken. At times, informal conversations have proved to be very useful and in those cases I have taken brief notes during the chats. The informal conversations have often taken place in groups. These discussions were not deliberately planned around a topic and the composition of the group was not fixed beforehand. Rather they often took place in a tea stall or on an open ground or a market place impromptu.

Usually dispossessed farmers and evicted slum dwellers who had gathered in a place to chit-chat amongst themselves have enthusiastically engaged in informal discussions with me sharing their opinions about a number of issues related to the politics of urban development.

Barring a few interviewees, in general, most of my respondents were cooperative and were keen to talk to me about their problems and woes. The ones who were not willing to share information were mainly government officials and real estate developers. They were suspicious of my motives and the consequences they might face if they openly talked with me. I have had problems recruiting respondents who were in positions of power, since the topic that I chose was a fervid issue at that time. This problem was amplified greatly during the state elections, which happened at the later stages of my fieldwork in April 2011.

18 At that time even common people, such as dispossessed farmers and slum dwellers, were extremely wary as a result of the tense political situation; this made them cautious and unwilling to participate in any kind of conversations about the pressing, yet volatile, issues.

Also, there have been times when I was mistaken as a government employee and since a general ire and discontentment prevailed among the subalterns towards the state for being at the forefront of various dispossession and eviction drives, some interviewing procedures were not smooth. The respondents were hostile towards me, at least initially and thus were reluctant to engage in any conversation; instead many actually hurled verbal abuse.

However, the moment they realized that I was not a representative of the government and was interested in understanding their standpoints, most of them were apologetic and welcomed me without any reservations.

After the fieldwork, all the tape-recorded interviews were transcribed. Even though

I had noted down the key points of the interviews and transcribed some of the crucial ones during my fieldwork, I mostly completed the transcription process after returning to the

USA. I used a grounded method in approaching the research problem. Thus the framing of the data and generation of the theory were based on the information and data collected from the field. The transcripts of the interviews and secondary materials collected during the research were read numerous times and important themes and issues related to the research questions were identified. These were then “open coded” 21 or thematically arranged and conceptually organized.

19 1.9 Positionality

A researcher’s position is an important aspect of a study, because it not only influences the phase of research design and fieldwork but also plays a key role in the way the materials are interpreted. It is important thus to analyze and be aware of this. Since I have spent a considerable amount of my life in Kolkata, my tacit knowledge about the place helped me in many ways. For instance, I was conversant in the language—Bengali— which my respondents spoke with me, including the local dialect. This is important because apart from being a tool of communication, it also allowed a more nuanced understanding of their answers. However, my class position among some of the interviewees—who belonged to the working class—was a deterrent. Since I was studying abroad (in the USA) and was perceived as a part of the elite brigade, many were initially suspicious (if not totally averse) to interacting with me. It took me several visits to forge a friendly relationship with them before they opened up about their experiences with me. On the other hand, my “privileged” status in their eyes was considered advantageous due to the greater possibility of communicating their problems to the higher authorities. This made them more responsive.

My class position, which was problematic for a section of the poor working class, actually helped in recruiting interviewees among the members of the middle class because of locational and socio-economic similarities. Moreover, the fact that I was studying in a reputed university in the USA evoked curiosity and interest not only among the respondents from middle-class neighborhoods but also among the youth in the upcoming township in Rajarhat They were keen to know about the culture and my experiences in a new country and this helped in having quite open and candid conversations, thus facilitating my fieldwork.

20 The government officials were somewhat cooperative, but given the volatility of the issue, they were not forthcoming in sharing important information. In this regard, I believe my gender identity helped in “extracting” more information from the officials, as the stereotypical image of “a woman being relatively harmless and docile” led them to divulge some of their “trade secrets”, especially with regard to the techniques used for land acquisitions and evictions: “For centuries it was assumed that women were less intelligent than men...she was never the observing eye” (Young, 2003: 5). Generally, they were quite cautious, but in the bid to flaunt their supremacy over the dispossessed and evicted population and their ingenuity in managing it, they disclosed more information than they otherwise would have. On these occasions, however, they insisted on me refraining from recording the interviews.

1.10 Outline of the Dissertation

The dissertation is divided into six chapters. The second chapter provides a historical background of the new urban development in India. It seeks to shed light on those internal and external conditions impinging on the country that led to the neoliberal turn in

1990s. The chapter outlines the reforms implemented after liberalization and how they differ from the past redistributive goals rooted in socialist ideals. It also traces the historical conditions and the rationale behind the salience of the urban question in India in recent times. In this chapter, I also review the literature and highlight the major themes of the topic concerning India’s new urban development. The extant literature can be broadly divided into two approaches—the mainstream and the critical. The mainstream approach heavily draws upon planning discourses, policy and management studies. These works

21 present largely positive accounts of the current form of urban development in India. The main themes dealt with in the critical approach are: accumulation by dispossession; urban entrepreneurialism; the role of the “new middle class”; the micro-practices of the subalterns; and the class struggle approach with a major emphasis on the concept of the right to the city. The chapter concludes with a critical evaluation of the extant literature and briefly discusses the conceptual framework for the present study.

The main objective of the third chapter is to explore the urban-space making politics that is taking place on the fringes of Kolkata. It argues that accumulation by dispossession, with the purpose of intensifying the commodification and speculative processes, is the mainstay of urban development politics observed there today. It is analyzed with respect to two juxtaposing cases, the planned city formation in the northeastern part (Rajarhat New

Township) and the relatively unplanned or private-developer-led urban-space making in the southern part. The chapter further establishes that accumulation by dispossession is not necessarily characterized by extra-economic coercion, but consensual means along with market forces can play important roles in influencing the process. I argue that, even though coercive methods are significant, the mechanisms and strategies used for attaining accumulation by dispossession are contingent rather than necessary and depend largely on the spatio-temporal context. The role of the state gains prominence in facilitating unhindered accumulation (by dispossession) in direct collusion with transnational and domestic capital. Further, this chapter also probes the socio-cultural and economic impacts on, and responses of, the dispossessed and displaced population.

The fourth chapter analyzes the urban restructuring processes in the Kolkata

Metropolitan Area. It examines the spatial forms that are apparent in the increasing privatization of spaces. The chapter aims to unpack the social processes that define the

22 entrepreneurial activities undertaken by the local state and its appurtenances in shaping the city. The experiences of squatter settlements along the banks of canals form a focus for understanding this exclusionary urban politics. A second focus is the re-commodification of factory lands in the city that have fallen to state ownership; a process allowing growing speculation and rising real estate development. This, however, is not a seamless process.

Chapter 4 thus also explores the terrain of contestations, negotiations and collaborations that evolves vis-à-vis the local state and the urban subalterns.

The fifth chapter dissects the role of the “new middle class” in India. The emerging middle class is touted as the greatest beneficiary of the liberalization process and it is projected as the main driver of the current course of urban development. This chapter aims at problematizing the nature of middle class politics in India by unpacking the character of the so-called new middle class. I assert that its primacy is not just in the size of the class, but the construction the idea of middle class also serves as an ideological framework. I call for a more nuanced look at the middle class politics based on spatio-temporal specificities. Thus I argue that middle class politics is much more contingent in nature than it is generally considered to be. Also, I argue that the ascendancy of the new Indian middle class is largely a social construction, economically and politically motivated.

23 Notes

1 The iconic and renowned movie actor in India, Amitabh Bachchan, rendered this speech on the eve of India’s 60th year of Independence in 2007. The Times of India group presented it as a promotional video to convey the message of recent successes and the growing importance of the Indian economy globally. Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KNomFKB8sgk accessed on 23rd March 2014 2 Source: http://sanhati.com/articles/1766/ accessed on October 19, 2009 3 Source:http://www.telegraphindia.com/1120331/jsp/calcutta/story_15315924.jsp#.UGEP_I1lRPg accessed on June 27, 2012 4 Source: http://news.outlookindia.com/items.aspx?artid=771252 published—Outlook accessed on August 27, 2012 5 This is one of the cornerstones in dialectical thinking. Bertell Ollman articulates the relation between quantity-quality in dialectics, “Initially, movement within any process takes the form of quantitative change. One or more of its aspects—each process being also a relation composed of aspects—increases or decreases in size or number. Then, at a certain point—which is different for each process studied—a qualitative transformation takes place, indicated by a change in its appearance and/or function. It has become something else while, in terms of its main constituting relationships, remaining essentially the same…. Only when money reaches a certain amount, Marx says, does it become capital, that is, can it function to buy labor-power and produce value” (2003; 16- 17). 6 In 1946 the Tebhaga movement was organized under the leadership of Communist Party of India [CPI] in West Bengal. It was a movement principally organized by the sharecroppers, where they stood against the landowners [jotdars and zamindars] to claim two-third of the produce, as against half of the total produce as prevalent at that time. It also questioned the authority of the landowners over the production of sharecroppers. Thus the concept of “land to the tiller” was established during this period. The Naxalite movement is a primarily a peasant movement based on Maoist ideologies that started in late 1960s and early 1970s in India. The term derives from the village Naxalbari in West Bengal, where the movement originated; since then it has spread over a wide area in India mainly in the tribal belt of the country. It was a violent uprising that sought to redistribute land to the landless through armed struggle. 7 The ire and discontent of the general public was largely expressed in the last state government elections in May 2011, where after a long stint of more than three decades, the CPI(M) led government was ousted and replaced by the Trinamool Congress, headed by the current Chief Minister, Ms Mamata Banerjee. 8 Source: http://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_Bengal accessed on 31st March, 2014 9 In the advanced countries such as USA this type of urban development is referred to as “greenfield” development along with the appurtenances of suburban living that includes shopping malls, large self-contained residential complexes, rapid highway connections on the rural hinterland of an urban area. 10 It is equivalent to the urban form of brownfield sites as noted in the developed world. 11 Map obtained from Kolkata Municipal Corporation and reproduced with prior permission. 12 Source: http://www.indianrealestateforum.com/attachments/real-estate- kolkata/14928d1346910606-rajarhat-road-base-price-hiked-rajarhat_map.jpg accessed on 24th January, 2014 13 Map by author, courtesy Chalantika Laha Salui 14 It refers to emulating and following the modernization project seen in the global cities of the First World (Banerjee-Guha, 2010) 15 Sibley, 1995; Fernandes, 2006 16 Flusty, 1994

24

17 “Proponents of extensive methods sometimes argue that intensive research fails to produce ‘objective’ results because its results are not representative (i.e. not replicated elsewhere). But provided there is no pretense that the whole population is ‘represented’, there is no reason why an intensive study should be less ‘objective’ (i.e. uncorroborated) about its particular subject matter than an extensive study” (Sayer, 1992: 249). 18 Marx uses an example to illustrate the basic principles of dialectics. “Half man, half demon, Cacus lived in a cave and came out only at night to steal oxen. Wishing to mislead his pursuers, Cacus forced the oxen to walk backward into his den so that their footprints made it appear that they had gone out from there. The next morning, when people came looking for their oxen, all they found were footprints. Based on the evidence of these footprints, they concluded that, starting from the cave, their oxen had gone into the middle of a field and disappeared” (Marx, 1971: 536-37; cited in Ollman, 2003: 12-13). 19 “Space, is neither absolute, relative or relational in itself, but it can become one or all simultaneously depending on the circumstances” (Harvey, 1973:13) 20 Snowball sampling is a method in which the recruitment of interviewees is done through (some) initial contacts, which in turn help in putting in touch with other possible interviewees. This way recruitment gains momentum or ‘snowballs’ and the researcher builds up layers of contact (Flowerdew and Martin, 2005: 117). 21 Flowerdew and Martin, 2005: 222.

25

Chapter 2

The New Urban Development in India:

Historical Context and Conceptual Framework

2.1 Introduction

Urbanization and urban development have been important themes in Western scholarship, especially given the significance of these processes in advanced capitalist countries. With over three quarters of the total population living in the cities in the developed world, especially in Western Europe and the US, the focus on the urban along with its attendant processes have certainly garnered great scholarly attention. However, it is quite different for the Global South.22 The majority of the population in this region lives in rural areas, although in terms of absolute numbers, the size of the urban population in the developing countries is far from insignificant. Since the beginning of the post-Fordist era, with the neoliberal turn at a worldwide scale, the Global North and South have been undergoing rapid and remarkable changes in urban processes, generating distinct politico- economic outcomes and socio-spatial forms. The nature, intensity and course of development, however, are markedly different in both regions.

In the wake of the global neoliberal regime, a “new spatial order”23 has come into effect. It essentially reflects multi-faceted and multi-scalar dynamics that promote acute inter-urban and intra-urban competition and an intense interplay of the global and the local

26 (Banerjee-Guha, 2011). In this regard, it can be asserted that the Global South is experiencing an unprecedented neoliberal onslaught leading to astounding transformations in the socio-economic, political and spatial fabric. The processes of urban-space making and restructuring are finding increasing salience in this part of the world with a rescaling of state spaces24 and a recasting of the urban.25

Countries in the developing world largely reflect the colonial past in their city forms and processes. The cities were mainly geared towards meeting the demands of the core regions (colonizers). There were key sites, mainly located near the sea or waterfront, which formed the nodes of accumulation and exchange. The cities in the Global South thus were not planned with regard to the internal needs of the economy; their orientation was external. Moreover, the continuous influx of the rural population into the relatively

“unplanned” urban areas in this part of the world creates further problems. The ubiquitous element, emblematic of cities in the Third World, is the slum and squatter settlement. With deeper and wider connectivity and interlacement of the global and the local in the increasingly globalizing world, there is also intensification of uneven, including urban, geographical development. This is seen in the high growth rate of the population in the urban areas of the developing world, prompting many scholars to predict the possibility of a

“planet of slums”26 in the future.27

The recent conceptualizations of denationalized28, revanchist29, entrepreneurial30 and hyperpolarized31 urban (re)development in the West do not capture the socio-spatial complexities and implications of cities in the developing world in exactly the same way as can be observed in the advanced countries. The uneven subsumption and integration of the

Global South in the hierarchical spatial matrix has led to sweeping changes, not least of which has been the seizure and development of vast swaths of rural land in the urban-space

27 making processes. The route to economic development is seen in greater integration with

(read dependence on) the global economy. In this regard, urban spaces are considered as the main drivers of the developing economies.

In recent years, India has emerged as an important player in the world economy. Its incorporation in the global network has been rapid. This was particularly notable after the revolution in information and communication technology and the subsequent ascendancy of the information processing industries leading to outsourcing. This incorporation is leading to a “new urban development” in India. India is projected to add another 497 million to its urban population between 2010 and 2050; this is higher than that of the past 40 years.32

However, the process of urban development in India today is fraught with contestations and contradictions. The volatility of the issue largely stems from socio-spatial, polarizing urban processes that are in turn rooted in neoliberal ideology, and which are proving to be existentially threatening for the majority of the population. In order to understand the current socio-economic, cultural and political processes at play that result in complex spatial forms and urban developments in India, etching the historical background is necessary.

The following section sets out the historical context of the neoliberal turn in India. It is divided into two parts—the pre-reform and post-reform periods. The next section focuses on the historical conditions that laid the foundation for the current urban development model. This is followed by a review of the extant literature dealing with the main conceptual issues on India’s “new urban development.” In order to understand the existing processes and forms of the current political economy of the new urban development in India, I present a conceptual framework that seeks to contribute to the existing literature in the concluding part of the chapter.

28 2.2 Historical Context

2.2.1 The Pre-Reform Period

After gaining independence from colonial rule in 1947, the central government of

India announced itself as a federal democracy emphasizing redistributive development

(Kohli, 2006). It adopted an “indigenously altered variant of Keynesianism, a ‘mixed economy’ approach” (Ahmed, 2011). The state, therefore, intervened in market dealings and invested strategically and selectively in key industries and sectors, many of which were nationalized for better control over them in particular, and over the economy in general. In the post-Independence era, the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, aimed for a self-sufficient economy without excessive reliance on foreign capital and trade. This led to a restriction on the inflow of foreign aid. The limited supply of foreign aid was disbursed based on a permit

(license) system that was largely regulated by the national (federal) state, thus further structuring its availability. India at this time was lampooned as a Permit or License Raj

(implying rule or kingdom.) Nehru imagined an India with modern industries and competent infrastructure built through the efforts of the government with limited assistance from outside. That was deemed to be possible, given the resources in India, as well as desirable since India did not believe in any form of dependence on the West, especially after the experience of colonial rule. However, the economy recorded a very slow growth rate of 3.5% per annum and a growth of per capita GDP of only 1% per year from the 1950s to the 1980s.33

Subsequent to the long downturn in the global economy starting in the 1970s, First

World countries (particularly the US under Reagan and the UK under Thatcher) introduced neoliberal policies that were designed to facilitate accumulation (Harvey, 2003). During this period, India was also suffering from the problems of a fiscal deficit coupled with a sharply

29 accelerating inflation rate. Further, the country inherited the structural constraints of the imperialist/colonial regime that were then multiplied by the flaws of the dirigiste economy

(Patnaik and Chandrashekhar, 1995). The continuous appropriation of wealth from the periphery (India) during the colonial period had been vital to the capitalist development in the core countries (France, Portugal and in particular Great Britain), but this process had stunted economic development in India (Frank, 1966; Amin, 1972). In the postcolonial period, the slow growth rate exacerbated the economic problems further. By the late 1980s, the country had been downgraded as an “investment destination by two leading international credit rating agencies” (Government of India 1992 cited in Ahmed, 2011:168).

Non-Resident Indians [NRIs] withdrew their money from Indian banks between October

1990 and March 1991. Even though India did not rely on foreign aid, it was dependent somewhat on short-term commercial borrowings and the savings of NRIs (Mukherjee,

2007; also see Joshi and Little, 1994). In 1990-91, 83% of India’s total financial inflows were debt-creating (Tendulkar and Bhavani, 2007). The fiscal deficit rose from 5.4% of GDP between 1975 and 1980 to 10% of GDP between October 1990 and March 1991 (Mukherjee,

2008). All this aggravated the internal crisis that India was facing during the late 1980 and early 1990s.

This was further accentuated by internal political instability (Frankel, 2005).34 The mounting internal crisis, relative failure of the agricultural and industrial policies in bringing about the level of success that India anticipated for complete agrarian transition, stunted industrial growth and the problem of fiscal deficit, all contributed to internal problems. There was an external pressure (in addition to the internal crisis) on India to open up the market to the global economic and political forces in order to resolve their fiscal deficit and balance of payment problems. India then approached the International

30 Monetary Fund (IMF) to resolve the issues. The loan payments came only upon the fulfillment of certain conditions, which were expressed in a so-called Structural Adjustment

Program (SAPs). This led to a gradual liberalization of the Indian economy starting in the

1980s and reaching its peak in the early 1990s (Corbridge and Harris, 2000). In 1991-92 the Indian government adopted what it called the New Economic Policy (NEP), which was based on the ideology of neoliberalism (June 1991; Frankel, 2005: 589). It broadly involved two sets of policies (Eashvaraiah, 2001:332; Surya Kant, 1999). The first involved macroeconomic stabilization, which aimed at achieving internal and external balances through reduction in public expenditures and subsidies, thereby affecting domestic demand directly. Macroeconomic stabilization aimed to do this indirectly by a devaluation of the currency, by monetary policy, etc. Second, the NEP aimed to promote economic efficiency through deregulation and the integration of the Indian economy with the rest of the world, replacing import substitution industrialization (ISI) with a greater export orientation. We should note here that apart from the internal economic crisis and political instability, the rising urban bourgeoisie also created pressure on the state at all levels and pushed for a reform agenda that would enhance opportunities for “trade, commerce and employment in lucrative service industries” (Ahmed, 2006; see Varma, 1998). Also, the dissolution of the socialist Soviet Union left India with “no alternative” other than neoliberalism as a paradigm of development.35 Since the adoption of the NEP, the onslaught of the neoliberal order has been apparent in all aspects of the politico-economic and socio-cultural fabric in India. The manufacturing and service sectors were the prime targets in the initial phase of neoliberal transformations followed by the agrarian sector.

31 2.2.2 The Post-Reform Period

The implementation of the neoliberal order can be conceptualized in two dialectically intertwined but analytically distinct moments: the (partial) destruction of extant institutional arrangements and political compromises through market-oriented reforms; and the (tendential) creation of a new infrastructure for market-oriented economic development, commodification and the rule of capital (Brenner and Theodore;

2002:15).36 The “neo-liberalists” claim that the distinguishing feature of neoliberalism is the withdrawal of the state. However, paradoxically, in practice it rarely involves unilateral acts of state withdrawal. Rather, there are selective withdrawal and selective interventions on the part of the state depending on the context and the need of capital(s). And, these acts of withdrawal and intervention are never class-neutral.

The “roll-out” and “roll-back” (Peck and Tickell, 2005) strategies are deployed by the state simultaneously in a complex fashion along with deregulation, or what can be more aptly termed reregulation (Snyder, 1999; Mansfield, 2004); flexibilization, privatization, de- unionization, globalization and competition are the key impetuses shaping the ideological and legal-institutional frameworks. Neoliberalism also involves cutting back on social services or moving towards a workfarist state as opposed to a welfarist one (Jessop, 2002).

This is accomplished in the bid to (re)create “new” markets of “new” commodities through privatizing new sectors (such as “natural” resources like land, water, social education and health).

Primarily, the New Economic Policy in India involved creating favorable conditions for foreign and domestic capital investment. It also implied opening up newer avenues for exploiting “cheap” labor and natural resources such as land through “speculation and other non-productive means” (Das, 2012).37 This, for India, was a definitive and decisive shift

32 towards a pro-market neoliberal stance and away from the socialist redistributive approach that was characterized by extensive regulation, protectionism, public ownership of key industries and a stunted economic growth rate during the post-Independence period. The state increasingly moved from decommodification38 (seen in large-scale nationalization of banks and key industries in the post-Independence era) to that of recommodification in the post-reform period with rising privatization of erstwhile state-held resources and new entities.

The urban in India has comprised a major arena for the playing out of these reforms.

Under the NEP, the focus of planning shifted towards urbanism39 or urban development during the latter quinquennium of the 1980s.40 Indian urbanization benefited from the fact that the country became increasingly important as a major recipient of outsourcing services and a center of back-office work for the world. The Business Processing Outsourcing (BPO) and Knowledge Process Outsourcing (KPO) sectors were projected as the “New Sunshine

Sectors”41 by the Indian state. The flourishing “new economy” thus catapulted the urban scale into a major policy interest among planners as opposed to the initial phase immediately following Independence.

2.3 Historical Background and Institutional Setting of Urban Development and Planning in India

In the post-Independence phase, there was no clear-cut agenda for addressing urban issues. The focus rather was on rural development as most of the population resided in the country. The total urban population in 1951 just after independence was about 60 million, which constituted about 17.29% of the total population (Census of India, 1951).

33 Cities did not hold any place of significance in the vision of the Indian future. This is evident in the First Five Year Plan42 after India gained independence from British rule in 1947

(Shaw, 1996; Batra, 2009). The most important aspect of urban planning had been about rehabilitating the refugee population of partitioned India (from West Pakistan and East

Pakistan—now Pakistan and Bangladesh, respectively), which had thronged in thousands across the border. The issue of urbanization and its attendant problems were viewed trivially and approached in a piecemeal manner.

From the Fourth Five Year Plan in 1969 on, though, there was a realization that the problems faced by urban India were real and needed to be addressed in a more systematic fashion. Accordingly, the Fourth Plan saw the establishment of the Housing and Urban

Development Corporation (HUDCO) that was aimed at providing funds for housing and urban projects to metropolitan authorities, state housing boards and other urban bodies

(Shaw, 1996). The authorities realized the importance of decentralizing urban development and gave greater significance to the growth of smaller towns in the bid to minimize pressure on the metropolitan cities. Also, new state capitals were planned, partly to divert development away from the big cities. New urban legislation and the creation of larger planning regions with the primary objective of generating funds for urban development were prioritized. Eventually the goal was to have cities that were self-financing; “For this purpose, it called for radical policy in urban land management” (Shaw, 1996:226).

The main objective during this period was to provide affordable housing to the poor through government funding (HUDCO in particular) and assistance. The removal of slums in the bigger cities was deemed unfeasible. A sustainable approach towards providing ameliorative conditions was found to be more appropriate. It is noteworthy that at this stage the state was seen as the primary driver of urban development with limited scope for

34 private capital. With regard to land management, the most effective policy was thought to be direct intervention through public ownership and development of land. Also, urban legislation such as the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act of 1976 (see below) was introduced with the purpose of better urban land management (Rao, 1990).43

The Fifth Plan (1974-79) mainly involved controlling land prices in cities, the development of the small and medium towns, and augmenting basic services in larger cities

(Batra, 2009). The need for infrastructural development in the metropolitan cities and urban areas with populations higher than 300,000 was also realized. This led to the launching of the Integrated Urban Development Programme (IUDP) and Sites and Services

Scheme mainly for making serviced land available to the poor urban population (ibid.).

Uncontrolled speculation and consequent escalation of urban land prices were regulated by imposing “differential taxes on its [land] use, higher taxes on vacant lands to discourage speculation, a conversion tax on change of land use and enhanced stamp duty on transfer of lands” (Ganeshwar, 1998: 303). The Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act (ULCRA) of

1976 was an important step towards “preventing concentration of urban land in the hands of a few thereby checking speculation in, and profiteering from, land. It enabled the socialization of urban land to ensure equitable distribution amongst various social classes and orderly development of urban built environment. The Act fixed a ceiling on the possession and ownership of vacant land in urban areas and acquisition of excess land for creating housing stock for the poor” (Batra, 2009: 13).44

The Sixth Plan (1980-85) continued to place high importance on the decentralization of population and the development of smaller towns. The focal point of this plan was the introduction of the Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns

(IDSMT) for the development of towns over 100,000. The program was launched to deal

35 with land acquisition and services, construction of new markets, provision of industrial estates, and provision of other services and processing facilities for the benefit of agricultural and rural development in the hinterland (Batra, 2009). The importance of agriculture in rural parts is underscored here even with regard to urban development.

Urban areas were still envisioned and accepted as recipients of migrant population and to have a significant link with the rural parts. The plan particularly de-emphasized the strategy of attempting massive relocation of slums in urban areas, opting instead for a focus on in situ slum development (Routray, 1993).45

The 1980s marked the shift towards a more pro-market stance by the Indian state.

This was clearly notable in the second part of the decade during the Seventh Plan (1985-90).

The Plan called for “radical (re)orientation of all policies related to housing” and saw the increasing role of private capital in the housing sector. The government’s role was deemed to be restricted to “mobilization of resources for housing, provision for subsidized housing for the poor and acquisition and development of land” (Government of India; Batra, 2009).46

Further, the National Housing Policy was introduced, aiming to resolve the issues of homelessness and to provide a minimum level of basic provisions to all. However, the role of the government was seen not only as the “provider for the poorest and vulnerable sections” but also as the “facilitator for other income groups and private sector by the removal of constraints and the increased supply of land and services” (ibid.). Urban poverty alleviation through Urban Basic Services (later this was changed to Urban Basic Services for

Poor—UBSP— in 1990) and the Nehru Rozgar Yojana (Nehru Employment Program) to improve the conditions for urban employment, particularly, were launched. The importance and connectedness of urbanization and economic development were stressed in the

36 National Commission on Urbanization (NCU), which studied the processes, patterns, trends and issues of urban development during this time period.

The Eighth Plan in 1992 marked the landmark, as it was the first plan after the official adoption of the NEP. The 74th constitutional amendment during this time was also a significant development. This granted decision-making power to decentralized urban local bodies (ULBs) “as institutions of democratic self-governance and devolution of essential functions related to city planning and service provision to these bodies” (Batra, 2009). This was mainly because the government realized that due to the prevalence of extreme poverty in rural areas, funds were limited, and the local bodies should be able to generate additional resources. “Seeing the link between weak urban local bodies and the existence of a highly subsidized and inequitable supply of various urban services, it (the Plan) urged strengthening the regulatory/organisational base of urban local bodies” (Shaw, 1996: 228).

This was implemented first in the metropolitan cities of Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai,

Hyderabad and Bangalore. The Eighth Plan also marked the publication of the India

Infrastructure Report (IIR) that emphasized the thrust towards privatization of infrastructure, service provision and urban governance. The study highlighted the need for infrastructure with an estimated budget projected at Rs. 282.97 billion per year—in sharp contrast to the Rs. 50 billion per year available hitherto (Mahadevia, 2003:50). In this context, generating additional funds was deemed to be possible and plausible only through opening up to private capital.47 A high degree of faith was reposed on the private sector to raise large funds from capital: “It was no longer necessary or desirable for the public sector to continue playing a dominant role in the provision of infrastructure services” (Batra,

2009: 21; emphasis added).48 The IIR overturned the principle of access to basic urban services as a matter of citizen’s right regardless of the ability to pay and replaced it with one

37 of “consumer satisfaction” determined by the ability to pay. In fact, based on the IIR, India laid remarkable importance on infrastructure and accordingly, since 1996, that is one area that has invariably received the greatest amount of attention.

The Ninth Plan (1998-2002) hinged on the IIR, thereby highlighting the importance of the private sector. This is evident in the pressure on state governments to generate funds without relying too much on the federal government. Among other things, it advocated concessions and attractive deals for private developers to invest in housing development.

Even when the poor were featured in the planning goals, it was mainly rhetorical: the invisible hand of the market and private capital would be the medium through which housing for the poor could be realized.

The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission

The Tenth Plan (2002-07) coincided with the groundbreaking launch of the Jawaharlal

Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) in 2005. I hereby delineate the salient features of the program: a program that is key to shedding light on the ideological and institutional fabric guiding urban development in India at present. The JNNURM brochure outlines the basic objective of the mission as to “create economically productive, efficient, equitable and responsive cities”. This is to be achieved through “a) integrated development of infrastructure services; b) securing linkages between asset creation and maintenance for long-run project sustainability; c) accelerating the flow of investment into urban infrastructure services; d) planned development of cities including the peri-urban areas, outgrowths, and urban corridors; e) renewal and re-development of inner city areas; and f) universalization of urban services so as to ensure their availability to the urban poor”.49 The total budget of the project is estimated to be around Rs. 1,260 billion, of which the central

38 government is supposed to provide about Rs. 500 billion, and the rest is expected to be generated by the state governments and ULBs (Batra, 2009).50 The mission highlights the role of international agencies such as the World Bank, the Department for International

Development (DFID) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in urban development projects. Public-private partnerships (PPP), partial withdrawal of the civic and public agencies from direct responsibilities for service provision (hitherto considered to be the primary charge of the government) and a pro-market stance are crucial to the program

(Sivaramakrishnan, 2011).

The Mission aims at developing 63 Indian cities into “world class sustainable” cities.

The prime focus is on building roads, flyovers, tunnels, skyways, airports, mega commercial complexes and investing in real estate projects for gentrification, recreation and beautification, all with a view to achieving international standards (Banerjee-Guha, 2010:

205). It is interesting to note that since the NEP was adopted in the 1990s, the “concept of

‘livable’ Indian cities disappeared from the Indian planning lexicon and got replaced by

‘world class cities’” (Banerjee-Guha, 2011: 80). The program is further divided into two sub- missions, viz., Sub-mission A is Urban Infrastructure and Governance (UIG) and Sub-mission

B is Basic Services to the Urban Poor (BSUP). UIG has 65% of the total funds and BSUP has

35%. The focus of UIG is on the development of roads, transport, infrastructure, water supply, sanitation and beautification; whereas the BSUP is concerned primarily with slum improvement, rehabilitation, access to basic services and shelter projects for the urban poor

(ibid.).

The Mission is predicated on acceptance and implementation of some mandatory reforms by the state governments. These include: decentralization and devolution of power as per the 74th amendment, 1992; repeal of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act of

39 1976; reform of rent control laws;51 rationalization of stamp duty and to reduce that to no more than 5% within seven years; enactment of a public disclosure law; enactment of community participation law, so as to institutionalize citizens' participation in local decision making; and, association of elected municipalities with the city planning function.52 Even though there are some “optional reforms”, those are in reality not optional: flexibility is granted on the deadline, but enforcement of the reforms is mandatory (Batra, 2009:31).

The emphasis on private capital investment and the enhanced role of the market in the mission is reflected in the documents. It is mentioned clearly that funds cannot be used to create wage employment; housing to the poor cannot be given free of cost and a

“reasonable” user fee will be charged to the urban poor for services so as to recover at least

25% of the project cost. Privatization or PPP is the preferred mode of implementation of projects, while assigning the minimization of the risks for the private investor to the state governments/ULBs. The state is supposed to be the facilitator and regulator for the unhindered execution of private-capital-led development (ibid.).

The opening up of urban property markets to global capital is signified by the fact that a 100% FDI in the real estate sector was now allowed. There was also a considerable reduction in the minimum area for the development of townships involving FDI: from 100 acres in 2002 to 30 acres in 2005. Further, FDI in real estate was allowed without prior approval from the government or Reserve Bank of India (the central banking institution in

India) (Batra, 2009:29). Consequently, there has been a rise in FDI in real estate from 4.5% in 2003-04 to 26.5% in 2006-07 (ASSOCHAM, 2006). Earlier, only NRIs (Non-Resident

Indians) and PIOs (Persons of Indian Origin) were permitted to invest in the real estate sector. Investments from foreign investors (other than NRIs and PIOs) were restricted to township projects through a local Indian company (as joint venture partnerships). However,

40 since 2005, the central government has further abated the legal barriers so that FDI is now allowed in all aspects of real estate, including townships, housing and built-up infrastructure development projects.53 According to the mission and also noted in the speech of the Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh, urban development is increasingly seen as a “natural part of the development process” that needs to be “facilitated by a conscious strategy of preparing our cities and towns to act as engines of economic growth”.54

2.4 Conceptual Themes of the New Urban Development

The existing literature on the new urban development can be broadly separated into two divisions—the mainstream approach and the critical approach. The mainstream approach presents glorified and positive accounts of urban development. Particularly, this comes from policy studies, planning discourses and management studies. The critical approach, on the other hand, questions the effectiveness and challenges the outcomes of an urban development rooted in neoliberal principles for the majority of the population in the country. Here I deal with the critical approach more elaborately as compared to the mainstream one, due to its greater relevance to my work. Also, through a critical lens I intend to debunk some of the major arguments presented in the mainstream approach.

2.4.1 The Mainstream Approach

This approach acknowledges the existing unevenness of the world and the systemic crises that the capitalist order faces periodically but it is optimistic about the positive outcomes of the greater expansion and intensification of capitalist relations across space

41 and time. It adheres to the belief that the world is turning flat, where flatness refers to increasing integration of the world both spatially and socially, where technological advancement under capitalism is the key in making it possible (Friedman, 2007). Further, it contends that spatial diffusion and trickle-down effects and the power of market relations can ensure development at various spatial scales, provided there is little or no intervention from the (welfarist) state.

These enthusiastic claims are seen in various studies across Global South. For instance, Shen and Wu (2013) show in their study on Shanghai (China) that the creation of rich urban enclaves, what they refer to as “master-planned communities”, are actually leading to greater investments and thus boosting the economic growth of the local area.

Likewise, Guzey (2009) too affirms that urban restructuring processes in Ankara (Turkey) have facilitated growth in rents that in turn is having positive effects on the central areas of the city. Subsequent to the current interest in urban development in India as the nucleus of economic growth, there is a burgeoning academic and journalistic literature, 55 which contrasts with a relative apathy towards the theme earlier. Within the body of the mainstream work, the topics that are mostly apparent are those pertaining to infrastructural development, spatial relations, economic patterning, and the governance of

Indian cities (Batra, 2009). The basic tenet underlying these studies is that development of the economy is possible through a growth of cities that can only be achieved through the uninhibited play of private capital and reliance on market, with the state acting as the facilitator in every possible way (see Chandrasekhar, 2008; Mukherji, 2008). Urban planning in India today, thus, is largely predicated on the global hegemony of neoliberalism.

The proponents of this approach contend that urban planning led by private capital will

42 bolster the pace of urbanization, promote regional balance, and ensure sustainable development.

2.4.2 The Critical Approach

The critical approach studies the new urban development from a number of different viewpoints. The works focusing on India are largely based on Marxist theories of accumulation. I contextualize the literature on Indian urban development by laying down the foundational arguments as applied more generally. In the following sections, I highlight the main themes of works pertaining to the critical approach.

2.4.2.1 Accumulation by Dispossession

From an historical-geographical materialist perspective, urban-space making is seen as a means of furthering the interests of (trans)national capital in the developing world.56

The main drive for this is coming from the inherent necessity of capital to find new avenues for unimpeded and intensified accumulation. Accumulation, in the wake of the neoliberal turn, is argued to be increasingly hinged on dispossession. Predatory means are used extensively to appropriate existing resources and thus release uncommodified or undercommodified57 land and labor into the sphere of circulation. It creates the conditions for further accumulation either through dispossession or through exploitation of wage labor.

Following Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation, Harvey (2003) coined the term

“accumulation by dispossession”. 58 This refers to the ongoing character of primitive accumulation. Breaking away from the historicist argument of primitive accumulation being solely occurring at a particular point in time and ushering in capitalist social relations, many scholars in recent times have argued quite cogently that primitive accumulation is not a

43 relic of the past (see Perelman, 1997; De Angelis, 1999; Harvey, 2001; Bonefield, 2002).59 It thus has been possible to dissociate it from the implied historical connotations of the term

“primitive” accumulation. Harvey, too, conforms to the thesis that asserts the continuing nature and increasing relevance of primitive accumulation in the present times under a global neoliberal order through his re-coinage of the term.60 The term, “accumulation by dispossession”61, also helps in encompassing a wider range of dispossession processes in contemporary capitalism that either did not exist during Marx’s time or have been redefined lately62 (Levien, 2011).63

Currently, accumulation by dispossession is believed to be essential for urban development and restructuring under the neoliberal global order in the developing countries, including India. Cities are undergoing processes of creative destruction following the dismantling of the welfare states and deregulation of the market. Sweeping privatizations and ensuing dispossession (including from land) is a key feature that is leading to accumulation (see Banerjee-Guha, 2009; 2010; 2011; Mahadevia and Narayanan,

2008; Weinstein and Ren, 2009). In this regard, the extant literature gives precedence to coercive means as a mode of dispossession for accumulation. In fact, many scholars draw a conceptual distinction between accumulation by dispossession and capitalist accumulation proper, or what Harvey refers to as expanded reproduction64 based on the means through which accumulation by dispossession takes place (see Glassman, 2006; Levien, 2011). They identify extra-economic coercion articulated in diverse forms of violence as the single most important aspect of the process. Overt extra-economic coercion is deployed, leading to the usurpation of spaces (read land) hitherto part of the public domain (such as commons) or serving as means of sustenance (not under the exclusive influence of advanced capitalist relations). These are privatized and handed over to international corporate entities for elite

44 consumption. This leads to a transfer of resources from the underprivileged classes to the capitalist class and its attendant machineries and allies. Demolition of squatter settlements, closing down of manufacturing units and renewal of intra-city areas along with the extension of urban areas into peripheral zones, devouring land in the process, are all considered to epitomize accumulation through dispossession.

This approach, however, emphasizes more the means of accumulation by dispossession and less how this also intensifies the commodification process and creates conditions for further accumulation. It also valorizes the role of extra-economic coercion over other means of dispossession. Further, empirically the focus is on the intra-city areas undergoing transformations and little is known about city-making politics on the peripheral regions.65 There are, however, a number of studies (see Levien, 2011, 2013; Hall, 2013;

Strumpel 2014) that deal with the creation of Special Economic Zones and industrial units in the urban fringes, but these works do not focus on city creation (planned or relatively unplanned as articulated in “spontaneous” urban extensions). This is problematic because even though there are similarities in the processes of industrial development and urban development, there are key differences in the means deployed, subsequent spatial forms and the nature of contestations.

2.4.2.2 Urban Entrepreneurialism

Closely connected to the former perspective but with a different angle of exploration is the urban entrepreneurialism approach. Even though urban entrepreneurialism upholds many of the mainstream tenets, it is critical of the impacts of the territorial competition that fuels entrepreneurialism. This body of work focuses on the global and local nexus within the broader capitalist economy. Cities are seen as conduits of global capital. The main focus is

45 on the entrenchment of the global into more local scales and the progressive rescaling of cities66, resulting in cities that are increasingly integrated into global networks. According to the literature, the forms and governance of cities are being remade to accommodate the needs of transnational capital. Since territorial competition and the territorialization of the politics of local and regional development67 are intensified manifold in the neoliberal regime, cities are envisaged as a part of this growing territorial competition for attracting and spatially pinning down ever-transient capital.68 The mainstream approach advocates the path of territorial competition for development, whereas the critical approach casts a skeptical look and analyzes the effects of that on the majority of the population.

Due to the inherent crisis tendencies of capitalism, uneven geographies of development heighten inter-place competition. Cities are implicated within a highly volatile and uncertain “geoeconomic environment characterized by monetary chaos, speculative movements of financial capital, global location strategies by major transnational corporations, and rapidly intensifying inter-locality competition” (Swyngedouw, 1992 as cited in Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 368). This competition is an exogenous force, which impinges on globalizing cities as part of the capitalist imperative for the constant necessity to perform (accumulate) or perish. This overbearing competition at a global level percolates down to local scales. It gives rise to a dialectical relation with greater integration between multitudes of geographical scales but heightens the conflict between places, leading to a

“global-local disorder” (Peck and Tickell, 1994), which is further intensified by rising uneven development. Within this increasingly unstable “glocal” framework,

“entrepreneurial cities”69 are seemingly becoming important means to ensure unhindered capital accumulation. Along with many cities in the Global North, cities in the Global South are also resorting to all sorts of ways to outcompete one another. Cities have resorted—

46 almost compulsively—to entrepreneurial activities due to global pressure. “If…urban entrepreneurialism (in the broadest sense) is embedded in a framework of zero-sum inter- urban competition for resources, jobs, and capital, then even the most resolute and avant- garde municipal socialists will find themselves, in the end, playing the capitalist game”(Harvey, 1989:5). Indian cities, like many other cities in the Global South, are thus argued to be undergoing “selective first-worlding”70 so as to become nodal points for global capital. Both of the above approaches take capital’s needs and perspective as paramount in determining the course of development. In other words, the production aspect is given primacy. This is problematic, as the approaches neglect the importance of the sphere of circulation and consumption. Capital’s need to accumulate has to be backed by the realization of the surplus values, either created or seized.

2.4.2.3 The Middle Class

This problem is somewhat addressed in another strand of literature that views the

“new Indian middle class” as the main driver of the new urban development in India (see

Varma, 1998; Fernandes, 2006; Donner et. al, 2011; Dickey, 2012). Plush shopping malls, residential buildings, luxury hotels and other recreational facilities, all characteristic of

India’s new urban development, all cater to the needs of the middle class. This, it is argued, is shaping market dynamics and leading to an active as well as inadvertent involvement of the middle class in the new urban politics. Policy changes prioritize the needs and demands of the middle class at the expense of those of the poor (Ghertner, 2011; see Baviskar, 2003,

Fernandes, 2004; 2006; Gandy, 2008; Bhan, 2009). The middle class is thus believed to exert powerful agency with regard to social, political and economic matters, especially in the wake of the neoliberal turn.

47 Historically, the Indian middle class has its roots in that section of the population that had the privilege of education in English and dates back to the colonial past (Mishra,

1961; Varma, 1998): “This enabled them to secure employment in the bureaucracy, public sector organizations or in the tertiary sectors of the economy” (Ahmed, 2011: 169; also see

Varma, 1998). This social group also included medium- to small-scale entrepreneurs who partly benefitted from the state’s protectionist policies during the dirigiste era (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987; Corbridge and Harriss, 2000).

The newness in the “new middle class” is not therefore the result of any sudden introduction of this class into Indian society. As Leela Fernandes explains, “the middle class is not ‘new’ in terms of its structural or social basis…. Rather, its newness refers to a process of production of a distinctive social and political identity that represents and lays claim to the benefits of liberalization” (2006: xviii). Its emergence is evident in the level of income inequality developing over the past twenty years; the top 10% of salaried population now makes 12 times more than the bottom 10%: a proportion that has risen precipitously since the 1990s.71 In addition, various reforms and policies feed the vested interests of the members of the middle class. In this regard, “spatial purification” 72, “which centers on middle class claims over public spaces and corresponding movements to cleanse such spaces of the poor and the working classes, is an important instrument used by it to control public spaces” (Fernandes, 2006:139; also see Appadurai, 2000; Baviskar, 2003; Anjaria,

2009).73

The role of this class is not just materially articulated but also discursively implicated. As Desai notes, the Indian middle class “seems to have caught the public’s imagination” (Desai, 2007: 345). The literature also argues that the praxis of the middle class is governed by certain ideals rooted in narratives of the modernizing global city. These

48 “hegemonic aspirations” in turn serve as a template for a wider section of the population that is actively disseminated by media (Fernandes and Heller, 2006; also see Fernandes,

2000; Ahmed, 2011). In this regard, consumptive practices and patterns of the middle class have become the “trope through which all other relationships including…with the state, with the poor, with globalization and with its [middle class] part, are discussed and understood” (Donner et. al. 2011: 9; also see Srilata, 1999; Dwyer, 2000; Liechty, 2003).

Conspicuous consumption, as articulated in new urban forms, is integral to middle class politics.

Furthermore, the interests and demands of the new middle class are supposedly in direct conflict with those of the poor working class. Since the subordinate classes are numerically much larger, there is an inherent threat to the middle class that makes it eager to safeguard its interests, often at the cost of the poor working class. There is a tendency to blame the poor for the urban problems facing India at present. For instance, Ahmed (2011) relates incidents of evictions carried out in Delhi primarily due to the concerns of elite and middle classes about sanitation problems supposedly resulting in occasional outbreaks of epidemics in the city (Banerjee, 1996): “Bourgeois environmentalism” is used as a weapon to put the blame on the poor instead of trying to ameliorate their living conditions (Ahmed,

2011: 173). In sum, the middle class along with the upper class form the urban elites in

India and provide ideological and material support for the neoliberal turn; they are actively involved in excluding the poor spatially and socio-economically. According to Vanaik (2002:

227), the underlying tenet of the middle class and the elites is that “[neoliberalism] is the most desirable ideal not only because it is the most efficient form of economic organization

(it produces most and best) but also the most just—winners win and losers lose because for the most part they deserve so”. The literature focusing on middle class politics (including its

49 demands) affirms that this group views the “poor as responsible for their own fates and as a drag on the rest of the country” (Ahmed, 2011: 169; also see Varma, 1998).

2.4.2.4 The Micro-Practices of Urban Subalterns

The above approaches portray the machinations and influences of the ruling classes along with the implications for the attendant ruling ideas. These approaches are largely top- down in their viewpoints. They stress the role of macroeconomic practices in shaping and creating urban spaces. In opposition to the above scholarship, the strand of literature focusing on the politics of subalterns and micro-practices of the dispossessed and displaced population examines the (re)negotiations of spaces with the local state. It thus examines the various informal means used by the subalterns, which fall beyond the reach of formal planning, to bargain and press for their rights and privileges. Following a post-structural stance, the focus is on the power of the urban subalterns rather than on that of the elites.

Urban development is not a unilateral process, but in the above top-down approaches the voices of the subalterns are somewhat muffled. Resistance in the form of

“everyday practices”,74 “quiet encroachment”,75 and various “weapons of the weak”76 that denote the diverse forms of contestations ranging from coping mechanisms or survival strategies to implicit resistance lay counter-claims on the neoliberal state. The subordinate classes are able, it is argued, to sneak in and tweak the existing power structures to make viable imprints of their own. The subalterns do not have an option other than exercising their agency not only to continue to make a living (in the form of survival strategies) but also to assert their rights (even if those are in the form of micro-politics).

In a study by Datta (2013)77 of Delhi’s squatter settlements, she contends, “while the violence of law produces precarious lives in the city, the same law is often used as a

50 ‘resource’ by slum dwellers to bargain with the state for resettlement”. According to her, the resettlement that is offered to a section of the squatters due to demolition of their “illegal” settlements is not something that they seek but when it is granted:

[T]hey see it (resettlement) as an entitlement from the state which when achieved would acknowledge their inclusion as urban citizens within the ‘legal’ city. To this end squatters use resettlement as a resource/route to make claims for a right to the city…They do this not just through informality and informal networks…but by gaining a working knowledge of the law, through explicit engagements with formal and legal processes, through active engagements with development based NGOs, and through their legal subjecthoods … In doing so, they empower themselves through law as active citizens (ibid.; emphasis added).

Similar to the abovementioned study, the literature emphasizing micro-practices often valorizes working class agency over capital. It is thus rooted in the notion of

Foucault’s (1990) concept of power, which can never be possessed; instead, it can only be exercised.

This is an important contribution, given the previous preference for the approach of macro-politics and relative neglect of complex and nuanced power plays in the literature; this bottom-up perspective adds a critical scale dimension to the study. Thus, from macro- politics, the focus moves towards micro-politics. Nonetheless, it does suffer from some weaknesses. These studies fail to situate the resistances of subalterns in the historical- material conditions that shape their emergence and subsequent course. This is problematic because, for instance, in the case of the aforementioned study by Datta, the law that is used to tag the squatters as “legal” or “illegal” can be used by them to attain some temporary objectives/palliatives. But that itself does not ensure empowerment, at least as the way

Datta asserts. If there is no change in their underlying structural conditions and material settings, then empowerment in the true sense does not occur and/or last. In this particular case, even when a legal entitlement to land is granted, the question remains to what extent

51 does that benefit the squatters?78 Even though it is true that power does not reside at any particular point, individual or social group alone, and power can be exercised in varying degrees by an entity, the underlying material conditions do facilitate or impede. Therefore, power is not just the ability to do something or the ability to exercise agency but can also be about the power over another. For instance, in virtue of capital owning and controlling the means of production, it does possess leverage over labor to set the terms and conditions of their dealings. This does not, however, mean that labor is powerless. In fact, as Marx says, the workers (the working class) make their own histories and geographies but not necessarily under the conditions of their own choosing. And, in a given spatial or temporal context, (class) struggle decides the outcome.

2.4.2.5 The Political-Economy of Class Struggle

This brings us to the class struggle perspective, which captures the inherent tension between the subordinate and ruling classes. In close relation to the former approach, these studies focus on issues such as the right to the city, which raises questions about urban citizenship rights in relation to the changing nature of urban governance, but from a standpoint located in political economy rather than the diffused or decentered power perspective coming out of post-structuralism of the former. It also deals with explicit forms of resistance in the urban restructuring process and focuses more on the organized collective acts of protests by the working class in pressing for their place in the city. Harvey

(2008), inspired by Lefebvre, revives and reiterates the question of the right to the city for the underprivileged classes. Urban politics is not just about the oppression of the

“disenfranchised”79 by the superordinate classes. Also, it is not just about the local micro- politics, an exclusive focus on which risks neglecting the entrenchment of the global within

52 more local scales. Hence, it is important to acknowledge the profound connections with the higher geographical scales, which shape the contestations of the poor at the local level. The literature dealing with the theme of urban citizenship and the right to the city largely focuses on the cities of the Global North. The implications of the right to the city in the

Global South are very different (see below). Also, class struggle involving the cities rarely takes into account the resistances and politics involved in urban-space making on the fringes, which is currently rampant in India.

2.5 Concluding Remarks and Outline of My Conceptual Framework

In this section, I outline the major themes in the literature that contribute to my understanding and conceptualization of the new urban development in India and that are most pertinent to my work. I also present my main arguments contextualizing it within the existing literature with a view towards contributing towards building a more comprehensive framework to study the theme of new urban development in India.

My work situates itself broadly within an historical-geographical materialist approach and embeds class struggle as the key component in analyzing the new urban development in India. Urban space (re)making is understood primarily as a necessity for unrestrained accumulation, and consequently as a means for the intensification of the commodification and speculative processes and reorganization of surpluses. Dispossession and displacement of population are thus integral aspects of urban development politics as found in India today. The concept of accumulation by dispossession (ABD) is essential in understanding the happenings of urban-space making in and around the city of Kolkata.

However, in the extant literature, there is a misconception and general tendency to

53 overemphasize the use of extra-economic coercion as the means to accumulation by dispossession. To reiterate, many scholars have actually defined accumulation by dispossession principally based on the means through which ABD takes place rather than the nature or purpose of it.80 Extra-economic coercion, in these works, seems to be the distinct feature that separates ABD from expanded reproduction or capitalist accumulation proper. I argue that ABD is primarily not about the means through which it takes place. In the context of my fieldwork, it can be seen that along with extra-economic coercion, consensual mechanisms played an important role, including the ideological framework that was actively erected and used to “manufacture consent”.81 Even market imperatives82 are important in eliciting consent among many farmers to give up their land for the lure of better prospects in the upcoming city. Particularly, in light of urban development, the importance of the ideological framework in generating consensus gains greater significance as compared to studies that mainly deal with industrial development on the urban fringes.83

For instance, as we shall see in Chapter 3, the necessity and possibility of convincing people to give up their means of living, land, becomes higher in the context of urban-space making as compared to industrial projects. Therefore, I contend that even though extra-economic coercion is important, it is not necessary. Rather, it is contingent on the historical- geographical contexts.

The politics surrounding urban development needs to be framed in part in terms of the world city vision. This strongly underpins the policies and practices pursued by the government in the development and restructuring of urban spaces. Following this, there has been a growing interest among urban sociologists and geographers in studying cities of the

Global South; still, the vacuum is quite noticeable due to a definite bias towards cities of the

54 advanced countries. My work intends to contribute in filling this gap in the existing literature.

The drive to become world-class cities is not only based on material pressures by the forces of globalization, but it is also backed by strong discursive and rhetorical influences articulated in dominant socio-political narratives. With regard to the Indian context, the drive to become a global city is impinging on the cities in the country. Due to various internal crises and external conditions, the Indian economy adopted the New

Economic Policy (as related in detail above), and since then the drive to fit into the global economic matrix has intensified. Inter-place competition at the worldwide scale has heightened due to globalization processes under neoliberal capitalism, and in this respect

India is no different. The recent shift in focus towards urban sites by the Indian state (at all geographical scales) shows clear bias towards the metropolises such as Delhi, Mumbai,

Kolkata, Bangalore, Hyderabad and Chennai. Particularly, these mega cities are viewed as playing prominent roles in the global hierarchical system.84 They are seen as real and potential nodes of financial flows in the global economy. This is highlighted in the concept of

“engines of growth” espoused by the JNNURM when focusing on urban planning in India.

The competition for growth amongst cities is not just with other cities in the country, but also with cities of the Global South as well as the Global North. This creates tension between global forces and local conditions. The drive of inter-place competition thus partly accounts for the degree of ruthlessness with which the onslaught of urban development (hinged on neoliberal paradigm) is felt at local scales.

My work seeks to fill this lacuna in the literature. For instance, the imprint of global financial institutions championing the cause and interest of transnational capital is achieved and conducted through their involvement in shaping planning processes in the cities of

55 India. The mandatory reforms set by the Asian Development Bank with regard to taxation structures and resettlement clauses as conditions for funding the various infrastructural projects required by urban development and re-development, do not appreciate the local complexities that are latent and that have far-reaching socio-spatial effects.85 Further, since the decentralization of power to the ULBs following the deregulation processes at the center, the pressure on the local states to generate their own funds has multiplied (Banerjee-Guha,

2011). This in turn is acting in specific ways to condition local urban politics.

Within the urban renewal mission (JNNURM), the concept of “investment friendly” policies has gained currency over people or welfare friendly ones, although “socialist” ideals are still enshrined in the Indian constitution. Garbed in the language of “infrastructural development”, the ravages of neoliberal policies are being reworked. The Indian state—at various scales—has been actively mobilizing resources and organizing urban space towards this end through infrastructural and real estate developments supported, in turn, by changes brought about in legal and ideological frameworks. Accordingly, there have been a number of amendments in the existing laws and the establishment of new ones. To name a few, the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) of 1976 and

Foreign Direct Investment laws have all been modified and bottlenecks have been removed in order to assist in land acquisitions and peri-urban land “developmental” projects. The power of eminent domain underlying the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, is being used indiscriminately by the state at all levels to acquire land for city (re)making. Eminent domain gives leverage to needs and decisions of the state over the general population as the ultimate goal of the state is deemed to be for the “common good” or “public purpose”. The term “public purpose” is discursively reproduced to serve the needs of capital and legitimize the actions of the state. More concretely, the legal and institutional changes

56 orchestrated by the state are also foundational to the planning and implementation of urban-space making processes in India.

According to current scholarship, the “new Indian middle class” is providing significant impetus for the new urban developments. It is proving to be the torchbearer of consumption practices entrenched in world city views and ideals. The hegemonic 86 representations of the middle class, through its everyday practices and ideals provide a normative standard for the subalterns who are supposed to aspire to the “modern lifestyle”.

The state, along with the media and civic organizations, are serving as important conduits of change and restructuration of identities by disseminating and popularizing the dominant ideology regarding modernization. This middle class politics is not just confined to the discursive spheres but also makes a more distinct material contribution by cooperating with the state and parastatal institutions and civic organizations, either through direct engagement or passive consensus in the “spatial purification”87 process. It is often seen as a revanchist restructuring politics leading to “interdictory spaces”88 and “geographies of exception”89 that delineate exclusionism and discrimination against the urban subalterns.

The images and realities of globalization condition the responses and identities of not only the elites and middle class but also the urban subalterns. I argue that “middle class” itself is a socio-political construct. Its ascendancy needs to be situated in the historical- material context. The state claims that the middle class is actually the driving force behind the current form and processes of urban development. But the state, in collusion with

(trans)national capital, is largely facilitating the “empowerment” and production of the class

(including rising income inequality) through the politics of liberalization.90 Also, I contend that conceptually it is important to draw a distinction between the idea of the middle class

(along with its attendant lifestyles based on conspicuous consumption) and inquire about

57 the reality of the middle class by probing into the differentiated character of this class. I also problematize the essentialization of the nature and course of middle class politics.

Experiential and material conditions are significant in its analysis. Such politics are not just highly opportunistic as alleged by some scholars;91 they are marked with contradictions, which are embedded in and driven by socio-cultural and material conditions. I thus call for a more nuanced look at middle class politics based on spatio-temporal specificities, and I contend that middle class politics are much more contingent in nature than they are generally considered to be.

The epistemological basis of the post-structural approach of micro-politics and

“everyday practices” (based primarily on Foucault’s concept of power) in understanding the technologies of politics from below weakens the possibility of conceptualizing resistance and the role of the subaltern classes in a collective and goal-oriented light. Even when the concept of micro-politics does acknowledge resistance, the atomistic and often defensive practices are unable to fully differentiate between coping strategies and radical politics, which definitely have unequal implications. Scott’s (1985) analysis of resistance somewhat addresses the above problem as he sees a radical component in the various resistance practices (both individual and collective). Scott shows how everyday forms of resistance practiced by peasants in a Malaysian village are grounded in their consciousness, thereby making them purposive in nature. This includes the traditional modes of resistance like foot dragging, going slow, feigned ignorance, dissimulation, desertion, slander, false compliance and so forth. Scott (1985:29) refers to these as the “weapons of the weak”: the ordinary modes of resistance of relatively powerless (non-unionized workers) groups. He defines class resistance as “any act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims (for example, rents, taxes, prestige) made on that class by

58 superordinate classes (for example, landlords, large farmers, the state) or to advance its own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-à-vis those super-ordinate classes” (Scott, 1985: 290). Aware of the limited efficacy of these acts, he differentiated between “real” and “token” resistances. He maintained further that although these everyday forms of resistance may seem to be insignificant, when practiced on a collective scale (for instance, an entire class against the elite or the state), they are capable of subverting dominant structures of power to a certain extent. These covert means of resistance prove to be “safe” strategies for subordinate classes to manifest their political interests (ibid.).

Although he believed that “token resistances” or everyday practices are no less significant than real resistance in disrupting and challenging the power structures when pursued on a collective scale, the theory is a bit problematic. On the one hand, he refers to these individualistic and covert forms of resistance as “weapons”, and on the other hand, he says that these are effective only when practiced on a collective scale. Therefore, he implicitly recognizes the limitations of these “ordinary modes of resistance” in significantly affecting the power structures.

In addressing the shortcomings of the above approaches and in understanding resistance, Bayat (2000) offers the concept of “quiet encroachment of the ordinary”. He asserts:

[T]he notion of ‘quiet encroachment’ describes the silent, protracted but pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied and powerful in order to survive and improve their lives. This is marked by quiet, largely atomized and prolonged mobilization with episodic collective action—open and fleeting struggles without clear leadership, ideology or structured organization. While this quiet encroachment cannot be considered as a ‘social movement’ as such, it is also distinct from survival strategies or ‘everyday resistance’ in that, first, the struggles and gains of the agents are not at the cost of fellow poor or themselves, but of the state, the rich and the powerful…. In addition, these struggles are seen not necessarily as defensive merely in the realm of resistance, but cumulatively

59 encroaching, meaning that the actors tend to expand their space by winning new positions to move on (2000: 545-6).

The concept of “quiet encroachment” is an important one, especially because it does acknowledge the underlying intent and consequences of the resistance that challenges

(even if not in an overt revolutionary way) the existing power structures. Further, it does acknowledge “everyday practices” but without basing it on a “decentered” power concept; rather, it hinges on the material conditions that lead to differences in the concentration of power. The concept, however, is unable to fully accommodate collective and organized protests within its explanatory framework. In the context of India, and many other developing countries, however, the rising intolerance of the state and its machineries of the subalterns is increasingly making quiet encroachment not a viable strategy of resistance.

This is mainly due to the escalating territorial competition in the globalizing world economy, resulting in the compulsion of the cities to continuously create conditions favoring growth

(read accumulation) in an expanding scale as opposed to social provisions (Harvey, 1989).

At present, “quiet encroachment” is not unimportant; it does have its moments. Its significance, however, as one of the most important means of resistance—as argued by

Bayat—is being challenged.

A similar concept, Benjamin’s (2008) “occupancy urbanism” relates to the reoccupation of (urban) land—land hitherto used by the underprivileged as a means of living—after being dispossessed or evicted. This is mainly done through various arrangements with the local state that allows occupancy on a de facto basis. Even though in consequence it may seem a form of resistance, in most cases it is primarily intended to act as a means of coping through difficult circumstances, especially given the limited alternatives. The “force of necessity”92 often fuels and conditions the political actions—

60 overt or covert—of the subordinate groups. In India, dispossession, displacement and enclosure of the commons leading to inaccessibility of public spaces threatens survival of the subalterns due to the destruction of their means for existence. In order to survive and have reasonably dignified lives, people are compelled to engage in political actions, even if they are not politically or class conscious. Daily survival needs shape their course of action, which could be covert, atomistic or individualistic, or collective and overt. The local conditions and rationalities from which the political actions flow are “forged relationally and historically vis-à-vis the hegemonic projects of social movements from above which seek to create and consolidate [dominating] structures” (Nilsen, 2008: 314-5). Additionally, unlike Bayat’s analysis, many of the actions taken by the urban subalterns in the context of dispossession and displacement are deliberate political acts. It is not always about quietly furthering their rights and more collectively and audibly defending their already-won gains, as argued by Bayat (2000). In fact, my work shows that the dominant power structures are subject to constant re-formation as the ruling and subordinate groups struggle over resources, means of production and in establishing a social organization of human needs and capacities (Nilsen, 2008). Yet, in the current historically specific context, this power to change and contend over resources is not the same for everyone, which accounts for the continuation, extension and validation of neoliberalism as a class project (Harvey, 2005).

There is little doubt that dispossession, eviction and displacement of people are integral aspects of urban space-making processes in India. This leads to destruction of livelihoods and spaces of (re)production. Despite the importance of the topic, the literature surprisingly lacks in works focusing on the effects on and of the dispossessed and displaced population. My work aims at addressing this issue by probing into the impacts on the

61 people and their responses to these processes, which are both complex and highly variable—economically, socio-culturally, politically and regionally.

In the neoliberal era of urban development in India, it is crucial to view urban space

(re)making through the lens of class struggle, as that is the central arena where the tensions, contradictions and power plays happen and are articulated. This is also important because it serves as a potent theoretical tool to integrate the seemingly disparate politics concerning accumulation by dispossession on the urban fringes and the urban politics of the squatters in the city, as observed in my research. In this regard, the theme of the right to the city is significant as it not only pertains to the question of urban citizenship—i.e., who belongs to the city and uses the public spaces—but also refers to the right to change the character and function of the city and in the process the local state system (Harvey, 2008).93 I assert that in the current context of India, the question of the right to the city often amounts to the right to a living for many. The state is actively involved in enclosing public spaces and communally held resources such as land and water, which were hitherto (urban) commons due to their general availability and common usage rights of the poor. This is done through various means of (semi-) privatizing spaces that either physically or symbolically restrict access to the usage of those spaces. Given the level of dependence of the poor on the commons in the Indian context, this is existentially more threatening as compared to the cities of the Global North. The concept of the right to the city thus is not just parochial questioning about possible reformism for accommodation of the poor but a radical change of the current politico-economic order (Purcell, 2003). In light of the above discussion, my work also seeks to broadly address the larger question: are the current urban development politics a plausible answer to the all-important development question in India?

62 Notes

22 I have used the terms ‘Global South’, ‘developing countries’, ‘poor countries’ and ‘Third World’ synonymously and in an interchangeable manner to provide narrative variety. 23 Banerjee-Guha, 2010 24 Brenner, 2004 25 Smith, 2002 26 Davis, 2006 27 “Ninety-five percent of this final build-out of humanity will occur in the urban areas of developing countries, whose populations will double to nearly 4 billion over the next generation. Indeed, the combined urban population of China, India, and Brazil already roughly equals that of Europe and North America. The scale and velocity of Third World urbanization, moreover, utterly dwarfs that of Victorian Europe. London in 1910 was seven times larger than it had been in 1800, but Dhaka, Kinshasa, and Lagos today are each approximately forty times larger than they were in 1950” (Davis, 2006:2). 28 Sassen, 2006 29 Smith, 1996 30 Harvey, 1989 31 Brenner, 2009 32 For a comparative analysis, China is projected to see 341 million people shifting into cities, followed by Nigeria (200 million), the United States (103 million) and Indonesia (92 million); according to the U.N.'s ‘2011 Revision of the World Urbanisation Prospects' report. Source: http://www.thehindu.com/news/india-will-see-highest-urban-population-rise-in-next-40- years/article3286896.ece accessed on 3rd June, 2012.

33 This low growth rate was derogatorily termed as “the Hindu growth rate” by economist Raj Krishna (1978), characterizing the fatalism and contentedness of Hindu population as the major cause for not trying to accelerate the economic growth of the country. The characterization and cause of low growth rate is however problematic as it is based on attitudinal and subjective factors, without any contextualization of the material conditions. Later Belgian economist, Paul Bairoch (1982), and British economist, Angus Maddisson, questioned the validity of the concept of “Hindu rate of growth”. It was found that India held close to one-fourth of the world’s share of GDP in 1750, but after the period of colonization, India’s share started dropping, so in 1800 it was about 20% whereas by 1880 it dropped precipitously to a meager 3%. Therefore, it is erroneous to conclude that fatalism and contentedness are main contributors to the slow growth rate. Rather, prolonged low growth rate and factoring of the high population in the per capita growth rate, which also was taken into consideration while describing the “Hindu rate of growth” are important caveats that need careful attention. Source: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/features/investment-world/market- watch/whats-a-hindu-rate-of-growth/article4795173.ece accessed on 24th February 2014 34 The Indian Minister, Indira Gandhi, was assassinated in 1984. Following that, there was a period of political unrest based on ethno-religious conflicts that led to political instability and turmoil (Frankel, 2005). 35 See Patnaik and Chandrashekhar (1995) and Chandrashekhar and Ghosh (2002); they challenge the thesis of India’s necessity to adopt neoliberal policies for economic growth during this period. 36 “The destructive and creative moments of institutional change within actually existing neoliberalism are intimately, inextricably interconnected in practice. Our use of the term ‘moments’ to describe these interconnections is therefore intended in the Hegelian-Marxian sense of conflictual yet mutually related elements within a dynamic, dialectical process, rather than as a description of distinct temporal units within a linear transition” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002:16). 37 Source: http://links.org.au/node/2818#_edn1 accessed on 28th July, 2012.

63

38 Esping-Andersen (1990) 39 “Urbanism may be regarded as a particular form or patterning of the social process. This process unfolds in a spatially structured environment created by man [sic.]”. A city is thus a tangible expression of urbanism—the social surplus product congealed socio-spatially in a concentrated form (Harvey, 2005: 239). It is not found in a pre-given form but is continuously evolving though not in any pre-determined predictable state (Brenner, 2009). 40 Urbanism and urban development in the current global context that is situated within the capitalist urban development framework is observable since 1970s. However, in India this is conspicuous since late 1980s. 41 India Today, 18th November, 2002. 42 I have also referred to Five Year Plan as Plan in short. 43 Taxes remained a weak base for urban funds. The urban property tax, for instance, yielded poor revenues and revenues from stamp duties and registration fees to urban local bodies were insignificant (NCU 1988:302 in Shaw: 1996). Even though the importance of decentralization of the urban population was realized during this time, there was a serious lack of systematic effort in materializing the same. The center maintained its financial commitment to the largest metropolitan cities and areas of national importance, and at the same time continued its rhetoric of decentralization. 44 “The ceiling in Class I cities like Mumbai and Delhi was fixed at 500 square meters vacant land per owner. The ceiling in other cities was progressively higher according to the size class of cities going up to 2000 square meters The total estimated vacant land in excess of ceiling limit at the time of the enactment of the ULCRA ranged between 1,66,162 hectares to 2,20,000 hectares” (CCS, 2007 as cited in Batra, 2009: 13). 45 During this period, the erstwhile Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, came in power after two and a half years of Janata Party’s rule following the national emergency. The Turkman Gate incident took place at the time of emergency when under the direction of Mrs. Gandhi and his son, Sanjay Gandhi, the slums at the Turkman Gate were violently demolished and protestors were brutally killed through police firing. In order to regain the confidence and to erase the memory of the incident, the Government was keen to uphold a pro-poor image (Batra, 2009). 46 Source: http://planningcommission.gov.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/index7.html accessed on 24th June, 2013 47 It asserts that promotion of privatization and commercialization is not a matter of political or ideological choice but is instead rooted in “pragmatic and non-ideology- related factors”. This is because “there is, today, considerable doubt about government’s ability to supply infrastructure services efficiently.” (IIR:2; as cited in Batra, 2009:21). 48 There was an implicit recognition that “given the monopolistic nature of infrastructure services, high initial investment, long gestation period in terms of returns and existence of externalities, it was perhaps necessary for the public sector to assume a predominant role in the provision of infrastructure in the post-Independence period” (Batra, 2009:21). This, however, was not considered a deterrent for welcoming privatization of infrastructure building, as the ideology underpinning the action had undergone a significant paradigm shift from dirigiste regime to the neoliberal order. 49 Source: http://jnnurm.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/broucher.pdf accessed on 16th August, 2013 50 The rate at which the funds will be disbursed is as follows: 35:15:50 between Center, States and ULBs respectively for cities with over 4 million population, 50:20:30 for cities with population between 1-4 million and 80:10:10 for other smaller cities (Batra, 2009: 30) 51 The implications of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act and Rent control laws will be dealt in greater detail in Chapter 4 52 The mandatory reforms at the state level include: introduction of e-governance using IT applications, GIS (Geographic Information Systems) and MIS (Management Information Systems) for various urban services; reform of property tax; adoption of modern, accrual-based system of

64 accounting; levying user charges to recover full cost of operation and maintenance within seven years; internal earmarking of budgets for basic services to the urban poor; and providing basic services to the urban poor including security of tenure at affordable prices. Source: http://jnnurm.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/broucher.pdf accessed on 16th August, 2013 53 Source: http://www.sethassociates.com/foreign-direct-investment-in-real-estate-in-india.html accessed on 18th August 2010 at 4:00pm 54 Source: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=78562 accessed on 19th August, 2013. Also see, http://jnnurm.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/RTP_MOD-1-1.pdf 55See:http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/JNNURM-improved-urban-life-quality- NSSO/articleshow/28121185.cms 56 By (trans)national capital I refer to both foreign and domestic capital. Since capital is highly footloose in nature (in comparison to labor), broadly speaking, the distinction between foreign and domestic capital is tenuous and is specific to a particular time. 57 Harvey, 2001; 2006 and Levien, 2011 58 Marx, in his seminal work, Capital Vol. 1, first dissects the nature of the capitalist mode of production, and identifies the source of surplus value. Then he goes on to explain the genesis of capitalism under “primitive accumulation”, where he establishes the historical specificity of capitalism and the factors contributing towards its continual reproduction. Marx asserts that primitive accumulation is a necessary precondition for the establishment of capitalism as the dominant mode of production. He also distinguishes between primitive accumulation and capitalist accumulation in general. He mentions that “…primitive accumulation (the ‘previous accumulation’ of Adam Smith) which precedes capitalist accumulation; an accumulation which is not the result of the capitalist mode of production but its point of departure” (Marx, 1976: 873). And general capitalist accumulation, which takes on a form of expanded reproduction, necessitates reproduction of capital on an extending scale, subject to the immanent laws of capitalist production (Marx, 1976: 739). If we note carefully then we will find that although Marx says that primitive accumulation is the point of departure, he does not say that primitive accumulation ceases to exist altogether after the general capitalist accumulation begins. Although Marx did not emphasize the continuous character of primitive accumulation explicitly, he did not explicitly deny its continuance as well. The less emphasis on primitive accumulation after capitalism is able to stand on its own feet is mainly political or strategic, rather than theoretical. He did that because he “…would not have wished his readers to believe that measures to eliminate ‘unjust’ instances of primitive accumulation might suffice to bring about good society. To have stressed the continuing influence of primitive accumulation risked throwing readers off track. They might conclude that the ills of society resulted from unjust actions that were unrelated to the essence of the market” (Perelman, 1997: 5). Instead, he wanted to emphasize the role of the “silent economic compulsion of the market”. 59 As opposed to many Marxist scholars who have asserted that primitive accumulation is only a historical phase preceding capitalism proper, Lenin (1899) argues that primitive accumulation is defined by time, which describes the historical pattern of separation between people and means of production when the transition between feudalism to capitalism took place (Lenin 1899, cited in De Angelis, 2000: 4). Maurice Dobb (1963) in his study on the transition to capitalism also conforms to the view that primitive accumulation is observed “…prior in time to the full flowering of capitalist production” (Dobb, 1963: 178). Zarembka (2002) vehemently argues that primitive accumulation should not be conflated with the general capitalist accumulation. He further adds that primitive accumulation cannot be used transhistorically (here transhistorical refers to the operation of primitive accumulation in the transitional period as well as throughout capitalism), which is only limited to the phase just preceding the establishment of the capitalist mode of production as the dominant one. He argues that Marx had referred to the transitional phase as primitive or original accumulation and after capitalism “stands on its own feet”; primitive accumulation is supplanted by general capitalist accumulation. Zarembka cites Marx’s works in support of his arguments. In Capital

65 volume 1, he states that Marx had particularly mentioned, “primitive accumulation...is the historic basis, instead of the historic result of specifically capitalist production” (pp. 875 cited in Zarembka, 2002: 5). 60 There is considerable debate around the topic concerning the increasing relevance of accumulation by dispossession in current times (See Ashman and Callinicos, 2006). Further, the reason behind the relevance is also a theme of contention among scholars. Harvey argues that due to global overaccumulation crisis, capital need a spatial fix for which it seizes upon existing resources to continue accumulation and that is achieved primarily through dispossession with severe ramifications in the Global South (Harvey, 2003; 2005) 61 Accumulation by dispossession or ABD comprises a whole range of processes. “A closer look at Marx's description of primitive accumulation reveals a wide range of processes. These include the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; the conversion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusive private property rights; the suppression of rights to the commons; the commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo- colonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources); the monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; the slave trade; and usury, the national debt, and ultimately the credit system as radical means of primitive accumulation. The state, with its monopoly of violence and definitions of legality, plays a crucial role in both backing and promoting these processes…there is considerable evidence that the transition to capitalist development was and continues to be vitally contingent upon the stance of the state. The developmental role of the state goes back a long way, keeping the territorial and capitalistic logics of power always intertwined though not necessarily concordant. All the features of primitive accumulation that Marx mentions have remained powerfully present within capitalism's historical geography up until now” (Harvey, 2003: 145). 62 To quote Harvey at length (2003: 147-48) “Some of the mechanisms of primitive accumulation that Marx emphasized have been fine-tuned to play an even stronger role now than in the past. The credit system and finance capital became, as Lenin, Hilferding, and Luxemburg all remarked at the beginning of the twentieth century, major levers of predation, fraud, and thievery. The strong wave of financialization that set in after 1973 has been every bit as spectacular for its speculative and predatory style. Stock promotions, ponzi schemes, structured asset destruction through inflation, asset-stripping through mergers and acquisitions, and the promotion of levels of debt incumbency that reduce whole populations, even in the advanced capitalist countries, to debt peonage, to say nothing of corporate fraud and dispossession of assets (the raiding of pension funds and their decimation by stock and corporate collapses) by credit and stock manipulations—all of these are central features of what contemporary capitalism is about….Wholly new mechanisms of accumulation by dispossession have also opened up. The emphasis upon intellectual property rights in the WTO negotiations (the so-called TRIPS agreement) points to ways in which the patenting and licensing of genetic material, seed plasma, and all manner of other products can now be used against whole populations whose practices had played a crucial role in the development of those materials. Biopiracy is rampant and the pillaging of the world's stockpile of genetic resources is well under way to the benefit of a few large pharmaceutical companies. The escalating depletion of the global environmental commons (land, air, water) and proliferating habitat degradations that preclude anything but capital-intensive modes of agricultural production have likewise resulted from the wholesale commodification of nature in all its forms. The commodification of cultural forms, histories, and intellectual creativity entails wholesale dispossessions (the music industry is notorious for the appropriation and exploitation of grassroots culture and creativity). The corporatization and privatization of hitherto public assets (such as universities), to say nothing of the wave of privatization (of water and public utilities of all kinds) that has swept the world, indicate a new wave of 'enclosing the commons'”. 63 See Adnan (2013) where he acknowledges the fact that Harvey has revived and broadened the

66 concept of primitive accumulation. However, he criticizes Harvey for over emphasizing and contextualizing ABD exclusively on neoliberal globalization, therefore making the concept problematic, as it is unable to explain the processes that precedes neoliberal era. I do not think Harvey ever says that ABD is operational only during neoliberal era but what he is emphasizing is the prominence of ABD during the current time due to the global overaccumulation crisis, which preceded the neoliberal era. It could perhaps be more apt to say that Harvey does not throw enough light on the preceding times and the effect of ABD during that time. But that can be counter argued by saying that, it was not the main objective of Harvey in that particular context. 64 Harvey, 2003 65 There are a number of studies (see Levien, 2011, 2013; Hall, 2013; Strumpel 2014) that deal with creation of Special Economic Zones and industrial units on the urban fringes but these works do not focus on the city creation (planned or relatively unplanned seen in ‘spontaneous’ urban extension). This is problematic on the account of the fact that even though there are similarities in the processes of industrial development and urban development, there are key differences in the means deployed, spatial forms and the nature of contestations. 66 Swyngedouw, 2000 67 Cox, 1998; 2008 68 This emanates from the contradictory relationship between fixity and mobility of capital (Harvey, 1989; Massey, 1984), that leads capital to invest at one point in time only to undermine, devalue and even destroy them to open up fresh room for accumulation at a later point in time. ‘The inner contradictions of capitalism are expressed through restless formation and re-formation of geographical landscapes” (Harvey, 2001). The fixity relates to the built- environments that embed capital in particular places, which includes various types of local dependences in the form of place- based cross-class alliances at multiple scales (Cox and Mair, 1988). And this uneven development not only serves as a basis for accumulation process but also under certain circumstances operates as a barrier to the latter (Brenner and Theodore, 2002:8). 69 Harvey, 1989; also see Hall and Hubbard, 1997 70 Banerjee-Guha, 2010 71 Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indias-income-inequality-has-doubled-in-20- years/articleshow/11012855.cms accessed on 24th February, 2014 72 Sibley, 1995; also see Fernandes, 2006 73 “This process represents an emerging dimension in Indian politics, one in which middle class individuals and social groups now consciously claim that the Indian middle class is a distinctive social group with its own set of social, political, and economic interests that must be actively represented” (Fernandes, 2006: 139). 74 Anjaria, 2011 75 Bayat, 2000 76 Scott, 1985 77 Source: http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ayona-datta/myth-of-resettlement-in- delhi accessed on 25th August, 2013 78 We shall see in chapter 4 that this seldom leads to positive impacts on the slum or squatter dwellers. 79 Bayat, 2000 80 See Glassman, 2006; Levien, 2011; 2013 81 Gramsci, 1971; Burawoy, 1985 82 See Webber, 2008 for the economic logics of primitive accumulation in China 83 See Adduci, 2009; Nielsen, 2010; Levien, 2011 84 The Information and Communication Technology (ICT) revolution facilitated the vertical disintegration of industries, enabling spatial relocation of work, thereby contributing to an internationalization of the division of labour, particularly, in white-collar work related to information processing (Huws, 2003:56-7). The phenomenon of outsourcing as a part of economic globalization

67 gained greater momentum, however, mainly after the revolution in ICT. This led to the progressive ‘tertiarization’ of economies and the emergence of what is popularly known as the new economy. In this regard, Information Technology (IT) and Information Technology Enabled Services (ITES) and other parts of the BPO (Business Process Outsourcing), KPO (Knowledge Processing Outsourcing) sectors are arguably the most rapidly growing industries across the world. They are an integral part of the, epitomizing the new service-based economy in the globalizing world. IT and ITES sectors are serving as important symbols of globalization in the economic landscape in several less developed countries, including India. 85 See Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis. 86 Gramsci, 1971 87 Sibley, 1995 88 Flusty, 1994 89 Ong, 2006 90 Also see, Fernandes, 2006 91 See Herring, 2008 92 Bayat, 2000: 547 93 “The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from that of what kind of social ties, relationship to nature, lifestyles, technologies and aesthetic values we desire. The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights” (Harvey, 2008:23).

68

CHAPTER 3

The Politics of Urban–Space Making on the Fringes:

Dispossession and Development

3.1 Introduction

In India, the creation of urban spaces is increasingly seen as key to economic growth; hence the encouragement given to the development of towns and urban-spaces that are proliferating on the fringes of large cities. In this regard, the periphery of Kolkata is no exception. However, the nature and course of city making politics in different parts of India are distinct. In this chapter I thus analyze the making of urban spaces on the fringes of

Kolkata. In so doing, I aim to fill in gaps in the current literature. In this regard, the chapter examines not only the process of accumulation by dispossession (particularly in the Indian context of urban-space making), including the means through which it is effected, but also how this leads to an intensification of commodification and speculative processes. It also analyzes the role of the state in shaping the politics of city-making. Further, in the current literature there is an overemphasis on the importance of extra-economic coercion over other means of dispossession. I seek to scrutinize the diverse means and strategies deployed in conditioning the process of accumulation by dispossession to understand whether extra-economic coercion is indeed necessary for ABD or not. Empirically, the politics of urban development has focused mainly on the intra-city areas with a relative

69 neglect of new urban-space making or city creation in the inter-city areas. Even though there are some studies focusing on the formation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) or industrial units on the urban fringes, that is not exactly the same as city-making. Therefore, this chapter particularly intends to explore the political economy of the urban development on peripheral parts of the city. In this context, it studies the means deployed, subsequent spatial forms and the nature of contestations that are distinct from industrialization on the fringes. The politics of urban-space creation is necessarily intertwined with class struggle and I intend to explore the different forms of struggle and the underlying ideologies that shape the politics of urban development. The chapter also enquires how urban-space making politics affects the existing geographies by unpacking economic and socio-cultural impacts on the dispossessed population. This is an important part, especially since the lack of work on this theme is noteworthy in the existing literature.

In this regard, the process of accumulation by dispossession94 (ABD) is central to the understanding of the urban development politics that unfolds at the periphery. The appropriation of the existing resources contributes towards accumulation, i.e. seizing upon the already extant means of production and modes of labor to reproduce capital on an expanding scale. Land is the main resource, which forms the focus of accumulation in these areas. Dispossession (separation of direct producers from their means of production) in this context serves the commodification of rural land into urban space and the transformation of land into urban real estate (Goldman, 2011: 557).

70 3.2 Dispossession Politics and Urban Development:

Planned and Relatively Unplanned Urban Development

My study is based in two areas on the periphery of the city of Kolkata. In the first it is a question of the formation of a new township in the northeast part (Rajarhat, in the district of North 24 Parganas), while in the second it is a matter of more informal, unplanned urban extension in the south (near Joka-Pailan area, in the district of South 24

Parganas). In both cases, land is at the heart of the politics of urban development. This politics centers on both land acquisition, infamously referred to as “land grabs” and also speculation in the land thus acquired. For the making of urban spaces, land is the most basic condition but it first has to be acquired. In both the northeast and in the southern part, land did not lie vacant; it was mostly devoted to farming. In the context of land question in

West Bengal under the communist regime, the making of urban spaces on the fringes is particularly interesting given the sea change in the attitude of the Left front government and the ensuing effects of neoliberal (urban-space making) politics. Further, Rajarhat New

Township was officially claimed as a “peaceful and successful” model of urban development initially. However, in the later part of the project, various media reports suggested otherwise. In the event of the contradictory reports and claims, the study of creation of urban spaces on the urban periphery, particularly begs close attention. The Joka-Pailan case, on the other hand, provided a relatively contrasting form of urban development on the fringes as compared to the city-making politics in the case of Rajarhat.

Land is not considered in these places as just a transferrable financial resource. It has multiple uses and bears a myriad of complex meanings, including socio-cultural, economic and personal ones. For some it is revered as a part of “mother earth”; “it is the source of sustenance”; “it is the symbol of their forefathers”; “it is also a great security”.95 In

71 both Rajarhat (northeast) and on the southern fringe of Kolkata, the land is particularly fertile. In Rajarhat its productivity is very high with year-round cropping, including three seasons of paddy and all kinds of vegetables. In the study area of South 24 Parganas, the farming season lasted for nine months and even in the remaining three months the land was not left entirely fallow; rather; vegetables were grown. In any case, land is something people do not want to part with. This is mainly because it is a means of sustenance for which it is hard to find substitutes given the limited possibilities in other sectors of the economy in

India. Accordingly, persuading a large number of landowners to sell their land can be done in part through extra-economic means, which the state has available to it. Further, land acquisition jeopardizes the livelihoods of not just the landowners, but also the land dependent population. The varied (often conflicting) interests of diverse classes need to be compromised, and that only a state can do with its power.

In both the Rajarhat and Joka-Pailan areas land was divided among many small holders. As in all land assembly processes the aim was to assemble land in a large contiguous bloc and this necessitated the intervention of the state. However, while the right of eminent domain was used to acquire land in the northern part—for the township in

Rajarhat— on the southern fringe the law was not drawn on. Rather the latter development

(Joka-Pailan) occurred in an informal manner and gradually, the state officially did not step in and the land assembly process was largely left to the private developers and market forces (see later). In the case of Rajarhat New Town, the need to assemble a large area of land in a stipulated time frame necessitated the state applying the right of eminent domain.

Given that some landowners would almost certainly be unwilling to sell their land, the intervention in the form of using the right of eminent domain by the state is a necessity not only to elicit consent but also the possibility of applying force in case of opposition. The

72 purchasing of land through assertion of the right of eminent domain, thus, raises difficult questions in this context.

3.2.1 The Politics of City Making: Planned Urban Development in Rajarhat

3.2.1.1 Contextualizing Eminent Domain

Eminent domain refers to the sovereign power that the state may exercise over all land within its territory. The meaning of this—in its irreducible terms—pertains to the power to take over land, even without the owner’s consent, for any public purpose (Ramanathan,

2009). However, what constitutes “public purpose” is open to debate. Since it implies compulsory acquisition of land, owners are expected to submit to the “rule of law” without challenging it. However, in the Indian context it is rarely so.

Due to the presence of limited alternatives to livelihood, land is a major source of sustenance for many. Further, land is not considered just as a transferable asset, it has deeper connotations (as noted above). Under these circumstances, the force of necessity fuels opposition to land acquisitions by the state. Political consciousness is largely shaped through class struggle. In this regard, West Bengal has had a vibrant and volatile political history, especially around the question of land. Be it the oppressed classes against the landowners, as is the case in the Naxalite Movement,96 or landowners opposing land acquisitions by the state, the people have been vociferous in defending their rights. Likewise people in West Bengal are very much aware of their electoral power over the government.

Therefore, any law is not something that they consider as pre-given and beyond questioning.

In Rajarhat, even though many did know about the law, they challenged the sovereign power of the state in this context (see later in the chapter). They questioned a right of the state that according to them was unjust and therefore eligible for contestation. It is also true

73 that many were also unaware of the legal obligation, given their relative isolation and uneducated background. Thus the knowledge or lack of it about the law does not guarantee undisputed submission, as it does not change the material reality that impinges on the land dependent population (including the owners) and that shapes their responses. The need to use force to dispossess farmers of their means of production emanates from this historical and geographical context.97

The Rajarhat New Town

The township has officially taken up 25 mouzas (villages) comprising 3075 hectares.

The state formed a public limited company, West Bengal Housing and Infrastructure

Development Corporation [HIDCO], in 1999, that was entrusted with the planning and establishment of the township in the Rajarhat area. The state along with its parastatal organization, HIDCO, formed active and direct as well as indirect alliances at multiple levels with different classes to create the township. In trying to understand the planned urban development, it is important to contextualize and analyze the role of the state. It is important to specify that by “state” I am primarily referring to the state at the provincial or regional level, unless otherwise specified. I do, however, acknowledge that the provincial state is not entirely independent of the national state, which sets the legal-ideological framework within which it has to operate. The function of the provincial state is also deeply connected with the state at the local levels—both urban and rural, as these form the arms though which the regional state is able to realize its goals.

74 3.2.1.2 Enclosure from Above

A. Extra-economic coercion

Armed with the power of eminent domain, which in turn is based on the Land Acquisition

Act of 1894, the state was able to use its monopoly to acquire land for the realization of the township project. This allowed appropriation of private land for the sake of “public purposes”. Dispossession often requires some degree of force—direct or indirect—without which expropriation may not be possible in the wake of intense opposition. In the case of

Rajarhat township, the state along with its attendant agencies was able to apply direct coercion on the people involved. The local political party members forged active associations with local goons and they, with the help of the police force, were able to coercively seize land: “Where could we go? ‘Mastans’ [goons] would come and threaten us and if we went to the police to complain they would not listen to us…. Instead, they came along with the ‘mastans’ to warn us of the consequences if we did not give in” (personal interview; January, 2011).

In addition, a nexus of land brokers [dalal] was mobilized by HIDCO to impose both direct and indirect coercion. The land brokers would work on the incentive of commissions resulting from land dealings. These land brokers had direct links with HIDCO and would be often backed in their activities by local political parties. This network of land brokers used all types of threats (apart from concessional and consensual means to be discussed in a later section) in compelling the land dependent population to give up their ownership and access rights to the land: “We were threatened that we will be killed if we oppose state acquisition…I felt extremely afraid as they could have resorted to any tactics to get my land”

(personal interview; April, 2011).

75 Apart from verbal threats, various weapons were brandished by the local hoodlums, who were already known to be notorious in the area. The visual threat added to the tense atmosphere. Weapons were not only carried at night but also openly flaunted in broad daylight to create a hostile environment:

I always felt that someone was following me, wherever I went…they [land brokers and local party members] used to come to house and threaten us…they also knew about our daily activities so they could also use those information to entice us or warn us…I was asked directly that you had gone to a money lender yesterday to get some money for your daughter’s upcoming wedding…but how do you plan to repay that and why do you want to go through such pains when you can easily get the money and much more than you have imagined by just selling your land for the project…they knew just about everything (personal interview; March, 2010).

The surveillance system that kept a tab on the activities of the villagers (landowners and other dependents on the land) was also a way of engendering terror so as to extract

“willingness” from the farmers to sell or give up their land for the township project: “I knew who are the informants…sometimes I would see them grouped in one corner of the street and chatting away as if they are there by chance, but all were planned, they would have these groups stationed at one place to check on what we were doing” (personal interview;

March, 2010). The surveillance actually worked as a means to discipline and control landowners, not only coercing them to give in but also to thwart any form of organized resistance movements. The surveillance system created a “panopticon” effect,98 as villagers did not know exactly when they were being watched and how that would impact them. This in turn facilitated the infusion of control and discipline—though not the main objective of the brokers—and created an atmosphere of terror that helped in compelling land sales.

If threats and compulsion did not work then violent measure such as forcible possession through destruction of the current usage of the land was resorted to:

76 A huge contingent of cops arrived in our village along with hundreds of armed people wearing red armbands. Then at least 50 lorries [trucks] entered the village and dumped rubbish on a full-grown mustard crop. The year’s produce was lost and living off the land had no option but to accept the compensation (The Telegraph, September 7th, 2009).

Through material and symbolic modes the power of the state and its allies was established.

In Rajarhat, the mainstay of most of the population was agriculture, so water formed an essential element of their existence for productive farming. Even though the area receives ample rainfall during the monsoons making the area rich for agriculture, regulated irrigation is a requirement for year-round cultivation. In this regard, the state provided and controlled the water supply. In the context of pursuing land acquisition, the state suspended the supply of water to the fields in the middle of the growing season. This compulsive measure resulted in creating coercive and tyrannical conditions for the farmers, thereby leaving little or no choice for many but to succumb to the demands of the state for selling their land:

One morning in the summer of 2008 Asharf Molla woke up and saw the irrigation department water pump, the only source of water for his 1.5-bigha plot, was not working. When he started asking around, the middle-aged farmer learnt that all the four pumps in Baliguri village, barely 3km from Salt Lake, were out of order. It was peak paddy sowing season and round-the-clock availability of water was a must. So Ashraf and other villagers headed straight for the irrigation department office seeking immediate help to fix the snag. But for days and weeks and months, no help came. Only the sowing season came and went (The Telegraph, September, 7, 2009).99

B. Market coercion

Extra-economic coercion undoubtedly is important to accumulation by dispossession.

However, economic imperatives are also significant factors that can condition the dispossession process. This is further accentuated when political and extra-economic forces

77 heighten them. Urban development of Rajarhat has witnessed state induced market coercion:

What they did was publish a proclamation by the governor of West Bengal in 1996. It was mentioned in the proclamation that 21 mouzas comprising of 2750 hectares of land in Rajarhat cannot be sold, transferred, mortgaged, or even leased by anyone… Even then what they saw was no one was still parting with their land. Then they declared that they are not acquiring land but if anyone sells the land then they cannot sell it to tom, dick or harry, they will have to sell it to HIDCO, that is the government (personal interview, January, 2011).

Land, for farmers, is a major source of sustenance not just because of the harvests or the crops yields but also as an asset, working as a primary source of security. Land is a means of production, for sure, but in case of any emergencies, it serves as the collateral, which can be used repeatedly. Land selling and more importantly pawning are very common in Indian villages. So it was in Rajarhat: “Land is life for us. When in need it has helped to get out of debt or to pay for medical treatments or for marriages and for so many things…. We generally sell land or mortgage it whenever required, only to repurchase it later or to buy some other piece of land” (personal interview, March, 2010). Additionally,

“[Land] It is what we base our lives on, it is our life, it is our soul, it comes to our rescue whenever needed…it is our biggest security” (personal interview, February, 2011):

For example, if I have a daughter and I have to get her married, how do I do that? I can sell 2-4 kathas100 of land and get the money with the help of which I make the arrangements for my daughter’s wedding. Later, when due to better production of crops in some season I might again buy back that 2-4 kathas or even more depending on my circumstances. But due to this proclamation if I cannot even do that then just imagine what would be my condition. Even when I am the landowner, I cannot do things with my land according to my will or needs (personal interview, January 2011).

It is clear from the above statements that land, apart from being the primary means of production, was the greatest safety net of farmers as well as rural landowners in Rajarhat.

Therefore, a decree freezing land sales for any period of time is extremely oppressive in

78 nature. Land is forcefully withdrawn from the market, which engenders difficult conditions for the farmers. Afterwards the replacement and modification of the former proclamation with a new one, which restricted the seller to selling their land only to HIDCO added to the pressures.

The role of market mechanisms in conditioning land acquisition and dispossession processes is also observed in a slower and seemingly non-coercive form, where the dull economic compulsion impinges on people, leading to selling of land. This feature is also noticed in the case of Rajarhat and more importantly in the politics of unplanned urban development, as we shall see later in the case of southern urban fringe of Kolkata.

3.2.1.3. Enclosure from Below

City making or the development of a planned urban center such as the New Town at

Rajarhat, does nevertheless, provide great possibilities for building alliances with the resident population and in this way it is unlike an industrial project. A city presents a complex landscape comprising a wide range of productive, consumptive and reproductive functions. The expansion of a terrain of consensus is important to directly facilitate accumulation through dispossession as well as thwarting any potential antagonisms and oppositions.

HIDCO instituted a network of land brokers through various schemes of commissions and material concessions. The land brokers formed an active part of the land assembly process. Brokers or dalals (as they were referred to in the local language) actively persuaded people to sell the land in exchange for the price offered by the government.

The fact that these brokers were locals meant that their social networks and connections facilitated the land acquisition process. These networks gave access to

79 differential social capital based on class and place that in turn influenced the rapidity and nature of land assembly. The brokering system included a series of actors, who served as key players in bringing about materially induced consensual means of acquisition. They formed a nexus from the grass roots to the top tier of administrative officials. Along with land brokers, suppliers of building materials in the form of syndicates formed another aspect of the multi-tier brokering system. The brokers were successful to a significant extent in eliciting consent from a section of the farmers with the incentive of economic stakes in the new city:

They said that I would gain a lot by selling the land…they told me that they can offer me a very attractive deal if I sell the land to them…I was not too sure then…they told me that I can buy a piece of land in the city later on with the money that it will then fetch a much higher price due to development of the city…and city land prices are much higher…so I would gain even more later on…I thought it could be good investment (personal interview; April, 2010).

Another farmer who also found the land deals attractive and sold the land was

(falsely) promised to have a direct stake in the developed land, which “they said I could use to set up my own business later or give the land for lease to someone else” (personal interview; March, 2010).

The willing farmers, who apparently made a calculated move based on a comparison between their old livelihoods sustained by agricultural means, and the new ones hinging on the development of the township, anticipated greater returns in the latter. The eagerness on the part of a section of the dispossessed population indicates a tendency of “enclosure from below”. Therefore, they proactively supported the formation of the town. Based on the circumstances created by the state and its allies, many farmers saw the “compensation” or the price for the land that was offered to them as “attractive” for their immediate economic

80 gains on a short-term basis. Therefore, many cooperated with the state and parastatal apparatuses to give up their land for the megacity:

At that time, I thought given a choice I would not like to sell my land, as that was not only my ancestral property but also a major means of subsistence, but the money that was offered even though it was not enough, especially given the value of the land, was good for the time being…we are farmers, not very rich, we will always have needs that have to be met and at that time if you offer me a good amount, I will probably not have the strength to say no (personal interview, March, 2010).

Some larger farmers deemed current returns from the land as not significantly high, especially since sharecroppers were the ones who were mainly reaping the benefits from the land. They were not dependent on farming for their daily livelihoods or were not even residing in Rajarhat. They were the absentee landlords. These landowners were largely passive in their support of the acquisition process. Many did not oppose the construction of the new township, but they typically did not form active alliances with the state or capital or their compatriots. However, the younger generation comprising mainly the children of farmers, were more accepting with regard to the new township. They are the ones who largely persuaded their families to sell their land to HIDCO in support of the township.

3.2.1.4 Social Construction of “Urban Development”

The state government, headed by the Left Front, and HIDCO devised a discursive platform that facilitated the process. Urban development, especially, city making cannot be achieved just with extra-economic coercion, especially in a democratic framework like that of India. It requires approval and consensus of the people within the region as well as outside it. Internal support is required for not only eliciting consent but also to minimize resistances and thwart oppositions. In doing so the state needed to legitimize their actions through discursive means.

81 The power of eminent domain was also used here, emphasizing the importance of the project as essential for the betterment of the people. The project was portrayed as

“developmental” and “public” in nature. It was identified as a democratic endeavor on the part of the government not only for the inhabitants of that area but also for the economy.

One of the important HIDCO officials proclaimed, “The city is for the people…it is intended to provide for jobs, housing, better infrastructure, and overall better living and working conditions for the people…it is surely for the public in general and for the development of the people” (personal interview; February, 2011).

Further, the justification of the planned township was backed by legislative support from the state machineries. This included bureaucratic and technical changes like the removal of bureaucratic bottlenecks in the proceedings for transferring agricultural and grazing land into urban industrial uses. An official in the West Bengal Department of Land and Land Reforms stated that in the initial stages land conversions were made easy in order to facilitate real estate development on the urban fringes. However, due to the rise in tension and potential resistance, land conversions from agricultural to industrial or commercial or residential usage were formally restricted. Later it was promulgated that only “fallow” and “unproductive” land will be allowed for conversion. The politics of representation and the power of discourses thus became integral parts for legitimating the project in terms of emphasizing how the proposed land use is far better than the current one.

It was widely proclaimed that the area in Rajarhat is “fallow” and “unproductive” and entirely “unfit for any agricultural activities”. The chief engineer of the project under

HIDCO asserts the following:

82 There were no economic activities here…people used to stay here but work in some service oriented activities in Kolkata or some other places…no one did any form of economic activities here…this area was ‘Dhupir Bil’ [a water body]… the area was marshy…there was no population to be displaced or dispossessed…there was no cultivable land…people contemplated suicide as the area was economically so depressed, with no hope for betterment…. To speak about the character of the land…87% was non-irrigated land. Rest of the land was only mono cropped…marshy wetland. There were no recorded ‘bheri’ [water bodies or ponds where fish culture is practiced] in that area, as it is very difficult to get conversions of ‘bheries’ into commercial and residential land; we did not have to face any problems as none of the ‘bheries’ were recorded (personal interview, February 2011).

Another official (Additional General Manager of the Administration division of

HIDCO) had similar views:

There were vast swathes of land, which did not even have mono cropping. The area was the upper basin of some Sunderban rivers [the delta region of the Ganges River system]. So it was a marshy land, water clogged. This area was of no use, cropping was also not possible in many parts (personal interview, February, 2011).

The legitimization of the township project is founded on the politics of representation. Through discursive means and with the aid of the media, the area itself was publicized to be apt for a township project, especially since, it was claimed, there are no real or potential (agriculturally) productive activities. It also allowed the cheapening of the land prices offered as compensation to the dispossessed.

Since the area itself had no lucrative undertakings and there was little hope for any

“development”, as maintained by the state officials, it was natural and pragmatic to have a town near Kolkata in that area. Moreover, due to the excessive pressure of population in

Kolkata, a new town is “obviously” necessary to provide some relief to the city, according to the rationale provided by the government officials, “Rajarhat town has been under planning in 90s. Looking at the ’81 and ’91 census we noticed that the population of Kolkata has been rising, so we needed a planned town to accommodate the rising population” (personal interview, February, 2011). Further, given the proximity of the location to the city of

83 Kolkata, officials stressed that this area was chosen as the most suitable. The necessity of the township was justified and attributed to the demographic problem and locational advantages. The allusion was to the fact that the township is inevitable and essential for the

“development” of not only that particular area, but also the local urban economy at the center of which is Kolkata, which undoubtedly is the primate city in the province of West

Bengal.

Even if we take the claims at their face value and consider them to be true, i.e. the project was mainly to minimize the population pressure of Kolkata and to bolster the development of the region of Rajarhat, it is interesting to note that development of agriculture and rural parts were not seen as an option. Instead the creation and imposition of urban spaces on a rural landscape were thought to be the best path for developing the region. This is symptomatic of the development paradigm followed by the state of West

Bengal in particular and India in general. Further, there is the fact the project was in place since the 1970s, and not as claimed during the 1990s. The main reason, which was cited as a demographic one seems to be fabricated and self-serving because it did not have any economic and political bases. The leader of the Rajarhat Land Protection Committee highlighted:

In ‘70s when Congress was in power in West Bengal, at that time the planning of the township in the Rajarhat area was proposed. At that time (in 1972) Rabin Mandal (CPIM) who was the chief (pradhan) of the gram panchayat opposed this idea of a township. Initially during the ’70s the township project was planned with 7 mouzas but now 25 mouzas have been taken over for the township. CPIM, which at that time resisted the township, is now proactively involved in materializing it (personal interview; January, 2011).

The state discursively created the area in question as economically backward with sparse population and with little scope for development based on agriculture; land being

84 marshy and infertile, at best suited for mono cropping. This was done over a length of time with the help of the media to propagate and establish the fabricated “truths”.

The emphases on “development”, “public purpose”, “betterment of the masses”, and

“city for the original population” were powerful discursive means not only to justify the project but also to elicit consent and support:

The city has given new hope for the resident population. It not only has amplified economic opportunities for the people who have been living miserably but it also has given lease of life to silted water bodies (‘bheries’) and therefore to the fishermen who depended on the catch of these ‘bheries’. Apart from economic opportunities, the overall development of the area has boosted health, educational and other social and cultural possibilities. The city has, no doubt, benefitted the local population, as it is for them it was built…they were an unhappy bunch, now they are happy with the positive changes in their lives…since the new township was envisioned by the our Minister [in 2011] Mr. Gautam Deb, it is absolutely his brainchild… thus we should be eternally grateful to him for his magnanimous vision…it is simply remarkable and incomparable (personal interview, February, 2011).

The mega city was projected as a city for the local population. Apparently, housing, educational institutes, health facilities, employment opportunities, the road system etc. were all pitched in for the development of the region thus benefitting the local population:

We have planned for housing for the Economically Weaker Sections [EWS], Low Income Group [LIG], Middle Income Group [MIG]. A few thousand flats are being planned for EWS where the apartments are priced at one hundred to two hundred thousand, which is really affordable. Another township is being thought of where LIG apartments will be around Rs. 400,000 to 700,000…each flat is about 400 to 600 sq. ft. in area…. Nothing of this sort has ever been planned in India or abroad that I am aware of…Shapoorji Palonji [well known real estate developer in India] is being vested with the responsibility of planning these flats for them…it is a nice place to stay, beautiful with a small living room, bathroom and a kitchen where you can even fit in a small fridge…. Apart from housing, just look at the health facilities the new town has promised to harbor, Tata Cancer Hospital, Chittaranjan Cancer Hospital, another campus for PG hospital [Presidency General Hospital or Seth Sukhlal Karnani Memorial Hospital (SSKM), one of the oldest hospitals in Kolkata from the colonial period], also opening a branch of AIIMS here [a renowned hospital in Delhi]…. Further, printing offices of Ananda Bazaar Patrika [a well-known publishing house mainly popular for its leading Bengali newspaper], statesman [an English daily], major IT hubs, financial hubs—only next to Mumbai in scale, a slew of shopping malls, all this and more are coming up in Rajarhat. In

85 terms of educational institutes, IIT [Indian Institute of Technology] has been allotted a plot of land, Bhabha Atomic Research Center [premier nuclear research center based in Mumbai] is interested to open a research institute here, we have allotted land to University of Calcutta, and so many English medium schools such as Delhi Public School [DPS] and Kidzee [playschool or preschool] are going to contribute majorly towards the development of the region. Who will be gaining from all this, of course people from other parts will be coming in, but the local population also have a lot to gain (personal interview, February, 2011).

Deconstruction: Challenging the claims

My interviews with the resident population including landowners, sharecroppers, laborers, small businessmen, people engaged in non-agricultural and agricultural activities such as large and small farmers, however, suggest that the legitimatization of the project is questionable on numerous grounds.

The area of Rajarhat is one of the most fertile regions in West Bengal. My interviews clearly indicate this:

The government has been propagandizing that per ‘katha’ the productivity in terms of money in Rajarhat was about 88 paise which is not even one rupee… The second lie that they are publicizing is that the production of per acre of land in WB on an average is 1210 Kg, which means per ‘katha’ on an average the production is about 20 kg (as 1 acre is equivalent to 60 ‘katha’). It is a lie…damn lie...these statistics are just damn lies (personal interview, January, 2011).

Per ‘bigha’ minimum of 15 sacks of rice are produced (one sack holds 60 kgs of rice). If one acre is equivalent to 3 ‘bigha’ so per acre the minimum production is about 45 sacks of rice which would be 45X60 kgs of rice that amounts to 2700 kgs of rice in one season (summer) in Rajarhat…so if the entire year is taken into account just imagine the amount of total production (personal interview, January, 2011).

It not only produced luxuriant crops each year, but the area also had many water bodies, supporting a significant number of people in fish cultivation.101 Most of these water bodies were held in common and were used by the inhabitants of the region as a means of subsistence. One of the major one was called “Dhupir Bil”, which has been replaced by the main arterial road running across Rajarhat New Town. In the following interview excerpts

86 this comes across clearly: “Here we had a big water body you can say a lake known as

‘Dhupir Bil’, which was rich in all kinds of fish. It served as an important alternative income source to many farmers; in fact many people were solely dependent on the fish produce of the lake” (personal interview; January, 2011). Another local person in Rajarhat added, “Yes, many thousands of people depended on ‘Dhupir Bil’. You probably have not even seen or heard the kinds of fish that was available there, such as ‘kholshe’, ‘shol’, ‘shing’, ‘magur’, koi’,

‘chang’, ‘lyata’, ‘puti, ‘chuno’, ‘chada’ and many more” (personal interview; January, 2011).

Another erstwhile farmer conceded, “Most importantly no investment or expenses were required. It was absolutely free as it belonged to all people. During monsoons especially we just had to place a net and scores of fish would be caught. It provided good income for so many of us” (personal interview; January, 2011). Another local person affirmed, “It was a storehouse of fish, very rich resource. Anyone could catch fish and sell in the market, did not cost us anything” (personal interview; January, 2011). The Joint Director of Fisheries

Department of West Bengal vouched for many of the facts stated by the original inhabitants of the Rajarhat area, thereby negating some publicized myths and refuting many of the claims of the state officials. She affirmed:

When I joined about 15 years back as the Deputy Director in the West Bengal Fisheries Department. We started a survey for fisheries and water bodies in the region of Rajarhat. We found many ‘bheries’ (water bodies), one of the major being ‘Dhupir Bil’. Kolkata is a unique place, where we are lucky to have fresh water, saline water in abundance…therefore, fisheries and fish culture are amply found. Also, fish cultivation is carried out in the wastewater too…. The Rajarhat area was one such region, where apart from agricultural activities, fish culture was rampant. Going by the definition of ‘wetlands’, we consider paddy fields to be wetlands too, as any area where water is stagnant for at least 6 months is considered to be a wetland. Therefore, fishing in the waters of the paddy fields was also found. In that survey we came across about 53 different types of fishes. Fish such as ‘lyata’, ‘nyadosh’, ‘koi’ are mostly found in the paddy fields, these are becoming extinct. Irrespective of the land acquisition movement that was on during that time in Rajarhat, we realized the enormous richness of water resources. So when we received an application of filling in about 29 of the recorded ‘bheries’ (water

87 bodies), we opposed that. We deemed that both environmentally and economically; it would be a major loss. We submitted the report and stated disapproval and our reservations against the township (excerpt from an interview of a documentary film, February on Rajarhat land acquisition, 2011).

On the one hand, the HIDCO officials stated with pride that the area was studied in detail by the “PWD department of West Bengal and The Bengal Engineering College”. On the other hand, they seemed to be absolutely unaware of paddy cultivation and the presence of water bodies where fish were cultivated and served many economic and environmental avenues for a large population. In fact, when a township is planned, it is mandatory and obvious that the area should be studied. Yet, the discrepancies in the highlighted facts by the HIDCO officials in my interviews about the “infertile and uninhabitable characteristics” of the region are clearly not true. These “facts” are created, propagated and maintained as self-serving truths in order to justify the urban development project.

The ultimate motive being land acquisition, the means were coincidental and contingent rather than necessary. In some cases, fear and hostility helped in coercing the landowners and land dependents to give up their stakes in the land. In those cases too, it was publicized that people are “willingly” selling their land and accepting the land prices as offered they are “happy” with the amount of “compensation” offered to them:

[At that time, in 1990s] Most of the area was dominated by CPIM and of course some belonged to the Congress Party. Under such a tumultuous environment some people just fled from the area leaving behind their belongings. But most of the people who did not have any other place to go could not escape from the pressure and violence. They were forcibly loaded in a bus and taken to the HIDCO office where they were made to sign the papers and their land was handed to HIDCO. At that time they were not given any money. Later a program was arranged where you could only see red flags of CPIM and the dais of the stage was also marked with their symbol. In this program with a lot of pomp and show former Chief Minister, Jyoti Basu, presented the checks to the farmers. The media was also invited, it was a way of publicizing that farmers willingly and voluntarily gave up their land for the township and everyone is very happy with the project (personal interview, January, 2011).

88 Along with force, the rationalization of the project was largely predicated on the consensual arguments for dispossession. This gave an idea on the surface that the land acquisition had been “peaceful and successful” without any resistance (as claimed by the erstwhile Housing Minister, Mr. Gautam Deb). The consensual means included the establishment of the township for the development of the region, primarily intended for the original inhabitants. If scrutinized in detail, it is apparent that from the very beginning the city was not intended for the resident population. Accordingly the planning, design and execution of the project did not include the original population. The project was extremely top-down in its approach with little or no direct assistance or support from a large section of the local population.

Rather, the plan was conceived at the regional level. The land prices were also fixed by HIDCO, representing the state. The process of planning and implementation did not involve the people for whom supposedly the project was designed. HIDCO was primarily responsible for buying and acquiring land for the township. It also developed the land and created individual plots for sale to the real estate developers and allotted those to them for specific land uses. This was done through public notices and requests for tenders at the national level that were regulated and managed by a committee set up for this purpose. All this implied minimal direct involvement of the resident population in the project designing and target setting. They were not notified beforehand in any formal manner befitting their democratic participation:

There was no public hearing held for the land acquisition. Just the day before the acquisition a notice was hung in the local BDO [Block Development Office]. Who goes to BDO regularly, so who would have known and who would have objected against land acquisition? They did everything in a pre-planned manner (personal interview, January, 2011).

89 We first got to know about the great land acquisition from newspapers…most of us who did not read newspapers came to know later from various sources. We were completely shocked as the news came from nowhere. One fine day, we got up in the morning and got the news from the newspapers. Initially many did not believe but gradually the matter sank in that we will lose our land (personal interview, March, 2010).

The “facilities” that were supposedly to be provided for the resident population as part of their “development”, as confidently claimed by HIDCO officials, included housing, roads, IT and financial hubs, schools, employment opportunities. In one of the interviews, a

HIDCO official inadvertently divulged the principal purpose of the roads in the Rajarhat area:

We wanted to have great roads for the township. The main purpose of having the township was its location to the airport, so a great road system is prerequisite. Roads should be such that there are no speed breakers and people can go to airport without stopping anywhere and with as much ease as possible. We have ensured that happens. The responsibility to regulate and control traffic on the main road on Rajarhat is being transferred from West Bengal police to Kolkata police because the state understands that this road is central to controlling the traffic between the city and airport. Since the experience of Kolkata Police in managing traffic is much better than West Bengal police, this decision was taken. The government wants to keep the main road absolutely free of any impediments so that everyone can access the airport comfortably (personal interview, February, 2011).

In other words, the city was primarily not intended for the former farmers and the original inhabitants, since they would not be the ones availing themselves of the airport and for whom traffic congestion needed to be controlled.

Likewise, the financial and IT hubs that state officials declared as the prime flagship projects of the township cannot plausibly be aimed at the former farmers or their children who are mostly educated in vernacular medium with mainly higher secondary degrees (as very few are college graduates). On the contrary, employment in information technology or

IT-enabled services, financial services, knowledge-processing services mostly require

English-speaking graduates as minimal qualifications for a job as a professional. Therefore,

90 the assertions regarding job opportunities for the resident population who were mostly farmers or their children are clearly not true. The same applies to the recreational and health facilities such as large sports stadiums, children’s entertainment parks and hospitals such as Tata Cancer Hospital and a few more that HIDCO officials stated are beyond the reach of the original residents of Rajarhat area. This is not only due to restricted affordability as none of these are charitable concerns with subsidized or free access but also the kind of living that is being promoted, which is alien to the original inhabitants.

3.2.1.5 Ideology and City Making: Fetishizing the (World) City

The possibility of city making is further facilitated by the prospect of basing the project on the neoliberal concept and functions of the “modern world-city”. This is how the officials and the supporters of the township such as land brokers presented it to garner wider support. Thus the social construction of the world-city, urban development and urban citizenship in the currently globalizing urban world gain leverage. These are glorified and so facilitate the city making and accumulation (including through dispossession) process. In other words, in addition to the materialistic means of dispossession, a supportive ideological framework is often required, and is discursively constructed to legitimize the state’s actions and to “manufacture consent” on the greater part of the population.

The dynamics of world-city making requires the erection of an ideological framework for wider reception and participation. This is found in the case of Rajarhat as well. The township fitted very well with the extolling of the rising consumerist culture based on the global city or world city discourse. A city was supposed to be the ultimate dream of everyone and a city life is what all should strive for. The ability to own and consume various goods and services epitomized modern life in modern cities. The city life

91 was glorified as a life with glitz and glamor much better and happier compared to a “lowly” existence in a rural setting. Therefore, it was claimed, it is natural to want a city and with the growing population, desiring superior living in a city with all its facilities. Thus it was propagated that the government’s goal is to provide the conduit for the materialization of the aspirations of its citizens. A government official in charge of the implementation of the township project boasted:

You see more and more people are moving to cities for a better life. Here we are building a city for the people in Rajarhat and they are getting all the facilities of a planned modern city at the very place where they are living already. They do not even have to move to any other city to avail those things…the people should be happy and they are happier than what they were earlier (personal interview, February, 2011).

The underlying premises of modern cities, as symbols of development, guided the logic of planned urban development in the Rajarhat region. The highly patronizing claims of surpassing the expectations and needs of the resident population partly strengthened their attempts at legitimization in establishing the township. This is further corroborated by the proclamations of the former Chief Minister, Mr. Buddhadeb Bhattachraya, when he questioned, “Will a farmer’s son remain a farmer?”102 The presumption behind such a statement is the idea of farming in the rural set up as obsolete and primeval, and the new generation appropriately wants to give up farming and “aspires to acquire educational skills that will get him employment” (Mr. Buddhadeb Bhattacharya announced this during the election campaigns in 2011). The state officials engaged in the making of the township have also hailed the importance of cities not only as a means to achieve growth but also as the better and more desirable life for the general population. “There is no future in farming…agriculture is reaching a state of stagnancy…the future is in the industry and service sectors, therefore the importance of cities” (personal interview; February, 2011).

92 This is also evident in the visual images of the Rajarhat township. The hoardings and billboards portraying the “best things in life”, “modern abode”, “the happening city” exemplify the vociferousness of the depiction (Figure 5).

Figure 5. A billboard for a new apartment complex in Rajarhat New Town

The uncouth and un-modern rural life, which should be replaced by the new and desirable urban life representing modern times, is also infused in the minds of people in other ways. In this regard, the younger generation served as the channel through which propagation of such ideas achieved fruition. Through a discourse about the imagined life in world cities, people were persuaded. The idea of the city was made more acceptable and

93 palatable. However, not everyone believed and supported the positive image building of the city. There were contestation and negotiation, which we shall deal with, later in this chapter.

3.2.1.6 State and Capital(s): Commodification, Speculation and City Making

Land dispossession is not the only essential aspect of city making on the urban periphery of Kolkata. Land speculation forms an equally important part. The state with its machineries were not only actively involved in expropriating land from the landowners and the dependent population; in this case it also was responsible for development. Therefore, the parastatal body, HIDCO, in alliance with various private developers was engaged in developing the land to be sold to private companies for further real estate and industrial development. The privately held land of peasants and the common land used by the entire population was taken over by the state to be developed and redistributed among the captains of global capital for further commodification and speculation.

After appropriating land from the original owners, HIDCO developed it in parcels, each allotted for residential, commercial, industrial, environmental, health, and educational purposes. It was done based on a master plan, created and ratified by HIDCO and the Indian

Institute of Technology (Kharagpur) in West Bengal in 1990s. The State Housing Board, financial institutions such as Infrastructure Development Finance Company [IDFC], and partners in the form of private developers made initial investments for the project to take off. An official in the planning department of HIDCO specified, “When we were able to create a land bank then investors started coming in and we sold them to those investors…that we became quite self-sufficient and were able to roll over the money for more acquisition and investments on land” (personal interview; February, 2011). HIDCO undertook the development of land in partnership with private developers in joint ventures or under the

94 umbrella term, public-private partnerships or PPP. The notable players in this regard were

Bengal Ambuja, Bengal Greenfield, Bengal Peerless, Bengal Shrachi, Bengal Emami etc. The prefix “Bengal” signifying the official partnership of the state with a private development company. Along with the “funded partners”, there were domestic and international investors, such as DLF, Shapoorji Pallonji, Unitech Group and a Singapore based company

Keppel Land, which were directly entrusted with land and real estate development.

The land was either forcibly seized at no price from the owners or expropriated at nominal price because of its discursively constructed “vacant”, “marshy” and

“unproductive” nature:

Farmers were given Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 6,000 per ‘katha’103 and the same piece of land was sold by HIDCO to the real estate companies at Rs. 600,000. When an apartment building came up on that land, the apartments are being sold at prices ranging from Rs. 15 million to Rs. 20 million. So the farmers are getting only 1% of what the government is making and only 0.0001% of what real estate developers are making from the piece of land that belonged to the farmers originally.104

To illustrate the degree of returns further, I quote the comments of the leader of the

Rajarhat Land Protection Committee:

The farmers were given Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 13,000 per ‘katha’. But the govt. sold the land at the rate of Rs. 300,000 to Rs, 3,000,000 per ‘katha’. The land where you will find the new city center (shopping mall) has been sold at the rate of Rs. 3,000,000 per ‘katha’. For instance, you have paid Rs. 120,000 per ‘bigha’ (20 ‘kathas’ at the rate of Rs. 6,000 per ‘katha’) to the farmer and then you had to fill the lowland with loose mud/soil, so even if I take that you have invested another Rs. 120,000 to fill the fields and developed it, the total comes to Rs. 240,000. But you have sold the same land at Rs. 1,000,000. So if we deduct Rs. 240,000 (your cost) from Rs. 1,000,000, then the remaining amount of Rs. 760,000 is your profit (personal interview; January, 2011).

Additionally, in the words of an HIDCO official:

We have bought land at the rate of Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 6,000 per katha, we have sold that land at Rs. 100,000 to Rs. 200,000 and apartments on that land are fetching more than Rs. 4,000,000…so you can well imagine the level of appreciation of values in this area due to the development of land that HIDCO has done (personal interview; February, 2011).

95

It is hard to calculate the exact rate of return stemming from accumulation by dispossession, as the figures stated by the officials were not consistent. Also, different areas in Rajarhat have fetched different compensation prices depending on the area and time of acquisition. Nevertheless and despite this variation, these figures are indicative of the high rate of returns, thereby, signifying the role of the state as a land broker and rentier gaining disproportionate revenues from (land) dispossession and then value appreciation through development and speculation.

Real estate development itself implies construction activities that generate huge surplus values. The development of land and later real estate developments are delegated to private companies directly or through various PPP collaborations that results in profit generation accruing to the private companies and the state. This is further accentuated by the employment of “cheap” and “docile” migratory labor rather than the employment of those locals who have been dispossessed. “Cheapness” and “docility” of course are attributes that are not inherent in workers but are social constructions, which indicate the underlying relations of production and exchange. The semi-proletarianized status of the workers and the spatial dissociation from the site of production and social reproduction contribute materially to the attractiveness of employing them in construction work. Further, migrant workers have limited stakes in any particular workplace since it is unlikely that they will be returning in the future, so any improvement in conditions of work will not redound to their advantage (Burawoy, 1978; Breman, 1985; 1996). Due to the above characteristics of migrant labor, lengthening the working day further heightens the possibility of extracting absolute surplus value.105

96 Further, there is competition amongst multinational and domestic companies in the dynamics of world-city making which forces up rents. The prominent ones are the IT and financial companies having domestic and foreign connections including Wipro, IBM,

Genpact, Cognizant, Capgemini, Tech Mahindra, Ericsson, Accenture, Philips, HCL

Technologies, Aegis, Xoriant Corporation and so on, which have been establishing production spaces in the upcoming mega city. Entertainment, hospitality, tourism industries and commercial activities are increasing the number of stakeholders in the politics of urban development, as the speculative activities grow. Even the areas adjacent to the New Town are experiencing the changes, thus undergoing a similar dispossession and speculation politics. However, the nature and course of urban development in that area needs to be examined further. 106

Urban-space making is not confined to the planned process alone in India. The expansion of the city limits is carried out in a relatively unplanned fashion as well. In fact, even though it is more common and is seemingly less controversial, the southern part of

Kolkata is witnessing an “unplanned” urban space formation.

3.2.2 “Unplanned” or Private-Developer led Urban Extension

The extension of the city on the southern fringe is relatively “natural” or spontaneous. Even though there are similarities in the method used for dispossession of the farmers at the periphery, there are noteworthy differences as well. In this part I will be focusing on the defining features of the “unplanned” urban extension on the periphery of

Kolkata.

Urban development in the southern part of Kolkata in the South 24 Parganas district is part of the gradual and continual expansion of the city. Even though creation of urban

97 space in those instances is not done in a planned manner as at Rajarhat, it is not entirely unplanned. Here the state did not take a lead in a formal manner to initiate and drive urban- space making, i.e., the right to eminent domain was not used in order to acquire land. It did however play an important role in an informal capacity. The development was primarily undertaken by private developers, focusing mainly on residential purposes. Market imperatives have played an important role in creating the conditions for dispossession. The proximity of the area to the city of Kolkata has given rise to a deep and organic dependence with the city. The urbanization of the land and its incorporation into the city did not happen rapidly; but market logics impinged on the population over a considerable period of time.

Dependence on agriculture as the sole avenue for income has declined. Many rural residents in that region had other avenues of income deriving from connections with the city, either

Kolkata or some other cities in the form of migratory labor:

I have had agricultural land for my ancestors and we were engaged in farming for a long time…our entire family is…but I was also working in a garment factory located in Kolkata…this was mainly during the off season” (personal interview; April, 2011). Another former farmer remarked, “my brother has been working in Bhubaneshwar and I used to take care of the farming part here…he used to work seasonally there…so together we took care of our [joint] family (personal interview; April, 2011).

Economic logics created the bedrock favoring land assembly. Under these circumstances, when urban-space making entered into the fabric of local social life, it resonated among many, especially with the incentive of land brokering. Since the state was not formally involved, markets set the price, which was relatively “fair” compared to the pricing process in Rajarhat. In the event of land acquisition, the lure of getting a “handsome” price for the land acted as an inducement for many. Importantly, the process of land acquisition was gradual depending on the nature of the project and the amount of land required for it. Also, the progress of the project was largely contingent on the generation of

98 funds for it by the real estate developers, which in turn affected the rapidity and extent of the land acquisition necessary for a particular project. These features marked the differences of the private-developer led urban extension from the planned city making in the Rajarhat area.

A land brokering system, very similar to the one instituted in the Rajarhat area, was also part of this process. A chain of actors was involved starting from the grass roots level to the higher level that had direct connection to the land and real estate developers. Leaving agriculture and the potential benefits resulting from land speculation acted as important aspects in attracting a considerable section of the population. However, the involvement of private developers in acquiring land and more passive state engagement are not a guarantee of fair dealing, as swindling and non-payment of the land price are equally common in this part:

We were told that we will be getting Rs.50,000 now and later another installment of Rs. 50,000 will be made… we got the first part, but even though our land was taken up and they have done construction on them as well, it has been more than 3 years but we have not got our due….we have pleaded to them many times but nothing is happening (personal interview; April, 2011).

Extra economic coercion was not entirely absent and was to be expected given the significance of land as a continuing source of sustenance for many. Although there were supplementary sources of income other than agriculture, the dependence on land was deep rooted. The fertility of land was quite high with production of rice and other vegetables round the year. The primary source of livelihood was agricultural production with secondary sources from migratory labor and employment in the city achieved through daily commuting, especially in off seasons. However, the scale and relative slowness of the project, along with the favorable market incentives (as stated above), did not lead to

99 organized and intense oppositions against land acquisition in this area. Even so, protest was not entirely absent.

Since the extension of the city in the southern fringe did not involve the making of a

“city”, the land uses were different compared to the Rajarhat new township. Land was acquired mainly for residential purposes, educational and health institutes with little or no expansion in the IT and ITES sectors as opposed to the New Town in the northeast. The instilling of an urban ethos was not orchestrated and was much more gradual through everyday interactions with the city of Kolkata and partly through the increasing invasion of media (television, print, billboards). The incorporation of the area was more subtle and passive compared to the planned city making in the New Town. Therefore, there was no need for the sort of orchestrated enticement observable in the case of Rajarhat.

Furthermore, since the development of the urban space happened gradually, it allowed greater integration of Joka-Pailan area with the city of Kolkata. This is mainly because some kind of dependence had formed even before people were completely dispossessed of their means of production (land). As a consequence, people gained confidence about their possible role in the city through experience and it was not just conjectural.

In the context of urban-space making, the glorified and positive accounts of urban development are abundant. Particularly, this comes from planners, government reports, and policy arenas that are then publicized by political representatives and state officials, not only in India but in West Bengal too. Under these circumstances, it becomes crucial to examine the claims made by the mainstream sources. Urban-space making processes on the peripheral parts of Kolkata had contradictory geographical and socio-economic implications.

The schism between the promise and reality is stark, and shapes and colors the responses of the dispossessed and displaced population. In order to unpack the politics of urban

100 development on the fringes through dispossession, it is important to examine the impacts it has had on the people directly affected by the processes. I deal with the economic impacts first and then explore the socio-cultural effects on the original inhabitants mainly in the

Rajarhat region where planned development of the town was noted. The impacts and responses on the southern fringe of Kolkata (the relatively unplanned urban expansion) resonate partly with the Rajarhat region. Even though similarities can be found, there are some crucial differences that I briefly delineated below.

3.3 Effects and Survival Strategies

3.3.1 Economic Impacts

The dispossession process induces a myriad of complex responses from the displaced and dispossessed population. Even though explicit resistances are observed, to be able to continue living, various coping mechanisms need to be adopted.

One of the major effects has been the intensification of the commodification process.

Urban-space making does not only pertain to the release of under-commodified107 or uncommodified land, but it also “frees” people (potential labor under a capitalist regime) from their means of production. Accumulation by dispossession is always dependent on the appropriation and production of the “other” at the same time (Harvey, 2003). Therefore, urban-space making in the current form as noticed in West Bengal leads to mass dispossession and displacement resulting in the production of a “relative surplus population” (Marx, 1976). In the case of Rajarhat new township, the majority of the population is stripped of its main source of subsistence and means of living, thus making them relatively redundant. India bears the testimony of historically and geographically

101 truncated and uneven capitalist development, so absorption of the “released population” through accumulation by dispossession has severe limits (Patnaik, 1999). The relative surplus population is in latent and stagnant forms (Marx, 1976). 108 The process of accumulation by dispossession is intrinsically connected to the process of proletarianization or commodification of labor power (to become wage-labor) but does not always necessarily lead to the latter, especially in the Indian context which is not backed by an equally advanced level of industrialization (Patnaik, 1999). Further, due to the proliferation of jobs in the lower echelons of the economy (mainly what is more generally referred to as the informal economy) “with extremely irregular employment” (Marx, 1976:

796), a relative surplus population in a stagnant form is also found. “Since my land has been taken away, I am workless…what can I do? I have tried to find some work but have not been able to” (personal, interview; February, 2010). “Many of us are unemployed…we do not have any flowing source of income and our future is really bleak” (personal interview;

January, 2010). During my fieldwork, the gatherings of former peasants in front of tea stalls and in the open grounds playing cards and chit chatting in the middle of the day, is testimony to the fact that a large section of the eligible population has not been fully proletarianized, i.e. has not been absorbed in the labor market on a regular basis. When asked about their current employment status and sources of income, the majority responded saying that they do not have any fixed employment.

Despite the employment prospects that were supposed to be opened up for the resident population, the reality was far from the truth. HIDCO along with the attendant bureaucracies infused the belief that the proposed city in Rajarhat would create new opportunities for work, and the population, which is “set free”, would be able to access those. Though the city materialized, the work opportunities were not geared (particularly)

102 towards the original population who lost their means of production. Economic impacts of the expropriation processes are being dealt with through multiple livelihood strategies.

Former peasants and workers in the agrarian and non-agrarian sectors in Rajarhat, in most cases are ending up depending heavily on the informal sector either in the new township and/or in the nearby city of Kolkata. Some are even compelled to move to other areas in search of employment, although this is not common in Rajarhat.

The case for many of the dispossessed people is similar; the bulk of the work that is being generated is not due to any effort of the state but is in the lower echelons of the labor market, thus directly or indirectly supporting the growing urban economy in Rajarhat and the nearby city of Kolkata. During my fieldwork, in a random survey consisting of 78 people in the Rajarhat area, almost 81% were engaged in informal activities, including daily wage earners and self-employed people, 5% were involved in syndicates (organizations formed by HIDCO to supply building materials to various construction sites), and the rest (14%) were unemployed. Even though the organic relationship between Kolkata and Rajarhat existed prior to the establishment of the new township, the nature and degree of the interactions have changed.

3.3.1.1 Commodified Labor and Living

Previously, Rajarhat was mainly the supplier of food grains and vegetables to the city of Kolkata. Even though a section of the population commuted daily to Kolkata for work, it also had a strong footing in the villages. Today, the population originally inhabiting

Rajarhat is serving the flourishing local urban economy by supplying “unskilled” and semi- skilled labor and as the “surplus population”, which is exploited according to the needs of capital in Kolkata or in Rajarhat. “I used to work in the [agricultural] fields…now I shuttle

103 between the city [Kolkata] and new town [Rajarhat] for work…whatever work I get for a day I do…my wife is going for work as domestic help in these residential buildings…we are trying to survive but it is increasingly difficult” (personal interview; May, 2011).

The emerging urban economy results in employment creation in the lower sections of the economy such as rag picking, garbage processing, domestic help, which the former peasants are compelled to take up without other employment options. I will relate a couple of stories here to explicate the dismal conditions of two families after dispossession. This is suggestive of the negative impacts of a larger part of the dispossessed population in

Rajarhat new township. The first is the story of an 80-year-old man, Ghiyassuddin Haji109, who was a farmer and owned some amount of land, but since his dispossession he has not been able to come to terms with his loss and thus has suffered a massive heart attack, due to which one side of his body is rendered paralytic. He could barely speak, when he said, “I had

10-12 ‘bigha’ of land…I was forced to part with that…it was my life…it was our living…but they [he was referring to ‘goondas’ affiliated to local political parties] did whatever they could and forcibly took my land away from me…[while crying] I do not want to live like this”

(personal interview; January, 2011). He is now dependent on his sons for a living.

The sons are engaged in processing and sorting of the garbage coming from various new residential, official and commercial buildings in the new town. This serves as a survival strategy for the family at the moment. Haji’s daughter-in-law added:

My husband along with his brothers are forced to do this…earlier, we had so much of rice production that the production of one paddy season would be enough for us to last for the entire year. In fact we would easily have at least 20-25 sacks of rice extra that we could sell in the market. We would be able to grow vegetables, rice and all kinds of necessary food items and we never had to buy anything…but now just look at what we are doing… we have to deal with all kinds of garbage, who wants to do this? ...The garbage items are sorted out based on the materials such as kinds of paper, plastics and metals and so on… we then sell this to other dealers and contractors… We were farmers; just look at our condition what the new city

104 has forced us to be…is this what we deserved? … Our conditions are so worse compared to our earlier times… now we cannot meet our daily requirements…our children are suffering badly because of all this…so we are forced to make a living by selling garbage (personal interview; January, 2011).

Haji had been a relatively small farmer, who did not own a huge amount of land

(especially considering the number of dependents on it) and was largely reliant on land for the survival of his family. They were not diversified enough to adapt to urban economic life.110

Another ex-farmer who was a sharecropper, cultivating 3 “bigha” of land has a family of six to support. He lost his land to the township and got almost nothing in return as compensation. At present he, along with his wife, separates the soles of shoes and sell those to different contractors:

We collect all kinds of shoes and separate the soles from those…we are unable to make our ends meet…sometimes we cannot afford two square meals a day…we were never very well off but at least we were not in such a pathetic condition…there are lot of things that we need not buy but today we have to buy clothes, rice, vegetables, almost everything…we were much better off when the town was not there…today I cannot afford to send my children to schools as I cannot bear the extra costs…we have no future…we were completely robbed off everything (personal interview; April, 2011).

The economic impacts of dispossession on the resident population are diverse and complex. It is contingent on class position or the preexisting economic conditions, socio- cultural networks and resources. The larger farmers who owned land over 30 “bigha”111 and whose bases for sustenance were broad and not limited to the product of rural agricultural land, were partly insulated from the ravages of dispossession. They already had secure sources of income outside their rural base and from other urban centers such as Kolkata.

Their children were mostly engaged in the service economy, either in the cities or were self- employed within the Rajarhat area or in Kolkata, the most common form of occupation

105 being shopkeeping. For many of these farmers, even though the main source of sustenance was agriculture, the supplementary sources of income were nevertheless crucial:

Now I have about 25 ‘katha’ of land left in which I am growing crops. Earlier, before the mega city happened, I had a lot more land (approximately 10 acres; i.e. about 30 ‘bigha’). [Production wise], From 1 ‘bigha’ there used to be a production of 16-17 sacks of rice, each sack is 60 Kgs…. [In terms of profit] That would be around Rs. 60-70 or even more depending on the market condition, but a minimum of Rs. 60 per sack (60Kgs) of rice for sure. We also cultivated a number of vegetables, Baliguri [a ‘mouza’ in Rajarhat area that has been taken up for the township] is known for vegetable production. All kinds of vegetables were grown, potatoes, gourd, radish, cauliflower, cabbage, mustard, pumpkin, eggplant and so on…. Selling vegetables is quite profitable…so apart from rice we were able to sell vegetables, especially in the winter season… One of my sons has a store where he sells rice, petrol…miscellaneous things and another son works in Barasat (in a private company near Rajarhat). Our children had the privilege of having a bit of education so we are able to survive and I can say that we are not too bad. But if you go to other houses in the neighborhood or in the village you will see that the conditions are really bad. Earlier we sold sacks of rice but now we have to buy those, we never had to buy rice earlier (personal interview; January, 2011).

The degree of diversification of sources of household income definitely affected the economic impact after dispossession. Even though the above respondent did acknowledge that their condition is relatively better in comparison to others around him, the effect of increasing commodification and the lack of a matching level of income did make the economic condition worse than the earlier times:

We were able to find fish in various water bodies [fish being an essential item in a Bengali diet], also we could rear hens, ducks, cows, goats and other such domestic animals for eggs, milk that we need not buy from market…but with the new township we cannot do those anymore…we have to buy everything to satisfy our needs (personal interview; January, 2011).

Moreover, rising inflation has been contributing to their woes further.112 Education for some has been able to serve as safety net after the loss of land:

I used to possess about 3.5 ‘bigha’ of land…I am imparting private tuitions to children of my immediate neighborhood and some come from nearby areas…I teach mathematics and science to them…after my land was seized our conditions are worse…my children and family suffered a lot for this…we are just about surviving (personal interview; April, 2011).

106

The level of education, itself, is largely influenced by the socio-structural conditions.

Having the rudiments of a formal education has not been able to uplift and improve the circumstances of the dispossessed population. In the case of landless laborers and sharecroppers, the level of education, even among the younger generation, was not high.

Their dependence on the land as their means of sustenance was greater, so their conditions are also quite miserable after the acquisition. Even the small and marginal farmers were not in any better situation, especially the ones who depended primarily on land for their subsistence:

I cannot even begin to describe the pathetic condition of the people here at present. People have fallen sick because of depression following their land acquisition. There is a landless laborer who has completely lost the ability to work after the land acquisition due to depression. Her wife binds ‘bidi’ (traditional cigarettes) and only gets Rs. 40 per day (less than $1) for making ‘bidi’. Can you imagine surviving in this world with such a low income?

Small and marginal farmers owning less than 5 “bigha” of land and without many avenues to fall back on were also adversely affected due to loss of land and increased commodification of living. The sharecroppers who were registered received a nominal amount as compensation, although there was huge dubiousness in the transactions, with many deserving farmers not receiving anything. The unregistered sharecroppers received nothing from HIDCO and in most cases since the degree of dependence on land was very high, they were truly worst hit by dispossession:

I worked on fields for many years, in fact my father and grandfather also worked…a level of trust was the main thing in maintaining the relationship between our family and ‘jotdar’ [landowner]…we did not have any written paper to show our claim as we never realized the need…we did not get anything from the government…the landowner gave us a small amount as a part of compensation according to his will (it was done unofficially)…. I now try to get some work as part-time construction worker or cycle-van driver to transport materials or sometime I get to load and unload the trucks bringing in supply materials (personal interview; April, 2010).

107

Urban-space making was predicated immensely on the creation of new employment opportunities for the resident population in the new township. In fact, one of the major tools used to “manufacture consent” was the promise of a better future in the city through new and high profile jobs. The jobs that are being created are mainly in the service economy catering to the township of Rajarhat. But employment in the IT sector, shopping malls, residential buildings, and other retail jobs that are mostly found in the new township, is restricted largely to a highly qualified personnel with greater educational qualifications and training. The major portion of the population in Rajarhat does not fulfill the requirements for the jobs in these sectors, especially the ability to speak and write English fluently, so high-ranking jobs for the majority are out of bounds. Hence salaried-jobs as security guards and janitors are commonly found for the typically uneducated population of Rajarhat.

However, employment even in these lower ranked jobs, is rare due to the compulsion of going through various private agencies that mediate the hiring process in the labor market:

My son wanted to get a job in the nearby building as a security guard but could not as I was told that we have to be enlisted in one of the agencies which hire such guards as their background needs to be checked…the agency is actually located in central Kolkata…my son or I could not go through all the hassle as I heard that just being enlisted itself takes a while and then there are a whole lot of requirements and paperwork that need to be filled in (personal interview; May, 2011).

The bureaucratic aspects involved in the job market made it increasingly difficult and inaccessible for the common people in Rajarhat.

A section of the land losers have been engaged in subcontracted work and so inducted into the international division of labor. They make hats, caps, purses, wallets, jackets made of leather and supply to the factories located in the nearby city of Kolkata through contractors. These factories are in turn situated in global production chains, delivering to other parts of India and exporting the finished commodities to countries such

108 as USA, Germany, England and other countries mainly in the Global North. In this regard, family labor comprising of women and children provide cheap labor for the production of the commodities:

My children and many of our family members are involved in making such hats, wallets, bags for ladies and so on. We actually get the raw materials from the contractor and we make the things and supply them. We only get the labor cost which is very minimal, we do not get the transport cost, so it is better if the nearer to us. It gives us a very nominal income but we are doing it because of the poor financial condition that we are in right now (personal interview; April, 2010).

Moreover, the state along with the parastatal body, HIDCO, have planned several

“service villages” in the Rajarhat region which are supposed to provide cheap labor to the emerging urban economy. Talking with the officials it was clearly evident that they expected these areas to serve cheap domestic labor to the homes of the middle classes who would be the prime buyers of residential property in the Rajarhat area. Further, training was provided to the younger generation from among the original resident population by HIDCO.

This was done so that they would be able to cater to the needs of the developing urban economy through incorporation in the labor market in the category of “semi-skilled” and

“unskilled” jobs. The services they are supposed to provide are invariably deeply entrenched in the developing urban economy:

We have tried to facilitate men and women in the job market by training them. WEBCON is a government approved company which has been given this responsibility by HIDCO to train youth in different types of vocational courses like plumbing, mobile phones repairing, beautician courses, which are very popular nowadays, also car repairing, training for electricians, embroidery work, haircuts, about 60 different types of work. It is funded completely by HIDCO. Through cooperatives the information about availability of courses are propagated and then people who are interested apply. The trainees have to provide just time and nothing else. The sessions happen at different times of the year…this is to encourage and train people in making them qualified for jobs in the labor market so that they can survive. We have already completed some batches and in the future if there are demand and applications to enroll in these courses then we will call them again (personal interview; February, 2011).

109 It may seem that new construction activities are growing due to extensive real estate undertakings and that would generate local employment. But that is not the reality.

The real estate developers prefer to employ migratory labor hailing from different states as construction labor (as mentioned earlier):

Labor contractors arrange for that [laborers]. They mostly come from the rural parts of West Bengal and from other states like Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa. You see people in agriculture do not have jobs round the year, so when there is an off- season they mainly do construction work. Again when during harvest time, they leave for their villages. These migratory workers are mainly used for construction work (personal interview; April, 2010).

In fact, one of the major survival strategies for the dispossessed population on the southern fringe is proving to be migration. Although the former peasant families do not have the base of security of land in the villages to fall back on, one or more members of the family are moving out of the household and migrating to other places for work. This is a way of enhancing life chances by spatially expanding the bases of income. This is however not very common, though there are increasing tendencies for such practices to become more common. As noted before, it is different from Rajarhat, where migrating to other cities is not as prevalent as commuting to the Kolkata in the new town area.

3.3.1.2 Gender and Work in the Emerging Urban Economy

Apart from providing cheap labor to the global economy, household labor in the form of women and sometimes children are also serving the local urban economy, such as the garbage processing workers as mentioned above. In fact, it serves as an important survival strategy for a vast majority of the population. Feminization of the workforce however occurs with limitations, largely hinging on gendered inequalities and subjectivities.

A significant portion of the female population is engaged in making incense sticks, “bidi”

110 [indigenous cigarettes], birdcages, decorative items etc. in their homes. These types of work are being exclusively done by women, who are trying to make ends meet by earning whatever work is at their disposal, sitting at home. Women belonging to the families of landowners, especially the small and marginal farmers have been trying to survive by doing extra work, as they are still not allowed to step outside for work. In fact, the male members of the family consider it a shame not only for the women, but also for their entire clan if women have to go outside for work.113 The conditions of these families are worse, especially because the men have been inducted into the lower echelons of the labor market with most of them being daily wage earners, thus struggling to eke out a living. The women themselves believe that their place is at home and it is not right to go outside for work: a rule which is keenly observed and imposed by the male counterparts. After talking to the women who make incense sticks, it is evident that they think working as domestic help is disgraceful and they cannot imagine doing that. This is in sharp contrast to the assertions and beliefs of the

HIDCO officials who had conveniently presumed that the women would have work as domestic workers that would contribute to their emancipation. In fact, one thing that I could notice was the difference in their role in the household economy. Previously, they admitted to not having envisaged themselves as contributing financially as that was not their primary function. However, faced with difficult economic conditions, they do realize that they might have a more concrete and substantial role to play in contributing to the familial income, particularly in child-care.

The mainstream argument would be that the opening up of the economy along with the compulsion of women to join the workforce would increasingly contribute towards greater empowerment and emancipation from their traditional roles in the rural economy.

My fieldwork, however, suggests otherwise. Patriarchal control instead of weakening is

111 getting strongly reinforced and capital is actually partly gaining from this. The women of the dispossessed families (especially among the Muslim population) are not allowed to seek work outside, but they are nevertheless expected to “assist” their husbands and other male members of the family in the subcontracted work comprising garbage processing or leather-goods making. In fact, the women did a major part of the work—in terms of time devoted and commodities produced, that is sometimes more than what the men did. Yet their contribution to work was not only unacknowledged but was also undervalued and deliberately demeaned by the men. Patriarchal control helped in keeping the women at home, using their labor for household chores as well as for production of commodities to be exchanged in the market. This intensified the reins of control further, thereby undermining their position in the household. Further, in the rural economy, the women were able to cater to their personal needs through selling surpluses from their domestic poultry keeping or the byproducts of paddy processing such as grain husks:

Earlier we used to have hens, ducks and sell the eggs… whatever we had extra after using up for our own home consumption…we would also sell the husks that would be extracted as fodder for cattle and other domestic animals in our own locality or sometimes in other nearby areas for some extra income…we used to have more than Rs. 1000 per month on an average…that would be good for our own expenses or if we needed to save something for the future or buy notebooks or pencils and clothes for our children or anything that our children needed we could have done that…we were quite self-sufficient for that matter and never had to beg for money from our husbands…but now we have no money in our hands...we are unable to provide for our children let alone think about our own clothes or other recreational items (personal interview; January, 2011).

My findings challenge the oft-repeated claims that are made in the literature arguing that employment is key to women’s empowerment (see Bergmann, 2005; Omvedt, 1980;

Sen, 1990). With the deterioration in the material conditions of the resident population, the status of women has not led to their empowerment or emancipation. I believe contextual factors are important in accounting for this. Contingent factors play a key role in

112 determining the course of development. In the current context, I should add that I am aware that it is also too early to make a conclusive argument about the effects of work on gender.

Therefore, a thorough analysis after a considerable lapse of time may yield a more conclusive result.

3.3.1.3 The Beneficiaries among the Resident Population

It is important to underline a caveat with regard to the economic impacts on the population, though. Strong social networks with political parties did influence the effect of dispossession on the population. The ones with direct political affiliations and favorably disposed towards the township project were able to exploit their socio-political networks and extract positive results, as opposed to the majority. Vertical ties of a section of the farming population (although the non-farming population was also important) with the people holding powerful political positions or connections did facilitate entry into land brokering and supplying building materials (in the form of syndicates affiliated to the major local political parties). It acted as a means through which many accrued considerable revenues. This is largely evident in the plush houses found in relatively modest neighborhoods, and belonging to either to the land brokers or members of syndicates or someone related to local political parties who have gained due to land dealings either directly or indirectly:

I think the mega city that is coming up has only benefitted people…. My father had about 10 ‘bigha’ of land. We were offered Rs. 6000-7000 per ‘katha’ for land.114 …I am doing business with the help of that money. I not only gained by selling land, but I am also supplying materials to the construction sites as a part of the syndicates… Do not think that we are only going to earn as long as the township is being built? This is never going to end… and if it does we will have enough to start some other business like opening up stores to cater to the incoming population…. We have gained not only financially but our standards of living have risen remarkably. Previously we could not afford mobile [cell] phones, but now every

113 one of us has one. Many of us have either bikes or cars…how many could afford that earlier (personal interview; January, 2011).

The above response was from a man aged 38 years who was actively involved in local (political) party work and had been raving about the positive impacts of the township.

He is a member of the syndicate affiliated to the CPIM party, similar to all other syndicates that are associated with the major political parties in that region. His father was a farmer, but he did not take any interest in farming. Further, he not only gained from the compensation offered in exchange for the land, but he keenly participated in the acquisition process as a land broker and later also joined the syndicates, thus earning money through supplying materials for construction. This privilege is, however, not common among the original population. When asked whether everyone has gained due to the development of the township and is everyone involved in the syndicates supplying materials, his response itself shed light on the reality:

It is true that not all are involved in the syndicate business, but those who are not involved have some other work such as loading and unloading of the trucks which come in filled with bricks, sand and other supplying materials…you see that is also work and so much work have created so everyone has been gaining (ibid.).. Even non-peasants and people who did not lose land but have had direct or indirect ties with HIDCO and local political parties (including CPIM, Congress and Trinamool Congress), and were engaged in brokering and/or syndicates benefitted (personal interview, January, 2011)

It was in order to “manufacture consent” and also to appease a section of the land losers and control any real or potential opposition, that HIDCO developed a system of cooperatives and syndicates. According to the Additional General Manager (Administration) of HIDCO:

Whatever work HIDCO undertakes is physically dispersed among different cooperatives. Works such as digging the ground, filling the lowland are being done through these cooperatives, which employ people from the locality…. Also, since we are doing the project according to the PPP model [public-private partnership] for so many of the works that private companies take up, we recommend these

114 cooperatives, so that even in the construction buildings etc. laborers from the cooperatives are used. Plus we have formed syndicates by clubbing some of the cooperatives together. Therefore, supplying materials for road construction and buildings are done through these syndicates. Even private companies have been asked by the government to use the materials supplied by these syndicates so that they keep getting work and people involved in this can earn a living. So all these works like manual labor as well supplying building materials have been done through cooperatives and syndicates (personal interview; February, 2011).

Apart from the former peasants, a part of the non-farming population, especially the petite bourgeoisie, with political associations was able to reap benefits from the formation of cooperatives and syndicates:

I am in the syndicate business, supplying building materials for construction in the Rajarhat area. I am in this business since the Rajarhat project started. He [the manager of HIDCO] taught us everything about the syndicate business…all about supplying and everything…many have been doing very well through the syndicate business; this is only possible because of the New Town Project. There is on an average a profit of Rs. 25-30 lakhs by supplying materials to one house. Many of the youngsters and people of younger generation have been engaged in the supplying business and are earning well… We never owned any land for cultivation as such. My father had a small business of steel works and after school I have been involved with the New Town Project, supplying building materials to the construction sites here. I am doing well along with the others who are in the syndicate business (February, 2011).

The syndicates and cooperatives, however, are largely affiliated to various political parties and only cater to a handful. Additionally, there is stiff competition among these cooperatives and only the ones with better contacts were able to reap substantial benefits than others. Some cooperatives have become defunct due to lack of profitability, especially the ones which do not have strong affiliations to the local political parties:

About 50-55 formed a cooperative of land losers that managed to get work worth of [rupees] one hundred thousand maximum. Considering they earn a profit of [rupees] twenty thousand in a year, if the entire amount is divided among 50 members then each one gets about four hundred rupees yearly that comes to thirty-three rupees per month which is a meager amount (A history of land robbery in Rajarhat, Dutta, 2010:9).

115 3.3.2 Socio-Cultural Impacts

City making not only establishes the urban material conditions, it is also accompanied by the images of globalization coupled with allied discourses. In liberalizing

India, these processes are conditioning and reshaping the identities of the original inhabitants (especially the younger cohort) and transforming the socio-cultural landscape.

With the making of the new township, the residents of Rajarhat exist in a world between modernity and traditionalism. The changes that have ensued due to the transformation of the rural landscape into an urban one have impinged on their worldview, perception and identities. My fieldwork focused mainly on the identity formation of a young generation, which increasingly sees opportunities in the upcoming city. My respondents mainly belonged to the age group of 18 to 28 years.

The ideological substratum that was built by the state in collusion with capital to elicit consensus for land acquisition, also influenced the acceptance of urban life on the part of the resident population. Some excerpts from my interviews115 show the eagerness among them to be part of the “world-city”; “Who does not want to live in a city”; “We want to be part of the city…as the life there is much more comfortable”; “I do not want to work in the

[agricultural] fields under the sun all day long with legs immersed in the muddy water”; “I did not see my future in farming…I wanted to work with the computers [implying in the IT sector]”; “I think city life is more fascinating than the life in the villages…it is so boring in the villages…it is much more interesting to live in a city”. The positive images and interpretation of the city life is evident among the relatively older population as well. “I want my son to work in the service sector not in farming as I did…that is where the future is”; “We were told that city life is much better as it will give access to facilities of modern living”; “I have always thought life in cities is something which we cannot have…something I have wanted to but

116 cannot have…but now through this township that has become possible”. Through a discourse about the imagined life in world cities, people were tried to be convinced. The idea of the city was made more acceptable and palatable116.

For many, including a considerable proportion of younger people, the New Town in

Rajarhat was symbolic of a highly desirable urban life. The sprawling shopping malls and retails centers along with plush luxurious hotels and residential buildings juxtaposed amidst the modest neighborhoods of the original population were emblematic of aspiring lives and ambitions. The real and imagined “world-class” city was woven into their everyday life experiences. The media and visual images in the form of graffiti and billboards played an important role in disseminating and infusing the idea of the world city among the younger generation.

Employment in the retail centers of the newly developed city serves as a mark of

“distinction” (Bourdieu, 1984) for some of the youth in Rajarhat and they see it as a means to shape and assert their identities. “I got my job at Pantaloons. Initially when I saw that there is a big shopping mall (City Center 2) and Pantaloons which you know is a big name in retail, I was curious to work there” (personal interview; April, 2011). The curiosity to work in a sprawling mall and a popular departmental store emanates from the glorified representations of the same. “I have worked at Shopper’s Stop (another well known departmental store in India)…it is really good in terms of the glamour and glitz associated with it. It is quite fashionable” (personal interview; April, 2011).

The occupational preferences in particular retail centers are ways of negotiating and asserting their social position as well as a means to preferential consumption. Consumption itself was used to mark and mask socio-cultural identities (Deutsch and Theodorou, 2010:

230).

117 I like shopping clothes, going to movies sometimes or eat outside… I do not depend on my parents for my personal expenses. I generally go to Inox movie theater (a multiplex, which general population cannot afford as the ticket prices are quite high). I watch at least one movie in a month. I think I will watch just one movie but that should be in a good multiplex theater like Inox. Even if the costs are more the environment matters. I like KFC not much McDonalds, so I eat quite a lot in KFC (personal interview; April, 2011).

I would not say I have enough money to shop only from malls; I do not have that kind of money. But when you work in an environment you tend to get accustomed to that and mostly you start liking it too. With me that is the case. Now that I have been working in mall for over 1.5 years, I have started liking the environment and the products of mall, you can say I like the overall culture of shopping in malls, and I prefer that to smaller shops. Only after I started working in a mall I realized its significance. For instance, I can buy a t-shirt worth Rs. 200 (about $5) that would be good enough for me given my economic and social background… but probably I will buy a t-shirt from the mall, which is branded worth Rs. 400 or more. This is because I have become habituated to good quality branded products and after that it is difficult for me to compromise and get down to a non-branded product (personal interview, April, 2011).

The consumption of branded clothes and commodities is an embodiment of superior tastes and preferences that are in turn perceived to be aligned with those of the middle and elite classes. This is conceived as a means to enhance a status and economic power defining their position in the social hierarchy (Bourdieu, 1984; Schor, 1998; Williams and Connell,

2010). Even though the branded products do not have any real advantage over similar unbranded ones, the mark of distinction is missing from the latter. The acquisition, consumption and exhibition of specific items such as clothing, hairstyles and accessories are a medium of recognition of not only one’s individual identity, but also of one’s place in the larger social matrix (Deutsch and Theodorou, 2010: 231; Milner, 2004). Accordingly, the insatiable desire for acquiring objects stems not from the use-values of the commodities but from their embodied social meaning (Milner, 2004). Habits have material bases as well as socio-cultural components. These youth, who come from modest backgrounds and cannot afford air-conditioners or luxurious lifestyles, see these items of personal comfort

118 (especially given the high temperatures in the summer in Kolkata) as symbols of a high-end life which while elusive are desirable. The ambitions and lifestyles of a section of younger population are colored by the “habitus” (Bourdieu, 1984) of the privileged classes, i.e., the mannerisms, gestures, postures, preferences which are involuntarily assimilated by members of particular social class.117 The elites and middle classes, especially from the “real city” of Kolkata, are held in high regard and are supposedly better, therefore, making them mimic-worthy:

I think people (young workers) from Kolkata have an edge over us because they are better educated, well trained. They come from an area that is more advanced economically, socially and culturally, all these matters a lot. As you know this area was quite backward for several years, which reflects in the mindset of the people. Since the time I become aware of my environment, I have disliked the place of my residence. People here are not at all progressive. They do not give much importance to education, people are not very ambitious, they do not have constructive goals in life. Their attitude towards life is very casual and negative I would say. People here do not have a “go-getter” attitude...for which I am moving out of this place along with my family… I do have a very keen interest to pursue my goals and to succeed in life. On the other hand boys and girls from Kolkata come from an advanced society where they have grown knowing the importance of education, their attitude towards learning and success is different, it is much more progressive. So definitely the ones who come from Kolkata have an advantage over the people here in Rajarhat in terms of their skills, knowledge, attitude and so on. Things will probably change here as well for the better; though I think however much development of buildings and roads happen it will be very difficult to change the mindset of people (personal interview, April, 2011).

The assimilation and internalization of the consumerist culture, upheld and promoted in the New Town, finds resonance with a section of the population, therefore. It serves as a survival strategy or a coping mechanism too for adapting to the new urban environment. Indirectly it helps to elicit consent and appease a part of the population, and thus avert contestations particularly over land acquisitions. Further, this trains youth to become successful consumers as well as producers in terms of future consumption and present possession of commodities (Milner, 2004). The consumptive practices are used by

119 the youth to mark and mask differences in the outer world, helping them in assessing their self-worth. This, however, further accentuates the already existing social inequalities exacerbated by the uneven economic impacts due to the city making (as discussed above).

In this regard, it is also problematic because urban-space creation—based on world-city imaginaries along with the attendant consumerism—fetishizes the underlying class relations. It helps in building up an illusion of equality as technically everyone can buy what is being portrayed through various marketing gimmicks (Deutsch and Theodorou, 2010;

Chin, 2001). The imagined lifestyles and the assumed equality achieved through mirroring consumption patterns of the upper classes masks the underlying inequality rooted in differential access to choices (Deutsch and Theodorou, 2010). This is because consumption and emulating the lifestyles of upper classes do not promise the imagined future “selves” the ability to cross social class boundaries (ibid.). Moreover, it applies undue pressure to conform to a particular standard set and one that idealizes the imagined urban life in world- class cities. Often when not realized or faced with impediments to the process of achieving a position in the upwardly mobile classes, it contributes towards frustration. The associated disappointments and unfulfilled desires result in cynicism and antagonistic feelings targeted generally at the upper classes, corporations and government.

There are also people in Rajarhat that have never accepted the changes subsequent to the establishment of the township in a favorable light. The following is an excerpt from an interview during my research fieldwork with a political activist. The views expressed by him reflected the key features pointed out by some respondents, especially those belonging to the older generation:

It is so unfortunate to see that the area, which once thrived and throbbed with life, is today only the place of the elites. There is a change in the culture of the region…. Today these areas are inflicted with goons, anti-social activities, gambling areas,

120 liquor shops, dance bars, massage bars, high profile prostitution. In all these resorts, which are for the rich people, sexual tourism is flourishing. Businessmen, political leaders, actors, film producers and all rich people gather here to have a good time. And ironically the women from the farmers’ houses are in many cases compelled to work here as domestic workers and even as call girls and prostitutes due to heavy poverty. They have very limited choice and given that there is no steady source of income, they have to resort to such means to earn a living. The men, including the youth population, are increasingly giving into liquor due to frustration as well as the popular culture, which is being propagated to attract the younger generations. The entire environment is vitiated due to the establishment of the new town and its inferior culture (personal interview; April, 2010).118

I feel appalled by the changes that is happening around…today when I look around I miss those days of simplicity…a time when we our friends would sit together with family and friends…things are changing so fast and for the worse…the close- knit bond among neighbors and friends are just getting ruined with the upsurge of the incoming population along with modern town (personal interview; March, 2010).

Capitalist production relations are alienating. They alienate from the means of production, from the fruits of the labor as well as from the production process, i.e. the conditions of her labor, and most succinctly from the socialization process of production and circulation, (among workers and between producers and consumers) (Marx, 1976). In the newly subsumed urban space, the fetishistic element associated with the world city and its associated ideological underpinnings is alienating in effect. There is also dissociation of people from their place with a loss of a sense of belongingness. The members of the younger generation, who opine that they dislike their current environment, compare it to the imagined (also somewhat futuristic) environment of the highly developed city, which the newly developed town does not conform to. This creates a sense of hollowness and discontentment with the current situation. For the elderly, on the other hand, the current region does not bear any resemblance to the home and hearth that they could relate to in the past. That also contributes towards heightening alienation and dissatisfaction.

121 In the above section, I have dealt with the economic and socio-cultural impacts along with the multiple survival strategies adopted by the original inhabitants of Rajarhat.

Coping mechanisms are used to adapt to the ensuing changes, but (land) dispossession politics is far from “idyllic” (Marx, 1976: 874). Overt forms of resistance form an integral part of the accumulation by dispossession process. The following section sheds light on the goals and forms of resistance, defining the urban-space making politics on the periphery.

3.4 The Politics of City Making and Resistance from Below

Dispossession and displacement are part and parcel of the urban development, taking place on the outskirts of Kolkata. It is evident that in the course of urban-space making there has been separation of producers from their means of production. These direct producers held access not only to land resources but also water resources and other commonly held resources. The resources along with the right to access and use thus have been destroyed. However, the “actually existing” politics of land dispossession cannot be assessed without consideration and analysis of “contestation from below”. Accumulation is an extremely dialectical process; this is all the more true for accumulation by dispossession, as the application of force is clearer in this case than in politics involving exploitation in the sphere of surplus value production. In this regard, since the role of the state is so clear in the case of Rajarhat planned development, resistance is mostly targeted towards the state apparatuses. However, the role of the state, though partially diffused in the relatively

“unplanned” urban expansion on the southern fringe, did generate opposition against the machineries aiding land assembly. This consisted of both state and non-state actors, which were colluding with each other to facilitate land acquisition.

122 In my next section, I largely focus on the resistance that was put up against the township project, or against the process of accumulation by dispossession in the context of land. I have already discussed the participation of a section of the population who can be considered “below” in terms of their subordinate position politically and economically; but instead of putting up a resistance, they actually aided the acquisition process. Some did that due to direct stakes that they had in the project and some passively supported the project envisaging their advantages in the long run, due to the their imagined life in a world-class city. Therefore, in the following section I am concentrating mainly on the oppositions that shaped the land dispossession politics in Rajarhat. This will be followed by a short discussion of the distinctive features of the relatively “unplanned” urban development in the southern fringe of Kolkata.

3.4.1 Opposition against Planned Urban Development

Even though the Rajarhat township project is one of the bigger urban developments in India involving large-scale dispossession, initially it did not evoke popular mass-scale protests of the sort likely to engender public attention. In fact, it was publicized from the very inception as “peaceful and successful”. However, this does not mean that oppositions, resistances and protests were altogether absent. Resistances have been rife overtly and covertly, on a collective and individual basis. In fact, because there were resistances, the mechanisms to impose the violent regime of dispossession, was all the more compelling.

Resistance in Rajarhat119 against the planned township can be analyzed under two broad categories; a) objectives—based on the underlying ideology; b) forms—based on the strategies and mechanisms deployed. Each of these have different political implications and

123 also vary based on the internal structure or composition of the resistance movement, which in turn leads to forging of different types of alliances or socio-political organizations.

3.4.1.1 Objectives of Struggle: Adversaries and Arbitrators

Based on the underlying ideology, resistances in Rajarhat area were of two distinct types. The first was against the very idea of the township. Here the opposition was against land acquisition, people’s dispossession, and it entailed rejection of the idea of giving up of land for whatever reasons. I identify them as the adversaries due to their underlying intent of strongly challenging the city making processes. The other was against the compensation or the land price that the government had fixed for the land. I refer to them as arbitrators.120

The two are analytically and politically disparate; both have distinct ideologies and strategies with different objectives and outcomes, which in turn shape forms of resistance.

Although analytically a distinction between the two groups of protestors can be drawn based on the goals, which in turn are based on different premises, in reality these entities were often fluid, thus sometimes partially overlapping and coexisting.

For both types of resistance, the common target was the state; the difference however was in the view of the state and its primary role in the process of development. On the one hand, for the former group of people, the premise behind outright rejection of the idea of development-induced displacement is the dismissal of the state’s role in advocating such a form of development—that is dubbed as anti-people and destructive in nature. On the other hand, people who were interested in negotiating the land prices were opposing the degree of involvement of the state in fixing the compensation and not allowing the play of the free market forces in the development process. The latter is not against the paradigm or nature of development as such.

124

The Adversaries

The vision of this group was to have a form of development, which is inclusive in nature, allowing greater democratic participation of the people directly, involved:

Many farmers opposed…vigorously opposed the very act of land acquisition. As many were about to lose their only source of livelihoods, especially the ones who had little pieces of land, the sharecroppers and the laborers who largely depended on land for a living, they were completely opposed to any form of land acquisition (personal interview; April, 2010).

They emphasized the importance of the resident population in having a say in the development process. They opposed the idea of top-down approach. Some of the interview excerpts will evince their standpoint:

This is our place, we have lived here all our lives…even our forefathers were here…how can someone else just come and decide on our future and fate... we should have been consulted before the government planned the township…they say the township is for us, but did we really want that; why did we were not asked, then the government would have known instead of the New Town, if we were given better sale prices for our crops that would have been more helpful; what kind of development is this…what kind of progress is this…why does it have to destroy our land, our lives for the development to happen…if it is development then why are we not a part of this…it can never be our development then (personal interviews).

Therefore, the protestors questioned the very notion of the current development.

The factors affecting the goals or objectives of the resistance movement are not definitive though. A complex mixture of variables is at play simultaneously that contributes to its nuanced and variegated character. Social composition or the internal structure of the protestors does not entirely determine the objectives or course of action followed.

In Rajarhat, the smaller farmers along with many sharecroppers had greater dependence on land. They also did not have large swathes of land that would have fetched a high compensation from HIDCO. They also did not muster skills that they thought would be

125 transferrable to an alternate profession. Therefore, they were the forerunners in opposing the development of township altogether. Further, many farmers did not see a future in the city. For them the lucrative and glamorous city life (as projected by the exponents of the township) was alien. Along with the process of land acquisition and dispossession, therefore, the concept of city itself was alienating to them. They are the ones who vehemently opposed the idea of development-induced displacement for the establishment of a town:

We are mere farmers…have been farming throughout our lives, we don’t know anything else, what are we going to do in the big malls that you see now. Our life is our land, we cannot imagine anything other than a life attached to our land…it is not for them [the government officials] to decide the price for our land. How can we live in a city?...We do not want to part with our source of existence at any cost…we do not want to have our livelihoods taken away for a city (personal interviews).

The above quotes exemplify the insistence of the farmers on rejecting that form of development, which necessitated their dispossession. Apart from farmers there were many who were dependent on land and other commons, which they could use communally and which were an integral part of their daily reproduction. For instance, people who had some connection with “Dhupir Bil”, other water bodies, and common grazing grounds also protested against the township project. This complex set of factors often worked in an intricate manner on the ground with diverse situations accounting for different goals.

The Arbitrators

Another section of the population was more inclined to fight for a more just compensation rather than against the development paradigm. This group included the ones who found development and dispossession as problematic but the amount of compensation demanded a more urgent consideration.121 It also comprised people who did not find the

126 dispossession and displacement to be problematic and their main goal was to have a greater share of the pie. They were primarily the arbitrators. They were unhappy with the sale prices of the land or the compensation offered to them by the government for their means of living. They largely opposed the “low” compensation. The premise behind offering higher compensation is that land or anything for that matter has an exchange value and can be bought:

Some of the landowners were initially offered an amount of Rs. 5,000- Rs. 6,000 per ‘katha’ by the CPIM party people in the wake of the establishing the new town…just imagine the low prices… This value was much below the prevailing market price at that time which was about Rs. 40,000 to 50,000 per katha (personal interview, March, 2010).

According to many, since it is their land on which the township is being literally founded, it is but fair to ask for more compensation, as they are the ones who are losing their means of living. Many were fighting for a better compensation, as they did not see any scope for opposing the township and going against the government. “How can we fight against the government…these people are so powerful, so we know we cannot fight with them…but I think it is crucial for us to get a better price for our land, as we are losing everything” (personal interview, March, 2010). Because of the dominating authority of the state, the arbitrators did not see any possibility of challenging it. So a middle ground was sought.

Past experience and memories of dispossession of themselves or of the people they have known or witnessed also played a decisive role in shaping the goals of the resistance.

The land acquisition and dispossession process were spread over a significant length of time. It did not happen at one go and therefore not all areas (“mouzas”) were affected at the same time. The experiences of others provided important life lessons, which facilitated the decision making process in determining the underlying goals:

127 We have no intention to fall in their [the state and its machineries] trap, we have seen how they had promised to give us employment and housing and other facilities, but what is happening now is totally not what we had thought…they [people from an adjoining mouza (village)] were fools to believe them [the cadres and party workers] and sell their land with whatever that was offered to them…but see how they are not left with anything now (personal interview, February, 2010).

The people who got the compensation money could not keep it for a long time. These peasants did not possess a lot of land. Even if we consider that the farmers did receive compensation how much did they actually get? Say some farmers possess about 1 or 2 ‘bighas’ [i.e. 20-40 ‘kathas’], how much money will they get if they are paid Rs. 5,000 per ‘katha’. So 5,000 x 20 = Rs. 100,000. This is just nothing for a lifetime. They are all poor farmers who need a steady flow of income otherwise this little amount of money gets exhausted in no time (personal interview, April, 2010).

Past experiences either made protestors more flexible and brought them to the negotiation table, where the resistance was put up to get a more fair compensation

(arbitrators); or it made people more resilient and persistent against the township as a whole (adversaries), as they realized that no amount of compensation could be good enough to guarantee their long term economic security. The members of the two groups were fluid at times based on past experiences and current situations.

Here I quote the leader of the Rajarhat Land Protection Movement at length describing their main demands and their major ground of contention with the government at present. The first line of the quote highlights the main viewpoint of the opposers. The primary opposition was against the act of dispossession, not compensation. The failure to resist the township and stop the process of dispossession is considered a “lost battle”:

We fought a lost battle; no one helped us. The areas where farmers cannot get back their land as those lands have been acquired and construction have been completed, in those places we are demanding to have half of the total profits that HIDCO has made by selling the land. Otherwise we have threatened that we will seize the completed apartments by force. Wherever construction or filling up of the ground have not started yet and still cultivable, we will continue to cultivate our land even if we have accepted money for that and if they want the money back we are ready to give that back to HIDCO, but we will keep cultivating on our land….

128 Can a government take land and make a profit of such a whopping amount in the name of development and public interest? Is this ethical? So our demand is to ask from the govt. a share of 50% from the profits for the farmers who have lost their land (personal interview; January, 2011).

My interviews reveal that for a section of the population who initially accepted the township without putting up much resistance on a sustained basis,122 their knowledge of the money involved in the transactions changed their standpoints. They became indignant, thinking that the land, which had been theirs for generations was taken away from them with false promises and mere crumbs, as opposed to the big money that is involved. This was helping in building a city, where they were not only denied any place or access to the facilities but for which they also got a raw deal. Their land was fetching unimaginably high prices and they were left disillusioned to languish in an increasingly unpredictable and insecure future. This infuriated many and they protested, both overtly and covertly against the township, with many joining the resistance movement in the hope of grabbing a better compensation.

3.4.1.2 Forms of Struggle

The underlying goals, however, do not determine the intensity of resistance or the explicit forms that those would take. However in most cases, since the act of dispossession is distinguishable by the degree of transparency, especially if done forcibly, the opposition cannot be discreet: it has to be direct and explicit (Levien, 2013).123 Dispossession itself does not evoke resistance, overt or covert. Voluntary selling of land in its truest sense may not invoke any resistance (provided there has been no coercion in fixing the price or selling the land). Further, the degree and nature of resistance depend on various factors, one of which is the conditions under which the dispossession has taken place and the aftermath of

129 that, i.e., the alternatives offered to the affected people. However, land being the means of survival for many, the act of expropriation not only threatens their existence, the coercive element in most cases induces overt reactions on the part of the vulnerable population.

The dispossession processes in the planned development of the township in

Rajarhat area was done primarily by the state. The force of eminent domain administered by the state behind land acquisition was very powerful. Accordingly, individual acts of resistance, although important – especially if considered cumulatively and symbolically— were less evident and effective; in short, they were secondary compared to collective forms of resistance.

Individual acts of resistance

Among the matrix of oppositional practices against development-induced dispossession and displacement, individual forms of resistance were with respect to individual attacks and individualistic means of resolving the problem: “When I was approached by party people to sell land, I said no on their face….I am not afraid of them”

(personal interview, February, 2010). Such acts of fearlessness were rare and rarely persistent. The same farmer eventually regretted giving up his land, “But the kinds of heinous acts they resorted to in order to get my land is just unimaginable…they forcibly acquired the land of the surrounding areas and restricted my access to my own land…what option was I left with” (personal interview; March, 2010).

There are many farmers who did not accept the compensation, not because they were not happy with the amount, but they refused to put a price tag on their land. For these farmers their land was invaluable. Their money was deposited in court. Even though they knew whatever amount they would get at that time, they might lose forever or would have

130 to go through a complicated and tortuous bureaucratic process to get that released, they did not give in. These opposers stuck to their standpoint without budging and balking under tremendous pressure. They not only lost their land since it was ultimately seized by HIDCO, but also the possibility of any compensation. The resistance was put up individually without collective organization. Further, even after the loss of land and forced dispossession, many refused to renounce their access to the land and they forcefully continued to cultivate it, by arranging their own private water supply and other amenities required for farming:

I am still cultivating a part of my land. I had about 6 ‘bigha’ of land, of which I am using a small part…I broke open the fence and entered…some party people came to oppose but they have not been able to deter me…there are others who use the grazing grounds for feeding their cattle and goats (personal interview; January, 2011).124

To continue the protests, even after land acquisition was somewhat complete, these individual acts of resistance were backed up by the Rajarhat Land Protection Committee— the principal organization fighting against the land acquisition process in Rajarhat.

Organized opposition

Organized or collective resistance was definitely more effective. Against the brutal force imposed on the resident population for purposes of acquisition and in order to develop a consensus for the township, there was overt and collective opposition by many:

Ghuni ‘mouza’ was one of the first areas to be attacked. When HIDCO people came to Ghuni for the purpose of developing land, which they acquired, men and women resisted vehemently. Women protested by lying on the ground and challenged the HIDCO people to run bulldozers over them. This fight continued for 5 days, as people resisted fearlessly (personal interview; January, 2011).

There have been other instances of aggressive protests by the dispossessed and displaced population. Farmers have also taken legal action against the state for forgery of papers and other procedural lapses or against the modus operandi of the land acquisition

131 process. These legal cases were backed by formal organizations combatting land acquisition, viz. The Rajarhat Land Protection Committee and The Rajarhat Agriculture Protection

Committee. These committees were set up to fight against land acquisition in Rajarhat and also to take legal action against the state on ethical and moral grounds, challenging the definition of development and the use of eminent domain to acquire land for “public purpose”. Apart from this, which did not serve as an effective means of challenging the township, environmental grounds served as a major vehicle for the resistance committees to take legal action against the state:

You cannot even build a restaurant without an EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) and here the ministry is proposing a town without an EIA. When we appealed in the court recalling the importance of an EIA, Satyabrata Sinha who was the chief justice under whom the case was being dealt with was transferred to the Supreme Court in New Delhi. He passed a judgment before leaving, he asked the housing department that how can you go on with a work of township without an EIA and ordered the department to complete the EIA immediately without which the township cannot progress a bit. The housing department on 12th August 2002 submitted an affidavit following the order of the court that the entire plan of the township is not ready yet so they cannot apply for an EIA. Note that it was on 12th August the housing department mentioned this. On 13th August 2002, exactly the next day, the environmental department stated that the housing department has asked (through a letter) for an NOC (No objection certificate) for the New Town project. So you see within a day the plan for the project was ready for the housing department to apply for an EIA at the environmental department. In the report presented by the environmental department, it was mentioned that after assessing an area of 3075 hectares (proposed for the township by the housing department), it is clearing and sanctioning an NOC for only 622 hectares. The court gave the ruling that based on the EIA submitted by the environmental department the court is permitting the township on 622 hectares. The chief justices at that time were A.K. Mathur and Girish Gupta (personal interview, as told by the leader of Rajarhat Land Protection Movement; January, 2011).125

The court ruling, however, could not annul the project. This was partly because there was mounting pressure from the state on the judiciary. Judges’ understanding is embedded within the broader class predilections and this is evident in recent court verdicts

132 that have been largely anti-poor, favoring neoliberal capitalism (Ahmed, 2006; Datta, 2012).

This is also evident in the Rajarhat case:

After filing the first case (see the above excerpt), we filed for a second one, which had Pinaki Ghosh and Bishyanath Samaddar as Chief Justices. They did not even read our petition, instead just threw away the papers. They alleged us as being anti-development and asked us to go back in the ages of cavemen as we were opposing the development of a town…I tried to protest against what the judge was saying but they just disposed off our case and threw it away without showing any reason. Later we came to know (through published documents) that this judge Pinaki Ghosh has received 2 plots in Rajarhat. So you can well imagine why he was in favor of the project…Land is being allotted under some special quota to the rich and famous and well known people from different walks of life (personal interview, January, 2011).

Opposition to the township was effective in a limited way. Apparently, success or failure in resisting the process of dispossession and displacement is easily discerned; either it would result in stopping the dispossession and saving the land, or not. However, in reality a myriad of middle grounds can be and were sought, as in struggling for a fair rehabilitation and resettlement program. For instance, the parastatal body HIDCO, with the support of the state government, planned a rehabilitation package for a small group of the people who had been evicted from their squatter settlements on government-owned land. The evicted people were granted 438 sq. ft. of land in Jatrgachi area within the New Town. The rehabilitation package has planned for other areas in Taruliya and Hatiara in the New Town.

The land is conferred on a basis of 99 years of lease with a subsidized rent payment of Rs.

20 (one third of 1USD) per annum. The tenants, however, are barred from making any changes to the property, or leasing or selling the land, and can only use it for residential purposes. Reformism is a means to combat and contain radicalism and as long as it is not impeding accumulation—in this instance, accumulation by dispossession— the neoliberal regime does not oppose that.

133 3.4.1.3 Limitations of the Resistance Movement

Overall, however, the movement against land acquisition and dispossession did not achieve the success it had intended. In fact, the movement itself did not gain the scale or intensity required to terminate the land appropriation process. In some of the successful cases of opposition against planned land acquisition elsewhere in the region land acquisition was stopped by denying literal access to the land “grabbers” altogether.126 For instance, in another noteworthy instance of protest against land acquisition in West

Bengal—Nandigram—for an industrial project, the residents of the place with the support of “Bhumi Uchched Pratirodh Committee” [Land Evicition Resistance Committee] dug up roads, damaged culverts and destroyed bridges to block access to Nandigram. This was possible because there were a few major roads and bridges linking Nandigram to the adjacent districts, making it relatively isolated in terms of its geographical location. Since

Rajarhat was located very close to Kolkata and was relatively well connected from all directions (see Figure 3), spatially dissociating it and denying administration and police access to it in order to prevent forcible expropriation was not possible. However, if the physical location of Rajarhat was an impeded opposition of this sort, geographic location did facilitate the creation of grounds for compromise and negotiations. In fact it was nearness to the city of Kolkata and the connections of the people in Rajarhat with the city that helped the state to obtain allegiance and align the interests of a section of the population through material concessions.

In addition, the nexus between big corporate houses along with political parties proved to be ominous, with oppressive forces at work to thwart and crush the movement with force. It made organizing the opposition movement all the more difficult. Further, the amount of money that was at stake was huge as it was a township project and the coalition

134 was with a gamut of capitalists such as land developers, construction companies, companies supplying building materials, retail industry, IT sectors and so on. This alliance spanning many “capitals” was able to fight against the cause of the dispossessed population more effectively. “You have DLF, Shapoorji Pallonji, Unitech, Peerless, all big multinational and

Indian companies that had some stakes here. No political party has the strength to enrage all of them” (personal interview; January, 2011).

One of the major deterrents to mass mobilization of the resistance movement was the powerful tie between all the major political parties. Even though the opposition party

(Trinamool Congress) raised a hue and cry against the land acquisition, it came in at a much later point. Although the project was championed by the then ruling party, the Left Front, and Rajarhat was largely dominated by the CPIM party, one of the means of expressing the resentment was observed through voting out the local leader. “This was a time when the elections happened and CPIM MLA (member of legislative assembly) of that region who resided there for 24 years lost the election from that part. After that Tanmay Mondol (who belonged to Trinamool Congress) rose to prominence” (personal interview; January, 2011).

The ousting of the CPIM MLA did not affect the materialization of the project, though, as from the very beginning, at the grassroots level, the members of the major political parties,

CPIM, Congress, Trinamool Congress cooperated with each other:

Gautam Deb (the Housing Minister of West Bengal, who is also the chairman of HIDCO), called Tanmay Mondol (Trinamool Congress MLA) for a meeting. Mondol knew me, and he called me up saying that he does not know much about the area the movement against land acquisition that is happening, so he wanted me to accompany him in this meeting with Deb. I agreed to go with him. He was supposed to come and pick me up at 5pm for the meeting on the day. I waited till 7pm but Mondol didn’t show up. This happened sometime in the year 2000…. [Later] Mondol declared that it was a mistake on his part to have opposed the township so far and he has realized that the township is a great idea and no one should be opposing it anymore. He also mentioned that from then on he would whole-heartedly support the work of township as there is nothing problematic

135 about the township…. Our president, who is 70 years old, went to Mamata Banerjee (Leader of Trinamool Congress; the current Chief Minister of West Bengal) 14 times, but he was turned down on one pretext or the other. Then one day she asked, what is the evidence that people in Rajarhat do not want the town? We asked her would signatures from people be deemed as good enough evidence or not, to which she asked us to submit the list of signatures the next day itself, when she was supposed to leave for New Delhi. Within a single night we collected mass signatures of thousands of people opposing the idea of the town. The next afternoon when she was leaving for Delhi, I personally went and handed over the document to Mamata in the airport. She was about to collect her boarding pass at that time I gave the document to her, we did not talk, but I did give the paper, which had all the signatures that we had collected. After the election Mamata gave an interview to TV channel, Star Ananda, and there she said that no one approached me from Rajarhat about their problem. At least I know that she lied because I was the person who had handed her the list of signatures opposing the new town (personal interview; January, 2011).

The social construction of conflict by the media also played an important role in shaping the movement as well as legitimizing the resistance to a considerable extent. The possibility of constructing Rajarhat as a “successful and peaceful” land acquisition model can be attributed to the lack of media coverage of the process in the initial phase. This would change. Singur and Nandigram127 attracted media attention during 2006-2007. This is the time around which there were a large number of media reports about the details of the violent opposition in those two cases. The two incidents of violent protest by the land dependent population provided a discursive legitimacy and a material support for future opposition movements elsewhere. Arguably, Nandigram and Singur, were vanguards for protests against land acquisitions. In this regard, media representation and extensive coverage of the events helped in propagandizing, and thus generating solidarity and consensus around such conflicts. This is evident in the news reports in popular dailies of

West Bengal—The Telegraph, The Statesman, Anandabazaar Patrika, Bartaman—with little or no news of Rajarhat land acquisition prior to 2006-2007 (around the time of Singur-

Nandigram events), though the new township started around 1999. Further, the Trinamool

136 Congress, which is the principal political opposition to the Left Front, showed particular interest in the land question so as to gain political mileage in the upcoming state elections in

2011. The matter thus was politicized further and became a point of contention between the ruling left party and the opposition. This further fueled the interest of the media in covering topics that were especially politically controversial.

On the other hand, the lack of wider support from political, social and cultural elites

(that was also partially orchestrated by state-manufactured data about the region and tactfully circulated by media) proved detrimental to the resistance movement even more.

“No one from the intellectual class as such supported our movement in the beginning at least. I have moved from pillar to post, have approached many so-called intellectuals from every walk of life, but no one came forward to support our cause” (personal interview;

January, 2011).128 The support from the intelligentsia comprising mainly of middle classes was important to get the required exposure and publicity for mass support. Its absence also implied limited funds for continuing opposition in an organized and sustained way.

Importantly, urban development across a large area (25 “mouzas” covering 3075 hectares) and spanning a relatively long period of time (over ten years in the entire area) imposes spatial and temporal constraints. As stated earlier, the acquisition of land and the resultant process of dispossession and displacement did not happen at one go. Acquisition happened area-wise (“mouza”-based). So at one point, only a few areas were immediately affected. As a result, mass resistance could not be organized as large number of opposers were lacking. Further, time is a big factor. It was a gradual process, unlike many of the successful oppositions noted against land acquisition for industrialization in other parts of

India (such as Singur and Nandigram). If there were some resistance, the state, along with its allies, was able to devise new modes of planning to combat those. Additionally, with time

137 people also became more accustomed to the new ways of life so that, sustaining the opposition and antagonism with the same fervor as it started was difficult.

3.4.2 Contestations against “Unplanned” Urban Development

With regard to the oppositions in the southern (relatively “unplanned”) urban extension, the forms of conflict against the forces of dispossession are similar to the ones observed in the Rajarhat area. Even though the scale and intensity was much restricted due to the limited size and rapidity of the project. Individualistic struggles were more prominent without having the support of a collective organization. The contestations lacked a structured platform that would enable better articulation of demands and disagreements.

In consequence the oppositions proved too feeble to stop the acquisition. The powerful nexus between land brokers and developers with the local administrative authorities and political party workers proved to be particularly effective in thwarting antagonisms:

Where could we go to find support to stop the land acquisition…we went to the police and they advised us not to protest and let the acquisition continue…they said what are you going to gain by opposing…it is imperative to happen and we cannot stop…so they said first stop opposing and then they will talk…what can we do…they all were involved (personal interview; May, 2011).

Again, the scale of the project facilitated the acquisition, as not many people were dispossessed at the same time, so the oppositions never gained in strength due to the lack of adequate number of people posing against it.

Foremost, in the case of the relatively “unplanned” urban development, cooptation and alliance formation between the landowners and land dependent population with the land brokers deployed by the private developers proved to be effective. This was done through economic inducements such as material concessions and commissions. To reiterate once again, dispossession from means of production itself does not necessarily imply

138 violent and overt opposition; the mode and the conditions under which it happens are important to shape the course of action.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explored land assembly politics, explicating the means and instruments that were used to bring about the creation of urban spaces. I argued that urban-space making is increasingly about accumulation by dispossession with a view to further intensifying commodification and speculative processes. The process involved alliances of multiple actors at different scales using both coercive and consensual means. I examined the role of the state due its supreme importance in urban-space making politics in the current context. The chapter further argued that accumulation by dispossession is not necessarily characterized by extra-economic coercion but consensual means along with market forces can also play important roles in influencing the process, thus contributing towards dispossession. Even though coercive methods are significant, the mechanisms and strategies used for to attain accumulation by dispossession are contingent rather than necessary and depend largely on the spatio-temporal context. I also demonstrated how urban-space making politics accentuated the existing uneven geographies by unpacking economic and socio-cultural impacts on the dispossessed population.

Urban-space making—both state-planned and private-developer-led—are two important forms of urban development presently evident in India. The primary motive behind the current creation of urban spaces is to intensify the accumulation process and ensure its unimpeded march. Accumulation through dispossession and exploitation form the crux of the new urban development, as urban centers are increasingly seen as the chief

139 drivers of the economy and engines of growth. Even though both the strategies—state- planned and privately planned—are means of initiating and establishing urban spaces on the rural periphery, the scale, strategies, objectives and outcomes vary. The strategy adopted to materialize urban-space making is a contingent matter. Based on the social, economic and political situations in space and time, the strategies are conditioned. However, land dispossession, land speculation and continuous transformation of the same into a commodity remain the key motives for both strategies of urban development. Huge investments in the form of real estate and industrial capitals—both domestic and foreign— are making inroads into these vast stretches of (previously) arable land in a big way and converting the rural landscape drastically. The changes in the land uses leading to dispossession and reorganization of surpluses are being shaped by the demands of transient global capital. The terms and conditions of urban-space making are being directly influenced by the requirements and preferences of capital, and not the people, as so famously proclaimed by the state officials.

Urban-space making directly orchestrated by the state allows fixing of depressed prices for land and expropriation of people through the exercise of the state’s institutionalized power in the form of eminent domain. Armed with the colonial land acquisition rule, which permitted land assembly for urban-space making in the name of

“public purpose”, the state applied extra economic coercion and manipulated market imperatives to force land sales and facilitate land acquisition process. In the making of a city, the application of force cannot be relied upon entirely due to the inherent tensions between the machinations from above and the possibility of contestation from below. The state, therefore, instituted an effective system of land brokering to entice landowners into selling their land through monetary incentives in the form of commissions. Associations of those

140 supplying building raw materials for construction were also formed to attract people to come on board willingly. However, these inducements were largely hijacked by local party workers and people connected with political elites. Land speculation is greatly intensified and has spiraling effects. It is engulfing not only the New Town area but is expanding its tentacles to the adjoining rural areas.129

In order to garner wide support and cooperation from the resident population and to thwart impending overt conflicts, the actions of the state hinged upon a strong ideological framework deeply entrenched in neoliberalism. The social construction and fetishization of world-city development and urban citizenship were proactively pursued through discursive and material means. As a result, consensual means formed an integral part of the politics of dispossession.

The state was not only directly involved in creating the conditions for sustained capital accumulation, thus acting in behest and behalf of capital; it also had direct stakes in land development and real estate development projects itself. In the forms of various joint ventures and private-public partnerships, the state, through its parastatal arm, HIDCO, had arranged for “sharing the pie” with the private developers. The rates of return from accumulation through expropriation130 multiplied manifold due to the artificial cheapening of the prices of the land and then its sale to the developer at very high prices, thereby earning excessive returns over and above development costs in the transactions of the developed land for residential, commercial, industrial uses. The state, thus, acted as a broker and rentier by capitalizing on accumulation by dispossession.

State-led and privately-designed urban-space making have no place for the dispossessed population in the planning process. It is an extremely top-down approach, with no consideration for those for whom supposedly the urban areas are being partly

141 established. In creating some affordable housing for the EWS, LIG and MIG it is being rationalized that the state is integrating them as well, which is far from true. Through lip service and rhetoric, the dispossessed are being appeased. Urban spaces are largely created for “outsiders”. They are mainly targeted towards the professional middle class and the elites who are supposed to come from other states or from the same state of West Bengal, to be residing and working in the new township. A further target is the NRI131 population, many of whom may not even actually reside there but are investing in speculative property.

Of course, industrial capitals in the form of IT, ITES, and financial sectors are also major players in terms of consumption of urban spaces and production of surpluses, thereby catering to the privileged few.

Urban-space making, however, is not unchallenged. Rather a vast terrain of negotiation, desperation, deliberation, contestation and struggle exists, manifested in various forms of survival strategies, overt resistances and organized movements, all of which are vital in shaping the politics of urban development. On the urban periphery, overt battles against extra economic coercion for land acquisition are the dominant mode of opposition for a few. There is another section, which resorts to a middle ground and is more flexible and aims to negotiate the terms of dispossession. Their fight is mostly for a better and fairer compensation as the price for giving up their means of living. Even though explicit resistances are observed, the struggle for living is much more compelling for the poor dispossessed and displaced population. Due to the urgency to continue living, various coping mechanisms need to be adopted.

Impacts of the expropriation are dealt with through multiple strategies.

Dispossession does not however lead to proletarianization in its entirety, due to the limits to capitalist development in countries of the Global South with a colonial past.132 The

142 released population from land thus lies in a latent and stagnant state of “relatively surplus population”. Employment is mostly found in the lower echelons of the urban economy (in the newly emerging Rajarhat new township or in Kolkata city). A large section of the former peasants or the ones dependent on land for a living, end up serving the growing needs of the upcoming township, however, within what is popularly known as the “informal sector”. For instance, the “new” work that the ousted peasants find consist of vending of vegetables and fish, woodworking, masonry, domestic help, rag picking and waste products processing, paper packaging, bags and cap making, shoe-repairing, cell phone repairing, car repairing and washing, incense stick making and so on. All these forms of employment cater to the needs of the incoming population in Rajarhat, serving the capitalists, political elites, the managerial and professional classes. In this regard, the incorporation of female labor is providing additional cheap labor for capitalist production (even though not always in the sense of real subsumption).133 Due to inherent gendered inequalities and subjectivities under patriarchal reign, increased women participation in work, however, does not necessarily relate to greater empowerment of women.

Increasingly commodified living juxtaposed with limited and diminished income sources is contributing towards extreme form of insecurity, thus heightening the vulnerability of the displaced and dispossessed population. In addition to economic impacts, the socio-cultural impacts have alienating inflections. In particular, the identities of the younger population, which apparently has been a major supporter of the establishment of the new township, are being modeled through conspicuous consumption of elites and middle classes. This internalization of the consumerist culture serves as a coping mechanism for a section of the population. The fetishism of the consumerist culture, supported by the world-class city ideal expressed by the new township, contributes in

143 temporarily marking and masking the underlying material conditions. Instead of making any real inroads in class relations, it exacerbates alienation through the illusion of an imagined identity, that often leads to frustration and antagonism among the youth when faced with reality. The current life is in contrast to the relatively more stable and higher income flow, self-sufficiency and secured living that was the case for a large part of the peasant population preceding the New Town development. The majority of the population is deprived and marginalized, languishing in extreme poverty and insecurity.

Accumulation by dispossession as noted in the current setting is deeply rooted in class struggle. Land in the Indian context is not just a transferrable piece of property. It embodies profound sociological and psychological meanings. Further, dissociation from it is existentially jeopardizing for the peasants, due to the degree of dependence on it as the means of sustenance, and in comparison to limited alternative livelihoods outside of it.

Therefore, dispossession from the means of living often evokes violent opposition. The longevity and degree of success of the struggle however depend on a multitude of complex factors including the scale of dispossession, the number of people directly affected, the substitutive possibilities, media coverage, external support in the form of political parties and civil society, historical experiences, the geographical location, the underlying ideologies and objectives of the contestation, and also reforms that are offered as temporary placebos.

The dispossessed and displaced population does make its own histories and geographies but not necessarily under its own choosing. Although the various forms of opposition against land acquisition for planned and relatively unplanned urban development did not show the desired results, it did serve to catapult the local antagonisms to national levels (along with other anti-dispossession struggles happening in India). Partly, this has led to the national government annulling the colonial Land Acquisition Act of 1894

144 and introduction of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, which came into effect from January 1, 2014.

However, reformism in the long run can be more damaging than class oppression. Although it does provide immediate amelioration to some extent, it in turn can be disabling for radical politics. Importantly, across all geographical scales, the state has become extremely cautious about land acquisition. In the current context, the Rajarhat protests led to official withdrawal of the urban development project in the adjoining rural areas of Rajarhat under the BRADA (Bhangar-Rajarhat Area Development Authority).134 Moreover, the opposition in

Rajarhat was one of the important events that contributed to rising public ire against the

Left Front government that ended in their defeat in the state elections after 34 years of rule in West Bengal.

The contradictory development inherent in (neoliberal) capitalism is further accentuated as the dispossessed and displaced population of Rajarhat and southern fringe of Kolkata now move to the nearby city of Kolkata in search of livelihoods. This itself defeats the purpose, as the official claim of creating urban spaces on the periphery was to decongest

Kolkata and to make the population less dependent on it. Therefore, in its truly emblematic form (neoliberal) capitalist development presents the problem anew. In the next chapter, I thus look into the urban development politics unfolding within the city of Kolkata as urban- space (re)making is not just about the creation of new urban spaces but also the upgrading and redevelopment of existing ones.

145 Notes

94 Harvey, 2001 95 These are excerpts from interviews during my research field work conducted during 2010-2011 96 See endnote 2 in Chapter 1 97 The challenges put up against the law of eminent domain are seen in various other political movements in India, for instance, the ‘Narmada Bachao Andolan’ [Save Narmada River Movement] primarily opposed the construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam on River Narmada (in the state of Gujarat—western India). 98 Foucault, 1995 99 Source: http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090907/jsp/calcutta/story_11459120.jsp accessed on 14th December, 2009 100 1 “Katha” is equivalent to 720 square meters. 101 I am abstracting from the environmental and ecological effects of the township on that region, even though those are extremely important, environmental and ecological concern is not one of the research questions as that is not the primary focus of my dissertation. 102 Source: http://sanhati.com/excerpted/588/ accessed on 21st November, 2009. 103 1 USD is equivalent to Rs. 42.46 as of 1st January 1999; source OANDA 104 Source: http://sanhati.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/rajarhat.pdf accessed on 12th October 2009 105 An inference from this is that the possibility of recruiting ‘cheap’ and ‘docile’ labor in the low- skilled activities does not lead to a transition from the phase of formal subsumption to real subsumption. Capitalists may be more inclined to extract absolute surplus value, thereby increasing their propensity to resist revolutionizing their production processes. This entails that in order to unpack the conditions reproducing migratory labor, it is important to situate the process in the context of the capitalist development dialectically, which could in turn relate to the development question of the poor countries of the world. 106 The adjoining area of Rajarhat was taken up for further creation of urban spaces under the BRADA [Bhangar-Rajarhat Area Development Authority] by the Left Front government. This had led to the beginning of land sales and speculation and forceful acquisition that is still continuing. Even though the new Trinamool government has officially annulled it, in reality nothing has changed on the ground. However, this theme in the said area needs to be researched further. 107 This refers to land that is not regularly bought and sold in the market, i.e., it is not fully commodified and thus not entirely subsumed in the sphere of circulation. See Harvey, 2003; 2006; Levien, 2011 108 “As soon as capitalist production takes possession of agriculture, and in proportion to the extent to which it does so, the demand for an agricultural labouring population falls absolutely, while the accumulation of the capital employed in agriculture advances, without this repulsion being, as in non-agricultural industries, compensated by a greater attraction. Part of the agricultural population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing proletariat. and on the look-out for circumstances favourable to this transformation….This source of relative surplus population is thus constantly flowing. But the constant flow towards the towns pre-supposes, in the country itself, a constant latent surplus population, the extent of which becomes evident only when its channels of outlet open to exceptional width….The third category of the relative surplus population, the stagnant, forms a part of the active labour army, but with extremely irregular employment. Hence it furnishes to capital an inexhaustible reservoir of disposable labour power. Its conditions of life sink below the average normal level of the working class; this makes it at once the broad basis of special branches of capitalist exploitation. It is characterised by maximum of working time, and minimum of wages” (Marx, 1976: 796). 109 The name has been changed to protect the respondent’s identity as per his request.

146

110 I did find out after talking to a few family members that some members of the family were also intermittently engaged in some work as masons and painters in the city of Kolkata, in the relatively off-agricultural season. 111 1 “bigha” is equivalent to about 0.33 acre. 112 The average rate of inflation during my fieldwork in India during the period of 2010-2011 was around 9%. Source:http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-01-24/news/28424463_1_prices-of- essential-food-wholesale-price-inflation-previous-month and http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-14/india-s-inflation-exceeds-9-for-11th-month- reducing-scope-for-rate-pause.html accessed on 5th February 2012. 113 This is particularly true for the Muslim population than the Hindus in that region. I have partly abstracted from the distinctions based on religious backgrounds due to the limited scope of my research and more importantly this was not particularly central to my research objective. 114 The total money due to land sales is about Rupees one twenty thousand to one forty thousand that is approximately $2500 to $3000 based on ($1 equivalent to Rs. 47 as in July 2001 when the land acquisition took place). 115 These are excerpts from personal interviews conducted during January 2011-June 2011. 116 However, not everyone believed and supported the positive image building of the city. There were contestation and negotiation, which I have discussed later in the chapter. 117 Bourdieu’s concept of habitus refers to mannerisms that are acquired in childhood unconsciously. He further argues that individuals are conditioned by their particular position in a class society to think, act and feel in certain ways. These dispositions become like habits or second nature and common sense, once internalized. Since they vary by class it is symptomatic of underlying class inequalities thus reflecting the class background of the members belonging to particular classes (Bourdieu, 1984; Williams and Connell, 2010: 352) 118 There are unconfirmed reports of the rise in liquor stores, massage parlors, and prostitution in the Rajarhat region. There is also a general perception about this among many original residents. 119 I focus here on the case of Rajarhat. The resistances of urban-space making in the southwest Kolkata has been similar on some grounds. However, it lacked the organizational structure that was found in Rajarhat. Further, the scale of the resistance was also influenced by the size of the project, the means used for land acquisition and the underlying intent of the resistance. 120 A similar categorization is found in a recent article by Levien (2013) 121 This included unregistered sharecroppers (bargadars), unregistered landholders (pattadars) and landless laborers who were deprived from any compensation. 122 The opposition was either tenuous, therefore were crushed brutally, or they willingly accepted believing that they would be benefitted to some extent. They were either passively supportive or could not sustain their resistance in front of the increasing pressure from the state and its machineries. 123 However, that does not mean that implicit and covert mechanisms or what is described as the “weapons of the weak” for anti-dispossession and repossession of land are altogether absent. 124 Even though these acts of resistances were creditable, the possibility of the same was partly because those did not significantly stall or change the process of dispossession. The state did not deem those necessary to halt or suppress as those did not pose as substantial threats 125 Also, committees, which filed the cases against the government lacked financial back up to continue their challenge to higher courts of justice. 126 This has been the case in Nandigram in western part of West Bengal in the event of land acquisition for establishing industrial center. 127 Singur, located in the district of Hugli, a TATA car factory was to be established on about 1000 acres of land. People of Singur opposed the land assembling process vehemently in October 2006. Nandigram is located in the Purba [East] Medinipur district of West Bengal. It was chosen for the location of an SEZ to establish a chemical hub in association with the Indonesian business

147 conglomerate, Salim group. But on March 14, 2007 there was a “state-led massacre” where at least 14 people were killed and many more injured in the event of opposing the land acquisition process. 128 There have been a few exceptions, who did extended their support on the issue. The intelligentsia included, “Suman Chatterjee (singer) who is now known as Kabir Suman and is Member of the Parliament (MP), Swapan Basu (singer), Professor Tarun Sanyal, Atin Bandopadhya (writer), Pratul Mukhopadhya (activist), Lopamudra Mitra (singer), Subhash Dutta (of Howrah Ganatantrik Nagarik Samiti—an organization fighting for social and political causes), Sushil Mukherjee (ex-vice chancellor), Professor Ajit Narayan Basu of IIT (Indian Institute of Technology), Sanu Lahiri (well- known painter). Except for them, no one supported our movement. Media had been somewhat supportive, of which E-tv (tv channel) covered our stories most widely. At that time there were not so many tv channels as we see now. In fact, I have gone to writer and activist Mahashweta Devi twice but she did not show any interest” (personal interview; January, 2011). 129 Land speculation is not only observed in the state planned city making but forms an important aspect of urban extension in the privately developed urban spaces in the southern part of Kolkata as well. 130 Also see, Levien, 2011 131 Non-Resident Indians [NRIs] 132 Here I would like to highlight that I do not adhere to the teleological reading of capitalist development in the Global South, where the inherent nature of the contradictory capitalist development in the countries with a colonial legacy are understood as incomplete transition to capitalism. 133 Marx examines the commencement of the capitalist labour process from a historical standpoint (Marx, 1976). He distinguishes between formal and real subsumption of labour under capital. The formal subsumption of labour under capital is effected by the compulsion of labourers to sell their labour power. But this does not necessarily affect the real nature of the labour process or the work organization, as the capitalists still have to rely on the existing forms and modes of labour inherited from the earlier social formations. “If changes occur in these traditional established labour processes after their takeover by capital, these are nothing but the gradual consequences of that subsumption. The work may become more intensive, its duration may be extended, it may become more continuous or orderly under the eye of the interested capitalist, but in themselves these changes do not affect the character of the actual labour process, the actual mode of working” (p. 1021). The formal subsumption of labour represents the initial stages of the capitalist mode of production where the production of surplus value is only made possible through prolongation of the working day, i.e. by the production of absolute surplus value. But the relentless extension of the working day meets with natural, moral and political constraints. Hence, at this preliminary stage the state plays a pivotal role in ensuring the sustained production of surplus value. Marx asserts, “… the pretensions of capital in its embryonic state, in its state of becoming, when it cannot yet use the sheer force of economic relations to secure its right to absorb a sufficient quantity of surplus labour, but must be aided by the power of the state…” (p. 382). However, the above-mentioned problems are surmounted at the stage of real subsumption of labour by capital. This stage is marked by ‘specifically capitalist mode of production (large-scale industry, etc.)’, which “… not only transforms the situations of the various agents of production, it also revolutionizes their actual mode of labour and the real nature of the labour process as a whole” (p. 1021), thus permeating the economic relations and the social fabric. As soon as the real subsumption of labour occurs, the labour process along with the relations and forces of production are transformed to adapt to the needs of capital accumulation. This is the phase when production of relative surplus value is made possible through intensifying the labour process. “It imposes on the worker an increased expenditure of labour-power within a time which remains constant, a heightened tension of labour-power, and a closer filling-up the pores of the working day, i.e. a condensation of labour, to a degree which can only be attained within the limits of the shortened working day” (p. 534). It is achieved by various methods, viz. cooperation, division of labour and introduction of machinery, each representing the various stages of capitalist mode of production. In

148 this regard the sanction and support of the state is a precondition for the formulation, implementation and sustenance of the laws governing the class differences. 134 This has not stopped unofficial development, evident in the continuation of land acquisition and speculation in the area.

149

Chapter 4

Urban Restructuring in Kolkata

4.1 Introduction

Urban restructuring is clearly under way in Kolkata. It is a part of the broader urban renewal program that is evident in the entire country under the Jawaharlal Nehru National

Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). In the previous chapter, I dealt with urban-space- making politics on the periphery of Kolkata. Since there are broadly two distinct forms of new urban development in India, the main objective of this chapter is to illustrate the new urban restructuring and redevelopment processes taking place in the city itself, particularly the Kolkata Metropolitan Area (KMA), which consists of the Greater Kolkata Region. In historically specific terms, urban restructuring or redevelopment is a complex set of processes that incessantly makes and remakes capitalist urban spaces. It can be viewed as the intricate range of processes related to material, social, and regulatory changes that facilitate rapid land and property redevelopment in the city areas (Weinstein and Ren,

2009), which in turn influence urban geographies.135

In trying to understand the nature of the new urban development, this chapter aims at analyzing the rationale of urban space remaking, including the forces that condition the same. Continuing the theme from the preceding chapter, I seek to situate urban restructuring processes in part within the world city framework, as it strongly underpins

150 the policies and practices pursued by the state at multiple geographical scales. The focus therefore are the geographies that are (re)created at the local scales due to the complex interplay of global forces. Since the existing literature either valorizes the global over the local or vice versa, I attempt to contextualize urban space restructuring within a global-local framework particularly with respect to the Indian context. In this regard, I unpack the role of the local state embedded within the multi-scalar state framework. Along with radical political movements, I also examine the micro-politics of the urban subalterns in the form of coping strategies and covert resistances. But I do so by situating it broadly in the material conditions that shape the nature and course of class struggle that includes the “everyday practices” and overt resistances. How all this in turn influences the urban space remaking and the politics from above is something I have tried to delve into in this study.

I examine the urban restructuring processes through the cases of squatter settlements along the canal banks in Kolkata and the closed factory units. Since evictions of squatter settlements and closing of “sick” industrial units and the concurrent transformations of those urban spaces stand out in terms of urban restructuring processes at present, it begs a thorough analysis. This is especially important due to the increasing role of global financial institutions in shaping the urban geographies of the squatters (canal- bank dwellers). Since there is a noteworthy lack of academic works on the global-local nexus (as mentioned above), especially in the Indian context, this particularly gains significance. Further, the examination of the closed factory units helps in shedding light on the restructuring processes deployed by the state, inspired by a world city vision, in recreating new urban geographies.

In the following section of the chapter, I outline the major entrepreneurial activities that the city of Kolkata has been engaged in lately. It intends to show the forms of urban

151 restructuring in the city at present. The next part demonstrates the making of (semi) privatized spaces through processes of “enclosures” and simultaneous destruction and recreation of “urban commons”, both of which are increasingly serving the interests of the elites. The succeeding section examines the instruments of redevelopment. This is followed by an analysis of the impacts on the subalterns, focusing on the canal-bank dwellers. The next section deals with the multiple survival strategies and the overt and covert resistances that define the class struggle and that are integral to shaping the restructuring processes.

4.2 Entrepreneurial Kolkata

In recent years, Kolkata has been undergoing drastic changes in its urban landscape that are transforming it into a “neoliberal entrepreneurial city” (Gooptu, 2011). Major

Indian cities such as Kolkata are being reconceived and refashioned as sites of rising entrepreneurial activities with increasing commodification and privatization. The state government in West Bengal and the local municipal bodies in Kolkata are at the forefront of these changes. To ensure uninterrupted capital accumulation through increasing collaboration with private capital in the form of public-private partnerships, Kolkata is engaged in providing a boost to the local economy. For instance, in the real estate sector, numerous companies have sprung up in collaboration with the state government. Some of the major players in this field are Bengal Ambuja, Bengal Peerless, Bengal Shrachi, Bengal

Greenfield, and so on. Moreover, the policies and politics surrounding urban development are markedly geared toward “civic boosterism” and place marketing to provide a positive image for greater inward investment, especially in the context of heightened interurban competition.

152 The drive to become a world-class city and an important node within the global politico-economic matrix is impinging increasingly on Kolkata. This is evident in the vision of the city’s plan for the future as espoused by the present Chief Minister, Mamata Banerjee, after coming to power in May 2011: “We want to develop Kolkata. Why can’t Kolkata be another London?”136 “London” signifies not only the similarity between two cities based on geographical proximity of a river (London along River Thames and Kolkata along River

Hooghly), but also the image and status of a “global city,” which Kolkata strives to achieve.

The process of urban regeneration in India is largely based on the experience of the First

World and driven by the global city imagery. Here is an excerpt from the “Vision and

Development Perspective—2025” document provided by the Town and Planning

Department of Kolkata Municipal Corporation, which underscores the importance of becoming an international hub and attaining “world-classness”:

“Kolkata, being a primate city in the eastern region, with its high trade oriented economy and aspiration to become a world class city by the year 2021…. The ‘Vision for

Kolkata’ by 2025 is that the city should be developed as a leading city in South East Asia.

Further, a) Kolkata should ensure a healthy and sustainable living environment of international standard for its citizens and visitors; b) Kolkata should promote a world class job environment for the working sector population; c) The city should provide a world class business environment to its potential investors.”137

The ministers and officials in high positions in government office have highlighted the relevance and importance of entrepreneurial activities. These are deemed necessary for greater investment and hence higher growth. In this regard, image building is particularly pertinent for Kolkata because of its history of militant workers’ struggles and high degree of unionism. There is thus urgency among the state actors to replace the image of an

153 unconducive environment for capitalist interests and investments with a more encouraging one. Even during my research fieldwork for my master’s work, the prominence of the ongoing urban entrepreneurialism was discernible in the planning vision of Kolkata. At that time, the Minister of Information and Technology, Mr. Manab Mukherjee, had asserted:

Change in social infrastructure is crucial and to that we are concentrating on aggressive publicity, as a change in common people’s as well as investors’ perception is required and it is in the process of changing…extensive publicity through road shows and other means to attract investment [are being implemented]. Social infrastructure means more investment and development of entertainment and recreational facilities like shopping plazas, restaurants for younger generation. Young people look forward to these facilities and to pull them in Kolkata, we need to provide them (personal interview, July 2005).

The plan and vision regarding Kolkata, that Mr. Mukherjee was referring to, have been taking concrete shape since the early 2000s, but its spatial impacts were more clearly visible during my doctoral fieldwork in 2010–2011.

The social force of competition impinges strongly on local governments, so that they are compelled to create and maintain conditions that ensure the continual reproduction of capitalist relations. This is especially intense given the decentralization of power to the urban local bodies as per the JNNURM. Furthermore, proper housing and better health facilities, upgraded educational institutions, and other parameters of social infrastructure go hand in hand with physical infrastructure for the reproduction of the labor force. Cities, therefore, need to be continuously “improved” to enhance their desirability not only for capital but also for workers.

In this regard, cities in India are also competing at the global scale within a network of globalizing cities. In the current context of stiff territorial competition among cities across the world, growth is of paramount importance even at the cost of social provisions. Cities

154 vie for an increasing amount of capital investment, and in the bid to lure capital; they engage in escalating urban redevelopment processes.

4.3 Geographies of (Semi) Privatization

Privatization generally refers to change in a social relationship through which there is a transfer of control and/or ownership of publicly owned resources from (local or regional) state authorities to firms and individuals. It is a variant of a more general process of enclosures, which signifies the seizure of common resources, exclusion of their common usage and transference of the same for private use (Heynen and Robbins, 2005). This analytical distinction largely coincides in reality, especially in the context of Kolkata.

Historically, any natural resource such as land or water that was under the ownership and control of the state authorities has been commonly used. In the event of limited resources available to the urban poor, these public resources have been integral parts of their lives, acting as means of sustenance for many. The “vested”138 (public) land owned by the state has harbored refugee populations, rural populations from nearby districts and states, and also destitute populations from the hinterland that have arrived in Kolkata in search of work. However, in the wake of the neoliberal turn, there are distinct changes marking the regulation and usage of these resources: part of the redefinition of urban development in

Kolkata. Urban land is a scarce resource; this element of scarcity is further intensified through an artificial barrier that is imposed through the processes of privatization and enclosure. In the current context of Kolkata, public land—even though not under common ownership—had common usage rights; through various forms of spatial practices such as evictions, these common usage rights are being abolished. I refer to this process as

155 enclosures, which may not be effected through legal or statutory changes and may not imply change of ownership, that is, from public to private, but it surely redefines the spaces of use from public to private in a more informal sense.

In trying to understand the processes of enclosure and privatization of spaces, I have chosen two vital aspects of urban renewal processes evident in Kolkata and its vicinity.

First, I shall discuss the nature of the politics of land associated with slum and canal-bank dwellers, who were either evicted (and some relocated—see below) or faced impending evictions from their settlements. In the second part, my study is based on the political economy of closure of factories that are being seized upon for “development” leading to the

(re)commodification of urban spaces for speculative and profitable (real estate) endeavors.

4.3.1 From “Ugly Shanties” to Developed-Aesthetic Zones

The canal system in and around Kolkata has been an integral part of the city. Since the pre-Independence era, these canals had been serving as major channels for drainage and transportation. The canals were used for inland navigation and drainage systems during British Rule to facilitate the activities of the British East India Company in the late

17th century in the circulation of goods. However, because of the lack of any maintenance over the years, the system has been impaired. Recently, the improvement of the canal system was considered important in order to build better infrastructure (mainly for drainage and sewerage). The Kolkata Environmental Improvement Project (KEIP; a part of

Kolkata Municipal Corporation), with direct financial support from the Asian Development

Bank (ADB) and Department for International Development (DFID),139 has undertaken the planning and implementation of the project. The project is under the broader rubric of

JNNURM (more specifically under the Basic Services to Urban Poor or BSUP scheme within

156 the project,140 especially the rehabilitation component) as a part of the urban development program and Valmiki Ambedkar Awas Yojna (VAMBAY—Valmiki Ambedkar Housing

Project, a central government scheme).141 Although all the canals in and around the city have degraded over the years, only a few of them have been identified by the KEIP in consultation with the ADB for improvement and rehabilitation works. Some of the main canals, along the banks of which eviction drives are under way, are Churial, Manikhali,

Keorapukur, Rajdanga, Anandapur, Tollygunge, and Panchanna. These are mostly located in the southern parts (southeast and southwest) of the city.

The land along the banks of the canals has long been home for a large number of people migrating from neighboring regions. These squatter settlements—locally referred to as

“khalpar busti” (canal-bank slum)—have occupied these state-owned lands for more than five decades (Figures 6 and 7). The project for improvement of canals and infrastructure required their eviction. KEIP claims that there are about 3,365 families living along those canals identified for rehabilitation and resettlement. However, the number is strongly disputed by the canal-bank dwellers. One of the leaders of the Brihottoro Kolkata Khalpar

Basti Uchhed Committee (Greater Kolkata Canal Dwellers and Slum Eviction Resistance

Committee) contends:

Rabindrapally, Churial, Kalagachia, Beleghata…all these places have been facing and/or are likely to face evictions soon. The total number of people that might be evicted according to official estimate is about 3600 [the actual number is 3365] families, as this is the number of people whose photo identification has been made. But actually more than 8000 families are there who are just about to get evicted as per our estimate (personal interview, February 2011).

The Director General (Project) of KEIP describes the main purpose of the project:

A major chunk of the project money is for sewerage and drainage…to develop infrastructure. Some money is also for canal rehabilitation and resettlement. Small bits are for slum improvement, solid waste management improvement and parks…. So when we started the sewerage and drainage project we wanted the storm water

157 to be drained from city limits of Kolkata (or wherever we were planning) to the sea via existing canal networks. When we were asked to build the infrastructure our job was to build an underground network to drain the water to the existing canals. The conditions of these canals were very bad…they were not maintained for 25-30 years…. Also due to our socio-economic habits these canals have turned into dumping grounds… So thousands and thousands of shanties around these canals have to be removed” (personal interview, April 2011).

Figure 6. Canal-Bank Dwellings

Moreover, KEIP’s website specifies that “with relocation of canal bank dwellers, re-excavations of canals and bridge constructions, the canal bank areas and their surroundings are poised for an improvement in environmental conditions with relatively unpolluted canal water, elimination of foul odor, elimination of cause of solid waste dumping, better conveyance of storm weather flows, improvement of drainage in catchments and elimination of ugly shanties along canal banks [emphasis added]”142 as

158 the main objectives of the project. The removal of “ugly” shanties along the canal banks is cited as required. But this is not only for environmental reasons such as the excavation and de-siltation of the canals, but also for the upgrading of the entire area, including the enhancement of the aesthetic value of the surroundings and - supposedly

– to provide a better life for the squatters. Because forceful eviction is not permissible under the ADB’s guidelines, the proper rehabilitation of the canal-bank dwellers is stressed under the program.

Figure 7. Canal-Bank Dwellings

This is what an official in charge of the rehabilitation and resettlement component mentioned about the project:

159 Canal-side dwellers (who) were staying along the canals in the most unhygienic conditions for many years. The canal-dwellers in that sense were a barrier in excavation, beautification, and improving the canal system overall. According to ADB, the people who were staying near the canal sides cannot be just [forcefully] evicted without rehabilitating them. So the R&R (rehabilitation and resettlement) component in the project was introduced to take care of this part (personal interview, May 2011).143

The above quotation exemplifies the local state’s stance toward squatter settlements—belonging to the urban poor—whose presence and lifestyles were condemned and largely blamed for the degraded condition of the canal system. This resonated well with the current sense of “bourgeoisie environmentalism” upheld by a section of the elites and upper middle class (Ahmed, 2011).

The canal banks are public land owned and controlled by the state. Previously, it allowed settlement in these lands without any objection. However, a clear change of standpoint is discernible, with rising eviction drives for infrastructural development and environmental, including beautification programs. The canal banks were commonly used by the dwellers for living and working so that evicting them from their spaces of production and reproduction amounts to blocking their access to these areas. Although the canal banks are not directly transferred to private capital as the ownership does not change, the accessibility and control as well as usage rights of the urban poor are heavily curtailed and the land is taken over by the state and rechanneled for more restricted uses. The canals are supposed to be excavated, which is to be followed by concrete embankment. The banks are then planned to be dotted with plants and trees and decorative lamps and lighting so that they are aesthetically pleasing. As a result, and both materially and symbolically, spaces of exclusion are created. Enclosed spaces (in terms of privatized use and restricted accessibility of spaces) are indirectly subsumed under the purview of speculation and circulation.

160 This is because the clearance of the squatters has a positive bearing on the real estate development of the adjacent areas. This is not just by accident and not a result of an externality factor, but by design. Infrastructural development and beautification, thus, facilitate reorganization and redistribution of surpluses by providing a boost to the real estate prospects and values of the areas. A real estate developer testifies to this:

The slums are an eye-sore…have you seen how filthy those areas are…the removal of those slums from these areas is definitely good. Many clients would not want a filthy, stinking slum area just at the entrance or nearby their places of residence…the initiative taken by the government will be good for development [real estate] (personal interview, April 2010).

The displacement of the canal-bank dwellers, thus, ensures revival of the adjoining areas, which in turn contributes to revalorizing the devalued landscape (Weber, 2002). The existing urban commons—such as land, canal water, and social networks—are destroyed

(see later), and simultaneously, the process recreates and redefines the spaces as ones of restriction and exclusion. Furthermore, the canal dredging and excavation works are being subcontracted to private developers and agencies, and these agencies are mostly tied up with the state of West Bengal in public-private partnerships—the signature feature of an entrepreneurial city (Harvey, 1989). In addition, parastatal bodies, such as Mackintosh Burn

Limited, undertake the constructions of buildings that accommodate the relocated population from the canal banks. The local state, thus, has direct stakes in the resettlement programs through surplus-generating construction work.

In reference to the creation of fragmented spaces, a veteran who has been involved in political activism commented as follows:

If you see historically the city has welcomed people from different parts with varied social status…. The city is not just for the rich people or just for the services catering to the rich. The city is for everyone…but today when I look around, I do not see that…pockets of extreme opulence is seen everywhere (personal interview, April 2011).

161

The city of Kolkata has been attracting people from its hinterland and other parts of the country. People from different socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds have come and settled in the city. Thus, the urban landscape bore the reflection of the same processes of intermingling of people of all sorts, “however, reluctantly and agonistically” (Harvey,

2012:67). This is changing with the proliferation of spaces of exclusion, fragmented and

“interdictory spaces”.144 The inherent bias toward a certain group of people over the other is clearly noted in the following response by a real estate developer: “slums or any squatters can be a nuisance when it comes to selling properties…you will find a posh flat and just adjoining that a squatter settlement…if you had decided to buy a flat in that area you might just change the decision seeing the dirt and filth around the area.” He also adds, “we are interested in selling our property as large amounts of money have been invested and it will be a total loss if we cannot sell those” (personal interview, February 2010). Production and reproduction of space are premised on capital’s drive for incessant surplus value creation and extraction even at the cost of destroying spaces for the urban poor. These acutely predatory and blatant practices define the neoliberal form of urban redevelopment politics that the city of Kolkata is witnessing lately.

4.3.2 From “Mills to Malls” and Private Enclaves

Along with the eviction of informal and “illegal” settlements in the city, closure of factories and the transformation of the defunct factory lands into gentrified spaces is a key feature of the new urban development in Kolkata. Most of these spaces are being redeveloped as shopping malls, residential complexes, and luxury resorts. In fact, the popular adage nowadays is “from mills to malls,” suggesting the changes in the urban

162 landscape in recent years. Numerous manufacturing plants in and around Kolkata have been closing down. Although the process of deindustrialization in the state of West Bengal has a longer and more complex history, the recent changes in land use are noteworthy and symptomatic of the underlying neoliberal paradigm of development.145 The locked-out industrial units occupy leasehold land, and to be able to make those available for redevelopment, the state (both at local and regional levels) is taking legal steps to enable that (see below). The state thus is increasingly moving from decommodification to that of recommodification in recent times.

In West Bengal, there are 113,846 sick units of which about 55,000 have closed down.146 There are a large number of factories in Kolkata and its surroundings as well, which have been locked out for many years, and some have permanently closed down recently.147 The governments at the center and the state level had set up the Board for

Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) in 1987 for the revival of the viable sick units and the closure of the unviable ones. “It was expected that by revival, idle investments in sick units will become productive and by closure, the locked up investments in unviable units would get released for productive use elsewhere.”148 But instead of reviving those sick units, the state government, along with powerful corporate houses, is making the land on which they stand available for real estate development. The factories are being closed down, citing diverse reasons, but the most popular one is to render them as sick units, which in most cases is deliberately orchestrated. This would evidently lead to losses, and that typically provided the pretext of declaring the factories “sick” by the management. A worker employed in a factory (Joy Engineering Works—a part of the Usha company - an Indian company renowned for manufacturing fans, sewing machines and other electrical products) who had been actively embroiled in a legal battle with the management authorities of his

163 factory contended:149

When we were working we did not understand that there was a lowering of profits or continuous loss. We saw that the goods were being produced and leaving the factory to be sold across India. Sometimes we heard that there is decreasing demand; sometimes lower production as a result of decreasing demand. After that, they showed heavy losses for many years and led to the closure of the factory (personal interview; January, 2010).

A political activist involved with the struggle against closure of factories affirmed:

There was no reason as such for the factory to be incurring such huge losses as claimed by them. They were focusing on the production of the ‘flora’ sewing machines, which was costly and was mainly used in the sweatshops of cotton textiles across India. When the demand for cotton textiles rose in India due to the upsurge of demand in the international market for cotton materials, the demand for flora machine also rose along with it. The simple sewing machines which had paddles used by the individual tailors in their tailoring shops were not very expensive as compared to the ‘flora’ machines which were both fancy and more expensive as it could do a lot of work such as designs and buttons etc. required mainly in sweatshops for faster production. After sometime both the Usha factories were shown to be running under huge losses. Even in Ahmedabad and Allahabad where you had Usha factories are noticing similar incidents (personal interview; January, 2010).

The management would usually approach the BIFR with a proposal to resuscitate the industry, a proposal, which would include some residential and commercial or leisure activities. Mass retrenchment of workers would usually follow after this through voluntary retirement schemes (VRSs). Even the factories that are deemed as unviable are not being put to productive use with workers’ interests on the agenda. Instead, land sharks and real estate developers are actively involved in land speculation and development aimed at catering to the needs of the rich. Although most of these factories belonged to private companies, they were serving the poor working class not just as a means of living through employment in factories; those sites also provided affordable and subsidized housing for workers.

164 Closed or locked-out factories signify values trapped in the form of constant capital, which is counterproductive to the accumulation process. A profitable outlet is required to bring the unproductive capital back into the sphere of circulation as fast as possible. Since the 1980s West Bengal experienced declining industrial production and this speeded up after the liberalization of the economy in the 1990s. However, with the emergence of the real estate sector as one of the prime vanguards of economic development, the devalued and dilapidated spaces are being renewed. It not only involves tearing down old structures and building new ones in their place, but it is also about changes in the functions and forms of the older structures, thus redefining the land use and for whom those spaces are being created. The restructured urban spaces facilitate accumulation by creating surplus values in the form of various construction works and the reorganization and appropriation of surplus values (generated elsewhere), such as by opening newer avenues for speculation and rent- seeking activities. Under the current neoliberal paradigm of urban development, the dismantling and revamping of these factory lands (along with their capital investments in the form of machineries and other concrete structures such as affordable workers’ housing) into real estate facilitating conspicuous consumption by the privileged classes are deemed as more profitable, hence desirable. In this regard, capital is providing the impetus, whereas the state is offering the needed institutional, political, and economic support in effecting it.

The erstwhile (2010) Minister of Land and Land Reforms under the Left Front Government describes the process concerning factory closure:

When many of the industrial units got closed, the government took away the land. But while taking away the land, the government realized that most of these lands had been mortgaged to the bank. There is an act, the bank loan recovery act, which entitles the bank to their loan money back. And they can go to the court to retrieve that. Thus to repay the bank loan is quite impossible for the government. So after taking over these factories, the government is offering those for auctions through

165 which the bank is getting back their loans. These lands are then being bought in the auction by these big real estate developers (personal interview, January 2010).

The malls and residential complexes that are being built on the factory lands are similarly out-of-bounds for the poor working class, as is the case along the canal banks.

However, the factory lands are directly facing the onslaught of neoliberal urban development through multifarious real estate development projects, whereas the canal banks that are being revived apparently for “public purposes” are indirectly encouraging speculative activities and gentrification processes in the surroundings. The local state acts as a facilitator with selective intervention from its side. On the one hand, when required, it withdraws its control over valuable resources and allows a free hand for capital, such as in the case of factory lands. On the other hand, in the name of infrastructural development, it plays an active role in changing the character of urban space by redefining control and usage rights, as in the case of the canal-bank dwellers.

Redefining the “Urban Commons”: Gated Communities

The privatized spaces that are being recreated have concrete expression in the form of numerous urban enclaves, more popularly known as gated communities, which are fast covering the landscape of Kolkata. By gated communities, I mostly refer to the residential complexes and luxury resorts and office parks,150 which literally signify walled enclaves.

“Physical walls and boundaries constitute the most rudimentary and geographically obvious form of enclosure” (Jeffrey et al., 2012; see Brown, 2010), thus making gated enclaves one of the most brazen spaces of exclusion.

Gated communities not only mean the enclosure of space, but also the privatization of public services (Blakely and Snyder, 1997). The process of enclosure implies in some way

166 the destruction of one form of urban commons on the one hand and the creation of a new

“urban commons”, on the other. It is a grossly exclusionary process for the majority of the population, but at the same time, it is inclusionary for a handful. “The rich these days have the habit, for example, of sealing themselves off in gated communities within which exclusionary commons becomes defined…The ultra-rich…are just as fiercely protective of their residential commons as anyone, and have more fire-power and influence in creating and protecting them” (Harvey, 2012: 71–74). Gated communities signify privileged spaces mainly for the elites and (upper) middle class, marking spheres of heightened consumerist culture or what can be rephrased as fetishistic culture. This is well expressed in the following quote from an elderly resident of a posh neighborhood. His views demonstrate how the concept of living, especially among the middle class, is changing and its effects on the landscape of Kolkata:

Quality in lifestyles is important, things have and are changing fast, the concept of quality has changed… for instance…My residence is in a housing complex and I don’t just want a residence, but also count on facilities such as swimming pools, gym, conference hall, jogging space—these things I did not imagine earlier, so [those] were not part of my life! Previously also we had big houses such as in New Alipore, Jodhpur Park [posh neighborhoods in South Kolkata)… these were built by rich people but the space required was much less… They did not ask for such modern things that are found today. In old times, the rich residences were in New Alipore and Jodhpur Park and Lake Gardens. You know that this place (Lake Gardens) and even Salt Lake. Salt Lake is also a rich residential area. No one wanted a swimming pool in the house or gym or jogging space or a conference hall earlier! They did not want these things! Or residences with a lot of space… the ‘gated’ complexes—that you have to enter through one gate and leave through the other, a lot of walled-space… Before, from home, people used to go to clubs for swimming. Not anymore. Now you will have it in your home (personal interview, April 2011).

The increased commodification of lifestyles through introduction, innovation, and subsequent promotion of “new” concepts of living is with a view to making greater profit.151

The architectural designs as well as discursive strategies in creating a narrative of “good

167 and desirable life” are largely premised on the idea of a global city and world-class city originating in the West, thus denoting “a certain imperialism of taste” to a great extent

(Harvey, 1989: 6). This not only serves as a template for gated communities in the material sense, but narratives of the apparent glitz and allure associated with the enclaves also aid in furthering profitability. Accordingly, an ideological framework enables generation and appropriation of surplus value in the form of gated communities along with the justification of the same.152

4.4 Instruments Creating Restructured Spaces

It is important to examine the means and strategies through which redevelopment processes are under way in Kolkata. These strategies can be broadly divided into direct coercion and institutional and discursive means that are seemingly “consensual” in nature, but which together are responsible for materializing the new urban development in Kolkata.

4.4.1 Direct Coercion or Physical Force

The possibility of applying physical force in creating privatized spaces and the restriction and destruction of urban commons is conditioned by the unequal balance of power. Forcible tactics by the state and other parastatal agencies in collusion with informal forms of governance that can incorporate criminal and antisocial elements, create an important weapon in eviction drives. The state monopolizes the power to enforce laws, and in the course of this, it often has to indulge in violent practices that use physical force on the part of the police. But in fact, criminal elements are also actively involved in deploying coercive tactics and violence to evict and displace people from the slum areas and canal

168 banks. Although forcible and involuntary eviction is prohibitive as per the rules set by the

ADB in the case of the canal-bank dwellers, force in the form of physical violence, intimidation, and other forcible strategies is commonly used for the purpose of eviction.

“We were threatened and evicted…we were told if we do not leave the place then we will be forced to evacuate the land and if there are any losses to any belongings then nothing will be compensated for. So obviously we got very scared and we had to come here…. Goons of political parties were used to threaten us” (personal interview, April 2011).

One of the common pretexts for eviction is fire. Slum fires that lead to destruction of informal settlements are regularly used by state authorities or private developers to remove unwanted dwellers:

Another incident, which I remember, was in 3 number Kalikapur, which is located opposite to Avishikta residential complex [in south Kolkata along the Eastern Metropolitan Bypass]. During Kali puja [a well known Bengali-Hindu festival celebrated during Oct-Nov each year], the settlement caught fire and was badly burnt. A local boy named Bishu who was part of the settlement earlier but had flourished as a real estate developer (in promoting business) lately came in support of the inhabitants and was ready to compensate for their loss with a condition that no one can approach any political party for help. He said it will take about 1-1.5 months to rebuild the settlement but he did not want any interference from political parties. The very next day TMC people came to help the settlers. They said that it is their responsibility to provide shelter to the affected persons and they would make every effort to rehabilitate them. The TMC members then shifted the affected persons to a new location in an open ground and provided some basic facilities like water food and tents… they did that for two months after which the supply of drinking water stopped suddenly. The local councilor was approached to look into the matter and to help the underprivileged people. In response he said, ‘what can we do? We have continued to provide help for two months, we cannot continue to provide help anymore’. Since there was no other option, people went back to their original place, but at that time they faced opposition from local goons and political party members asking them not to resettle there. The people defied the orders and continued to resettle as their explanation was simple, ‘we have been staying here for the last 30-35 years, we were taken temporarily to a new place, but now we are back to our original location.’ This led to struggle (personal interview, April 2011).

Clearly, because of lack of evidence, it cannot be said definitively, though, whether

169 slum fires are completely orchestrated as part of the machinations of private developers in collusion with the state as a scheme for clearing the land of squatters or whether they are simply mishaps. Nonetheless, it is certainly true that once a fire destroys a settlement, the ousted population is not allowed to resettle there.153 Goons and workers of local political parties prevent the resettlement process through the use of force and threats.154 Those lands are then typically taken over for real estate development, as observed in many cases in Kolkata (Ultadanga in 2007 is a case in point).155

4.4.2 Institutional Means

The urban renewal process in Kolkata, which is a part of the JNNURM, has drawn on various institutional and policy changes in order to implement the project successfully.

Presently, laws are being devised and modified quite unabashedly to aid in the development process. This is because of the fact that the current policies and the proposed changes are deemed to be key to the fruition of the mission. The Minister of State for Urban

Development, Mr. Saugata Roy, affirmed the requirement and importance of the institutional changes in order to provide a favorable setup for JNNURM:

Under JNNURM we want to reinforce the changes of certain reforms such as Urban Land Ceiling Act…but that has not been followed by the state…. Some changes need to brought about in municipal governance…with regard to legal formalities also we want the stamp duties to be reduced as the state government currently is charging a hefty amount, the revision of rent control act is required as they are in favor or tenants and not of house owners which discourage home ownership and house construction.

I would like here to specifically probe deeper into two key laws, the Urban Land

Ceiling and Regulation Act and the Rent Control Act. It has been argued by those with an interest in furthering the urban redevelopment process that they have had a tremendous negative impact on it; as a result, the repeal and needed reform of both laws are considered

170 necessary. Apart from these two laws, the new taxation method, Unit Area Assessment

(UAA), which is being introduced in Kolkata, will also have an indirect effect on changing the existing urban geographies in the Greater Kolkata Area. The Unit Area Taxation is a conditionality that has been imposed by ADB for granting required aid for various developmental projects such as the KEIP (as discussed above).

4.4.2.1 The Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act

This Act was enacted in 1976156 and is defined as “an act to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good.”157 The Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act (henceforth ULCRA) came into effect in 64 urban agglomerations that were spread over 17 states and 3 union territories and covered towns with a population of more than 200,000 as per the 1971

Census. However, it was later argued that ULCRA was unable to achieve the desired goals because of various bottlenecks and drawbacks in its implementation. Therefore, under the

JNNURM, the repeal of ULCRA was considered to be one of the mandatory reforms.158 States have been instructed to abolish it within a committed time frame. The repeal of the Act was considered to be a significant contribution towards reviving the stagnant housing industry and providing a boost to the real estate sector. 159 Hence, the Government of India decided to repeal the Act under the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Repeal Act of 1999. Almost

171 all the states have repealed the Act, except for a few, and among the latter is West Bengal.

As the Minister of the State for Urban Development puts it:

At one time when this Act was introduced it was thought to be good for the overall welfare of the society but in reality people are getting around through various subterfuges so the purpose of freeing the land was not served and the same land developers, real estate developers, promoters are ruling the roost. We are still trying to persuade state governments to abolish this act in all the states… It was thought to be preventing people from accumulating a huge amount of land but anyway people are doing it so what is the point in keeping the act…so the center wants it to be abolished.

West Bengal has been cautious so far. But with mounting pressure from the real estate lobby and the Government at the Center, Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee believes that the state should move forward toward the repealing of the ULCRA or at least make some modifications in order to favor unrestricted land acquisition in an urban area.160

4.4.2.2 Rent Control

The Rent Control Act was introduced in India in 1918 in Bombay (now Mumbai) and then followed by Calcutta (now Kolkata) (Dey and Dev, 2006). It was promulgated to protect the tenant from “illegal” eviction and also to safeguard the tenant from being charged an unfair rate of rent (ibid.). The JNNURM (administered by the center) has been pressing for abolition of the act so as to induce a favorable climate for investment in the real estate sector; since housing is a state subject the enactment and implementation of rent control laws are conferred on individual states. The main argument against rent control is how it impedes real estate development. This is because property owners are unable to sell their properties to developers because of the strong protection granted to tenants by the law; thus, immediate revoking of the same is sought under the JNNURM. Moreover, rent control laws are alleged to be the main reason behind “rapid deterioration of the existing

172 housing stock” (ibid.). Thereby, obsolescence and “blight” in many parts of the city are reported to be common, especially in the northern parts of Kolkata (KMC Report, Plan for development of Kolkata Municipal Corporation, 2008). In addition to pressure from the central government, the real estate lobby has been persistently pushing the local government in Kolkata to do away with rent controls. A real estate developer avers:

It is relatively difficult to get land in north Kolkata, mainly because of the many shareholders and litigated land who are in constant dispute with each other over the property… In these parts, rent control is a major barrier…. We mostly do not want to get involved in the legal hassles of disputed land, so in many cases we just stay away from all these problems …we hope that the government will step in and do the needful in changing the rent control laws, that would surely boost the real estate development in the north [Kolkata] (personal interview, February 2010).

It is not just the real estate developers who recognize the barrier posed by the Rent

Control Act; the local state also acknowledges it. According to the KMC report for the vision of the future of the urban renewal process in Kolkata:

The Rent Control Act, which is applicable for these premises, has virtually become a major bottleneck and has turned into a severe deterrent for making further investment in real properties. The act not only arrests increases in supply of newly built-up spaces for letting out but also effectively decrease[s] the rental values-as it prevents just rent escalation against market inflation. Consequently the owners lose interest even for routine maintenance of the tenanted property, causing their obsolescence and ultimate decay... The recent cases of collapse of some such properties corroborate these facts (KMC Report, Plan for Development of Kolkata Municipal Corporation, 2008: 193).

Hence, doing away with rent control is deemed to be a necessary precondition for the successful execution of the urban renewal process.

The state is aware of the constraints imposed by the ULCRA and Rent Control Act, and currently, it is seriously considering amendments to eradicate these bottlenecks so as to intensify real estate development. However, the nature and course of removal are contingent on class struggle.

173 4.4.2.3 Taxation Policy: Property Tax

With regard to property taxes, the KMC has been trying to introduce a new taxation policy, known as the Unit Area Assessment (UAA), which is area-based as opposed to the current rent-based system. The introduction of the new policy has been under way since it was one of the mandatory clauses imposed by ADB when approving the loan for the developmental project undertaken by the KEIP (as described above).161 The KEIP (project) director maintained, “The ADB has maintained that taxation has to be systematic, needs to be reformed” (personal interview, April 2011). The State Assembly approved the UAA system in 2006, but for bureaucratic reasons and opposition from some local councilors, the introduction of the new system has been stalled. The current system is allegedly less transparent and is prone to “subjectivity and ambiguity” (KMC website, 2013).162 According to the new system, the city will be divided into various zones or blocks, which are in turn classified into seven categories, from A to G (category A possessing the highest Base Unit

Area Value [BUAV] and category G the lowest). This classification is based on the current facilities, property values, and other miscellaneous factors associated with the properties in particular locations. Irrespective of geographical locations, slums and squatter settlements are categorized under G. However, the areas where the canal-bank dwellers have been relocated are classified under category E.163 Even though the new system claims to be sensitive toward the needs of the slum dwellers and squatters—by supposedly providing protection to the urban poor—in effect the reality is quite different. Since many of the slums

(including canal-bank dwellers) and squatter settlements are located in the central areas— housing the privileged classes—they might be directly “immunized” from having to pay higher taxes. However, with significant rises in property taxes in and around them, the reproduction of daily living would become expensive. For instance, rising property taxes

174 may lead to a rise in the living costs in that area, not only in terms of high rent and housing costs, but also due to relatively expensive amenities. This may in turn lead to “voluntary” displacement of the urban poor due to unaffordability.

The ADB acts as a custodian of global capital, upholding its interests through various structural adjustments and conditionalities. These mandatory clauses such as Unit Area

Taxation (along with levying compulsory water taxes) are applied apparently as a means to facilitate loan repayments by the local state. However, these have direct and indirect effects on the local conditions. Even though the ADB is not directly involved in privatizing spaces, through its policies it is clearly encouraging conditions that will prove to be beneficial for capital and real estate development. Despite its discourse on poverty reduction, ADB is actually supportive of a market-led economic development in the Global South, such as

India; it is thus largely serving as a conduit of global capital.164

4.4.2.4 The Land Reforms Act of West Bengal—14(z) Amendment

Under the Land Reforms Act of West Bengal, factory lands belonged to the state and were leased out to private companies for industrial purposes. Thus these lands were

“leasehold,” and legally it was not permissible for private companies to sell them. According to the Act, the land when not in use for industrial production would be taken over or

“resumed” by the state. The 14(z) amendment to the original Act was introduced in 2004 to remove the legal hurdles to allowing productive use of locked-out factory lands. According to a state-sponsored study conducted by WEBCON (a parastatal consultancy firm), it was revealed that there are over 41,000 acres of land lying locked up in closed mills spanning five districts in West Bengal. As a result, the state proposed an amendment to the Act, in particular to allow the sale of a portion of these lands for the revival of sick units or for the

175 payment of employees’ arrears in these factories. Further, the plan also laid out the possibilities of allotting part of the land for small-scale industries or other industrial units.

The amendment thus enabled the transformation of “leasehold” land to “freehold” land through open auctions.165 Although the amendment was made primarily for reviving sick units, none of these units were resuscitated. Instead the amendment served the interests of property capital. First, the land was “resumed,” then sold to the owners, mostly at a low price so that they could sell a part of the land for productive industrial use or revival of factory units. But instead of using the money for industrial renewal, the land was resold to big corporate real estate developers at exorbitant prices.166 This is a typical scenario that is commonly found in Kolkata (as well as in other parts in India).167 The state government as well as the local urban bodies are well aware but are completely nonchalant about it.

4.4.3 Discursive Means

4.4.3.1 The Dichotomy between Legal and Illegal

The issue of legality in the context of urban development has gained immense significance lately. Many slum dwellings and squatter settlements that had developed over the years were illegal. Since the canal-bank dwellers do not have legal tenure to the land they occupy, they are seen as “illegal settlers” or “encroachers”. The issue of illegality is being used increasingly as a discursive means masked behind an institutional logic to evict people from their inhabited areas and to commodify land and lives.168

Even though the government had issued legal documents such as proof of residence, voter identity cards or ration cards (which can be used as proof of residence) they are not considered as sufficient to prove a claim to the land that squatters or slum dwellers occupy.

“We were granted voter’s identity card with proof of address. Why were we given that if we

176 are illegal as the government is claiming now?” (personal interview, April 2011). The leader of the Greater Kolkata Canal Dwellers and Slum Eviction Resistance Committee further elaborates:

First of all the terms of legal and illegal that you are raising now, when we first came and settled here that time you did not say anything but rather supported us in settling and even gave us voter’s ID…that you did just for votes. He was then a legal inhabitant of the place. He was even given electricity. You granted license [for work and opening shop such as trade license] to some. How did you give that? How can you use the terms legal and illegal to define us now? You knew that this was illegal from the very beginning (personal interview, March 2011).

The ousted people question the malpractices engaged in by the government in evicting the slum dwellers. “We even have voter’s card with our address printed on it as the canal bank where we resided earlier, but that too is not enough for the government…do we not have any say on these decisions (personal interview, April 2011).

The local state emphasizes how “illegality” is a major concern right now. One of the government officials reflects on the rationale behind the eviction:

All these settlements that you see along the canals are all illegal, people have been settling there without any planning for many years…many other settlements across the city and its outskirts have grown on government-owned land…none of the settlers have any legal rights to be living there…if the government wanted it could have easily evicted them without any explanation, but the government is trying to have a more inclusive planning agenda right now…thus rehabilitation169 of the evicted population in many of the parts are of prime concern (personal interview, June 2011).

Another government official averred how the illegal identity of slum dwellers acts as a deterrent in their daily lives; legalization is not only required but also desirable to the rehabilitated population.

Previously when they used to live in canal-side they did not have a proper address for which they have faced many problems. They could not open a bank account; they were even turned down from government hospitals without treatment, as the patients were not admitted because they did not have proper addresses. But now due to the rehabilitation program taken up by KEIP (funded by ADB) they will be able to do all this and much more (personal interview, May 2011).

177 The legal-illegal divide is used—often successfully—as a means to manufacture consent (and placate any form of possible resistances).

We were told that we are illegally living on the plot of land, which belongs to the government and if we want to avoid any direct confrontation, which will eventually result in expulsion from the land…so they asked to cooperate with the government and to get a legal address…whatever we were getting we should be happy, that’s what we were told and actually we thought we are so poor how can we fight against the government (personal interview, May 2011).

Another displaced and rehabilitated canal-bank dweller added; “It was also a chance to have some legal proof of our stay…we thought that will be good for us, especially for our children” (personal interview, April 2011).

The slum dwellers do emphasize their important role in making their living spaces habitable while questioning the validity of the legal-illegal concepts.

When we came here from our villages, this place was hell, all kinds of garbage were found here including dead corpses of men and animals such as cows…it was not at all habitable…we through our effort made this place livable…today we are happy here…although we still have problems but we do have a life, which we have created for ourselves by toiling for so many years…were we not illegal then, if yes, then why suddenly is there so much hue and cry over our identity over the land that we are living in (personal interview, May 2011).

This also begs the question of citizenship and right to the city, which is well expressed by a professor who is actively engaged in resistance movements against eviction and displacement of the poor from their place of habitation in Kolkata and its outskirts.

Only when you have a legal document you can stay in the city and when you do not you leave the city with no right to stay is completely wrong. No one has the right to put forth the question of legality among the city dwellers. If only you are the owner or renting a particular property you can stay, otherwise you can’t is ridiculous. Anyone can stay in the city… No one occupied the city first, only when some people came and started staying then only the questions of legality came. Then why ask the incoming people or the people who have been staying in the city for long about their right to the place where they either want to stay or have been staying for many years albeit without ‘proper legal documents’. Why raise those questions now when those questions are baseless in the historical light?... I don’t understand the concept of illegal occupants or encroachment and trespassing. Historically when people have moved into the city they have created a space for them within

178 the city and have stayed there. At that time due to different political and socio- economic reasons they were either explicitly or implicitly supported for their occupancy. But now based on the changes in the political and social environment, the questions about their legality and illegality are being raised. They are poorer and weaker; that is why they are being targeted and are being asked such questions. Most importantly, if I could live in my village then why would I leave my home, my family and come to the city? I was compelled to come to the city. So why would that not be considered? When people from Orissa and Bihar or Rajasthan came and started living here, did we say, no this city is only for the Bengalis and not for any other people speaking another language than Bengali? We did not! So the question about legality is just not at all a question. A city can never be of any language, or any class or for any particular community. Therefore, how can you say you are poor so you cannot live in the city, this is unimaginable (personal interview, April 2011)

Illegality is not just politically constructed; the identities of canal/slum dwellers and squatters, too, are redefined and discursively manufactured. In this regard, the politics of difference aids in essentializing and stereotyping slum/canal dwellers by describing them as “illegal,” “encroachers,” “antisocial,” “uncivilized,” “uncultured,” “dirty,” “rowdy,”

“criminal-minded,” “drunkards,” “morally low,”170 which contributes towards a general stigmatization and offers legitimacy to the actions of the government, especially among the middle class and the elites. The negative representation of slum dwellers and squatters often helps in garnering support for eviction drives and at the same time engenders aversion and resistance among the middle class.171 The politics of difference refers to the process of differentiating or “othering” a group of people from one’s own self-ascribed group based on socially constructed attributes. Typically these attributes assume a socially hierarchical form and have moral implications; the “other” is somehow lacking in basic desirable traits—dirty, illegal, immoral, incapable, immature, violent, ignorant, primitive, and so on. The politics of difference, through the structure of dominance and subservience that it creates, thus acts as a discursive condition for (re)producing power relations.172 In this context, sanitization of spaces to create safe and clean cities through various “spatial

179 purification” processes,173 which denote cleansing of spaces by removing undesirable elements, gains importance.174

“Squatters now find themselves subordinated to and subsumed within the regulatory frameworks of formal and legal mechanisms in the city, and therefore the meanings and consequences of being ‘illegal’ have become important in their lives. Such a context creates insecurities and uncertainties among the urban poor” (Datta, 2012: 8). The insecurities of the urban poor are magnified manifold in the event of displacement from their places of residence, thereby destroying not only their homes but also social ties and economic dependence and changing their entire lives.175

4.4.3.2 Consensual Mechanisms: “Moralizing” the Poor

The state has linked up with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for the demolition and subsequent relocation of the canal-bank settlements. A range of strategies has been deployed by the NGOs in close conjunction with KEIP officials to convince canal- bank dwellers to shift to the new locations, as many are not willing to do that. Through group discussions, puppet programs, dramas, and teachings, the residents of the canal banks are persuaded. The involvement of NGOs is considered an integral part of the scheme to manage the social components of the project. One government official who was primarily in charge of the resettlement and rehabilitation aspect averred:

We had to seek the help from several NGOs… Most of the people in KEIP are engineers, since this project had a social component that involved people, so we had to ask for help from NGOs as they were more experienced in dealing with people in a more direct manner. When people have some kind of diseases that are diagnosed medically, similarly we did a social diagnosis, which could not have been done by engineers (personal interview, May 2011).

180 The “social diagnosis” necessitated the institution of a regulatory and disciplinary framework to produce self-forming subjects. This system of disciplinary power seeks to subjugate and elicit consent from the residents of the canal banks for the resettlement project. The purpose of this is to generate a larger consensus and curtail possible antagonism and conflicts for the proposed eviction drives. In this regard, discourses on morality, particularly revolving around the themes of health and hygiene, are fundamental to regulate and control the minds and bodies of the canal-bank squatters.176

If you go to a slum you will notice dirty children roaming around, not going to school, playing with mud and dirt. Of course poverty is an issue but more importantly, lack of awareness about a healthy lifestyle is a major problem that is what we primarily addressed. We explained to them that if they were earning say Rs. 100 ($2.25 approx.) per day, about Rs. 50 goes in medicines and other medical reasons, another Rs. 20-25 goes in alcohol and drugs, if they are well informed about the dos and don’ts in order to avert unwanted expenses then they can invariably save a lot more which will help in bolstering their income.... We also taught them the goodness of leading a hygienic lifestyle, for example, open defecation was a major problem along the canal side due to lack of proper toilets, so we taught them what this can mean for their health…also we told them to eat only after washing their hands, to cut their nails regularly as that can also bring about hosts of diseases if not cleaned properly, to change and wash clothes regularly, to bathe daily, to boil water before drinking and so on, although we did receive some positive responses, those were not great. So basically we tried to imbibe good values of living, as the way they used to live is obnoxious and they should realize the benefits of healthy living over their filthy conditions (personal interview, May 2011).

Along with the paternalistic attitude of the state officials, the above views also reflect the moralizing undertones of the project in securing compliance from the dwellers.

The disciplinary and ideological apparatuses aim at subjugating and instilling normative standards in bodily functions and psychological makeup. Consequently, “docile bodies” are recreated to behave in certain ways by laying down discursive practices and a body of knowledge that distinguish “normal” from “abnormal,” “acceptable” from “objectionable,”

“virtuousness” from “vice” (Foucault, 1991). This “normalizing” disciplinary framework

181 serves as an important instrument for the state in legitimizing its actions and garnering support from the canal-bank dwellers. This is largely evident from the responses of some of the residents who internalized the “goodness” of a hygienic lifestyle that was propagated as achievable only by moving out of the canal-bank areas.177

Further, the setting up of the moralization project acts as a means of producing self- disciplining consumers who are able to make rational choices and move successfully into a more commodified lifestyle.

Resettlement does not just mean you will shift your place of stay but it means a total change in lifestyle. So we ensured that we just did not provide them with a shelter but also provide them the tools to adjust to the changes in the new place. There is a huge difference between staying in slums and staying in high rises, it requires a lot of adjustments in the way of living for the people. For instance, earthen furnaces that were used in the canal-side dwellings are harmful because of the smoke and for cooking they mostly used twigs and branches of trees or cow dung, and the smoke is quite irritating to the eyes and it is also quite harmful for the lungs. So we made them aware how to switch to gas and stove for cooking, which they had to use anyway in the building (where they were proposed to be rehabilitated) is beneficial. We conducted weekly training, monitored and consulted regularly with the people and the NGO members (personal interview, May 2011).

It is not that the conditions of living along the canal banks are not problematic. But the main objective of educating them about the need to overcome and change their unsanitary conditions of living is not to improve their living conditions. The main purpose is to garner support through justifying the decision of relocating the dwellers to a new place and to construct a successful neoliberal consumer. Further, other than moralizing enunciations, these consensual means are also part of the modernizing project, which is based on the idealization of the global city and its associated “modern” lifestyles. What better ways to convince canal-bank dwellers to relocate without putting up much resistance than to make them believe that the project aims at their benefits and is primarily oriented towards their welfare?

182 To this effect, the relocation package also serves as a means to legitimize and secure the vulnerable positions of the “illegal” settlers in the city. “There are many who have tried to resist the resettlement process but we try to persuade them by showing them the advantages of living in flats [apartments]…it is also something to be proud of…we ask, instead of living in these filthy areas is it not better to live in multistoried buildings and that too with a legal status?” (personal interview, May 2011). The opportunity to resettle in the designated areas is thus presented as a ticket to legitimate existence or the “alluring” legal status in the city.

All these discursive techniques serve as instruments to bring about the restructuring processes that are apparently more palliative and acceptable to the canal-bank dwellers.

Even the rhetoric of participatory planning is used effectively to build consensus among the residents of the canal sides, though in reality any degree of involvement in the designing, planning, and implementation of the project is not allowed. The process of generating and eliciting consent was the only time when the NGOs interacted with the canal-side settlers, which was given the name of “participatory development with a bottom-up approach.”

4.5 Impacts: Commodification of Living

The impacts of commodified living are not only notable in the lives of people living on the urban fringes but are also glaringly accentuated in the case of canal-bank dwellers. To reiterate: The removal of the canal-bank dwellers was done as a part of the ADB-funded project for urban infrastructural development. The main officially stated purpose for that was to be able to improve the city drainage and for beautification. As a part of the project,

ADB had underlined the need for resettlement of the evicted dwellers. Therefore, one of the

183 highlights of the project was the relocation and resettlement of the canal-bank dwellers to other parts of, or near, the city. However, the economic impacts of the destruction of their canal-bank living and the creation of a separate settlement in another part are proving to be colossally detrimental for the dwellers, not the least of which is the fact that the rehabilitation and resettlement program was not entirely free, as the “beneficiaries”

(relocated population) had to pay Rs. 5,000 (about $100) as a “token amount” as per the regulations set by JNNURM and ADB. Even though Rs. 5,000 may not be a huge sum, it is nevertheless a substantial amount for daily wage earners.

4.5.1 Destroying the Spaces of Production

The canal banks were not only just spaces of reproduction, where they served as a living place for the inhabitants; they were also intrinsically rooted in people’s lives as a site for production as well. The space itself was a major component of production and exchange as not only was it the site where production of various commodities and services took place, but it also facilitated the selling of those commodities. The dwellers were relocated to multistoried buildings (mostly consisting of four stories) in separate apartments (Figure. 8).

Each floor has eight apartments—or “flats,” as they are colloquially referred to. Each apartment consists of one room. The size of the room is about 16 feet by 10 feet. There is a balcony 6 feet by 3 feet, which is also supposed to serve as a kitchen. The toilet is about 4 feet by 5 feet. The structure of the building as opposed to the flat surface of the canal banks is not conducive to establishing a workshop. Further, commercial activities and production activities are not permissible within the premises of the resettled area, especially in the upper stories. In addition to this, even in the case of the apartments located on the ground

184 floor, the size of the room of each apartment makes it nearly impossible to live and work because of the miniscule size of the same:

I used to have a workshop for furniture. I, along with two of my sons and two helpers, were engaged in making small and sometimes large wooden furniture…but after coming here I am unable to do any such work so practically I am jobless right now…my sons are trying to find some jobs wherever they can and this is how we are trying to survive (personal interview, April 2011).

Figure 8. One of the resettlement areas for the canal-bank dwellers

The following is noted by a renowned professor and a political activist engaged with slum and canal-bank movements:

A lot of unfinished and finished products are made in these areas [slums]…for example, you will find many boxes are spread across footpaths [sidewalks] and the streets for drying, boxes of different sizes used for packing garments and so on. Now suppose you resettle them in buildings, where will those people dry their boxes that they make? These people who have been into making boxes for probably generations do not know what else to do, they have not developed any other skill sets… That person does not just stay in busti [slum], he also needs the

185 footpath [side walk] to dry those boxes which he is making for a livelihood. If I just say ok let us go and give you a place does not solve any problem, who will look into the rest of the matter? Say for example, the kite makers, they need a room for making the kites and another place to dry them, to make threads, or to make glue, all these things need space (personal interview, April 2011).

The sale of the goods so produced is also important, and this involves a nexus of people, which is place-specific (Cox and Mair, 1988). The relocation of the canal dwellers has resulted in the destruction of the socioeconomic ties that made the sale of their products possible:178

I had my customers in the locality of the earlier place…even the ‘thekedar’ (contractors)—who would bring work for us and to whom we also supplied a part of the finished products—used to be located near the canals, so they used to bring in materials [to make jute-brushes for cleaning purposes] to us and we used to make those at our homes and then supply those back to them (contractors)…with the relocation my ‘thekedar’ does not want to come here as it is too far away from our original location (personal interview, May 2011).

The distance to where the canal-bank dwellers have been moved is an important consideration. According to the guidelines provided by the ADB, the move should have taken place within two and a half kilometers from the original area. However, as averred in the interviews with state officials, “due to lack of space near the canal areas” (read “lack of inexpensive spaces for resettlement”), they were moved to areas at least three to six kilometers away. In some cases, the canal-side dwellers have complained that the move was about eight to ten kilometers from their original settlement area. This has negatively impacted the spatial base of their socioeconomic pursuits. Many of the male residents of the canal banks were rickshaw pullers,179 and the women were mostly employed as domestic helps. Relocation meant loss of work.

I used to work at 6 houses before I came here. But I had to leave all my work as I shifted here which was far from where I used to live. I have just started working at a new place where I work for about one and a half hours and then there is the travelling time as well. So my income itself has gone down tremendously. Is it possible for my husband who is a rickshaw puller to maintain a family of 10

186 people? Earlier my work was 10 minutes by walking but due to health reasons and the distance I could not continue to work (personal interview, April 2011).

Rickshaw pulling is done in a specific area. There are particular spots that a rickshaw puller is associated with, where he180 has to pay a monthly fee and reserve the spot by buying it for a fixed amount. Unions of rickshaw pullers that are in turn affiliated with some political party regulate these spots.181 The organizations of rickshaw pullers are locally dependent, thus making their work place-bound. Changes in the places of work are problematic and strongly discouraged, which makes relocation difficult. The spot in a local rickshaw stand also needs to be reserved through a series of contacts and using financial means (e.g., usually it entails purchasing a spot at the rickshaw stand).182

I was working near the Kalikapur area as a rickshaw-puller…I have been there for the last fifteen years…I had to pay Rs. 5000 when I bought the spot there and every month I had to pay a fee to the union… because of the relocation I am unable to work there as it is very far from this place…and I will have to buy a new spot near to this place but that is also not possible for the remoteness of this place (personal interview, May 2011).

Shifting location not only implies buying a fresh spot in the newer areas but also raises the issue of the social contacts that are necessary to get a rightful position in the relocated area. Further, a greater part of the population catered to the local market as vendors of vegetables or fish. Fixing a place in the local market is also mediated through contractors based on social ties, which are in turn rooted in specific places. The relocation has destroyed all such ties, which were formed through years of living, thereby jeopardizing the lives of the people involved.

Moreover, the places that they have been relocated to are quite remote: outside the core city region and with very little transportation, making the areas largely inaccessible to say the least (Figure. 9). The resettled locations are sparsely populated with limited residential, commercial, and other land uses. Accordingly, the possibilities of forging new

187 ties and establishing a fresh life for the relocated people are dismal, especially given the undesirability of those areas for habitation. Efficient and adequate means of transportation are necessary for people to eke out a living either in their original settlement area near the canals or in new areas with economic and social opportunities. However, the areas where the canal-bank dwellers have been shifted to hold little promise for their betterment even in the near future, let alone at the present moment. The result is an extreme form of marginalization, making the lives of the former canal side dwellers increasingly insecure.

Figure 9. A small footbridge connecting a resettlement area with a paved road

188 4.5.2 Destroying the Spaces of Reproduction: Commodified Living and Social Costs—“It’s Like Living in an Island”

Despite the fact that the canal banks were not ideal locations for living, relocation has resulted in a deterioration of conditions of living and working. On the one hand, the avenues of income for the canal-side inhabitants are being dismantled; simultaneously their existences are being commodified. Remoteness of the places implies greater transportation costs even to avail oneself of basic amenities, such as buying groceries in the market, fetching drinking water, going to schools for children, to go to places of work, and so on:

Previously where we lived we had to walk for about 15-20 minutes to get drinking water, but at least we could get drinking water. Is it possible to go to Anandapur, which is over one hour by walking to get drinking water? Can my daughter-in-law go there leaving her young kids at home or can I go walking for such long distances to get drinking water [referring to her inability to do because of poor health and age factor]? (personal interview, April 2011).

Another evicted canal-bank dweller adds:

Is it possible for people like us to go to Ruby (about an hour by walking) for groceries? [Earlier] there were lots of shops and stalls like tea stalls, grocery shops, even vegetable and fish vending were common [in the settlement area or nearby]. We rarely had go to a market to buy vegetables or fish, most of the times we got those from the vendors…cycle repairing shops, saree shops, tailoring shops and what not. But here we have nothing…it is like living in an island with no proper connection with the outside world (personal interview, April 2011).

Apart from transportation costs, now there are additional costs that the canal-bank dwellers have to bear that they did not have to earlier. Living in high rises does not allow them to use wood as fuel, which is the most common medium of cooking. Kerosene or an

LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) connection is mandatory. This is definitely taxing on their limited means. Further, water was abundantly used from the canals. Even though it was not clean or potable and imbued with various pollutants, it served basic purposes without

189 having to pay for it. At present, in the relocated buildings, there are overhead tanks on the terrace that need to be operated through a common fund and electricity charges that have to be paid collectively.183 This water is not potable but is generally used for washing and household cleaning purposes. The canal water on the other hand, however unsuitable for drinking purposes, could be used to satisfy some needs and was a commonly held and used resource. Moreover, additional charges are levied on water, which is a compelling burden on the limited resources of the poor working class. In some areas, even pumps are not yet operable. As the overhead tanks are filled using electronic pumps, the operability of the pumps is crucial for basic water supply to these buildings. For them the hardships have multiplied. And in some others, occupants are not willing to pay extra for water pumps and thus are not using those.

Earlier we could use the water of nearby tube wells, or ponds and most importantly we could use the canal water. But in absence of any such facilities nearby, people are having a lot of problems regarding water. Now just think for the people who would collect some firewood, and get some water in the nearby pond or tube well for their daily activities like cooking etc. how on earth will we survive without the basic things (personal interview, April 2011).

The problem of drinking water is particularly problematic, as there are absolutely no facilities for it.184 During my fieldwork, I had noticed a few tube wells in the area, although those were very few compared to the number of people who are supposed to depend on them. When inquired further about drinking water, many grumbled that the water from the tube wells was not fit for drinking, as they were insufficiently deep.

Tube well water is not worth drinking…it is poisonous water…but still we are having it out of compulsion. If you look at the rice that we make using this water, you will see how the rice turns reddish because of the high level of contaminants in the water. Everywhere there is some kind of drinking water facilities in the bigger apartment complexes but in our place the government is not doing anything… People are falling sick by drinking this water [from the shallow tube well]…all kinds of stomach problems and other diseases are happening. We cannot afford to be so careless with our children … the doctor has asked my grandchildren

190 to be only given bottled water because of the low quality of drinking water here. What to do we are trying to give bottled water as much as possible. But those are so expensive… a one liter of bottle costs Rs. 10-12185… is it possible for people like us to continue to buy bottled water on a daily basis? (personal interview, April 2011).

The canal dwellers mostly lived in joint families with various earning members pooling their income, which helped in their survival. But since the relocation was granted to each family, the size of the apartment itself is an impediment toward continuing with earlier living arrangements (Figure. 10). This has resulted in the break up of families, and that has put an additional burden on their overall family income, as pooling resources on the former scale is not possible anymore.

My son had to move out with her wife and two children because it became impossible for all of us staying together in such a small room186…earlier the place that we stayed was larger with two separate rooms, and a small kitchen…we always wanted to live together, who would want their son to move out…this has not only led to splitting up of our families but it is affecting us financially…they are unable to manage as they have to pay high rents to where they moved in and we are unable to afford too, as we did not have much income earlier and with our health failing we were increasingly dependent on our sons and they are unable to pay for our expenses anymore (personal interview, April 2011).

Apart from the sociological impacts of family breakup, the financial crunch is greatly impinging on the poor families. The intensification of their commodified existence is further noticed in other areas of daily living. The following quote187 with my additional notes in parentheses exemplifies the extra costs incurred by the families due to the relocation:

[Now] there is a common septic tank for one building which gets filled up very quickly as 32 families are using it. So it needs to be cleaned frequently, but the KMC [Kolkata Municipal Corporation] will not take the responsibility; just imagine the amount of problems for the residents. [The cleaning has to be arranged by the relocated canal dwellers by generating their own money. Earlier the canals largely served this purpose as those were also used for defecation purposes]. There are no lights in the common spaces of the buildings and no lights in the streets, which are responsibilities of KMC, rather electricity from the buildings are used to light the streets, through the endeavors of the residents and not the government. This electricity is distributed by CESC [Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation formerly it was state-owned but now it has been privatized], it is obviously charging us money

191 for that, they would not do any charity work as they seek profit (personal interview, March 2011).

So for the people who can barely survive, electricity bills are imposed on them, which is aggravating their conditions even further.

Figure 10. An apartment (room) in the resettlement area

With regard to other related social costs, the remoteness of the area has also adversely affected the educational opportunities of children, as many cannot afford to travel long distances from their new location to their schools in the original settlement area. The problem is heightened by the fact the newer locations do not have any school188 that the children can go to.

My younger son used to go to school…he has studied till grade 8…after the exam he could not continue with his studies so he has recently joined work. [Why so?] First

192 of all this place is very far from any school, so it was not possible for him to travel regularly to school from here. Secondly, the economic condition of our family has suffered a lot after moving here so we needed additional financial support (personal interview, April 2011).

This has threatened their perceived future prospects. Many (especially women) believe that with the better education of their children, they have higher chances of improving their economic condition in the future. The relocated areas also lack any hospitals or medical centers within five kilometers. In one case, a state official affirmed that there is a hospital near one of the resettlement sites, but since it is an upscale private hospital, the expenses incurred there are beyond the reach of the canal-bank dwellers, who are primarily daily wage earners. One of the respondents lamented, saying her neighbor’s daughter-in-law had to deliver a baby on the way to the municipal hospital a few days back, as it was very far from their current (relocated) place.

Previously, a domain of contestation, collaboration, and negotiation with the civic authorities and privileged classes existed, through which the “squatters”, such as the canal- bank dwellers, were able to manage their daily lives. Some of the claims that they made regarding civic rights were de jure, using the advantage of their dominating role in the electoral process because of the sheer size of the population. For instance, they are issued voting cards with the addresses on them that recognize their role in the political-democratic process (as mentioned earlier in this chapter). Some claims, however, were de facto in nature. Particularly, with respect to the services provided to urban citizens, though those may be intended for the tax-paying ones, there are not any specific legal restrictions imposed on others. For instance, the canal-bank dwellers used to get drinking water from

Garden Reach Water Works, which supplies water to various parts of the city, generally targeting the middle and elite classes. However, the water was also fetched for drinking by

193 the dwellers living in squatter settlements along the canals through various pipelines, accessed through taps at different points in the city.189 Another instance, in terms of arranging electricity, many of these settlements had to arrange that “illegally” out of compulsions due to their limited material means and lack of political clout. In this regard, various extralegal strategies, like bribery, needed to be organized or negotiated with multiple state functionaries.190

With relocation and resettlement, however, the channels for making these claims on civic provision were greatly curtailed. This is a major price that the canal-bank dwellers had to pay for their valuable but elusive “legal” status in the city. The increased commodification of their livelihoods is evident in their current ordeal. For daily wage earners, a rise in expenses with a simultaneous reduction in the avenues for gaining income can wreak havoc on their limited resources. This exclusionary and extremely top-down planning process is proving to be exceedingly detrimental for the canal-bank dwellers, leading to deep socioeconomic marginalization and heightened insecurity.

For a city—primarily based on capitalist relations—to survive, continuous accumulation is necessary. Hence workers with semiskilled and “unskilled” jobs, belonging to the poor working class, cannot be completely done away with. Rather, they hold an essential place in the reproduction and growth of the urban area. The logic of the rehabilitation and resettlement program for the canal-bank dwellers stems from the inherent urge to accumulate but without having them occupy valuable land with real estate potential. Also, discriminatory policies and practices entrenched in the neoliberal capitalist developmental model make the sight of poor working classes undesirable (due to the images of the aestheticized global city) but make their presence and their labor essential.

Further, under democracy the state needs to reproduce its legitimacy constantly. In the

194 current context, this is attempted through various reformist measures for the continuation of accumulation without cardinal challenges and disruptions to the same.

4.6 Responses of the Poor Working Class: Canal-Bank Dwellers

Urban restructuring processes are not unilateral. The politics from above is met with resistance from below. The earlier sections dealt mainly with the neoliberal onslaught, particularly on the urban poor. The following section focuses on the diverse responses of the dispossessed and displaced population, particularly focusing on the canal-bank and slum dwellers.

There is an artificial split between the place of work and the place of residence. Even though these spheres are deeply interrelated, they appear to be independent under capitalism, making the struggle for labor to control the social conditions of its existence split into two seemingly independent struggles (Harvey, 1976). In the case of the canal-bank eviction, the separation of the site of production and reproduction is partly obscured due to its geographical coevality, as the spaces of work and living overlap in most cases. That contributes largely to shaping the resistance movements, making them sometimes stronger and more intense.

The distinctions between overt and covert responses are quite apparent. However, covert means of responding can be judged as individualistic, atomistic, self-indulgent, and opportunistic, which obscures the political element entrenched in those actions. Yet to expect that daily wage earners will engage in well-coordinated and structured resistances that are principled and self-sacrificing is unrealistic and utopian. The daily struggle to live is far more fundamental than any consciousness of the underlying political element that

195 would evoke organized resistance. Therefore, the subtle ways of resistance are also important due to their intent and consequences (even though those might not be consciously articulated). However, in intention and consequences, they are not targeted toward the hegemonic power structures. Instead, the main purpose is to cope with the existing conditions, which in fact in most cases in lieu of subverting the dominating system may largely support the status quo.

4.6.1 Coping Mechanisms

Coping mechanisms, in the current context, are subtle ways of adapting to the changes in the resettlement area. Although these mechanisms are essentially purposive in nature, they are often not strategically adopted or practiced by the canal-bank dwellers, to defy the dominating regime. These mechanisms emanate partly out of compulsion or lack of plausible alternatives and partly out of free will. The underlying intention is to accept and make necessary compromises so that they get acclimatized to the new environment in order to make the best of the situation for their basic survival. For (daily) wage earners, the struggle to live continues on a daily basis. In the present case, even though the majority is extremely unhappy and dissatisfied with their conditions after the resettlement, they have to trudge along for their basic existence. These coping mechanisms thus provide a means to combat the hardships with a sense of tolerance and without challenging the dominating system.

Due to the increasing economic problems after the relocation, many children of the canal-bank dwellers had to discontinue their education in order to provide financial support to their respective families.191 In this regard, the employment of children has helped in cushioning the financial hardships of the relocated families to a certain extent:

196 My son was in his ninth standard, was supposed to sit for his board examination next year…but he had to drop out of school...he helps me with vegetable vending now…I need his help because I have to commute to long distances to bring in the vegetables everyday from Ballygunge [referring to a large market in South Kolkata] and then I have to travel to the local market where we used to live to sell those…all this I cannot do any longer without anyone’s help (personal interview, April 2011).

Another respondent adds:

My son was in his second year of college but he could not continue…we had a small store selling CDs, DVDs and cassettes that needed to be taken care of…my health is failing due to long distance travel everyday either by foot or cycle…I cannot do that everyday, so my soon took over (personal interview, April 2011).

As noted above, the size of the room that constitutes the apartment is often an impediment for families to stay together. Living separately is an unpleasant solution for many families. Others who are unable to move out due to various constraints—such as financial dependence, emotional bonding, and so on—are finding staying together in a “tiny room with adult children and married children embarrassing and shameful.” Therefore many make arrangements to sleep in their neighboring “flats” if they have a lesser number of people to live in their room:192 “One of my sons and another daughter sometimes go in the next door to sleep…we are good friends so they allow that…anyway, their son along with their children is living separately, so they are only two people so they allow that” (personal interview, May 2011).

The instrument of infusing discipline to aid and abet increased commodification was used by the state in order to avoid resistance, elicit consent, and to construct able consumers. This is often internalized and assimilated by the resettled population in order to cope with their current living arrangements. Particularly, the impressionable younger generation has imbibed values and norms that are helping them adapt to the changes. For instance:

197 When I came here I really liked it…although my parents have been complaining about numerous things, which I think is definitely a problem…but it is true that our living along the canals were so unhygienic…in fact, now we live in flats…these are not so nice as the ones where my mother used to work, but is much better [compared] to what we were in…now if anyone asks me where I live, I can say in flats, not along canals…that was filthy (personal interview, May 2011).

To optimize the space for living, many have taken informal steps to acquire a preferred apartment within the resettlement site. The first-floor apartments are the most coveted ones. But due to restrictions on who could choose what type of apartment, as the allotment of those were done through a lottery, the relocatees have to resort to unscrupulous ways of negotiating with state functionaries. Through the use of contacts and linkages as well as sometimes through bribery, the cooperation and assistance of state officials is sought.193 Many actually have bribed officials to give them the first floor apartments:

We were lucky to get the first floor apartment…my husband knew Sir [state official] and he requested him to allot the first floor as we had six members in the family for which we needed additional space194…the kitchen [balcony] that extends outside that serves as extra space…it can also be used for storing some other supplies such as cooking utensils and bathroom supplies and other things…it is also much easier to carry water from the nearby tube wells to here than carry it to the fourth floor…I do feel bad for others who do not have this advantage (personal interview, April 2011).

4.6.2 Resistances

4.6.2.1 Covert Practices

Some of the coping mechanisms (discussed above) are intrinsically linked with covert forms of resistance. In effect, the covert strategies employed by the relocated settlers may often aid in coping with their present condition and in overcoming (temporarily) hardships.

However, I have drawn the distinction between coping and covert practices amounting to resistance on the basis of the underlying intent and the potential impact of those actions.

198 Related to the above point of coping mechanisms, the preference for first-floor apartments is not only to optimize the available space but also to maximize economic possibilities. The balconies for some of the first-floor apartments are being used for setting up small stalls selling items for daily consumption—such as bread, biscuits, matchboxes, cigarettes, and so on. These stalls are actually illegal since by law economic activities within the premises of the resettlement area are not allowed. However, this law is defied consciously: “I know that this is not allowed here…and I am going against the law by doing so, but what other options do we have” (personal interview, April 2011). These small shops serve the relocated canal-bank dwellers only. This saves the residents from making frequent trips to far-off places to meet their daily demands. It also aids the owners economically as it provides them with some additional income. Since these arrangements are done without legal approval, the shopkeepers have to negotiate with the state officials who occasionally come to visit these areas.

Further, some relocated residents have rented out their allotted “flats” to non- eligible people, and they have moved to some other place, living as squatters in those areas yet untouched by eviction drives.

Here many have rented out their flats to people who did not belong to our ‘khalpar busti’ [canal-side settlement]…they know what they are doing is illegal—the ones who have rented it and the ones that are staying there, both are aware of that…as we have not been given possession of these places and even if we want to we cannot sell or rent or even make changes in the rooms as we would like to…so obviously renting these flats is illegal…the sir [state official] that comes here to visit us know of them as we have informed him but he does not do anything…there must be some arrangements made by the original resident or the current resident with him (personal interview, May 2011).

The Indian state functions along multiple “modes of being” (Das, 2007:162), so for many people, “the intermittent nature of government control, the illegibility of the law, and

199 the negotiations around the thin lines between the legal and the illegal are part of [everyday life]” (Anjaria, 2011:67). The negotiations carried on with some of the state functionaries at the lower level are a means of challenging the restrictions imposed by the “actual state”

(referring to the higher authorities [read government]), which are inhuman and unsympathetic toward the needs of the poor and thus are deemed as not worth complying with and so fit to be defied. The fear of punishment due to their “illegal actions” compels them to resort to implicit means, which are carried out clandestinely. Yet those actions are undertaken with the conscious knowledge of their potentially subversive nature and the possible threat to the system.

4.6.2.2 Overt Protests

Overt forms of resistance by workers are explicit oppositional practices. These are not carried out stealthily and are definite acts of dissidence that directly challenge the dominating power of the system and actions of higher (state) authorities. These actions can be collective (which mostly are) or individualistic. Collective actions can also take the form of resistance movements if those are structured with consciousness of the intention and implications. In this regard, I agree with Nilsen and Cox’s definition of social movements “as collective projects developed and pursued by subaltern groups, organizing a range of locally-generated skilled activities around a rationality that seeks to either challenge the constraints that a dominant structure of needs and capacities imposes upon the development of new needs and capacities, or to defend aspects of an existing, negotiated structure which accommodate their specific needs and capacities” (2013: 73).

The individual acts of opposition are evident in the way many people disregard government orders and return to their original settlement area near the canal. Even though

200 they may have voiced their displeasure verbally and through petitions at their planned relocation, yet without much success, they have resorted to “occupancy urbanism”

(Benjamin, 2008), in most cases moving back to their original locations. This indeed was not overtly done at the outset, with many covertly sneaking out. But with time and arrangements with the local state, the practice gradually became legitimized through collective support of the fellow canal-bank dwellers in the relocated area.

Moreover, the resettlement process happened over a lengthy period of time and was not completed at one go. It, therefore, served as a lesson for the ones who were supposed to be shifted to the relocated sites in the future. After learning of the experiences of their neighbors and fellow residents, many refused to move to these resettlement sites. Even though these protests were met with brute force by the state with the help of the police and some eventually crushed, they nevertheless challenged the state and its appurtenances.

Thus, on a more formal note, the canal-bank dwellers have organized a collective body called “Brihottoro Kolkata Khalpar Busti Uchhed Committee” (Greater Kolkata Canal

Dwellers and Slum Eviction Resistance Committee) to give a structured platform to present their demands and problems to the concerned authorities. One of the major objectives of the committee is to provide proper rehabilitation to the canal-bank dwellers. As the secretary of the committee questioned, “Is this the rehabilitation that we were promised or is this what we deserve?” (personal interview, February 2011). He further added that the committee has made many petitions appealing to the local urban bodies overseeing the resettlement and rehabilitation programs concerning the canal dwellers (KMA and KEIP).

The main demands in the petitions for the already-relocated population are for better, affordable, and relatively spacious housing structures, as the ones they have been shifted to are “falling apart”:

201 These buildings are made with the cheapest materials available in the market…it has been only 2 years that we have been shifted here and you can already notice cracks and crevices in the walls and the floors…paints are chipping off everywhere, there are damp patches in the rooms, potholes in the streets within the premises of the area. The rooms that we have been given to live, are like hen-houses…how can anyone live there…just because we were living along the canals, does it mean we do not deserve to have dignified lives...we also demand proper drinking water, adequate street lighting…cleaning of the safety tanks and other basic provisions which we are entitled to and that too without the additional costs that have been imposed on us after the relocation (personal interview, April 2011).

The protests are not just for the ones who have already been evicted from the canal banks but also for future evictees:

We do not want to be removed to far-off places as has been the case with the ones who have already been relocated…we are demanding either give us rehabilitation in the areas where we have been staying for more than four decades and have all our social and economic ties rooted in there or give us land as was initially proposed195 and we can build our own homes there according to our needs. Or give us compensation in cash…we are the people for whom the project [rehabilitation and resettlement] had been arranged for, it was for our benefit…the money that the ADB had granted to the government was possible using our photo ID and in the name of doing good for us…in our names this money had be granted…so even if it is Rs 10 we want that money as the money which was for us is our money to some extent, especially because rehabilitation program planned by the government for our welfare is a disaster…we have even filed a case against the authorities demanding monetary compensation (personal interview, February 2011).

During my fieldwork, I have noted that the attitude of the majority of the canal-bank dwellers is rebellious. The ones who are threatened with eviction have strongly asserted that if needed, they will put up a fight. They will not leave the place for some remote area that the government has assigned to them. The rehabilitated population, on the other hand, is furious over the problems that they are facing. It was very clear when I went in there to talk to them and they mistook me as a government employee. Their initial responses were steeped in indignation. Later they were tremendously vocal about their problems and requested me to convey their demands and grievances to the concerned authorities. Given that they are facing enormous privations despite the tall promises made to them before the

202 relocation—about better housing, dignified living, and the legal status of their citizenry— they are compelled to resort to overt resistance, particularly when faced with desperate situations.

In the case of explicit forms of resistance in an organized way, sit-in demonstrations, protest marches, rallies with slogans are used as means to fight against the brutal evictions.

More structured and vociferous collective actions have been noted in various cases of forcible evictions of canal-bank dwellers and slum dwellers. The canal-bank dwellers in some of the eviction/relocation drives had put up overt resistance, fighting against the police atrocities. One such violent protest occurred in Nonadanga. The police—on the orders of the state government—bulldozed, burnt, and evicted the “illegal” settlements occupying land near the resettlement area, where canal-bank dwellers under the ADB- funded KEIP project have been relocated. Originally this land (near the Nonadanga canal) had been granted by the Land Revenue Department to KEIP for rehabilitation purposes, but squatters from various parts of the city and nearby districts occupied it. The settlements that were removed in the drive comprised the canal bank dwellers who even after resettlement (by KEIP) had not been able to cope with the changes in their lifestyles in the high rises, so some of them had settled along the canal near Nonadanga. This area also had settlers from the canal banks where evictions had led to displacement of people without any relocation (as not everyone along the canal-banks were provided with resettlement under the KEIP project). Further, the Nonadanga squatter settlements also included recent occupants who were the victims of natural disasters and thus had migrated from nearby districts.196

However, the development of multispecialty hospitals—such as Fortis and Desun— close to the relocation site in Nonadanga (the hospitals are still about an hour by walking

203 from the Nonadanga resettlement area) has made the land susceptible to speculation. The land surrounding these specialized private hospitals catering to the privileged classes is now supposed to be developed for plush hotels and residential complexes, for which evacuating the land of the settlements is necessary. The area is becoming increasingly valuable for speculators and real estate developers; the consequence is seen in the aggressive eviction of the people living on that land “illegally.” The protests initially involved demonstrations and slogan-marching and petitions to the concerned authorities to consider their case. This, however, did not yield any fruitful result, and the police cruelly mauled those settlements on March 30, 2012. However, even after the demolition, the residents refused to leave the area and instead protested by putting up makeshift shelters and ran a community kitchen to sustain their strong protests. A fast-to-death by some committee members of “Uchched Pratirodh Committee” (Eviction Resistance Committee) and some forms of agitations every day were organized and put up against the state authorities and their attendant forces. This was, however, met with violent attempts to crush the opposition through “lathi” charges (baton charges) and arrests of a number of protestors, including a section of the activist group.

4.7 Conclusion

The chapter sought to demonstrate the socio-spatial forms that restructuring practices are creating in Kolkata. It unpacked the capitalist logic of the urban-space- remaking process aimed at the intensification of the accumulation process by opening up newer avenues of surplus generation and redistribution. I argued that increasing territorial competition exercises pressure on the city of Kolkata to engage in entrepreneurial activities

204 so as to pin down transient capital. Therefore, the state is involved in creating favorable conditions for the realization of capital’s interests. I demonstrated that international financial institutions upholding the interests of transnational capital are increasingly gaining importance in remaking urban spaces. To bring about the necessary urban transformations, the state resorts to coercive, institutional, and discursive means. The local state, however, is deeply embedded within a global-local matrix and its functions and attendant geographies are thus highly influenced by the complex interaction of global dynamics at the local levels. I contend that restructuring is not aimed at the betterment of the poor majority as often gloriously portrayed in the mainstream arena. I asserted that the impacts on the poor working class are socio-spatially marginalizing, taking the form of contrasting urban landscapes. However, the actually existing geographies are etched through the continuous struggle that the urban subalterns put up against the power structures to reclaim their rights to the city.

Following the liberalization of the Indian economy, Kolkata has been undergoing radical socio-spatial transformations through various restructuring and redevelopment processes. The hitherto “urban commons” (land and canal water) are being increasingly enclosed in terms of restricting access and curtailing occupancy and usage rights of the poor working class through eviction drives. The government-owned land, which served as “urban commons,” and was an essential means of living and reproduction for canal-bank dwellers, is being redefined. These areas are becoming (semi) privatized. There are no changes in ownership or statutory limitations, but effectively those spaces are becoming out-of-bounds for the reproduction of the poor. Further, the land of closed manufacturing plants is undergoing real estate development in the form of shopping malls, luxury resorts, and gated communities, thus encouraging conspicuous consumption and catering to the supposedly

205 growing “new Indian middle class” and elites. The increasing tendency toward fragmentation of urban spaces in Kolkata is evident in the contradictory spatial enclaves in which extreme opulence is juxtaposed with severely poor and squalid zones.

The land is being repossessed by the state in the name of infrastructural upgrading, environmental improvement, aestheticization projects, and revival of sick factory units.

However, those “reclaimed” lands are then rechanneled to serve the interests of

(transnational and domestic) capital. Indeed, the state is actively involved in undertaking entrepreneurial activities for creating and reproducing the conditions favorable for generating and reorganizing surplus values. The clearance of squatters helps in boosting the real estate value of the adjacent areas, thereby facilitating speculative and rent-seeking activities. Even construction work that is integral to real estate development is contributing immensely in creating surplus values. The shopping malls that mostly harbor retail stores of domestic and international capitalists facilitate the global reorganization of surpluses.

Additionally, investments in urban land speculation and real estate development are materialized through active collaborations and partnerships with the state and capital in the form of various public-private partnership ventures. Also, the overriding influence of international financial institutions—the custodians of transnational capital—is discernible in the urban restructuring process in Kolkata. Direct aid from the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank (JNNURM), and other global financial institutions is funding the projects that claim to be supporting urban development at the local level. In this regard, these financial institutions are directly dictating the terms of planning, and capital is also influencing the restructuring process, fitting their needs and conveniences. This has necessitated important changes in the legal and institutional framework.

206 The instrument used for shaping the current urban-space remaking in Kolkata is direct coercion, which often amounts to physical force and violent tactics, institutional rearrangements, and discursive means. The state has to resort to aggressive techniques for mass evictions, as the poor in most cases are adamant at not wishing to leave their working and living spaces. The institutional and regulatory framework facilitates the implementation and workings of urban restructuring and redevelopment processes. With regard to this, substantial changes are being proposed and adopted to open up greater possibilities of urban-space remaking. Discourses of illegality are constructed to act as a means to manufacture consent and curb any form of resistance. The legal-illegal divide is intensified through the politics of difference as it aids in essentializing slum/canal dwellers by tagging them as “encroachers” or “antisocial,” thus denoting undesirability. The general stigmatization helps legitimize the state’s actions against the “illegal squatters,” especially among the privileged classes. In this regard, the institution of a disciplinary framework by moralizing the poor canal dwellers complements the discursive project. This typically pertains to values of health and hygiene that are used to regulate the minds and bodies of the canal-bank dwellers. The moralization process not only serves to curtail antagonisms by generating consensus among the poor; it also helps in producing self-disciplining consumers in the wake of a greater commodified lifestyle for the relocated canal-bank dwellers.

The resettlement and rehabilitation program that is claimed to be beneficial for the ousted canal-bank dwellers is principally proving far more detrimental. Due to relocation, their spaces of production and living, along with the social networks that had formed over the years, have been completely destroyed. The evictees are finding it difficult to adjust to the new lives imposed on them. It has resulted in greater commodification of their living,

207 which is obviously burdensome, given that all are daily wageworkers living on meager means. Further, the resettlement areas are on the peripheral parts of the city, which are far removed from the original location, implying a disavowal of basic, dignified living for the poor. Discriminatory policies and practices entrenched in the neoliberal capitalist developmental model make the sight and presence of the poor working classes undesirable in the core city parts (due to prospective real estate development and the images of the aestheticized global city) but make their existence somewhere essential for the supply of cheap labor.

The urban subalterns, however, are actively involved in struggling against the neoliberal onslaught on their lives. The urban restructuring processes do not evolve in a social vacuum; the disenfranchised shape these processes and their outcomes. The actually existing urban geographies in the Greater Kolkata area are contingent on class contestation.

The poor working class responds to the machinations of capital and its allies—the state and its appurtenances—overtly and covertly. The covert means can apparently be atomistic and self-indulgent in nature, which might obscure the ingrained political element. For wage earners, these individualistic and unstructured means of opposition are far more common due to the necessity of engaging in the struggle for existence. In this regard, various survival strategies—which are different from covert mechanisms of resistance, based on the intent and consequences of those—provide the means to combat hardships and cope with their current situations.

With the increasing displacement and dispossession of the slum or canal-bank dwellers and residents of squatter settlements, it can be said arguably that there are distinct revanchist undertones in the process of spatial changes in Kolkata. The judicial system, along with physical force, has been actively used by the state with the support of private

208 developers and other capitalists for their own vested interests. This has led to the upholding of rights and claims of the middle class and elites in reshaping the urban landscape and at the same time denying the basic rights of the urban poor to their living and work spaces in

Kolkata and other cities in India (Ghertner, 2008; Gooptu, 2011). Moreover, the clearance of the poor into enclaves far removed from the central parts of the city, thus giving rise to

“interdictory spaces” (Flusty, 1994), may be symptomatic of revanchist politics. However, urban revanchism in the sense of “revenge” of the elites or the middle class on the urban poor by adopting a “zero tolerance” attitude—as experienced in New York (Smith, 1996)— is not exactly observed in Kolkata.

Urban-space (re)making is not just about production of spaces following capital’s logic. Capital’s need to accumulate has to be backed by the realization of the surplus values, either created or seized; therefore the sphere of circulation is of paramount importance.

The current literature often does not account for the importance of this aspect, especially in relation to the production sphere. In this regard, the “new Indian middle class” is identified as the driver of the new urban development in India. In the next chapter I intend to analyze the nature and role of the middle class in shaping the new urban development and its attendant politics.

209 Notes

135 The process should not be conceived as something occurring in a site; rather it creates and recreates the site (the city) itself, thereby influencing its nature, functions and its relations to other socio-spatial units. “The urban is not a fixed arena or generic site in which restructuring processes occur; it is, rather, itself continuously reconstituted in and through such processes. To speak of urban restructuring, therefore, is to reference a process in which the very nature of cities—as sites of production, consumption, settlement, regulation and contestation—is reorganized and transformed: the ‘city-ness’ of those spatial units we have come to label ‘cities’ is thus never pre-given, but is continually remade through the process of restructuring” (Brenner et al. 2009:36). 136 Source: Mungpoo News, June 22, 2011. 137 Source: Plan for Development of Kolkata Municipal Corporation, September, 2008:2; emphasis added 138 In West Bengal, the excess land that is available after the application of land ceiling on privately held rural or urban land, is acquired by the state, the process is called “vesting” and the land thus acquired and taken over by the state is called “vested land”. 139 DFID deals with the e-governance aspects, whereas funding for designing and implementation of the project is primarily the responsibility of ADB. 140 See Chapter 2 141 VAMBAY was initially launched in 2001 to provide housing for urban slum dwellers who do not possess adequate shelter. Later this scheme was subsumed under Integrated Housing and Slum Development Program [IHSDP], which is a component of JNNURM, although the IHSDP now focuses on smaller towns and cities, which are not covered under the JNNURM. Please see chapter 2 for greater details of JNNURM. 142 Source: http://www.keip.in/bl3/pdfFiles/IMP7.pdf accessed on November 21, 2012 143 The political economy of rehabilitation and resettlement of the canal-bank dwellers will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. 144 Flusty, 1994 145 Kolkata (erstwhile Calcutta) was once the seat of great industrial and commercial development even before the colonial rule by the British Raj. Due to its economic prowess and advantageous location, Calcutta was named the capital of East India Company in 1772 till 1911 (when the capital was moved to Delhi). During the colonial rule, like many other parts of India, the province of Bengal began to suffer a set back due to discriminatory policies adopted by the British state in the quest for greater surplus value. Raw materials and expansion of market inter alia became prime concerns for which policies were geared towards prioritizing British-made products vis-à-vis Indian goods and materials production. Among other things this marked the inception of declining production and gradual destruction of industries in Bengal, including Kolkata. After the partition of Bengal the process of deindustrialization gained momentum as many of the industries such as rice and jute, which were key industries in the province had their source of raw materials severed, with the agricultural regions located in Bangladesh (the East Pakistan). Furthermore, the owners of most of these industries were British entrepreneurs and later those were taken over by non-Bengalis such as Marwaris145 who came and settled from the state of Rajasthan. They were not attached to the place as much as Bengalis were. So the revenue generated in the state in many instances got transferred to other places in the form of investment resulting in stagnation of industries in West Bengal. “For Kolkata, the hand-over has been one of the main reasons for deindustrialization as those traders to whom these industries were handed over were not classical entrepreneurs. Further, Swadeshi145 enterprises in Kolkata played an important role in industrialization, industries like Bengal chemical, Bengal Lamp, Sulekha Ink, National Tannery all were a part of the Swadeshi Movement. Those were established with the primary objective of fighting against the British....So there was a political reason behind their establishments. But after Independence, the main motive with which these industries

210 were started did not exist anymore. So there was not any incentive to continue those industries” (personal interview, April, 2011). A host of other problems such as lack of technological innovation, continuous expansion was stalled due to lack of investment in industrial production. The poor work culture and militant workers’ union politics over wages and working conditions are cited as classic reasons for deindustrialization in West Bengal, although evidences are largely inadequate in this regard. Also, a popular belief behind deindustrialization in Bengal is based on the characterization that Bengalis have little acumen in expansion of business and lacking in entrepreneurial skills. Further, the Left Front alleges the lack of central government support as an important cause for closing down of factories (again studies have not been able to prove this yet) (Nagarik Mancha, 2005). In addition, lack of infrastructure, corruption and with little support from the government did not contribute positively in reviving the sick units, which later were locked out due to lowering productivity and eventually were closed down forever (ibid.). On top of this, the imperative to accumulate and the lure and impingement of the real estate sector under the current neoliberal context are acting as catalyst to greater closure of factories in West Bengal in general and Kolkata in particular. 146 These are the official estimates but the actual numbers are claimed to be much higher based on unofficial figures due to the presence of many unregistered industrial units. 147 The study conducted by WEBCON focused on the entire state of West Bengal. In the published document, there was no mentioning of the exact figures for the number of locked-out factories in Kolkata. 148 Source: http://bifr.nic.in/introduction.htm accessed on July 15, 2012. 149 The ex-factory worker who fought valiantly against management, real estate developers, labor union leaders, the police and the political leaders for justice and his right as a worker was run over by a vehicle in January 2011. 150 In Kolkata a number of Information Technology (IT) parks have been growing. However, these are mainly on the urban fringe areas near the new town of Rajarhat. 151 The growing and intensified commodification process is not just found within the gated communities but also noticed outside the enclaves. The urban poor are also subject to the acute commodified lifestyles, which will be explored in the next chapter. 152 The nature and impacts of the ideological underpinnings and fetishistic mode of life is further unpacked in the next chapter. 153 I am thankful to Prof. Swapna Banerjee-Guha for drawing my attention to the frequency of slum fires and slum eviction and a possible connection between them in a telephone conversation in April 2011. 154 This is not only seen in Kolkata but in other parts of India as well such as Mumbai, Chennai, Delhi. Whether it is accident, arson or ploy for eviction that begs further investigation (“Slum fires: Accident, arson or eviction?” Times of India, July 22, 2013) 155 Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/Foul-play-whiff-in-Ultadanga-slum- fire/articleshow/1053313.cms accessed on 16th August, 2013 156 “Urban land ceiling has always remained a hurdle in getting land for real estate projects. According to the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, introduced in 1976, the ceiling limit on vacant land in urban area is 7.5 ‘cottahs’ (one-eighth of an acre).” Source: http://www.telegraphindia.com/archives/archive.html accessed on August 24, 2013 “Individuals can hold a maximum of 500sqm in Calcutta and areas under civic bodies in Category A towns. In Category B towns such as Asansol, Burnpur and Durgapur, the ceiling limit is 2,000sqm.” Source: http://www.telegraphindia.com/archives/archive.html accessed on August 30, 2013 157Source: The Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act (1976), The Government of West Bengal http://www.wburbandev.gov.in/pdfs/The%20Urban%20Land%20(Ceiling%20and%20Regulation) %20Act%20and%20Rules_1976.pdf accessed on June 2, 2012 158 See Chapter 2 for the details on mandatory reforms

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159 Source: http://jnnurm.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Mandatory_Primer_5- RepealULCRA.pdf accessed on May 28, 2012 160 Source: http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/bengal-set-to-amend- urban-land-ceiling-act-112010200098_1.html accessed on June 8, 2012 161 Another important conditionality is the imposition of water tax, which has not been approved by the KMC yet. 162 Source: https://www.kmcgov.in/KMCPortal/jsp/UAASystemHome.jsp accessed on 25th August 2013 163 “The entire city is divided into 293 blocks and these blocks are classified into seven categories (A to G) on the basis of market value, infrastructure, facilities etc. Corresponding to each category, (viz. A,B,C,D,E,F,G) an Annual value / sq. ft. ie Base Unit Area Value (BUAV) is assigned. Thus category 'A' has the highest BUAV while 'G' has the lowest BUAV. It ensures equity at the macro level of the properties lying within the same block or similar category block. However, in order to remove hardship ‘bustee’ / slum / ‘thika’-tenanted area are categorized as 'G', for the purpose of assessment, irrespective of their geographical location under any block or category. Similarly, all recognized RR colonies including settlements under Govt. notified EWS and BSUP Schemes have been categorized as 'E' irrespective of their geographical situation under any block or category, unless it belongs to a block whose category is lower than that of 'E'. To account for the wide heterogeneity among properties within a block, Multiplicative Factors (MFs) are introduced. MFs would account for variations in terms of size, purpose of use, age of the property, location of the property within the block, nature of occupancy and type of structure, which would be clearly notified and used to increase or decrease Base Unit Area Values of different properties as applicable or to keep it same”. Source: KMC website, https://www.kmcgov.in/KMCPortal/jsp/UAASystemHome.jsp accessed on 25th August, 2013 164 One of the other major conditionalities is the requirement of imposing tax on water usage on the people within the KMA. 165 Source: http://pd.cpim.org/2005/0911/09112004_prakash.htm accessed on 25th March, 2010 166 Datta, Nagarik Mancha http://sanhati.com/literature/1499/ accessed on 23rd August, 2013 167 See Whitehead and More, 2007 168 See later in this chapter 169 The Resettlement and Rehabilitation program under the KEIP for the targeted canal-bank dwellers are only for specific areas, as discussed later 170 These terms have been taken from various sources ranging from personal interviews with residents of upscale neighborhoods, government officials, personal experiences over the years, as well as from newspaper and other media sources. 171 The details of middle class politics will be dealt in the next chapter. 172 Any class society is based on relations of inequality, exploitation and social injustice. In order to sustain and perpetuate this relation of super-ordination and subordination of various material, discursive and symbolic means are deployed. In this context, the politics of difference gains importance. This is because it naturalizes these socially constructed characteristics in order to serve the vested interests of the dominant groups in diverse ways. 173 Fernandes, 2006; Sibley, 1995; also see chapter 2 174 Also see Baviskar, 2006; Fernandes, 2006; Gooptu, 2011 175 See later in this chapter for the discussion on the impacts on people due to evictions 176 Foucault, 1977; also see Skinner, 2012 177 The responses of the resident population living along the banks are discussed later in the chapter. 178 Some of the products may have been produced for home consumption, for instance woodwork, as I had observed making of small wooden boxes made for home use, but that was not the primary purpose of the production process though.

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179 Here I am primarily referring to cycle rickshaws, although auto-rickshaws are also important. These are very common modes of transportation in Kolkata and other parts of West Bengal. 180 Rickshaw pulling in Kolkata is an exclusively male-dominated work. 181 Most of these unions, so far, were predominantly affiliated to CPIM or adjunct workers’ organization [CITU—Centre of Indian Trade Union]. But this is fast changing now with the advent of the Trinamool Congress in power in the State Assembly elections in 2011. With more and more of these organizations changing its connection to the Indian National Trinamool Trade Union Congress. 182 Rickshaws (cycle rickshaws in this case) are very common mode of transportation in Kolkata. In fact, rickshaws serve a very large section of the population ranging from poor working class to upper middle class. In each neighborhood usually there is one rickshaw stand, i.e., a group of rickshaw- pullers. A rickshaw pullers needs to reserve a spot by paying an amount to the union of rickshaw- pullers in one particular location. The amount that needs to be paid to “buy” a spot is generally based on the location of area in the city. For instance, the posh neighborhoods charge a higher amount compared to a humble one. 183 At one block in Nonadanga (E-block) there was one pump and that was the only one catering to 208 flats (apartments) and each occupant was supposed to operate the pump thrice for two-hour slots. Source: http://www.nagarikmancha.org/images/1405-CANAL%20BANK%20DWELLERS.pdf accessed on 29th January, 2014 184 Moreover, carrying water from tube-wells manually to 4 stories is much harder than carrying it on flat ground (in comparison to living in canal-bank). 185 This is equivalent to about 20 cents. However, for a daily wage earner it is a big sum of money, especially because 1 liter of water is not sufficient for a day’s consumption. So the cumulative effect on daily expenses is much more acute. 186 The family comprised of husband and wife aged over forty years with four children, one unmarried daughter and three sons, of which one son was married with two children. So when the married son moved out along with his wife and children, there were still five people living in the sixteen by ten feet room. 187 This is a response from one of the leaders of “Brihottoro Kolkata Khalpar Basti Uchhed Committee” (Greater Kolkata Canal Dwellers and Slum Eviction Resistance Committee). 188 There is one school near Nonadanga resettlement area, which is a private school, exclusively for upper middle families, i.e., beyond the reach of the poor working class. 189 It was not however exclusively directed towards the privileged classes, as water being a basic amenity was being supplied to the poor as well without discernible restrictions till recently. Things are changing though, where more glaring favoritism is being shown towards the richer classes lately. 190 Chatterjee (2004) asserts, “Many of these groups, organized into associations, transgress the strict lines of legality in struggling to live and work. They may live in illegal squatter settlements, make illegal use of water and electricity, and travel without tickets in public transport. In dealing with them, the authorities cannot treat them on the same footing as other civic associations following more legitimate social pursuits” and refers to them collectively as political society (p.40). However, he provides an extremely simplistic and problematic characterization of people belonging to the so called political society as using illegal means to claim their citizenship right. He further notes, “…they are among thousands of similar associations representing groups of population whose very livelihood or habitation involve violation of law… These groups on their part accept that their activities are often illegal and contrary to good civic behavior” (ibid. emphasis added). His arguments are problematic on two accounts. First, he very parochially sees the behavior and activities of the illegal settlers as “illegal and contrary to good civic behavior” which is not usually the case. Rather, they are the ones who are often trying to become “legal” and “law-abiding” citizens and trying to fit in more than he credits them for. This is opposed to members of the so called civil society who break laws with impunity and who demand that the rules be waived for them”(Baviskar and Sundar, 2008: 88). Second, the characterization of poor wage earner as illegal and not complying to good civic behavior is essentialist and ahistorical, i.e. he does not take into consideration the historical-material

213 conditions under which the actions take place and their meanings connoted. It is not about their nature to be unruly and uncivil, but under the limited material means and political bindings that leave few choices for them. 191 The need to stop going to school for further education was because of the need to support as well as the distance between the school and their new homes became quite insurmountable (as mentioned above). For many of the little children, less than 12 years old, they had to just stop going to school because of long distance as well as to minimize the incurring expenses for the daily commute. They could not join work to help their families because of their age. A few of their mothers however was hopeful that the government will soon do something so that their children can go to school in the locality as they thought that is important for their future. 192 There are quite a few who have chosen different paths to resolve this problem and that will be discussed later under the sub-section of resistances. 193 Even though this may be considered as a covert form of resistance by defying the authorities, this is primarily arranged to cope with their present economic hardships and thus does not have any subversive effect on the resettlement program; rather it facilitates that through greater cooperation from a section of the resettled population and the state officials. 194 Even though there were families with more than six members, they did not get an apartment on the first floor, as the size of family had nothing to do with it. 195 Initially it was decided that for each family of five, 183 sq ft of land would be provided for resettlement within 800 meters of the original location. The scheme also said that for each family with more than three adults 215 sq. ft. of land would be provided. Source: http://sanhati.com/excerpted/2321/#sthash.7c8bJDON.dpuf accessed on 15th January, 2014 196 Source: http://sanhati.com/articles/4775/ accessed on 23rd February, 2014

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CHAPTER 5

The Indian Middle Class and Its Politics

5.1 Introduction

Since the official adoption of the New Economic Policy by India in 1991, there has been an increasing outcry over the place of the middle class in the “new economy.”197 It is claimed that the middle class has grown in size and significance over the years and that this accounts for its “newly” defined role in the Indian political economy.198 Post-liberalized

India itself is presented in political and popular campaigns199 as “India Shining” and the vanguard of this “new India” is supposedly the upwardly mobile “new Indian middle class”.

The new middle class is portrayed in popular discourse as “confident”, “uninhibited”,

“pragmatic” and “full of energy and drive…[thus] making things happen” (Das, 2002: 280).

The members of this class are vocal about their demands and are actively participating in making the economy (including urban spaces) as well as vociferous about claiming the benefits of liberalization (Fernandes, 2006). Moreover, the middle class represents an idealized vision that is supposed to guide other classes, especially the poor working classes, as a model to aspire to, thus bearing its influence discursively as well. Middle-class politics, however, is widely depicted as engaged in practices that undermine the positions of the urban subalterns, thus proving to be anti-poor. 200 Therefore, both materially and discursively, the new Indian middle class is making marks in the globalizing world.

215 Urban development politics is a matter of class struggle. In this regard, apart from the state, capital and working class, the other important actor, as acknowledged in the current literature, is India’s new middle class. In light of the (above) claims and portrayals, it is important to analyze the nature and role of the middle class in the Indian economy in general and with regard to the politics of urban-space making in particular. This chapter aims at problematizing the nature of the middle class and its politics in India by unpacking the character of the so-called “new middle class”. I call for a more nuanced look at middle- class politics based on spatio-temporal specificities. In order to analyze the politics of the new middle class in the current Indian context, I study a relatively upper middle class neighborhood in Kolkata.

The first section of this chapter aims at tracing the rise of the new Indian middle class, concentrating on the urban fraction, especially in the metropolitan cities. This section attempts to define what is meant by middle class, delineate its size and also tries to understand its variegation and diversity. The next section deals with middle-class politics, which is further subdivided into two parts based on the interaction between the middle class and poor working class primarily over living space in Kolkata—the sub-sections focus on exclusionary politics and collaborative politics. Before concluding, I briefly discuss the complex relation between the state, middle class and poor working class in the context of living-space politics in a neighborhood in Kolkata.

5.2 Tracing the (New) Middle Class

In order to understand the role of the middle class in (urban) development politics in India, it is important to make sense of the term middle class in the Indian context. A wide

216 gamut of characteristics is used to define it, including “income, durable property and assets, occupation, structural position…consumption patterns and practices, cultural and social capital and attitudes” (Dickey, 2012: 567). In terms of size, the Indian middle class is estimated to be anywhere between five million and three hundred and fifty million in various unofficial and official records, although the higher counts are believed to be a gross exaggeration (ibid.; also see Vanaik, 2002). The size and composition of the class clearly depend largely on the criteria used to define it and the kind of data used to measure it. This itself makes the concept of “middle class” highly fuzzy. Some scholars have argued that boundaries cannot be assigned to the concept of “middle class” and the qualities of fuzziness and intangibility of the concept impart flexibility and thus allow multi-layered interpretations of the same (Brosius, 2010; also see Fernandes, 2006).201

The various characterizations of the middle class include, according to Fernandes

(2006: xxxiv): the middle class as an income-based group; a structurally defined group; an aspirational-cultural class; and a product of discourse and social imagination. By middle class I refer to highly paid professional people such as managers, executives, white-collar workers and intellectuals and the group of petty traders and producers, people characterized by significant cultural capital such as particular types of identities of caste, community, or region and competences marked by educational or other social skills, especially proficiency in the English language. It also includes people who have some form of property or relatively well-paid salaried or professional employment that is considered adequate enough to be used for consumption beyond mere subsistence202 and thus are better off than the majority of the population in India (Harriss, 2006: 447; also see Dickey,

2012)

217 The extant literature argues that the members of this class are not only providing the current impetus to the new urban development but that its historical antecedent also played a crucial role in the adoption of the NEP in the pre-liberalization period. Historically, proficiency in the English language was the hallmark of the middle class during the colonial period. Access to English language education largely determined the status of people within the middle class. Even though there were some exceptions, the general pattern was to depend on education as a means of achieving access to employment and economic power

(Fernandes, 2006). Even after Independence in 1947, the continuation of English education created an urban bourgeoisie that used this as a tool to secure employment in the bureaucracy, in public sector organizations and in the tertiary sectors of the economy

(Ahmed, 2011; also see Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987). India’s welfarist stance with socialist goals immediately after Independence nurtured the urban bourgeoisie, including a relatively large group of medium to small-scale entrepreneurs who benefitted initially from the state’s protectionist policies (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000). But by the early 1980s, this historically urban middle class was increasingly frustrated with the restrictions imposed by the state on trade and commerce and on employment opportunities in service industry. This led to growing dissatisfaction among them and they started opposing welfarist ideals that required them to pay high income taxes in order to improve the conditions of the poor

(Varma, 1998). They are the ones who implicitly and more vociferously supported the adoption of the NEP in 1991 (Ahmed, 2011). Consequently, there was a definitive change in developmental imaginaries associated with the urban. For instance, the people belonging to this class of the urban bourgeoisie (including the middle class) imagined their cities of living to be more globally connected. Thus the role of the (new) urban middle class in shaping the politics of the nation is not just a recent phenomenon, although the nature and course of it

218 have changed in recent years. The “newness” in the “new middle class”, however, is not primarily because of changes attributable to any structural or social basis, i.e. it “does not refer to upwardly mobile segments of the population entering the middle class. Rather, its newness refers to the production of a distinctive social and political identity that represents and lays claim to the benefits of liberalization” (Fernandes, 2006: 19). Furthermore, although there is significant debate on whether or not there is a substantial rise in the size of the middle class, mainstream scholarship contends that, due to the liberalization of the economy, the middle has been expanding immensely.203

The demand for the present globalizing urban landscape is attributed to the rising income of the middle class. The rise in income is believed to have led to greater affordability of commodities, particularly those expressing conspicuous consumption, which is the hallmark of the contemporary Indian middle class. A glitzy glamorous world—presented through plush malls, name-brand clothes, luxurious living areas with golf courses, various in-house facilities such as swimming pools and movie theaters, designer cars, and other luxury goods—expresses the rising demand of the middle class and concomitant interests of the government (at all scales) and capital in catering to it. But is the middle class in India really significant in terms of its size as portrayed in popular media? To put it bluntly, how great is “The Great Indian Middle Class”?204

One of the biggest challenges has been to calculate this precisely. An income-based criterion used by the National Council of Applied Economic Research in 2009 defines households earning less than Rs. 40,000 annually (at 2001-02 prices) as the low-income group, whereas those with earnings over Rs. 180,000 fall within the high-income category.

Households earning between Rs. 40,000-180,000 fall under the middle-income group or the middle class (Kapur, 2010). An exact assessment of household income in India is very

219 difficult to make and tax records are not reliable, so most of these estimates are extremely impressionistic and arbitrary in nature (Vanaik, 2002: 228). A very optimistic assessment, based on the above criteria, estimates the middle class to be about one hundred and forty million households (about 62% of the total households). This, however, is a gross exaggeration. In a less expansive definition, the NCAER had assessed about twenty-eight million households as falling into the middle class category in 2009 (Kapur, 2010).205

The National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) and the National Commission for

Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS) completed a survey in 2004-05 of, among other things, employment-unemployment and consumption expenditure.206 Consumption items that were considered included food, fuel, clothing and consumer durables. It also included educational and medical goods and services. The NCEUS computed the monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE) and daily per capita consumption (DPCE).

Based on the 2004-05 data, the distribution of the population among the various categories as per the above survey is as follows: About 6.4% of the population is extremely poor,

15.4% is poor, 19% is marginal and 36% belongs to the vulnerable group. This means that about 77% of the population is not among the “middle class”. In fact according to the data more than three-fourths of the population lived on less than Rs. 20 per day (less than $1).207

About 19.3% falls within the middle-income group with an average monthly expenditure of

Rs. 1098 (about $24 in 2004-05).208 This figure, however, is far below the figures that are generally projected to portray the legendary middle class in India: indeed, a dinner for two in any fancy restaurant in the metropolitan city will be more than this average monthly expenditure. The rest of the population constitutes 4% of the total population, which can be called the elites, but this is also not a homogenous group. This 4% of the population according to the NCAER estimate expends on an average of Rs. 93 (about $2) per day. Thus

220 it is highly probable that more than three-fourths of those even in this bracket do not or cannot engage in the level of conspicuous consumption projected by the conventional image of the “middle class.” Consequently, it does not include the increasingly visible middle class such as IT professionals and people with high-salaried, white-collar jobs in the private and public sectors, i.e., the commonly held “middle class.” Hence a plausible guestimate could be that the (upper) middle class that is most often referred to and which supposedly forms the epitome of shining India is a miniscule proportion of the total population; about eight to ten million which is not more than 1% of the population (Ray, 2008). It should however be noted that in the Indian context even 1% of the population is not an insignificant number, as it amounts to about ten million people.

The importance of the middle class in liberalizing India is not just in the absolute numbers though. I argue here that its significance is also in the construction of the idea of the middle class. This denotes the “hegemonic aspirations”209 and idealized representations that symbolize a world class210 or a globalizing class hailing from “modern” world cities located mostly in the Global North. The idea of the middle class stands for an imagined and socially constructed utopian idea about the middle class and its lifestyles. It represents

“modern” values and ideals, which are reflected in their transforming lifestyles, consumption patterns, behavioral traits, and overall attitudinal changes. In short, its importance also lies in the way it is a discursively constructed, generating an imaginary that can wield a powerful influence on the masses. Apart from serving as a real market within and outside India, the idea of ‘middle class’ thus projected also serves as a means of creating and expanding the potential market as it is used as a tool to entice people into conspicuous forms of consumption. It is the idea of a homogenous class that regularly visits shopping malls, buys only name-brand clothes, eats in fancy restaurants, owns comfortable homes in

221 nice neighborhoods, and rides in high-end cars, all of which is used to create a fantasy among the general population.

The cosmopolitanism and the desire to be a part of the global world or to be a part of a world class do exist but are largely generalized and presumed to be the goal and dream of every person in India, middle class or not. Gupta (2001) condemns the tendency among the Indian middle class for what is called “Westoxification,”211 and which broadly refers to the blind adoption of Western consumption patterns. Thus he dismisses the aspiring middle class and elites as “alien, anti-national, immersed in superficial consumerist display of commodities and fads produced in the West” (Brosius, 2010: 10).212 The representation of the middle class in many of the academic works is as an inert mass of people blindly following and responding to discursive images and narratives based on Western lives and ideas (Fernandes, 2006). However, the Indian middle class is marked by its extreme heterogeneity with regard to incomes, consumption patterns, identities, cultural and social capital,213 so that any generalization can be highly misleading. Nevertheless a section of the middle class with relatively higher income residing in metropolitan cities in India does constitute the visible part of the middle class. This is largely socially and politically constructed so that it has a bearing on the psyche of the other sections of the population.

The purchasing power of a section of the visible middle class mostly comprising of the upper echelons of the class is a reflection of the global flexibilization of labor and the increasing integration of the developing countries into the globalizing world. With the revolution in Information and Communication Technology (ICT), the proliferation of software-related jobs (IT and ITES) including outsourced jobs in the tertiarized “new economy” has gained greater momentum. This is mainly because the ICT revolution facilitated the vertical disintegration of industries, enabling work to be relocated. This

222 contributed toward an internationalization of the division of labor, particularly, in white- collar work related to information processing (Huws, 2003: 56–7). A section of the highly educated middle-class professional stratum associated with jobs involving information technology is nurtured by global capital. The income, hence purchasing power, of this elite section has risen in the liberalized economy,214 albeit with highly insecure employment and an oppressive labor regime.215 The average salary of software professionals with over five years of experience in the US is about $70,000 per annum. In India the salary for the same type of job with comparable qualifications amounts to about $55,000 per annum.216 Given the differences in costs of living in these two countries, the purchasing power of Indian software professionals is quite high, especially in big cities. Further, in the era of “consumer capitalism” and with loosened import restrictions, there is an excess of consumer goods available in the Indian market. To top this, the changes in banking policies in recent years have led to the development of a debt economy similar to the West in terms of facilitating greater consumption through loans for various reasons such as home and automobile loans.

“The availability of credit has brought the promise—if not the reality—of ownership to the middle class as never before… [it] is of course as much about the possibility of class empowerment through ownership and consumption as about the actual attainment of these goals” (Chowdhury, 2011: 67). The terms of ownership of properties and consumption patterns have changed completely due to these state-backed bank policy changes.217 Thus today Equal Monthly Installments [EMI] schemes are fairly common and desirable among the middle class, although most popular among the members of the upper strata of this social group. According to an estimate, the number of circulating credit cards in 2007 was about twenty-five million. Although much smaller compared to global standards, this is quite high based on the trend that more and more people are opting for it (ibid.). Moreover,

223 public-sector salaries have been hiked substantially since 1997, while personal-income taxes have been reduced (Dickey, 2012: 566).

Despite significant changes in the GDP and GNI per capita,218 the benefits of this economic growth have benefitted only a handful thereby further concentrating wealth in the hands of a few people coming from the elite section and a top tier of the middle class

(including civil servants, professionals, business owners) (ibid.). This can be partly demonstrated through growing income inequality in India after the formal liberalization of the economy. A report notes, the top 10% of wage earners now make twelve times more than the bottom 10%, this is up from the multiplier of six in the 1990s in India.219 The top

5% of the population in India possessed over 38% of the total wealth in the country (2002–

03),220 and it constitutes about 0.5% of the top 1% of the global wealth holders.221 The degree of skewedness of income distribution at the top tier can easily be imagined. Thus the upper section has definitely benefitted partly due to the liberalization of the economy, albeit the effects are far from uniform or necessarily positive even for this section.222 For instance, due to increased privatization of the hitherto public sector companies, such as banking and life insurance, jobs are vulnerable to the vacillation of the global economy (Dickey, 2012).

Also, even though education levels are rising and the pay in white-collar jobs is higher, the actual number of jobs in India has not grown significantly, thereby intensifying the level of competition for the existing jobs (ibid.).223 Along with the objective criteria to frame the middle class, if we also account for the subjective aspects, i.e., the ones who identify themselves as middle class, the variegation within the class increases even more (Dickey,

2012). Therefore, it can be inferred that the middle class itself is a very fragmented and highly diverse class. It is almost an overgeneralization and misnomer to put an umbrella term on such as class to define it.

224 In sum, the construction of middle class, both materially and discursively, serves to internalize the belief in the “Indian dream”, upheld and endorsed by the middle class. It produces an imaginary class that is both inspirational as well as aspirational, something whose boundaries are permeable and thus gives hope to a vast section of the Indian population to the possibility of realizing the dream.224 On the one hand, it creates a class of people, which helps in consolidating capital’s interests through intensification of consumption. On the other hand, this further helps in minimizing the possibilities of antagonism and contestation by garnering consensus among a large section of the Indian population, especially aimed at the potential protestors, i.e., the majority of the subalterns.

The intention is to minimize the possibilities of challenges to the hegemonic class alliances, implicated at all geographical scales.

5.3 Middle-Class Politics

In this section I aim to demonstrate the overt politics or activism in a (upper) middle class neighborhood in shaping the urban living spaces.225 Residential associations are mushrooming in the middle-class neighborhoods of Indian cities, especially in the post- liberalization period. These organizations look after respective neighborhood spaces, upholding the interests of the residents in them. Thus they are engaged actively in socio- spatial processes, articulating middle-class aspirations, requirements and sensibilities. My study is based on a relatively upper middle class neighborhood located in the southern part of Kolkata. This residential area was established in 1961 and soon after “The Regent Estate

Residential Association” was formed in 1963. The total area is about 32 acres (including parks and ponds) of which the residential area is around 20 acres.

225 The residential neighborhood in Regent Estate is regarded as an idyllic, “pollution free environment” 226 by the residents, which according to them contributes to its attractiveness and makes it extremely livable. My interviews with the residents of the place revealed a high degree of satisfaction and pride among them deriving from being a part of the neighborhood. In fact, it is regarded as one of the old upper-middle-class neighborhoods in south Kolkata, which (barring a few changes) has not lost its (socio-spatial) identity even after major transformations in many parts of Kolkata following the neoliberal turn. All the residents are members of the association and it is maintained through a membership fee of

Rs. 25 per month for each resident (that is about $6.5 annually).227 The regulation of

(urban) neighborhood spaces in the Regent Estate is done by the residential association, which undertakes multiple functions as a surveillant, a barricading and facilitating body attempting to maintain spatial sanctity, social discipline and “cultural richness.”228

5.3.1 Spaces of Conflict: Exclusionary Politics

Even though Regent Estate is the home of several upper-middle-class families, thereby making it relatively upscale and posh, the surrounding areas have squatter settlements, which are “jobor-dokhol” (forcibly-occupied) areas. Such areas are mostly referred to as “colonies” in colloquial language, denoting lands that have been occupied illegally by a refugee population (mainly from erstwhile East Pakistan now Bangladesh) during the partition of India in 1947. Even though historically the refugees did not have legal entitlement to the land where they settled, currently their socio-economic positions are not low. Unlike most slum and squatter areas, they live in concrete houses, often more than one-storied, and have superior educational qualifications and job skills. Thus many of the residents in the “colony” areas do not belong to the poor working class per se, although

226 there could be a sizeable proportion that would be borderline. Overall, they are definitely not as well-off as the residents of Regent Estate. But more than their current socio- economic level, the historical background sets them apart and consequently they are often considered “uncultured” by the celebrated Bengali middle class (à la Regent Estate residents). Therefore, the tension (often subtle but sometimes more explicit) between these two areas is palpable. There is no physical boundary as observed in the modern gated communities in the city of Kolkata. But there is a distinct socio-spatial demarcation visible in the form of a higher density of house-plots with no space in between, narrow streets, lack of open spaces, and a dearth of green landscapes in the “colony” areas.

The secretary of the Regent Estate residential association describes their relationship with the people of the surrounding “colony”:

We kind of maintain a distance from them; it has always been the case. They also do not feel comfortable interacting with us… We have separate Durga Puja229…You see historically this has been the case and now we probably do not want to change it or you can say it has become a part of our culture. Socio-economically and culturally too the colonies and us belonged to different cultures, even though practically things have changed a lot now, you can find really rich people even in the colonies, there is something of the culture which we cannot relate to or even they cannot adjust to…Also, we feel there is no need to interact with each other on a regular basis. We are not doing any work with them, so not only we prefer to keep a distance, there is no need to mix with them, so we can afford to keep a distance, which we do (personal interview, June 2011).

The process of spatial purification,230 which denotes middle-class claims over public spaces and the corresponding efforts to cleanse such spaces of the poor and working classes,231 is evident in Regent Estate. It is not just about steps taken proactively to erase the working class but also to reproduce on a daily basis what many scholars refer to as the

“middle-classness,”232 or the middle-class identity of the neighborhood’s space. Spatial purification thus aids in maintaining the sanctity of the living spaces. It is practiced by the residents in various ways that enable usage of spaces for particular purposes by specific

227 kinds of people and thus barring others. For instance, interviews with the residents corroborated the relative intolerance toward unwanted elements in using the neighborhood space for purposes that are not deemed acceptable to the majority of them. This includes the use of playgrounds by children or anyone for that matter from outside the area, especially the “rowdy” ones from the adjoining “colony areas.” One of the residents asserted,

“Do you not think it is a nuisance? They can damage the structures of our building, they create unnecessary noise and disturb the nearby residents” (personal interview; June,

2011). Even though the same problems can be found even if resident children played, it is not the possible damage and noise that are unacceptable. The intolerance stems more from the premise that property ownership grants exclusive usage rights to the owners alone and others’ presence is deemed unauthorized. The former respondent further added, “most importantly they are playing in our property without seeking our permission which is itself a problem” (ibid.).233 Guarding of space and interests with such vigor is relatively new, especially with a hint of revanchism in the actions of the residents. Kolkata has been known for its lenience toward the urban poor in the pre-liberalization period, and a shared use of spaces and utilities were not questioned to this extent.234 Another resident recollected:

You see we had a bigger playground, which is popularly known as Layelka, that is a property of Regent Estate, but that has been taken over by the local people [mostly used by the people coming from adjacent ‘colony’ areas]… long back that ground is used for playing cricket and other sports and I think it is quite well maintained by a local youth club…we had lost the control over that playground many years back…there was a dearth of open spaces for children to play so when they used to use the ground we did not resist (personal, interview; June, 2011).

This underscores the difference in attitude from the current stance toward the concept of neighborhood space and usage rights. It is not only confined to the use of playgrounds but expands to other common resources such as water.

228 There are about three ponds in the Regent Estate area, the largest of which was taken over many years by the local poor working class. One resident actually commended the maintenance of the pond “seized” by the people hailing from lower middle and poor working classes who reside mostly in the adjacent areas outside Regent Estate. “I really doubt if we could have taken such good care and kept the pond in such good condition if it had been under our exclusive control…they are doing a very good job” (personal interview;

June 2011). However, the leniency is markedly absent currently with regard to the use of the other two ponds that are known as “jora-pukur” or twin-ponds.235 The twin-ponds are proving to be a terrain of contention over usage rights. The secretary of the residential association relates:

In 1995–96 the twin ponds that I referred to, were overtaken by some people in the Bijoygarh colony [referring to poor working class people]. They were fishing in those ponds and selling the catch in nearby markets. We do not allow any commercial activities on our premises and technically they used our ponds to catch fish for selling in the market without our permission. When we went to stop them, they completely ignored our requests and even our warnings. Some hoodlums with political back up started it, so in spite of our persuasions they were adamant. It became a form of supplementary income source for them. Also washer-men would wash clothes in the ponds and hang them near the ponds…that looked really bad…all these things were problematic (personal interview; June, 2011).

Even though in this case, the state is not directly involved in defining the usage rights of resources (through policy and statutory changes) that serve as a means of living for the poor as such, middle-class people are clearly engaged in an informal politics designed to defend their spaces of habitation.

Apart from the question of rights, spatial practices are also characterized by an aesthetic sense. This is largely conditioned by the state and is deeply rooted in India’s neoliberal urban politics. Beautification has been an important aspect of urban restructuring as noted in Chapter 4. Many members of the middle class have actually been

229 very vocal and supportive of the local state drive for the aestheticization of urban spaces.

Thus many of the residents responded with their strong disapproval of their space being used by others who did not belong to the residential areas. The issue for the residents was not just the unauthorized use of their living spaces, but the aestheticism associated with the use, or rather the lack thereof, made it more problematic. For instance, washing clothes in the ponds and drying those in the open just do not “look good,” so the residents were not willing to compromise on that front. Also, unaesthetic practices may depreciate the property value and the residents are apprehensive of this possibility. Thus concerted efforts are made to not only preserve the existing property values, but beautification of the neighborhood spaces is actively proposed and undertaken to serve both psycho-cultural and material needs. “The ponds would have looked pretty if we could have been able to stop those [undesirable] activities and provide a concrete embankment around the ponds with pretty lights and green landscaping” (personal interview; June, 2011).

In terms of surveillance and barricading functions, the residential association also engages in preventing any unauthorized use of their garbage disposal facilities in the form of open vats:

We have two vats where garbage of Regent Estate is supposed to be disposed of, but many times people from surrounding areas would come and dispose of garbage. This is a major concern and we have been trying to resolve it but have not succeeded yet. We, from the association, had even placed a guard from 11pm to 7am so that people could not come from outside to dump garbage in our vats. But the ones who had to dump came at other times to dispose garbage. All the surrounding areas, even the open bazaars in the vicinity that we have dump their wastes in our vats. The colony areas also have vats but those are a bit far so people prefer to dump in the nearby (Regent Estate’s) vats (personal interview; June, 2011).

230 Further, surveillance is carried out so as to regulate the space and keep out unwanted elements, which are very easily dismissed as “anti-social,” especially if they are from nearby poor neighborhoods:

At night this place becomes quite desolate unlike the surrounding areas where it is too crammed and crowded…many times we have seen [unknown] couples, who would engage in public display of affection which we do not like…our residents are wary of our children too on whom this will have a negative influence (personal interview; June, 2011).

Apart from the preconceived notions and prejudices against people belonging to the poor working class, the concerns are at times based on some of the past experiences of criminal activities in the area:

Also, we have sometimes caught people to openly consume alcohol and play cards in public…at night this place becomes a haven for such activities and all this becomes unsafe for our residents as these hoodlums can do anything when drunk…we have had a couple of such unpleasant incidents in the past (personal interview; June 2011).

Surveillance is arranged by the residential association to ensure safety of the residents. “We have arranged for night guards taking care of the internal security of our neighborhood. We as residents collect money to pay the night guard” (personal interview;

June, 2011). Therefore, surveillance is used as a supervisory tool to keep a check on the happenings in the area so that with proper and timely information any untoward incident can be averted. It is a means of establishing disciplinary force that can control the neighborhood space.

Barricading the area from undesirable practices is done through material means such as instituting night guards as well as through the politics of distinction. Consumptive and cultural practices and the performativity of middle-class identities, or “middle- classness,” enclose the space materially and symbolically. The politics of distinction is enacted through various ways, such as unwillingness to interact with the people from the

231 surrounding “colony areas,” and planning out cultural programs exclusively for the residents, thus barring “outside” people from entering their territory. Therefore, space is also reproduced through middle-class activism based on distinction and it itself also serves as a tool to mark distinction. This is evident in the responses of the residents who feel a sense of pride in belonging to the area and see Regent Estate as a posh, middle-class, residential place.

Middle-class spatial politics in managing the space of living is not confined to the domain of civil society. In fact, the state machineries are used to facilitate certain practices and constrain certain others. This enables consumption of spaces exclusively for the residents without any encroachment from outsiders that might be deemed threatening.

To tighten our control over the space so that the people of the ‘colony’ or slum areas do not use our area for merriment and consuming alcohol, we take the help of the police…as we feel unsafe at night if drunkards are lurking in the streets. Thus when things become unbearable we report to the police and patrolling is initiated. During those times these activities are largely under control. But when the patrolling stops they can come back and start the nuisance again (personal interview; June, 2011).

In order to maintain the “purity” and the distinct middle-class identity of the residential space, no commercial activities are allowed in Regent Estate. Thus there is a strict prohibition of any street vending, which can be judged as a serious encroachment offense.

We as residents have objected vehemently from the very beginning to any commercial activities like street vending in our premises. It is absolutely not allowed…such as tea stalls, or vegetable vending or ice cream, or ironing stalls are strictly not permitted. A few days back in front of one of our residents’ house a vendor sat with vegetables. In fact, within a short period of time he even started making good sales, people must have thought why walk to the bazaar, let’s buy from the vendor. But the next day itself we went there and asked the vendor to leave (personal interview; June, 2011).

232 The possibility of a takeover of the living space by the numerically stronger but socio- economically weaker group leading to their displacement is threatening to the residents.

Thus any sense of a permanent usage of their space is strictly prohibited, although street hawking in the form of moving around in carts to sell products such as vegetables, fish, bags, steel utensils and so on is allowed. This kind of selling is encouraged, as it serves as a convenience for residents who then do not have to commute to grocery markets (although those are not too far).

Middle-class politics involves active production of spaces that suit the needs and aspirations of the class. Active space making in Regent Estate is seen through the creation of spaces that match the middle-class identity. This entails upholding a “pollution-free,” minimally congested, green landscaped and peaceful environment that forms the hallmarks of (upper) middle-class living. In addition, luxurious living through production and consumption of spaces that are on a par with living in a world-class city is given increasing importance. Swimming pools are finding currency among the residents, as they stand for the luxurious life especially in tune with world-class “modern” cities like Kolkata. Thus

Regent Estate too has been planning the establishment of an in-place swimming pool.

Apparently, a swimming pool is a great health and recreational facility for the majority of the resident population, who belong mostly in the mature age group (40+).

We do not have any physical-activity oriented stuff going on here. People who stay in our area are mostly aged and they need some physical activity to stay fit. Swimming, we think, can give the opportunity for recreation and refreshment. Many young children who are residing here have to go to Anderson (a popular swimming club located in South Kolkata which is not too far from Regent Estate) for swimming, by having the swimming pool here that can be helpful for many (personal interview; June, 2011).

The twin-ponds, a current arena of conflict between the residents and the surrounding people (see above), form a greater matter of contention when it comes to the

233 issue of the proposed swimming pool. Since the pools are being used by the neighboring urban poor to catch fish and wash clothes, that accounts for the greatest impediment at present to transforming the ponds into pools. The president of the association remarked,

“When we have a swimming pool, it will be of international standards in this location…the look of the entire area will change for sure. We want to cover up the swimming pool from the top so that no one from outside could have a sneak peek” (ibid.). Thus privatization of space through avenues of enclosing safeguards the interests of the middle class by regulating the accessibility of their living spaces to outsiders. The transformation of the ponds to pools can help in barricading the use of residential space by unwanted people

(read poor people or “encroachers”). If ponds are lying without being utilized by the residents themselves, then the chances are high that these would be put to some use, especially in the event of few feasible alternatives for the nearby poor people, as availability of water is an important means of sustenance. Also, swimming pools do not serve just as a marker of distinction, they are also supposed to be appealing in terms of looks, helping to beautify the area and thereby ensuring an increment in property values. “Swimming pools can really enhance the looks and utility of our area and that would help to attract more people to come and stay here” (personal interview; June, 2011).

Even though commercial activities are (supposedly) strictly prohibited, the planned swimming pool is not thought of as a non-commercial entity with exclusive usage rights for the residents only:

We will have to allow other people outside of Regent Estate to come and learn swimming, otherwise the cost of having one cannot be met, as I do not think we can recover the costs and maintenance by only having our residents to use it. We are planning to charge about Rs. 500-650 [about $11-$14] per month as a service fee…we also have a plan of developing one of the other ponds [out of the twin ponds] into a recreational facility with paddling boats…we also want to have

234 changing rooms and cafeteria for the people who would be members of the swimming club (personal interview; May, 2011).

Therefore, it is not that the residents are opposed to any form of commercialization of their living space, as emphasized above; rather the important point is not to have undesirable commercial activities. “Undesirable” refers to any activity or practice that is deemed threatening to the residents’ rights over their space through usurpation by the urban poor. It should be noted that people belonging to the middle class are aware of the fact that the urban subalterns are much larger numerically than themselves. Therefore, while in terms of economic power, the middle class takes precedence, in terms of the political-democratic process, it is a minority (Vanaik, 2002). The imminent fear of being displaced, losing control over (urban) spaces and having rights stripped due to the ascendancy of the oppressed people is impinging on the consciousness of the middle class.

Moreover, the undesirable elements and unwanted usage of residential space pertaining to the nearby urban poor is filtered out systematically through economic means. The secretary of the residential organization candidly admitted this:

The fact that we are going to charge a fee of Rs. 500-650 that will give us more control over the nature of the crowd in this area that will come to use our facility…paying that amount of money per month is not everybody’s cup of tea…this will ensure keeping out the people who cannot afford to pay for the service (personal interview; June, 2011).

Therefore, activism involving production and consumption of space is not just about preserving the (middle) class identity such as avoiding unaesthetic elements and uncouthness in the area. It is based on material reality and is guided by both material and discursive conditions.

235 5.3.2 Spaces of Collaboration: Accommodating Politics

The literature on middle-class politics in urban-space making focuses largely on spatial purification processes. However, as the middle class itself is not a homogenous group, its politics, too cannot be universalistic in nature. I aim to problematize the popularly held notion of middle-class politics to be invariably anti-poor and exclusionary and call for a more nuanced look at it.

In the context of Regent Estate, spatial politics does not involve just segregating practices. Denying the poor access to particular living spaces is not necessarily marginalizing them. This is seen in the case of the facilitation of a rickshaw-stand at the heart of the residential area, and another at one end of the area. Rickshaw-pullers belong to the poor working class who carry people around the neighborhood and beyond in cycle- rickshaws (although there are some places in Kolkata where there is still a prevalence of hand-pulled rickshaws). Since the colonial period, rickshaws have proven to be an extremely popular and convenient mode of transportation for many citizens in Kolkata.

However, in recent times intolerance toward their presence in urban upscale Kolkata neighborhoods is increasingly common.236 This intolerance can be seen as a revanchist237 attack on the poor working class by the elites and the privileged middle class in order to control their living space. This, however, did not create any problems in the case of the rickshaw-stand in the Regent Estate residential area. When inquired about its function and how it is being looked upon, most of the residents agreed on its immense utility and due to its relative advantage its “unpleasing” feature is suitably overlooked. “Most of the people who are here are aged people who cannot walk too far without a rickshaw. Many have cars but going to local places in cars is not too feasible, so rickshaws provide a very convenient mode of transportation” (personal interview; May, 2011). The entry, presence and usage of

236 living space by the poor working class, however, is allowed with certain conditions pertaining to conduct and maintenance of spatial discipline and decorum. There are preconceived notions about the behavior of the poor being “rowdy”, “aggressive” and

“boorish”, thus conditionalities are imposed238 :

There have been incidents where ‘rickshaw-wallahs’ (rickshaw-pullers) have been found talking in loud voices or using obscene language in front of someone’s house where their stand is, so that people have seriously objected and we have taken stance by asking them not to repeat any objectionable conversation or behavior in our area as that disrupts the environment (personal interview; June, 2011).

Further, a section of the residents affirmed that the use of the twin-ponds by the nearby washer-men as well as fishing in them, are encouraged by some of the residents in front of the ponds. According to them, “instead of opposing their presence, they have no problems and are quite reticent about it…actually they implicitly support them” (personal interview; May, 2011). The reason behind the passive encouragement is seen as individual arrangements between the subalterns and some of the residents. Monetary benefits accrue to the residents through a payment made for these uses. This kind of dealing is also observed where a resident has allowed a stall for ironing clothes in front of his house. There are some residents who have vociferously supported it, going against the directives of the residential welfare association because it is advantageous to have a stall nearby that presses clothes for the “prim and proper” looking middle class. Even though commercial activities are strictly not allowed, especially when it comes to permitting any working class undertakings, there are exceptions.

Another contradiction is noted in the dealings of the members of the residential welfare associations with the neighboring poor. On the one hand, they like to maintain socio-spatial distance from the people of “colony” and slum areas, i.e., based on perceived and real socio-cultural and economic differences between themselves and the relatively

237 poorer population. On the other hand, the women members of the residential organization forming another adjunct body of the association, a ladies club named Nandana,239 showered patronage veiled in the language of benevolence and charity on the “poor women of the surrounding areas”. Apart from arranging cultural programs for the residents of Regent

Estate, Nandana is actively engaged in altruistic work for the “betterment” of the poor, especially women:

We provide money for health and educational purposes…we distribute warm clothes to the needy, we even go to jails to teach women sewing work, we try to provide training for the underprivileged women so that they can become independent that would help them financially, also that helps in empowering them…we generate the money primarily through membership fees, which is about Rs. 40 (less than $1) for each month, and a fete that is organized every winter time and the money helps us to do (social) work year round (personal interview; June, 2011).

This paternalistic attitude, along with a suspicion and reluctance to mix with the underprivileged on a more personal and social level, underscores the contradiction and hypocrisy on the part of middle class. These superficial interactions, however, ensure some kind of positive connection and camaraderie between them and the nearby poor working class.

These types of collaborative arrangements with the middle class consolidate and facilitate the position of the poor working class within upscale living spaces. If it is deemed advantageous and beneficial in some ways to the middle-class, then spatial politics does not always translate into anti-poor exclusionary practices. Middle-class politics in India has always been characterized as highly opportunistic (Herring, 2008) and this holds true even today. Decisions and actions on the part of the middle class are driven by inherent needs within particular spatial and temporal contexts. It is not essentially anti-democratic and anti-poor. Nevertheless it is relevant to say that in recent times a section of the middle class

238 (particularly the upper strata) in general has particularly benefitted through liberalization of the economy. Also, the people belonging to this class are the ones who are increasingly influenced by the idea of middle class hinged on the imagined concept of a globalizing class living in “modern” world cities. This has led to a rise in explicit consumptive practices of a conspicuous sort, sometimes amounting to a materialistic exhibitionism240 not apparent in earlier times. As such, the middle class is engaged in spatial politics largely guided by the sensibilities and perceptions predicated on the imageries of the global city.

Since the members who identify themselves as middle class (including people who do not fall under the definition of middle class defined through objective criteria) also see themselves in most cases as the conduits of the global progressive changes, their presence and impact are more clearly seen in urban spatial activism. However, as I have argued above, the middle class in India is characterized by extreme heterogeneity; therefore, clubbing the politics of middle class into one category is problematic. For instance, some middle-class people at least do realize the importance of poor working class people in their lives. It is a form of mutual dependence and not an abstract reality that is difficult to comprehend. When inquired about their opinion on removal of slums from the nearby region, residents of Regent Estate became quite concerned about the availability of affordable and cheap domestic labor:

My domestic help lives nearby in a slum…she does not have to travel a lot to come to my place. In fact, there are some days when I have asked her help at different times based on my convenience and need for the day, the flexibility of working hours has been mainly possible because she lives so close to me. If she had to travel a lot then she would definitely not have this kind of flexibility of coming and going based on my requirements, and also she would give many excuses of coming late such as train delays, flooded neighborhood during monsoons and so on as that is what used to happen earlier when I had a different maid who commuted daily from her village…also I do not have to pay for her transportation costs and this makes her wage not too bad [high] (personal interview; May, 2011).

239 Many therefore opposed the idea of the removal of slums at the cost of their comfortable and affordable lifestyles. Experiential and material conditions influence the nature and direction of politics of middle-class people.241

In this regard, another relevant example would be the case of street vendors in

Kolkata. It is widely known that the elite and middle classes were vocal in their support for the state (the then CPIM-led Left Front government) for “Operation Sunshine”: i.e., the forcible removal of street vendors and hawkers in Kolkata in the mid-1990s.242 However, within a few months the hawkers reclaimed their previous places and this was backed up by their unions, the opposition party (primarily Indian National Congress) and a small section of the ruling Left Front party (Bandyopadhyay, 2009). The popular portrayal of the middle class in this context does not take into account the fact that middle-class people, especially a large section situated in the lower and middle range, benefit significantly from street hawking and vending. They are the ones who implicitly extended their support to the hawkers: something that is evident in the flourishing and expanding hawkers’ markets in many parts of the city. A large portion of the middle class used its power as consumers in backing up the street hawkers. One section does raise its voice against the unauthorized occupancy of the pavements. They contend that due to street hawking, taxpaying pedestrians are unable to use the public space, which is their right. Nevertheless, they cannot deny the advantages and conveniences of buying commodities from street vendors.

A number of non-governmental organizations had conducted surveys on street vending and consumers all over India. In Kolkata, the most important union of hawkers, the

Hawkers’ “Sangram” [Struggle] Committee, carried out a survey between April 1999 and

March 2000. The survey revealed that people from all sections of the economy bought commodities extensively from street vendors. “A section of the upper income group

240 patronized some food hawkers because of the taste and flavours. The middle income groups bought clothes, vegetables and fruits from street vendors as these were cheap and fresh.

The main beneficiaries were the urban poor. These people purchased nearly all their necessities from street vendors because of the low prices” (Bhowmik, 2012).243

My inquiry of the residents of the Regent Estate revealed similar responses. Many went to plush malls regularly to buy products such as clothes but most, including the regular visitors to malls preferred to buy commodities for daily use from street vendors due to the affordability of goods:

Who wants to pay an exorbitant price for something very similar to what you can get in the local market (referring to items of daily use such as shoes and bags)? In fact, I would always prefer to buy things here [from street vendors] than from malls as most of their items are overpriced and if somebody argues that those are of better quality than the locally-made ones, then I will say that may be some of those are of better quality, but the advantage of quality is largely offset by the sky- high prices…only people who are filthy rich or are stupid would like to be duped (personal interview; May, 2011).

The environment of the mall, however, scores high among those middle-lass consumers who might prefer to go to an air-conditioned mall than haggle in the streets, especially, due to inclement weather, during the summer months. The sentiments and opinions of men and women, especially the elderly and middle-aged groups, were similar, as through experience they have realized the advantages of street vendors over malls.244

Nevertheless there is an inherent contradiction in the preferences of a section of the middle-class people, as they were also critical about the problems street vending can pose.

This is especially problematic if street trading is located in their immediate living space, thus “polluting the environment”, which is absolutely not desirable. The responses of the majority of the population reflected a form of the not-in-my-backyard [NIMBY] stance that acknowledged the importance of street vending but would not like to have it near their

241 places of residence. This perception is also observed with regard to proximity to slum areas and working class neighborhoods as long as a minimal socio-spatial distance could be maintained with minimal disruption within their spaces of living. It is therefore a parochial assumption that all members of the middle class are engaged in anti-poor politics and are making concerted efforts to remove “unaesthetic” slums from their neighborhoods. The actions and alliances are largely influenced by spatio-temporal contexts that are not only based on socio-cultural and discursive factors but also greatly predicated on material conditions.

5.4 The State, the Middle Class and the Working Class

The role of the state in urban-space making is undeniably of paramount importance.

The Indian state at various scales has to manage the politics of liberalization in conjunction with pressures both from above and below. The neoliberal state has been championing the causes and interests of the privileged classes and thus is actively engaged in the production of civic spaces seen as representative of a globalizing India. However, the Indian state at present is often “fragmented and conflicted as it oscillates between responding to the organized demands of the middle class communities and workers’ organizations”245, and struggles undertaken by the poor working class on a more unorganized form. The terrain of urban spatial politics is thus fraught with contestations, negotiations, and enabling and disabling factors.

Thus, the local state does not always act on the behalf, and at the behest, of the middle class. The dynamics of the political situation condition state actions. With regard to spatial politics in the middle class neighborhood of Regent Estate, the contradictory role of

242 the local state in relation to the privileged and subordinate classes can be seen. One of the major problems in Regent Estate is the adequate and proper supply of drinking water. Given that it is a relatively upscale neighborhood, the problem of drinking water does not seem to be likely, but it is, in fact, a grave one:

We have been facing a major problem of inadequate and inconsistent supply of drinking water for a long time. We do not get water from Kolkata Corporation but from Public Health and Engineering (PHE), which is not good quality water, and the supply is also not adequate. We have been trying to resolve the issue for a long time now by asking the corporation to provide adequate drinking water.... When Regent Estate came into being there were about 60-65 people but now that has increased to 8,000. Therefore, the infrastructure that was used to supply water to a handful people is not good enough for 8,000. Although it has been about 50 years, the pipeline and infrastructure have not been upgraded to fit the need and demand of our times…. I have talked with the mayor and he said that we cannot have water from Garden Reach (a major water pumping station and reservoir, supplying water to large areas of Kolkata). Our surrounding areas get water from Garden Reach twice a day and those are the ‘colony’ areas. The mayor said that giving water to us from Garden Reach would mean depriving them to a certain extent. Therefore so far they have been deterred from doing it. Also, the level of resistance the colony-people can put up is much more … we are ‘bhadrolok’ (gentlemen), we cannot fight with the government as much as them … they have a high fighting spirit (personal interview; June, 2011).

The state has to strike a fine balance between conflicting interests and it cannot always be assumed that the state will take the side of the privileged classes. Here the working class is regarded as important as a substantial electoral base, so enraging them is strategically avoided.

Further, as we noted above, the residents of Regent Estate complained about usage of their living space by people coming from the adjoining “colony” areas for merrymaking, sometimes drinking alcohol and using their private ponds. To control the former problem, the residents even sought direct help from the state by instituting a police patrol. But that was not granted for an extended period of time. The main reason for that was the apparent bias towards the problems of the working class over the middle class:

243 Police says that we cannot be installing patrol for an extended period of time and justifies their acts saying, gentlemen like us can sit at home or bars and drink but where will the poor people go? So they come in a desolate place like our neighborhood and drink and that should be tolerated to some extent, what can you say after this response from the police (personal interview; June, 2011).246

With regard to taking measures for unauthorized usages of the twin-ponds too the police has not been keen to help and has appealed to the residents to go for an amicable settlement. The local state machineries do not want to elicit resistance from the poor.

Therefore, the concepts of private space and its unauthorized use are challenged by the working class based on their material needs, and the state and its machineries to consolidate its electoral base sometimes uphold these. This is not to say that the state and its appurtenances such as the police take the sides of the working class for political reasons.

Rather electoral possibilities, the specific socio-material conditions in that particular context, and of course the continuous struggle between classes shape the outcomes.

5.5 Conclusion

The new middle class in India is presented as the main driver of urban-space

(re)making politics. It is argued in the mainstream literature that the members of the class are not only actively contributing toward the new urban development, but they are also deemed the greatest beneficiaries of neoliberal urban politics. Thus the middle class is supposedly the epitome of shining (urban) India and symbolizes the globalizing class that aspires to live in world-class cities, thereby conditioning the nature and course of urban development in India.

In this chapter, I argued that middle-class politics is much more contingent in nature than it is generally considered to be. Also, I asserted that the ascendancy of the new Indian

244 middle class is largely a social construction that is economically and politically motivated.

Its primacy is not just in the size of the class believed to contribute toward the demand for urban (re)development processes in recent times, but the construction of the idea of the middle class also serves ideological purposes. Based on my analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, as well as this one, I also believe that the focus on, and glorification of, the middle class is a divisive force that, deliberately or not, depoliticizes class struggle. Therefore, a better understanding of its role (including the nature and direction of its politics) in urban-space making and restructuring processes can be gained by studying it in relation to the underlying socio-material and structural conditions. I thus call for a more nuanced analysis of the “emerging” middle class in India and its associated politics in shaping urban-space

(re)making.

In order to understand the nature of the new middle class it is important to scrutinize the size of the middle class. It is especially significant in the light of the growing claims that the size of the class is rising thereby vindicating the current form of urban development in India. It is however a daunting task to precisely define the middle class due to high levels of class differentiation. Many criteria are used to delineate the middle class such as income, consumption patterns, aspirational traits, educational qualifications and so on. The estimate of class size varies enormously. With strict measures it is assessed to be less than five million, while a more expansive definition estimates it to be more than five hundred million (varying, in other words, from about 0.5% to 50% of the total population!).

Most sources agree that due to the difficulties in calculating the size of the middle class, the higher numbers are a gross exaggeration. The middle class is also being produced through the policies and widening of economic scopes in the post-liberalization period. The upper echelons of the class—comprising primarily the visible professionals employed in the

245 information processing and highly specialized tertiary sectors—are nurtured and promoted by domestic and international capital with the support of the state. The importance of the middle class in India, however, does not emanate only from its real or perceived size. It is the creation of the idea of the middle class as a homogenous entity that stands for the idealized representation of a class that sets the normative standard towards which the majority of the subalterns can or at least are expected to aspire. The active production of the idea of middle class by the ruling bloc247 serves as a means to legitimize that state and capital’s actions. Since it predominantly involves dispossession and marginalization of the subalterns, it thus helps in averting resistance from below in the context of (neoliberal) urban development. It creates a class of people, which aids in consolidating capital’s interests through expansion and intensification of conspicuous consumption. Moreover, this also helps in curtailing antagonism among the masses by eliciting consent and support for the current model of urban development along with its associated politics. The concept of

“middle class” thus provides an ideological framework that fetishizes the inherent tensions between antagonistic classes (based on production relations). The (idea of) middle class, materially and symbolically, acts as a buffer between the ruling bloc and the underprivileged classes.248

The middle class is supposedly engaged in an overt exclusionary politics that translates into spatial purification processes, thereby resulting in socio-spatial marginalization. This, however, is not universally applicable. There are various contingent factors that play an important role in shaping middle-class spatial activism. Through a study of an (upper) middle class neighborhood in Kolkata, I not only explicate the exclusionary politics that middle-class members engage in, but I also problematize the essentialization of the nature and course of middle-class politics. Experiential and material conditions are

246 significant in the analysis of middle-class politics. It is not just highly opportunistic as alleged by many scholars; it is marked with contradictions, which are embedded and driven by socio-cultural and material conditions. It is also the heterogeneity of the (middle) class that makes it possible to hope for forging democratic politics in favor of the majority of the poor working class. For instance, a large section of the middle class lies at the lower end of the stratification system and has more socio-economic commonalities with the urban poor.

However, I believe instead of overemphasizing the role and essentializing the nature of middle class as anti-poor, it is also important to study its politics in conjunction with material conditions rooted in production relations. Capitalism anyhow makes fetishization of production relations both necessary and possible due to its inherent mystification of exploitative conditions that generate surplus value (Marx, 1976). Additionally, the focus on distributional and consumptive relations, where class is envisaged as an outcome of income, occupation and skill differentials, thus categorizing it as upper, middle and lower classes, acts as a divisive force. This aids the ruling classes in obscuring the antagonism inherent in the production domain and diverting attention to distributional conflicts. It thus contributes partly in depoliticizing class struggle, primarily confining struggles within the working class(es) (including the middle class if considered from its position in the sphere of production). It is undeniable that the conceptualization of class from distributional standpoints is important. In fact, the concept of class in reality is much more complex than just dividing it into two broad categories based on capitalist production relations—working class and capitalist class. In order to carve out a democratic and progressive politics that challenges the status quo in society, it is crucial not to disparage the significance of social classes based on the sphere of distribution. A true historical-materialist perspective should

247 thus aim at identifying the common interests within working classes and unraveling the inherent tensions between working and capitalist classes.

NOTES

197 By the term “middle class” I am primarily referring to the urban middle class in the metropolitan cities such as Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore and Hyderabad. Due to limitations and relative irrelevance to my work, I am steering away from any analysis of the rural middle class and middle class in the small towns and cities in India. 198 See Varma, 1998; Fernandes, 2006 199 This is in reference to the India Shining campaign popularized by the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP]- -a “Hindu Nationalist” right wing Party-- for the general elections in 2004. 200 See Varma, 1998; Appadurai, 2000; Fernandes, 2006, Harriss, 2008; Anjaria, 2009; Ahmed, 2011 201 Wacquant (1991:57) asserts that the middle class is “constituted through material and symbolic struggles, waged simultaneously over class and between classes…the middle class is necessarily an ill-defined entity”. He further notes that to be able to capture the reality of the middle class, it is important not to draw strict boundaries; rather one should acknowledge the ambiguity and fluidity of the notion (ibid.). I do recognize that there are advantages to not force a definition on the highly complex concept, which in reality is extremely heterogeneous, as its innate characteristic is differentiation. I do think, however, that an exploratory definition is necessary in order to grasp the reality to some extent. Otherwise, anything and everything can be enfolded within the concept, making it even more chaotic than it already is. I am therefore offering a working definition of middle class that I have used in my research and that has helped guide me in the analysis. 202 Dickey, 2012 203 With respect to West Bengal in particular, traditionally, middle class is based on the ideal category of “bhadralok” [it literally means gentlemen, denoting respectable people], a term that signifies the aristocratic literati drawn from the highly educated, upper-castes of pre-colonial and colonial Bengal (Scrase and Ganguly-Scrase, 2011). The middle class of Bengal too aspired to upward social mobility

248 through refinement and (English) education in the colonial times (Chatterjee, 1997). The members of the middle class in West Bengal also formed an implicitly supportive social base for accepting liberalization of the economy. 204 Varma, 1998 205 Again, in another categorization scheme based on income itself, NCAER had put the estimate of middle class to be two hundred and fifty million out of one billion population in India (which comprises about twenty to twenty five percent of the population). The income categories used in the former study included groups with income above than Rs. 96000; between Rs. 70001-96000; Rs. 45001-70000; Rs. 22501-45000; and below Rs. 22500 annual income of households (ibid.). These discrepancies in the findings by the same governmental organization about the size of the middle class, sheds light on the difficulties and ambiguities in locating the middle class. This categorization is not very accurate in reflecting the strength and purchasing power of the classes within the middle- income groupings. A person having an annual income of Rs. 70000 is significantly different in her purchasing power to another person whose income is Rs. 22500. Further, how can a person with an annual income of Rs. 22500 be compared to another person whose income is more than Rs. 96000, where there is no upper limit to this category? 206 The following statistical data and analysis are heavily drawn upon a study by Partho Sarathi Ray published in “Sanhati Selections” (2008) titled “Will the ‘Great Indian middle class’ show up, please?” Source: http://sanhati.com/excerpted/743/ accessed on 24th January 2014 207 In 2004-05 the currency rate was $1 is equivalent to Rs. 45.91 in July 2004 208 To give a better idea about the method of calculation and to put the figures in comparative perspective, I am quoting an excerpt at length by Ray (2008). “Based on these values, each household was classified as one of the following: ‘extremely poor’ when the MPCE is less than or equal to 0.75 times the poverty line (PL), ‘poor’ when the MPCE is greater than 0.75 PL but less than or equal to 1.0 PL, ‘marginal’ when MPCE is greater than 1.0 PL but less than or equal to 1.25 PL, ‘vulnerable’ when MPCE is greater than 1.25 PL but less than or equal to 2.0 PL, ‘middle income’ when MPCE is greater than 2.0 PL but less than or equal to 4.0 PL and ‘high income’ when MPCE is greater than 4 PL. Before we go into the details of what percentage of our population belongs to each group, it would be instructive to know what the poverty line is. There is considerable criticism about the determination of the poverty line in India, which systematically underestimates poverty and deprivation. The authors of the report determine the poverty line from the data of the employment-unemployment survey (EUS) and the results are not very different from the official poverty line estimates. For example, the official poverty line for 2004-05 is Rs 356.3 for rural areas and Rs 538.6 for urban areas whereas the poverty line as computed by the commission is Rs 346.2 for rural areas and Rs 514.0 for urban areas. It is also important to know that for international comparison purposes, people below purchasing power parity (PPP) of $1 are considered extremely poor and those below PPP of $2 are considered poor. $2 at PPP therefore signifies a sort of international poverty line. Now, coming back to the data from the NCEUS, we find that the extremely poor have an average DPCE of just Rs 9 (PPP $1), the poor has DPCE of Rs 12 (PPP $1.3), the marginal, Rs 15 (PPP $1.6), and the vulnerable, Rs 20 (PPP $2.2). The middle income group has an average DPCE of Rs 37 (PPP $4) and the high income group has an average DPCE, the highest in India, of Rs 93 (PPP $10.2). These estimates are nationwide averages including rural and urban areas. These data by themselves are startling. The extremely poor, the poor, the marginal and vulnerable on an average subsist on less than Rs 20 per day and on less than Rs 600 per month (remember that the average to and fro train fare for an overnight journey in the lowest reserved class is around Rs 600; therefore, not withstanding Lalu Prasad’s “populist” rail budgets, a train journey in a reserved compartment is out of bounds for all these people). The middle income group in India has an average daily consumption of the princely sum of Rs 37 and an average monthly consumption of Rs 1,098 which is just double the international poverty line (the airfare for a single journey in one of the low-cost air lines is around Rs 3000, which means that the airports and the proliferating airlines are not for these people). This leaves the high income group, and even the presence of the Tatas and the Ambanis, and the 53 dollar billionaires of

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India who contribute 31% of the GDP, and the thousands of conspicuously-consuming software professionals, does not pull the average DPCE of this group above Rs 93. This means that for an overwhelming number of people in this group, the DPCE would be much below Rs 93, and would be actually closer to the average DPCE of the middle income group”. Source: http://sanhati.com/excerpted/743/ accessed on 24th January, 2014 209 Fernandes and Heller, 2006 210 Brosius, 2010 211 Gupta borrows the term from Iranian scholar, Jalal-e-Ahmed, to denote the uncritical adoption of consumerism of the West, but without concomitant acceptance of the ideals based on equality and democracy, thereby believing that consumerism itself is all that is to be “modern” (see Gupta, 2001; Luce, 2011). 212 Similarly, Varma (1998) also criticizes the faddist consumerism among the Indian middle class to be selfish without the acknowledgement of the vast population who linger in abject poverty. 213 Bourdieu (1986) concedes, “Cultural capital can exist in three forms: in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state, in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.)…and in the institutionalized state” such as educational qualification (p. 47). Thus these are non-economic assets, which define a particular social class as these serve as marks of distinction. “Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group” that can be effectively used as a means to strengthen and facilitate one’s class position or movement from one class to the other (p. 51) 214 Source: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2006-06-23/news/27461204_1_costs- entry-level-indian-engineers accessed on 16th December, 2013 215 Roy, 2006; Masters Thesis 216 Source: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2006-06-23/news/27461204_1_costs- entry-level-indian-engineers accessed on 16th December, 2013 217 The interest rates are high, for automobile loans it is 12% for the first year and for home loans it is 10% for the first year (Chowdhury, 2011: 67). 218 Source: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/ind_aag.pdf accessed on 19th January, 2014 219 Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indias-income-inequality-has-doubled-in-20- years/articleshow/11012855.cms accessed on 9th February, 2014 220 Source: http://www.oecd.org/site/worldforumindia/Davies.pdf accessed on 24th January, 2014

221 Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/India-has-254000- members-of-the-top-1-of-global-wealth-holders-Report/articleshow/23816867.cms accessed on 24th January, 2014 222 See Ghosh, 1994; Fernandes, 2000 223 The latest World Development Report by the World Bank says India’s youth unemployment — as a percentage of the youth work force — was 9.9% for males and 11.3% for females in 2010. In 1985, the figures were 8.3% and 8%, respectively. Source: http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/11/23/young-jobless-and-indian/ accessed on 29th March, 2014 224 See Chapters 3 and 4 225 In Chapter 4 we delved into the complicit role of the urban middle class in relation to the state in molding urban spaces. Here, even though the state’s connection with urban-space making politics is undeniable, it is much more implicit as opposed to what we saw in chapter 4. 226 It is a phrase used by a respondent during my fieldwork interview process. 227 $1 is equivalent to Rs. 45, based on the currency exchange rate in June 2011 when the interviews were conducted. 228 It is a part of an excerpt of my interview conducted during my fieldwork.

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229 Durga puja is the most important festival among Hindu Bengalis that happens during end of September or beginning of October every year. 230 Sibley, 1995; Fernandes, 2006 231 See Chapter 2 232 Donner, 2011 233 The level of intolerance varied between residents, as one resident mentioned, “what is the point in being a selfish giant and not allowing little children to use the playground? Where will they play otherwise?” (personal, interview; June, 2011). 234 See below for more details. 235 Initially, it started as one elongated pond, but with gradual siltation and garbage piling, the pond bifurcated into two ponds; thus the nomenclature as twin-ponds. 236 Apart from some journalistic reports, there is little academic work on this theme. 237 Smith, 1996 238 These terms were used in various conversations with the residents while defining the poor people in slum and colony areas and more generally to poor working class people. 239 The meaning of the ladies club in Bengali relates to the female power, symbolized by Goddess Durga. 240 Varma, 1998; also see Kapur, 2010 241 As Marx (1976) says, experience influences or shapes our consciousness (along with ideas, of course, but those are also not entirely divorced from any material basis). 242 Bandyopadhyay, 2009; also see Bhowmik, 2009 243 Source: http://www.inclusivecities.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/Bhowmik_Urban_Responses_to_Street _Trading_India.pdf accessed on 14th January, 2014 244 In my study, the middle aged and elder population’s opinions were given greater importance especially because they are the main consumers as well as exercise political agency in shaping urban spaces. This is opposed to views of the younger population, who did have a preference of malls over street vendors, though. 245 Fernandes, 2006: 172 246 It is also likely that the limited resources do not allow the institution of police patrol for a longer period of time in the middle class neighborhoods. 247 By ruling bloc I refer to the coalition between state, capital and elite classes, also the middle class which in actions reproduces the hegemony (Deshpande, 2003). 248 Also see Deshpande, 2003

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Chapter 6

Conclusion

The main objective of my research was to examine the nature and course of the new urban development in India. I focused on the city of Kolkata and its peripheral areas, situated in the eastern part of the country.

6.1 Key Theoretical Contributions

The new urban development in India—involving urban-space making and restructuring processes—is an integral part of the planning agenda today. It is often considered the panacea for the developmental problems faced by the country. With the shift in planning focus from rural to urban development at the national and provincial state levels, Indian cities and urban peripheries are undergoing drastic changes. I sought to answer particular questions regarding the new urban development in India.

With regard to the main focus of my research, it was important to understand the rationale of the current urban development in India. Taking an historical-geographical materialist approach and embedding class struggle as the key component, urban-space

(re)making is explained primarily as a necessity for unrestrained accumulation and consequently as a means for the intensification of the commodification and speculative processes, and redistribution of surpluses.

252 The primary contributions of my study are with respect to the following strands of literature. Broadly, my study challenges the mainstream claims that urban space creation and upgradation is key to the development of the majority of the population. My work argued that subsumption of space within the capitalist fold through urban-space making relying on primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession does not necessarily result in greater development. Rather, urban development on the fringes of Kolkata has resulted in patchy and skewed socio-spatial outcomes. Therefore, the argument forwarded by mainstream scholars and policy-makers that the path towards development is through the establishment of capitalist relations by ABD currently made possible and believed to be desirable through urban-space making is unfounded. I demonstrated that restructuring is not aimed at the betterment of the poor majority, as is often gloriously portrayed in the mainstream arena. I asserted that the impacts on the poor working class are socio-spatially marginalizing, thus accentuating the unevenness of urban geographies. However, the actually existing geographies are etched through continuous class struggle.

Further, my empirical study also helps in the understanding of the concept of accumulation by dispossession. First, it draws an analytical distinction between accumulation by dispossession and commodification (including labor). It is often presupposed in the literature that accumulation by dispossession leads to commodification of labor or proletarianization, but in the context of India it is hardly so. In fact, due to dispossession and displacement, especially on the urban fringes, a large section of the population has been rendered “relatively surplus”. Capitalism not only generates uneven geographical development but also requires so for its continual expansion and intensification. India testifies historically and geographically to an acute form of uneven capitalist development, so absorption of the “released population” from land through

253 accumulation by dispossession has severe limits. The process of accumulation by dispossession is intrinsically connected to the process of proletarianization or commodification of labor power (to become wage-labor) but does not always necessarily lead to the latter, especially in the Indian context. In this sense, the new urban development is the exacerbation and perpetuation of the historical geography of capitalism in the country.

Second, my work also contributes to a better understanding of the process of accumulation by dispossession both theoretically and politically. Accumulation by dispossession is essential in understanding the happenings of urban-space (re)making in

India. There is a general tendency to overemphasize the use of extra-economic coercion as the means to accumulation by dispossession. In fact, many scholars have actually defined accumulation by dispossession principally based on the means through which ABD takes place rather than the nature or purpose of it. Extra-economic coercion, in these works, seems to be the distinguishing feature that separates ABD from expanded reproduction or capitalist accumulation proper. But my work shows that ABD is primarily not about the means through which ABD takes place. In the context of my empirical study it can be seen that along with extra-economic coercion, consensual mechanisms played an important role, including the ideological framework that was actively erected and used to manufacture consent. Even market imperatives were important in eliciting the consent of many farmers to give up their land for the lure of better prospects in the upcoming city, which was partly strategically deployed by the state. I contended that even though extra-economic coercion is important, it is not necessary. Rather, it is contingent on the historical-geographical context.

Further, politically, this argument is important to forging an effective and successful anti- capitalist politics. Conceptualizing ABD through violence and coercion is problematic, as that would present a distorted picture of the reality concerning dispossession and the new

254 urban development in India. Therefore, misconstruing urban development politics in the current context will be an impediment in carving out successful anti-dispossession and anti- capitalist movements.

Moreover, I aimed at understanding how global forces are implicated at the local scales in shaping urban-space creation and restructuring processes. In the current context, I situated my work within the urban entrepreneurial approach and world city framework in understanding the processes of global territorial competition impinging at the local level.

The drive of inter-place competition thus partly accounts for the degree of ruthlessness with which the onslaught of urban development (based on a neoliberal paradigm) is felt on a local scale. This creates tension between global forces and local conditions. There is a serious lacuna in the current literature in understanding the accumulation process in the context of urban India as a tension-ridden class project. The existing scholarship also valorized either global actions or local specificities. However, in the currently increasing globalizing world, the local needs to be implicated on a global scale. I argued for the primacy of accumulation process in the process of (world) city making. My study illustrated the growing role of international financial institutions, which fulfill crucial auxiliary functions for transnational capital, in remaking urban-spaces at the local level in the Global South. In this regard, I asserted that global city discourses play an important role in constructing the ideological framework that in turn affect the urban development politics as seen in India today. My study explicated how the necessity of convincing people to give up their means of living—land—becomes more important in the context of urban-space making in India as compared to industrial establishments. In this regard, the state’s actions hinge largely upon a strong ideological framework. The social construction and fetishization of world-city

255 development and urban citizenship are proactively pursued through discursive and material mechanisms.

The role of the state gains prominence in facilitating unhindered accumulation (by dispossession) in direct collusion with capital in influencing the new urban development in

India. The state not only lays down material conditions favoring accumulation but also— along with the media and civic organizations—serves as an important conduit of change and restructuration of identities by disseminating and popularizing the dominant ideology regarding modernization. However, the politics from above is dialectically shaped by the nature and intensity of class conflict that in turn affect the workings of the state. In my work,

I unpack the role of the local state embedded within the politico-economic matrix at multiple scales. In this regard, along with radical political movements, I also examine the micro-politics of the urban subalterns in the form of coping strategies and covert resistances. But I do so by situating it broadly in the material conditions that shape the nature and course of class struggle that includes the “everyday practices” and overt resistances. How all this in turn influences the urban space remaking and the politics from above is something I have tried to delve into in this study.

With regard to other actors vis-à-vis the state in influencing the nature and course of urban development, I also problematized the concept of the new Indian middle class and cast a new light on its politics. In the current literature, the new middle class in India is presented as the main motivating force for the urban-space (re)making politics. It is also seen as the greatest beneficiary of neoliberal urban politics. Thus the middle class is supposedly the epitome of shining (urban) India and symbolizes the globalizing class. I argued that the ascendancy of the new Indian middle class is largely a socioeconomic construction that is also politically motivated. It is being produced through the policies and

256 subsequent widening of income among classes in the post-liberalization period. The upper echelons of the class—comprising primarily visible professionals employed in the information processing and highly specialized tertiary sectors—are nurtured and promoted by domestic and international capital with the support of the state. The importance of the middle class in India, however, does not emanate only from its real or perceived size. It is the creation of the idea of the middle class as a homogenous entity that stands for idealized representations of a class that sets the normative standard to which the majority of the subalterns can aspire. The concept of the “middle class” thus provides an ideological framework that fetishizes the inherent tensions between antagonistic classes (based on production relations). The (idea of) middle class, materially and symbolically, acts as a buffer between the ruling bloc and the underprivileged classes. I contended that middle class politics is much more contingent in nature than it is generally considered to be. I also asserted that the focus on and glorification of the middle class is a divisive force that is a deliberate attempt to depoliticize class struggle. Therefore, I proposed that a better understanding of the role of the middle class (including the nature and direction of its politics) in urban-space making and restructuring processes would be achieved by studying it in relation to the underlying socio-material and structural conditions. Experiential and material conditions are significant in the analysis of middle class politics. It is not just highly opportunistic, as alleged by many scholars; it is marked with contradictions, which are embedded and driven by socio-cultural and material conditions. The heterogeneity of the

(middle) class also makes it possible to hope for forging democratic politics in favor of the majority of the poor working class. For instance, a large section of the middle class lies in the lower strata and has more socioeconomic commonalities with the urban poor, making

257 its political interests (at least potentially) overlap. I thus called for a more nuanced look at middle-class politics based on spatio-temporal specificities.

6.2 Gaps in the Study and Future Research Themes

My fieldwork experience indicates that many dispossessed farmers unable to find jobs in the industrial and service sectors have had to resort to self-employment. There is a burgeoning number of self-employed people in the informal sector consisting mostly of the dispossessed people of India. Self-employed workers comprised about 56% of the total workforce in the Indian economy in 2004-05, which has risen significantly in recent years.

The individual self-employed persons or “the petty producers,” in many instances cannot survive in the highly competitive market and as a result they end up in a pauperized state.

They become all the more vulnerable to extremely exploitative relations in the spheres of both exchange and production (labor market and workplace). Under these desperate conditions, they are, therefore, often compelled to sell their labor power at very low wage rates (sometimes at starvation wages) endlessly re-commodifying their labor power spatially and temporally, i.e., many become migrant workers moving from one place to another, which can range from very short stints to very long periods of migratory labor. The condition of easy availability of workers makes disposability a possibility, particularly for low-skilled jobs as observed in my study area. Moreover, since there are many laborers available for the same work, capitalists are not interested in the proper reproduction of labor power. Under these circumstances, instituting a repressive labor regime in the spaces of production becomes increasingly plausible. My dissertation focused primarily on the topic of urban (land) politics; the sphere of capitalist production largely predicated on

258 exploitative relations and the subsequent geographies of labor emerged as important aspects that need further investigation. This needs to be situated and examined in relation to the global neoliberal order as a class project (Harvey, 2006).

Further, my findings challenged the often repeated and commonly held claims made in the literature that employment is the key to women’s empowerment (see Bergmann,

2005; Omvedt, 1980; Sen, 1990). In my study, with the deterioration of the material conditions of the resident population, the status of women has not led to their empowerment or emancipation. I believe contextual factors are important in accounting for the relationship between gender and work. Employment does not necessarily imply empowerment or degradation of women’s status; contingent factors play a key role in determining the course of development. This, however, is a provisional conclusion, given the fact that capitalist relations have not yet deeply penetrated and subsumed the pre- capitalist relations on the urban periphery of Kolkata. Due to time restrictions, I was unable to delve deeper into the issue but it surely begs for greater attention. Similarly, caste, religious and regional identities are important aspects that cut across class relations. In this study, I have partly abstracted from the implications of non-class identities in the present context, whose consideration may provide a more nuanced look at the politics of the new urban development in India.

"No system, including that of human society, can exist in empty space; it is surrounded by an 'environment,' on which all its conditions ultimately depend. If human society is not adapted to its environment, it is not meant for this world” (Bukharin, 1925).249

Accumulation processes affect the environment in diverse ways. On the urban fringes and in the city of Kolkata, dispossession politics not only affected land and labor but had serious ecological and environmental impacts. Since my research questions did not particularly deal

259 with this issue, I have not probed into the relation between accumulation and the politics of nature. However, urban-space making and restructuring processes are deeply intertwined with ecological and environmental factors, as seen in the destruction of “Dhupir Bil” (water- body) in the Rajarhat New Town and its implications for the people. Therefore, a pertinent question that evolves is how do urban-space (re)making politics affect and reproduce the ecological environment in the Third World context? And what are its socio-economic implications in relation to pre-capitalist societies?

6.3 Political Contributions and Policy Prospects

“The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it” (Marx, 1845: 158; Eleven Theses on Feuerbach).

My interviews with the dispossessed and displaced population suggested that they were not averse to “development” per se, but they did question the concept and implications of such a developmental model (based on neoliberalism) that is socially and spatially marginalizing. Even though most of them did not understand the ideological underpinnings of the urban developmental model pursued by the state currently, through their experiences they realized the oppressive and unjust nature of it.

The guiding doctrine for development should be a truly democratic allocation, control and utilization of resources (including space production and consumption) for the people, by the people and of the people. This is probably a truism that development should be primarily aimed at using production to meet the needs of the disenfranchised population, but it should not be only in rhetoric but aim at actually mobilizing the means to realize the

260 goal. In this regard, it is important to fashion out a strategy, which will be based on the contextual specificities of West Bengal.

Urban development does not necessarily mean dispossession of the means of production from farmlands, especially the productive ones—as is evident in my case studies situated in West Bengal. Even though there are not many parts in the state of West Bengal that are devoid of any agricultural production, there are areas, which are not as fertile as some other parts. Therefore, displacing and dispossessing population from densely populated regions and devouring very productive agricultural land should not be the means to urban-space making in the first place. Further, adequate compensation is a must to not only the dispossessed but also the entire land dependent population. In this regard, the application of the colonial act of 1894 land Acquisition is not only obsolete but also unfair.

This is partly addressed by the Central Government in India with the recent introduction of the new land legislation—Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013—but how effectively it is applied needs to be seen. Since land is not regarded (in my study context) just a transferable resource and is considered as a great source of sustenance and security, compensation packages should account for this fact. Moreover, the rate of returns from the developed land is enormously high compared to the compensation granted to the dispossessed population.

This needs to be addressed by compensating the land dependent population adequately with a sustained income source such as a guaranteed job to a member of the family in the service sectors of the upcoming city. In case of a city the possibility of providing employment is higher due to the diverse economic activities. Further, compensation is not just about economic needs but other socio-cultural facilities such as educational and medical institutes are also important. In so doing urban-space making should not have to be

261 exclusionary and it should be truly not just for attracting new people but also accommodating the original population.

The ravages of dispossession and displacement can be minimized by true participation and involvement of the local people in the planning and execution of the urban development process. This is valid for new urban space creation on the fringes as well as for restructuring processes within the cities—as is observed in the case of squatters (canal- bank dwellers). It should be based on the real needs of the people, where local people and their knowledge (a form of participatory endeavor) could be exploited in the development process. Even the resettlement and rehabilitation package should be planned based on their needs and expectations. Wherever possible in situ development of the canal-bank dwellers should be sought; whether the canal-bank dwellers want a resettlement or and where they would prefer and in what form should not be decided in a top-down manner. Rather true consultation and cooperation with the concerned population are crucial for successful materialization of urban development.

However, all this presumes an underlying principle of democratic, inclusive and just development of the majority of the population, and that is not the basic tenet of neoliberalism. Therefore, achieving the above-mentioned goals through policy changes is not possible under the current neoliberal paradigm due to its inherent limitations. It is not only important to engage in rigorous criticism (theoretically and politically) of the current system, but also to challenge it materially through class struggle. This is what has the potential to institute a more democratic and just system that will in turn shape the urban- space making and restructuring processes. In this regard, it is important to bring together the struggles of the displaced and dispossessed population on the urban fringes and the subalterns in the existing cities.

262 My dissertation was an attempt to provide a critical analysis of the new urban development in India; it was also intended to explore the possibilities of radical democratic politics in ushering in a more just society for the majority of the population. I would like to delineate the common grounds that are evolving for socio-political movements that are actually (sometimes potentially) challenging the hegemonic order. In this regard, the theme of the right to the city is significant as it not only pertains to the question of urban citizenship, i.e., who belongs to the city and has the right to occupy and use the public spaces, but also refers to the right to change the character and function of the city and, in the process, the local state system (Harvey, 2008).250 I assert that in the current context of

India, the question of the right to the city tantamount to a right to a living for many. The state is actively involved in enclosing public spaces and communally held resources such as land and water, which were hitherto (urban) commons catering to the needs of the poor.

Given the level of dependence of the poor on the commons in the Indian context, this is existentially more threatening as compared to the cities of the Global North (see Mitchell,

2003). The concept of the right to the city thus is not just parochial questioning about possible reformism for accommodation of the poor but a radical change of the current politico-economic order (Purcell, 2003).

The dispossessed farmers on the urban periphery and the evicted canal-bank dwellers are both engaged in resistance politics pertaining to their right to the city. Initially, many farmers fought against the land acquisition policy, and even the ones who had agreed to give up their land did so under the impression that the city that was being built was for them. Instead, their experiences have been quite to the contrary. Therefore, along with the evicted slum dwellers, the displaced farmers have similar grievances and demands— to be able to have a proper place in the city for a dignified living.

263 As Piven and Cloward (1977) put it, urban subalterns experience deprivations and oppression within a concrete setting, and not as a consequence of some abstract processes.

It is the daily struggle of people that shapes their grievances, establishes the measure of their demands, and points out the targets of their anger. However, these experiences are not simply isolated instances of offenses and frustration. Rather, they provide critical clues to the underlying structures and relationships, which are for the most part not apparent

(Wainwright, 1994 as cited in Cox and Nilsen, 2013). These obscure structures and relationships, which the subalterns may apparently not be very aware of, are made more explicit when (political) movement participants connect. In that context, the interactions between the seemingly disparate struggles find a common platform for sharing and extending their “fragmented knowledge.” This happens in ways that enable the disenfranchised population to develop a better understanding of the power structures so as to direct their efforts in such a way that their intentions might be more effectively realized.

“This, in turn, means that the grievances, demands, and targets may expand: from oppositional collective action bound by scope, aims and cultural ‘language’ to a specific, situated and local experience, towards mutual recognition across differences in wider- ranging and more radical projects for change” (Cox and Nilsen, 2013: 74).

With regard to the possibilities of radical political movements, I completely agree with E.P. Thompson (1978:149). Here I quote him at length: “Far too much theoretical attention (much of it plainly ahistorical) has been paid to class and far too little to class struggle. Indeed, class struggle is the prior, as well as the more universal, concept. To put it bluntly, classes do not exist as separate entities, look around, find an enemy class, and then start to struggle. On the contrary, people find themselves in a society structured in determined ways (crucial, but not exclusively, in productive relations), they experience

264 exploitation (or the need to maintain power over those whom they exploit), they identify points of antagonistic interest, they commence to struggle around these issues, and in the process of struggling they discover themselves as classes, they come to know this discovery as class-consciousness. Class and class-consciousness are always the last, not the first, stage in the real historical process.”

In this context, separate political movements are joining in a concrete arena such as the “Sramajibi Adhikar Jatra” (Movement for Wageworkers’ Rights) in Kolkata, which aims at collectively voicing the concerns of the marginalized population. It not only addresses the issue of rights to the city, but also incorporates people’s movements against other forms of exploitative relations under the neoliberal global order. A major concern common to many of these collective resistances is the polarizing and exclusionary nature of urban development politics. Participants from various parts of West Bengal joined the rally that took place as a part of the political movement during my fieldwork in April 2011. Among others, it included thousands of people, such as canal-bank dwellers, evicted hawkers, closed-factory workers, displaced farmers, unorganized workers engaged in the informal economy, pavement dwellers, and so on. Even though dispossession politics at the periphery and within the city cuts across multiple classes and so have diverse interests after dispossession and displacement, a potential common ground for these socio-political movements is the issue of the right to the city, which in fact can be seen as coalescing through various people’s movements as well as daily struggles for existence. This keeps kindling the hope for a more democratic politics focused on the question of true development for the majority of the people.

265 Notes

249 Source: http://www.marxists.org/archive/bukharin/works/1921/histmat/ accessed on 15th February, 2014 250 “The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from that of what kind of social ties, relationship to nature, lifestyles, technologies and aesthetic values we desire. The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights” (Harvey, 2008:23).

266

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