GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD
ANNUAL REPORT 2011-12 ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD
The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) was constituted on November 15, 1983 by the President of India by exercising the powers conferred by Section 27 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 (33 of 1962) to carry out certain regulatory and safety functions under the Act. The regulatory authority of AERB is derived from the rules and notifications promulgated under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Environment Protection Act, 1986. The mission of the Board is to ensure that the use of ionizing radiation in India does not cause undue risk to health of people and the environment. Currently, the Board consists of Chairman AERB, Chairman SARCOP (Ex officio), four Members from outside and a Secretary.
AERB carries out its functions through highly qualified work force and specialist committees under the guidance of the Board. Apex level committees include Safety Review Committee for Operating Plants (SARCOP), the Safety Review Committee for Applications of Radiation (SARCAR), Advisory Committees for Project Safety Review (ACPSRs), Advisory Committee on Radiological Safety (ACRS), Advisory Committee on Industrial and Fire Safety (ACIFS), Advisory Committee on Occupational Health (ACOH) and Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety (ACNS). The ACPSRs recommend to AERB issuance of authorizations at different stages of projects of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), after reviewing the submissions made by the project authorities based on the recommendations of the associated Project Design Safety Committees.
SARCOP carries out safety surveillance and enforces safety stipulations in the operating units of the DAE. SARCAR recommends measures to enforce radiation safety in medical, industrial and research institutions, which use radiation and radioactive sources. AERB receives advice on development of safety codes and guides and on generic nuclear, radiation and industrial safety issues from ACNS, ACRS, ACIFS and ACSDFCF. ACOH advises AERB on occupational health safety matters. The administrative and regulatory mechanisms in place ensure multi-tier review of all safety matters by experts in the relevant fields available nationwide. These experts come from reputed academic institutions, R&D organizations, industries and Governmental Agencies.
AERB has a Safety Research Institute (SRI) at Kalpakkam, which carries out research in various safety- related topics and organizes seminars, workshops and discussion meetings periodically.
AERB has seven technical divisions. Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Directors / Heads of Divisions and Director, SRI constitute the Executive Committee, which meets periodically and takes decisions on important matters related to the functioning of the organization. AERB enforces the following Rules issued under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962: lAtomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004. lAtomic Energy (Working of the Mines, Minerals and Handling of Prescribed Substance) Rules, 1984. lAtomic Energy (Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules, 1987. lAtomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996. lAtomic Energy (Control of Irradiation of Food) Rules, 1996. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
ANNUAL REPORT 2011-2012
ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD NIYAMAK BHAVAN, ANUSHAKTI NAGAR MUMBAI-400 094
Website : www.aerb.gov.in THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD
lDevelop safety policies in both radiation and industrial safety areas. lDevelop Safety Codes, Guides and Standards for siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of different types of nuclear and radiation facilities. lGrant consents for siting, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning, after an appropriate safety review and assessment, for establishment of nuclear and radiation facilities. lEnsure compliance with the regulatory requirements prescribed by AERB during all stages of consenting through a system of review and assessment, regulatory inspection and enforcement. lPrescribe the acceptance limits of radiation exposure to occupational workers and members of the public and acceptable limits of environmental releases of radioactive substances. lReview the emergency preparedness plans for nuclear and radiation facilities and during transport of large radioactive sources, irradiated fuel and fissile material. lReview the training program, qualifications and licensing policies for personnel of nuclear and radiation facilities and prescribe the syllabi for training of personnel in safety aspects at all levels. lTake such steps as necessary to keep the public informed on major issues of radiological safety significance. lPromote research and development efforts in the areas of safety. lMaintain liaison with statutory bodies in the country as well as abroad regarding safety matters. lReview the nuclear safety aspects in Nuclear Facilities under its purview. lReview the safety related nuclear security aspects in Nuclear Facilities under its purview. CONTENTS
Page No. CHAPTER 1 GENERAL 1 1.1 COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD 1 1.2 ORGANISATION CHART OF AERB 2 1.3 SUMMARY 3 CHAPTER 2 SAFETY REVIEW OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES 13 2.1 MEASURES TAKEN POST FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IN JAPAN 13 2.2 NUCLEAR POWER PROJECTS 15 2.2.1 Project Safety Review 15 2.2.2 Consents / Clearances / Permissions Issued 21 2.2.3 Regulatory Inspections of projects 21 2.3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND RESEARCH REACTORS 24 2.3.1 Safety Status of Operating Plants 24 2.3.2 Consents / Clearances / Permissions Issued 24 2.3.3 Operating Plants Safety Review 24 2.3.4 Regulatory Inspections 31 2.3.5 Licensing of Operating Staff 33 2.3.6 Significant Events 34 2.4 FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES 35 2.4.1 Operating Plants / Project Safety Review 35 2.4.2 Consents / Clearances / Permissions Issued 38 2.4.3 Regulatory Inspections 38 2.4.4 Licensing of Plant Personnel 40 2.5 R&D UNITS AND OTHER FACILITIES 40 2.5.1 Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre (VECC) 40 2.5.2 Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology (RRCAT) 41 2.5.3 Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) 41 CHAPTER 3 SAFETY REVIEW OF RADIATION FACILITIES 42 3.1 INTRODUCTION 42 3.2 APPROVALS AND CONSENTS 43 3.2.1 Type Approvals 43 3.2.2 Approval of Radiological Safety Officers 45 3.2.3 Approval of Packages for Transport of Radioactive Material 45 3.3 LICENSING / AUTHROIZATION 45 3.3.1 Licensing/Authorization 45 3.3.2 Shipments under Special Arrangement 47 3.4 REGULATORY INSPECTIONS 47 3.5 SAFETY SURVELLIANCE OF RADIATION FACILITIES 47 3.5.1 Radiation Diagnostic and Therapy Facilities 47 3.5.2 High Intensity Gamma Irradiation Facilities 47 3.5.3 Industrial Radiography Facilities 48 3.5.4 Nucleonic Gauging Facilities 48 3.5.5 Gamma Irradiation Chambers / Blood Irradiators 48 3.5.6 Transport of Radioactive Materials 48 3.5.7 Disposal of Radioactive Materials 48 3.6 UNUSUAL OCCURANCES AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 48 3.7 STRENGTHENING REGULATION OF RADIATION FACILITIES 50 3.8 FORMATION OF DIRECTORATE OF RADIATION SAFETY 50 3.9 REGIONAL REGULATORY CENTRES (RRC) OF AERB 50 CHAPTER 4 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY IN DAE UNITS 51 4.1 LICENSES ISSUED UNDER FACTORIES ACT, 1948 51 4.2 REGULATORY INSPECTIONS 51
(i) Page No. 4.3 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY STATISTICS 52 4.4 FATAL ACCIDENT 56 4.5 PROMOTION OF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY 56 4.5.1 DAE Safety and Occupational Health Professionals Meet 56 4.5.2 Industrial Safety Awards 56 4.5.3 Fire Safety Awards 56 4.5.4 Green Site Awards 57 4.6 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 57 4.6.1 Advisory Committee on Occupational Health 57 CHAPTER 5 ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES 58 5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY 58 5.2 OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES 62 CHAPTER 6 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 66 CHAPTER 7 SAFETY DOCUMENTS 67 7.1 NEW SAFETY DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED 67 7.2 SAFETY DOCUMENTS TRANSLATED AND PUBLISHED IN HINDI 68 7.3 SAFETY DOCUMENTS UNDER DEVELOPMENT 68 7.4 REVIEW OF IAEA DRAFT DOCUMENTS 69 CHAPTER 8 SAFETY STUDIES 70 8.1 SAFETY ANALYSIS 70 8.1.1 Behavior of High Performance Concrete Exposed to Fire 70 8.1.2 Hydrogen Sulphide Dispersion Analysis at Rawatbhata Site for Design Basis Accidents 70 8.1.3 International Round Robin Analysis on BARC Containment Test Model (BARCOM) 70 8.1.4 SBO Analysis of CANDU-6 Plant 71 8.1.5 Experimental Study on Transient CHF in Horizontal Channels 71 8.1.6 External Coupling of 3-D Neutronics and Thermal-Hydraulics Codes 71 8.1.7 Indigenous Computer Code Development 71 8.1.8 Spatial Instability Analysis in Large PWRs 71 8.1.9 Fire Modelling of a Main Control Room in a Typical PHWR Plant 71 8.1.10 Development of Condensation Model for Hydrogen Distribution Studies 71 8.1.11 Development of Code to Implement Failure Surface for Core Disassembly in Severe Accident Conditions 72 8.1.12 Fuel bundle Deformation under Stratified Flow Conditions 72 8.1.13 Estimation of Core Radionuclide Inventory 72 8.1.14 Estimation of Conditional Probability of Stagnation Channel Break in PHWR 72 8.2 SAFETY REVIEW 72 8.2.1 Criticality Safety Review of Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle facility 72 8.2.2 Review of Level-1 PSA for TAPS-1&2 and MAPS 1&2 73 8.2.3 Review of Final Safety Analysis Report of KK NPP-1&2 Level 1 PSA 73 CHAPTER 9 SAFETY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 74 9.1 NUCLEAR SAFETY 74 9.1.1 Reactor Physics and Radiation Safety 74 9.1.2 Reliability and Probabilistic Safety Assessment 78 9.2 ENGINEERING STUDIES 79 9.2.1 Fire Safety Studies 79 9.2.2 Studies on Hydrogen Distribution in Enclosures 79 9.2.3 Structural Analysis 81 9.2.4 Microstructural Based Constitutive Model to Predict the Creep Behaviour of Modified 9Cr-1Mo Ferritic Steel at 873 K 81 9.2.5 Numerical Simulation and Validation of Thermal Striping Phenomena 82 9.2.6 Air Side Pressure Drop in AHX-B Inlet: Effect of Adjoining Structures 83 9.3 ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY STUDIES 84 9.3.1 RS-GIS Studies 84 9.3.2 Hydrogeological and Hydrogeochemical Studies at Kalpakkam 86
(ii) Page No. 9.3.3 Waste Management related Studies 87 CHAPTER 10 PUBLIC INFORMATION 90 10.1 PRESS RELEASES 90 10.2 AERB NEWSLETTER 90 10.3 ANNUAL REPORT 90 10.4 WEBSITE MANAGEMENT 90 10.5 INTERACTION WITH MEDIA 90 10.6 PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS 90 10.7 RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT-2005 90 10.8 AERB's INITIATIVE ON PUBLIC AWARENESS: PATICIPATION IN SCIENCE FESTIVALS AT ANNA GEM SCHOOL AND SATYABHAMA UNIVERSITY, CHENNAI 91 CHAPTER 11 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 92 11.1 AERB BECOME THE MEMBER OF MULTINATIONAL DESIGN EVALUATION PROGRAMME (MDEP) 92 11.2 SENIOR OFFICERS FROM OECD VISITS AERB 92 11.3 USNRC DELEGATION VISITS AERB 92 11.4 INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REVIEW SERVICE (IRRS) 93 11.5 AERB-USNRC STANDARD PROBLEM EXERCISE (SPE) ON PERFORMANCE OF CONTAINMENT VESSEL UNDER SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITION 93 11.6 INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC SAFETY CENTRE OF IAEA 94 11.7 IAEA-EBP KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA RESEARCH INITIATIVE FOR SEISMIC MARGIN ASSESSMENT (KARISMA) BENCHMARK STUDY 94 11.8 INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE STANDARD PROBLEM (ICSP) EXERCISE ON INTEGRAL PWR DESIGN NATURAL CIRCULATION FLOW STABILITY AND THERMO-HYDRAULIC COUPLING OF CONTAINMENT AND PRIMARY SYSTEM DURING ACCIDENTS 95 11.9 INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON NEW HORIZONS IN NUCLEAR REACTOR THERMAL HYDRAULICS AND SAFETY, JAN 2-3, 2012, SAFETY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, KALPAKKAM 96 11.10 AERB-ASN STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING AND WORKSHOP 97 CHAPTER 12 QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 98 12.1 QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (QMS) OF AERB 98 CHAPTER 13 HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 99 13.1 MANPOWER AUGMENTATION 99 13.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 1995 AND IMPLEMENTATION / WELFARE OF RESERVATION POLICY FOR SCHEDULED CASTES / TRIBES / OBC 99 13.3 TRAINING 99 13.3.1 AERB Orientation Course for Regulatory Processes For SRI (OCRP-SRI-2011) 99 13.3.2 Orientation Course for DAE Graduated Fellowship Scheme (DGFS) Fellows 99 13.3.3 Other Training Activities 99 13.4 REFRESHER COURSE 100 13.5 AERB TECHNICAL TALKS 100 13.6 AERB COLLOQUIUM 100 13.7 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 100 13.8 DEVELOPMENT OF OFFICE AUTOMATION SOFTWARE 100 13.9 ONE DAY AWARENESS PROGRAMMES 101 13.10 HIGHER QUALIFICATION 101 CHAPTER 14 SAFETY PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES 102 14.1 SAFETY RESEARCH PROGRAMME 102 14.2 WORKSHOPS/SEMINARS/THEME MEETINGS 103 14.2.1 AERB Theme Meeting on "Status of LWR Analysis" 103 14.2.2 AERB Discussion Meet on "Review of Off-site Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan of Indian NPPs based on Experience of Fukushima Nuclear Accident 103
(iii) Page No. 14.2.3 Discussion Meeting on "External Events in Siting of Nuclear Power Plants" 103 14.2.4 Discussion Meet on "Implementation and Operational Aspects of Physical Protection System (PPS) at Nuclear Power Plants / Nuclear Facilities" 104 14.2.5 Theme Meeting on "R&D Activities of SADD and SRI, AERB" 104 14.2.6 Workshop on "Evolving Trends and Technologies in Fire Safety" 104 14.2.7 Discussion Meet on "Regulatory Inspection of NPPs" 104 CHAPTER 15 OFFICIAL LANGUAGE IMPLEMENTATION 105 CHAPTER 16 ACHEIVEMENTS 107 CHAPTER 17 MISCELLANEOUS 108 17.1 INTERACTION WITH OTHER AGENCIES 108 17.1.1 Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) 108 17.1.2 Representation in Ministry of Environment and Forests 108 17.1.3 Project Guidance provided by IPSD, AERB to Engineering Students 108 17.1.4 Project Guidance provided by NSAD, AERB to Engineering Students 108 17.2 RETIREMENTS ON SUPERANNUATION 108 17.3 INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY CELEBRATION 108 CHAPTER 18 DEPUTATIONS ABROAD 109 APPENDIX PUBLICATIONS 112 ANNEXURE LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 117
(iv) INDEX TO TABLES
Table Title Page No. No.
2.1 Meetings of Safety Review Committees of Nuclear Power Projects and Back End Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities 15
2.2 Regulatory Inspections of Nuclear Projects and Categorization of Deficiencies observed during RI (April 2011 to March 2012) 22
2.3 Meetings of Safety Committees 24
2.4 Categorization of Recommendations Made During Scheduled Regulatory Inspections (April 2011 to March 2012) 32
2.5 Licensing of Operating Staff 33
2.6 INES Rating of Significant Events in NPPs during the last five years 34
2.7 Meetings of Safety Review Committees of Fuel Cycle Facilities 35
2.8 Categorization of Deficiencies Observed during Scheduled Regulatory Inspections of Fuel Cycle Facilities (April 2011 to March 2012) 40
3.1 Radiation Installations Regulated (April-2011 to March-2012) 42
3.2 a Number of Type Approvals Issued (April-2011 to March-2012) 43
3.2 b NOCs Issued for Import (April-2011 to March-2012) 44
3.2 c Consents Issued (April-2011 to March-2012) 44
3.3 Approval Certificates Issued to RSOs (April-2011 to March-2012) 45
3.4 Licences/NOCs Issued (April-2011 to March-2012) 46
A. Procurement of Sources 46
B. Number of Sources Disposed off at Different Disposal Agencies 46
3.5 Regulatory Inspections (April-2011 to March-2012) 47
4.1 Comparison of Incidence Rates of DAE Units (2011) with Equivalent Non-DAE Industries (2005) 54
5.1 Radiation Doses Received by Workers in NPPs (2011) 63
5.2 Radiation Doses Received by Workers in Front End Fuel Cycle Facilities 64
5.3 Radiation Doses Received by Workers in Medical, Industrial and Research Institutions (2011) 65
6.1 Number of Emergency Exercises Conducted in year 2011 66
14.1 New Research Projects Approved 102
14.2 Research Projects Renewed 103
(v) INDEX TO FIGURES Figure Title Page No. No. 2.1 System Wise Classification of SERs in NPPs during the year 2011 34 2.2 INES Rating of Significant Events in NPPs during the year 2011 34 3.1 No of Regulatory Inspections Carried out in Last 4 Years 47 4.1 Distribution of Reportable Injuries in DAE Units in 2011 53 4.2 Distribution of Man-days Lost in DAE Units in 2011 53 4.3 Injury Index of DAE Units in 2011 53 4.4 Frequency Rates in DAE Units in 2011 54 4.5a Year wise comparison of Frequency Rate in DAE Units 54 4.5b Year wise comparison of Severity Rate in DAE Units 54 4.5c Year wise comparison of Injury Index in DAE Units 54 4.6 Distribution of Injuries caused by various Unsafe Acts in DAE Units-2011 55 4.7 Distribution of Injuries Caused by various Unsafe Conditions in DAE Units-2011 55 4.8 Distribution of Injuries with respect to the Type of Accidents Causing Injuries in DAE Units-2011 55 5.1a Liquid Waste Discharges from NPPs (Tritium) 58 5.1b Liquid Waste Discharges from NPPs (Gross Beta) 59 5.1c Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Tritium) 59 5.1d Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Argon) 60 5.1e Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Fission Product Noble Gases) 60 5.1f Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs(Iodine-131) 61 5.2a Public Dose at 1.6 Km Distance from NPPs 61 5.2b Total Effective Dose in Different Zones 62 5.3 Collective Dose (person-Sv) at NPPs 63 5.4 Collective dose for Front-end Fuel Cycle Facilities (FCFs) for the last five years 64 8.1 FE model of BARCOM containment with different section properties 70 9.1 Comparison of MCNP Calculated keff values for Different Nuclear Data Libraries 74 9.2 Comparison of Fission Rate Distribution in Core 146/138-F7 Cb - 1.8 g/l 75 9.3 Dose rate distribution vs. Distance with respect to Duct axis - Source at the centre of Duct 76 9.4 MCNP Plot of Neutron Trench Streaming Experiments & Comparison of MCNP Results with Measurements 77 9.5 Comparison of ISOGEN Results with Measured Values of Pavelescu et al., 2006 77
9.6(a) Flame for u¥=0.75 m/s; fuel pool x/L=0.2 to 1.2 79 9.6(b) Variation of local Da (left); fuel and oxygen mass fraction(right), normal to fuel surface at x/L=0.2 (leading edge) 79 9.7 Geometry, boundary conditions and initial conditions 79 9.8 Contour plots of hydrogen mole fraction for hydrogen mixing problem (Case II) 80 9.9 Progression of (a) Non-uniformity Index, (b) Deflagration Volume fraction and (c) Deflagration
pressure ratio with time for Case I (with Xav = 0.03) and Case II (with Xav = 0.05) 80 9.10 (a) Expansion bellow at RCB penetration of PFBR FE Model (b) Von Mises stress 81
(vi) Figure Title Page No. No. 9.11 Sensitivity of limit state function g(X) with random variables 81 9.12 Comparison between predicted and experimental creep strain-time curves for different stress levels at 873 K 82 9.13 Two-dimensional view of the model 82 9.14 Contours of Mean Temperature Difference 83 9.15 Contours of RMS Temperature 83 9.16 CFD model for original design 84 9.17 CFD model for actual construction 84 9.18 Pressure distribution for original design 84 9.19 Pressure distribution for actual construction 84 9.20 Road network of Tummalapalle area 85 9.21 Land use/ land cover of Tummalapalle area 85 9.22 Temporal variation of thermal plume characteristics around MAPS 85 9.23 Regression analysis for Measured versus Calculated groundwater heads for all stress periods (April-2008 to March-2011) 86 9.24 Piper Trainer plot for Kalpakkam site 86 9.25 Chloro Alkaline Indices for Kalpakkam site 86 9.26 Chadda's plot for Kalpakkam site 86 9.27 Langmuir plot for the sorption of strontium on clay colloid 87 9.28 Kinetic fit for the sorption of strontium on clay colloid at 298K 87
9.29 XRD pattern of b- and g-Ga2O3 88
9.30 TEM micrograph of g-Ga2O3 88 9.31 Kinetics of dissolved TBP degradation 88 9.32 Comparison of Numerical and Analytical Leach rates of Cs137 for the specimen (a) SC 12% (b) SCV 12% 89 11.1 Displaced shape of the structure at ultimate pressure 93 11.2 Variation of leakage rate from containment with multiples of design pressure 94 11.3 (a) (a) 3D Model of the structure (b) Damage contour due to lateral loading 95 11.4 Determination of Performance point of the structure for Fixed Base and SSI model by pushover analysis 94
(vii) CHAPTER 1
GENERAL
1.1 COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD
1. Shri S. S. Bajaj --- Chairman Chairman, AERB
2. Shri S. K. Chande --- Member (Ex Officio) Vice-Chairman, AERB and Chairman, SARCOP
3. Dr. (Smt.) K. A. Dinshaw* --- Member Former Director, Tata Memorial Centre, Mumbai
4. Dr. K. V. Raghavan --- Member Distinguished Professor, INAE Reaction Engineering Laboratory, Indian Institute of Chemical Technology Uppal Road, Hyderabad - 500007.
5. Prof. Devang V. Khakhar --- Member Director, Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay
6. Prof. Harsh Gupta --- Member Member, National Disaster Management Authority, NDMA Bhavan, A-2, Safdarjung Enclave New Delhi
7. Shri R. Bhattacharya --- Secretary Director, Information and Technical Services Division and Industrial Plants Safety Division, AERB
* Dr. Dinshaw passed away on August 26, 2011.
1 OBITUARY
Padmashri Dr. (Ms.) K. Dinshaw (16.11.1943 - 26.08.2011)
Padmashri Dr. (Ms.) K. Dinshaw, the renowned Ex-Director, Tata Memorial Centre and Board Member of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, died on Friday, 26th August 2011 at 0650 hrs.
We, at AERB, deeply mourn the sudden demise of our esteemed Board member.
Dr. Dinshaw was the Director of Tata Memorial Centre and Board member of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board since July 2005. She was the recipient of Padmashri award from the Govt. of India in the year 2001. She was a pioneer in Oncology in India.
Dr. Dinshaw will be remembered in AERB for her immense contribution in the deliberations of Board Meetings.
1.2 ORGANISATION CHART OF AERB
ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD
Safety Review Committee Safety Review Committee for Operating Plants for Application of Radiation (SARCOP) (SARCAR)
Project Safety Review Advisory Committees Committees
Safety Research Institute (SRI), Kalpakkam
Nuclear Projects Safety Division Radiological Safety Division (NPSD) (RSD)
Nuclear Safety Analysis Operating Plants Safety Division Division (NSAD) (OPSD)
Information & Technical Services Division (ITSD) Industrial Plants Safety Division (IPSD) Administration Division
Siting & Structural Engineering Division (SSED) Accounts Division
2 1.3 SUMMARY (TDP) of Heavy Water Board (HWB) at Mumbai. A Uranium AERB continued to mill at Tummalapalle is under monitor the safety status of commissioning and 3 Uranium nuclear power plants (NPPs), fuel mines are in the development cycle facilities, radiation facilities stage. In addition, 20 Beach Sand and research centres, and review Mineral (BSM) facilities are also them as appropriate for initiating under regulatory control. A large necessary regulatory actions to number of radiation facilities ensure adequate level of safety at engaged in applications of all the facilities under its purview. ionizing radiation in the fields of medicine, industry and research AERB is conducting are also regulated by AERB. safety and regulatory supervision of 20 operating NPPs and project The three major research safety supervision of 6 reactors centres under regulatory under construction and 1 reactor supervision of AERB are Variable under commissioning. Energy Cyclotron Centre (VECC), Regulatory activity of AERB also Kolkata, Raja Ramanna Centre for covers projects and operating fuel Advanced Technology (RRCAT), cycle facilities including 7 Heavy Indore and Indira Gandhi Centre Water Plants (HWP), 4 Indian for Atomic Research (IGCAR), Rare Earths Limited (IREL) plants, Kalpakkam. 6 Uranium mines and 2 Uranium mills, Nuclear Fuel Complex There has been no major (NFC) at Hyderabad, Zirconium safety related event in any of the Complex at Pazhayakayal and nuclear and radiation facilities Technology Demonstration Plant during the year.
AERB Board Meeting in Progress at SRI, AERB (Shri S. S. Bajaj, Shri S. K. Chande, Dr. K. V. Raghavan, Prof. Devang V.Khakhar, Prof. Harsh K. Gupta and Shri R. Bhattacharya are seen along with senior officials of NPCIL)
3 AERB carried out its robust systems capable of functions with the support of its withstanding challenges arising secretariat and specialist from external events. However, committees under the guidance of to further enhance the safety the Board. The Board met three features of NPPs, the Committee times during the calendar year made certain recommendations. 2011. During the financial year AERB accepted the 2011-12, the Board met twice: on recommendations of the September 9, 2011 at AERB, AERBSC-EE and asked NPCIL to Mumbai and on February 13, formulate the approach and 2012 at Safety Research Institute action plan for their (SRI), Kalpakkam. During the implementation. AERB also meeting at Kalpakkam, the undertook focussed regulatory members visited PFBR inspections of all the NPP sites. construction site. Taking cognizance of the report of During 2011-12, AERB carried AERBSC-EE and the findings of out its mandated functions and Actions by AERB following focussed regulatory inspections as responsibilities with the support of Fukushima Accident in Japan well as inputs from NPCIL its secretariat and specialist reviews, Safety Review committees under Board's On March 11, 2011, a Committee for Operating Plants guidance. massive earthquake and tsunami (SARCOP), the AERB's apex caused extensive damage to the committee for safety review and nuclear reactors and spent fuel enforcement, has taken steps for pools at the Fukushima Nuclear review and follow-up of safety Power Plant in Japan, releasing enhancement measures at NPPs. radioactivity into the The approach adopted for the environment. Following the review and assessment are accident, AERB took steps to outlined below: address any adverse impact of releases from Fukushima NPPs at lRe-confirmation of capability Japan on Indian public. to withstand currently defined site specific external events AERB initiated actions and assessment of margins for re-verification of safety of available beyond that. Indian nuclear plants against severe external events. As a first lEnhancing the capability of step, AERB asked Nuclear Power the plants to perform the Following Fukushima accident in Corporation of India (NPCIL) to safety functions under Japan, AERB has taken many carry out a comprehensive extended Station Black Out important actions promptly for re- reassessment of safety against (SBO) / extended loss of heat verification of safety of Indian external events and emergency sink through the design NPPs against severe external mitigation measures at all NPPs. provisions. events. In parallel, AERB constituted a High Level Safety Committee for lReview and strengthening of External Events (AERBSC-EE) Severe Accident Management with National level experts to ( S A M ) p r o g r a m m e review and assess the safety of particularly with respect to Indian NPPs against severe Hydrogen management, external events exceeding the reliable containment venting design basis of the plant. The and availability of key Committee noted the inherent parameters for monitoring strengths of designs, operating adequacy of SAM programme practices and regulations followed following an extreme external in India, which have resulted in event affecting multiple units.
4 The measures for safety documents to identify the implementation of various need for revision of the existing recommendations have been requirements / guidance or need identified. These measures have for development of any additional been categorised into short term, requirement / documents. medium term and long term, with respect to time frame for Addressing public implementation, as brought out concerns about the impact of this below: accident on environmental conditions in India due to Short term measures radioactivity releases from Fukushima NPPs, AERB lEnhancing the reliability of constituted an In-house cooling through external hook Monitoring Cell to follow the up points. events at Fukushima continuously In the wake of Fukushima and keep a close vigil on the accident, AERB has taken steps lTraining and mock-up radiation / contamination levels in for follow-up of safety exercises of operating Japan and India. The reports of enhancements at various NPPs. personnel. the Cell, which provided details on the radiation levels in India, the Medium term measures status of plants at Fukushima and surrounding radiation levels, were lIntroduction of seismic trip uploaded on AERB's website on a where it does not exist. daily basis for about a month. This together with press releases and lStrengthening backup power briefings to the press and media supply (air cooled mobile / was useful at easing the public fixed Emergency Diesel anxiety in this regard. Generators (EDG) at higher elevation). Safety Review of Nuclear Power Projects lStrengthening provision for monitoring of critical AERB continued to parameters under prolonged follow the well-established loss of power. practice of multi-tier review process for safety review of lSteps for augmentation of nuclear projects starting from onsite water storage, stages of Siting through wherever required. Construction, Commissioning to To address public concerns, AERB Operation. The highlights of constituted an In-house Long term measures project safety reviews conducted Monitoring Cell to follow the during this financial year are as events at Fukushima and keep lEnhancing SAM programme. follows: public updated on the developments. lCreation of an emergency After conducting safety response facility capable of reviews at various intermediate withstanding severe flood, power levels, AERB granted cyclone & earthquake etc. Consent to the 220 MWe PHWR, Kaiga Generating Station-4 (KGS- AERB has taken steps for 4) to operate at 100 % Full Power review and follow-up of safety (FP). KGS-4 achieved 100% FP enhancements at various NPPs. operation successfully on April 8, Additionally, AERB has 2011. undertaken a review of its existing
5 Design of Rajasthan 1650 MWe capacity each of Atomic Power Project-7&8 European Pressurized Reactor ( R A P P- 7 & 8 ) P H W R a n d (EPR) is in progress by in-house Kakrapar Atomic Power Project- study groups (IHSG) constituted 3&4 (KAPP-3&4) PHWR of 700 by AERB. Safety review for siting MWe capacity is identical, except consent for JNPP is in progress by for certain site specific changes. Site Evaluation Committee (SEC) The detailed design safety review of AERB. of these PHWRs is in progress. Subsequent to granting clearances Safety review of projects for “First Pour of Concrete” for for setting up of nuclear fuel cycle KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8, facilities namely, Demonstration design safety review for the Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing construction sub-stage i.e. Plant (DFRP) and Fast Reactor “Erection of Major Equipment” is Fuel Cycle Facility (FRFCF) AERB granted clearance for the in progress. continued during the year. hot-run of KK-NPP-1. Safety review for clearance for the Safety review of A total of 17 regulatory commissioning sub-stage i.e. Kudankulam Nuclear Power inspections were carried out for 'Initial Fuel Loading' for the KK- Project-1&2 (KK-NPP-1&2), the various nuclear power project NPP-1 is in progress. twin units of 1000 MWe reactor sites. Additionally there were each of Russian VVER design, is in exclusive inspections on aspects of progress. AERB granted industrial & fire safety, nuclear clearance, for the hot-run of KK- security and civil & structural NPP-1 and the same was engineering. successfully completed by NPCIL in July, 2011. Safety review for Safety Review of Operating granting clearance for the NPPs and Research Reactors commissioning sub-stage i.e. “Initial Fuel Loading” for the KK- All NPPs and research NPP-1 is in progress. reactors operated safely during the year. For Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project-3&4 (KK-NPP- The applications for 3&4), safety review for first renewal of authorization (ARA) of construction sub-stage i.e. Madras Power Station-1&2 excavation clearance is in (MAPS-1&2) and Tarapur Atomic AERB expanded the scope of progress. Siting clearance for four Power Station-1&2 (TAPS-1&2) regulator y inspections by units KK-3 to 6 was granted earlier and periodic safety review (PSR) including the nuclear security on February 9, 2011. of Tarapur Atomic Power Station- aspects. 3&4 (TAPS-3&4) were reviewed Civil construction of 500 in detail by AERB. These reviews MWe Prototype Fast Breeder indicated that the operational and Reactor (PFBR) is nearing safety performance of these plants completion. Erecting of was satisfactory during the period. equipment and components is in Subsequent to the Fukushima progress. AERB granted clearance accident, it had become necessary for commissioning of Interim Fuel to review the safety margins of Storage Building (IFSB) for PFBR. TAPS-1&2 and MAPS-1&2 (located at coastal sites) against The design safety review extreme natural events such as of draft technical assignment flood and earthquake, and document for Jaitapur Nuclear multiple failures. Pending the Power Project (JNPP), six units of resolution of these issues, AERB
6 had renewed the license of these protection procedures. plants for a limited period instead of five years. National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) After detailed review by participated in the off-site Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic emergency exercise conducted at Research (IGCAR) Safety all sites during the year. District Committee and SARCOP, officials were given training on permission for 18th irradiation management of off-site campaign of Fast Breeder Test emergencies before conducting Reactor (FBTR) was granted for the exercise. National Disaster conducting experiments related to Response Force (NDRF) trial production of Sr-89 from personnel also participated in Yttria, continued irradiation of these exercises and demonstrated structural materials and gaining their capability in radiation field experience in high temperature measurement and All nuclear power plants and operation. decontamination of personnel & research reactors operated safely equipment. AERB personnel during the year. During the year, a total of participated in these exercises as 38 significant events were observers to check response of all reported from operating NPPs. stake holders. Out of these, 36 were rated at International Nuclear Events Safety Review of Fuel Cycle Scale (INES) level-0. An event in Facilities, R & D and Other Narora Atomic Power Station-1 Facilities (NAPS-1) resulting in damage to spent fuel bundle during refueling All nuclear fuel cycle and operation was rated at INES level- Research and Development 1. An event in KAPS, which (R&D) facilities operated safely involved radiation exposure to 4 during the year. temporary workers beyond the annual exposure limit, was rated The major exploration at level-2. facilities of AMD at various locations of India were inspected. The radioactive releases Operational safety review of from NPPs were within the limits operating uranium mines and of technical specifications for mills of UCIL continued. A total of 47 inspections were operation. Extensive safety review was conducted for operating NPPs and carried out for the changeover of research facilities during the year, A total of 47 inspections the final product from Magnesium out of which 25 were scheduled were conducted for operating Di-Uranate (MDU) to uranium inspections and 22 were special NPPs and research facilities during peroxide in Jaduguda Mill. The inspections. In addition, 6 security the year, out of which 25 were regulatory experience gained over inspections were also carried out scheduled inspections and 22 the years in safety monitoring of for operating NPPs. were special inspections. In the tailings pond has been addition, 6 security inspections translated in form of a safety were also carried out for operating document which is in advanced NPPs. stage of publication. AERB continued to monitor the activities As part of the special of IREL plants with special focus inspections undertaken by AERB, on long term management of inspectors were deputed at the thorium oxalate and recovery of NPPs during biennial shutdowns uranium from thorium to check adherence to radiological concentration stored earlier. In
7 fuel fabrication facilities, several tantalite ore. AERB inspected all operational safety issues were these facilities and made addressed ranging from ageing recommendations pertaining to management of old plants to disposal of tailings and residues upgradation and modernization which contain enhanced levels of of process control instruments. radioactivity. Action for Safety surveillance of HWPs development of a safety guide for engaged in production of heavy these facilities has been initiated. water as well as versatile solvents continued. The impact on leakage With respect to R&D and AERB has brought the Naturally of hydrogen sulphide from HWP- industrial units, operational safety Occurring Radioactive Material Kota at Rawatbhata site was review of the activities at ECIL, (NORM) industries under modeled and accordingly, the VECC and RRCAT continued. regulatory control which includes emergency preparedness of the Ongoing safety review of the the facilities processing beach site is being re-assessed. accelerator projects such as the sand minerals (BSM) and Super Conducting Cyclotron and columbite tantalite ore. AERB With respect to fuel cycle Radioactive Ion Beam facility at inspected all the facilities and projects, exhaustive review was VECC, Medical Cyclotron at made suitable recommendations carried out prior to issue of Kolkata, Indus-2 synchrotron and regarding disposal of tailings and consent for operation of oxide and FEL LINAC at RRCAT, Indore residues which contain enhanced sponge production facility at continued. Permission for use of levels of radioactivity. Zirconium Complex, certain beam lines of INDUS-2 for Pazhayakayal and TDP for experimental purpose was recovery of rare metal from granted. phosphoric acid at RCF, Chembur. The proposal for integration of For nuclear fuel cycle Thorium plant with the upcoming facilities, R&D, BRIT and other 10,000 Tonnes Per Annum (TPA) facilities, a total of 60 regulatory of Monazite Processing plant at inspections were conducted IREL OSCOM was reviewed and during the year. consent for construction was issued. Other projects for which Industrial Safety consents were issued are siting of uranium mill at Gogi, construction Applications for of tailings pond at Tummalapalle, renewal/issue of licenses for siting and construction of Niobium operation of various DAE units Twenty nine inspections were Thermit Production facility at were reviewed and licenses under conducted in fuel cycle facilities. In N F C , H y d e r a b a d , the Factories Act, 1948 were addition forty-six industrial safety- commissioning/operation of renewed/issued to HWP- Baroda, focussed monthly inspections at diversified projects of HWP such Electronics Corporation of India construction sites of NPPs and 8 as Tri Butyl Phosphate (TBP) Limited (ECIL), Tirupati, quarterly inspections of fuel cycle Facility at HWP-Baroda, Versatile Z i rc o n i u m C o m p l ex , facilities construction sites were Solvent Pilot Plant (VSPP) at Pazhayakayal, MAPS-1&2 and carried out. HWP - Tuticorin, Heavy Water Rajasthan Atomic Power Station-2 Clean-up Facility (HEWAC) at (RAPS-2). Kota. Regulatory inspections Recently, AERB has for industrial and fire safety brought the Naturally Occurring aspects were strengthened at Radioactive Material (NORM) project sites. The inspections industries under regulatory specially focussed on the control which includes the implementation of Job Hazard facilities processing beach sand Analysis (JHA) along with check minerals (BSM) and columbite lists and safety work permits for all
8 hazardous works at sites. Special E-Licensing of Radiation inspection on electrical safety Applications (ELORA), for aspects has been initiated at all improving regulatory control over operating fuel cycle facilities. radiation facilities.
Apart from the regular During the period inspections of nuclear power January 2011 to March 2012, projects, operating NPPs, fuel AERB issued 3602 licences for cycle, R&D and other facilities, procurement of radiation sources; additional 46 industrial safety 57 licences for procurement of focussed monthly inspections at linear accelerators and 460 construction sites of nuclear authorizations for export and power projects and 8 quarterly disposal of sources and operation inspections of fuel cycle facilities of one industrial gamma radiation construction sites were carried processing facility. AERB conducted regulatory out. inspections in various radiation AERB also issued 1245 facilities and investigated 7 There was one fatality certificates of registration for unusual occurrences related to during the period, which occurred diagnostic X-ray installations. loss or misplacement of radiation in Nuclear Fuel Complex, Seventy permissions were sources. Hyderabad due to burns caused issued for transport of by electric flashover. radioactive material other than disposal. Five shipments Safety Review of Radiation were approved to be transported Facilities under special arrangement.
AERB took several A E R B c o n d u c t e d measures for improving the regulatory inspections in various regulatory control over the radiation facilities and radiation facilities. investigated 7 unusual Computerization of inventory of occurrences related to loss or legacy sources was completed. misplacement of radiation Regional Centres set up at Kolkata sources. and Kalpakkam started carrying out regular surveillance of the AERB conducted During the period of April 2011 to radiation facilities in eastern and awareness programmes for March 2012, a total of 620 southern zones respectively. regulatory requirements and inspections were carried out for There has been a significant radiation safety in fields of various radiation facilities increase in the number of interventional radiology, nuclear compared to 383 during the last regulatory inspections of radiation medicine, planning of calendar year. facilities compared to last year. radiotherapy installations, With persistent efforts of AERB, dosimetry aspects for radiation Directorate of Radiation Safety processing facilities, radioactive (DRS) was established in the state contamination in steel products, of Mizoram (which is the second safe handling of radioactive state to have DRS after Kerala). material, etc. This year, AERB has also signed Memorandum of Understanding While adopting a graded (MOU) with the State approach for regulatory Governments of Chattisgarh, inspection of radiation facilities, Punjab and Tamilnadu for there was a substantial increase in establishment of State Level DRS. the number of inspections. During AERB has initiated steps to the period of April 2011 to March implement a state-of ar t 2012, a total of 620 inspections
9 were carried out for various condensation model for hydrogen radiation facilities compared to distribution studies, estimation of 383 during the last calendar year. conditional probability of stagnation channel break in Safety Document Preparation PHWR were initiated during the year. Many developmental During the period, studies, such as IAEA-EBP several important safety KAshiwazaki-Kariwa Research regulatory documents were Initiative for Seismic Margin developed which included Safety Assessment (KARISMA) Code on 'Radiation Protection for benchmark study and AERB- Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities' USNRC Standard Problem specifying the basic requirements Exercise on performance of for radiation protection during containment vessel, progressed siting, construction, well. Papers were presented in commissioning, operation and National and International decommissioning of nuclear fuel Conferences and Seminars. cycle facilities. Four Safety Guides were published on 'Classification AERB continued to Safety regulatory documents were of Radioactive Waste', promote and fund several developed which included Safety 'Predisposal Management of High research projects on reactor safety, Code on 'Radiation Protection for Level Radioactive Waste', radiation safety, front end and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities' 'Decommissioning of Nuclear Fuel back end fuel cycle safety related specifying the basic requirements Cycle Facilities other than Nuclear problems and industrial safety at for radiation protection during Reactors', and 'Materials of various reputed universities and s i t i n g , c o n s t r u c t i o n , Construction for Civil Engineering academic institutions under the commissioning, operation and Structures Important to Safety of Safety Research Programme. decommissioning of nuclear fuel Nuclear Facilities'. One Safety Financial supports were extended cycle facilities. Manual was published on 'Quality to Seminars, Symposia and Assurance of Civil Engineering Conferences on topics of AERB Structures Important to Safety of interest organized by academic Nuclear Facilities'. The existing institutes and professional bodies. Safety Guidelines on 'Works Contract' was revised as 'Control Some AERB officials of Works'. published their work in International Journals and Research & Development successfully completed their (R&D) and Safety Related higher studies such as Ph.D and Studies M.Tech.
AERB made progress in Developmental Activities carrying out R&D and safety related studies in SRI, Kalpakkam AERB took steps towards and some technical divisions of incorporating state of the art AERB, Mumbai related to reactor technologies in carrying out its physics, radiation safety, fire & regulatory functions. AERB has industrial safety, environmental taken an initiative to implement safety, structural analysis and ELORA, web-based information waste management. Some and communication technology important studies like behavior of (ICT) application for the high performance concrete automation and real time exposed to fire, round robin management of “Consenting analysis on BARC containment Process” i.e. issue of licenses and test model, development of regulatory clearances to various
10 radiation facilities and other key been sent to CNS organizers and stakeholders across the country. will be discussed during the extraordinary meeting of CNS of AERB has initiated IAEA scheduled in August 2012. necessary steps to implement a state-of-art Office Automation Multinational Design System (OAS), a web-based ICT Evaluation Programme application for the automation of (MDEP) “Administrative, Financial and General Processes” i.e. AERB has become a full member manpower planning, entire of MDEP, which is a multinational employee lifecycle from initiative to develop innovative recruitment to retirement, payroll, approaches to leverage the finance, document management, resources and knowledge of general office management, etc. national regulatory authorities to serve as centralised web-based who are, or will shortly be, office management information undertaking the review of new system. reactor designs. As a full member, AERB will contribute to the International Cooperation Programme's strategic decisions in the MDEP Policy Group and the Following the Fukushima MDEP Steering Technical accident, there were a number of Committee. Besides, AERB will meetings and events play an active role in design AERB has become a full member internationally organized by IAEA specific working groups such as on of MDEP, which is a multinational and Nuclear Energy Agency EPR and issue specific working initiative to develop innovative (NEA) of OECD, in which AERB groups such as Codes and approaches to leverage the participated actively. The Standards Working Group resources and knowledge of ongoing interaction with IAEA, (CSWG), Digital Instrumentation national regulatory authorities NEA and regulatory bodies of and Control Working Group who are, or will shortly be, USA, France and Russia (DICWG) and Vendor Inspection undertaking the review of new continued. High level delegation Co-operation Working Group reactor designs. from USNRC, NEA and ASN (VICWG). visited AERB for exchange of technical information including AERB's Self Assessment actions taken following against International Fukushima accident. Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Parties to the international Convention on AERB has planned to get its Nuclear Safety (CNS) have regulatory process peer reviewed decided to hold an Extraordinary by the Integrated Regulatory Meeting to review actions Review Service (IRRS) mission of following Fukushima accident. A IAEA in the near future. As a first National report has been prepared step, AERB decided to assess the on safety of Indian NPP in the readiness of AERB for IRRS wake of Fukushima accident mission. Therefore, a committee which brings out the actions taken was constituted with several by AERB, NPCIL and DAE and working groups to meticulously also the planned actions to be review the existing system vis-à-vis taken in future for further the IAEA regulatory safety enhancement of safety against standards. The committee is extreme external events in Indian finalizing its report. NPPs. The National report has
11 H R Development Orientation Course for Regulatory Processes for Safety Research Indian nuclear power industry Institute (OCRP-SRI-2011) was along with associated fuel cycle conducted during June-August, facilities is undergoing significant 2011 at Kalpakkam for the expansion. In addition, there is a scientists / engineers newly substantial increase in the use of inducted in SRI-AERB and radiation for societal benefits. To nominated scientific staff from meet the regulatory challenges units located in Kalpakkam. The arising out of these expansions, course covered important topics AERB has augmented the related to nuclear and radiation technical manpower substantially safety. by direct recruitment, inducting AERB has augmented the postgraduates through AERB AERB has provided guidance to technical manpower substantially Graduate Fellowship Scheme young engineering students to by direct recruitment, inducting (AGFS) at IIT-Bombay and IIT- share its expertise in the fields of postgraduates through AERB Madras, and through training Quantitative Risk Assessment, Graduate Fellowship Scheme schools of BARC, IGCAR, NPCIL Hazard Assessment and (AGFS) at IIT-Bombay and IIT- and NFC. Consequently, the Operability (HAZOP) studies, Fire Madras, and through training manpower in AERB has increased Hazard Analysis / Modeling, schools of BARC, IGCAR, NPCIL from 251 to 286. Probabilistic Safety Analysis, Core and NFC. Dynamic Studies, Plant As a part of competence Dynamics, etc. during summer development, AERB continued to internships of engineering train its staff by organizing various students from various institutions training programmes, workshops, like IIT-Bombay, IIT-Kanpur, BITS- on the job training at sites etc. Pilani, BITS-Goa, etc.
12 CHAPTER 2
SAFETY REVIEW OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES
2.1 MEASURES TAKEN POST FUKUSHIMA lSafety of NPPs under prolonged Station Black Out NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IN JAPAN (SBO) and loss of Ultimate Heat Sink.
Subsequent to the accident at Fukushima NPPs, lSafety of spent fuel storage facilities at NPPs against Japan on March 11, 2011, the Hon'ble Prime Minister of external events. India ordered a fresh review of safety of NPPs with respect to external events. The AERB's apex committee for lSevere Accident Management provisions and operational safety review and enforcement, SARCOP guidelines (SAMG). directed NPPs to undertake self assessment of safety against prolonged SBO and loss of heat sink due to These specialist groups worked for detailed external hazards. NPCIL conducted an immediate review review of plant specific design aspects and requirement for to assess available capabilities to deal with the extreme further enhancement of safety. AERB also undertook external events by considering extended blackout and loss focussed regulatory inspections at all the NPP sites. of ultimate heat sink provided in the existing design. AERBSC-EE noted that the robustness of design The Board of AERB took stock of the situation in provisions for handling the postulated initiating events Fukushima and its implication with respect to India. There within the design basis is a regulatory requirement and were public concerns about the impact of this accident on AERB ensures their availability and operability through its environmental conditions in India due to the radioactivity existing mechanisms for safety reviews, licensing and releases from Fukushima NPPs. AERB set up a monitoring inspection & enforcement during siting, construction, cell to follow the events at Fukushima continuously and commissioning and operation. In addition, Periodic Safety keep a close vigil on the radiation/contamination levels by Review (PSR) of NPPs is carried out in accordance with the scanning the information from IAEA and Japan and the guidelines given in AERB safety guide AERB/SG/O-12. monitoring facilities set up at various locations within India Safety assessments performed during PSR takes into as part of the radiological emergency framework. AERB account among other factors, improvements in safety was also providing support with respect to decision making standards and operating practices, cumulative effects of by various government agencies related to need for plant ageing, modifications, feedback of operating monitoring of passengers from Japan, import of materials experience, safety analysis and development in science including food articles, etc. The monitoring carried out by and technology. Through this process of PSR, the strengths AERB showed that there was no radiological impact within and shortcomings of the NPP against the requirements of India. AERB has been regularly providing information on current standards are identified. The report on the PSR is the prevailing radiation levels in India, the status of plants subjected to regulatory review process for satisfactory at Fukushima and surrounding radiation levels through its resolution of the shortcomings. PSR along with extensive website. AERB was also providing information updates to operational experience feedback programme in Indian the press and electronic media. NPPs and findings of the special safety assessments of Indian NPPs conducted subsequent to accidents at TMI AERB constituted a high level committee (USA), Chernobyl (Russia) and an incident of fire at (AERBSC-EE) with national level experts in the areas of (i) Narora-1 (India) led to substantial safety upgrades in older design, safety analysis and NPP operation, and (ii) NPPs and design of NPPs built later. The Committee also external events in the field of seismology, hydrology and noted that the Indian Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors earthquake engineering, to carry out a comprehensive (PHWRs) having certain specific design safety features review of capability of NPPs to deal with external events such as two independent shut down systems, low pressure within and beyond design basis. The committee and low temperature moderator system, water filed vault constituted specialist working groups for detailed review in surrounding the calandria, features to enable natural the following major areas: circulation for decay heat removal etc provides advantages, especially while dealing with the lExternal events in relation to the safety of NPPs. consequences of severe external events. In addition, these reactors are designed to withstand the effects of lSafety of Electrical, Control and Instrumentation earthquake and tsunami of specific magnitudes which are systems against external events. decided based on conservative criteria. However, to further enhance the safety features of NPPs, the
13 Committee made certain recommendations. AERB – Availability of key parameters for monitoring accepted the recommendations of the AERBSC-EE and even under most extreme conditions asked NPCIL to formulate the approach and action plan for their implementation. lCreation of an emergency facility at each NPP site which should remain functional under extreme events Taking cognizance of all the above inputs i.e self including radiological, with adequate provisions of assessment by utility, report of AERBSC-EE and the communication and having capacity for housing findings of focussed regulatory inspections, SARCOP has essential personnel for a minimum period of one taken steps for review and follow-up of safety week. enhancement measures at NPPs. The approach adopted for these safety enhancement measures following Based on the above reviews, a number of Fukushima is outlined below: measures have been identified for strengthening the safety of nuclear power plants. These measures were categorised lRe-confirmation of capability to withstand currently into short term, medium term and long term, with respect defined site specific design / review basis levels of to time frame for implementation, as brought out below: external events for individual plants. This included revisiting the results of earlier PSRs and review of need Short term measures for further strengthening, as necessary. lEnhancing the reliability of cooling through external lAssessment of margins available for beyond the design hook up points / review bases levels of external events. The objective of such assessment was to rule out existence of cliff lTraining and mock-up exercises of operating edges close to the design basis /review basis levels and personnel assess NPP's capability to perform minimum safety functions in such situation. Medium term measures lEnhancing the capability of the plants to perform the lIntroduction of seismic trip where it does not exist safety functions under extended SBO / extended loss of heat sink through the design provisions. Towards l this, plants were asked to carry out safety assessment Strengthening backup power supply (air cooled for extended SBO beyond 24 hours and assess the mobile/fixed EDGs at higher elevation) need for increasing the capability of existing provision for continued heat removal. The measures being lStrengthening provision for monitoring of critical incorporated based on the above assessments include, parameter under prolonged loss of power
– Alternate provisions for core cooling and cooling lSteps for augmentation of onsite water storage, of reactor components including identification / wherever required creation of alternate water sources and providing hook-up points to transfer water for long term Long term measures core cooling, lEnhancing Severe Accident Management programme – Provision of portable DGs / power packs lCreation of an emergency response facility capable of – Battery operated devices for plant status withstanding severe flood, cyclone & earthquake etc. monitoring AERB has taken steps for review and follow-up of – Additional hook up points for making up water to safety enhancements at various operating NPPs. Similar spent fuel storage pools actions are in progress for incorporation of the lessons learnt from the reviews, for the plants under construction lReview and strengthening of severe accident by the respective Project Safety Review Committees, management particularly with respect to: which are responsible for safety review for licensing of the projects. Additionally AERB has undertaken a review of its – Hydrogen Management existing safety documents to identify the need for revision of the existing requirements/guidance or need for – Reliable provision for containment venting development of any additional requirement / documents.
14 AERB is exchanging the information related to Third-tier review is carried out by the Board of assessment and safety enhancements of NPPs with other AERB. countries. AERB has been participating in the activities of IAEA. Senior officials of AERB participated in the IAEA Periodic regulatory inspections of Nuclear Power ministerial conference 2011 and IAEA Fact Finding Projects (NPPs) are carried out to verify compliance with Mission to ascertain factual information and to identify the design requirements, recommendations by the safety initial lessons learned from the accident. The staff of AERB committees and those requirements specified in various participated in the various meetings organised by IAEA, codes, guides and standards of AERB. including IAEA-IRS National Co-ordinators meet, and presented the reviews carried out by AERB and the actions AERB proposes to introduce a system of taken / proposed to be taken. A delegation from United reporting of significant events during States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) led by construction/commissioning stages of projects, on similar Chairman, USNRC visited India during November 2011. lines as is done for operating plants. Towards The recommendations arising from review of Fukushima implementation of this, document on Significant Event accident in India and USA were discussed during the Reports for NPPs (SERP) has been finalized, after meeting between AERB and USNRC delegation. AERB considering comments/suggestions of NPCIL-HQ and all and Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN), France, discussed the project sites. safety issues of mutual interest including emergency preparedness and management of post accidental Table 2.1 lists the number of meetings held by first situations and safety reviews carried out after Fukushima and second tier safety committees during the year. In accident during a two day workshop conducted in addition, a large number of meetings of SGs, TFs and WGs February 2012. During these meeting, it was noted that for various projects were also held for in-depth review of the actions taken by AERB post Fukushima are generally specific aspects of the projects. in-line with the actions taken in other countries. Table 2.1: Meetings of Safety Review Committees 2.2 NUCLEAR POWER PROJECTS of Nuclear Power Projects and Back End Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities 2.2.1 Project Safety Review Project Safety Number of AERB has been following a well-established Committee Meetings practice of multi-tier review process for safety review of ACPSR-LWR # 1 7 nuclear projects starting from stages of Siting through Construction, Commissioning to Operation at rated ACPSR-PHWR 2 power. The Site Evaluation Committee (SEC), Project PDSC-KGS-3&4 and RAPP-5&6 1 Design Safety Committee (PDSC), Civil Engineering PDSC-KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8 4 Safety Committee (CESC) and associated specialist PDSC-KK NPP 3&4 1 groups (SGs)/ task forces (Tfs) / working groups (WGs), carry out the first-tier review. In the case of KK NPP-1&2, PDSC-PFBR 2 SGs carry out the first-tier design safety review. For PDSC-DFRP 3 commissioning phase, additional specialists groups have PDSC-IFSB 3 been constituted to perform in-depth safety review of various commissioning procedures and performance tests PDSC-FRFCF 3 of various systems. Apart from the above, various In- SEC-JNPP 4 House Review Groups (IHRGs) conduct technical reviews CESC 7 of all the submissions for adequacy before sending to respective safety committees. Status of safety review of various projects and important observations / recommendations made during Second-tier review is performed by the respective the review are given in the subsequent paragraphs. Advisory Committee for Project Safety Review (ACPSR- LWR-1, ACPSR LWR-2, ACPSR-PHWR/PFBR), which (i) KGS-3&4 and RAPP-5&6 includes specialist members from the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), Central Boilers Board, KGS-3&4 and RAPP-5&6 are repeat designs of Central Electricity Authority and Educational Research standardized 220 MWe PHWRs with minor differences, Institutes, experts retired from DAE units and members mainly in plant layout and control & instrumentation from BARC, IGCAR, NPCIL and AERB. systems. The design differences are due to implementation of improvements based on; operation experience
15 feedback from similar plants and other plants as o Procurement of portable diesel generator and applicable. Some design changes are also made based on portable emergency lights. site specific requirements. o Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) were Applications for continuous operation of KGS-4, revised as necessary, for extended existing power RAPP-5 and RAPP-6 at rated power were reviewed by supply failure along with cooling water failure. PDSC for KGS-3&4 and RAPP-5&6. Subsequently, these Additional EOPs for handling Beyond Design applications along with PDSC recommendations on the Basis Accident (BDBA) are under preparation. same were reviewed jointly by ACPSR-PHWRs and SARCOP. These NPPs were licensed for continuous o Estimation of time for which the required loads operation at rated power and the review responsibilities of can be operated with the available DGs and these Units were transferred from PDSC and ACPSR- diesel fuel at site and to identify back up source. PHWR to Unit Safety Committee (USC) and SARCOP. The responses to recommendations made by ACPSR- o Evaluation of capacity of backup power supply PHWRs are being submitted by NPCIL-Head for monitoring important parameters. Quarters/Site in progressive manner which are being reviewed by USC. Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSAR) of o Mock-up was carried out to demonstrate KGS-3&4 & RAPP-5&6 are under review by a working pumping of water from Rana Pratap Sagar lake group. using fire tender in RAPP 5&6.
Some of the salient observations / o H2S leak along with earthquake will also be recommendations made during the safety review are given considered for the purpose of emergency below: preparedness at RAPP site. lSeepage of water was observed in south side Fueling o Approximately 5000 m3 of water is additionally Machine Service Area (FMSA) of RAPP-5 since April, stored in cooling water discharge tunnel of KGS- 2010. The seepage rate reduced from 250 ml per day 3&4 for emergency purpose which can be (as observed in March 2011) to 100 ml/day at present. pumped by diesel driven fire water pumps. This Monitoring of tritium and other chemical contents of water can also be pumped into various identified seeped water is being carried out. Action plan for systems through independent hook up points further investigation to identify source of seepage using portable pumps. during Biennial Shut Down (BSD) has been submitted by RAPP 5&6 and is under review by USC. (ii) KK-NPP-1&2 lDuring routine sampling in May 2011, steam Major civil construction activities and erection of generator(s) of RAPP-5 was suspected to be having major equipment for KK-NPP-1&2 (each of 1000 MWe leakage of water (2-3 kg/day). The leak rate remained VVERs) have been completed. Commissioning activities in the same order. The leak was closely monitored with are in progress for KK- NPP-1. increased sampling frequency to identify the leaky steam generator(s). Also precautionary measures were Hydro tests of primary coolant system and taken and contingency plan was prepared to contain secondary system, structural integrity test and integrated the leaked out water during various modes of plant leakage rate test of primary containment and containment operation. A proposal for identification & rectification spray test are already completed. of leaky tube has been submitted by NPCIL to USC. As part of pre-commissioning activities of KK- lBased on Fukushima NPP event assessment, actions NPP-1, the commissioning of various individual systems have been initiated to further enhance safety of KGS- required for hot run and conduct of various transient tests 3&4 and RAPP-5&6. The actions are as follows: with dummy fuel assembly loaded in the core with Reactor Coolant System (RCS) in hot and pressurized condition is o Independent hook-up points have been identified completed. Application seeking clearance for hot run of for direct fire water injection to Moderator KK-NPP-1 was submitted in August, 2010. Loading of System, PHT System, secondary side of Steam Dummy fuel assemblies and CPSARs in the core was Generators, Emergency Core Cooling System, completed in May 2011. All the salient issues, required to End-Shields Cooling System, Calandria Vault be resolved prior to hot-run, were responded satisfactorily. Cooling System and Spent Fuel Storage Bay. The ACPSR-LWR#1 reviewed the application for hot-run proposal is under review. along with associated submissions and recommendation
16 reports of specialists groups and submitted its respective design intents. After successful completion of recommendation report for clearance for hot-run. AERB hot run, various measurements and tests, KK-NPP granted the clearance for hot-run for KK-NPP-1 on June submitted the application for opening of RPV top head 30, 2011. and removal of dummy fuel assemblies from KK-NPP-1. The same was under review by AERB. Continuous hot-run operation for 200 hours of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) at temperature 260°C - KK-NPP-2 is in advanced stage of construction. 280°C and pressure 15.7 MPa was completed in July, 2011. Various commissioning tests during hot-run were ACPSR-LWR-1 continued the review of FSARs conducted including heating of RCS in steps to 260ºC, and commissioning related documents/test results and stabilised operation at 260-280ºC, reactor coolant pumps NPCIL has been responding progressively to the issues combination tests, measurement of displacements of RCS raised for their resolution. pipelines, measurement on supports and hangers, checking effectiveness of insulation, measurement of Some important observations and vibrations and pressure drops across fuel assemblies and recommendations made during safety review of KK NPP- various sections/equipment of RCS, drop testing of control 1&2 are given below: rods, pressurizer level control, checking trend of cooling of RCS by connecting passive heat removal systems, lKK-NPP has conducted reliability tests for safety Diesel assessment of transport time of boric acid solution from Generators (DGs) (25 valid starts and loading up to quick boron injection systems to reactor core, cool down of 50% full load) for each DG for meeting pre- RCS to 130oC and checks on shut down cooling system, operational testing requirements as per IEEE-387. etc. Testing of Emergency Transfer (EMTR) to pick up load in sequence for one DG was completed. Subsequently, as part of commissioning activities, first inspection to collect base-line data post hot-run, (i.e. lAs pre-requisites for hot-run, computer based C&I pre-service inspection) for various components / system required for hot run stage were validated at site equipment viz. steam generators, Pressurizer (PRZ), Quick by KK commissioning group and audited by a separate Boron Injection System (QBIS) tanks and Main Coolant group from NPCIL-HQ. The audit reports were pipeline (MCP) welds was commenced. reviewed by relevant AERB committees.
From October 13, 2011 to March 18, 2012, lAction has been initiated to provide the siphon breaker commissioning activities were suspended due to agitation to prevent draining of spent fuel storage pool water in by local public at KK NPP plant site. Only limited number case of passing of check valve or pipe break at lower of employees were allowed to enter the plant during this elevation. period by the agitators. Plant was manned continuously on round the clock basis by two shift crews for preservation lSecond stage hydro accumulators are used for and maintenance. Guarding of various entry / exit points, providing passive core cooling by adding water into manning of Main Control Room (MCR), periodic core following loss of coolant due to pipe break along patrols/rounds by security / plant personnel, deployment with SBO when there would be no power supply of minimum required fire safety personnel and medical available at site. During pre-commissioning stage, the personnel, was ensured. Instrumentation and Control observed profile of cooling water flow rate vs. time did (I&C) systems for control and monitoring were functional. not match with that provided as per design. 400 kV and 220 kV switch yards were energized and kept Subsequently, site has changed the size of orifice in the in-service. Sea water cooling systems for normal and drain line of the accumulator and retesting will be emergency loads were in operation. Desalination plant, done. safety chillers, fire water system, ventilation system etc. were in operation and temperatures were maintained in all lNPCIL task force for safety assessment of KK NPP-1&2 the areas. Water quality in plant systems was maintained. in wake of Fukushima accident completed the Equipment preserved in dry condition were filled with assessment and issued their interim report in August, silica gel and monitored for relative humidity. The action 2011. Subsequently in March, 2012, NPCIL submitted plan for preservation was reviewed by the safety the proposed measures to be incorporated along with committees to ensure that healthiness of equipments was detailed action plan. The proposal and the plan are maintained. prepared considering recommendations of AERB committee for natural external events. The submission Commissioning tests results of KK-NPP-1 were made by NPCIL is being reviewed by respective SGs progressively submitted to check confirmation of and ACPSR LWR-1.
17 lFor the purpose of ensuring continuous core cooling under the postulated event of loss of coolant from the core, various safety systems (High pressure injection system, Borated water injection system and long term emergency core cooling system) are provided. Each one of the three safety systems has 4 trains. Each of these trains is having one pump for each safety system. Under LOCA conditions, the pumps take suction initially from the spent fuel pool and subsequently from the Reactor Building (RB) sump. Test will be carried out during commissioning to demonstrate that any of these pumps does not cavitate under simultaneous operation of all these 12 pumps while taking suction from fuel pool or during transition of suction from fuel pool to RB sump and finally when Testing of SG-Pulse Safety Device - KK-NPP-1 taking suction from RB sump. Site. Commissioning of 230 KV GIS, 70 MVA station lDuring the suspension of commissioning activities transformers and 50 MVA general service transformer was over six months (Oct, 2011 to March 2012), site completed. undertook various preservation maintenance measures at KK-NPP-1&2 to keep the required water Some of the salient observations / chemistry and the required environment for the recommendations made during the safety review are given various components / equipment. The action plan for below: preservation was reviewed by the safety committees to ensure that the healthiness of the equipment was lBHAVINI will reassess the capability of the project maintained. Site submitted report mentioning details including its fresh fuel storage area and spent fuel of observed parameters during preservation and subassembly storage bay to withstand natural external preventive maintenance. The report was reviewed by events such as tsunami, earthquakes, cyclones and SGs and ACPSR LWR-1 and found satisfactory. floods etc. within the design basis and beyond design basis accident.
lPermission for integration of roof slab with main vessel was granted after ensuring that the design re- evaluation will not call for any design modifications in the reactor assembly design. Mock welding for integration of roof slab to main vessel was carried out as per approved procedure. The results of mock welding were reviewed in detail. However, various stipulations / hold points were specified during the actual welding based on review of results of mock welding, for adherence by the utility.
lThe base-line data on the fuel sub-assembly (FSA) head locations to check for verticality during Assembling of CPS-AR Drives in progress - KK NPP -1 commissioning is to be collected. This base line data will be required for detecting the FSA head tilting as the (iii) Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) irradiation progresses. Each FSA head location is to be monitored after identified burn-ups of the fuel till the Construction and erection activities are in FSA design is validated in the reactor. The SA has to be progress for indigenously designed sodium cooled PFBR unloaded from the core as soon as its margin gets of 500 MWe capacity. Main vessel was integrated with roof consumed to ensure that tilting remains within the slab after the erection of core catcher, core support design margin so that the grappling of FSA for removal structure, grid plate, inner vessel, etc. in the main vessel. will be as per design intent. Sodium pipe lines are being laid and steam generators are being erected in the secondary side. Sodium required for the plant has been stored in the sodium storage tanks at
18 (iv) KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8 lSuper heavy concrete (SHC) of minimum density 4.2 gm/cc is used for construction of Fuel Transfer (FT) Detailed design review of 700 MWe PHWRs is in room of KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8. To qualify the progress. The design of RAPP-7&8 is similar to KAPP-3&4, SHC mix, NPCIL carried out initial mock up test at except for site specific changes. Subsequent to granting of KAPP-3&4. However, considering limited number of AERB clearances for “First Pour of Concrete” for KAPP- cores that could be taken from mock-up blocks and 3&4 and RAPP-7&8, safety review for the next limitations of Ultra Sonic Pulse Velocity (USPV) construction sub-stage i.e. “Erection of Major Equipment” measurements on mock up blocks, radiometry test on is in progress. SHC blocks was recommended.
Salient observations / recommendations made lIn view of the higher neutron flux in 700 MWe PHWRs, during the safety review are given below: Tritium concentrations in Moderator and Primary Heat Transport (PHT) systems would increase faster. lExperiments were conducted with the scaled down Provisions for limiting the Tritium in moderator & PHT facility at IIT-Bombay for validating the passive decay systems are essential for reducing man-rem (collective heat removal system (PDHRS) design by NPCIL. dose) consumption. Some more experiments to demonstrate decay heat removal capability are planned in the experimental lFor environmental qualification (EQ) of equipment / setup at Tarapur R&D centre of NPCIL. NPCIL has components, apart from seismic qualification, been asked to submit report on feasibility of long term cumulative dose calculation for radiation qualification, core cooling through PDHRS for extended SBO prevailing vibrations conditions and similar field duration. phenomenon as per operational experience, etc. also need to be considered. Shake table test of computer lContainment spray system (CSS) plays important role based systems (CBS) should demonstrate the in containment depressurization and removal of radio- structural integrity as well as unaffected functioning of iodine under postulated LOCA. CSS being employed main computer in the CBS. These are also required to for the first time in Indian PHWRs, experiments for be covered in the EQ submission. CSS are in progress to establish various parameters and experiment with full size header is planned at lAn incident of heavy rain occurred during concreting KAPS Site. of pour-I of NB-7 raft of RAPP-7&8. AERB undertook a special inspection to review the status of the pour. lPrimary containment is being provided with 6 mm The site was advised to carry out assessment of the thick carbon steel liner towards achieving lower pour concrete to ensure its soundness and provide a leakage rate and is designed for 1.6 kg/sq.cm (g) complete scheme of pour continuity vis-a-vis pressure based on Main Steam Line Break (MSLB). construction joint before resuming further construction Mock-up tests were conducted towards finalizing the in NB-7 raft. The site was also asked to review and procedure for construction of containment envelope ensure that adequate rain protection measures are in with metallic liner. place before taking up further concreting. CESC reviewed NPCIL reports on the above aspects and lAs per Radiological Impact Assessment (RIA) by accepted NPCIL proposal to resume concreting of the NPCIL, calculated doses for two months period affected pour with certain stipulations. following the design accident are observed to be well within the AERB limits with adequate margins without taking credit for emergency counter measures to be taken during postulated event, in public domain. Considering various aspects of RIA i.e. source term estimation methodology, input data, etc; further fine tuning in the calculations is needed for final RIA report. lDuring safety evaluation of various design measures for the 700 MWe PHWRs, designers have been asked to check the design capabilities, strengths and margins to finalize additional safety features on short term and Bird's Eye view of NB-7& NB-8 of RAPP-7&8 long term basis.
19 lSite has been asked to finalize the site specific spectra to arrive at the design basis ground motion for KKNPP- 3&4.
Being a repeat design, the experience gained from KK-NPP-1&2 is being utilized for effective and efficient review of KK-NPP-3&4.
(vi) Jaitapur Nuclear Power Plant (JNPP)
NPCIL is planning to install progressively 6 units of European Pressurised Reactor (EPR), each of 1650 MWe Pressurised Water Reactor at Jaitapur Site on the Bird's Eye view of Main Plant Construction Area of KAPP-3, 4 western coast of Maharashtra. MoEF had accorded the (KAPS-1, 2 seen in background) environmental clearance for the site, subject to AERB consent. SEC-JNPP undertook review of NPCIL (v) KK NPP- Units 3 to 6 application for siting of 6 x 1650 MWe EPR at Jaitapur along with the site evaluation report and related NPCIL plans to build four more VVERs of 1000 documents. Further submissions necessary for satisfactory MWe each at KK site with essentially same design as KK- completion of the review were identified. SEC visited 1&2. Siting clearance for Units 3 to 6 was earlier given by JNPP site to have a firsthand experience of the site and AERB in February 2009. Environmental clearance was siting related activities. Fencing work on the land side of given by Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) for the site and geotechnical investigation works were in KK NPP-3&4 in September 2008 and for KK NPP-5&6 in progress. SEC inspected a few of the cores drilled for December 2009. Tamilnadu State and District have geotechnical investigations. recommended giving Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Clearance for KK Site. Subsequently, application seeking The detailed review of Technical Assignment (TA) clearance for site excavation for KK NPP-3&4 along with Part-I (General Safety Requirements) was done by AERB relevant Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) constituted Working Group (WG-TA) which had brought covering; general design description, classification for out various observations. These are being addressed by safety, seismic and environmental qualification NPCIL by way of discussions with M/s AREVA. requirements, site characteristics, design of structures, Subsequently NPCIL submitted responses/ clarifications to systems, equipments/components, and other related some of the issues raised and these are under discussions. documents are submitted. These are under review by AERB. Pre-project activities were in progress. The Meanwhile NPCIL had also submitted TA Part II activities at KK-3 to 6 site were suspended during October (General Technical Details) and TA Part III (QA, Simulator, 2011 to March 2012 due to agitation by the local villagers. and Decommissioning) which are being reviewed / studied in-house in AERB by various study groups. Some of the salient observations / recommendations made during the process of safety (vii) Demonstration Fast Reactor Fuel review are given below: Reprocessing Plant (DFRP) lIt was opined that postulated severe accident should DFRP is a fore-runner of the reprocessing facility be analyzed elaborately considering multiple failures FRFCF (Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility) to close fuel cycle in more than one NPP where multiple units are of PFBR, being setup by IGCAR at Kalpakkam. It is divided located. NPCIL was asked to analyze common cause into 2 concrete cell facilities called Head End Facility (HEF) failure due to external events in more than one NPP and Process Plant Facility (PPF). Most construction / and demonstrate that adequate resources are equipment installation and piping for the PPF have been available to mitigate the consequence. completed at the time of construction of Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant (KARP). Civil construction and lThe common station DG building is located towards equipment erection activities of HEF are in progress. the sea at a lower elevation than safety related DGs. It was recommended to relocate the common station Some of the salient observations/recommendations made DG building at a higher elevation than the present during the safety review are given below: proposed location, preferably at an elevation of the safety DGs.
20 lSite has developed methodology for arresting water 2.2.2 Consents / Clearances / Permissions Issued seepage into the pipe trench by concreting with Self Compacting Concrete (SCC). PFBR lAnalysis for assessing the hydrogen generation in the lPermission to integrate roof slab with main vessel high level waste tanks in waste tank farm and its (June 16, 2011). consequences for extended SBO is under progress. KK- NPP-1 lSite has been asked to submit consequence analysis on unavailability of DG building following an lClearance for hot-run of KK-NPP-1 (June 30, 2011). earthquake. RAPP-7&8 (viii) Interim Fuel Storage Building (IFSB) lClearance for first pour of concrete for RAPP 7&8 AERB granted clearance for construction for IFSB (July 16, 2011). in August, 2006. Civil construction of IFSB was completed. Commissioning of auxiliary systems and mechanical DFRP handling equipment was in progress and the facility is ready for receiving the fuel pins and its assembling. lPermission to concrete the pipe tunnels with SCC Clearance for receiving the fuel pins and commissioning (Sept. 20, 2011). (Stage-I) of IFSB was given after safety review of the application and related submissions. KAPP-3&4
(ix) Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility (FRFCF) lPermission for KAPP-3,4 construction activity beyond 91.7m El (Nov. 22, 2011) FRFCF is an integrated fuel cycle plant to facilitate closure of the fast reactor fuel cycle. It comprises of 5 plants IFSB and common services: lClearance for commissioning (Stage-I) of Interim Fuel lFuel Reprocessing Plant (FRP) to process irradiated Storage Building (IFSB) for PFBR (March 27, 2012). fast fuel of PFBR, KGS-3&4 lFuel Fabrication Plant (FFP) to fabricate Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel, lClearance for continuous operation for KGS-3&4 (February 28, 2012) lReprocessed Uranium Oxide Plant (RUP) to provide depleted UO2 powder for MOX fuel pellet fabrication RAPP-5&6 and depleted UO2 axial blanket pellets, lClearance for continuous operation for RAPP-5&6 lCore Sub-Assembly Plant (CSP) to assemble fuel (February 28, 2012) bundles, 2.2.3 Regulatory Inspections of Projects lWaste Management Plant (WMP) to handle all wastes arising from the fuel cycle and common services and Regulatory Inspections (RI) of the on-going utilities required by all the plants. nuclear projects were carried out as a safety audit measure to ensure compliance with the AERB safety requirements Geo-technical investigations for the site have and stipulations. The observations made during been completed. Formal notification of approval from regulatory inspections are broadly categorized as follows: MoEF is awaited. Safety review of application and related submissions for construction is in progress.
21 Category: I • Violation of AERB safety directives and/or ACPSR/PDSC/CESC Stipulations/ Recommendations, • Non-compliance with the Requirements of AERB Codes/Standards/Rules and other Licensing conditions Deviations from Technical Specifications for Operation and Safety Report requirements during commissioning stage. Category: II • Deficiencies and degradations in systems/ structures/ components and deficiencies in preservation/ construction procedures/ practices /QA of safety and safety related systems • Deficiencies in procedures and compliance with PSI requirements • Major Inadequacies and non-compliance in Emergency Preparedness during construction / commissioning • Deficiencies in important procedures to meet Technical Specification for operation requirements during commissioning stage Observation/ Recommendation requiring Safety Review Category: III • Shortcomings noticed in the design of safety, safety related and safety support systems, during construction/ commissioning phase, including generic design deficiencies. Deficiencies in implementation of safety, and/or each of design provisions related to safety, safety related and safety support system. Category: IV Procedural inadequacies and non-compliance during construction / commissioning: • Organizational • Managerial • Training & Qualification • Emergency Preparedness • QA of Non - Safety Related Systems, O&M Procedures Category: V General Observations/Deficiencies regarding • Housekeeping and Good Practices
The number of RIs carried out for various projects is given in Table 2.2.
Table: 2.2 Regulatory Inspections of Nuclear Projects and Categorization of Deficiencies observed during RI (April 2011 to March 2012)
Project No. of Inspections Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat. Total I II III IV V
PFBR 3 0 10 28 56 9 103 KAPP 3&4 4 0 13 42 79 8 142 RAPP 7&8 3 1 10 12 70 5 98 DFRP 2 0 1 9 14 6 30 IFSB 2 0 0 5 22 3 30 FRFCF 1 0 1 2 7 0 10 KKNPP 1&2 1 0 1 7 8 0 16 KKNPP 3&4 1 0 5 3 1 0 9
Total 17 1 41 108 257 31 438
22 Some of the important observations / installed CS liner plates in ceiling. Site informed that recommendations made in the RIs of various projects as this may be due to water ingress. Site was asked to conducted above are given below: prepare preservation procedure and ensure healthiness of installed liner plates and its weld joints (i) KK NPP 1&2 particularly for preservation of areas where In Service Inspection may not be feasible. lAfter installation of orifice at the downstream of control valve of Intermediate Cooling Water System (KAA), lSonic Detection and Ranging (SODAR) instrument / flow achieved was less than design value. Connection equipment is now installed at KAPS site to measure of Expansion tank which is riding on the system was meteorological parameters at various heights in the changed from upstream side of Heat Exchanger (HX) atmosphere for the purpose of assisting in dispersion to downstream side to HX (closer to pump suction) studies. The radiological impact assessment will be and orifice size was increased. The flow obtained revised using the latest data from the SODAR. during emergency mode operation will be checked during commissioning. (iv) RAPP-7&8 lDuring hot-run stage, Steam Generator Pulse Safety lIt was recommended to carry out periodic radiological Devices (SG-PSDs) were tested by spring actuation. monitoring and radiation survey in and around the Main valve indication at MCR was unavailable for 6 construction areas, due to 6 operating NPPs in the out of 16 valves. Site was asked to make main valve vicinity. indication at MCR available for all PSDs and repeat the testing of SG-PSDs with steam. lConstruction power supply for RAPP-7&8 is planned to be drawn from RAPS-5&6 and RAPS-3&4 power (ii) PFBR supply to be kept as standby. Site will ensure that interlock is provided between the power supplies of lThe exhaust chimneys of two DGs open near the two stations so that there is no impact on the operating suction well of Safety Grade Decay Heat Removal plants. System (SGDHR) heat exchanger. Hot DG exhaust may hamper the performance of SGDHR when both lEmergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pit is the systems are required to be in service. This aspect is provided with 500 mm curb wall to prevent entry of under review. water into the pit due to internal flooding. During field visit, it was observed that floor drain from 90 m El is lAxis misalignment exists between the opening in roof entering south ECCS pit, which is laid as per issued slab for placing IHX and the stand pipe in inner vessel. drawing. The provision of drain line into the ECCS pit The acceptability of observed misalignment is to be defeats the purpose of the curb wall. This aspect is ensured for achieving proper leak tightness between under review. the hot pool and cold pool. (v) DFRP lCable trays were found passing close to steam generator (SG-3) as per the present layout. Electrical lRadioactive gaseous effluent ducts, from different cables are to be ensured to be properly process cells, cell areas, labs and active areas to the segregated/separated from high enthalpy/high stack connecting via HEPA-filter plenum, are laid on temperature lines. Other observations related to cable open terrace, unprotected/unshielded for about 50 m tray layout such as fouling of monorail with cable trays, length and are accessible during plant operation. improper cable tray clearance, etc. are to be Safety implication of this design is being reassessed. addressed. lAs per the site, foundation bolts for new DG will not be lOne of the diesel oil storage tanks is very near to the required as anti vibration pads will be used for new cooling water buffer tanks of both the DG sets of each 1010 kVA DG. Assessments for the same will be division and there is no fire barrier between the diesel carried out for DG seismic qualification and stability oil storage tank and buffer tanks. Proper during operation. separation/fire barrier in between buffer tanks and diesel oil storage tank has been recommended. lIt was observed that the cells of off-gas header coming from hot pipe area (amber zone) was entering into cell (iii) KAPP-3&4 service area through deep bed filters and then again going back into off-gas fan room through HEPA filters lIn ECCS pits, patches of rust were observed on the banks. As the cell service area will be occupied by
23 operating personnel, provision for adequate local 2.3.2 Consents / Clearances / Permissions Issued shielding needs to be assessed. During the year, a number of applications from (vi) IFSB the utilities were reviewed and several authorizations / clearances / permissions were issued. Important among lAs per the design of potentially active water storage, them are: low level waste will be temporarily stored in concrete tanks (not lined) before pumping it out to the KAMINI lExtension of license for operation of TAPS-1&2 upto reactor delay tank. Site was asked to closely monitor December 31, 2012. for any seepage of water into the ground from the low level waste tanks. lExtension of license for operation of TAPS-3&4 upto (vii) FRFCF August 31, 2012.
lExtension of license for operation of MAPS-1&2 upto lFire water system should be made available during the March 31, 2013. construction phase.
(viii) KK-NPP- 3 to 6 lPermission for 18th irradiation campaign at FBTR, IGCAR lEmergency preparedness plan (EPP) for KK NPP-3&4 was issued in September, 2011. This will be revised to lPermission for fabrication of one batch of Cobalt appropriately integrate with the EPP of KKNPP 1&2, Teletherapy sources at RAPPCOF. prior to start of main plant activities. Site was asked to expedite this process before excavation clearance. 2.3.3 Operating Plants Safety Review
2.3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND The safety status of individual NPPs and research RESEARCH REACTORS reactors is described below.
2.3.1 Safety Status of Operating Plants (i) General
AERB carried out safety review and monitoring of Safety assessment of Indian NPPs in the wake of operating NPPs and research reactors. The SARCOP held accident at Fukushima Daiichi NPPs 11 meetings during the year. The unit safety committees (USC) / standing committees under SARCOP met a Following Fukushima accident, AERB number of times to review safety related issues of individual recommended NPCIL to carry out a comprehensive plants or subjects in detail. The number of meetings reassessment of safety against external events and conducted by various safety committees / standing emergency mitigation measures at all the NPPs. committees during year 2011-12 is given in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Meetings of Safety Committees NPCIL completed the safety assessment of all operating NPPs and identified measures to deal with Name of the Safety Committee No. of Meetings severe external conditions. SARCOP carried out detailed review of the assessments. In addition, special regulatory SARCOP 11 inspections of NPPs were carried out to assess the existing TAPS-1& 2 Safety Committee 5 provisions and preparedness of these plants to deal with TAPS- 3 &4 Safety Committee 11 such events. The highlights of assessments undertaken by AERB and NPCIL and the status of key recommendations RAPS-MAPS Safety Committee 5 made during these reviews are as follows: NAPS-KAPS Safety Committee 11 KGS-1to 4 and RAPS-3 to 6 Assessment of Safety of NPPs against Seismic Safety Committee 10 Event IGCAR Safety Committee 5 As per the present regulations, design of NPPs SARCOP Standing Committee - provides adequate margin against seismic event of certain
Reactor Physics 5 magnitude, which are decided based on conservative SARCOP-Standing Committee criteria. Accordingly, the reactors from NAPS-1&2 2.3.2 Consents/Clearances/Permissions Issued on Control & Instrumentation 5 onwards have been designed and constructed with appropriate seismic considerations. These requirements Expert Group on Coolant Channels 1
24 were not specifically considered during the design of NPPs expected to function during earthquake and flood at the at TAPS-1&2, RAPS-1&2 and MAPS-1&2. However, as site. However, an extreme external event may result in total part of periodic safety review, seismic re-evaluation of loss of power supplies. Such a situation is termed as these stations was carried out for the site specific ground extended SBO at NPPs. All Indian NPPs are designed to acceleration level, according to the approach given in shut down during the SBO condition. However, the IAEA Safety Report Series-28 “Seismic Evaluation of capacity for removal of decay heat is available only for a Existing Nuclear Power Plants”. Based on the findings of limited duration by natural convection through emergency these re-evaluations, some of the structures, systems and condenser in TAPS-1&2 and steam generators in PHWRs. components were modified / strengthened. These include To ensure the availability of power supply at the NPPs anchoring of battery banks and control room panels, under such condition, additional robust DG sets are being strengthening of masonry walls, strengthening the procured for all the stations. In addition, provisions are supports for cable trays and ventilation ducts, etc. being made for injection of cooling water to reactor core Accordingly, the components required for carrying out the and important systems (including spent fuel storage bay) three basic safety functions, viz. safe shutdown of reactor, by fire tenders or diesel driven pumps. decay heat removal and containment of radioactivity, are demonstrated to be capable of withstanding site specific Based on the above assessments, a number of ground acceleration. However, in wake of accident at upgrades are being implemented at all NPPs to strengthen Fukushima NPPs, NPCIL has been asked to identify and the safety against external events, which include the assess the additional systems, structures and components following: that need to be qualified for seismic conditions. lAll the NPPs have a provision to alert operators about The peak ground acceleration levels (PGA) for seismic event, based on the ground motion sensed by which various NPPs are qualified are as follows: the seismic instruments installed at site. NAPS and KAPS have design provision for automatic tripping of NPP TAPS- RAPS- RAPS- NAPS- KAPS- KGS- KGS- reactors during a seismic event. For other reactors, 3&4 3&4 5&6 1&2 1&2 1&2 3&4 operators are expected to take manual action based on Design 0.2g 0.1g 0.1g 0.3g 0.2g 0.2g 0.2g seismic alarm. Subsequent to accidents at Fukushima PGA NPPs, the provision of automatic reactor trip during seismic event is being implemented at other stations NPP TAPS-1&2 RAPS-1&2 MAPS-1&2 also. In this regard, NPCIL has informed that the installation of seismic switches and associated cables PGA considered for 0.2g 0.1g 0.21g re-evaluation are expected to be completed by June 2012. The implementation of logic for reactor trip requires unit Assessment of Safety of NPPs against Flood outage and will be done at the available opportunity.
The design flood levels and the capability of NPPs lAugmentation of emergency power supplies is being to withstand flood were re-visited. The reviews indicated carried out at all NPPs by procuring additional air that NAPS-1&2, KGS-1 to 4, RAPS-3 to 6 and TAPS-3&4 cooled DG, which will be located at higher elevation have adequate margins above the design flood levels. As and have margin above the expected PGA of site for per the revised analysis, the expected flood levels at TAPS- withstanding earthquake. 1&2, RAPS-1&2 and MAPS-1&2 are higher than the levels considered during the initial design of these stations. lStrengthening of the diesel storage provision at site to The flood up-to the revised estimated level may result in ensure availability of diesel to operate diesel submergence of some important equipment such as generators for continued availability of power supply. emergency diesel generators and fire water pumps. Accordingly, action has been taken for either relocation of lAugmentation of provisions for water sources at the these equipment or installation of alternate equipment at site to ensure the availability of cooling water for higher elevation to meet the intended function. The handling event that could result in loss of ultimate heat revised flood assessment for KAPS-1&2 has indicated that sink for cooling the reactors. the length of the weir on the Moticher pond needs to be increased to retain the original design flood level. lImplementation of provision of hook-up points through which cooling water can be injected directly Capabilities to Withstand Extended Station Black into the reactor core and other important systems Out (including spent fuel storage bay) by fire tenders or diesel driven pumps. The emergency power supplies at all NPPs are
25 lThe committee constituted by AERB had testing of hydrogen recombiners, which are planned to be recommended creation of an on-site emergency used in Indian PHWRs for post-accident management of response facility at each NPP site which will remain hydrogen in reactor building containment. Initially, passive functional under a beyond design basis external event. catalytic recombiner devices (PCRD) developed by BARC The facility will have provisions for food, resting & are planned to be tested at this facility. This facility has a other facilities for essential personnel for a period of large insulated 60 m3 carbon steel pressure vessel,
about one week and have provisions for designed to withstand H2 explosion in full vacuum communication for obtaining information from all condition. The concentration of hydrogen, air and steam units at the site and other relevant agencies to decide will be controlled in the facility so as to keep the mixture far the further course of actions. NPCIL has submitted an from the detonation limit. The safety aspects of the facility approach paper for making such facility at all NPPs, were reviewed in detail by AERB. A special inspection of which brings out general requirements for such the facility was conducted prior to issue of start of facilities. NPCIL has been asked to submit the station experiments at the facility. After satisfactory reviews, specific approach note, along with the action plan for permission was granted for conducting experiments for creation of emergency facility at all the sites. testing the hydrogen recombiners at the facility.
All the NPPs have reviewed EOPs for events, such (ii) TAPS-1&2 and TAPS-3&4 as flood, earthquake and SBO condition and these have been revised. A list of critical parameters and alternate TAPS-1&2 and TAPS-3&4 operated safely during means for measuring these parameters has been the year. identified. These EOPs will be further revised after implementing the additional measures being implemented Extension of the License for Operation of TAPS- for strengthening the safety of these plants. 1&2
With the implementation of the The license for operation of TAPS-1&2 was valid recommendations made during various reviews carried till March 2011. As per the regulatory requirements, TAPS- out in AERB and NPCIL, it is expected that NPPs could be 1&2 had submitted an application for renewal of license. safely brought to cold shutdown state during external This application was reviewed in detail by OPSD, TAPS events. However, NPCIL has been asked to carry out Safety Committee and SARCOP. These reviews indicated analysis for severe accident conditions and develop that the operational safety performance of TAPS-1&2 guidelines for operator to take appropriate actions for such has been satisfactory during the reporting period and accident conditions. In this regard, NPCIL is considering the in-service inspections carried out so far have not implementation of provisions such as hydrogen revealed any significant degradation. There were some recombiners and containment venting scheme for pending issues, which include monitoring the healthiness mitigating the consequences of the unlikely event of severe of inaccessible welds of the reactor pressure vessel accident. (RPV), containment inerting, boat sampling of core shroud etc. need to be resolved. In addition, it was necessary to All the nuclear plants have an emergency review the safety margins of TAPS-1&2 against natural preparedness plan which prescribes the roles and events, flood and earthquake in particular, and the responsibility of the agencies involved in mitigating the consequent multiple failures. Pending the resolution of consequences during radiological emergency. National these issues, the permission for continuing operation of Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) also participated TAPS-1&2 was granted for a limited period up to June in augmentation of the off-site emergency response 2011. procedures. In this respect, the workshop for the district authorities followed by a mock emergency exercise was TAPS-1&2 submitted a progress report and conducted at all sites and areas for improvement have action plan towards resolution of the identified issues and been identified. National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) requested for further renewal of license for operation of personnel also participated in these exercises and these units. The application was reviewed in detail by demonstrated their capability in radiation field TAPS Safety Committee and SARCOP. measurement and decontamination exercises. There are four circumferential weld joints and six Hydrogen Recombiner Test Facility (HRTF), longitudinal weld joints in each RPV of TAPS-1&2. TAPS Tarapur and NPCIL had earlier proposed an approach that involved analysis for assessing the healthiness of RPV NPCIL has undertaken construction of a supplemented by limited inspection of the welds. In this hydrogen recombiner test facility (HRTF) at Tarapur for regard, TAPS-1&2 carried out assessment of the growth of
26 the postulated crack existing since initial start-up of the License for Operation of TAPS -3 & 4 reactor, assuming various degradation effects during service. The analysis indicates that the crack growth and The license for operation of TAPS-3&4 was valid the calculated stress intensity factors are well within limits till August 31, 2011. As per the regulatory requirements, assuming the reactor to be in operation till year 2030. In TAPS-3&4 carried out a periodic safety review (PSR) of addition, TAPS submitted an action plan for inspection of the plant performance and submitted an application for joints of RPV. As per the action plan, the inspection of two renewal of license for the next five years. These reviews longitudinal joints and one circumferential joint will be covered the aspects related to operational performance, undertaken during the forthcoming refueling outage of significant events, radiological safety performance, status TAPS-1 in July 2012. Based on the experience of this of safety related systems & equipment and environmental inspection, the inspection of remaining joints will be discharges, ageing management and equipment planned. In order to assess the healthiness of core shroud, qualifications etc. TAPS-1&2 has planned to extract and analyze a boat sample from the shroud of TAPS-1 in July 2012. TAPS- The PSR report was reviewed by OPSD and 1&2 has also agreed to provide inerting of primary TAPS-3&4 SC. These reviews indicated that the containments. As per the submitted action plan, the performance of various systems was satisfactory during the scheme for inerting of primary containment will be reporting period. The effluent discharges from the station implemented in TAPS-2 during the next refueling outage in remained well below the prescribed technical December 2012 and in TAPS-1 during its subsequent specifications limits. The total effective public dose at the refueling outage. exclusion boundary of Tarapur DAE site, which include dose due to other facilities at the site, was also less than TAPS-1&2 and NPCIL submitted reports on 2.5% of limit prescribed by AERB. During the review, it was assessment of safety of these units against external events noted that a number of modifications have been and an action plan for implementation of measures to undertaken or are being considered based on the further strengthen the safety. General information on the operating experience, to improve the performance of assessment and the identified strengthening measures is various systems at TAPS-3&4, which includes brought out in Section 2.3.3.(i). The other important plant modifications in important first of a kind (FOAK) systems specific issues are brought out below. such as SDS-2 and reactor regulations systems. These modifications were planned during the biennial shutdown The original design basis flood level of TAPS-1&2 (BSD) of these units, November 2011 for TAPS-4 and May was 29.3 m. However, the revised assessment has 2012 for TAPS-3. In addition, strengthening measures indicated that the expected flood level for Tarapur site is 32 identified post Fukushima was also to be implemented. m. A per the revised assessment, some of the important Pending resolution of these issues, license for operation of equipment, including auxiliaries of emergency DGs, SBO TAPS-3&4 was extended upto August 31, 2012 only. DGs, salt service water pumps, are likely to be affected by flood. TAPS-1&2 is taking measures to ensure the Incident of Partial Failure of Two out of Six Banks availability of these equipment by either relocation them or of Shutdown System-2 (SDS-2) in TAPS-4 on May providing protective measures or providing alternate 30, 2011 equipment to perform intended function. For example, affected components of DGs are being relocated at a The reactors at TAPS-3&4 have two higher elevation, a protection wall has been constructed independent, fast acting and diverse shutdown systems. around SBO DG and an alternate system is being SDS-1 drops shut-off rods into the reactor core under considered for salt service water pumps. gravity while SDS-2 injects liquid poison to moderator system through six banks. SDS-2 is provided as a back up After the detailed review of the status of issues to SDS-1. During poised state of SDS-2, gadolinium related to renewal of license for operation of TAPS-1&2, it nitrate solution is kept filled in six poison tanks. This poison was noted that progress has been made towards resolution is injected into moderator using high pressure helium. The of the issues related to renewal of license for operation of injection gets terminated when a high density polyethylene TAPS-1&2. However, the work on some issues is still in (HDPE) plastic ball floating in the poison tank seals the progress and is likely to take some more time to complete. bottom seat of the tank. Both the shutdown systems are Considering the action plan submitted by TAPS-1&2 for independently capable of maintaining the reactor in long resolution of these issues, the license for operation of term shutdown state. TAPS-1&2 was extended up to December 2012 only. Further renewal of license for operation of these units will On May 30, 2011, TAPS-4 was in shutdown state. be based on progress towards resolution of the identified SDS-2 was manually actuated as a prerequisite for issues. containment related tests. During actuation the balls in two
27 tanks prematurely sealed the tanks and allowed only A special regulatory inspection was carried out to partial injection of poison. Earlier, during filling of these investigate the event. Both the above incidents were tanks, balls got stuck at an intermediate position. The reviewed in detail by TAPS-3&4 SC and SARCOP. The investigations revealed that the ball diameter was not reactor was allowed to restart after implementation of the uniform due to which it got stuck in the tank at a particular identified corrective actions. orientation. Subsequent measurements of balls in other tanks and those stored as spares, indicated that this was Extension of the Construction Clearance for due to inadequate QA during manufacturing and Additional Away From Reactor (AAFR) Spent Fuel procurement. The ball detection system installed on the Storage Facility at Tarapur poison tanks failed to detect the intermediate locations of the balls due to design deficiency. The event as such did NPCIL had undertaken construction of an not have any effect on safety, as the unit was in shutdown Additional Away from Reactor (AAFR) facility at Tarapur state. The defective balls of SDS-2 were replaced. Suitable to provide additional storage space for spent fuel that modifications are also being made in the ball detection would be generated during the future operation of TAPS- system to make it more reliable. Pending implementation 1&2 reactors. AERB had issued the clearance for of this modification, the position of the balls is confirmed construction of AAFR Spent Fuel Storage Facility at TAPS prior to restart of the unit. Following the event, TAPS-3&4 1&2 initially up to December 31, 2010, which was has committed to tighten the QA requirements and has subsequently extended up to October 31, 2011. NPCIL augmented the periodic surveillance program for SDS-2 further informed that due to various reasons, the and its balls / tanks to ensure the system healthiness. construction activities were delayed and requested for the extension of validity of the construction clearance of the Incident of simultaneous rupture of all four Over facility. Based on the request submitted by NPCIL, the Pressure Rupture Devices (OPRDs) of Calandria in validity of construction consent of AAFR, Tarapur was TAPS-4 on June 9, 2011 extended up to March 31, 2012. Subsequently, NPCIL has submitted a request seeking permission for commissioning In PHWRs based NPPs, the calandria containing of AAFR, which is being reviewed in AERB. moderator heavy water is provided with over pressure (iii) RAPS-1 to 6 relief devices (OPRDs) to limit the maximum pressure in calandria. Radiolysis of moderator system heavy water RAPS-1 continues to be under shutdown with all present in calandria results in formation of deuterium and the fuel bundles removed from the reactor core. RAPS oxygen, which are recombined back to heavy water using units 2 to 6 operated safely during the year. catalytic re-combiners in the helium purification circuit. (iv) MAPS-1&2 On June 9, 2011, an incident of simultaneous rupture of all four OPRDs of calandria occurred in TAPS-4, Both the units operated safely during the year. while the unit was in guaranteed shutdown state. The incident occurred just after completion of maintenance Extension of License for Operation of MAPS-1&2 work involving replacement of self powered neutron detectors (SPND) in vertical flux unit (VFU). Investigations The review of MAPS application for renewal of revealed that a combination of factors like increase in authorization for operation beyond December 31, 2010 conductivity of the moderator, stoppage of the re- indicated that the performance of the plants during the combiner units and non-sampling of cover gas led to build reporting period was satisfactory. However, following the up of deuterium in the cover gas space. Maintenance Fukushima accident, AERB had asked NPCIL to carry out activities on VFUs allowed air ingress into the cover gas a comprehensive reassessment of safety against external and provided oxygen, which resulted in an explosive events and emergency mitigation measures at all the NPPs. reaction and consequent simultaneous rupture of all Pending the reassessment of safety and emergency OPRDs. Following the incident, inspections and functional mitigation measures at these NPPs, the permission for tests were carried out to ensure healthiness of systems and operation of MAPS units were limited to September 2011. structures located in reactor building. The inspections and tests indicated that there was no degradation of these Subsequently, MAPS submitted report on systems and structure due to explosion. No abnormality assessment of safety of plants against external events and was found in any of the SSCs. Actions taken to prevent action plan for implementation of measures to further recurrence of the event included modifications of the cover strengthen the safety. The general information on the gas circuit to avoid stagnant spaces and monitor the assessment and the identified strengthening measures is moderator cover gas composition during unit shutdown brought out in Sec. 2.3.3.(i). Other important plant specific condition also. issues are as given below.
28 The original design basis flood level of MAPS is operation of MAPS was extended for a limited duration up 8.95 m EL, which is based on the storm surge. After the to March 2013. The further renewal of license will be cyclone that stuck the Andhra coast in 1977, the expected considered based on the progress made towards resolution flood level of site was re-estimated to be 10.45 m. During of the identified issues. the design of PFBR, the assessment for flood level was carried out considering tsunami and the expected flood (v) NAPS-1&2 level was evaluated to be 12.5 m EL. Accordingly, an additional diesel generator, diesel driven fire water pumps Both the units operated safely during the year. and diesel driven compressor were provided at higher elevations. However, the revised evaluations have Incident in NAPS-1 indicated that the flood level could be 12.896 m EL, which may affect the additional equipment also. MAPS has In NAPS-1, during refueling operation a pair of expressed difficulty in providing protection around the spent fuel bundle got detached from its end plates resulting safety systems installed at lower elevations due to space in separation of fuel pins from the fuel bundle. The event constraints. Considering this, the additional provisions are occurred due to a mechanical fault in fuel transfer system, being implemented for strengthening the safety of plant used for transferring spent fuel from reactor building to against external events, such as additional sources of spent fuel storage bay. The fuel pin of the spent fuel bundle power supply, provisions for water storage and hook-up got damaged during the fuel transfer operation, as was arrangements for injecting water to essential systems. evident from the minor release of iodine and fission These provisions are being located above 13 m EL and can product noble gas through the stack at the time of the cater to the requirements for maintaining reactor under event. This event was rated level 1 on INES. cold shutdown state. During the review, SARCOP expressed that these provisions should be considered for (vi) KAPS-1&2 mitigation of an accident condition and all the safety systems should be available with adequate redundancy up Both the units operated safely during the year. to latest evaluated design basis flood level for the site. In view of this, MAPS has been asked to consider installation Over exposure to four temporary workers at KAPS-2 of additional redundant equipment, which can function up to the expected flood of the site. In PHWR based NPPs, refuelling is done when the reactor is on-power. The spent fuel bundles from reactor During the assessment of MAPS, a number of building are transferred to spent fuel storage bay through safety upgrades were identified for strengthening the safety spent fuel transfer tubes (SFTT) which are inside a shielded of plants against external event. Some of them, including trench called spent fuel transfer duct (SFTD). The radiation provision of solar lights in vital areas, installation of field in the SFTD area goes high for a short period during additional UPS for monitoring essential parameters during transfer of spent fuel bundles through SFTT. extended SBO condition, provision for hooking-up dedicated air cylinders for operation of main and At KAPS, work related to housekeeping and area emergency air locks to ensure containment integrity, painting inside the SFTD was undertaken from April 21, implementation of shore protection measures, installation 2011, for which personnel entry to SFTD was required. On of 2 x 200 kVA air cooled DGs, etc have been implemented May 30, 2011, a radiological work permit was issued for at the site. As per the schedule submitted by MAPS, a the work after taking clearance from control room majority of measures to be implemented for strengthening engineer-in-charge of refuelling operations. This permit the safety of plants are expected to be completed by March was issued to carry out painting work between 09.15 hrs 2013. These include provision of an automatic reactor trip and 13.00 hrs in the SFTD area. Control room staff was during seismic event, commissioning of 2 x 200 kVA air instructed not to transfer any spent fuel during this period. cooled DGs, upgradation of existing DG located at 12.5 m However, at around 11.40 hrs, refueling operator in the EL to make it an air cooled DG (if feasible), raising of the control room inadvertently discharged a pair of spent fuel bund around diesel storage tank and relocation of diesel bundles to SFSB. Four workers involved in housekeeping transfer pumps at higher elevation and provision of hook- and area painting work in SFTD got exposed to high up points for injection of cooling water to reactor core and radiation field and received radiation dose of 90.72, essential systems (including spent fuel storage bay) by 66.81, 58.70 and 23.23 mSv. AERB conducted a special either fire tenders or the proposed diesel driven pumps. It regulatory inspection to investigate the incident. The was also noted that actions have been initiated towards investigations revealed that this incident happened due to implementation of remaining strengthening measures. inadequate review of the procedure, inadequate Considering the satisfactory progress towards resolution of appreciation of the potential hazard and non-adherence to the issues identified post Fukushima, the license for the standard work practices. The incident was reviewed in
29 detail by NAPS-KAPS Safety Committee and SARCOP. radiography and increasing burn-up, IGCAR proposed to Following the incident, the license of the concerned fueling replace one U-Al fuel assembly with a fresh Pu-Al fuel handling engineer was suspended and he was sent for assembly. Such replacement of U-Al fuel sub-assembly refresher training. The event was rated at level 2 on INES. with Pu-Al fuel sub-assembly has been envisaged in the design of this reactor. The safety aspects related to this (vii) KGS-1 to 4 replacement of fuel sub-assembly, such as change in reactivity, delayed neutron fraction, effective neutron KGS-1 to 4 operated safely during the year. lifetime and reactor period and qualification of new fuel assembly, were reviewed in detail by IGCAR SC and Renewal of License for Operation of KGS-1&2 SARCOP. Based on the reviews, permission was granted for replacement of one fuel sub-assembly of KAMINI. The license for operation is KGS-1&2 is valid up to June 2012. As per the regulatory requirements, the Reprocessing of FBTR Spent Fuel Sub-Assemblies station has submitted report on the PSR and requested at CORAL, IGCAR renewal of license for operation. The application is under review. Fast reactor fuel reprocessing, being a complex technology, is being implemented in stages. These include (viii) INDIRA GANDHI CENTRE FOR ATOMIC testing of equipment and systems in the engineering RESEARCH laboratories and then integrating them in a hot cell for radioactive runs. FBTR fuel reprocessing is being carried th Permission for 18 Irradiation Campaign at FBTR, out in the CORAL facility (earlier called LMC), set up in IGCAR Reprocessing Development Laboratory of IGCAR. IGCAR had successfully completed 17 campaigns of IGCAR submitted proposal for the 18th irradiation reprocessing of FBTR fuel pins in this facility, which campaign of FBTR for conducting experiments related to included 5 campaigns of reprocessing of fuel pins trial production of Sr-89 from Yttria, continued irradiation irradiated up to a burn-up of 155 GWd/T. Considering this, of structural materials and for gaining experience in high IGCAR requested authorization for regular reprocessing of temperature operation. It was also proposed to start the FBTR fuel irradiated up to 155 GWd/T. SARCOP had irradiation of natural uranium-6% Zirconium-sodium earlier identified certain issues were need to be bonded metallic fuel pins as a part of the programme for implemented at the facility before according permission for development of metallic fuels. The proposal for 18th regular reprocessing. These were related to augmentation irradiation campaign and the performance of the reactor of boron coated counter system, upgradation of power during 17th campaign were reviewed in detail by IGCAR supplies, higher than normal radiation fields in the SC and SARCOP. continuously occupied areas such as control room & active analytical laboratory (AAL), stricter implementation of During the 17th campaign, there were two bioassay programme, etc. IGCAR had satisfactorily significant events related to anomaly in temperature at addressed all the issues, except the higher than normal outlet of fuel sub-assemblies and failure of a fuel sub- radiation fields in the control room. In this regard, IGCAR assembly. The investigations revealed that the anomaly informed that even after implementation of the identified observed in the temperature at the outlet of high burn-up actions, the radiation field in control room was remaining sub-assemblies were due to combination of statistical about 5 µGy/hr, which is higher than the acceptable values errors, plenum mixing effects and generic flow reduction of <1 µGy/hr for continuously occupied areas. due to clad swelling for the high burn-up sub-assemblies. Considering this, IGCAR established a separate central IGCAR had also identified the leaky bundle by conducting monitoring station (CMS) in the low radiation background special experiment and removed it from the core. IGCAR area and provided all the important process variables and had carried out detailed investigations for these incidents radiation related alarms in CMS. It was proposed to and taken identified corrective actions. Considering the monitor the operation from CMS, where as the erstwhile above, AERB agreed to the proposal for 18th irradiation control room, renamed as central operating station (COS), campaign of FBTR. will be used only for a limited number of operations. This will help in reducing the time spent by plant personnel in Replacement of One U-Al Fuel Sub-assembly of the COS, thus reduce their radiation exposure. As the KAMINI, IGCAR with Pu-Al Fuel SA operating experience of the facility with the changed layout needs to be reviewed before permitting regular operation KAMINI reactor is a low power (30 kW) U-233 of the facility, permission was accorded for reprocessing of fuelled research reactor having fuel subassemblies made of one FBTR spent fuel sub assembly in the new layout of the U-Al. In view of the large requirements for neutron plant. The permission for regular reprocessing at the facility
30 will be considered based on satisfactory review of the 2.3.4 Regulatory Inspections experience of this campaign. During the period, a total of 47 inspections were (ix) RAPPCOF carried out in the operating NPPs and research facilities, out of which 25 were scheduled inspections and 22 were Permission for Fabrication of One Batch of Cobalt special inspections. Teletherapy Sources at RAPPCOF Special regulatory inspection of all NPPs (except RAPPCOF has recently undertaken fabrication of TAPS-1&2) and FBTR & KAMINI at IGCAR, was carried indigenous cobalt teletherapy sources (CTS). This involves out to assess the capability and the preparedness of these handling of active cobalt radiation sources inside the hot- stations to deal with the situations arising out of the cell. This operation is performed remotely from outside the external events such as flood, tsunami and earthquake and hot cell. During the process of fabrication of these sources the events of SBO. A similar inspection of TAPS-1&2 was in the last year, spread of contamination was observed conducted earlier in March 2011. inside the hot-cell. Further, during decontamination of hot- cells, spread of contamination was observed in the other Six regulatory inspections, one each at MAPS-1, areas of facility, which are normally expected to be free of RAPS-4, KGS-1, KGS-3, TAPS-4 & NAPS-1, were contamination. Considering this, RAPPCOF was asked to conducted during the biennial shutdown of respective suspend fabrication of CTS at the facility. AERB conducted units to monitor the compliance to the radiation protection special regulatory inspection of the facility to assess status aspects. In addition, special regulatory inspections of of the facility and radiation protection practices at the RAPS-3&4, RAPS-5&6 and RAPPCOF were also facility. Subsequently, RAPPCOF completed the conducted to assess the radiological aspects at these decontamination of the hot cells and other areas of the facilities. facility and revised the procedures so as to avoid spread of contamination during fabrication of CTS. RAPPCOF also A special inspection of TAPS-4 was conducted for assured about the actions taken for improving the checking the station preparedness for carrying out the first radiation protection practices at the facility and requested campaign of coolant channel inspection. Another special permission for fabrication of one batch of CTS, which inspection of TAPS-4 was conducted on view of the involves cutting of 3 pellet capsule for fabrication of two incident of simultaneous rupture of calandria OPRDs. The CTS. The procedures for fabrication of CTS were reviewed special inspection at KAPS-1&2 was undertaken in view of in detail by the local safety committee of RAPPCOF and the incident of radiation over-exposure of four contract RAPS-MAPS Safety Committee. After detailed review of workers. the status of the facility and considering the revised procedure for fabrication of CTS and the assurance given The observations during the scheduled regulatory by the facility to avoid spread of contamination, inspections are categorized as follows: permission was given for fabrication of one batch of CTS at RAPPCOF.
Category: I Deviations from Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements/ stipulations. Category: II Deficiencies and degradations in Systems / Structures / Components of Safety and Safety Related systems and deficiencies in important procedures to meet the technical specifications & reporting criteria. Category: III Shortcomings identified in the design of Safety, Safety related and Safety support systems, based on operating experience including generic deficiencies. Category: IV Procedural inadequacies. Category: V Observations on housekeeping and departure from good practices.
Category wise distribution of observations in different plants during the period April 2011 to March 2012 is given in Tables 2.4.
31 Table 2.4: Categorization of Recommendations Made During Scheduled Regulatory Inspections (April 2011 to March 2012)
Unit Number of Inspections Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat. Total I II III IV V Planned Special
TAPS-1&2 2 0 0 1 6 37 4 48 TAPS-3&4 2 4 1 3 11 75 3 93 RAPS-2 2 1 0 0 9 51 0 60 RAPS-3&4 2 3 0 1 4 57 0 62 RAPS-5&6 1 2 0 0 4 40 0 44 MAPS-1&2 2 2 0 1 2 54 1 58 NAPS-1&2 2 2 0 3 11 46 5 65 KAPS-1&2 2 2 0 3 4 52 0 59 KGS-1&2 2 2 0 3 4 31 2 40 KGS-3&4 2 2 0 2 1 48 7 58 RAPPCOF 1 1 ------FBTR & KAMINI 1 1 0 5 6 30 1 42 Radio Chemistry Lab 1 0 ------Radio Metallurgy 1 0 ------Lead Mini Cell A, B, C 1 0 6 4 3 22 0 35 FRTG 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 25 22 7 26 65 543 23 664
Some of the salient observations made during the 2. Design Improvements above Regulatory Inspections are as follows: At NAPS-1&2 (& KAPS-1&2) automatic reactor 1. Plant Procedures trip is provided on high ground acceleration (seismic trip). Surveillance of this trip logic is carried out once in two TAPS-3&4, KGS-3&4, RAPS-3&4, KAPS-1&2 years. During regulatory inspection it was observed that and RAPS-2 are carrying out in-service inspection based continuous monitoring of healthiness and availability of on draft ISI manual. NPCIL / Stations were asked to Seismic trips circuits does not exist. The unavailability of expedite issue of approved ISI manual. this trip due to loss of power supply or discontinuity in the wiring will remain unnoticed till the next surveillance test. Revision of emergency preparedness manual for Hence, on the recommendations of RI team, station has NAPS, KAPS-1&2 and MAPS is pending. NPCIL / Stations prepared a scheme for continuous monitoring of this were asked to complete the revision of these manuals at the circuit. The scheme is presently under review with NPCIL earliest. designers.
Surveillance test of station batteries (C-10 & In the standardized PHWR design (i.e. NAPS HRD) is carried out periodically. At MAPS, emergency onwards) the Air Handling Unit of Main Control Room is diesel generators are prevented from auto start during this provided with smoke exhaust fans. This provision does not surveillance, resulting in the unavailability of DG sets on exist in MAPS. MAPS was asked to implement the design demand. Based on the regulatory inspection provisions in line with standardized PHWRs. recommendation, station has discontinued the practice of disabling DGs during surveillance test of station batteries. In the standardized PHWRs auto closure of main & emergency airlock doors takes place on containment box- up signal. MAPS was asked to implement this provision.
32 In the standardized PHWRs, control room is 4. Significant Events provided with survival ventilation system for maintaining habitability of main control room during accident. MAPS Stations were asked to report the following under was asked to implement this provision. significant event criteria.
Some of the area radiation monitors of RAPS- lIn June 2011, MAPS-1 was tripped inadvertently by 3&4 were given power supply from class-IV in place of the control room operator. class-II. Station was asked restore the power supply to these monitors as per the original design. lIn TAPS-4, five pencils of a fuel bundle got detached, among which three pencils dropped on the inspection 3. Surveillance & Monitoring Program bay floor.
l Space heaters are provided for high rating motors At TAPS-4 during BSD, the snubbers of PHT headers for maintaining healthiness. It was observed that space were found to be in seized condition on surveillance. heater panels for motors of reactor building (i.e. ECCS This happened because these were not motors, shutdown cooling pump motors etc.) are located environmentally qualified for the high temperatures in pump room. Hence these are not accessible during existing in the feeder cabinets. normal operation. Stations were asked to explore means lIn RAPS-6, ten spent fuel bundles got dropped on for monitoring space heaters for ensuring healthiness of spent fuel storage bay floor while shifting these from important motors. inspection table to spent fuel tray.
Radiation measuring instruments (area radiation lNAPS-1&2 experienced Class-IV failure on two monitors, teletechtors, rem counters etc.) are not being occasions and subsequently tripped on 'SG Delta T calibrated for their entire range due to non-availability of High' due to faults in the switchyard. sources with adequate strength at the stations. Stations were asked to calibrate the radiation instruments for the 2.3.5 Licensing of Operating Staff entire range at the specified frequency. The number of operating personnel, who were As per design, all protection parameters of licensed / re-licensed from various NPPs during April, 2011 emergency DG (EDG) other than fire, differential to March, 2012, is tabulated in Table 2.5. In addition, for protection and over speed are bypassed during LOCA the operation of FBTR, 6 senior shift engineer (Level-II), 1 condition. Stations were asked to introduce routine senior fuel handling engineer (Level-II) and 6 control room surveillance of this logic in design. assistants / field supervisors (Level-IV) were licensed/re- licensed. Table-2.5: Licensing of Operating Staff Plants No. of Persons Licensed Licensing Committee SCE ASCE ASCE(F) CE CE (F) Meetings TAPS-1 & 2 4 5 0 2 0 2 TAPS-3 & 4 8 10 3 10 6 3 RAPS-1 & 2 2 4 2 5 2 2 RAPS-3 & 4 5 5 4 15 0 2 RAPS-5 & 6 4 0 1 14 2 2 MAPS-1 & 2 1 4 2 2 1 2 NAPS-1&2 7 8 2 5 4 2 KAPS-1&2 6 2 6 6 1 2 KGS-1 & 2 3 5 1 7 0 2 KGS-3 & 4 5 3 2 6 1 2 Total 45 46 23 72 17 21
33 2.3.6 Significant Events Event Scale (INES). The INES system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rates events at seven levels It is obligatory for operating nuclear power plants (1 to 7) depending on their safety significance. Events to report promptly to regulatory body, certain events that rated at level 4 and above are termed as Accidents. The occur in the plant which have or may have impact on accidents at Chernobyl NPP in former USSR (now in operational safety. Under the reporting system established Ukraine) in April 1986 and Fukushima NPPs in Japan in by AERB, the events reportable to the regulatory body are March 2011 were rated at level 7 on INES. The accidents divided into two categories, termed as, involved core meltdown with the consequences of off-site (a) Events and radioactivity release to environment. Events rated at levels 1, 2 and 3 are called incidents. Events with no safety (b) Significant Events. significance are rated at level 0 or below scale. The IAEA- This categorization of events is done based on INES scale is depicted at the end of the report. their safety significance and importance to operational safety experience feedback. Based on the established In the year 2011, a total of 38 significant events reporting criteria, event reports (ER) and significant event were reported from the operating NPPs. The system wise reports (SER) are submitted to AERB. classification of SERs in NPPs is given in figure 2.1. The classifications of SERs on INES scale is given in Figure 2.2. The SERs received from the operating NPPs are The number of SERs in NPPs during last five years and also rated on the International Nuclear and Radiological their ratings on INES are given in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: INES Rating of Significant Events Feed water Instrumentation No system in NPPs during the last five years steam and & Control affected/failed Power 5% 8% conversion INES 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 3% Levels
0 28 22 23 33 36 Electrical 16% 1 8 2 0 1 1 Primary 2 0 0 0 0 1 Systems Essential 66% 3 0 0 0 0 0 service systems >3 0 0 0 0 0 2% Total 36 24 23 34 38 Figure 2.1: System-wise Classification of SERs in NPPs during the year 2011
6
5
4
3 INES 0
2 INES 1 INES 2 1
0
KGS 3&4 RAPS 5&6 Fig. 2.2: INES Rating of Significant Events in NPPs during the year 2011
34 One significant event of the year 2011 was rated third and final review is by the Regulatory Body/Board. For at level 2 on INES and another one event was rated at level other facilities, a two-tier review process is followed with 1 on INES. The level 2 event occurred in KAPS-2 and level first level of review conducted by DSRC or respective USC 1 event occurred in NAPS-1. These events are described in of the operating facility and second level of review by the 2.3.3 (v) and (vi). The other 36 significant events were ACPSR-FCF or SARCOP. Safety review of the operating rated at level 0 on INES. plants is carried out by USC and SARCOP. The number of meetings conducted for review of fuel cycle facilities is 2.4 FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES given in Table 2.7.
The nuclear fuel cycle facilities under regulatory The highlights on safety status, reviews, control of AERB are Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. regulatory inspections and licensing of personnel carried (UCIL) mines and mills, Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL) out in the above facilities are given below. plants, Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), Zirconium Complex (ZC), Heavy Water Plants (HWP), Atomic Minerals 2.4.1 Operating Plants / Project Safety Review Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD) and Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility (FRFCF). In addition to above, Safety review and monitoring of operating fuel Beach Sand Minerals (BSM) and Naturally Occurring cycle facilities were carried out during the year. Radioactive Materials (NORM) facilities are also regulated Applications for issue / renewal of licenses and various by AERB. consents of these operating units were received in AERB. After detailed review of the applications and based on the A three-tier review process is followed for granting satisfactory performance of the units, licenses were issued / consent for major stages of large nuclear fuel cycle renewed for operation of the units. facilities. The first level of review is done by Design Safety Review Committee (DSRC) or respective Unit Safety The status of safety review of applications from Committee (USC) of the facility followed by second level of operating fuel cycle facilities, important observations and review conducted by Advisory Committee for Project recommendations made during the review are given Safety Review- Fuel Cycle Facilities (ACPSR-FCF) and the below. Table 2.7: Meetings of Safety Review (i) Uranium Corporation of India Limited Committees of Fuel Cycle Facilities (UCIL) Name of the Safety Committee No. of Meetings The mines at Jaduguda, Bhatin, Narwapahar, Design Safety Review Committee 2 Turamdih, Banduhurang, Bagjata and the mills at for Diversified Projects (DSRC-DP) Jaduguda & Turamdih operated safely during the year. Design Safety Review Committee 3 Commissioning activities at Tummalapalle mill are under for Uranium Extraction Projects progress. Decline development at Mohuldih and (DSRC-UEP) Tumallapalle mines are also under progress. Trial run of UCIL Safety Committee 3 peroxide process at Jaduguda Mill was taken up and is under progress. UCIL-SC, SARCOP, DSRC-UEP and BSM-NORM Safety Committee 4 ACPSR-FCF reviewed the following proposals of the UCIL NFC Safety Committee 3 mines/mills for granting clearances. HWP Safety Committee 5 lProposal for the authorization for safe disposal / ECIL Safety Committee 2 transfer of radioactive wastes from Turamdih mine was VECC RRCAT Safety Committee 3 reviewed and recommended by UCIL-SC. Advisory Committee for Project 4 Subsequently UCIL submitted a proposal for Safety Review- Fuel Cycle Facilities enhancement of annual limit for radioactive solid (ACPSR-FCF) wastes from Turamdih mine and the same is under review. Advisory Committee on 3 Occupational Health (ACOH) lThe proposal for expansion of Banduhurang mine was Advisory Committee on Safety 3 reviewed and recommended by SC subject to Documents related to Fuel Cycle compliance of certain stipulations. Subsequently, Facilities (ACSD-FCF) licence for enhancement of uranium ore production Fatal Accident Assessment 1 capacity from 2400 to 3500 TPD at Banduhurang Committee (FAAC) mine of UCIL was issued on July 8, 2011.
35 lThe proposal of personnel dosimetry coverage lProposal for processing of natural uranium oxide scheme at UCIL facilities was reviewed and the muck from AFD, BARC for NGADU production at committee requested UCIL to submit the scheme for IREL Udyogamandal, Kerala was reviewed. SC coverage of personnel and ambient dosimetry for the agreed to the proposal in principle with certain operating uranium mines of UCIL to AERB for stipulations. detailed review. lLicense for operation of THorium retrieval, Recovery lReport on the leakage of tailings slurry from the of Uranium and re-Storage of Throium (THRUST) discharge pipeline behind pilot plant inside UCIL project for IREL, Udyogamandal was issued on boundary limit at Jaduguda Mill was reviewed by November 11, 2011. UCIL-SC. UCIL-SC recommended that UCIL should carry out root cause analysis for external corrosion of lProposal for processing crude Sodium-Di-Uranate tailings piping and submit an action plan to prevent (SDU) available at Technology Demonstration Plant any failure of tailings slurry discharge pipeline. (TDP) of Heavy Water Board, using the existing facilities at Rare Earths division (RED), IREL lThe proposal for expansion of Turamdih mine by Udyogamandal, Alwaye was reviewed. SC increasing the ore production from 550 to 1000 TPD recommended to process about 1 ton of crude SDU was reviewed and USC recommended the same with available at TDP, Mumbai using the existing facilities at certain stipulations. RED with certain stipulations. lThe proposal for approval of Technical specifications lSafety Evaluation Report on proposed Monazite Up- for Turamdih mill and Jaduguda mill was reviewed gradation project at IREL, Chavara was discussed. and SC recommended the same with certain Safety Committee recommended to the proposal of corrections. up-gradation of monazite concentrate to 65+% monazite rich fraction using the existing circuit for six lThe proposal for commissioning of Tummalapalle mill months with certain stipulations. of UCIL was reviewed in the Design Safety Review Committee for Uranium Extraction Projects (DSRC- lApplication for renewal of License for Thorium Plant UEP). Safety committee recommended the same with operation at Orissa Sand Complex (OSCOM), Odisha certain stipulations. was reviewed. SC recommended to extend the validity of the existing license till December 2012 with certain (ii) Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL) stipulations.
The IREL plants at Chavara, Manavalakurichi, (iii) Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) Chatrapur and Udyogamandal operated safely during the year. The BSM-NORM SC, ACPSR-FCF and DSRC-UEP All the plants of NFC, Hyderabad operated safely reviewed the industrial, fire safety and radiological safety during the year. After ensuring satisfactory compliance to status of the following proposals of IREL. the safety requirements, following proposals were recommended by NFC Safety Committee/ACPSR-FCF. lSafety report for the production of high purity individual rare earths elements at Rare Earths lConsent for operation of 'Oxide production Facility & Division, Udyogamandal was reviewed. Safety Sponge Production Facility' at Zirconium Complex, Committee agreed to the proposal in principle with Pazhayakayal was reviewed by the SC and ACPSR- certain stipulations. FCF. Based on the recommendation of ACPSR-FCF, license for operation of the Zirconium Complex at lAnnual health physics report of IREL Udyogamandal, Pazhayakayal was issued by AERB on November 11, Chavara, Manavalakurichi and OSCOM were 2011. reviewed. Committee recommended various measures to improve the radiological safety aspects of lProposal for grant of siting and construction consent the plants. for Niobium Thermit Production Facility (NTPF) at NFC, Hyderabad was reviewed by the Safety lThe revised Safety Assessment Report on 10,000 TPA Committee and ACPSR-FCF. Based on the Monazite Processing Plant (MoPP) retrofitting with recommendations of the ACPSR-FCF consent for 150 TPA Thorium Nitrate Plant at IREL, OSCOM was siting and construction for NTPF, NFC, Hyderabad reviewed by the safety committee and ACPSR-FCF. was granted on February 6, 2012. ACPSR-FCF has asked IREL-OSCOM to submit certain documents for further review.
36 (iv) Heavy Water Plants (HWPs) clearance to HWP-Kota with certain stipulations. Subsequently, the proposal was reviewed by SARCOP Heavy Water Plants - Manuguru, Kota, Hazira & and SARCOP agreed to the proposal with certain Thal operated safely during the year. HWP-Tuticorin is stipulations. under shutdown. Presently, AERB has granted consent for siting and construction of 'Versatile Solvent Synthesis Pilot lThe application for grant of consent for operation of Plant at HWP-Tuticorin' based on recommendations of 'Technology Demonstration Plant (TDP)' at RCF, ACPSR-FCF. Various diversified projects like Tri Butyl Chembur, Mumbai was reviewed by DSRC-UEP and Phosphate (TBP), BEXD and Versatile Solvent Production subsequently by ACPSR-FCF. Based on the Plant (VSPP) at HWP-Talcher were under normal recommendations of ACPSR-FCF, AERB granted the operation. Heavy water production facility at HWP- operation clearance for TDP with certain stipulations. Baroda has suspended its operation. Presently, HWP- Baroda is catering to the production of potassium metal lThe proposal for commissioning and operation and has commenced operation of Tri Butyl Phosphate consent of Versatile Solvent Synthesis Pilot Plant (TBP) after receiving consent from AERB. (VSSP) at HWP-Tuticorin was reviewed by DSRC-DP and ACPSR-FCF. Based on the recommendations of The following important proposals / safety issues ACPSR-FCF, consent for commissioning and were reviewed in the Heavy Water Plants Safety operation of VSSP at HWP-Tuticorin was granted by Committee (HWP-SC), DSRC-DP / UEP, ACPSR-FCF and AERB with validity till end of March 2017. SARCOP and after ensuring satisfactory compliance to the safety requirements, following clearances / renewal of lApplication for construction clearance for Oxidation licenses were granted / given. Plant at HEWAC facility, HWP-Kota was reviewed. SARCOP opined that the conversion of HEWAC by- lApplication for renewal / extension of license for product to aqueous form as an interim measure is not operation of HWP, Baroda was reviewed. In view of desirable and recommended that HWB should the decision taken by Heavy Water Board (after expedite the development of technology for approval from DAE) for de-commissioning of heavy converting the HEWAC by-product to metal hydride water production technology demonstration plant at form. HWP-Baroda, SC recommended for renewal of l license for operation of potassium metal plant only. Report of Task Force on H2S dispersion analysis at Based on the recommendation of the SC, AERB Rawatbhata Site for Design Basis Accident at HWP- renewed the license for operation of HWP-Baroda Kota was discussed. SARCOP recommended that potassium metal plant for a period of five years. HWB should review the report of the Task Force-A, and submit its response with adequate justification for lConsent for siting and construction of 'Versatile non consideration of any scenario presented in the Solvent Synthesis Pilot Plant at HWP-Tuticorin' was report and also on the assumptions and methodology reviewed by DSRC-DP and ACPSR-FCF. Based on the used during the analysis by the Task Force. recommendation of ACPSR-FCF the consent was issued by AERB for a period of five years on July 8, lIn the wake of Fukushima accident in Japan, AERB 2011 with certain stipulations. constituted a committee to review the safety of Indian NPPs during extreme natural events. HWB was also lProposal for grant of license for operation of 'Tri- Butyl asked to carry out safety assessment of HWPs based Phosphate Plant at HWP-Baroda' was reviewed by on the recommendations of this committee. HWB DSRC-DP and ACPSR-FCF. Based on the submitted a status report on the preliminary safety recommendation of ACPSR-FCF the license for assessment of HWP-Kota and the action plan for safety operation of TBP facility at HWP-Baroda was issued assessment of other plants and the same was briefed to by AERB for a period of five years on July 8, 2011 with SARCOP. SARCOP recommended that the list of the certain stipulations. safety related equipments & systems essential for safe shut down of the plant and their categorisation should lHWP-Kota submitted an application for grant of be submitted to AERB and HWPSC for review and commissioning clearance for Step C (i.e. acceptance commissioning activities with respect to Cryogenic system with hydrogen / deuterium) for HEavy WAter (v) Atomic Minerals Directorate for Clean-up facility (HEWAC) at HWP-Kota. HWPSC Exploration and Research (AMD) visited the HEWAC facility and after detailed review recommended for grant of Step C commission Development of mine related activities are in
37 progress at AMD-Gogi site. Regulatory inspections were Banduhurang mine of Uranium Corporation of India carried out for AMD sites namely South Central Region, Limited (UCIL) was issued on July 8, 2011. Central Region, South Region, Eastern Region, Northern Region & Western Region. lConsent for Operation of Technology Demonstration Plant (TDP) at RCF, Chembur, Mumbai, was issued on (vi) Beach Sand Minerals (BSM) & Naturally October 18, 2011 with certain stipulations. Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) Facilities lLicense for Operation of Zirconium complex, Pazhayakayal was issued on November 11, 2011. Beach Sand Minerals & Naturally Occurring l Radioactive Materials Safety Committee (BSM-NORM Consent for Siting & Construction of 3 TPA Niobium SC) reviewed the radiological safety status and Thermit Production Facility at Nuclear Fuel Complex applications for issue of licenses. (NFC), Hyderabad was issued on February 06, 2012. 2.4.3 Regulatory Inspections lProposal to amend the license conditions of following three Non-DAE BSM facilities, in view of the changes proposed by the facilities were reviewed: Regulatory Inspections on industrial and fire safety aspects under the Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules - a) M/s Transworld Garnet India Ltd., Tamilnadu 1996, radiological safety aspects under the Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004 and waste b) M/s V.V. Minerals, Tamilnadu management aspects under the Atomic Energy (Safe c) M/s Trimex Sands Pvt. Ltd, Srikakulam Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules, 1987 were carried out. The major recommendations made were as follows: lIssues at Kerala Minerals and Metals Ltd (KMML) namely, the transfer of Monazite concentrates from the (i) Fuel Cycle Facilities (FCF) existing monazite storage, increase in monazite content in the tailings due to process changes & lAt HWP-Hazira, a detailed survey/inspection should shifting of Monazite rich tailings from Earthen pits no. be carried out on priority to ensure structural integrity I & IV were discussed. Safety Committee of the plant. recommended for shifting of the monazite rich fractions to Anchumana site for underground storage l At HWP-Kota, adequacy of Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) in trenches. monitors should be reviewed w.r.t. release of H2S from top of exchange towers and other areas like CCR air 2.4.2 Consents / Clearances / Permissions Issued bullet area.
The applications related to new projects of fuel lAt Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal, fire and smoke cycle facilities for stage wise consent (i.e. siting, detectors should be tested once in six months and construction, commissioning, operation and de- records should be maintained. commissioning) were reviewed by DSRC/USC, ACPSR- FCF and finally Regulatory Body. The detailed safety lAt NFC, Hyderabad, access control should be assessment covered industrial, fire & radiological safety, implemented at dispatch section of controlled area at waste management and environmental protection aspects New Uranium Fuel Assembly Plant (NUFAP) to of the projects and based on the above assessment prevent entry of personnel without TLD to controlled following stage wise consents were issued. area from outside. lConsent for Operation of 'Tri- Butyl Phosphate Plant at lAt IREL, Udyogamandal, maintenance schedule of HWP-Baroda' was issued for a period of five years on civil structures should be followed. July 8, 2011 with certain stipulations. lAt IREL-OSCOM, job hazard Analysis should be lConsent for Siting and construction of 'Versatile prepared for different construction activities of Solvent Synthesis Pilot Plant at HWP-Tuticorin' was Monazite Processing Plant and mitigation measures granted for a period of five years on July 8, 2011 and should be provided for each hazards identified. Consent for commissioning & operation was issued on April 02, 2012 with certain stipulations. lAt UCIL-Tummalapalle, fire organization should be made available as per Class III minimum fire staff lConsent for Enhancement of uranium ore production requirement in UCIL mentioned in AERB Fire capacity from 2400 TPD to 3500 TPD at Standard (AERB/NF/SS/FPS (Rev.1)
38 lAt Jaduguda and Turamdih Mill, UCIL, work permit (ii) Beach Sand Minerals Facilities system should be followed for all electrical work in crushing section falling under the scope of MRS as well Regulatory Inspections on radiological safety as under the electrical department of crushing section. aspects of Non-DAE Facilities (Beach Sand Minerals) were carried out. The major recommendation arising out of lAt AMD-Southern, Eastern & Western regions, regulatory inspections made were related to provisions to periodical audiometry tests should be carried out for be made pertaining to storage of raw material, calibration the persons employed in drilling operation as per the of radiation survey meters, procedure for dose estimation, Schedule XI of Rule no. 88 of the Atomic Energy accumulation of scrap materials near tailings' yard and use (Factories) Rules, 1996. of Personnel Protective Equipment.
The observations under Scheduled Regulatory Inspections are broadly categorized as below: Category Type Particulars
CATEGORY- I Violation of Rules, Acts, AERB Codes & Standards, Tech. Specs. Requirements (Safety Limit, Limiting Safety System Settings and Limiting Conditions of Operation), SARCOP/AERB Safety Directives, Licensing conditions CATEGORY- II Deficiencies in Operating Systems and Safety Related systems Deficiencies in Surveillance procedures/practices Short comings identified in the design of Safety related equipment and working conditions based on plant's operating experience including Generic deficiencies. Safety Review related observations. CATEGORY-III Procedural inadequacies in : ØOrganizational, ØISI, ØO&M procedures ØTraining & Qualification, ØRadiation Protection Procedures, ØRadiological Waste management, ØEffluent management ØEmergency Preparedness CATEGORY-IV General observations/deficiencies regarding ØHousekeeping and ØGood Operating/maintenance Practices
Category wise distribution of observations in different fuel cycle plants during the period April 2011 to March 2012 are given in Table 2.8.
39 Table 2.8: Categorization of Deficiencies Observed During Scheduled Regulatory Inspections of Fuel Cycle Facilities (April 2011 to March 2012) Unit Number of Inspections Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat. Total I II III IV UCIL 2 4 18 100 48 170 NFC 2 11 14 171 51 247 ZC 2 3 11 51 15 80 IREL OSCOM 2 4 10 74 17 105 IREL Udyogamandal 2 3 3 41 54 101 IREL Manavalakurichi 1 0 0 9 0 9 IREL Chavara 1 0 0 8 2 10 HWP -Manauguru (*) 1 0 17 84 55 156 HWP- Kota 2 1 23 49 65 138 HWP- Talcher 1 2 3 15 6 26 HWP- Tuticorin 2 0 9 18 19 46 HWP-Thal 2 2 15 23 77 117 HWP- Baroda (*) 1 1 5 13 10 29 HWP- Hazira 2 5 16 42 50 113 ECIL 2 11 13 26 53 103 RRCAT 2 3 20 18 12 53 VECC 2 7 23 61 15 106 Total 29 57 204 813 549 1609 Note: 1) The heavy water production at HWP-Tuticorin, Baroda & Talcher remained suspended. 2) (*) The no. of inspections is as per the financial year, however 2 inspections each at HWP, Manuguru & Baroda were carried out during the calendar year 2012. Apart from the above, monthly and quarterly 2.5.1 Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre (VECC) inspections of various construction sites of NPPs, Beach Sand Minerals, manufacturing facilities and fuel cycle The room temperature (K-130) cyclotron facilities were also carried out. operated safely during the year. In super conducting cyclotron (K-500), commissioning activities were under 2.4.4 Licensing of Plant Personnel progress. Construction of medical cyclotron facility was in progress. The operational status of K-130 cyclotron at lHeavy water plants licensing committee authorized / VECC, Kolkata and seismic up-gradation of super re-authorized 48 operation personnel during the year. conducting cyclotron of VECC is under review. The following proposals / safety issues were reviewed by VRSC. lNFC licensing committee authorized/re-authorized 13 operation personnel for shift-in-charge position during lDesign basis reports with respect to medical cyclotron the year. along with the proposal for beamlines in medical cyclotron. 2.5 R&D UNITS AND OTHER FACILITIES lRevised technical specifications and scheme for Safety review of VECC, RRCAT and ECIL were training and licensing of operators in K-130 cyclotron. carried out. lThe progress report on superconducting cyclotron. A two- tier review process is followed, based on hazard level, for the above facilities with first level of review During regulatory inspection, AERB team conducted by respective USC of the facility and second recommended to prepare fire hazard analysis reports for level of review by SARCOP. superconducting cyclotron and room temperature cyclotron (K-130) and operation manual for room
40 temperature cyclotron (K-130), fire detector & alarm etc., audiometry test should be done for all employees systems should be installed in the hot store used to store working in AC plants, electrical work permit should be radioactive sources and failure modes & consequence implemented and adequate safety officers / supervisors analysis should be carried out for safety interlocks related should be ensured in the safety organization of RRCAT, to K-130 cyclotron. Indore.
2.5.2 Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced 2.5.3 Electronics Corporation of India Limited Technology (RRCAT) (ECIL)
Indus-1 was operating and producing All the manufacturing units of ECIL were in synchrotron 450 MeV beam energy at 100 mA current. operation except the thermal battery division which is Indus II is in operation with 2 GeV energy and 100 mA under renovation. The commissioning tests of 10 MeV current. The 750 keV DC accelerator and 10 MeV LINAC LINAC test facility is under progress. were under operation. The commissioning of 10 MeV FEL LINAC is in progress. The construction of Agricultural and The following proposals / reports / safety issues Radiation Processing Facility is in progress. were reviewed in ECIL -SC.
The following proposals/safety issues were lThe Licence for operation was granted for smartcard reviewed in VRSC. printing & packaging facility at Tirupathi, Andhra Pradesh after review by ECILSC & SARCOP. lOperational experience feedback of Indus-II accelerator. lAnnual Health Physics report for the year 2011 and Industrial Safety Performance report of 2011 were lApplication for testing of 300 keV, 6 kW DC reviewed. accelerator for technology demonstration purpose. lDetailed review was done on Fire Hazard Analysis lThe proposal for commissioning of soft and deep X- recommendations, fire hydrant system, fire station and ray lithography beam line (BL-7) and X-ray fire brigade organization aspects at ECIL, Hyderabad. fluorescence microprobe beam line (BL-16) was reviewed in VRSC and after ensuring satisfactory During regulatory inspection of ECIL, compliance to the safety requirements; the proposal Hyderabad, the significant recommendations made were; was recommended. to convene Factory level Safety Committee once in three months as per Rule-44(a) and Sectional Level Safety lProposal for siting and building clearance of IR-FEL Committee once in a month as per Rule-44(b) of the LINAC building. AEFR-1996, to establish work permit system for hazardous jobs, to maintain fire organization as per AERB Safety During regulatory inspection and special Standard on “Fire Protection Systems for Nuclear inspection of RRCAT the significant recommendations Facilities” and to commission the plant fire water system on made were; augmentation of fire staff, preparation of job priority. hazard analysis (JHA) for jobs like erection of steel trusses
41 CHAPTER 3
SAFETY REVIEW OF RADIATION FACILITIES
3.1 INTRODUCTION radiation gauging devices (nucleonic gauges) including well-logging devices and facilities manufacturing The radiation facilities in India are broadly consumer products that contain radioactivity. Research classified as medical, industrial and research facilities. installations include universities and other research Medical facilities include diagnostic X-ray machines, institutes handling a variety of sealed and unsealed telegamma units, medical Linear Accelerators (LINACs), radiation sources and also X-ray facilities for research brachytherapy units using manual and remote after purposes. loading techniques and nuclear medicine centres practising diagnosis and therapy. Industrial installations Number of various radiation installations and include gamma and X-ray radiography equipment, radiation devices, which are regulated by AERB, are given gamma and X-ray radiation processing plants, ionizing in Table 3.1. Table 3.1: Radiation Installations Regulated (As on March-2012) Sr. Type of Application Number of Devices in use Number of No. institutions
1 Diagnostic X-ray ~ 50,000 ~ 40,000 2 Computed Tomograhy ~4000 ~3000 3 Radiotherapy 319 Teletherapy Telecobalt units 237 Gamma Knife units 07 Super Gamma System 01 Accelerators 232 Tomotherapy 03 Cyber Knife 02 Intra-operative Radiotherapy 02 Brachytherapy High Dose Rate 200 Low Dose Rate 14 Manual(Intracavitary) 61 Manual (Interstitial) 20 Sr-90 Ophthalmic Applicators 42 Ru-106 Ophthalmic Applicators 02 I-125 Ophthalmic Applicators 03 I-125 seeds for Prostrate Implant 01 Applicators 4 Nuclear Medicine Diagnostic low and high dose therapy Not applicable 179 High dose therapy 41 5 Research centres using unsealed Not applicable 251 radioisotopes 6 Radio Immuno Assay (RIA) Not applicable 235 7 Medical cyclotrons 12 12 8 Industrial Radiography Radiography Camera 2265 X-ray units 268 472 Accelerators 15
42 9 Gamma Irradiators 16 16 10 X-ray Beam Irradiators 05 04 11 Gamma Chambers 131 110 12 Nucleonic Gauges 9404 1710 13 Well Logging 754 50 14 Consumer Products Gas Mantle 31 Lamp starters 13 Smoke Detectors Not applicable 104 Electron Capture Detector (ECD) 890
3.2 APPROVALS AND CONSENTS Specifications (SS) documents for a variety of devices. These SS documents are periodically reviewed and revised 3.2.1 Type Approvals in order to meet currently accepted international standards. Safety Review Committee for the Application of In order to ensure that the radiation doses Radiation (SARCAR) examines the design safety features received by workers and members of the public do not of each device and recommends issuance of type exceed the prescribed dose limits and further that such approval. SARCAR held six meetings during the year. doses are kept As Low As Reasonably Achievable Based on the recommendations of SARCAR, AERB issued (ALARA), design safety is accorded primary importance type approval certificates to the manufacturers / suppliers and operational control measures are monitored. All of devices incorporating radioactive materials and devices incorporating radioactive sources, including radiation generating equipments. Number of the devices radiation generating equipment are subjected to a type type approved during the period is given in Table 3.2.a. No approval procedure. AERB permits only type-approved Objection Certificates (NOC) issued for procurement of devices to be marketed and used in India. The criteria for certain equipment is given in Table 3.2.b and the consents type approval are stipulated in the Standards issued are given in Table 3.2.c.
(Note: The data on Type Approvals issued, NOCs issued for import, Consents issued, RSO approval certificates issued, licences/NOCs issued for procurement of sources, number of sources disposed of at different disposal agencies, regulatory inspections and unusual occurrences was earlier being reported on a calendar year basis. Henceforth this will be reported for the financial year (April-March). In view of this change, the present report gives the data for the period January 2011 to March 2012.) Table 3.2.a: Number of Type Approvals Issued Sr. Type of Equipment Number of Models No. Type Approved Jan-2011 to April-2011 to March-2011 March-2012 1 Medical Diagnostic X-ray units 26 41 2 Computed Tomography (CT) Units 00 12 3 Interventional Radiology Units 00 04 4 I-125 Sealed Source for Surface Mold and Interstitial Implant 00 01 Brachytherapy Techniques (Renewal) 5 Tele Cobalt Units 00 00 6 Medical Linear Accelerators 06 06 7 X-ray based Radiotherapy Patient Positioning System 00 00 8 CyberKnife Robotic Radiosurgery System 00 00 9 Remote Controlled Afterloading Brachytherapy Units 00 00 10 Industrial Gamma Radiography Exposure Devices (IGRED) 00 01
43 11 Industrial Gamma Radiography Exposure Devices (IGRED)-Renewal 00 02 12 Approval of Classification for the Design of Sealed Sources 00 01 13 Industrial Radiation Gauging Devices (IRGD) 29 49 14 X-ray baggage inspction system 00 05 15 Gamma Chambers 00 05 Table 3.2.b: NOCs issued for Import Sr. Type of Equipment Number of NOC Issued No. Jan-2011 to April-2011 to March-2011 March-2012 1 Computed Tomography (CT) Units 00 16 2 Interventional Radiology Units 00 05 3 SPECT-CT Units 00 00 4 PET-CT Units 00 00 5 Medical Linear Accelerators 01 01 6 Remote Controlled After loading Brachytherapy Units 00 00 7 Radiotherapy Simulator 00 00 8 Rotating Knife Ray System 01 01 9 Gamma Ray Stereotactic Neurosurgery System 00 00 10 Medical Cyclotron 00 00 11 Select Seed 'I-125' sources for permanent implant treatment of 00 00 prostate cancer 12 Industrial Gamma Radiography Exposure Device / source 00 04 Changer Models 13 Mobile Industrial radiography X-ray Units 00 00 14 Industrial radiography X-ray Units 00 00 Table 3.2.c: Consents Issued Sr. Type of Equipment Permission Granted No. Jan-2011 to April-2011 to March-2011 March-2012 1 Site Approval for installation of Gamma Radiation Processing Facility 00 01 2 Design and Construction Approval for Gamma Radiation 01 01 Processing Facility 3 Licence for routine operation of Gamma Radiation Processing Facility 00 01 4 Renewal of Licence for routine operation of Gamma Radiation 03 06 Processing Facility 5 Certificate of Approval for radiation processing of food products 03 03 to Gamma Radiation Processing Facility 6 Site Approval for installation of Medical Cyclotron Facility 00 05 7 Design and Construction Approval for Medical Cyclotron Facility 00 00 8 Permission for Operation of Medical Cyclotron Facility (Renewal) 00 01 9 Permission for supply of the new remote control unit and guide 00 01 tube applicable to industrial gamma radiography exposure device (IGRED) model GAMMARID- 192/120
44 3.2.2 Approval of Radiological Safety Officers 3.2.3 Approval of Packages for Transport of Radioactive Material The approval certificates issued to Radiological Safety Officers (RSOs) are given in Table 3.3. Various packages used for transport of radioactive material, that are covered under transport Table 3.3: Approval Certificates Issued to RSOs regulations are, Excepted Packages, Industrial Packages, Type A Packages, Type B(U)/(M)/C Packages. Graded approach is applied in evaluating the performance Sr. RSO Level Number standard of package designs/regulatory approval for the No. Approved packages. 'Type A' packages, which are used to transport Jan-2011 Apr-2011 to to radioactive material of activity not exceeding the specified Mar-2011 Mar-2012 limits (A1/A2 values), need to be registered with AERB. All 'Type B' packages are subjected to a stringent approval 1 RSO Level-III 59 217 procedure and are required to fulfill the regulatory (Radiotherapy) standards. 2 RSO Level-III 02 08 (Industrial Radiography) During the report period, design approval 3 RSO Level-III 12 12 certificates were issued to three Type B(U) packages and (Gamma Irradiators) one Type B(M) package, registration certificates were issued to seven Type A packages. Renewal of design 4 RSO Level-II 51 232 approvals was issued for one Type B(U) package. (Industrial Radiography) 5 RSO Level-II 22 67 3.3 LICENSING / AUTHORIZATION (Nuclear Medicine Diagnosis) 3.3.1 Licensing / Authorization 6 RSO Level-I 29 195 (Nucleonic Gauge) Licenses for operation were issued to one medical 7 RSO Level-I 11 59 cyclotron and one high intensity Gamma Radiation (Research Applications) Processing Facilities (GRAPF). 8 RSO Level-I 02 11 (Well Logging) AERB issued 1245 regulatory licenses as Certificate of Registration to diagnostic X-ray installations 9 RSO Level-I 00 00 upon confirming that the applicable regulatory (Ship breaking) requirements are duly satisfied. Thirty eight NOCs were 10 RSO Level-I 00 01 issued for the export of radioactive sources. Three hundred (Container scanner) nine NOCs were issued for transfer of sources abroad for disposal. Thirty authorizations were given for Gamma 11 RSO Level-I 00 01 Irradiation Chamber. Details of Licences/NOCs issued (NORM Industry) during the period, are given in Table 3.4.
45 Table 3.4: Licences / NOCs Issued A. Procurement of Sources Sr. No. Type of application Regulatory Licences / NOC Local Import Jan to Apr 11 to Jan to Apr 11 to Mar 11 Mar 12 Mar 11 Mar 12 1 Radiotherapy Telecobalt 02 08 02 06 Telecaesium - - - Accelerators - - 12 45 Gamma Knife - - - - Tomotherapy - - - - Brachytherapy HDR - - 41 190 LDR - - - - Manual (Intracavity & Interstitial) 03 03 - - Opthalmic Sr-90 - - - - Opthalmic I-125 03 04 - - Ophthalmic Ru-106 02 - - - 2 Nuclear Medicine RIA facilities 08 08 00 48 Diagnostic & Therapeutic 123 194 123 185 Research 23 56 03 171 3 Industrial Gamma Radiography sources 279 1032 109 290 4 Gamma Irradiators (Category-IV) 02 04 - - Gamma Chambers (Category-I) 00 04 - - 5 Nucleonic Gauges 12 58 59 188 6 Well Logging - - 30 43 7 Diagnostic X-ray (Registration) 328 917 - - CT and Cath lab units (License) 65 334 - - 8 Consumer Products Gas Mantle 03 03 - - Lamp starters 02 01 - - Electron Capture Devices 19 17 11 106 Smoke detectors - - 06 04 Explosive detectors - - 40 74
B. Number of Sources Disposed off at Different Disposal Agencies
BRIT WMD, BARC CWMF, ECIL, Original Supplier NAPS, Narora Kalpakkam Hyderabad Abroad Jan to Apr 11 to Jan to Apr 11 to Jan to Apr 11 to Jan to Apr 11 to Jan to Apr 11 to Jan to Apr 11 to Mar 11 Mar 12 Mar 11 Mar 12 Mar 11 Mar 12 Mar 11 Mar 12 Mar 11 Mar 12 Mar 11 Mar 12 67 419 112 257 3 71 11 16 52 789 122 88
Note: In addition, 27 and 1290 numbers of I-125 sources were disposed off in BRIT during January to March 2011 and April 2011 to March 2012 respectively. 280 numbers of Ionisation Chamber Smoke Detectors were disposed off during January to March 2011 at WMD, BARC. 739.27 and 364.11 kgs of Depleted Uranium were disposed off at WMD, BARC during January to March 2011 and April 2011 to March 2012 respectively.
46 3.3.2 Shipments under Special Arrangement 700 620 Consignments, which do not meet all the 600 normally applicable requirements of the transport 500 regulations due to specific reasons, are permitted to be 383 transported under special arrangements, which include 400 provision of compensatory safety measures achieved 300 through operational controls. Five such shipments were 177 200 approved during the year. 110 100 No. of Inspections 3.4 REGULATORY INSPECTIONS 0 2008 2009 2010 2011* Compliance assurance is one of the main Year objectives of regulatory inspection. Details related to regulatory inspections during the year are given in Table *The data given were as per financial year i.e. April 2011 to 3.5. As seen in Fig. 3.1, there has been a substantial March 2012, whereas the data given from 2008 to 2010 increase in the number of inspections in radiation facilities are as per the calendar year. in the last year. Fig. 3.1 No of Regulatory Inspections Carried out Table 3.5: Regulatory Inspections in Last 4 years Sr. Facilities Number of Number of No. institutions Inspections Regulatory inspections were conducted in As on Jan-11 Apr-11 various radiation facilities and 7 unusual occurrences March-12 to to Mar-11 Mar-12 related to loss or misplacement of radiation sources were investigated. Seventy permissions were issued for 1 Diagnostic X-ray ~ 50,000 22 84 transport of radioactive material. Five shipments were 2 Radiotherapy 319 28 157 approved to be transported under special arrangement. Awareness programmes for regulatory requirements and 3 Nuclear Medicine 179 08 62 radiation safety in the fields of radiography, research 4 Industrial Radiography 472 08 86 application of radioisotopes, oil well logging, Thorium Nitrate user industries etc were conducted. 5 Gamma Irradiators 16 09 15 6 Nucleonic Gauges & 1710+50 18 125 Following are the detailed radiation safety status Well Logging of the above said facilities for the period January to 7 Gamma Irradiation 110 21 22 December 2010. Chamber 3.5.1 Radiation Diagnostic and Therapy 8 Transport of Not 22 58 Facilities Radioactive Material applicable & Consumer Products On the basis of pre-commissioning safety 9 Research Institutions 210 - 11 evaluation, AERB issued authorizations for the using sealed sources commissioning of 54 teletherapy units (5 telecobalt unit, 48 medical LINAC and 1 Gammaknife unit) and 26 3.5 SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF RADIATION remote after-loading brachytherapy units, and for the FACILITIES decommissioning of 08 teletherapy units during the year. Permissions were accorded for re-starting 10 telecobalt One industrial gamma radiation processing units after source replacement. Seventy nuclear medicine facilities were issued license for operation during the report facilities were inspected. AERB reviewed annual safety period. With this, there are now 16 industrial gamma status reports received from the licensees and inspected radiation processing facilities in operation in India. Over 106 medical X-ray diagnostic installations. 3602 licenses were issued for procurement of radiation sources, 57 licenses were issued for procurement of linear 3.5.2 High Intensity Gamma Irradiation accelerators and over 460 authorizations were issued for Facilities disposal of sources in India and abroad. A total of 1245 certificates of registration and 399 licences were issued to Regulatory inspections were carried out at 24 diagnostic X-ray installations. operating gamma irradiation facilities.
47 Four proposals for the loading/ replenishment of from medical, industrial and research institutes for safe Cobalt-60 sources from such facilities were reviewed and disposal to the original supplier or to one of the approved clearances were issued. Sites for installation of one more radioactive waste disposal facilities in India. The number such facilities have been approved. Two facilities were of authorizations issued for export to original supplier decommissioned during the period. abroad was 311.
3.5.3 Industrial Radiography Facilities Before the authorization for transport of radioactive material for disposal in authorized disposal There are 472 industrial radiography institutions agencies is issued, safety assessments of the disused operating in India. The total number of industrial gamma sources are done by physical inspection, correspondence radiography exposure devices deployed for radiography with the waste generator and the authorized waste work is 2265. There are 268 Industrial X-ray units and 15 management agency. A total of 149 such authorizations industrial accelerator facilities. During the year, AERB were issued in the report period. carried out announced as well as unannounced inspections of 94 industrial radiography sites and 3.6 UNUSUAL OCCURRENCES AND installations. Out of 94, six were unannounced ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS inspections. The monthly safety status reports received from radiography institutions were reviewed to ensure All unusual occurrences at radiation facilities were availability of safety infrastructure and inventory of reviewed in the AERB Standing Committee for radiography devices/sources. Type approval applications Investigation of Unusual Occurrences in Radiation for three new models of radiography devices were Facilities (SCURF). As per the recommendations of the reviewed and approved. A total of 1710 authorisations committee, enforcement actions were taken against the were issued for source procurement for the IGREDS. concerned institutions. Following are the details of the unusual occurrences in the report period. 3.5.4 Nucleonic Gauging Facilities 3.6.1 In January, 2011, theft of fifteen no. of nucleonic AERB carried out inspections of 143 institutions gauge sources (Co-60 of activity in range of 0.8 to 6 mCi) using nucleonic gauging devices. Safety status reports took place from M/s Durgapur Steel plant (DSP), from these installations were reviewed to ensure Durgapur. The sources were stolen by breaking the source availability of safety infrastructure and inventory of storage room. Three officers were deputed at DSP for nucleonic devices/sources. A database of the nucleonic investigation of the incident, who carried out search devices housing radioactive sources used by the various operation for the missing sources. In search process, two industrial and research institutes in India is being Co-60 sources (~6 mCi and 3.5 mCi) were recovered from maintained. scrap shops at Durgapur. The main cause of the incident was due to improper storage of the disused nucleonic 3.5.5 Gamma Irradiation Chambers / Blood gauge sources. Enforcement action against DSP was Irradiators initiated and AERB directed DSP to enhance their efforts to trace the remaining 13 nucleonic gauge sources and There are 131 gamma irradiation chambers / initiate corrective measures for the security of the sources blood irradiators in operation in the country. Forty three in their possession. Officers from AERB verified the inspections were carried out for gamma irradiation enhanced physical security arrangement provided for the chambers during the period. nucleonic gauge sources in the possession of DSP.
3.5.6 Transport of Radioactive Materials 3.6.2 In January 2011, M/s WENS Quality Assurance Pvt. Ltd., Chennai an authorized radiography institute, Seventy permissions for transport of radioactive reported an incident involving detachment of radiography material were issued during the year. AERB communicates source (35 Ci, Ir-192) from the radiography exposure regularly with other government authorities for safe device model Gammarid. The source was recovered by the transport of radioactive material in and out of the country. radiographer and trainee. During handling of above The concerned nodal and other agencies are Director incident, the radiographer and the trainee received dose General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), New Delhi, Port Trusts, excess to the prescribed annual dose limit (maximum dose Airport Authority of India and Customs. received was 91 mSv). The main cause of the incident was due to malfunctioning of the safety mechanism of the 3.5.7 Disposal of Radioactive Materials exposure device. M/s WENS Quality Assurance Pvt. Ltd., Chennai temporarily laid off the above radiography The users send decayed radioactive materials personnel from radiography work.
48 3.6.3 In February 2011, M/s Hi-Tech Radiography AERB conducted awareness programme at M/s IOCL Services (HTRS), Vadodara reported an incident involving Paradeep for Safety and Security of Radiography Sources. theft of IGRED model Roli-1 containing 13.0 Ci of Ir-192 The stolen device and the source could not be recovered so source, which was kept inside a four wheeler. AERB far. Enforcement action against M/s IXAR, Mumbai was deputed 3 officers at the site for investigation of the initiated and AERB directed M/s IXAR, Mumbai to incident and to carry out search operation for the missing enhance their efforts to trace the missing source and IGRED. Local police authorities were also involved in the initiate corrective measures for the security of the sources search operation. Subsequently, IGRED was recovered by in their possession. M/s IXAR, Mumbai demonstrated to the local police. The main cause of the incident was due to AERB the enhanced physical security arrangements at improper storage of the radiography exposure device. their other radiography sites. On May 12, 2012, the stolen Enforcement action against the institution was initiated. IGRED was recovered by the local police. The recovered M/s HTRS demonstrated to AERB about the security IGRED and source (with activity of about 0.41TBq (11Ci), measures initiated to avoid recurrence of such incident in as on the day of recovery) is found to be intact and in safe future. condition.
3.6.4 In March 2011, M/s Om Tech NDT Services, Surat 3.6.7 An incident took place with the Elekta Gamma an authorized radiography institute, reported an incident Knife model 4C at National Institute of Mental Health and involving IGRED model Roli-3 containing 5.2 Ci of Ir-192 Neuro Sciences(NIMHANS), Bangalore while treating a which accidentally fell down from a height about 76 m patient on October 7, 2011. The patient blanket got stuck while carrying out radiography work at Jamnagar. The between the couch and sliding mechanism of the source was recovered safely by RSO of the institution and automatic positioning system (APS) leading to returned to BRIT, Mumbai for safe disposal, since the malfunction of the sliding shutter which did not close and damaged device Roli-3 could not be repaired by BRIT for got stuck. The hospital personnel removed the patient out re-use by the institution. AERB issued directive to the of the room immediately & corrected the problem. There institution to submit the detailed report of the incident and was no case of overexposure due to the incident. The asked to return the TLD badges of the radiography supplier of the unit was instructed to investigate the personnel who handled the incident for immediate dose possibility of recurrence of such incidences in other units evaluation. M/s Om Tech NDT Services, Surat complied supplied in India. All the users of the same model of the with the AERB directive and the dose to the radiography equipment, in India, were also informed about the incident personnel was found to be within permissible limit. and to take proper precaution.
3.6.5 In March 2011, M/s Sonal NDT Services, Pune, 3.6.8 In October 2011, incident of robbery involving an authorized radiography institute, reported an incident radiography exposure device model Roli-1 Sr. No. 94212 involving damage to pigtail of IGRED model Roli-1 containing Ir-192 source of activity 0.56 TBq (15 Ci) took containing 4.23 Ci of Ir-192 source while carrying out place at a radiography site (Barrackpur) of M/s SKB radiography work. The damaged pigtail was safely Metallurgical Services, Howrah. The robbers took away transferred into lead container by M/s Sonal NDT Services, valuables kept in the factory premises including the Pune and subsequently the damaged pigtail was returned radiography device. Two officers from AERB visited the to BRIT, Mumbai for safe disposal. The main cause of the site and met the local police authorities to help in recovery incident was improper crimping of the source pigtail. BRIT, of the radiography exposure device. In November 2011, Mumbai initiated necessary actions in the design features local police recovered the exposure device containing the of source pigtail of Roli-1 exposure device to avoid source. Officer from AERB inspected the device and recurrence of such incidents. found the device and source in intact condition. The main cause of the incident was due to improper storage of the 3.6.6 A theft incident involving radiography exposure radiography exposure device. Enforcement action against device model Delta-880 containing 3.1 TBq of Ir-192 took the institution was initiated. M/s SKB Metallurgical place at M/s Indian Oil and Tankage Limited (IOTL), Services, Howrah demonstrated to AERB about the Paradip Refinery, Orissa in October 2011. The device security measures initiated to avoid recurrence of such belonged to a radiography agency M/s IXAR, Mumbai. incident in future. AERB deputed 2 officers for investigation of the incident. The incident occurred mainly due to the negligence of 3.6.9 In November, 2011 M/s Petrocon Engg. & radiographer of M/s IXAR, Mumbai towards the security of Inspection Co., Navi Mumbai reported an incident the source. Officers from AERB carried out regulatory involving theft of IGRED model Delta-880 containing inspection at IOCL and IOTL, Paradip site to verify the 1.03TBq (28Ci) of Ir-192 source which was kept inside a physical security arrangements provided to the exposure four wheeler. Officers from AERB were deputed at the site devices of other radiography agencies. Subsequently, of incident for investigation. Local police was also
49 informed about the incident and their help was sought to lImproving the awareness on regulatory requirements recover the stolen exposure device. In spite of extensive by way of issuing notices through print media, search operation conducted by M/s Petrocon Engg. & conducting awareness programmes and knowledge Inspection Co., and local police, exposure device could not sharing through AERB website. be recovered. The main cause of the incident was due to improper storage of the radiography exposure device. lAll the universities in the country were communicated Enforcement action against the institution was initiated. to submit the details of the sources in their possession. M/s Pertocon Engg & Inspection Co. has been directed to Reminders were sent to the non responding continue the efforts to search the device. institutions.
3.6.10 In November, 2011 M/s Becquerel Industries Pvt. lA training programme related to radiation safety was Ltd., Nagpur informed to AERB about the incident conducted at Punjab University on 10-11 August involving missing of IGRED model Delta-880 housing 2011. One more such a programme is planned to be about 0.92TBq (25Ci) Ir-192 from one of their conducted at Indian Institute of Sciences, Bangalore. radiography sites at Raigad, Chhattisgarh. Due to the lRepeated communication with users (including extensive efforts of M/s Becquerel Industries Pvt. Ltd., universities) was made to improve the compliance Nagpur, the device with source could be recovered safely with the requirement of submission of periodic safety within a day of the incident. The device and the source reports. were found to be intact. The main cause of the incident was due to improper storage of the radiography exposure lFurther augmentation of manpower (by about 20 %) device. AERB warned the institution and directed to was done to deal with regulation of radiation facilities submit the detailed measures initiated by M/s Becquerel more effectively. Industries Pvt. Ltd., Nagpur to prevent recurrence of such incident. M/s Becquerel Industries Pvt. Ltd., Nagpur lTo ensure speedy disposal of disused sources, a complied with the AERB directive. committee reviews and addresses the procedural issues. 3.6.11 A fire accident took place in AMRI Hospital, Kolkata on December 9, 2011, affecting the radiation l620 RIs of radiation facilities were carried out as therapy facility. The hospital was equipped with radiation against 383 during last year. generating equipments and a HDR brachytherapy unit containing Ir-192 source. The Micro Seclectron HDR lFor effective regulation, two safety guides (on Brachytherapy unit Sr.No. 31585 containing Ir-192 source consenting process and security of radiation of 2.8 Ci was found to be intact. The unit was recovered sources/facilities) were brought out. Another eight from the basement & shifted from the hospital to VECC, safety documents are under preparation. Kolkata on December 10, 2011, as an interim measure, for lConsenting process of most of the research institutions safe and secure storage. AERB suspended the licence for handling small amount of activity was completed. operation of the radiotherapy equipments on December 12, 2011, till further order. 3.8 FORMATION OF DIRECTORATE OF 3.7 STRENGTHENING REGULATION OF RADIATION SAFETY (DRS) RADIATION FACILITIES For better regulatory control, presently, DRS have Vigorous initiatives by AERB, post Mayapuri been functional in the States of Kerala and Mizoram. incident, to revamp the regulation of radiation facilities During the year, with persistent effort, MOUs were signed continued this year also. These include: between AERB and Governments of Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Chhattisgarh and Punjab for formation of lA task group undertook special regulatory inspections DRS. (RIs) of more than 90% of coal washeries having nucleonic gauges. RI of remaining washeries, steel 3.9 REGIONAL REGULATORY CENTRES plants and thermal power plants will be undertaken in (RRC) OF AERB the coming year. In order to have more effective regulation on lELORA (e-licensing of radiation applications), a web- radiation and nuclear facilities, Southern Regional based interactive system for managing the regulation Regulatory Centre (SRRC) at Kalpakkam and Eastern of radiation sources and facilities in an effective and Regional Regulatory Centre (ERRC) at Kolkata were made transparent manner has been designed. It will become fully operational. operational by November, 2012.
50 CHAPTER 4
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY IN DAE UNITS
AERB is entrusted with the administration of the in future. The recommendations made by FAAC are Factories Act, 1948 in all the Department of Atomic Energy further discussed in the respective Unit Safety Committees units including R&D Organizations (Other than BARC and / SARCOP and Board of AERB. BARC Facilities) within its purview through Industrial Plants Safety Division (IPSD). Industrial safety and fire 4.1 LICENSES ISSUED UNDER THE safety aspects of operating units along with significant FACTORIES ACT, 1948 events are reviewed by the Division, Unit Safety Committees and SARCOP. Industrial safety with respect to The following licenses for operation were construction of new facilities and fire safety aspects of new renewed / issued to various DAE units. projects are also reviewed. lLicense for operation of Technology Demonstration Licenses are issued / renewed and regulatory Plant, HWB at RCF was issued for a period of five inspections of all DAE units are carried out under the years. Factories Act, 1948 and the Atomic Energy (Factories) l Rules, 1996. License for operation of THRUST Project for IREL, Udyogamandal was extended for a period of one year. Regulatory inspections of Nuclear Power Projects l are carried out every month for effective monitoring and License for operation of Zirconium complex, Pazhayakayal was issued for a period of five years. rectification of 'unsafe acts & unsafe conditions' to ensure highest level of industrial safety at the construction sites. lLicense for operation of Electronics Corporation of India Ltd, Tirupathi Unit was issued for a period of five Competent persons are designated for various years. DAE units under the Factories Act, 1948 (as amended in 1987) and Rule -31 of the Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, lLicense for operation of HWP-Baroda for operation of 1996 for the purpose of carrying out tests, examinations Potassium Metal Plant was renewed for a period of five and inspections under various section (s) of the Factories years. Act, 1948, namely civil construction & structural work, operation of dangerous machines, lifts and hoists, lifting lLicense for operation of Madras Atomic Power Station machinery and lifting tackles, pressure plant, dangerous was renewed for a period of five years. fumes, supervision of handling of hazardous substances and ventilation system. Thirty Eight persons were lLicense for operation of Rajasthan Atomic Power designated as competent persons under various sections of Station-2 was renewed for a period of five years. the Factories Act, 1948. 4.2 REGULATORY INSPECTIONS Certifying Surgeons are appointed under Section-10 of the Factories Act, 1948 (as amended in For improving and maintaining the highest 1987) and under Rule-5 of Atomic Energy (Factories) standard of industrial safety at workplace in construction Rules, 1996 by AERB for carrying out the duties prescribed sites, monthly inspections of nuclear power projects and in Rule-7 of Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996. Three quarterly inspections of other fuel cycle facilities and R&D doctors were appointed by AERB as Certifying Surgeon at unit projects were carried out with emphasis on work at various DAE units during this year to look after the height. Monthly industrial safety status reports received occupational health safety of employees. from all major construction sites are reviewed along with compliance of recommendations of previous monthly A Fatal Accident Assessment Committee (FAAC) regulatory inspections. Based on the review and outcome constituted by AERB reviews the fatal accidents at DAE of monthly inspections, written directives are issued from units based on the investigations carried out by AERB and time to time to utilities for maintaining a safe workplace for recommends remedial measures to prevent such accidents employees at site.
51 Regulatory inspections on industrial & fire safety 2011of DAE units (other than BARC facilities and mines) aspects under the Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996 published by AERB provides the data on accidents and and the Factories Acts, 1948 along with radiological safety analysis of number of injuries and man-days lost caused by and waste management aspects under the Radiation various factors. Protection Rules, 2004 and the Atomic Energy (Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules, 1987 were carried In the calendar year 2011, there were 31 out at various DAE units. reportable injuries with a loss of 22265 man-days in comparison with 54 reportable injuries with a loss of During the year, 140 regulatory inspections were 13724 man-days in 2010. carried out, which include 46 special monthly inspections at construction sites of nuclear power projects and 8 Statistics revealed that there was almost one quarterly inspections of construction sites of fuel cycle reportable injury per 1000 employees since 2007 till 2010 facilities. During these inspections, the inspectors ensured but in the year 2011, it has come down to 0.58. At the same immediate rectification of the unsafe conditions and time, the frequency rate has come down to 0.23 in the year unsafe acts observed. During the inspection, safety 2011 after almost a constant Frequency Rate of 0.50 since significant events and near miss accidents are also 2007. The Severity Rate (SR) for 2011 was relatively high reviewed. The compliance to the findings of these (166) as compared to 2010 (105). inspections and the AERB directives has improved the overall safety culture of the units. Some of the significant Incidence Rates (IR) of the DAE units were improvements at the operating plants and construction compared between similar industries across the country. project sites are given below. The non-fatal Incidence Rate in NPP was 0.07 as compared to 3.85 (2005) in other Electricity Generation lAt HWPs and NFC, Safety assessment of plants by companies in India. The non-fatal Incidence Rate in HWPs considering consequences due to external events (viz- was zero as compared to 1.76 (2005) in other Chemical earthquake, Tsunami and flood) and current Indian manufacturing units in India. These figures highlight better Standards have been initiated based on AERB's safety performance of DAE units among other industries of directive. same type in the country. lAt HWPs, disposal of old unused gas cylinders has In 2011, 273 Near Miss Accidents (NMA) were been implemented after ensuring proper precautions reported from different units of DAE. Nearly, 20 % of the and decontamination procedures to prevent hazards reported near miss accidents were “Fall of Objects” type like toxic release & fire. and 10 % were “Exposure to Electricity”. Analysis revealed that almost all “Fall of Objects” type incidents were in lAt NFC, Hyderabad and Zirconium Complex, different Operating Nuclear Power Plants and Nuclear Pazhayakayal, safety work permit and electrical safety Power Project construction sites and most of the “Exposure work permit is being practiced. to Electricity” types of incidents were in operating units. lAt IREL, Udyogamandal, the surveillance of civil It was observed that industrial safety performance structures is being followed. of DAE units is better than other similar industries in the country. Table 4.1 gives the comparison of incidence rates lAt AMD sites, Job Hazard Analysis for drilling in some DAE units with other similar industries in the operation is performed and a checklist is being country. Unit wise comparison of reportable injuries and developed to ensure safe working. man-days lost in 2011 is presented in Figs. 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. Unit-wise comparison of Injury Index and lAt all NPP construction sites, compliance to Rule-11 of Frequency Rate are given in Figs. 4.3 and 4.4 respectively Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996 for illumination and year wise comparison of Frequency Rate, Severity levels, implementation of Safety checklist based on Rate and Injury Index in DAE Units is shown in Fig. 4.5 a, Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) and check list for 4.5 b, 4.5 c. maintenance / cleaning of Ready Mix Concrete Plant is being practiced. Distribution of injuries caused due to unsafe acts, injuries due to unsafe conditions and injuries with respect 4.3 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY STATISTICS to the type of accidents in DAE units are presented in Figs. 4.6 to 4.8. The compilation of Industrial Safety Statistics -
52 Fig. 4.1: Distribution of Reportable Injuries in DAE units in 2011
Fig.4.2: Distribution of Man-days Lost in DAE Units in 2011
0.8 0.7304 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0819 0.0273 0.0172 0.0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0023 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 T C ts CC CIL CA E IREL BRIT HWP AMD VE ojects IGCAR C & Z RR NF NP Plan UCIL Mills NP Pr Fig. 4.3: Injury Index in DAE Units in 2011
53 Fig. 4.4: Frequency Rate in DAE Units in 2011
Fig. 4.5 a: Year wise comparison of Frequency Fig. 4.5 b: Year wise comparison of Rate in DAE Units Severity Rate in DAE Units
Fig. 4.5 c: Year wise comparison of Injury Index in DAE Units
Table 4.1: Comparison of Incidence Rates of DAE Units (2011) with Equivalent Non-DAE Industries (2005)* (Data Source- Pocket Book of Labour Statistics 2009) Incidence Rate Industry Type Fatal Non-Fatal
Heavy Water Plants (2011) 0.00 0.00 Manufacture of Chemicals & Chemical products (2005) 0.15 1.76 Nuclear Fuel Complex (2011) 0.24 0.96 Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products except Machinery and Equipment (2005) 0.10 1.81 Nuclear Power Plants (2011) 0.00 0.07 Electricity, Gas, Steam and Hot water supply (2005) 0.25 3.85
54 Fig. 4.6: Distribution of Injuries caused by various Unsafe Acts in DAE Units-2011
Fig 4.7: Distribution of Injuries caused by various Unsafe Conditions in DAE Units- 2011
Fig 4.8: Distribution of Injuries with respect to the Type of Accidents causing Injuries in DAE units-2011
55 4.4 FATAL ACCIDENT asked all DAE Units to carry out hazard analysis on all electrical systems / panels to identify arc flash hazards and There was one fatal accident during the period implement the recommendations of the analysis to prevent April 2011-March 2012 which occurred at Nuclear Fuel such incidents. Board also recommended to identify all the Complex, Hyderabad. This accident was investigated to old electrical equipment which does not have in-built arrive at the root cause and remedial measures were safety provisions to prevent electric arc–flash and replace suggested to the site to prevent recurrence. those panels / systems on priority.
A summary of the accident along with review and The accident brought out the significance of recommendations / directives of AERB are described electric arc flash as an occupational hazard. AERB has below. communicated the lessons learnt from the accident to all DAE Units and issued a directive to examine and identify On November 30, 2011, an incident of electric all electric power distribution / conversion panels and arc flashover occurred in MCC room (Zone -1 heater panel systems for probable arc flash hazard and methods of Calcination Furnace-I) of New Uranium Oxide Fuel employed for its prevention. Besides, AERB has prepared Plant (Oxide), NFC, Hyderabad. The incident took place a comprehensive checklist to assess the electrical systems, while attending to the problem in the control and power design provisions, competency of manpower, section of the thyristor converter panel (used for resistive workmanship etc of a facility and initiated special heating of Calcination Furnace). During functional testing inspections of all Fuel Cycle Facilities based on the of the panel with a multi meter (measuring Voltage), an checklist. electric arc flash occurred resulting in serious burn injuries to two officers involved in the job. One of the victim 4.5 PROMOTION OF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY succumbed to her injuries after battling for life for almost 10 days. The accident was investigated by AERB and was 4.5.1 DAE Safety and Occupational Health reviewed in the AERB Fatal Accident Assessment Professionals Meet Committee (FAAC) in detail. The root causes of the accident identified were – (a) unsafe act involving the The 28th DAE Safety & Occupational Health improper use of multi meter for voltage measurement and Professionals Meet was jointly organized by Atomic Energy (b) deficiency in design due to non-availability of fast Regulatory Board, Mumbai and Indian Rare Earths Ltd, acting / current limiting fuses in the circuit. OSCOM during November 24 – 26, 2011 at Bhubaneswar, Odisha. The themes for the meet were FAAC recommended to NFC to implement “Emerging Trend in Environment Protection” for Industrial remedial measures such as incorporation of fuses in the Safety and “Life Style Diseases” for Occupational Health zone heater power supply circuit, use of multi meters with & Safety. Dr. S.S. Ramaswamy memorial endowment in-built safety shutters for probe selection, testing & lecture was delivered by Shri R.K. Garg, Former Chairman maintenance on complex power distribution / conversion & Managing Director, IREL. A booklet on “Environment panels by trained and authorised personnel with a Protection” was released during this meet. AERB Green permit–to-work and housing the thyristor converters in Site awards were presented to the winner units namely, separate cabinets for ease of maintenance & testing. It was NFC, Hyderabad and NAPS. also recommended to refer the Standard for Electrical Safety in Workplace (NFPA -70E) in formulating and 4.5.2 Industrial Safety Awards augmenting the present electrical safety policy of the facility. Atomic Energy Regulatory Board presents Industrial Safety Awards every year to the DAE Units who The accident was reviewed in the Apex achieve excellent level of performance in industrial safety. committee of AERB - Safety Review Committee for For the year 2011, Rajasthan Atomic Power Project 7&8 in Operating Plants (SARCOP) and in the Board Meeting. Group I (i.e Construction units), Madras Atomic Power SARCOP endorsed the recommendations of the FAAC Station 1&2 in Group II (i.e Production Units-I) were the and also recommended to implement the refresher training winners. There were no winners for Group III (i.e and certification system for authorized persons who may Production Units-II) and Group IV (i.e Research Units and work on live electrical systems. Committee also other Low Risk Units). recommended to adopt the standard industrial practice of using electrical maintenance group for power distribution / 4.5.3 Fire Safety Awards conversion panels and instrumentation maintenance group for Control & Instrumentation jobs. Board of AERB Atomic Energy Regulatory Board presents Fire expressed its concern over the unfortunate accident and Safety Awards every year to the DAE Units who achieve
56 The existing Green Site Award will be replaced by a new 'Environmental Protection Award' based on the recommendation of a working group constituted by AERB from next year.
4.6 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
4.6.1 Advisory Committee on Occupational Health
The Advisory Committee on Occupational Health (ACOH) for employees of DAE Units reviews the occupational health records, recommends measures to ensure their good health, informs AERB of any observed DAE Safety and Occupational Health Professionals Meet in case of occupational diseases and suggests ways to Progress (Shri R. Bhattacharya, Secretary, Director IPSD and ITSD, AERB, improve the occupational health safety. No occupational Shri S. K. Chande, Vice-Chairman, AERB, Shri S. S. Bajaj, diseases were reported during 2011-12 from any of the Chairman, AERB, Dr. R. N. Patra, CMD, IREL, Shri R.K. Garg, DAE units. The committee reviewed the yearly Former CMD, IREL and Shri D. Mohanty, Head, IREL OSCOM Occupational & Health Status report for the year 2011. (left to right)) higher level of performance in fire safety. The Fire Safety Based on the recommendation of ACOH, AERB Awards are based on the preventive efforts taken by the and Kaiga Generating Station (KGS), NPCIL in Unit, the fire incidents that had occurred during the period association with Kasturba Medical College, Manipal under consideration and the fire potential at the site. DAE conducted a Training Programme/Workshop on “Acute units are categorized based on fire potential as Category-I Trauma, Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation and Poisoning” (all operating NPPs, HWPs and NFC) and Category –II for the benefit of Para medical staff and Certifying (IREL units, UCIL units, NPPs under construction, Surgeons working in the Occupational Health BHAVINI, RRCAT, VECC, BRIT, AMD, IGCAR and ECIL). Centres/First Aid Centres of the DAE units. The workshop The winners of the award in Category I & Category II were was conducted during December 16 - 17 2011. The Kaiga Generating Station 3 &4 and Kakrapar Atomic workshop also included a talk on “Management of Power Project 3&4 respectively. Radioactive Contamination” for Certifying Surgeons.
The Industrial Safety along with Fire Safety Awards for the year 2011 were presented in the month of April, 2012.
4.5.4 Green Site Awards
Green Site Awards for the year 2010 were given to winning units during the 28th DAE Safety and Occupational Health Professional Meet, which was held at Bhubaneswar during November 24-26, 2011. The award is based on the highest value of Greenery of the site, which takes into account the existing greenery area, efforts made for making the site greener, terrain conditions of the site and effective site area. The DAE units are divided into two Industrial and Fire Safety Award Function in Progress categories based on the total area of the plant including (Shri S. S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB, Shri S. B. Mathur, Deputy housing colony site, namely, Category-A (<350 hectares) Director General, DGFASLI, Shri S. K. Chande, Vice-Chairman, and Category-B (>350 hectares). Based on these criteria, AERB and Shri R. Bhattacharya, Secretary, Director IPSD and ITSD, AERB (left to right)) in Category-A, NFC, Hyderabad and in Category-B, NAPS site were the winners.
57 CHAPTER 5
ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES
5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY The absolute discharges from all NPPs were, in general, similar to those in the previous years. Figs. 5.1a - 5.1f show The Environmental Survey Laboratories (ESL) of the liquid and gaseous discharges from the plants for the the Health, Safety and Environment Group, BARC carry years 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 as percentage of out environmental surveillance at all the operating NPPs at permissible limits as per technical specifications. Figs. 5.2a sites. The liquid and gaseous waste discharged to the and 5.2b show the committed effective dose to the environment during the year 2011 from the operating members of the public due to the release of radioactive Units was only a small fraction of the prescribed technical effluents from the plants. Radiation dose to members of the specification limits. The technical specification limits on public near the operating plants is estimated based on release of radioactive effluents for all the NPPs were measurements of radionuclide concentration in items of revised with effect from January 1, 2010. This has resulted diet, i.e., vegetables, cereals, milk, meat, fish, etc and in increase of discharges of some of the effluents, in terms through intake of air and water. It is seen that in all the sites of the percentage of technical specifications limits from the the effective dose to public is far less than the annual limit year 2010 onwards as compared to the previous years. of 1 mSv (1000 micro-Sievert) prescribed by AERB.
Fig. 5.1 a: Liquid Waste Discharges from NPPs (Tritium)
70 60 50 40 30 ech Spec. LImit 20
% of T 10 0 TAPS RAPS MAPS NAPS KAPS KGS RAPS TAPS KGS RAPS 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 3&4 3&4 3&4 5&6 2007 0.00 0.32 3.50 37.83 23.28 2.12 0.19 0.87 2008 0.00 0.08 4.05 37.46 21.55 4.15 0.13 0.41 2.32 2009 0.00 0.33 2.40 25.13 60.68 4.89 0.29 0.46 0.66 2010 0.00 0.42 7.50 15.73 9.91 4.50 0.24 12.22 1.53 0.4 2011 0.00 0.25 13.80 4.36 9.85 5.52 0.44 8.10 2.38 0.46
Note: 1) TAPS 1&2 has Boiling Water Reactors. Hence, there is no generation / discharge of Tritium. 2) The data of MAPS pertains to transfer of liquid waste to Centralised Waste Management Facility, Kalpakkam for processing & discharge to the environment. 3) In KAPS-1, suppression pool was dewatered during the year 2009 and 71.25 TBq of tritium activity was disposed as liquid effluent, after obtaining approval from SARCOP.
58 Fig. 5.1 b: Liquid Waste Discharges from NPPs (Gross Beta)
25
20
15
10 ech Spec. LImit
5 % of T 0 TAPS RAPS MAPS NAPS KAPS KGS RAPS TAPS KGS RAPS 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 3&4 3&4 3&4 5&6 2007 0.96 0.01 2.29 6.65 1.44 0.00 0.06 2.16 2008 0.82 0.0009 2.60 6.74 0.65 0.01 0.03 1.65 0.41 2009 0.37 0.07 2.20 7.60 1.56 0.01 0.02 0.45 0.11 2010 0.55 0.77 18.00 6.78 1.77 0.032 0.10 6.78 0.57 0.06 2011 0.29 0.81 20.41 7.80 1.24 0.253 0.02 3.92 0.22 0.04
Fig. 5.1 c: Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Tritium)
12 10 8 6
ech Spec. LImit 4 2 % of T 0 TAPS RAPS MAPS NAPS KAPS KGS RAPS TAPS KGS RAPS 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 3&4 3&4 3&4 5&6 2007 7.89 9.17 6.70 4.47 2.98 7.64 0.41 2008 5.57 8.50 4.16 6.68 2.09 6.63 0.25 0.44 2009 5.04 8.50 3.19 6.84 7.06 2.08 0.25 0.22 2010 3.89 9.96 3.86 5.13 3.03 6.69 1.01 0.35 1.62 2011 4.20 8.19 2.89 7.02 2.86 6.6 1.63 0.62 2.84
Note: 1) TAPS 1&2 has Boiling Water Reactors. Hence, there is no generation / discharge of Tritium.
59 Fig. 5.1 d: Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Argon-41)
50 45 40 35 30 25 20
ech Spec. LImit 15 10
% of T 5 0 TAPS RAPS MAPS NAPS KAPS KGS RAPS TAPS KGS RAPS 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 3&4 3&4 3&4 5&6 2007 0.00 9.52 13.77 0.73 1.13 0.32 2008 0.00 0.00 13.34 0.36 1.29 0.06 0.02 2009 0.00 15.00 14.3 0.15 1.63 0.04 0.08 2010 0.00 39.04 19.87 6.96 3.16 0.13 4.84 1.22 0.03 3.47 2011 0.00 43.72 20.16 6.06 6.26 0.06 2.12 0.74 0.12 4.46
Note: 1) Discharge of Ar-41 was controlled under the technical specification limit for FPNG at NAPS & KAPS till the year 2009. Subsequently, separate limits were prescribed for discharge of Ar-41 for these stations.
Fig. 5.1 e: Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Fission Product Noble Gases)
25
20
15
10 ech Spec. LImit 5 % of T 0 TAPS RAPS MAPS NAPS KAPS KGS RAPS TAPS KGS RAPS 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 3&4 3&4 3&4 5&6 2007 8.71 0.00 1.96 0.84 1.47 1.92 2.12 1.00 2008 10.68 0.00 1.70 0.29 0.64 2.46 1.28 1.14 0.003 2009 7.32 0.05 2.10 0.19 0.43 4.70 1.91 1.45 0.00 2010 11.94 3.26 6.00 2.38 7.77 9.43 21.3 9.81 0.05 6.36 2011 8.79 17.60 3.09 1.58 14.09 13.82 4.87 21.33 0.03 19.45
60 Fig. 5.1 f: Gaseous Waste Discharges from NPPs (Iodine-131)
6
5
4
3
2 ech Spec. LImit
1 % of T 0 TAPS RAPS MAPS NAPS KAPS KGS RAPS TAPS KGS RAPS 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2 3&4 3&4 3&4 5&6 2007 1.94 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.025 0.002 0.01 2008 2.19 0.03 0.07 0.001 0.015 2009 1.66 0.08 0.01 0.004 0.002 0.21 0.02 2010 5.21 0.008 0.05 0.02 0.91 0.91 0.51 2011 3.02 3.24 0.16 0.224 8.71 0.041 0.05 0.53 0.62
Note: 1) In the Technical Specification of TAPS-1&2, the limit for Iodine - 131 releases includes the discharge of Particulate activity also.
Fig. 5.2 a: Public Dose at 1.6 Km distance from NPPs (AERB Prescribed Annual Limit is 1000 micro-sievert)
45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
Effective Dose in micro-sievert Tarapur Rawatbhata Kalpakkam Narora Kakrapara Kaiga Site Site Site Site Site Site 2007 16.25 13.30 15.60 1.05 1.00 1.26 2008 23.00 1.26 12.80 0.48 0.79 1.31 2009 11.82 14.60 13.20 0.30 0.60 2.48 2010 10.15 39.60 22.93 0.42 0.75 1.47 2011 7.42 36.30 19.50 0.48 0.88 1.90
61 Fig. 5.2 b: Total Effective Dose in Different Zones (AERB Prescribed Annual Limit is 1000 micro-sievert) 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 Effective Dose in micro-sievert 0 Tarapur Rawatbhata Kalpakkam Narora Kakrapara Kaiga Site Site Site Site Site Site 1.6km 7.42 36.30 19.50 0.48 0.88 1.90 1.6-5km 3.38 17.10 9.50 0.37 0.48 1.31 5-10km 1.45 7.00 3.60 0.30 0.38 0.85 10-15km 0.84 3.20 1.90 0.28 0.32 0.64 15-30km <0.6 2.00 0.90 0.28 0.32 0.64
5.2 OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES exceed 100 mSv in a span of 5 years. The specified annual limit for radiation exposure of temporary worker is 15- In each NPP a Radiological Safety Officer (RSO) mSv. For better exposure control, the individual cases are and Assistant RSO are designated by the competent investigated and controlled at an early stage so as to avoid authority to implement the radiation protection reaching the AERB specified dose limits. Following ILs are programme. The RSOs are entrusted with the applicable to the nuclear facilities. responsibility for providing radiological surveillance and safety support functions. These include radiological Monthly dose - 10 mSv monitoring of workplace, plant systems, personnel, and effluents, carrying out exposure control (Regulatory limit Quarterly dose - 15 mSv 30 mSv), exposure investigations and analysis and trending of radioactivity in plant systems. Annual dose - 20 mSv
All NPPs have radiation safety programme and The information on number of workers in NPPs work procedures intended to control the occupational who received dose between 20 to 30 mSv and above 30 exposures. AERB Safety Manual on 'Radiation Protection mSv during the year 2011 is given in Tables 5.1. There for Nuclear Facilities' (AERB/NF/SM/O-2 Rev.4, 2005) were four cases of exposure above 20 mSv during the year specifies Dose Limits and Investigation Levels (IL) for 2011 at KAPS-1&2 during housekeeping and painting occupational workers to control the individual doses. As jobs in SFTD area. The incident resulting in this exposure is per AERB guidelines, for an occupational worker annual brought out in Section 2.3. dose limit is 30-mSv, with the condition that it should not
62 Table 5.1: Radiation Doses Received by Workers in NPPs (2011)
NPP Number of Average dose No. of Average dose No. of workers monitored for monitored persons among dose received dose in the range persons persons received dose receivers (mSv) (mSv) < 20 20-30 >30 (mSv) (mSv) (mSv)
TAPS-1&2 1801 1.99 1468 2.44 1801 0 0
RAPS-1&2 999 1.12 670 1.67 999 0 0
MAPS-1&2 1332 1.51 1165 1.73 1332 0 0
NAPS-1&2 1266 1.02 834 1.55 1266 0 0
KAPS-1&2 1258 1.22 900 1.71 1254 1 3
KGS -1&2 1525 1.30 1172 1.70 1525 0 0
RAPS-3&4 1568 1.43 1191 1.88 1568 0 0
TAPS -3&4 1842 0.73 1192 1.13 1842 0 0
KGS -3&4 1379 0.92 816 1.56 1379 0 0
RAPS 5&6 1342 0.44 933 0.63 1342 0 0
Fig. 5.3 give collective dose for operation and maintenance of NPPs (excluding the dose for special campaign like EMCCR, EMFR and up gradation activities) for year 2007 to 2011.
Fig. 5.3: Collective Dose (Person-Sv) at NPPs 6
5 2007 4 2008 3 2009 2010 2 2011 1
0
The information on number of workers in various Fuel Cycle Facilities who received dose less than 20 mSv, between 20 to 30 mSv and above 30 mSv during the year 2011 is given in Tables 5.2. Fig. 5.4 gives the collective dose for Front-end Fuel Cycle Facilities (FCFs) for the last five years.
63 Table 5.2: Radiation Doses Received by Workers in Front End Fuel Cycle Facilities
Type of Location Number of Average Maximum Number of workers Facilities Exposed Dose for Dose of received dose in the range Persons Exposed Exposed Persons Persons < 20 20 – 30 >30 (mSv) (mSv) mSv mSv mSv Uranium mines Jaduguda 698 4.07 9.39 698 0 0 (UCIL) Bhatin 179 3.62 9.94 179 0 0 Narwapahar 689 4.26 6.99 689 0 0 Turamdih 462 5.73 10.42 462 0 0 Bagjata 152 3.05 3.49 152 0 0 Banduhurang 54 1.26 1.38 54 0 0 Uranium mill Jaduguda 475 1.92 5.61 475 0 0 (UCIL) Thorium mines Chavara 53 0.42 1.41 53 0 0 and mineral Chatrapur 161 0.94 7.74 161 0 0 separation (IREL) Manavalakurichi 187 5.75 14.11 187 0 0 Thorium mill Udyogamandal 293 4.56 16.9 293 0 0 (IREL) Fuel fabrication Hyderabad 906 1.05 9.8 0 0 0 (NFC)
Fig.5.4: Collective dose (Person-Sv) for Front-end Fuel Cycle Facilities (FCFs) for the last five years
6
5
4
2007 2008 3 2009 2010 2011
2 Collective Dose ( person-sV)
1
0
NFC TIN ARA MINE MILL V A IRE MK BHA T JAD MINE AHAR MINE IRE OSCOM IRE CHA AP BAGJA W TURAMDIH MINE JADUGUDA BANDHURANG MINE NAR IRE UDYOGAMANDAL
64 The information on number of workers in medical, industrial and research institutions who received various doses during the year 2011 is given in table 5.3. The number of radiation workers who received >30mSv were: 14 out of 26541 in medical, industrial and research installations. Table 5.3 Radiation Doses Received by Workers in Medical, Industrial and Research Institutions (2011)
Category of No. of Average No. of Average Number of Workers Received Annual Radiation Monitored Dose for Exposed Dose for Individual Dose Excluding Zero Dose, Worker Persons Monitored Persons Exposed D(mSv) Persons Persons (mSv) (mSv) 0
Diagnostic 43316 0.35 18130 0.83 18120 7 2 1 0 X-rays
Radiation Therapy 8462 0.22 3780 0.49 3780 0 0 0 0
Nuclear Medicine 1927 0.43 1143 0.72 1142 0 1 0 0
Ind. Radiography 6531 0.66 2392 1.80 2369 13 4 2 4 & Radiation Processing
Research 4002 0.11 1096 0.40 1096 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 64238 0.35 26541 0.85 26507 20 7 3 4
65 CHAPTER 6
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are provided with site once in a year and once in 2 years respectively. adequate safety features to guard against the possibility of any accident. Further, the safety features such as a Subsequent to accident at Fukushima NPPs, containment building around each nuclear power unit NDMA also participated in augmentation & helps in mitigating the consequences, should an event standardization of the off-site emergency response occur. However in the event of a BDBA, it might become procedures and sensitizing the district authorities. In this necessary to take certain mitigating measures in the public respect, the workshop for the district authorities followed domain. Site-specific emergency preparedness plans are by a mock emergency exercise was conducted at all sites therefore drawn up and maintained at all stations for plant and areas for improvement have been identified. NDRF emergencies, site emergencies and off-site emergencies. personnel also participated in these exercises and To test these plans, periodic emergency exercises are demonstrated their capability in radiation field carried out involving the station authorities, district measurement and decontamination exercises. The administration, and the members of public. Plant response of the plant personnel, district officials and public emergency exercises (PEE) are carried out once in a involved in these exercises was observed by AERB quarter by each NPP. Site emergency exercise (SEE) and observers. The number of SEE and OSEE carried out in off-site emergency exercise (OSEE) are carried out by each NPP sites in 2011 is given in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Number of Emergency Exercises conducted in 2011
NPP Sites SEE OSEE
Tarapur Site 1 1 Rawatbhata Site 1 1 Kalpakkam Site 1 1 NAPS Site 1 1 Kakrapar Site 1 1 Kaiga Site 1 2
Periodic SEE and OSEE were carried out at drills at some of the HWPs sites. The response of the plant hydrogen sulphide based HWPs at Manuguru and Kota. personnel, officials & public involved in the exercise and SEEs are carried out once in 6 months and OSEEs once in general level of awareness amongst the public were good. a year. AERB had constituted two committees to arrive at realistic concentrations of the toxic hydrogen sulphide gas in the SEEs, Periodic Emergency Exercises (PEEs) & event of release of complete inventory from HWP, Kota fire drills are carried out at ammonia based HWPs at with respect to NPPs and new projects of RAPP 7&8 and Baroda, Thal & Hazira. PEEs are carried out once in a NFC, Kota to have emergency preparedness plans. The quarter and drills are carried out once in 2 months. report on hydrogen sulphide dispersion following accidental release from HWP-Kota and emergency AERB officials witnessed the SEE & OSEE mock preparedness therein was discussed in SARCOP.
66 CHAPTER 7
SAFETY DOCUMENTS
AERB develops safety documents, which include It addresses classification of solid, liquid and gaseous waste Safety Codes (SC), Safety Standards (SS), Safety Guides and identifies characteristics important to their (SG), Safety Manuals (SM) and Technical Documents (TD) management. Radioactive waste is generated in the for nuclear and radiation facilities and related activities. activities involving use of radionuclides and generation of The progress on various safety documents during the year nuclear power. Radioactive waste varies in physical and is given below. chemical forms and in concentration of various radionuclides. Activity levels of radioactive waste range 7.1 NEW SAFETY DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED from low levels associated with radioisotope applications in laboratories, hospitals etc. to high levels associated with 1. AERB Safety Code 'Radiation Protection spent fuel-reprocessing. for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities' (AERB/NF/SC/RP) 3. AERB Safety Guide 'Predisposal Management of High Level Radioactive This safety code specifies the basic requirements Waste' (AERB/NF/SG/RW-3) for radiation protection of the occupational workers, the members of the public and the environment from undue This safety guide provides guidance for hazards of ionising radiation in the operation of nuclear predisposal management of high-level radioactive waste fuel cycle facilities. The code specifies radiation protection to meet various safety requirements prescribed in the requirements in siting, design, construction, AERB safety code on 'Management of Radioactive Waste' commissioning, operation and decommissioning of (AERB/NRF/SC/RW). Operation of nuclear and radiation nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The code also specifies the facilities may generate high-level radioactive waste requirements with respect to roles and responsibilities of (HLW). Management of this waste may involve long-term the Consentee, the RSO and occupational workers with storage at various stages before its final disposal. respect to radiation safety. The requirements on control, monitoring, surveillance and quality assurance aspects of This safety guide applies to the predisposal radiation protection programme are also brought out in management of HLW. It provides guidance on design, the code. construction and operation of facilities for predisposal management of HLW including liquid HLW. This safety code shall apply to all nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as: 4 AERB Safety Guide 'Decommissioning of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities other than ØMining and milling of uranium and thorium ores; Nuclear Reactors' (AERB/NF/SG/RW-7)
ØFuel enrichment/fabrication; This safety guide sets out recommendations relating to the safe decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle Ø Nuclear power plants; facilities other than nuclear reactors as per the regulatory requirements prescribed in AERB safety code on ØResearch / experimental reactors; 'Regulation of Nuclear and Radiation Facilities', ØFuel reprocessing; (AERB/SC/G). Nuclear facilities, as they reach the end of their life, need decommissioning. It also brings out ØRadioactive waste management plants; and decommissioning options, requirements of radiation protection for occupational workers and general public ØAny other facility as determined by AERB. and radioactivity releases to the environment.
2. AERB Safety Guide 'Classification of This safety guide addresses the roles and Radioactive Waste' (AERB/NRF/SG/RW-1) responsibilities of the various agencies involved, manpower and training requirements, as well as This safety guide gives various approaches on organisational and administrative aspects of which radioactive waste can be classified to meet various decommissioning. The guide also covers design and safety requirements prescribed in the AERB safety code on operational features, strategies and planning, stages of 'Management of Radioactive Waste' (AERB/NRF/SC/RW). decommissioning, various safety issues arising there from,
67 safety assessment, radiation protection and management industrial safety organisation, safety management of radioactive waste during the decommissioning of systems, work procedures to maintain a safe working nuclear fuel cycle facilities. environment for all personnel and to prevent any unsafe condition / act endangering the life of personnel engaged The scope of this safety guide includes guidance in industrial activities. This 'guidelines' is essential for on the decommissioning of: implementation and assurance of conventional safety in areas such as industrial, chemical, electrical, fire, ØFissile and fertile nuclear material conversion and environmental and is applicable for all works taken up by processing facilities, the facility as well as contracted works.
ØFuel fabrication facilities, The major objectives are:
ØReprocessing facilities, and ØTo create awareness among workers about industrial hazards and safe working procedures. ØWaste treatment, conditioning and storage facilities. ØTo lay down safe work procedures and systems to be 5. AERB Safety Guide 'Meterials of followed for different type of industrial activities Construction for Civil Engineering Structures Important to Safety of Nuclear ØTo establish a robust safety management system. Facilities' (AERB/NF/SG/CSE-4) ØTo protect the health and ensure the safety of the Civil engineering structures form an important workers from industrial activities. feature having implications to safe performance of nuclear installations. This safety guide specifies the materials to be 7.2 SAFETY DOCUMENTS TRANSLATED used in construction of civil engineering structures/ AND PUBLISHED IN HINDI buildings to provide adequate assurance for safety of nuclear installations in India. 1. AERB Safety Guide titled 'Primary Heat Transport System for Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors' Provisions of this guide are applicable for (AERB/NPP-PHWR/SG/D-8; 2003). materials of construction of those structures, which are engineered using codes and standards published by AERB 2. AERB Safety Guide titled 'Management of or Bureau of Indian Standards. Material specification for Radioactive Waste Arising from Operation of structures designed using codes/specification of other Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor Based Nuclear country should be drawn up in line with the relevant Power Plants' (AERB/NPP/SG/O-11; 2004) accepted specification of that country with the approval of AERB. 3. AERB Safety Manual titled 'Regulatory Inspection and Enforcement in Nuclear Power Plants and 6. AERB Safety Manual 'Quality Assurance of Research Reactors' (AERB/NPP&RR/SM/G-1; Civil Engineering Structures Important to 2007). Safety of Nuclear Facilities' (AERB/NF/SM/CSE-3) 7.3 SAFETY DOCUMENTS UNDER DEVELOPMENT This safety manual specifies the quality assurance aspects to be followed during the construction of civil 1. AERB Safety Code 'Site Evaluation of Nuclear engineering structures for safety of nuclear installations in Facilities' [AERB/NF/SC/S (Rev-1)] India. This manual gives details to develop QA plans specific to multifarious activities of civil engineering 2. AERB Safety Guide 'Protection against Internally construction. This manual is applicable for civil Generated Missiles in Pressurised Heavy Water engineering construction activities of structures important Reactor Based Nuclear Power Plants' [AERB/NPP- to safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs), research reactors PHWR/SG/D-3] and other nuclear facilities. 3. Safety Guide on 'Development of Safety Documents 7. AERB Safety Guidelines 'Control of Works' for Nuclear and Radiation Facilities', [AERB/SG/G-6 [AERB/SG/IS-1 (Rev.1)] (Rev. 1)]
The safety guidelines has a basic framework of 4. AERB Safety Guidelines 'Siting, Design,
68 Construction, Commissioning, Operation and 9. Construction for Nuclear Installations (DS441) closure of Tailing management Facilities for Uranium Ore Processing' (AERB/SG/IS-7) Comments on following document preparation profiles were sent to IAEA. 5. AERB Safety Guidelines 'Intervention and Derived Intervention Levels for Off-Site Emergency' 1. Leadership and Management for Safety (DS 456) [AERB/NRF/SG/EP-5 (Rev-1)] 2. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or 7.4 REVIEW OF IAEA DRAFT DOCUMENTS Radiological Emergency (DS 457)
Following IAEA documents were reviewed in 3. Occupational Radiation Protection (DS 453) AERB. 4. Predisposal Management of Waste from the Use of 1. Monitoring and Surveillance of Radioactive Waste Radioactive Materials in Medicine, Industry, Disposal Facilities (DS 357) Research, Agriculture and Education (DS 454)
2. Volcanic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear 5. Establishing a National Radiation Safety Installations (DS 405) Infrastructure (DS 455)
3. Commissioning for Nuclear Power Plants (DS 446) 6. Radiation Safety and Regulatory Control for Consumer Products (DS458) 4. Schedules of Provisions of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2009 7. Management of Radioactive Residues from Mining, Edition) (DS 451) Mineral Processing, and other NORM Activities, revision of WS-G-1.2 (DS459) 5. The Safety Case and Safety Assessment for Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste (DS 8. Safety in Medical Uses of Ionizing Radiation (DS399) 284) 9. Safety Guide on Protection of the public against 6. Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the indoor exposure to natural sources of radiation Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2012 (DS421) Edition) (DS425) 10. Schedules of Provisions of the IAEA Regulations for 7. External Expert Support for the Regulatory Body the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2012 (DS429) Edition), TS-G-1.6.
8. Application of the Principle of Justification to Practices, Including Non-Medical Human Imaging (DS401)
69 CHAPTER 8
SAFETY STUDIES
8.1 SAFETY ANALYSIS robin analysis program to assess the ultimate load capacity of containment test model (BARCOM). The test model is a 8.1.1 Behavior of High Performance Concrete 1:4 scale replica of 540 MWe PHWR pre-stressed concrete Exposed to Fire inner containment structure of TAPS-3&4. A team from AERB is participating in this exercise. Ultimate capacity of Evaluation of behavior of concrete structures the model was evaluated using ANSYS software as a part subjected to high temperature during fire condition is an of pre-test analysis and results were presented during first important subject considering the safety aspect of nuclear workshop. The analysis could not capture the non-linear installations. A preliminary study was conducted as a part response of the model at higher pressures due to of developmental work initiated by AERB to frame safety limitation of ANSYS software in representing inelastic requirements and guidelines in design and construction of behavior of concrete. A repeat analysis has been fire resistant nuclear structures. Eight significant attempted using ABAQUS software. Meanwhile the parameters affecting the behavior of concrete exposed to BARCOM model has been tested upto its functional failure high temperature have been identified considering hydro- and more material data has now been made available. All thermo-chemo-mechanical models available in literature. relevant material test data are used in the analytical model A simplified numerical model based on finite difference developed in ABAQUS. The complete analysis is in method (FDM) has been developed to account for heat progress. The analytical model is shown in the figure and mass transfer inside the concrete and estimate below. susceptibility of thermal spalling under fire. The developed model was verified by comparing the temperature and pore pressure predictions with the published data. The model was modified by considering diffusivity as a temperature dependent variable to simulate fire response behavior of high performance concrete.
8.1.2 Hydrogen Sulphide Dispersion Analysis at Rawatbhata Site for Design Basis Accidents
The preliminary analysis of hydrogen sulphide
(H2S) dispersion due to accidental release from HWP-Kota was done by HWB using double gaussian dispersion model. AERB constituted a task force to re-evaluate H2S dispersion using heavy gas dispersion models. Based on the factors like modeling capability, validation, ease of usage, availability and familiarity with the software, etc. the software PHAST 6.6 was selected for consequence analysis of the scenarios. The objective of the analysis was to have an overview of realistic maximum concentration of
H2S in most probable design basis accidental scenarios, the affected distance and the estimation of time to reach the distance using PHAST software. The report by the task force was reviewed by SARCOP and based on the assessment, emergency preparedness at Rawatbhata site is being reviewed.
8.1.3 International Round Robin Analysis on BARC Containment Test Model Fig. 8.1 FE model of BARCOM (BARCOM) containment with different section properties BARC has organized an international round
70 8.1.4 SBO Analysis of CANDU-6 Plant zero power state. It has been demonstrated that TRIKIN results are in agreement with benchmark results. With this Station blackout accident scenario was carried additional feature, TRIKIN has now become a versatile out using computer code RELAP5/MOD3.4 for the generic space-time kinetics code for the analysis of large number of CANDU-6 plant with an objective to improve severe reactor dynamics problems involving reactivity and power accident analysis capability for PHWRs. CANDU-6 is a distribution anomalies in PWRs. generic PHWR plant with a total thermal power of the plant is 2064 MWth. There are 380 fuel channels in the core, 12 8.1.8 Spatial Instability Analysis in Large PWRs fuel bundles per channel and each bundle assembly has 37 fuel elements. The primary heat transport system consists Large PWR cores are susceptible to spatial xenon of two loops. The 12 bundles in a fuel channel are instability and this instability becomes more severe with modelled as 12 axial nodes. The pressure tube and the increasing core size. A simple methodology has been calandria tube are modelled using SCDAP core developed to assess the spatial dynamic behavior of large component shroud. The pressure tube failure and melting PWRs against xenon spatial instability in different modes. of the core is predicted successfully. The studies on severe The method aims to analyze xenon dynamic behavior accident progression are being continued. against anticipated reactivity perturbations. Reactivity perturbations in different modes have been evaluated 8.1.5 Experimental Study on Transient CHF in based on reactivity device movements as well as localized Horizontal Channels thermal variations in the core. The effect of individual core design and operating parameters on xenon spatial A test facility is built at IIT-Bombay to conduct instability has been studied. The behavior of spatial experimental study on transient critical heat flux (CHF) in stability index (SI) with core size is investigated. Based on horizontal channels under low pressure and low flow SI-core size curve, a threshold core size has been conditions with an objective to understand the mechanism determined beyond which a PWR core tends to become of transient CHF and to develop a correlation for spatially unstable. Methodology has been used to assess predicting the CHF in transient conditions. Appearance of the spatial xenon dynamic behavior of different modes of red hotness on the heated channel is considered as the oscillations in VVER1000 and AP1000 reactor cores. occurrence of CHF in the present study. Transient CHF measurement with initially set mass fluxes is completed. 8.1.9 Fire Modelling of a Main Control Room in a For the purpose of comparison, steady state CHF Typical PHWR Plant measurement is also completed. Analysis of the data is in progress. The fire modeling analysis of main control room was carried out using Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS-5.0) 8.1.6 External Coupling of 3-D Neutronics and with an objective to analyze the temperature pattern near Thermal-Hydraulics Codes control panel, detection time of smoke and heat detectors, and also to estimate the time required to reach the failure An interface computer program is being temperatures of panels. Major equipment such as control developed to integrate RELAP code with 3-D neutronics panels, location of ventilation ducts, locations of smoke code 3DFAST. Automatic exchange of data was initiated and heat detectors were modeled. Analyses were carried between RELAP and 3DFAST using external coupling out in to assess the temperature profile, smoke profile, and methodology. Cross section data base was generated using detection time of detectors. It is observed that the response PHWR lattice code. Interface program was developed time of detector is in the range of 2-4 s and temperature between RELAP and 3DFAST using external coupling variation is in the range of 100-120 C. methodology. Further studies are in progress. 8.1.10 Development of Condensation Model for 8.1.7 Indigenous Computer Code Development Hydrogen Distribution Studies
A thermal hydraulics coupled 3D kinetics code This work aimed at the development of a 'TRIKIN' was developed and validated for the analysis of condensation model using the Computational Fluid large number of transient problems in VVER reactors Dynamics (CFD) for the containment hydrogen which involve triangular lattice arrangement of fuel pins. distribution for Indian reactors. CFD code simulations are Capabilities of TRIKIN have been extended to analyze necessary for obtaining accurate predictions. square lattice core geometry for handling spatial kinetics Experimental studies in the past have indicated that the related problems in western type of PWRs. The square steam condensation plays an important role in the lattice space-time module has also been validated against hydrogen mixing and distribution in the containment. a NEA rod withdrawal accident benchmark problem at hot However, commercial CFD codes do not have in-built
71 condensation models. In this direction, a condensation VVER core have been carried out using ORIGEN code. model was implemented in the CFD computer code Equilibrium core inventory of source term has been through user defined functions. User defined functions evaluated for power, enrichment and burnup history of were developed for the mass, momentum, energy, and each fuel assembly in the core at the end of cycle condition. species balance equations together with associated It has been found that local peaking of radionuclide can be turbulence quantities viz., kinetic energy and dissipation as high as 160 % of average core value. Inter comparison rate sinks. The model was benchmarked against a simple of core inventory evaluated based on core average flow domain (idealized version of the CONAN test facility. parameters has also been done and it has been observed The developed model was also validated against the ISP- that core inventory evaluated based on single point 47 test of TOSQAN test facility. The predictions are in good calculation (using core average parameters) is about 5 % agreement with the data. higher, and thus gives a conservative inventory estimate. This work is being extended to the analysis of release and 8.1.11 Development of Code to Implement Failure transport of fission products in the reactor coolant system Surface for Core Disassembly in Severe and containment. Accident Conditions 8.1.14 Estimation of Conditional Probability of Failure surface was developed earlier for Stagnation Channel Break in PHWR predicting disassembly of reactor channels of a PHWR under severe accident conditions. Failure of calandria A methodology to estimate the conditional tubes was based on the total strain reaching failure strain at probability of a break in inlet feeder being the stagnation a particular temperature. The failure curve was in terms of channel break in PHWR is developed. Rupture at any time for reactor channel to fail, load on the reactor channel location of PHT system up to size of double ended largest and temperature of the channel. A code was developed to feeder pipe belongs to category-2 events which are events show how this failure curve can be used to obtain the of moderate frequency. For a particular range of break sizes corresponding temperature of the channel from the system in inlet feeder, the flow in the corresponding reactor thermal hydraulic code and predict the failure of calandria channel reduces almost immediately to stagnant /very low tube from the failure curve as accident progresses. flow conditions and remains sustained due to high flow inertia of PHWR pipe structure. As it is a single channel 8.1.12 Fuel bundle Deformation under Stratified event out of hundreds of channels, the signal for reactor Flow Conditions trip is generated very late. Consequently the fuel temperature raises sharply and fuel failure may occur. The During LOCA scenario there is a possibility of conditional probability of stagnation channel break for flow stratification. In an accident condition, when coolant feeder pipe is estimated deterministically. There is a range flow to an individual channel is reduced, lower portion of of break sizes for which the clad surface temperature raises fuel bundle is at low temperature, whereas upper portion above fuel failure limits. Depending on this range and of fuel bundle is at higher temperature. This differential break locations in the feeder, the conditional probability is temperature across the fuel bundle leads to thermal estimated. It is assumed that conditional probability stresses and strains and bending of fuel bundle elements. depends on the range of break sizes leading to stagnation. In the analysis lower fuel rods temperature is taken as The analysis was carried out using thermal hydraulic code 300oC where as upper portion takes different temperature RELAP5/Mod 3.4. The conditional probability when values. Fuel rod weight and high temperature loads are multiplied with the frequency of inlet feeder pipe break will modeled using a finite element code ANSYS. High give the frequency of stagnation channel break. It is temperature material properties are used for the observed that the conditional probability of stagnation calculation. It is observed from the analysis that in the high channel break is significant. temperature range, end plate yields and accommodates the deformations of the fuel bundle. The fuel bundle 8.2 SAFETY REVIEW deformations were found to be limited. 8.2.1 Criticality Safety Review of Fast Reactor 8.1.13 Estimation of Core Radionuclide Inventory Fuel Cycle facility
Accident source term is defined as the magnitude, The criticality safety analyses for fuel reprocessing composition, form (physical and chemical) and mode of plant, fuel fabrication plant of fast reactor fuel cycle facility release of radioactive elements released during a reactor were carried out as a part of design safety review of FRFCF accident. Evaluation of inventory of radionuclides residing committee. Criticality safety issues are involved in the in the core becomes the first step in source term estimation. transportation, storage and various process operations. Consistent with this need, core inventory estimations in a Different types of fuel material such as powder, pellets,
72 solution, rods exist in the various geometrical shapes such 8.2.3 Review of Final Safety Analysis Report of as tank, annular tank, with water, concrete reflection. KK NPP-1&2 Level 1 PSA Various criticality control mechanisms in design such as mass control, concentration control, volume control, PSA Level-1 for KK NPP-1&2 is under review control through soluble poison and double contingency after implementation of recommendations by specialist principles in design were examined during the review. group and ACPSR-LWR. Review of the FSAR of KK Level- Based on the review, it is suggested to carry out remodeling 1 PSA is in progress. of some components in FRP to eliminate error related to homogenization, approximation of geometry shape, etc. in the design.
8.2.2 Review of Level-1 PSA for TAPS-1&2 and MAPS 1&2
The reports on Level-1 PSA for TAPS-1&2 and MAPS-1&2 have been reviewed by AERB Committee on PSA.
73 CHAPTER 9
SAFETY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
9.1 NUCLEAR SAFETY include uniform and regularly perturbed lattices were analyzed using a continuous energy Monte Carlo N- 9.1.1 REACTOR PHYSICS AND RADIATION Particle (MCNP) code. The purpose of the study is to SAFETY validate indigenous code system, EXCEL-TRIHEX-FA- HEXPIN against the standard Monte Carlo (MC) code, a) Theoretical Analysis of Phase-B Physics MCNP. In addition, the overall performance of theoretical Experimental Scenarios of VVER KK-NPP-1 estimations from these two code systems was analyzed against the experimental measurements. The present Theoretical analysis of the Phase-B physics analysis covers 8 uniform lattices which include different experimental scenarios of VVER KK-NPP-1 was carried pitches, enrichments and boron concentrations and also, out using indigenous code system, EXCEL-TRIHEXFA. 15 regularly perturbed lattices, which include different The analysis included scenarios, namely, filling of absorber types. The nuclear data libraries, namely, moderator with 2800 ppm boron after dry loading of 60 ENDF/B-6, ENDF/B-7, JEFF3.1 and JENDL3.2 were fuel assemblies, loading of remaining 103 FAs, warming used. The effective neutron multiplication factors (keff) up of the system from 20ºC to 280ºC, poising of 10 control values obtained through the present MCNP simulations groups, approach to first criticality by boron dilution, worth are found to show trend similar to those of our previous of symmetric Control and Protection System Absorber study employing indigenous code system. Comparison of Rods (CPSARs) in groups, individual worth of all CPSARs, MCNP calculated keff values is shown in Fig.9.1. The keff worth of all CPSARs with maximum worth rod stuck out, values obtained with ENDF/B-6 library are found to be estimation of various reactivity coefficients, etc. The lower than those with other libraries, whereas the results calculated values have been compared with the designer's with JENDL-3.2 are seen to be the largest. The data and found to be in good agreement. comparisons of MCNP computed keff values, fission b) Analysis of Temporary International reaction rate distributions and reaction rate distributions Collective (TIC) Experimental Lattices of measured by foil activation demonstrate that the VVER through Monte Carlo Simulations indigenous codes are equally good to MC code in predicting the experimental measurements. A variety of TIC experimental lattices which
Fig 9.1: Comparison of MCNP Calculated k values for Different Nuclear Data Libraries eff
74 Comparison of fission rate distributions in core ID data. From this it can be inferred that the indigenous code 146/138-F7 with boron concentration of 1.8 g/l is shown in system can be used for generation of LWR physics Fig.9.2. The variations in the results are observed to be parameters. small within the uncertainties associated with the input
Fig 9.2: Comparison of fission rate distribution in core 146/138-F7 Cb – 1.8 g/l c) An Inverse Calculation Technique for d) Radiation Streaming Experiments for Optimization of Gamma Ray Shielding Validation of Monte Carlo Calculations Designs In-homogeneities in shield structures lead to A new computer code named as SHIELD considerable amount of leakage radiation (streaming) DESIGN has been developed in Visual Basic for precise increasing the radiation levels in accessible areas. estimation of shielding thickness for gamma ray source Development works on experimental as well as facilities. The code introduces a computational technique computational methods for quantifying this streaming based on inverse calculation and iterative procedures to radiation are continuing. Monte Carlo based radiation optimize the gamma ray shielding thickness. This new transport code, MCNP is a tool for modeling and analyzing technique enables quicker and easier way of shield design such problems involving complex geometries. In order to optimization by computing shield thickness required in a validate calculations using this computational method, it is single run. The shielding thickness arrived with this code necessary to carry out some experimental measurements can be a first hand information to the designer to carry out simulating the in-homogeneities for typical cases. The data forward calculations. Also, the code is very useful to thus generated will be analyzed using MCNP code and regulators for quicker verification of shield calculations in optimized input parameters for the code in finding various shield design applications. The validation of the solutions for similar radiation streaming problems will be code has been carried out by performing analyses of the arrived at. Comparison of such experimental data in gamma shielding design for some standard problems. complex concrete ducts with MCNP calculations will Comparison of the results with those of renowned forward enable generation of bias factors, thumb rules and calculations, experimental measurements, NCRP analytical fits for total radiation dose rates within and publications and other gamma radiation shielding utilities outside such ducts. Since the penetrations and ducts like RAD-PRO etc. shows its suitability for gamma shield through bulk shields are unavoidable in an operating design calculations. In addition, the code has been used to nuclear facility, the results on this kind of radiation review the FRFCF shield optimization calculations and streaming simulations and experiments will be very useful there was good agreement in the results. in the shield structure optimization.
75 d.1) Gamma Streaming Experiments Theoretical dose rate distributions agree well with the experimental measurements for the maximum value Gamma radiation streaming experiments were and its location. The percentage deviations of MCNP code carried out at SRI employing a point, Co-60 gamma calculated dose rates from the experiments are well within source of present activity ~0.07mCi, NaI(Tl) (Ǿ1.4”x2”) ±15% for most of the cases for straight hollow cylindrical based gamma spectrometer (TARGET identiFINDER) and annular ducts whereas for rectangular z-shaped the with the ducts of various shapes and dimensions. Straight deviations are up to about ±20%. Over all, the present hollow and annular and rectangular z-shaped ducts were study throws light on suitability of MCNP code for the used as in-homogeneities in sand shielding material. These analysis of gamma radiation streaming problems for all duct shapes were arrived based on our experience in shield duct configurations considered. Comparison of MCNP design optimization calculations for Prototype Fast simulated dose rate distribution vs. distance with respect to Breeder Reactor (PFBR). Then, Equivalent theoretical duct axis with the experimental measurement is shown in simulations have been carried out with the Monte Carlo Fig.9.3 for the source location at the centre. code, MCNP-4C.
Straight Hollow Cylinder Straight Annular Cylinder
Fig.9.3: Dose rate distribution vs. Distance with respect to Duct axis – Source at the centre of Duct
d.2) Analysis of Neutron Streaming through the MICROSPEC2) were used to measure neutron dose rates. Trenches of RFQ Linear Accelerator Also, the results of the experiments have been compared Facility with their theoretical MCNP simulations to validate it for radiation streaming analysis. NCRP-51 based design of LINAC facility housing RFQ based neutron generator (NG-1-433) is being set up Comparison of measured neutron dose rates with at RSD, IGCAR. Neutron trench streaming experiments that of theoretical demonstrates the good agreement were carried out in this facility by keeping standard Am-Be within ±10% for most of the locations except for the (5Ci) neutron source over the entrance point of one of location D1 (Fig.9.4) where the maximum deviation of these trenches, which are provided for running the cooling about 17% is observed. The analysis shows that the total channels, power cables & control cables to the neutron dose rate due to radiation streaming through the trenches generator from the control room. Dose rates were is falling along the trench towards the control room side. measured at five locations along the trench including its Also, MCNP code is found to be suitable for the analyses of entrance and exit as shown in Fig.9.4. Neutron monitor neutron streaming problems. (ATOMTEX BDKN-01) and Neutron spectrometer (BTI
76
Fig.9.4: MCNP Plot of Neutron Trench Streaming Experiments & Comparison of MCNP Results with Measurements
e) Validation of ISOGEN, an Indigenous Fuel spent fuel nuclide inventories, 2) decay heat, and 3) Depletion Analysis Code against neutron and gamma radiation source spectra etc. Theoretical Benchmarks on Isotopic Available benchmarks relevant to the PHWRs, LWRs and Generation and Fuel Depletions FBRs have been analyzed. The validation studies demonstrate the predictive capability of the indigenous Studies were carried out for validating ISOGEN, code system against other international results. ISOGEN an indigenous fuel depletion analysis code against calculated major actinides concentration (in grams) and standard theoretical benchmarks on isotopic generation radioactivity of selected actinides and fission products (in and fuel depletion analysis of fast and thermal reactor Bq/kg U) after the cooling time of 5590 days are compared cores. The validation study covers the principal areas of with the measured values available in the literature in Fig. code and nuclear data application to the prediction of 1) 9.5.
Fig.9.5: Comparison of ISOGEN Results with Measured Values of Pavelescu et al., 2006
77 Advanced FBRs mainly based on metallic fuel modern digital equipment for their safety critical functions. with high breeding ratio will play a major role in meeting The use of computer based controls for safety critical the high nuclear power growth envisaged in India. In this operations demand for a systematic evaluation of software regard several conceptual reactor designs with metal alloys reliability. Effective and efficient methods are needed to of U-Pu-Zr fuel have been suggested for commercial ensure dependability and compliance to high reliability operations. A study was conducted to analyze the various requirements of systems important to safety. Existing physics design aspects of a sodium cooled U-Pu-6%Zr approaches have assumptions and limitations, which are fuelled 1000 MWe metal fueled FBR (MFBR). Core not acceptable for safety applications. Towards this, a neutronics calculations indicate that this reactor can attain hybrid method combining formal verification and a breeding ratio of nearly 1.5. The variation of breeding mutation testing to quantify the software reliability in ratio with the changes in Zirconium fraction in the metal nuclear safety systems is developed. The results obtained alloy is brought out in the study. The reactor kinetics and suggest that software reliability depends on three factors: safety parameters of the 1000 MWe MFBR are also test coverage, formal verification coverage and cohesion computed in the study. Detailed burnup analyses are of the code. The method is implemented on a carried out to compare the core burnup effects in MOX and representative code for core temperature monitoring MFBRs. For this purpose, a 500 MWe MFBR and MOX system of NPP. The method is expected to yield a logically fuelled PFBR are compared. The results indicate that the justifiable estimate for software reliability and help loss of reactivity in the metal core with burnup is less than regulators in independent verification and validation. This half that of a MOX core and its breeding ratio remains work is carried out in coordination with EIG, IGCAR. nearly constant. It is also found that the isotopic composition of plutonium (Pu-vector composition) (b) Identification of Potential Initiating Events remains more stable with burnup in a metal core. Since for Level-1 PSA of FBTR multiple fuel recycling is interlinked with FBR growth, this behavior indicates that it is perhaps easier to maintain a For Level-1 PSA of FBTR, a list of potential constant Plutonium isotopic composition (Pu vector) with initiating events leading to core damage is identified. The multiple recycling in MFBR compared to MOX fuelled list is arrived at by engineering evaluation, deductive ones. analysis and operational experiences. To reduce the complexity in computation, initiating events that impose f) Development of Neutron Transport Theory the same success criteria and lead to identical plant Code for Reactor Calculations conditions are grouped. The accident sequence progression of all the initiating events are developed using An indigenously developed and versatile code event tree modeling and the list of mitigating functions / based on neutron transport theory “Anisotropic Transport systems are identified. Reliability modeling of mitigating Equation Solver in 3-D (ATES3)” is being evaluated to systems is being done in a phased manner. One of the adoption for future reactor analyses. As a first step, the frontline systems viz, Preheating and Emergency Cooling validation and verification of this code was carried out (PHEC) system identified from the potential initiating against the famous 3-D neutron transport benchmarks events is modeled in detail. Fault tree approach is adopted proposed by Osaka University in Japan in the late eighties. to model the system with inputs from process and Further, the results obtained by ATES were also compared Instrumentation diagram, relevant safety analysis reports, those obtained by 3-D transport code TRITAC. The technical documents and interaction with plant personnel. benchmark analysis results of ATES match very well with PHEC system failure is taken as the top event and all the the results by earlier evaluations. However, the present sub-systems / component that could cause the system version of ATES code has a limitation that it can solve the failure are modeled. neutron transport equation for XYZ core geometries. In order to make ATES more versatile for applications to Hex- (c) PSA of Reprocessed Uranium Oxide Plant Z core geometries, e.g. VVER or FBR, modifications are (RUP) of FRFCF required for which work is progress. As a first step of level-1 PSA of a reprocessing 9.1.2 Reliability and Probabilistic Safety facility, four potential initiating events in RUP of FRFCF Assessment that can lead to unsafe state are identified taking into account the various activities at the plant such as reduction (a) Software Reliability of U3O8, pellet fabrication and pin fabrication is modeled. The associated accident sequences are identified for all NPPs are replacing analog equipment with unsafe states due to fire, chemical hazard and radioactivity.
78 9.2 ENGINEERING STUDIES Fig.9.6(a) shows a boundary layer flame over ethanol pool surface. Fig. 9.6(b) provides the analysis at the flame 9.2.1 Fire Safety Studies leading edge; the flame is sustained where Da»1 (or log10Da»0) and where fuel is completely consumed. (a) Theoretical Studies (b) Experimental Program A method to characterize the flame stability and extinction has been developed. The presence or absence The detailed design of the proposed of flame at a particular location is quantified in terms of Compartment Fire Test Facility (CFTF) has been
'local' Damköhler number (Dal), as opposed to the completed. The fabrication and installation of all the key traditional method of using 'global' Damköhler number. It components, such as fire compartment, fuel pan, exhaust is shown that irrespective of the flow configuration, a flame hood and duct, control room etc., is in progress at site. is sustained only at a location where the local Damköhler Numerical studies have been initiated for the actual CFTF number is equal to or slightly greater than unity. To configuration to investigate the effect of fuel type and demonstrate the applicability of this concept, numerical quantity, ventilation configuration (removal of combustion studies are performed for various flame configurations like gas through forced/natural draught) and multi- co-flow, cross and opposed flow flames and the idea is compartmentalization of the fire room. The objective is to applied to these flames. A well validated, CFD based obtain a blind prediction for various conditions and combustion model that was developed in-house at SRI, prepare the test matrix for conducting experiments safely. has been employed to conduct these numerical studies.
Fig. 9.6(a) Flame for u =0.75 m/s; Fig. 9.6(b) Variation of local Da (left); fuel ¥ fuel pool x/L=0.2 to 1.2 and oxygen mass fraction(right), normal to fuel surface at x/L=0.2 (leading edge)
9.2.2 Studies on Hydrogen Distribution in (c) Deflagration volume fraction (V ); and (d) Deflagration def Enclosures pressure ratio (Pdef).
In safety analysis, hydrogen released into nuclear reactor containment subsequent to a core degradation accident is usually considered to be uniformly mixed with the containment air. However, uniform mixture may not be possible in case of scenarios such as station black out where no a/c power is available to drive the fans and building coolers. In such scenarios, hydrogen distribution is to be studied in detail.
In order to, depict mixing and flammability of the released hydrogen, compare distributions objectively, and demonstrate that the acceptance criteria for hydrogen distribution are met, a quantitative method to characterize hydrogen distribution in enclosures, is developed. This method involves four numerical indices, namely (a)
Average Mole fraction (Xav); (b) Non-uniformity Index (c); Figure 9.7: Geometry, boundary conditions and initial conditions
79
Figure 9.8: Contour plots of hydrogen mole fraction for hydrogen mixing problem (Case II)
The method has been applied to several studies Xav =0.03) and 50% (Case II, Xav = 0.05) respectively. on hydrogen distribution in enclosures. Some of them are Figure 9.8 shows the progression of diffusion process for (a) Dispersion of a stratified layer of hydrogen and air due Case II. The average mole fraction is unaltered for these to diffusion, (b) Scaling studies on hydrogen stratification; cases. Figure 9.9 shows the progression of the remaining (c) Release of hydrogen as a buoyant jet and (d) Influence three indices with time. of natural convection on a stratified layer of hydrogen. This study and the other studies have shown the Figure 9.7 shows the geometry considered for the relevance of the developed indices in providing useful study (a) above given above. Two cases are considered in quantitative information on hydrogen distribution in which the mole fraction in the top layer are 30% (Case I, enclosures.
Figure 9.9: Progression of (a) Non-uniformity Index, (b) Deflagration Volume fraction and
(c) Deflagration pressure ratio with time for Case I (with Xav = 0.03) and Case II (with Xav = 0.05)
80 9.2.3 Structural Analysis The procedure is integrated with a Finite Element (FE) code for limit state evaluation. The predominant (a) Failure Probability Evaluation of Expansion failure mode identified using deterministic analysis of Bellow using iHOSRSM expansion bellow is low cycle fatigue. The FE model and Von Mises stress range in the bellow inner surface due to Expansion bellows are used in the containment thermal expansion is shown in figure-9.10. It is observed penetrations as soft connection to mitigate the effects of that failure probability has strong dependence with differential movements between the penetrating pipe and temperature of pipe and moderate dependence on containment shell. The bellow has lower design margins material properties and mean diameter of bellow, as than that for other mechanical components and a potential shown in figure-9.11. Order of Chebyshev polynomial for source of leakage of contaminations to atmosphere in the random variables associated with material properties, event of failure of their structural integrity. The failure diameter, thickness and temperature is 6, 3, 3, and 6 probability of expansion bellows at the RCB penetration of respectively. Probability of failure of expansion bellow PFBR under operating condition is estimated using evaluated by iHOSRSM, which required only103 number improved High Order Stochastic Response Surface of deterministic evaluation, is of the order of 1.0e-6. The Method (iHOSRSM). The iHOSRSM is an in-house low failure probability indicates that the expansion bellow developed code, which is well validated and will maintain the structural integrity for the design loading. computationally efficient.
Fig.9.10: Expansion bellow at RCB penetration Fig. 9.11: Sensitivity of limit state function of PFBR (a) FE Model (b) Von Mises stress g(X) with random variables
9.2.4 Microstructural Based Constitutive Model and remnant lifetimes in creep. In the present investigation, to Predict the Creep Behaviour of Modified 9Cr- CDM approach has been used to predict creep behaviour 1Mo Ferritic Steel at 873 K of modified 9Cr-1Mo steel at 873 K for the stress range of 70 – 200 MPa (NIMS data). Modified 9Cr-1Mo steel is an Creep strain curves are determined from the important high temperature structural material for steam results of continuous-measurement or interrupted tests generator (SG) applications in thermal and nuclear power involving the application of a constant load (or stress) to a industries. The creep lifetimes of this steel has been limited uniaxial testpiece held at constant temperature. The ability due to damages caused by coarsening of dislocation to predict creep strain time curves and rupture strains of networks and subgrains together with coarsening and critical components is of great importance when trying to dissolution of precipitates. The above damage evolution ensure stable operation of existing power plant and for rates are coupled with kinetic creep law containing developing current procedures to extend design lifetimes microstructural parameters in order account for total safely based on constitutive analysis of short time creep damage and for prediction of creep curves at 873 K for tests. A wide range of creep model equations are in use different stress levels. The results obtained from CDM today to represent the high temperature-time dependent analysis in terms of creep strain-time data (Fig. 9.12), and deformation behaviour of engineering materials. time to rupture at different stress levels has been Physically based Continuum Creep Damage Mechanics comparable with the experimentally observed values. (CDM) has been a unified frame work for predicting design
81
Fig.9.12 Comparison between predicted and experimental creep strain–time curves for different stress levels at 873 K.
9.2.5 Numerical Simulation and Validation of Numerical analysis of thermal striping Thermal Striping Phenomena phenomena using Large Eddy Simulation was carried out using data reported in literature (Voke and Gao [1998]). A Thermal striping is the random temperature three-dimensional model has been created with fluctuations occurring due to the improper mixing of approximately four lakh meshes. The simple two- different temperature fluid streams. The study of thermal dimensional view of the model can be seen in Fig. 9.13. A striping is important in both water cooled and sodium time step of 0.001s has been used to properly account the cooled nuclear reactors due to the chances of occurrence turbulent characteristics. The Smagorinsky-Lilly subgrid- of failure of structural components. The reactor scale model was used for the Large Eddy Simulations. The components which if subjected to larger thermal model consists of three jets of water flowing into the fluctuations will fail and this will be beyond repair. Hence impingement domain through a channel of 72 mm width. the prediction of the temperature fluctuations expected in A hot jet (size 38 mm) at 318 K is surrounded by two cold the reactor components before the start of its operation is jets of 303 K (17 mm each). Simulations were carried out essential. for a period of 94 s. Various thermal hydraulic parameters of importance were analysed to verify the adequacy of the model.
Fig. 9.13 Two-dimensional view of the model
82 Fig. 9.14 shows the contours of mean temperature with the high velocity and stagnant fluids. Away from the difference and Fig. 9.15 shows the contours of RMS interaction zone of the jets the temperature fluctuations temperature fluctuations. Both the plots were in good reduces. In the core region of the jets, the fluctuations in agreement with the data reported in literature. At the jet temperature were comparatively less. Close to the Perspex interaction zone the temperature fluctuations were the plate, which is significant location from the thermal striping maximum. This is because of the increased interaction point of view, the temperature fluctuations were minimal.
Fig. 9.14 Contours of Mean Temperature Difference
Fig. 9.15 Contours of RMS Temperature
9.2.6 Air Side Pressure Drop in AHX-B Inlet: and AHX of one design and the other two (Type B) have Effect of Adjoining Structures DHX and AHX of another design.
In the Indian PFBR, highly reliable decay heat After construction, one of AHX-B air inlets is removal capability is achieved through the safety grade surrounded by walls which were not considered in the decay heat removal (SGDHR) system. This system consists original design. These walls offer additional resistance to of four independent circuits consisting of one sodium to air flow. In order to estimate the resistance offered by these sodium decay heat exchanger (DHX) and one sodium to surrounding structures, a comparative study involving 3-D air heat exchanger (AHX). Two circuits (Type A) have DHX CFD analysis was carried out for the inlet region.
83 Fig. 9.16 and Fig. 9.17 show the original design and only by 1 Pa as compared to the total pressure drop of 166 the actual construction of the AHX-B inlet region. Fig. 9.18 Pa. Since the increase in pressure drop is just 0.6 %, the and Fig. 9.19 show the contour plots for pressure drop for reduction in heat removal capacity is estimated to be less the original design and the actual construction of AHX-B. than 0.8 % of the nominal value, which is acceptable. This study has helped in qualification of as built AHX-B inlet From the numerical analysis, it is seen that the region. neighboring structures increase AHX-B inlet pressure drop
Fig. 9.16: CFD model for original design Fig. 9.17: CFD model for actual construction
Fig. 9.18: Pressure distribution for Fig. 9.19: Pressure distribution for original design actual construction
9.3 ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY STUDIES bodies includes lakes, tanks and ponds. The road map includes highways, metalled roads, unmetalled roads, cart 9.3.1 RS-GIS studies track, pack track and foot path (Fig.9.20). Soil map includes soil type, texture and depth. The lineament map contains (a) Remote Sensing and GIS based faults, inferred faults published in the geology maps and Environmental Assessment for lineaments interpreted from satellite images. The lineament Tummalapalle Uranium mines (50 km map will be a used as input for the groundwater movement Radius), Cuddapah, Andhra Pradesh studies. The geomorphology units represented in the study area are structural hills, dissected hills, residual hills, linear The spatial database on road network, drainage ridges, pediments, pediplains, intermontane valley and network, lineament, surface water bodies, lithology, soil valley fills. The land use/ land cover types present in the map, Digital Elevation Model (DEM), geomorphology and study area are agriculture land, deciduous forest, scrub land use/ land cover were completed for UCIL site at forest, follow land/scrub land, plantations, water bodies and Tummalapalle, Andhra Pradesh. The map on surface water settlement (Fig.9.21).
84 Fig. 9.20: Road network of Fig. 9.21: Land use/ land cover of Tummalapalle area Tummalapalle area
(b) Spatial mapping of Sea Surface Temperature temperature. To validate the satellite derived SST, the data pertaining to MAPS Condenser Coolant were compared with the filed measured SST. The creation of Discharges using RS – GIS a site specific semi-empiric algorithm is in progress to predict the field SST from the satellite derived SST. Determination of sea surface temperature (SST) at Kalpakkam Sea was carried out by employing multi-dated The preliminary studies revealed the plume satellite thermal infra-red imageries. The aim of the study is dimensions of north-south direction: 200m to 3240m and to identify the temporal characteristics of the thermal plume east-west direction: 210m to 2590m. From the available around Madras Atomic power Station (MAPS) due to analysis, it was observed that the difference between satellite condenser coolant discharges using satellite derived derived and measured SST is (-) 4.30C. i.e. satellite data is Thermal Infra Red (TIR) data. For the studies, 39 cloud free under predicting. A typical temporal variation of thermal scenes were identified belonging to 2005-2010 and the data plume characteristics is shown in (Fig.9.22). was processed to convert Digital Numbers (DN) into
Fig. 9.22 Temporal variation of thermal plume characteristics around MAPS
85 9.3.2 Hydrogeological and Hydrogeochemical March-2010 and one year prediction (April-2010 to Studies at Kalpakkam March-2011) period, with real time rainfall data as recharge boundary condition. This output results were (a) Groundwater Flow Modeling compared with the observed groundwater head data.
The groundwater flow modeling is a vital The outputs obtained for 9 stress periods were component in the safety assessment of a radioactive waste analyzed using statistical techniques. It was observed that disposal facility. This also helps a great deal in siting the the standard deviation of residuals was varying between vital nuclear installations. A 2-layer aquifer model for 0.27 and 0.36 m for transient simulations. However, for Kalpakkam plant site using the Visual MODFLOW Pro prediction period was in the range of 0.43 to 1.04 m. This Ver.2009.1 has been developed. The output from the deviation is understandable because the head boundary study provides the required baseline data for carrying out conditions assumed for predictive run period was derived the contaminant transport modeling from radioactive from the 2-year average of groundwater head data of each waste disposal facilities at Kalpakkam. Validation of 2- bore well locations. Fig.9.23 shows the regression plot of layer aquifer model was attempted by employing the measured versus calculated groundwater heads with good model as a transient condition for the period April-2008 to regression co-efficient of 0.86.
Fig.9.23 Regression analysis for Measured versus Calculated groundwater heads for all stress periods (April-2008 to March-2011)
(b) Evaluation of Hydrogeochemical Processes site. Data obtained through chemical analyses of at Kalpakkam Site groundwater samples were used for graphical plots and geochemical calculations. Chemical speciation and Geochemical signatures of Kalpakkam site were reactive mineralogy of the site was deduced from the deduced by chemically analyzing the different anions and mineral equilibrium geochemical software, PHREEQC. cations from borewell water samples taken at Kalpakkam
Fig. 9.24 Piper Trainer plot Fig. 9.25 Chloro Alkaline Fig. 9.26 Chadda's plot for Kalpakkam site Indices for Kalpakkam site for Kalpakkam site
86 Piper diagram, used to identify the facies of 9.3.3 Waste Management related Studies groundwater as well as the geochemical processes along the flow path of groundwater for Kalpakkam site indicates (a) Role of Colloids in the Transport of that most of the samples fall in the field of mixed Ca-Na- Strontium in Groundwater
HCO3 type (Fig.9.24). Chloro alkaline Indices deduced for the borewell samples confirmed the ion exchange and In Kalpakkam area, the radioactive wastes are reverse ion exchange processes activated in the study area. disposed in near-surface disposal facilities, and as the Studies indicate that the sampling locations away from the waste inventory predominantly consist of cesium and saline water bodies have fresh water wherein ion exchange strontium. To understand the kinetics and mechanisms of takes place and the indices are negative. The borewells radionuclide sorption on clay colloidal surfaces, the nature closer to the saline water bodies have rich deposits of Mg of sorption phenomenon of strontium on kaolinite clay and Ca in the aquifer which gets exchanged with Na in the was studied at different temperatures. Effect of pH, Na+ 2+ groundwater that shows positive indices (Fig. 9.25). and Ca and temperature on kd was determined. The sorption data of strontium on kaolinite clay was fitted with Hydrogeochemical processes occurring in the two adsorption isotherms viz. Langmuir and Freundlich study area were interpreted using, Chadda's plot. Data was and it was observed that the data was in good agreement expressed as the difference between the alkaline earths with Langmuir model (Fig.9.27) The kinetics of sorption of (Ca+Mg) and alkali metals (Na+K) for cations, and the strontium was found to follow pseudo second order difference between the weak acidic anions (HCO3 +CO3) kinetics (Fig.9.28). and strong acidic anions (Cl+SO4) (Fig. 9.26). The plot corroborates the reverse ion exchange process taking The free energy values were more negative at place at Kalpakkam aquifer due to the excess of Ca+Mg higher temperatures indicating that the spontaneity of over Na+K. Interpretation of hydrogeochemical data sorption increases with increase in temperatures. The suggested that weathering of minerals, ion-exchange strong pH and ionic strength dependent sorption suggests processes and were mainly responsible for the that sorption of Sr2+ is dominated by ion exchange and groundwater chemistry of the study area. surface complexation. The geochemical sorption characteristics of strontium on kaolinite clay provide valuable insight in understanding the role of geo- environment on radioactive waste disposal in the study area.
Fig. 9.27 Langmuir plot for the sorption Fig. 9.28 Kinetic fit for the sorption of strontium on clay colloid of strontium on clay colloid at 298K
87 (b) Application of Nanotechnology for Waste The particle size determined from the TEM Treatment Applications investigations for g-Ga2O3 was found to be in the range of 3-5nm (Fig.9.30). For the degradation of 400mg/L
Degradation of dissolved Tri-n-butyl phosphate dissolved TBP, 10mg of g-Ga2O3 was employed as the was studied using nano sized photocatalysts. Nanosized photocatalyst Experiments were repeated with 10mg of b- photocatalysts such as b- and g-Ga2O3 were employed for Ga2O3 and 10mg of P-25 TiO2 (Degussa, Germany). It was the first time for the degradation of dissolved TBP. Solution observed that complete degradation of TBP could be combustion method was adopted for the synthesis of the achieved in less than 40 minutes using Gallia nano photocatalysts. The synthesized photocatalysts were photocatalysts while P-25 TiO2 takes 60 minutes for similar characterized using XRD, TEM and other characterization degradation. The rate was found to follow pseudo first techniques to confirm the nanostructures as well as the order kinetics and degradation efficiency of TBP follow the morphology of the photocatalysts. Powder XRD order g-Ga2O3 > b-Ga2O3 > P-25 TiO2. (Fig.9.31).The determination revealed that while b-Ga2O3 is highly method adopted follows environmentally benign crystalline, g-Ga2O3 was weakly crystalline (Fig.9.29). advanced oxidation technology and follow green chemistry route.
Fig. 9.29 XRD pattern Fig. 9.30 TEM micrograph Fig. 9.31 Kinetics of
of b- and g-Ga2O3 of g-Ga2O3 dissolved TBP degradation
(c) A Numerical Model for Diffusive Leaching In the present study, two different waste specimens of Radionuclides from a Cylindrical Solid viz., SC 12% and SCV 12% containing radioactive Cs-137 Waste Matrix were considered. The SC 12 % denotes 12% sludge content mixed with the cement slurry, whereas SCV 12% Towards safety assessment of a Near Surface corresponds to 12% radioactive sludge mixed with cement Disposal Facility (NSDF) for radioactive wastes, leaching containing vermiculite as the additive. By using the of radionuclides from the immobilized waste-form into the numerical method, leach rates calculated for both the contacting ground water has been initiated. The leach samples for a period 200 days are shown in figures 9.32a rates of various radionuclides constitute the source term to and 9.32b. hydrogeological transport models. The present study describes a simple two dimensional finite difference model The numerical model was validated by using the to evaluate the diffusive leach rates of radionuclides from leach rate values obtained by evaluating the analytical cylindrical waste-form. The governing equation was leach expression. For both the sample specimens, formulated in two-dimensional cylindrical co-ordinate numerical leach rates are in good agreement with the system. This equation was solved numerically to obtain the analytical values. concentration distribution in the waste matrix. From the concentration distribution the leach rate of radionuclide from the surface of the waste matrix was evaluated in Bq/day.
88 Fig 9.32 a Fig 9.32 b
Fig. 9.32 Comparison of Numerical and Analytical Leach rates of Cs-137 for the specimen (a) SC 12% (b) SCV 12%
89 CHAPTER 10
PUBLIC INFORMATION
10.1 PRESS RELEASES work carried out in various divisions of AERB during every financial year. The report is widely circulated to all the units AERB periodically issues press releases in English and Public Sector Undertakings under the DAE, Nuclear and Hindi to keep the public informed about important Regulatory Agencies of other countries, IAEA, premier regulatory and other related activities. During this year, 8 educational and research institutes in India, Radiological press releases were issued and the details on the same are Safety Officers of various hospitals and nuclear available on AERB website. installations, news agencies in India, ex-members and Chairmen of AERB, Ex-Directors and Ex-Heads of the i. Accident at Fukushima Power Plant – Revision of divisions of AERB. The report is published in English as INES rating issued on April 12, 2011. well as in Hindi. ii. AERB Industrial and Fire Safety Awards issued on 10.4 WEBSITE MANAGEMENT April 19, 2011. AERB as part of its policy of public information iii. AERB grants Clearance for Starting of Construction has been posting information relevant to public and of two more Nuclear Power Plants issued on July 21, licensees on its website. The information related to use of 2011 radiation in medicine, industry and research for societal benefits and beach sand mineral industries has also been iv. Radiation Safety Concerns at Lok Nayak Hospital, put on the website. The information includes the Delhi issued on August 10, 2011. applicable acts, codes and rules, regulatory and safety documents and regulatory application forms related to v. Report of AERB Committee to Review Safety of issuance of licenses, authorizations and registration etc. Indian Nuclear Power Plants against external events New forms for radiation facilities were uploaded. About of natural origin issued on September 5, 2011. approx. 7 lakh hits to the website were reported during the period. vi. USNRC Delegation visits India issued on November 17, 2011. 10.5 INTERACTION WITH MEDIA vii. Incident of fire at Advanced Medicare and Research Queries raised by media are replied by phone and Institute (AMRI) & Hospital, Kolkata Radiological e-mails as well as during press meets by the senior officers Status issued on December 9, 2011. of AERB. viii. AERB meets a delegation from French Regulatory 10.6 PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS Authority issued on March 2, 2012. Ninety three parliament questions were received 10.2 AERB NEWSLETTER and replied during the period.
AERB News Letter covers AERB press releases, 10.7 RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT-2005 important national and international news, safety reviews of plants / projects and authorizations issued to nuclear Required measures were taken on the and radiation facilities, activities related to training, implementation of 'Right to Information Act (RTI)' in AERB workshops, colloquia, seminars, symposiums, etc., The and the required information has been put on AERB Newsletter also carries expert views regarding safety of website. Eighty six queries received from various nuclear and radiation facilities. AERB Newsletters Vol. 24 applicants under RTI Act were replied during the year. No.1 and 2 covering the period from January to June, 2011 and July to December 2011 were published in In a meeting organized by Administrative English and Hindi during the year 2011-12. Training Institute (ATI), DAE on 'Experience Sharing Workshop on RTI', a presentation was made by APIO of 10.3 ANNUAL REPORT AERB. In the above interaction meeting the members shared their experiences to improve the implementation of Annual Report of AERB brings out the details of RTI Act-2005.
90 10.8 AERB's INITIATIVE ON PUBLIC regulation. The exhibits also aimed at giving a correct AWARENESS: PARTICIPATION IN perspective on doses received by way of medical SCIENCE FESTIVALS AT ANNA GEM diagnostics and natural background and the actual public SCHOOL AND SATYABHAMA dose received due to radioactive discharges from NPP, etc. UNIVERSITY, CHENNAI The university students and the general public AERB participated at the Chennai Science were also made aware of AERB's technical co-operation Festival during January 27-30, 2012 and Satyabhama with international regulatory bodies and international University, Chennai on February 21, 2012. AERB agencies. displayed its exhibits on the safety and regulatory aspects of Nuclear & Radiation Facilities. The exhibits consisted of The response to the AERB's exhibits at both the AERB's role in ensuring safety by way of issuance of science fairs was extremely encouraging with more than consents, multi-tier review process and regulatory 500 visitors of various age groups and students visiting the inspections. The AERB safety documents were displayed stall and getting informed about AERB and its role. for the public to get a glimpse of the technical aspects of
91 CHAPTER 11
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
11.1 AERB BECOMES MEMBER OF 11.2 SENIOR OFFICERS FROM OECD (NEA) MULTINATIONAL DESIGN EVALUATION VISITS AERB PROGRAMME (MDEP) Mr. Luis E. Echavarri, Director-General, MDEP is a multinational initiative to develop Organisation for Economic Co-operation and innovative approaches to leverage the resources and Development (OECD) NEA and Mr. Javier Reig, Head, knowledge of national regulatory authorities who are, or Nuclear Safety Division, OECD (NEA) visited AERB on will shortly be, undertaking the review of new reactor November 4, 2011 for a meeting with AERB officials. designs. On April 4, 2012, India's AERB became the first Presentations were made by AERB on topics “Immediate new member in the MDEP since its inception in 2006. Prior Actions by AERB – Post Fukushima” and “Highlights on to India joining the programme, MDEP membership Recent Regulatory Activities and Indian Participation to included national regulatory authorities from Canada, NEA”. NEA made presentation on activities of its different China, Finland, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the committees. Mr. Echavarri reiterated that presently AERB Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom is participating only in CNRA activities. He insisted upon and the United States. the participation of AERB in CSNI activities and joint research projects. He also invited Indian participation in Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) performs the the area of public communication of nuclear regulatory Technical Secretariat function in support of the MDEP. The organizations. programme is governed by a Policy Group (PG), consisting of the heads of the participating organizations and implemented by a Steering Technical Committee (STC) and it's Working Groups (WGs).
The work of MDEP is carried out by design specific and issue specific Working Groups. Presently two design specific working groups (EPR-WG and AP1000- WG) have been established under MDEP to share information and co-operate on specific reactor design evaluation and construction. In addition to this, issues- specific (generic issues) working groups have also been established for the technical and regulatory area, which include: Vendor inspection Co-operation (VIC-WG), Codes and Standards (CS-WG) and Digital Meeting between AERB and OECD (NEA) Instrumentation and Control (DIC-WG). delegation in progress at AERB (Mr. S. S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB, Mr. Luis E. Echavarri, Director-General, OECD, Mr. Javier Reig, Head, Nuclear Safety AERB will be actively participating in different Division, OECD and Mr. R. Bhattacharya, secratory AERB WGs for mutual sharing of experience in different areas. In are seen along with other senior officials) view of the envisaged programme of DAE which includes setting up of nuclear power plants of different technologies 11.3 USNRC DELEGATION VISITS AERB including EPR, India's participation in MDEP will be very useful while performing the Safety Review for these reactor A team of USNRC officials led by Mr. Gregory B. designs and carrying out licensing activities. Our Jaczko, Chairman USNRC visited AERB on Nov.15, 2011. membership in MDEP will also enable a VVER design Presentations were made on topics related to nuclear specific group to be set up. The enhanced cooperation safety regulation and AERB-NRC nuclear safety co- among regulators on an international platform will operation. Both the countries emphasized that even improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the regulatory though the operating NPPs had inbuilt safety systems, design reviews of new reactors, leading to more efficient some safety upgrades were required in view of the and more safety focused regulatory decisions. Fukushima accident. The discussions during the meeting revealed that the safety upgrades being planned in both the countries were on similar lines. Following activities were discussed for future co-operation:
92 lIndo-US Seminar on Nuclear Safety; Spring 2012, round robin studies. This was completed and the report Mumbai, India was submitted in March 2011. lContinuation of standard problem exercises(SPE) Phase-2 study has two distinct parts. First part involves examination of methods to estimate leakage rate lPosting of Next Batch of Engineers at NRC as a function of pressure. These methods are to be evaluated relative to the PCCV test results, incorporating lessons learned from the first phase of the Round Robin Analysis. The second part consist of enumeration of methods for predicting leakage of pre-stressed concrete containment vessels as function of pressure and temperature and application of these methods to characterize the performance, in terms of leakage rate, under pressure and temperature; and transition them to probabilistic space.
Phase-2 study has also been completed. A step- by-step procedure was formulated to predict leakage versus pressure in the pre-stressed concrete containment using available leakage versus crack width correlations in Meeting between AERB and USNRC delegation in progress the literature. This procedure was also submitted to at AERB organizer for distribution among other participants. (Mr. S. S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB and Mr. Gregory B. Jaczko, Another methodology was developed to predict the Chairman, USNRC are seen in the picture along leakage for steel lined pre-stressed concrete PCCV. The with other senior officials) leakage is estimated based on liner damage co-efficient representing initiation of liner tear based on fracture 11.4 INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REVIEW energy, tri-axility factor (ductile failure criteria) to ascertain SERVICE (IRRS) complete damage state as a function of inelastic strain in the zone of interest and variation of damage co-efficient AERB is performing internal assessment to with respect to inelastic strain. Different variations of evaluate the preparedness of AERB for undergoing IRRS damage co-efficient were assumed, such as linear, mission of IAEA. For assessing the preparedness, an IRRS parabolic and power function. Full 3D global shell model Committee has been formed. Also various working groups with smeared rebar and prestressing steel was analyzed have been constituted under the main Committee to assess using ABAQUS software. The analyses were conducted for the different modules mandatory for IRRS review. Each two cases of pressure and temperature variation module was reviewed thoroughly in the working groups corresponding to two accident conditions. The responses, and draft reports were discussed in the main Committee. thus analyses based on above two cases, were used to Review report has been prepared and is being reviewed by calculate the leakage rate. the committees to assess the preparedness of AERB for the IRRS mission.
11.5 AERB-USNRC STANDARD PROBLEM EXERCISE (SPE) ON PERFORMANCE OF C O N TA I N M E N T V E S S E L U N D E R SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITION
A standard problem exercise (SPE3), “Performance of Containment vessel under Severe Accident Condition” has been taken up under the framework of 'USNRC-AERB Nuclear Safety Cooperation Program”. The SPE#3 is intended to benchmark the analysis methods with the results of 1:4-Scale PCCV model tests performed at Sandia National Laboratories. The activities of the SPE are divided into two phases. Fig. 11.1 Displaced shape of the structure Phase-1 deals with the examination of certain local effects, at ultimate pressure which were identified as important during the previous
93 Fig. 11.2 Variation of leakage rate from containment with multiples of design pressure
11.6 INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC SAFETY undertaken. This EBP focuses on quantifying available CENTRE OF IAEA margins, understanding the behavior of structures, soil and equipment during earthquake and identification of main AERB has joined the international seismic safety parameters influencing the response. As part of working center of IAEA in the following working areas: area 2(WA2), dealing with re-evaluation of safety of existing NPPs, AERB completed the analysis and lWorking Area – 3: Seismic safety evaluation performance evaluation of the reactor building. Response spectrum method and time history method were employed lWorking Area – 5: Tsunami hazard for structural analysis and benchmarking of the structure. These analysis were undertaken for fixed base condition lWorking Area–7: Engineering aspects of protection and soil base modeled as per the soil model provided by of nuclear installations against sabotage IAEA and for a best estimate soil model. Performance evaluation was undertaken both by nonlinear time history lWorking Area–8: Site Evaluation and External analysis and pushover analysis on full 3D shell-beam Events Safety Assessment model of the structure. For this purpose, material nonlinearity was incorporated using Concrete Damage AERB conducted numerical simulations of the Plasticity model available in ABAQUS. The results of thes tsunami caused by Great East Japan Earthquake of March analysis were submitted to IAEA. Figures below show the 11, 2011 and the results were presented in the 1st meeting shell-beam model of the structure and result of pushover of WA-5 on tsunami hazards. analysis carried on Fixed Base and SSI model.
11.7 IAEA-EBP KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA AERB also completed the benchmarking exercise RESEARCH INITIATIVE FOR SEISMIC for residual heat removal system piping as part of WA2. MARGIN ASSESSMENT (KARISMA) Benchmarking of residual heat removal (RHR) piping BENCHMARK STUDY system was carried out. Finite element model of the RHR piping was developed and response analysis was carried AERB is a participant of the IAEA extra budgetary out. Response analysis was undertaken by envelope programme (IAEA-EBP) on seismic safety of existing response spectrum method and multi support response NPPs, wherein a bench mark study based on the spectrum method. The results/values estimated by AERB observations during the July 2007 earthquake that were in very good comparison with the mean values of the affected the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station is results from different participants
94 (a) (b) Fig 11.3 (a) 3D Model of the structure, (b) Damage contour due to lateral loading
Fig 11.4 Determination of Performance point of the structure for Fixed Base and SSI model by pushover analysis
11.8 INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE integral-type reactors, where, experimental data can be STANDARD PROBLEM (ICSP) EXERCISE used to assess computer codes for reactor system design ON INTEGRAL PWR DESIGN NATURAL and analysis. This will also improve understanding of CIRCULATION FLOW STABILITY AND important phenomena expected to occur in a natural THERMO-HYDRAULIC COUPLING OF circulation integral type small reactors. CONTAINMENT AND PRIMARY SYSTEM DURING ACCIDENTS Blind calculations of two transient scenarios, namely SP-2 (Loss of feed water transients with ADS The purposes of this IAEA ICSP is to simulate flow operation) and SP-3 (operational conditions at different instability phenomena under natural circulation conditions power levels) have been carried out using and coupled containment/reactor vessel behavior in RELAP5/SCADAP/MOD3.4. This is to understand the
95 possible phenomena like natural circulation flow instability Energy Regulatory Board, Kalpakkam, on January 2-3, and loss of feed water transients with ADS operation in 2012. Recent developments and future challenges in small integral natural circulation reactors. Initial conditions various areas of nuclear reactor thermal hydraulics for the transient simulations were obtained by performing especially on severe accident, emergency preparedness, steady state calculations. and safety were discussed. Chairman, AERB stressed the importance of the workshop and released the inaugural In SP-2, the system falls into a two-phase issue of New International Journal “SRESA's International oscillatory mode owing to low pressure instabilities due to Journal of Life Cycle Reliability and Safety Engineering”. core boiling, flashing etc. Simulation of the SP-2 transient, establishes long term cooling of the core through natural The following broad themes were covered in the circulation in the case of loss of feed water in the workshop: secondary. Based on the current study that is still in progress, more emphasis could be laid on the modeling of ©Challenges In Advanced Reactors. the secondary steam generator coils. Different flow physics in the secondary side can be expected when modeling the ©Regulatory Requirements/Guidelines for Advanced SG coils as single and three equivalent pipes in the code Nuclear Power Plants modeling. Simulation of SP-3 establishes the steady state operation with the core exit at subcooled condition by ©Thermal Hydraulics-Experimental and Numerical adjusting the secondary feed water flow rate for a wide range of power from 10% to 80% of the maximum power. ©Severe Accident Management Guidelines The system steady state is achieved by changing the feed water flow and, however, the system could fall into an ©Emergency Preparedness unsteady (oscillatory) phase depending upon the feed flow. In this context it is essential to identify the stable and ©Strategies for Reactor Safety Enhancement unstable operating conditions through a stability analysis. The findings and observations made are reported to IAEA. ©Review of Major Accidents – Safety Insights Gained – Consequences and Combination of External Events. 11.9 INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON NEW HORIZONS IN NUCLEAR REACTOR ©New Age Computer Codes and Application of PSA in THERMAL HYDRAULICS AND SAFETY, Reactor Safety JAN 2-3, 2012, SAFETY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, KALPAKKAM ©Advances in Passive Safety for Advanced Reactor
The International Workshop on New Horizons in The discussion focused on several important Nuclear Reactor Thermal Hydraulics and Safety was areas such as passive system vs. active system, lessons organized in co-operation with the Board of Research in learnt from Fukushima accident and preparedness for Nuclear Sciences (BRNS) and Society for Reliability and future, ultimate heat sink with air or water, margins for Safety (SRESA) in Safety Research Institute (SRI), Atomic design basis/external events and hydrogen issues.
Participants of International Workshop including Invited Delegates from Reputed Organisation from Abroad as well as from India (Shri S. S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB is seen along with invited delegates)
96 Panel Members of the Workshop (L to R: Prof. Revankar, Dr. Choi, Dr. Prabhat Kumar, Shri K. K. Rajan, Shri S. G. Markandey)
11.10 AERB-ASN STEERING COMMITTEE by AERB-ASN workshop on March 1, 2012. In the MEETING AND WORKSHOP workshop several issues were discussed including Indian and French safety assessment and EPR nuclear safety. It A delegation of nuclear safety experts led by Mr. was mutually agreed to exchange the regulatory Andre' Claude Lacoste, President ASN held a meeting with documents on radiation facilities, particularly on Mr. S.S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB and other senior officials challenges like lost sources, safety & security of sources, of AERB on February 29, 2012. This was the first steering management of X-ray installations etc. After committee meeting between AERB and ASN understanding the practices of each other, organizing workshops on these topics may be thought of in future. The Steering Committee meeting was followed
97 CHAPTER 12
QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
12.1 QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (QMS) In order to enhance awareness level on QMS OF AERB requirements and improve competence of AERB personnel in performing their QMS functions, training Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is entrusted programme on Internal Audit as per IS/ISO 9001:2008 with the responsibility of ensuring that use of nuclear was held during April 27 to April 28, 2011 at AERB energy and ionising radiation does not pose undue risk to conducted by National Institute of Training for the workers, members of the public and the environment Standardization, Bureau of Indian Standards. An in the country. In order to meet required standard and awareness programme was arranged on September 5, continual improvement of quality in carrying out its 2011. functions, AERB has opted certification under ISO 9001 standard by Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) for its QMS Monitoring Committee (QMS-MC) of consenting activities, regulatory inspection and AERB met 4 times and reviewed the audit observations preparation of regulatory documents since November 15, arising from internal audits carried out in the year 2011. 2006. Similarly, Executive Committee of AERB reviewed the audit reports. The following action points have been AERB has prepared Quality Manual as level-I identified in the QMS-MC meeting and the action for document and 13 numbers of procedures as level-II implementation of these have already initiated. documents for implementation of Quality Management System (QMS) as per ISO 9001 standard at AERB. All the a. Formation of a Sub-Committee for revising the QMS level-I and level-II documents were revised and the QMS of Level-I and Level-II documents AERB was recertified as per new ISO 9001:2008 standard b. Revision of QMS Level-III documents, as necessary, in November 2009. by the respective division As per the requirements laid in the ISO c. Formation of a Sub-Committee for revising the procedures and Quality Manual for AERB, internal audit Minutes of Meeting (MOM) format for AERB Safety for various divisions of AERB were carried out. There were Committees with respect to the difficulties faced 47 nos. of observations and no Non-Conformance (NC) d. Review on quantification and validity period of reported for May-June 2011 audit, while 40 nos. of quality objectives observations and no NC reported for November 2011 audit. All the observations of both the internal audits were e. Revision of the existing format of the Client's complied. Similarly, surveillance audit was carried out in Feedback Form November 2011 by BIS and no NC was reported by BIS. f. Closure of non-functional committees in AERB However, certain suggestions were provided by BIS auditor, which have been implemented. g. Organizing training for Lead Auditors.
98 CHAPTER 13
HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
13.1 MANPOWER AUGMENTATION 13.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 1995 AND AERB manpower is being augmented at various IMPLEMENTATION / WELFARE OF levels and through various channels in view of the RESERVATION POLICY FOR SCHEDULED expanding nuclear power programme and increasing CASTES / TRIBES / OBC number of radiation facilities in the country. This is being done through fresh recruitments, transfer of experienced During the year 2011-12 AERB recruited 33 personnel from operating plants and R&D institutes like persons through direct recruitment in various grades, out BARC and IGCAR and induction of postgraduates of which one candidate belongs to SC and one belongs to through AERB Graduate Fellowship scheme (AGFS) in IIT ST. Action has been initiated to fill the reserved vacancies Bombay and IIT Madras. (SC, ST, OBC) in the grades of SA (B), UDC & Steno.III. Rosters are maintained as per the orders on the subject. Out of the total 130 new posts (103 Scientific & The backlog vacancies are being worked out and periodic Technical and 27 Administrative / Accounts posts) reports & returns are being sent to DAE. sanctioned for the expansion of AERB under the XI Plan 71 posts in Scientific & Technical and 22 posts in 13.3 TRAINING Administrative / Accounts categories respectively have been filled. AERB is taking steps to fill up the remaining 37 13.3.1 AERB Orientation Course for Regulatory vacant posts. During the year, the following personnel Processes for SRI (OCRP-SRI-2011) were inducted in AERB. AERB Orientation Course for Regulatory lFour students, 2 from IIT Madras and 2 from IIT Processes (OCRP-SRI-2011) was conducted at SRI, Bombay who were sponsored under AERB Kalpakkam during June 23 to August 8, 2011. Forty-seven Graduate Fellowship Scheme for M.Tech. in the year participants from SRI, IGCAR, BARCF, MAPS-1 and 2009 joined in 2011 as Scientific Officer(C). BHAVINI were benefitted by the course. In-house faculty delivered lectures on the topics, which included: Functions lTen Scientific Officers (C) joined through various and Responsibilities of AERB, Regulatory Inspections of Training Schools of DAE (i.e. from NPPs, Reactor Concepts and Systems, Accident Analysis, BARC/NPC/NFC/IGCAR). Basic & Operational Reactor Physics, Radiological Safety, Operational Health Physics, Industrial Plant Safety AE Act lFour Scientific Officers joined through inter-unit and Rules, Environment Protection Act and Rules, Civil transfer. Engineering Safety Aspects, Nuclear Security, QA Requirements of NPPs, Operation Experience Feedback lTen Scientific Officers/Technical Officers were (OEF) and Event Reporting. The Course was appreciated recruited through open advertisement in the grade of by all participants. (D) & (E). 13.3.2 Orientation Course for DAE Graduate lOne Scientific Assistant (B) was (recruited through Fellowship Scheme (DGFS) Fellows IGCAR panel). Four engineers, selected under AGFS, underwent lSix officers/staff of Administration joined through training successfully in Orientation Course for DGFS inter-unit transfer/promotion. Fellows (OCDF) of Human Resource Development Division, BARC. lFour Stenographers Gr. II & Two Lower Division Clerks joined through direct recruitment (from the 13.3.3 Other Training Activities panels of other units of DAE). lTwo officers underwent training in BARC training As on March 31, 2012, the total staff strength in school under OCES program. AERB is 286 comprising of 230 scientific and technical & 56 supporting staff of Administrative / Accounts. lAround 50 staff members were nominated for 30 various Training Programmes conducted by ISTM,
99 Shri V. Balasubramanian, Director, SRI, Addressing the Participants during the Inauguration of OCRP-SRI Course at SRI, Kalpakkam (L to R: Smt. Reeta Rani Malhotra, AERB, Dr. A. Ramakrishna, Course Coordinator, Dr. S.M. Lee, Raja Ramanna Fellow and Shri G. Srinivasan, Director, ROMG, IGCAR, Kalpakkam are seen on the dias)
New Delhi & Administrative Training Institute, DAE 13.7 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT on topics related to RTI matters, Establishment Rules, Cash & Accounts, Budget, Administrative Vigilance, A 'Knowledge Portal' has been functional at the Management, Reservation in Service, Orientation internal website of AERB, as part of knowledge Programmes, Workshop on Healthy & Happy Life, preservation and easy retrieval. Training/teaching etc. material, proceedings of Conferences and Seminars, Papers presented/published by AERB personnel and 13.4 REFRESHER COURSE management information system were posted on the portal at regular intervals. National and international A two day refresher course on “Effective codes/guides/manuals are also being posted on the portal. Communication” by a professional corporate trainer was conducted in AERB for the benefit of 25 participants. A well-equipped library is maintained in AERB. A total of 82 new publications have been added during the 13.5 AERB TECHNICAL TALKS period and with this, the total collection of publications has gone up to 10,142. In addition, 21 Journals were Technical talks were arranged on the following subscribed during the period. Reference and Information topics.' Services have been provided to the users and visitors of the Library. List of New Additions, World Nuclear News, lAnalysis of Experimental Scenarios during Phase B NucNet News, NEI Newsletter, Bulletin of the Atomic Physics Commissioning of VVER KK Unit-1 using Scientist Newsletter etc. are circulated in digital form Indigenous Code System. regularly by sending e-mails to AERB Staff. Table of Contents of new issues of important journals of AERB's lRight to Information Act-2005. subject interest available in Science Direct is regularly circulated by email alerts. 13.6 AERB COLLOQUIA BY INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS 13.8 DEVELOPMENT OF OFFICE AUTOMATION SOFTWARE Two AERB colloquia were organized on 'Integrated Decision-Making Using INSAG-25, US Safety AERB is in the process of implementing Office Goals' by Mr. Ashok Thadani, Chairman, Scientific Automation Software (OAS) to achieve the following. Committee of the French Nuclear Safety Authority, ASN and Senior Advisor, US-NRC and on 'The Fukushima lEnhance the ability to harness IT as Potential tool for Daiichi Accidents' by Mr. Balraj Sehgal, Emeritus Professor achieving the development and governance vision of of Nuclear Power Safety at Royal Institute of Technology, the organization. Sweden. lAttaining synergy in operations among various
100 verticals of the AERB to deliver the best benefits to from Kolhapur region attended the programme. the administration. l“Radioactive Contamination in Scrap Metal and lFacilitate the organisation in achieving its Steel Products” was arranged for the concerned governance envisions through Information & industries in New Delhi on September 23, 2011. Communication Technology (ICT). Forty participants from steel industries and suppliers / manufacturers of radiation monitors belonging to lSimplification & streamlining of the procedures of Delhi, Aligarh, Jalandhar and Moradabad attended AERB through comprehensive Business Process the programme. Reengineering. l“Safe Handling of Packages Containing Radioactive 13.9 ONE DAY AWARENESS PROGRAMMES Material” was conducted for the representatives of the airlines (carrying class 7 cargo), freight AERB conducted following one day awareness forwarders, cargo handlers etc. on November 9, programmes for regulatory requirements and radiation 2011 at Import Cargo Terminal, Indira Gandhi safety in various industries and, academic institutions. International Airport, New Delhi. Thirty participants attended the programme. l“Safety and Security in Handling of Nucleonic Gauges” organized at Navi Mumbai on May 31, l“Safety & Security of Industrial Radiography 2011. Total 30 engineers from various units of Sources” was organized by AERB on November 18, Reliance India Limited viz. Mumbai, Patalganga, 2011, IOCL, Paradip, Odisha. The programme was Hazira, Jamnagar, Vadodara, Nagpur, Bharuch, conducted for the management of IOCL, Paradip, Nagothane, Barabanki(UP), Hoshiarpur(Punjab), various contract awarding parties and all the Baulpur (Orissa), OWL (Rajahmundry) participated radiography agencies working at IOCL, Paradip site. in the programme. Around 110 participants belonging to about 30 contractors attended the programme. l“Radiation Safety and Regulatory Aspects of Nucleonic Gauges” organized at Tata Steel Limited l“Regulatory Aspects in Diagnostic Radiology and (TSL), Jamshedpur on June 17, 2011. About 40 Radiation Safety” at Pune Hospital, Pune on Engineers/technicians from various departments of February 20, 2012. About 300 participants TSL participated in the programme. consisting of X-ray technologists and radiologists participated in the programme. l“Safety and Security of Industrial Radiography Sources” organized at M/s Bharat Petroleum l“Radiation Safety, Security and Regulatory Aspects Corporation Limited (BPCL)-Kochi Refinery, Kochi of IRGDs/NGs” - Special meet for on July 22 and 23, 2011. About 90 Engineers Manufacturers/Suppliers of Ionizing Radiation participated in the programme. Gauging Devices (IRGDs) / Nucleonic Gauges (NGs) was organized at AERB on February 24, 2012. About l“Radiation Safety and Regulatory Aspects in 50 representatives from manufacturer/supplier of handling of Nucleonic Gauges and Industrial IRGDs participated in the meet. Radiography Devices” at M/s Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Limited (KIOCL), Mangalore on July 28, l“Familiarization of the Regulatory Requirements for 2011. About 35 Engineers/technicians from various the Import and Use of the Equipments Containing departments and security officials of M/s KIOCL Small Amounts of Radioactive Material and participated in the programme. Radiation Generating Equipments Used for Various Purposes” on March 20, 2012, at AERB for the l“Radiation Safety Aspects of Use of Ionising suppliers/importers/local manufacturers of the above Radiation in Research Applications” at Punjab mentioned products. About twenty participants University, Chandigarh during August 10-11, 2011. attended the programme. The programme was organized for the users of radioisotopes and students undergoing M.Sc. 13.10 HIGHER QUALIFICATION programmes in the University. There were about 100 participants. AERB encourages its officers to pursue higher education. During the period, five of its officers completed l“Radioactive Contamination in Steel” for concerned Ph.D, 3 officers completed M.Tech and 2 officers industries in Kohlapur region was organized by completed one-year orientation programme on Nuclear AERB on August 18, 2011. Thirty five participants Science and Engineering.
101 CHAPTER 14
SAFETY PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES
14.1 SAFETY RESEARCH PROGAMME symposia and conferences of interest to AERB. The CSRP met four times during the year and deliberated on 10 new 14.1.1 One of the objectives of AERB is to promote project proposals and recommended Grant-in-Aid for 6 safety research and related activities relevant to safety and new projects as given in Table 14.1. It also approved the regulatory work. For this, a Committee for Safety Research renewal of 8 ongoing projects as given in Table 14.2. Programmes (CSRP) has been constituted to frame rules, regulations and guidelines and to evaluate, and 14.1.2 In addition, financial support was provided to 34 recommend grants for the research projects and to monitor seminars, symposia and conferences. The sub-committee their progress periodically. The Committee also of CSRP met 8 times to clear the applications seeking recommends financial assistance to universities, research financial support from AERB for conducting the organizations and professional associations for holding seminars/conferences.
Table 14.1: New Research Projects Approved
Sr. Project Title Principal Organisation No. Investigator
1. Experimental and Numerical Investigations of Heat Prof. R. P. Vedula IIT-Bombay, Mumbai Transfer in Tube, Single Rod Bundle Geometries Using Supercritical Fluid Freon-22 2. Development & testing of corrosion inhibitors for Dr. N. Rajendran Anna University, firewater system materials Chennai 3. Non-contact strain measurement of Zircaloy using Dr. M. Ramji IIT-Hyderabad, digital image correlation (DIC) under high Hyderabad temperature ambience 4. Seismic fragility of the primary containment Dr. Siddartha Ghosh IIT-Bombay, Mumbai considering structural integrity and leakage through the damaged containment 5. Thermo-mechanical failure in PT-CT tubes used in Prof. Krishna N. IIT-Bombay, Mumbai Indian PHWR Jonnalagadda 6. Leukocyte DNA damage as a biomarker for Dr. Anupama UCMS & GTB Hospital, radiation exposure to patients undergoing MDCT Tandon Delhi examinations
102 Table 14.2: Research Projects Renewed
Sr. Project Title Principal Organisation No. Investigator
1. Development and Testing of Indigenous Cost Dr. K. M. Ganesh Kidwai Memorial Inst. Effective 3-D Radiation Field Analyser of Oncology, Bangalore 2. Establishment of Diagnostic Reference Levels Dr. K. N. Govinda PSG College of (DRLs) in Select Procedures in CT Imaging” Rajan Tech. Coimbatore 3. Microbial biofilm formation and corrosion of Prof. K. Prashanth Pondicherry University firewater pipelines in NPPs 4. Studies of the transport of Hydrogen-Air-Steam Dr. S. K. Das IIT-Madras Chennai Mixture within a confinement 5. A Study on radioactivity in Phosphogypsum based Dr. P. Shahul Hameed J.J College of building and construction materials and indoor Engineering & radon inhalation dose estimate in Tamil Nadu Technology, Trichy 6. Evaluation of burst criterion of Zircaloy Clad Dr. Mohd. Kaleem IIT-Patna Khan 7. Retrospective Assessment of Indoor Radon Dr. R. C. Ramola H.N.B. Garhwal Exposure…. Implanted on Glass Surface University Tehri Garhwal 8. Transient CHF in horizontal channels under LPLF Prof. S. V. Prabhu IIT-Bombay, Mumbai conditions
14.2 WORKSHOPS / SEMINARS / THEME responsibilities of the agencies involves in handling such MEETINGS situation. After the accident at Fukushima NPPs, the emergency preparedness plans of all NPPs have been 14.2.1 AERB Theme Meeting on “Status of LWR revisited. In this regard, AERB also organized a one day Analysis” discussion meet on “Review of Off-site Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan of Indian NPPs based on A theme meeting on 'Status of LWR Analysis' was Experience of Fukushima Nuclear Accident” on organized in November 23, 2011 to integrate several November 30, 2011. About 100 delegates from AERB, groups from BARC, AERB, NPC, SRI-AERB and IGCAR NPCIL, BARC and NDMA participated in the discussion for the reactor physics code development and analysis of meet. The presentations were made on the various aspects Light Water Reactors. The objective was to promote open related to emergency preparedness at NPPs. The issues interaction, free exchange and sharing of technical that emerged during the discussions include the need for (i) expertise. The meeting contained talks on reactor physics revision of AERB Safety Guides related to Emergency codes and thermal hydraulics coupling codes developed in Preparedness, (ii) review of the role and responsibilities of BARC, NPC and AERB, validation and benchmarking various agencies involved in handling emergency situation exercises on these codes, steady state lattice and core to avoid ambiguity, (iii) prescription of intervention levels physics analysis of VVER core and operational reactor for taking appropriate protective actions during physics aspects of Kudankulam reactors. emergency, (iv) enhancement of public awareness programme by suitable experts to allay the unfounded fear 14.2.2 AERB Discussion Meet on “Review of Off- and (v) establishment of a review and monitoring group in site Emergency Preparedness and AERB which should review any nuclear and radiological Response Plan of Indian NPPs based on emergency situation in the country and advice Chairman, Experience of Fukushima Nuclear AERB. Actions have been initiated in AERB towards Accident” resolution of the issues identified during the discussion meet. Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are provided with adequate safety features to guard against the possibility of 14.2.3 Discussion Meeting on “External Events in any accident. However, in the event of a Beyond Design Siting of Nuclear Power Plants” Basis Accident, it might become necessary to take certain mitigating measures in the public domain. All NPPs have AERB organized a one day Discussion Meet on prepared emergency plan which brings out the roles and “External events in siting of NPPs” on 6th January, 2012.
103 The objective of the meeting was to discuss external events 14.2.6 Workshop on “Evolving Trends and in relation to siting of nuclear installations and derivation of Technologies in Fire Safety” design basis parameters for these events. About 125 delegates from AERB, NPCIL, BARC, IGCAR, UCIL, One day workshop was organized by AERB HWB and other national expert agencies as well as focusing on the 'Evolving Trends and Technologies in Fire members of AERB safety committees participated in the Safety' for all DAE units fire professionals on February 9, Discussion Meet. 2012 at AERB, Mumbai. Speakers from AERB, NPCIL, BARC and experts from non-DAE organizations made 14.2.4 Discussion Meet on “Implementation and presentations on varied topics like usage of eco-friendly Operational Aspects of Physical Protection fire extinguishers (Halon alternatives), Advanced methods System (PPS) at Nuclear Power Plants / and techniques of Fire Hazard analysis and fire Modelling, Nuclear Facilities” fire Probabilistic Safety assessment, Fire & Explosion Consequence analysis techniques, familiarization with AERB organized a one-day discussion meet on AERB Fire standard (Revised) etc. About 120 participants “Implementation and Operational Aspects of Physical took part in this workshop. Protection System (PPS) at Nuclear Power Plants / Nuclear Facilities” on February 2, 2012. The objective of the meet 14.2.7 Discussion Meet on “Regulatory was to share the experience related to implementation of Inspection of NPPs” PPS and the information related to state of art technologies and to collect inputs required for preparation of regulatory Regulatory inspection is one of the important inspection manual on security aspects of NPPs. The meet tools for carrying out safety surveillance of Nuclear Power was attended by seventy two delegates from AERB, Plants / Projects. Regulatory inspections are carried out BARC, NPCIL, IGCAR, BHAVINI, DAE and HWB. during siting, construction, commissioning and operation Presentations were made on the topics related to evolution of NPPs to check functioning of plant systems, quality & development of PPS technologies, design & evaluation assurance programme, adherence to approved of PPS, regulatory aspects and experiences from various procedures, compliance with the conditions specified in sites. The meet was fruitful as the experiences were shared consents issued by AERB & various safety documents, etc. mutually among participants. The meet brought out issues In order to assess experience of regulatory inspections and related to development of regulatory documents on to identify the scope for further improvement in its nuclear security aspects of Nuclear Power Plants / Nuclear effectiveness and efficiency, AERB organized a one day Facilities. discussion meet on the subject of “Regulatory Inspections of Nuclear Power Plants / Projects” on March 16, 2012. 14.2.5 Theme Meeting on “R&D Activities of The meeting was attended by about 100 delegates from SADD and SRI, AERB” AERB, NPCIL and BHAVINI. Presentations were made on the experience of regulatory inspections, current A theme meeting on 'R&D Activities of SADD and international practices & trends and feedback of utility of SRI, AERB' was organised in AERB on February 3, 2012. regulatory inspection program. The panel discussion at the Participants from BARC, NPCIL, AERB and SRI attended end of meet brought out suggestions, which include this one day theme meeting. The objective of the meeting revision of the criteria followed for categorization of the was to provide a platform for a detailed discussion on the regulatory inspection findings, conducting un-announced status of regulatory R&D activities, identify thrust areas inspections of NPPs, conducting inspections during and action plans and future collaborative activities. biennial shutdown of NPP units, revision of the frequency Various speakers from SADD and SRI made detailed of routine inspections based on the performance of the presentations covering areas such as severe accident unit and extension of the scope to conduct inspection of analysis, structural analysis, uncertainty analysis, thermal contractors and vendors. hydraulics studies, probabilistic safety analysis, engineering safety studies, fire safety studies, hydrogen distribution studies, nuclear reactor physics and radiation safety studies and environmental safety studies. Possible areas of collaborative work between SADD and SRI were identified.
104 CHAPTER 15
OFFICIAL LANGUAGE IMPLEMENTATION
AERB constantly gives its best for the propagation lDr. R. K. Vajpayee, SO (F), Technology Development of official language, Rajbhasha Hindi. Apart from the Division, Nuclear Recycle Group, BARC, Mumbai regular official work and various translations, AERB gave a talk on June 13, 2011 on "Safe Disposal of ensures a series of activities throughout the year. The Nuclear Wastes". He presented a description of major core of Hindi related activities include publications, various procedures involved in the permanent internal inspections, training, workshops, talks and annual disposal of nuclear wastes and also touched upon the competitions. latest research being done this field.
I. Publications in Hindi lMrs. Rani Verma, Principal, Atomic Energy Central School, Tarapur, delivered a talk on "Yoga for lThree safety documents were published in Hindi. Personality Development" on November 30, 2011. Work on publication of 7 safety documents is in Her talk highlighted the significance of Yoga for progress. leading a healthy life. She demonstrated a couple of yogic kriyas which were beneficial. lAERB: 25 Years of Safety Regulations - a book released on the occasion of AERB's Silver Jubilee Celebrations highlighting various activities of AERB was translated in Hindi entitled laj{kk fu;eu ds iPphl o’kZ lWork pertaining to AERB's bilingual (English- Hindi) Scientific & Technical Glossary was completed for publication.
II. Promotional activities for Hindi Implementation lFive inspections were conducted by the members of official language implementation committee (OLIC) covering various divisions of AERB and SRI, Hindi Talk organized by OLIC Kalpakkam for identifying the areas of Hindi (Shri Zahir Hussain, AD(OL), Dr. A. Ramakrishna, Chairman, OLIC, Shri S. S. Bajaj, Chairman, AERB, Shri S. K. Chande, Vice Chairman, implementation and enhancing the use of Hindi in AERB, Mrs. Rani Verma, Speaker and Shri S. Krishan, CAO divisional activities. are seen on the dais) lAs part of the Hindi teaching scheme, 04 Officers of lOn the occasion of Hindi Day on September 14, AERB qualified Hindi Praveen exam in May, 2011. 2011, Shri S. A. Sukheswala, Ex-Scientific Officer of AERB delivered a lecture on “Radiation Exposure in III. Hindi Talks / Workshops Fukushima Daichii, Japan”. His talk brought out detailed information pertaining to the Fukushima lAERB hosted the Joint Hindi workshop conducted incident. under the Joint Official Language Coordination Committee of the four units of DAE AERB, HWB, lDr. Krishna Kumar Mishra, Senior Scientist, Homi DCSEM and DPS. The workshop was conducted Bhabha Centre for Science Education spoke on during 20-22 December, 2011 in AERB. There was “Chemistry and its Evolution through the Ages” active participation from AERB. January 10, 2012. The talk was poetically titled “jlk;u dh fodkl ;k=k & izLrj ;qx ls ijek.kq ;qx rd”. lDr. Anjali Kulkarni, Head, Medical OPD, BARC Hospital delivered a talk on June 13, 2011 on lMs Malini Shah from Aasthachrysalis, presented a Diabetes-Symptoms & Prevention covering various talk on “Positive Living” on March 27, 2012 in AERB. salient aspects related to Diabetes. The audience appreciated the talk and demonstrations held as part of the presentation.
105 IV. Hindi Competitions lAERB conducted Annual Hindi competitions for its employees. These competitions were well received lHindi Day celebrations were held on September 14, for the sheer novelty that most of the events carried 2011 under Joint Official Language Coordination along. There was freshness about the format of the Committee at V.S. Bhavan jointly for all four units of event or the topics chosen. DAE– AERB, DPS, HWB & DCSEM. The competitions included quiz, debate, extempore speech and poetry recitation. Winners from AERB received their prizes in various events in the ceremony.
106 CHAPTER 16
ACHIEVEMENTS
AERB recognises that constant pursuit of lMs L. Thilagam, Technical Officer (D), SRI, AERB knowledge upgradation in topics relevant to regulatory has been awarded Ph.D. degree in Physics for her functions and safety studies would help a long way in thesis titled, 'Reactor Physics Analysis of LEU & MOX strengthening the human resource. Keeping this in view, Fuelled Light Water Reactor Cores' by the University AERB continued to support and encourage AERB officials of Madras, Chennai on November 04, 2011. This to pursue higher studies such as Ph. D and M. Tech during work was carried out under the guidance of Dr. this year. K.V.Subbaiah, SRI, AERB.
I. Achievement of Ph. D. II. Other Achievements lShri A. Ramakrishna, Scientific Officer (H+), ITSD, lShri Lalit Mohan Sharma, SO(D), RSD, AERB AERB has been awarded Ph.D. degree in Physics for acquired M. Tech in Radiological Safety Engineering his thesis titled, 'Physics Modeling of Water Cooled with specialization in Nuclear Engineering from and Water Moderated Reactors (VVER) and their Homi Bhabha National Institute, Mumbai. Validation against Lattice Physics Experiments' by Mumbai University on March 05, 2012. This work lShri Phani Karthik Vonteddu, SO(D), IPSD, AERB was done under the guidance of Dr. V. Jagannathan, acquired M. Tech in Chemical Engineering with BARC. specialization in Nuclear Engineering from Homi Bhabha National Institute, Mumbai. lShri Obaidurrahman K., Scientific Officer (E), SADD, AERB has been awarded Ph.D. degree in lKum. Paridhi Aggarwal, SO(C), IPSD, AERB Mechanical Engineering for his thesis titled, 'Spatial acquired M. Tech in Electrical Engineering with Instability Analysis in Large Light Water Reactors' by specialization in Design, Operation and Maintenance the IIT Bombay, Mumbai during institute's 49th of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities from Homi Bhabha convocation on August 05, 2011. This work was National Institute, Mumbai. done under the guidance of Professor J. B. Doshi of IIT Bombay and Dr. S. M. Lee, Former Director, lShri Moloy Kumar Chakraborty, TO(E) and Vijay V. SEG, IGCAR, Kalpakkam. Muthekar, SO(D), S&SED, successfully completed one year orientation program on “Nuclear Science lShri Rajib Lochan Sha, Scientific Officer (D), RSD, and Engineering”, conducted by Human Resource AERB has been awarded Ph.D. degree in Physics for Development Division of BARC for 54th batch of his thesis titled, 'Dose Evaluation and Quality OCES trainees. Assurance in High Dose Rate Intracavitary Brachytherapy of Gynaecological Cancer' by lShri Sunil Pagar (SO/D), acquired the Level-II Osmania University in April, 2012. This work was certification for Welding Inspector from Indian done under the guidance of Prof. P. Yadagirireddy, Society of Non Destructive Testing (ISNT). Osmania University, Hyderabad. lShri P. Satish Kumar, SO/C and Shri G. Suresh lShri Mayank Verma, Scientific Officer (D), NPSD, Kumar, SO/D successfully completed Indian Society AERB has been awarded Ph.D. degree for his thesis of Non-destructive Testing and American Society of titled, 'Hybrid Formulation for the Capacitated Lot Non-destructive Testing Level-II certification in Sizing Problem and Lagrangian based Solution Liquid Penetrant Testing and Ultrasonic Testing. Technique for the Single and Two Stage Capacitated Dynamic Lot Sizing Problem with Backorders and lShri P. Satish Kumar, SO/C completed Orientation Setup Times' by IIT Kanpur in January 2012. This Course for DGFS Fellows-2010 in Nuclear Science work was done under the guidance of Dr. R. R. K. and Engineering from BARC, Mumbai in August Sharma, IIT Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh. 2011.
107 CHAPTER 17
MISCELLANEOUS
17.1 INTERACTION WITH OTHER AGENCIES Facility” was carried out by internship project students of B Tech. Chemical Engg., MGM's College 17.1.1 Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) of Engineering & Technology, Navi Mumbai.
Shri R. Bhattacharya, Secretary, AERB is a lA project on 'Trend Analysis on Chemical Disasters in member of BIS Occupational Safety & Health and India over last two decades and case study on Chemical Hazards Sectional Committee, CHD 8 and societal risk assessment for toxic release based on convener of its Sub-Committee CHD 8:2 and is involved in Bombay Dock incident' is being carried out by review and revision of BIS documents. internship student from School of Environmental Sciences, Mahatma Gandhi University Kottayam, 17.1.2 Representation in Ministry of Environment Kerala. and Forests 17.1.4 Project Guidance provided by NSAD, Ministry of Environment and Forests has AERB to Engineering Students constituted two separate environment appraisal committees for nuclear facilities: 1) Civilian Nuclear During this year, NSAD officers have provided Facilities, 2) Strategic Nuclear Facilities. Shri R. guidance on the following areas to internship students Bhattachraya, Secretary, AERB is a member of both these from various universities. committees and has contributed in reviewing the new lDevelopment of a random sampling model for use in projects such as new BARC facility at Vishakapatnam, estimation of uncertainty in safety analysis Andhra Pradesh and Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing lVariation in safety margin due to changes in reactor Facility at Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu etc. power profile In addition draft guidelines of Central Pollution lPSA and reliability studies Control Board for Management and Handling of lBuckling of storage tanks due to seismic events Phosphogypsum generated from Phosphoric acid plants lPlant dynamics studies & Reactor kinetics studies were reviewed. 17.2 RETIREMENTS ON SUPERANNUATION 17.1.3 Project Guidance provided by IPSD, AERB to Engineering Students The following officials retired on superannuation during the period. The Industrial Plants Safety Division of AERB has been encouraging in providing guidance to young lShri R.I. Gujrathi, Outstanding Scientist and Director, engineering students to share its expertise in the fields of NPSD retired on 01/12/2011. Quantitative Risk Assessment, Hazard & Operability (HAZOP) studies, Fire Hazard Analysis / Modelling etc. lDr. S. K. Gupta, Distinguished Scientist and Director, During this year IPSD officers have provided guidance on SADD retired on 31/1/2012. the following areas to internship students from various universities, 17.3 INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY CELEBRATION lA project on 'Hazard Identification and Consequence Analysis of Versatile Solvent Synthesis Pilot Plant A cultural programme was organized by women (VSSP)' was carried out by winter internship student employees of AERB on International Women's Day on of University Institute of Chemical Engg. Technology, March 8, 2012. The programme was attended by the Punjab. women employees of AERB and spouses of senior AERB officials. A special talk on “Life Style Management for lA project on “Quantitative Risk Analysis of 130 Working Women” which included stress relieving exercises MTPA Tri Butyl Phosphate Plant (TBP)' was carried and better time management skills was arranged as part of out by summer internship B. Tech students from IIT the celebration. All the ladies actively participated in Bombay, Chemical Engineering branch. various competitions and games. Prizes were distributed to lA project on “Hazard Identification and the winners. AERB ladies worked as a team for the grand Consequence Analysis for n-Hexane Storage success of the programme.
108 CHAPTER 18
DEPUTATIONS ABROAD
Name of the Officer Period Venue Purpose of deputation From To Shri R. I. Gujrathi 28/03/2011 01/04/2011 Netherlands IAEA Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors Mission to the High Fusion Reaction Shri S. S. Bajaj 04/04/2011 14/04/2011 Vienna 5th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety Shri S. K. Chande 04/04/2011 14/04/2011 Vienna 5th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety Dr. S. K. Gupta 04/04/2011 14/04/2011 Vienna 5th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety Shri C. S. Varghese 04/04/2011 14/04/2011 Vienna 5th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety Shri Deepak Ojha 04/04/2011 14/04/2011 Vienna 5th Review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Nuclear Safety countries Shri J. Koley 04/04/2011 14/04/2011 Vienna 5th Review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Nuclear Safety countries Shri S. K. Pawar 26/04/2011 29/04/2011 Canada ISO/TC-85/SC-2 Subcommittee meeting on radiation protection Shri S. S. Bajaj 25/05/2011 27/05/2011 Vienna 29th meeting of the Commission on Safety Shri Ajai Pishardy 25/05/2011 26/05/2011 Vienna To attend the review meeting of KARISMA Phase-2 analysis Shri S. K. Chande 26/05/2011 02/06/2011 Japan IAEA Expert Mission to investigate the Fukushima accident Shri S. K. Chande 06/06/2011 10/06/2011 France Meetings of Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) and Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) Shri S. K. Ghosh 06/06/2011 10/06/2011 China IAEA TM on development of the IAEA Safety Guide on construction of Nuclear Installation Shri R. B. Solanki 06/06/2011 10/06/2011 Canada IAEA TM Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) for CANDU Reactor Shri S. K. Chande 20/06/2011 21/06/2011 Finland Advisory Committee Meeting of the International Reporting System (ACIRS) Shri A. D. Roshan 18/07/2011 21/07/2011 Vienna IAEA kick-off meeting of Tsunami Hazards conducted by IAEA International Seismic Safety Centre Shri R. K. Singh 14/06/2011 17/06/2011 Vienna 22nd meeting of the IAEA-TRANSSC - National representative Shri S. S. Bajaj 20/06/2011 24/06/2011 Vienna Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety Standard
109 Shri R. K. Singh 06/07/2011 08/07/2011 Vienna Open ended meeting of Tech. & legal experts to develop on non-binding instrument on the transboundary movement of scrap metal that may inadvertently contain radioactive material Shri S. K. Pradhan 26/06/2011 01/07/2011 Russia IAEA International Training course on the Physical Protection Inspection at Nuclear Facilities Shri Neeraj Kumar 26/06/2011 01/07/2011 Russia IAEA International Training course on the Physical Protection Inspection at Nuclear Facilities Shri R. I. Gujrathi 07/07/2011 08/07/2011 Sroval Republic 18 t h meeting of the WWER Regulations forum Shri S.K. Chande 25/07/2011 29/07/2011 USA Fourth Indo-US Civil Nuclear Working Group (CNWG) Meeting and Meetings at Argonne National Laboratory and Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory Shri S. K. Ghosh 25/07/2011 29/07/2011 Vienna IAEA coordinating meeting on the Development of the IAEA Safety Guide on construction of Nuclear Installation Shri Deepak Ojha 16/08/2011 19/08/2011 Vienna IAEA consultant meeting to prepare working material on criteria and coding for events during construction. Shri R. I. Gujrathi 18/08/2011 22/08/2011 Korea To Participate as a fellow in the Korea Foundation Global Seminar (KFGS) Shri Mahendra Prasad 12/09/2011 13/09/2011 France N E A - O E C D w o r k s h o p o n Establishing Desirable Attributes of C u r r e n t H u m a n R e l i a b i l i t y Assessment Techniques in Nuclear Risk Assessment Shri S. S. Bajaj 15/09/2011 16/09/2011 Paris 2nd MDEP conference on New Reactor Design Activities. Shri S. S. Bajaj 18/09/2011 24/09/2011 Vienna 55th Session of IAEA General Conference and Senior Regulator Forum Shri L. R. Bishnoi 12/09/2011 14/09/2011 Vienna IAEA meeting on International Generic Ageing, Lessons Learned (IGALL), WG III Shri Ajai S. Pishardy 27/09/2011 29/09/2011 Spain Meeting of WG 8.1 of the IAEA International seismic safety centre Shri Deepak Ojha 26/09/2011 30/09/2011 France IAEA TM to exchange Experience on Recent Events in Nuclear Power Plants & TM of the IRS national coordinators and OECD NEA WG on Operating Experience. Shri J. Koley 19/09/2011 23/09/2011 Paris 7th meeting CNRA WG on RNR and 2nd meeting of STG Fukushima Shri Ajai S. Pisharady 04/10/2011 07/10/2011 Helsinki To attend 1st meeting of WG-7 of IAEA-ISSC
110 Shri R. Bhattacharya 17/10/2011 21/10/2011 Indonesia To participate as faculty member in IAEA workshop on External Human Induced Events & Meteorological and Atmosphere dispersion aspect in Site Evaluation for NPP. Shri R. K. Singh 24/10/2011 28/10/2011 Vienna IAEA TRANSSC-23 meeting Shri S. K. Chande 31/10/2011 04/11/2011 Korea Annual meeting of Sr. Regulators of Countries operating CANDU type reactors. Shri S. Duraisamy 31/10/2011 4/11/2011 Korea Annual meeting of Sr. Regulators of Countries operating CANDU type reactors. Shri A. D. Roshan 28/11/2011 30/11/2011 Japan 2nd meeting of WG-5 (Tsunami- hazards) of IAEA International Seismic Safety Centre Shri S. K. Chande 05/12/2011 09/12/2011 France 26th meeting of CNRA and 50th meeting of CSNI Shri Ajai S. Pishardy 6/12/2011 8/12/2011 Vienna 3rd meeting of IAEA-EBP on Seismic Margin Assessment (KARISMA) Smt. Manju Saini 06/12/2011 09/12/2011 Vienna IAEA TM on methodology for verification of declared contents in the transport of Nuclear and other radioactive material across border Smt. Reeta Rani 12/12/2011 14/12/2011 Vienna IAEA TM on Fuel Design & licensing Malhotra of mixed cores for water cooled reactors. Shri R. K. Singh 30/01/2012 03/02/2012 Vienna Second open ended meeting of Tech. & legal experts to develop on non- b i n d i n g i n s t r u m e n t o n t h e transboundary movement of scrap metal that may inadvertently contain radioactive material Shri S. A. Hussain 13/02/2012 15/02/2012 Vienna IAEA's ITDB selected POC (point of contact) meeting Shri. A. D. Roshan 29/02/2012 03/03/2012 USA Invited speaker in the Indo-US Science & Technology Forum, 4th Symposium of Indo-Americal Frontiers of Engineers, Shri Vivek Piplani 27/02/2012 02/03/2012 Vienna IAEA consultant meeting to prepare draft IRS highlights 2010-11. Shri S. K. Chande 19/03/2012 22/03/2012 Vienna International Experts' meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP Dr. S. P. Lakshmanan 27/03/2012 30/03/2012 Korea IAEA workshop on International PWR design Natural Circulation Flow stability & Thermal Hydraulics Shri S. K. Chande 29/03/2012 30/03/2012 Paris Advisory Committee Meeting of the International Reporting Systems for Operating Experience (ACIRS)
111 APPENDIX
PUBLICATIONS
JOURNALS Advanced Oxidation Nanotechnology", Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear chemistry (DOI: lShylamoni P., Prabir C. Basu, “Concrete Structures 10.1007/s10967-011-1595-8), 2011. of Nuclear Power Plants”, Indian Concrete Journal, Vol. 85, No. 4, pp. 9-27, April 2011. lV. S. Smita, M. Suriyanarayanan, H. Seshadri and A. B. Mandal, “Thermal Behaviour Pattern of lNilesh Agrawal, K. Velusamy, S. K. Das. “A Method to Tributyl Phosphate Under Adiabatic Conditions”, Characterize Mixing and Flammability of Hydrogen Journal of Thermal Analysis and Calorimetry, DOI: Air Mixtures in Enclosures”, International Journal of 10.1007/s 10973-012-2197-6, 2011. Hydrogen Energy, Vol. 36, pp 12607-12617, 2011. lR. Deepthi Rani and P. Sasidhar, “Physico-chemical lR. K. Chandran, I. Banerjee, G. Padmakumar, K. S. Characterization of Clays at Kalpakkam Nuclear Reddy, “Investigation of Thermal Striping in Plant Site towards Assessment of Radioactive Waste Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Using Ten-Jet Water Disposal", Nuclear Engineering and Design, doi: Model”, Heat Transfer Engineering, Vol. 32 (5), pp. 10.1016/J.nuclengdes.2011.03.017, 2011. 369-383, 2011. lJayashree, V. Ramaswamy and H. Seshadri, lSeik Mansoor Ali et al., "A Numerical Study of 'Synthesis, Characterization and Photocatalytic Leading Edge Anchoring Characteristics of Ethanol Activity of CdS-Montmorrillonite Clay Composites", Sourced Laminar Boundary Layer Diffusion Nanoscience and Nano Technology: An Indian Flames", Combust. Sci Technol. 183, pp. 1133- Journal, 5(3), 24-29, 2011. 1145, 2011. lA. Ramakrishna, V. Jagannatha, R. P. Jain, "Analysis lC. Anandan and P. Sasidhar , "Changes in Coastal of Regularly Perturbed Lattices and Reaction Rate Morphology at Kalpakkam, East Coast, India Due to Distributions from TIC Experiments for X7 Lattices", 26 December 2004 Sumatra tsunami”, Geomatics, Annals of Nuclear Energy, 38, pp.1623-1644, 2011. Natural Hazards and Risk, 2: 2, 183- 192, DOI: 10.1080/19475705.2010.532976, 2011. lNilesh Agrawal, Seik Mansoor Ali, K. Velusamy, S.K. Das. “A Correlation for Heat Transfer During lS. Chidambaram, U. Karmegam, P. Sasidhar, M. V. Laminar Natural Convection in An Enclosure Prasanna, "Significance of Saturation Index of Containing Uniform Mixture of Air and Hydrogen”, Certain Clay Minerals in Shallow Coastal International Communications in Heat and Mass Groundwater in and around Kalpakkam, Tamil Transfer, Vol. 39, pp 24-29, 2012. Nadu, India", J. Earth Syst. Sci, 120(5), 897-909, 2011. lR. Deepthi Rani and P. Sasidhar, “Geochemical and Thermodynamic Aspects of Sorption of Strontium on lU. Karmegam, S. Chidambaram, M. V. Prasanna, Kaolinite Dominated Clay Samples at Kalpakkam", P. Sasidhar, "A Study on The Mixing Proportion in Environmental Earth Sciences, 65(4), 1265-1274, The Groundwater Samples by Piper Diagram and 2012. Phreeqc Model", Chin. J. Geochem, 30:490-495 DOI:10.1007/s11631-011-0533-3, 2011. lSudhir K. Jain, A. D. Roshan, Siddharth Yadav, Sonam Srivastava, and Prabir C. Basu "Strong- lH. Seshadri and P. K. Sinha, "Photocatalytic Motion Data from Structural Response Recorders in Performance of Combustion Synthesized b-Ga2O3 Indian Earthquakes", Earthquake Spectra, February for the Degradation of Tributylphosphate in Aqueous 2012, Volume 28, Issue 1, pp. 1-404. Solution", Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry (DOI: 10.1007/s10967-011-1469-0), lSeik Mansoor Ali, V. Raghavan and Ali Rangwala., 2011. (2012), "Numerical Analysis of Flame Heating on Arbitrarily Oriented Condensed Fuel Surfaces", Fire lH. Seshadri and P. K. Sinha, "Efficient Saf. J. 49, pp. 67-78. Decomposition of Liquid Waste Containing EDTA by
112 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES Regulatory Context”, presented in the 43rd Annual Conference of Society of Nuclear Medicine India at lP. K. Baburajan, G. S. Bisht, S. K. Gupta, and S. V. Chennai during 08-11 December 2011. Prabhu, "Measurement of Subcooled Boiling Pressure Drop and Local Heat Transfer Coefficient in lDr. Pankaj Tandon et al, “Radiation Dose to the Horizontal Channel under LPLF Conditions" Personnel Handling F-18 FDG and Dose Reduction NURETH-14, Canada, September 25-30-2011. Methods” was presented at the International Conference on Clinical PET and Molecular Nuclear lP. K. Baburajan, G. S. Bisht, S. K. Gupta, and S. V. Medicine (IPET 2011) organized by IAEA during Prabhu, "Experimental Investigations on Critical 8-11 November 2011, at Vienna. Heat Flux in A Horizontal Channel for Low Pressure Low Flow Condition", ISHMT – ASME 2011, IIT lDr. Pankaj Tandon “Radiation Safety in Nuclear Madras, December 27-30-2011. Medicine” published in the proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Association of Medical lP. K. Baburajan, G. S. Bisht, S. K. Gupta, and S. V. Physicists of India (AMPI) held at Vellore during Prabhu, "Effect of Inlet Stiffness on CHF in 16-18 November, 2011. Horizontal Channels under Low Pressure and Low Flow Conditions", International Conference on lG. Sahani, D. N. Sharma, P. K. Dash Sharma, P. K. Advances in Energy Research (ICAER 2011), DESE, Dixit and S. A. Hussain “Design Principles of IIT Bombay, December 9-11, 2011. Adjustable Collimators for a Telecobalt Machine using Monte Carlo Simulation”, 32nd Annual lS. P. Lakshmanan, R. S. Rao, S. K. Gupta, Conference of Association of Medical Physicists of "Numerical Analysis on the Stability of A Natural India (AMPI) held at CMC, Vellore during November Circulation Boiling Water Reactor - Effect of 16-19, 2011. Geometric Parametric of PHT Loop", International Conference on Simulation Modeling and Analysis lPravin J. Patil, Kadambini Devi, D. M. Rane, Amit (COSMA 2011), Coimbatore, December 14-16, Sen, A. U. Sonawane and S. A. Hussain 2011. “Applications of Radiation Sources in Steel Industries in India”, International Conference on Non lOm Pal Singh and Obaidurrahman K., "Impact of Destructive Evaluation for Steel and Allied Industries Nuclear Power on Environment, International (NDESAI-2011) at Jamshedpur during December 2- Humboldt Kolleg, Regional and Expert International 3, 2011. Conference on Adaptive Management of Ecosystems", October 19-21, ISEC, Bangalore 2011. lR. K. Singh, Manju Saini and S. A. Hussain “Denials lR. Srinivasa Rao, Teany Thomas, Kannan N Iyer, S. of Shipments for Radioactive Material – Indian K. Gupta, "Development of Condensation Model Perspective”, International Conference on the Safe and Implementation in CFD Code for Hydrogen and Secure Transport of Radioactive Material: The Distribution Calculations", Div-III: Paper ID#418. Next Fifty Years – Creating a Safe, Secure and Transactions, SMiRT 21, 6-11 New Delhi, India Sustainable Framework, 17 to 21 October, 2011 November, 2011. Vienna, Austria. lR. Srinivasa Rao, Teany Thomas, Kannan N Iyer, S. lR. K. Singh, G. K. Panda and S. A. Hussain “Security K. Gupta, " Validation of The Condensation Model during Transport of Radioactive Material in India – A for Containment Thermal Hydraulics”, NURETH Review”, at IAEA International Conference on the 14-406, The 14th International Topical Meeting on Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Material: Nuclear Reactor Thermalhydraulics, NURETH-14, The Next Fifty Years – Creating a Safe, Secure and Toronto, Ontario, Canada, September 25-30, 2011. Sustainable Framework, 17 to 21 October, 2011, Vienna, Austria. lShri Ajay Kumar Gocher and Dr. Pankaj Tandon, RSD, AERB, “Radiological Safety in Using N-13 lG. Sahani, D. N. Sharma, P. K. Dash Sharma and S. isotope in PET Facility in India” presented in the 43rd A. Hussain “Design of Multileaf Collimator (MLC) for Annual Conference of Society of Nuclear Medicine a Telecobalt Machine- Monte Carlo Simulation”, India at Chennai during 08-11 December 2011. published in the Book of Abstracts of Conference of Indian Association for Radiation Protection (IARP) at lShri Subrata Pathak and Dr. Pankaj Tandon, RSD, Mangalore University, Mangalore during March 15- AERB, “Delay tank – An Overview in Indian 17, 2012.
113 lL. R. Bishnoi and Sourav Acharya, “An Efficient lAvimanyu Banerjee, D. Das, K. Ramprasad, R. Structural Form for Concrete Containment Bhattacharya, “Dispersion and Probit Study of Structures”, SMIRT 21, Div. V, Paper ID#234, 2011. Chlorine Vapour Release in Zirconium Sponge Plant”, NFC-Hyderabad, 28th DAE Safety & lL. R. Bishnoi, R. P. Vedula and S. K. Gupta, “Effect of Occupational Health Professionals Meet, Reinforcing steel on Pressurized Air Leakage through Bhubaneswar November 24-26, 2011. Cracks”, SMiRT 21, Div. III, Paper ID#496, 2011. lH. K. Kulkarni, P. Gupta, V. V. Pande, R. lAjai Pisharady, S. Ghosh and Prabir C. Basu, “Modal Bhattacharya, “Sustainable Development: A Key to Pushover Analysis of Inner Containment Structure”, Survival of Industries”, 28th DAE Safety & Div. V, Paper ID#599, SMiRT 21, 2011. Occupational Health Professionals Meet, Bhubaneswar November 24-26, 2011. lDebashis Mukherjee, Samaresh Paikara, Durgesh C. Rai and L. R Bishnoi “Prediction of Confinement lM. K. Pathak, 'Training, “A Tool for Continual Effect of RC Grid Elements on URM Walls”, SMiRT Improvement of Safety Culture, 28th DAE Safety & 21, Div. V, Paper ID#641, 2011. Occupational Health Professionals Meet”, Bhubaneswar 24-26 Nov., 2011. lC. Senthil Kumar, Ajai S. Pisharady, S. Usha and Prabir C. Basu., “Seismic Fragility Analysis Of lP. Gupta, H. K. Kulkarni, R. Bhattacharya, Structure, Systems And Components Of Fast Breeder “Methodologies for Improvement in Environmental Test Reactor”, Div. V, Paper ID#608, SMiRT 21, th Performance”, 28 DAE Safety & Occupational 2011. Health Professionals Meet, Bhubaneswar November 24-26, 2011. lL. R. Bishnoi, R. P. Vedula and S. K. Gupta, “Refined Modelling of Crack Tortuousness to Predict lC. Senthil Kumar, Ajai S. Pisharady, S. Usha and Pressurised Air Flow through Concrete Cracks”, Prabir C. Basu, “Seismic Fragility Analysis of International symposium on Engineering under Structure, Systems and Components of Fast Breeder Uncertainty Safety Assessment and Management Test Reactor”, Transactions, SMiRT 21, November 6- (ISEUSAM-2012). 11, 2011. lTushar K. Mandal, Siddhartha Ghosh, Ajai S. l Pisharady, “Seismic Fragility Analysis of A Primary Varun Hassija, C. Senthil Kumar, S. Varadarajan and Containment Structure using IDA”, International S. Usha, “Identification of Potential Initiating Events Symposium on Engineering under Uncertainty: Leading to Core Damage in Fast Breeder Test Safety Assessment and Management (ISEUSAM- Reactor and Modelling of Their Accident Sequence 2012). Using Event Tree Analysis”, Transactions, SMiRT 21, November 6-11, 2011. NATIONAL CONFERENCES lNilesh Agrawal, V. Balasubramaniyan, K. Velusamy, lV. Phanikarthik, K. Ramprasad, R. Bhattacharya, S. K. Das. “An Approach towards Quantification of “Environmental Management – A System Hydrogen Mixing and Flammability in Nuclear Approach”, 28th DAE Safety & Occupational Health Reactor Containment”, Part I – Mixing”; st Professionals Meet, Bhubaneswar November 24-26, ISHMT_IND_12_037. Proceedings of the 21 2011. National and 10th ISHMT – ASME Heat and Mass Transfer Conference; IIT Madras; December 27-30, lSoumen Sinha, R. Bhattacharya, “Environmental 2011. Impact Assessment (EIA) Guidelines”, 28th DAE Safety & Occupational Health Professionals Meet, lNilesh Agrawal, V. Balasubramaniyan, K. Velusamy, Bhubaneswar November 24-26, 2011. S. K. Das. “An Approach towards Quantification of Hydrogen Mixing and Flammability in Nuclear lS. M. Kodolkar, H. K. Kulkarni, R. Bhattacharya, Reactor Containment”, Part II – Paper ID: “Role of AERB in Environmental Protection”, in DAE ISHMT_IND_12_038. In proceedings of the 21st Units, 28th DAE Safety & Occupational Health National and 10th ISHMT –ASME Heat and Mass Professionals Meet, Bhubaneswar November 24-26, Transfer Conference in IIT Madras December 27-30, 2011. 2011.
114 lR. K. Chandran, I. Banerjee, G. Padmakumar, V. National & 10th ISHMT-ASME Heat and Mass Balasubramaniyan, K. K. Rajan and P. Transfer Conference, IIT Madras, December 27-30, Kalyanasundaram. “Simulation of SGDHR 2011. Conditions in a Large Scale Water Model of PFBR”, Proceedings of the 21st National & 10th ISHMT-ASME lC. Anandan, R. Kaviyarasan, M. Sankar Ram, P. Heat and Mass Transfer Conference (ISHMT 2011), Sasidhar and V. Balasubramaniyan, “Sea Surface Chennai, India, December 27-30, 2011. Temperature Estimation for Condenser Coolant Discharges from a Power Plant using Satellite Data”, lSeik Mansoor Ali, V. Raghavan and Ali. S. Rangwala, Proc: 2nd National Conference of Ocean Society of "Numerical Estimation of Mass Burning Rate of a India, Technologies for Ocean Exploration- Condensed Fuel using Temperature Field", OCISON'11, National Institute of Ocean Technology Proceedings of the 21st National & 10th ISHMT-ASME (NIOT), Chennai., June 22-24, 2011. Heat and Mass Transfer Conference (ISHMT 2011), Chennai, India, December 27-30, 2011. lR. Kaviyarasan, P. Sasidhar and V. Balasubramaniyan, “Role of Groundwater Modeling lSeik Mansoor Ali et al., "Experimental investigation for a Nuclear Installation- Kalpakkam case study”, of Steady Flame Spread over Alcohol Pool Surfaces", National Seminar on development and sustainability Proceedings of the 21st National & 10th ISHMT- of earth resources and environment (DSERE)', 12- ASME Heat and Mass Transfer Conference (ISHMT 13, March 2011. 2011), Chennai, India, December 27-30, 2011. lArun Aravind, R. Kaviyarasan and P. Sasidhar, lR. K. Chandran and V. Balasubramaniyan, “Groundwater Flow and Contaminant Transport “Comparison of Natural Circulation Phenomena in a Modeling Round Robin Exercise (RRE)”, Test Case- Large Scale Water Model of PFBR Using Two II, AERB, Mumbai, February 10-11, 2011. Different Turbulence Models”, Proceedings of the International Conference on Thermal Energy and lL. Thilagam, Usha Pujala, T. S. Selvakumaran, K. V. Environment (INCOTEE – 2011), Srivilliputhur, Subbaiah, D. K. Mohapatra, E. Alaguraja, R. 2011. pp. 431-437. Baskaran, V. Balasubramanian, B. Venkatraman, “Monte Carlo Code Validation Through Neutron lC. Anandan and P. Sasidhar, “Application of Geo Streaming Experiment”, Theme Meeting on Reactor Spatial Tools in Impact Assessment and Mitigation of Physics: Current Status & Future Directions, Vikram Tsunami at Kalpakkam”, A Case Study. Proc.: Sarabhai Auditorium, IGCAR, Kalpakkam, 23rd Regional Conference on Geomatics in Disaster risk September 2011. management: Special Reference to Eastern India- GEOMATICS 2012 and Annual Convention of lL. Thilagam, D. K. Mohapatra, S. Renuga, R. Indian Society of Geomatics (ISG) organized by ISG Manohari, B. Mathiarasu, K. V. Subbaiah, V. in Bhagalpur during February 23- 24, 2012. Balasubramanian, “Validation of Computational Codes through Gamma Streaming Experiment”, lV. S. Smitha, M. Surianarayanan, H. Seshadri and Theme Meeting on Reactor Physics: Current Status A. B. Mandal, “Synthesis of Red Oil under Adiabatic & Future Directions, 23rd September 2011, Vikram Conditions”, Proc. of THERMANS Symposium, Sarabhai Auditorium, IGCAR, Kalpakkam. Anushakthinagar, BARC, Mumbai, January 31- February 2, 2012. lL. Thilagam, D. K. Mohapatra, K. V. Subbaiah, M. Iliyas Lone, V. Balasubramaniyan, “Gamma lP. Ramakrishna, H. Seshadri, P. Sasidhar and V. Streaming Experiments for Validation of Monte Balasubramaniyan, “Efficient Degradation of Carlo Code”, In the Proceedings of IARPNC-2012, Hydrazine in Aqueous Solutions by Adopting Green March 15-17, 2012, Mangalore University, India. Chemistry Route”, Proc. of. 28th DAE Safety and Occupational Health Professionals Meet jointly lK. V. Subbaiah, L. Thilagam, R. Sarangapani, V. organized by AERB & IREL-OSCOM., pp1761-1801 Balasubramaniyan, “SHIELD DESIGN: A Code for Bhubaneswar, November 24-26, 2011. Quicker Optimization of Gamma Ray Shielding Designs”, In the Proceedings of IARPNC-2012, lArun Aravind, P. Sasidhar, and V. March 15-17, 2012, Mangalore University, India. Balasubramaniyan, “A Numerical Model for Diffusive Leaching of Radionuclides from a lUsha Pujala, L. Thilagam, T. S. Selvakumaran, K. V. Cylindrical Solid Waste Matrix”, Proc. of 21st Subbaiah, D. K. Mohapatra, R. Baskaran, “Analysis
115 of Radiation Streaming Through the Trenches of lShri Vikas Shukla, Hukum Singh, M Dash, P. Vijayan RFQ Linear Accelerator Based Neutron Generator and P. R. Krishnamurthy, “Offsite Emergency Facility”, In the Proceedings of IARPNC-2012, March Preparedness and Response Plan based on The 15-17, 2012, Mangalore University, India. Experience of Fukushima Nuclear Accident”, at IARP in March 2012. lShri Vipin Chander, S. K. Pawar and S. Duraisamy, “Regulatory Aspects of Radiation Protection in Indian Nuclear Power Plants”, at IARP in March 2012, by.
116 ANNEXURE
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACI&FS : Advisory Committee on Industrial & Fire CCC : Construction Completion Certificate Safety CCF : Common Cause Failure ACRS : Advisory Committee on Radiological CDA : Core Disruptive Accident Safety CEO : Chief Executive Officer ACNS : Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety CESC : Civil Engineering Safety Committee ACOH : Advisory Committee on Occupational Health CESCOP : Civil Engineering Safety Committee for Operating Plants ACPSR : Advisory Committee for Project Safety Review CFD : Computational Fluid Dynamics ACPSR-FCF : Advisory Committee for Project Safety CHF : Critical Heat Flux Review for Fuel Cycle Facilities CIIRI : Committee for Investigation of Industrial AC-SD-FCF : Advisory Committee on Safety Radiography Incidents Document relating to Fuel Cycle Facilities CJR : Condensation Jet Reactor other than Nuclear Reactors CLRI : Central Leather Research Isntitute AEC : Atomic Energy Commission CMD : Chairman & Managing Director AERB : Atomic Energy Regulatory Board CMG : Crisis Management Group AFFF : Advanced Fuel Fabrication Facility CNS : Convention on Nuclear Safety AFR : Away From Reactor COIS : Computer Operator Information System AGFS : AERB Graduate Fellowship Scheme CORAL : Compact Reprocessing of Advanced ALARA : As Low As Reasonably Achievable Fuels in Lead Cells ALPAS : Automatic Liquid Poison Addition CPRI : Central Power Research Institute System CRCS : Control Room Computer System AMD : Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research CSED : Civil and Structural Engineering Division AMPI : Association of Medical Physicists of India CSRP : Committee for Safety Research Programmes ARA : Application for Renewal of Authorization CT : Computed Tomography ASDV : Automatic Steam Dump Valve DAE : Department of Atomic Energy BARC : Bhabha Atomic Research Centre DCS : Distributed Control System BDBA : Beyond Design Basis Accident DDU : Deeply Depleted Uranium BEXD : Boron Enrichment Exchange Distillation DEM : Digital Elevation Model BHAVINI : Bhartiya Nabhkiya Vidyut Nigam DFACS : Dry Fly Ash Collection, Segregation and BIS : Bureau of Indian Standards Storage Facility BRIT : Board of Radiation and Isotope DFRP : Demonstration Fast Reactor Fuel Technology Reprocessing Plant BRNS : Board of Research on Nuclear Sciences DG : Diesel Generator BWR : Boiling Water Reactor DGCA : Director General of Civil Aviation CC : Core Catcher DGFS : DAE Graduate Fellowship Scheme
117 DHX : Decay Heat Exchanger FW : Feedwater DNBR : Departure of Nucleate Boiling Ratio FWPH : Fire Water Pump House DP : Diversified Projects GIS : Geographic Information System DRS : Directorate of Radiation Safety GRAPF : Gamma Radiation Processing Facility DSRC : Design Safety Review Committee HA : Hydro Accumulator DU : Depleted Uranium / Delhi University HCLPF : High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure EBP : Extra Budgetary Project HCR : Human Cognitive Reliability EBP : Elemental Boron Plant HDS : Hydrogen Distribution Simulator ECCS : Emergency Core Cooling System HDPE : High Density Poly Ethylene ECIL : Electronics Corporation of India Ltd HRA : Human Reliability Analysis EJ : Expansion Joint HEF : Head End Facility EFD : Experimental Fluid Dynamics HEWAC : Heavy Water Clean-up Facility EMCCR : En-Masse Coolant Channel Replacement HTC : Heat Transfer Coefficient EMFR : En-Masse Feeder Replacement HWB : Heavy Water Board EMTR : Emergency Transfer HWL : High Water Line EPR : Evolutionary Pressurised Water Reactor HWP : Heavy Water Plant ESL : Environmental Survey Laboratory HX : Heat Exchanger EVS : Eigenvalue Separation IAEA : International Atomic Energy Agency FAAC : Fatal Accident Assessment Committee ICMS : In Core Monitoring System FAC : Flow Assisted Corrosion ICSP : International Collaborative Standard FBR : Fast Breeder Reactor Problem FBTR : Fast Breeder Test Reactor IDCT : Induced Draft Cooling Tower FCF : Fuel Cycle Facility IFSB : Interim Fuel sub-assembly Storage FDS : Fire Dynamics Simulator Building FEP : Features, Events and Processes IGCAR : Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research FFR : Fatal Frequency Rate IGRED : Industrial Radiography Exposure Device FHA : Fire Hazard Analysis IGRPP : Industrial Gamma Radiation Processing FHI : Fire Hazard Index Plant FHS : Fuel Handling System IICT : Indian Institute of Chemical Technology FM : Fuel Machine INES : International Nuclear and Radiological FOAK : First Of A Kind Event Scale FP : Full Power IPCL : Indian Petrol Chemical Ltd., FRF : Fuel Reprocessing Facility IQS : Improved Quasi Static F.R. : Frequency Rate IR : Incident Rate FT : Fuel Transfer IREL : Indian Rare Earths Limited FTC : Flux Tilt Control IRS : Incident Reporting System FRFCF : Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility IRV : Instrumented Relief Valve
118 ISI : In-Service Inspection NEA : Nuclear Energy Agency ISO : International Organisation for NFC : Nuclear Fuel Complex Standardization NOC : No Objection Certificate IPSD : Industrial Plants Safety Division NPCIL : Nuclear Power Corporation of India ITSD : Information & Technical Services Limited Division NPP : Nuclear Power Plant JHA : Job Hazard Analysis NPSD : Nuclear Projects Safety Division JLR : Jet Loop Reactor NRSC : National Remote Sensing Agency JNES : Japan Nuclear Energy Safety NSDF : Near Surface Disposal Facility Organization NTC : Nuclear Training Centre JNPP : Jaitapur Nuclear Power Plant NU : Natural Uranium KAMINI : Kalpakkam Mini Reactor NUOFP : New Uranium Oxide and Fabrication KAPP : Kakrapar Atomic Power Project Plant KAPS : Kakrapar Atomic Power Station OBE : Operating Basis Earthquake KGS : Kaiga Generating Station OCDF : Orientation Course for DGFS Fellows KK-CG : KK-Coordination Group OCRP : Orientation Course for Regulatory KK-NPP : Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project Processes LEU : Low Enriched Uranium OECD : Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development LHGR : Linear Heat Generation Rate OJT : On Job Training LHS : Linear Heat Sensing OLIC : Official Language Implementation LINAC : Linear Accelerator Committee LMC : Lead Mini Cell OPF : Oxide Production Facility LOCA : Loss of Coolant Accident OPSD : Operating Plants Safety Division LOR : Loss of Regulation OSCOM : Orissa Sand Complex LPIS : Liquid Poison Injection System OSEE : Off-site Emergency Exercises LTTM : Low Trajectory Turbine Missile PCCS : Passive Containment Cooling System LWR : Light Water Reactor PDSC : Project Design Safety Committee MAPS : Madras Atomic Power Station PEE : Plant Emergency Exercises MC : Monte Carlo PET : Positron Emission Tomography MDNBR : Minimum Departure from Nulceate PFBR : Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Boiling Ratio PGA : Peak Ground Acceleration MIAS : Multiple Input Alarm System PHRS : Passive Heat Removal System MOX : Mixed Oxide PHT : Primary Heat Transport MV : Main Vessel PHTS : Primary Heat Transport System MWTP : Mineral Water Treatment Plant PHWR : Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor NAPS : Narora Atomic Power Station PIV : Particle Image Velocimeter NDMA : National Disaster Management Authority PLC : Programmable Logic Controller NDFA : National Disaster Response Force PPF : Process Plant Facility NDT : Non-Destructive Test
119 PPP : Primary Pressurising Plant SC : Safety Committee PRA : Probabilistic Reliability Analysis SCR : Supplementary Control Room PSA : Probabilistic Safety Assessment PSAR : Preliminary Safety Analysis Report SCRAM : Safety Control Rod Accelerated Movement PSR : Periodic Safety Review SCURF : Safety Committee for Investigation of PSR : Project Safety Review Unusual Occurrences in Radiation PSS : Primary Shutdown System Facilities QA : Quality Assurance SCWR : Super Critical Water Cooled Reactor QMS : Quality Management System S/D : Shutdown RADAS : Radiation Data Acquisition System SDSS : Special Decision Support System RAPP : Rajasthan Atomic Power Project SEC : Site Evaluation Committee RAPPCOF : RAPP Cobalt Facility SEC NRS : Scientific and Engineering Center for Nuclear Radiation Safety RAPS : Rajasthan Atomic Power Station SEE : Site Emergency Exercise RB : Reactor Building SER : Site Evaluation Report RBGM : Review Basis Ground Motion SER : Significant Event Report RCC : Reinforced Cement Concrete SG : Safety Guide RCP : Reactor Coolant Pump SG : Steam Generator R&D : Research and Development SG : Specialists Group RI : Regulatory Inspection SGDHRS : Safety Grade Decay Heat Removal RPV : Reactor Pressure Vessel System RRCAT : Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced SIMPLE : Semi Implicit Method for Pressure Linked Technology Equations RRE : Round Robin Exercise SINP : Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics RRS : Reactor Regulating System SLHS : Small Leak Handling System RS : Remote Sensing SM : Safety Manual RSA : Response Spectrum Analysis SPE : Standard Problem Exercise RSD : Radiological Safety Division SPF : Sponge Production Facility RSO : Radiological Safety Officer SPND : Self Powered Neutron Detector RTD : Resistance Temperature Detector SPSA : Seismic Probabilistic Safety Analysis RTI : Right to Information SRI : Safety Research Institute SADD : Safety Analysis & Documentation SR : Severity Rate Division SREH : Safety Related Electrical House SAR : Safety Analysis Report SRPH : Safety Related Pump House SARCAR : Safety Review Committee for Applications of Radiation SS : Stainless Steel SARCOP : Safety Review Committee for Operating SSA : Site Safety Assessment Plants SSSC : Seismic Structures Systems and SBLOCA : Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Components SC : Safety Code TAPS : Tarapur Atomic Power Station
120 TBP : Tri-Butyl Phosphate USNRC : United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission TDP : Technology Demonstration Plant VECC : Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre TF : Task Force VRSC : VECC and RRCAT Safety Committee TIPEEZ : Tsunamis and Post Earthquake Considerations in the External Zone VSPP : Versatile Solvent Production Plant THA : Time-Histories Analysis VVER : Voda Voda Energy Reactor TG : Turbine Generator WANO : World Association of Nuclear Operators TPW : Tsunami Protection Wall WG : Working Group Type B (U) : Type B (Unilateral) WIP : Waste Immobilization Plant UEP : Uranium Extraction Plant WWER : Water Water Energy Reactor UGC : University Grants Commission XRD : X-ray Radiography UHS : Uniform Hazards Spectra ZMT : Zone Mean Temperatures USC : Unit Safety Committee ZMTD : Zone Mean Temperature Deviation UCIL : Uranium Corporation of India Limited ZSP : Zirconium Sponge Plant
121 INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EVENT SCALE (INES) (REVISED) Level / Descriptor Nature of the Events Examples
7 Major release: Widespread health and environmental effects Chernobyl NPP, MAJOR requiring implementation of planned and extended counter USSR(now in Ukraine), ACCIDENT measures. 1986 6 Significant release: Likely to require full implementation of Kyshtym Reprocessing SERIOUS planned counter measures. Plant, Russia,1957 ACCIDENT
5 Limited release: Likely to require partial implementation of Windscale Pile, UK, some planned counter measures. 1957 ACCIDENT WITH Severe damage to reactor core/Several Deaths from radiation. Three Mile Island, NPP, WIDER Release of large qualities of radioactive material within an USA, 1979 CONSEQUENCES installation with a high probability of significant public exposure. Goiania, Brazil, 1987 This could arise from a major criticality accident or fire.
4 Minor release of radioactive material unlikely to result in Tokaimuro,Japan,1999 implementation of planned countermeasures other than local Saint-Laurent des Eaux ACCIDENT WITH food controls. NPP, France, 1980 LOCAL Fuel melt or damage to fuel resulting in more than 0.1% release of Fleurus, Belgium, 2006 CONSEQUENCES core inventory. At least one death from radiation/Release of significant quantities of radioactive material within an installation with a high probability of significant public exposure.
3 Near accident of an NPP with no safety provisions remaining. Vandellos NPP, Spain, Highly radioactive sealed source lost or stolen/misdelivered 1989 SERIOUS without adequate radiation procedures in place to handle it. Ikitelli, Turkey, 1999 INCIDENT Exposure rates of more than 1 Sv/hr in an operating area. Severe contamination in an area not expected by design, with a Sellafield,UK,2005 low probability of significant public exposure. Exposure in excess of ten times the statutory annual limit for Yanango,Peru,1999 workers/ Non-lethal deterministic health effect (e.g. burns)from radiation.
2 Significant failures in safety provisions but with no actual Forsmark. Sweden, consequences. 2006 INCIDENT Exposure of member of public in excess of 10mSv/Exposure of a worker in excess of the statutory annual limits/Radiation level in an Atucha, Argentina, operating area of more than 50mSv/hr. 2005 Significant contamination within the facility into an area not expected by design. Found highly radioactive sealed orphan source, device or transport package with safety provisions intact./Inadequate packaging of highly radioactive material sealed source.
1 Minor problems in safety components with significant defence in Breach of operating depth remaining/ Low activity lost or stolen radioactive source, limits at a nuclear ANOMALY device or transport package. facility/Theft of a Overexposure of member of public in excess of statutory limits. moisture density gauge 0 DEVIATIONS No safety significance BELOW SCALE
122 Edited and published by Shri R. Bhattacharya, Secretary and Director, ITSD & IPSD Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, Niyamak Bhavan, Anushakti Nagar, Mumbai- 400 094 (e-mail: [email protected]). website: www.aerb.gov.in.
Compiled by : Dr. A. Ramakrishna and Smt. P. Shylamoni, ITSD, AERB
Printed at Printania Offset Pvt. Ltd., Matunga, Mumbai-19
123 AERB DAY CELEBRATIONS 2011
INDEPENDENCE DAY CELEBRATIONS 2011
WOMENS DAY CELEBRATIONS 2011 ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD NIYAMAK BHAVAN, ANUSHAKTI NAGAR MUMBAI-400 094