CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE
The Cost of Truth in a World of Politics: How Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya are Influenced
by Qatar and Saudi Arabia
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree of Master of Arts in
Mass Communication
By
Abdullah Alhendyani
December 2019
The graduate project of Abdullah Alhendyani is approved:
Dr. Yue Zheng Date
Dr. Stephanie Bluestein Date
Dr. José Luis Benavides, Chair Date
California State University, Nothridge
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Table of Content
Signature Page ------ii
Abstract ------iv
Chapter 1. Introduction ------1
Research Questions ------3
Chapter 2. Literature Review ------4
Historical Context ------4
Theoretical Framework ------16
Propaganda Model ------16
The Five Filters ------18
Other Concepts ------24
Chapter 3. Methodology ------26
Case Summary ------27
Sampling ------32
Critical Language Study ------34
Chapter 4. Findings ------37
Research Answer 1 ------37
Research Answer 2 ------45
Chapter 5. Conclusion ------55
Discussion ------57
Limitations & Future Research ------58
References ------60
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Abstract
The Cost of Truth in a World of Politics: How Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya are Influenced
by Qatar and Saudi Arabia
By
Abdullah Alhendyani
Master of Arts in Mass Communication
The case of the Jamal Khashoggi disappearance brought international uproar when it was revealed that Khashoggi was assassinated within the Saudi Arabian consulate in Turkey.
Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news networks were quick to pick up the story to control the narrative when news of Saudi Arabia’s involvement reached the surface. Al-Jazeera, a
Qatar-funded network, and Al-Arabiya, a Saudi-backed network, took contrasting stances on the issue. This research studies the differences found in the English websites of both networks and how their coverage of the case aligns with the ideologies of Qatar and
Saudi Arabia. Findings confirm the propagandistic role of news media organizations in terms of how both networks approached their coverages. Through the use of critical language study (CLS), this paper concludes that the reporting of Al-Jazeera and Al-
Arabiya correlates with the agendas of their respective countries of ownership.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
On the 2nd of October 2018, Jamal Khashoggi walked into the Saudi consulate in
Istanbul, Turkey and never walked out. The case caused an international uproar as more evidence started piling up indicating of a harsh outcome; Jamal Khashoggi was killed.
The Turkish media were quick to point fingers at the involvement of the Saudi government in the attack, which they denied initially (Kirkpatrick, 2018).
By the time facts of the story were breaking from the Turkish press, the evidence against Saudi Arabia’s involvement was growing in size and power. Under pressure and constant counteract-measurement news leaks from the Turkish government, Saudi Arabia came with the official statement that Khashoggi was murdered by rogue agents within its consulate on the 20th of October (Hjelmgaard, 2018). The case garnered significant media attention since its earliest days, especially from Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya.
Al-Jazeera, a Qatari-funded news network, took the stance of the Turkish press in which they assumed the direct involvement from the Saudi government as soon as the news broke out. Al-Arabiya, funded by Saudi investors, pursued a defensive route in trying to extricate Saudi Arabia from its involvement in the murder. Al-Jazeera and Al-
Arabiya are considered among the two largest news networks in the Middle East region
(Mellor, Ayish, Dajani, & Rinnawi, 2011). Research has shown that both networks assume the agendas of their respective elites, even though they have constantly denied those allegations (Touzani, 2010; Al-Obaidi, 2011; El-Ebiary, 2011; Harb, 2011;
Mitchell, Brown, & Guskin, 2012; Zeng & Tahat, 2012; Samuel-Azran, 2013; Lo &
Frkovich, 2013; Pourhamzavi & Pherguson, 2015; Al-Rawi, 2017).
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The murder of Jamal Khashoggi was a perfect case for the rivalling news networks to fight against each other in their never-ending cold war. For Al-Jazeera, it is within Qatar’s benefit to turn the world against Saudi Arabia’s government and to portray it as a villain (Beydoun & Baum, 2012). Al-Arabiya needed to control the narrative before it was out of hand in order to maintain the public image of Saudi Arabia (Mellor,
Ayish, Dajani, & Rinnawi, 2011). The Khashoggi case provided Al-Jazeera with a mainstream story portraying Saudi Arabia in a bad light, while Al-Arabiya wanted to derail the bad publicity away from its backing country.
This research examines the history between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and how their clashes across the years have led to the creation of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news networks as tools of influence across the region. It also argues that both news networks pass through the five filters of the propaganda model (PM) proposed in the book
Manufacturing Consent by Herman and Chomsky (1988).
By understanding how both networks work for the agendas of their respective countries of ownership, this study argues that the coverage about Jamal Khashoggi was influenced by Qatar’s and Saudi Arabia’s agendas which hindered the levels of journalistic accuracy expected from such news organizations.
Through the analysis of how both news networks covered the Jamal Khashoggi assassination, this study will provide an understanding about how Al-Jazeera’s and Al-
Arabiya’s reporting aligned with state, specifically Qatar and Saudi Arabia, influences and agendas or were they accurate and neutral. Hence, this study aims to answer the following research questions.
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RQ1: How do the agendas of Qatar and Saudi Arabia influence the news coverage of state-owned media, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, in terms of how both networks approached the Jamal Khashoggi case?
RQ2: Where do Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news networks fit within the five filters of news assembly taken from the propaganda model?
Even though the Turkish media, and the Turkish government to an extent, played an important role in the leaks concerning Jamal Khashoggi, their role will not be discussed deeply within this paper. Due to a lack of resources to Turkish media outlets, or an understanding of the Turkish language, the researcher is not able to study the contents of the Turkish media thoroughly and accurately. With that being said, it should be emphasized that the Turkish media played the first and biggest role in leaking and breaking news about Jamal Khashoggi to other networks.
Chapter one provides an introduction and outlines the goals of this research.
Chapter two has two sections. The first section outlines the historical context between
Qatar and Saudi Arabia that led to the creation of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. The second section revolves around understanding the propaganda model, its concepts, and the five filters proposed in it. Chapter three states the methodology used to study difference in coverages between Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya about the case of Jamal Khashoggi.
Chapter four provides the findings and answers the research questions proposed. Chapter five states the conclusion, including avenues for future research and limitations.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter reviews the historical context of the relationship between Qatar and
Saudi Arabia and outlines the relationships with the two media networks (Section 1), and then presents a literature review regarding the propaganda model for analysis of the political-economic influences on news production (section 2).
I. Historical Context. This segment reflects upon the rise of Qatar and Saudi
Arabia to power and how the source of conflict between them is rooted in disagreements that have been culminating across the years. A majority of the discussion revolves around some of the major issues between the two countries that eventually lead to the creation of
Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya in their efforts to influence the region.
Qatar's recent powerful grip into the modern world is not only a thing of wonder, but a fascination of many scholars and academics who are still trying to fit the pieces together as to how this small country in the Arabian Peninsula catapulted itself into becoming a domestic powerhouse and a global influencer of international relations
(Kamrava, 2013). Qatar's overwhelming advancement into the mainstream spotlight has made the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) declare the country to be among the fastest growing countries in the entire world (Beydoun & Baum, 2012).
When it comes to population (2.5 million) and geographical size (4,473 sq. mi.),
Qatar is one of the smallest countries in the Arab world and yet, it is one of the most significant influencers in the entire Arab region while having a large impact on international relations (Katzman, 2018).
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The most astonishing aspect about Qatar's rise into this much of a global dominance is not built upon decades of hard work and cunning political maneuvers, but on its efforts in recent years to position itself in the right place to seize international superiority (Beydoun & Baum, 2012).
Qatar, under the leadership of Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani, catapulted itself into power by taking advantage of not only the natural resources it had, but the incredibly volatile region in which it is located (Beydoun & Baum, 2012; Kamrava, 2013; Başkan,
2016). When talking about the Arabian Peninsula region as a whole, we have to take into account how the leaders of yesterday fell and left a vacuum that needed to be occupied, something Qatar was very aware of.
Qatar and Saudi Arabia’s rise to power began with the decline of the previous powerful nations within the Arabic world (Beydoun & Baum, 2012; Kamrava, 2013;
Yetim, 2014; Başkan, 2016; Katzman, 2018) The power dynamic in the Middle East has seen a rapid change over the last few decades (Kamrava, 2013).
For a long time, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iran were considered the powerful nations within the Middle East (Kamrava, 2013). Equally as unstable as the region itself, none of these countries are considered elites anymore and their decline in power left vacuums to be fulfilled, especially by Qatar and Saudi Arabia (Kamrava, 2013; Başkan, 2016).
While Iran is still considered a powerful nation by all parameters, especially in terms of military and nuclear strengths, the term power in here refers to these nations' influence over the Arabian region, which they lost gradually across the years as they began suffering from revolts, depression periods, trade boycotts, and international isolation (Kamrava, 2013).
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As for Iraq, it began to fall out of power after suffering a defeat following its invasion of her neighboring country, Kuwait, and the ramifications of that aggressive move. Iraq fell under heavy debts and tariffs, enforced upon it by the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) and the United States of America, following its removal from Kuwait territories (Keynoush, 2016).
Iraq's gradual decline came to an eruption in 2003 after the United States Army marched into the Iraqi land and apprehended Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein. This left the country in turmoil that it has yet to leave. This increased Iran's presence within the area, a development that Saudi Arabia warned about (Keynoush, 2016).
Egypt and Syria fell victims to the events of the Arab Spring of 2010 in which they suffered major revolts that resulted in overhauls to their fundamental structures and participated in the decline of the two nations’ grip over the region (Phillips, 2017).
With the decline of these four nations, the large gap that they left behind allowed countries such as Qatar, Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to emerge as the new frontier of powers and influence within the Middle East (Kamrava, 2013; Başkan, 2016).
It is within this vacuum that Qatar, through cunning political decisions and relentless domestic and international investments, catapulted itself into stardom and made a name for itself (Beydoun & Baum, 2012; Roberts, 2012). Qatar was no longer seeing itself as a desert-filled country within the far-ends of the Arabian Peninsula, it was advocating itself as a brand of luxury and prestige (Kamrava, 2013).
Qatar became such a valuable commodity that it made its capital, Doha, not only a travel destination worthy of challenging the likes of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, but a land of esteem and great value due to the amount of foreign investments in it (Kamrava, 2013;
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Katzman, 2018). Qatar has successfully played the cards it was dealt, a wealth of natural resources and a vacuum of power, to the fullest of its capabilities as it seized its place within the elites of the region.
When inquiring about which country would be considered a true ally of Qatar, it might prove to be difficult to pinpoint a true answer as Qatar's rise to superiority came at the expense of trust, or lack thereof (Beydoun & Baum, 2012).
Qatar would often weave across multiple political parties, even conflicting ones, in its way to gain international recognition (Beydoun & Baum, 2012). Qatar would often find out which country benefits it the most, and it would align itself with that country for a time period, until the benefit shifts to being with another country and so on (Beydoun &
Baum, 2012; Katzman, 2018).
Qatar would support the attacks on Israel on one hand and then make deals with the Israeli state with the other. It would constantly condemn terrorist groups that do not align with its viewpoints, alike the Hezbollah and the Houthis, and then fund known- terrorist affiliates like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Al-Qaeda that align with its agendas and ideals (Katzman, 2018).
In essence, Qatar constantly switched its stances on issues and topics across the region in accordance with whatever gained it the most advantage or helped it maintain a status quo, especially when it comes to keeping the stability of the ruling family and its domestic issues (Yetim, 2014). Qatar managed to attain a significant amount of power in a very short time by taking the fullest advantage of being at the right place at the right time (Beydoun & Baum, 2012).
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That is not to say that Qatar's rapid rise to power and major international influence is going to be temporary because it was attained so fast. The state has made it a promise that by 2030, they will no longer be relying on natural resources (oil and gas) as its main sources of income while at the same time, Qatar has made it a priority to host significant foreign investments that range from public parks all the way to extravagant man-made islands (Kamrava, 2013).
While the 2030 move to separate itself from relying on oil and gas seems like such a short time span to undo the decades of infrastructure built upon those natural resources and move to more stable ones, Qatar has already secured financial funds into solar energy panels, the building of tourist attraction locations, and securing the approval to host global events, including winning the bid at the Fédération Internationale de
Football Association's ceremony to be the hosting nation of the prestigious 2022 World
Cup (Kamrava, 2013).
Taking all of the previously discussed in mind, the picture of Qatar is perfectly clear. It is a country that, starting from the late nineties, began to understand the resources it had and the volatile region in which it is located at. This made Qatar pursue independence from the shadows of Saudi Arabia while waiting for the perfect time to sail its boat away from the Saudi pier. That opportunity came through in the start of the century as the powerful nations within the Arab region began to fall under turmoil.
Unlike Qatar, Saudi Arabia's rise to power was not an overnight phenomenon, but a process that has was hundreds of years in the making (Mouline, 2014). It would be hard to look at any country within the Arabian Peninsula and not have its roots dating back toward a land, tribe, or a territory that resides within the grand and open grounds of Saudi
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Arabia (Mouline, 2014). Saudi Arabia, especially Mecca, Medina, Najd, and Riyadh, were the centers of the Islamic empire for many centuries.
Even when the Caliphate, the highest structure attained in Islamic nations, was moved from Medina into Baghdad for the Abbasid empire or to Istanbul in the Ottoman
Empire, the Arabian Peninsula still enjoyed a great deal of economic prosperity due to it being the land that connected the whole territories within the Islamic nation to each other and many of its cities became commercial hubs as a result (Mouline, 2014).
That is not to say that all of the ancient Arabian Peninsula enjoyed a great deal of prosperity, as there were hordes of tribal towns and farming villages that were considered poor by those days' standards (Mouline, 2014) but overall, the whole region was in a great position to play a key role in the development of the whole Islamic empire and, with it, the emergence of today's Saudi Arabia as a powerful nation (Mouline, 2014).
The ancient Arabian Peninsula was a host of different cultures, people, tribes, languages, rituals, etc. and Saudi Arabia was in the middle of it all (Mouline, 2014). This allowed for an increase in trade and international travels all passing through the territories of Saudi Arabia. It being the host country of Mecca, the grand ritual space for Muslims everywhere, has also made Saudi Arabia relevant throughout the years with a large impact on the surrounding nations (Mouline, 2014).
Among the likenesses between Qatar and Saudi Arabia is the way both countries found their way into monetary gains and being among the wealthiest nations in the world.
The discovery of oil in the Arabian Peninsula catapulted a lot of the countries within the
GCC, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, into being financial powerhouses when it comes to monetary gains (Hertog, 2010; Guzansky, 2016). Another one of the most impactful
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issues between the two nations refers to the differences in their interpretation of Islamic values, especially with the branch of Islam known as Wahhabism (Kamrava, 2013).
Saudi Arabia and Qatar both follow the Sunni branch of Islam, especially the
Wahhabism teachings (Başkan & Wright, 2011). The differences between the two countries come in the form of their interpretation of Wahhabism (Mouline, 2014). For
Saudi Arabia, they are more rigid while Qatar takes more liberties with their view for the scriptures of Wahhabism (Başkan & Wright, 2011). This effectively means that Saudi
Arabia and Qatar share the same religious teachings but view them differently. The Saudi government insists that Qatar, by supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, is being disloyal to their shared religious practices and beliefs (Katzman, 2018).
Qatar distanced itself from Saudi Arabia and emerged as a country of its own. By supporting enemies of Saudi Arabia, Qatar made it perfectly public that it answers to no one. This made it in direct conflict with Saudi Arabia and birthed a new Cold War between countries that were once considered close (Beydoun & Baum, 2012). Unable to foster the same military prowess that Saudi Arabia has, Qatar would have to be creative with its tactics. Qatar would fight the war not with guns, but with ideologies.
To pinpoint an exact date as to when the perceived cold war between Saudi
Arabia and Qatar began, or started to manifest, one has to take 1995 date into consideration (El-Ebiary, 2011; Beydoun & Baum, 2012). Prior to 1995, Qatar was governed by Sheikh Khalifa Bin Hamad al-Thani who was, for lack of better terms, a puppet of Saudi Arabia who tailored the country's policies toward the needs of the neighboring Saud family (El-Ebiary, 2011; Yetim, 2014).
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Sheikh Khalifa was not an inadequate ruler, nor did he foster his country into periods of unjust and economic inequality, but he was not a visionary leader either. He was content with keeping and maintain the status quo, something that his son, Sheikh
Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, disagreed with (Beydoun & Baum, 2012).
On a routine visit to Geneva, Sheikh Hamad seized control of all government facilities in a peaceful, and quite bloodless, coup d'état and declared himself as the governor instead of his father (Beydoun & Baum, 2012). Angered, the father tried to reclaim his throne, but the public, officials, and international authorities recognized his son as the rightful Emir of Qatar, effectively taking the throne from him without bloodshed (El-Ebiary, 2011; Beydoun & Baum, 2012; Yetim, 2014).
Unlike his father, Sheikh Hamad was not a fan of having Qatar be a puppet of
Saudi Arabia's affairs. He wanted to nurture its independence from its Saudi neighbors, an approach that put the countries on colliding paths (Roberts, 2012; Pourhamzavi &
Pherguson, 2015). The Arab world has long been unified under two terms: Arabic, obviously, and Islam (Deeb & Winegar, 2012). The disagreement between Qatar and
Saudi Arabia would soon jeopardize those terms and endanger the way people perceive them. To an outsider, the Arab world is a collection of countries that are all cohesive and share the same values and cultures, however, as with every sturdy building, there have been cracks that are reaching new heights year after year (El-Ebiary, 2011).
These cracks take shape in the conflict between Qatar and Saudi Arabia that dates all the way back to 1992 in which the two countries got into confrontations over the border that later resulted in Qatar boycotting the Gulf Cooperation Council Summit of
1994 (El-Ebiary, 2011). The earliest signs of Sheikh Hamad's hostility to Saudi came in
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the form of counter-coups that were backed by Saudi Arabia for his father to reclaim the throne, but they were not successful (Roberts, 2012).
Hamad bin Khalifa had a different view for Qatar; he did not want it to be a puppet state for Saudi Arabia, which was the direction his father was going towards
(Yetim, 2014). Qatar was in the process of turning its country from a mere name into a worldwide recognized brand (Roberts, 2012; Kamrava, 2013). To do so, it needed to distance itself from Saudi affairs and build itself a network with global reach.
Qatar would catapult its shaky relations with Saudi Arabia in 1996 when it launched Al-Jazeera news channel in Doha (Al-Obaidi, 2011; Brown, Guskin, &
Mitchell, 2012). The Emir funded the channel and it became an extended arm for the
Qatari government ever since then (Fahmy, Wanta, & Nisbet, 2012).
The arrival of Al-Jazeera was welcomed by a fund of $150 million from the Emir of Qatar at the time (Mitchell, Brown, & Guskin, 2012). The channel is so heavily-funded by the government that it receives an annual $100 million from the state while having its annual expenditure to be as high as $650 million (Mitchell, Brown, & Guskin, 2012).
There is no doubt about whether Al-Jazeera is influenced by the government or not as most scholars agree upon the notion that the channel heavily reflects the views of the Qatari government towards whatever issue arises, whether it be foreign or domestic
(Touzani, 2010; Al-Obaidi, 2011; El-Ebiary, 2011; Harb, 2011; Mitchell, Brown, &
Guskin, 2012; Zeng & Tahat, 2012; Samuel-Azran, 2013; Lo & Frkovich, 2013;
Pourhamzavi & Pherguson, 2015; Al-Rawi, 2017). While the Qatari state has affirmed multiple times that it does not interfere with the channel’s agendas and programs, that appears to be far from the truth (Samuel-Azran, 2013).
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In his 2003 study, Samuel-Azran clarifies that “Qatar effectively promotes its public diplomacy goals by operating Al-Jazeera as a hybrid network whose independence is limited by the boundaries of Qatar’s crucial interests” (Samuel-Azran, 2013, p. 1307).
These findings correlate to another study that examined the coverage of Al-
Jazeera channel on conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt and found that its soutput aligns with Qatar’s attitudes toward said countries (Pourhamzavi & Pherguson, 2015).
A different study examined news coverages across different channels and came to the conclusion that Al-Jazeera was the most sensational and provocative news channel on cable television across the region (Al-Obaidi, 2011). On top of that, Qatar is still giving annual funds of up to $100 million to Al-Jazeera (Brown, Guskin, & Mitchell, 2012).
That is not to say Al-Jazeera is automatically in the wrong because it is influenced by the government's ideals, as Al-Jazeera has been connected to covering a lot of humanitarian causes and raising awareness to human right issues within the region alongside providing an equal space to underrepresented factions to speak their minds and state their opinions (Touzani, 2010). But the connection to the state will always put the integrity of the channel at stake (Fuller, 2017).
Al-Jazeera has also been criticized of providing a platform for terrorist group, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda, to address audiences and converge people into their line of thinking (Al-Obaidi, 2011; Zeng & Tahat, 2012; Al-Rawi, 2017).
Al-Jazeera is considered to be the most watched news channel within the Arab world (Samuel-Azran, 2013). With a potential reach of 53 million viewers across the market of viewership within the Arab region (Allied Media Corporation, 2005), Al-
Jazeera has the biggest market share across the Arab region, and it is also one of the most
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watched and recognized news channels in it (Touzani, 2010). Ipsos, a global research firm, issued a one-page statement in which it declares that Al-Jazeera has more viewers in the region than the rest of the news channels combined (Ghawi, 2013).
Saudi Arabia’s distaste for Qatar also transcends politics and weaves into religion as both countries follow the Sunni branch of Islam and practice a form of Salafi. Qatar, however, has been more liberal when it comes to its religious practices (Başkan &
Wright, 2011). Saudi Arabia preaches the Wahhabi way of Islam, but it vastly differs from Qatar’s interpretation of it which is a major reason as to why it does not want Qatari influence over the region (Yetim, 2014). These clashes of ideologies and religious values are seen as major threats by Saudi Arabia, especially considering how influential Al-
Jazeera is in its own country while boasting about having viewers that believe the channel to be among the highest networks when it comes to credibility (Johnson & Fahmy, 2008).
Not only does Qatar spread its ideologies in Saudi households, it is also spreading, in Saudi Arabia’s eyes, a different sector of Islam within its borders. This puts the issue at two intertwining paths: Qatar supports the channel financially and uses it to advocate its own agenda (Samuel-Azran, 2013; Pourhamzavi & Pherguson, 2015).
These reasons were more than enough for Saudi Arabia to justify funding Al-
Arabiya news channel to battle Al-Jazeera’s influence across the region (Shapiro, 2005;
Abubakar, 2017). Al-Arabiya was launched in 2003 in an attempt to take market share from Al-Jazeera and be its main competitor (Fahmy, Wanta, & Nisbet, 2012; Brown,
Guskin, & Mitchell, 2012).
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In a 2013 study about the way in which the two channels framed the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, it has been found that Al-Jazeera uses package format, a whole segment is prepared to be played with audio and visual aids, in 55% of its stories. Al-
Arabiya relied more on voice overs, an anchor narrating over a video, by 48% in its coverages (Elmasry, El Shamy, Manning, Mills, & Auter, 2013).
The same study also found that Al-Jazeera uses more aggressive words in 22% of its stories while Al-Arabiya’s figure was at 3%. It has also been noted in the findings that
Al-Jazeera interviewed more people and conducted broader sourcing for its news
(Elmasry, El Shamy, Manning, Mills, & Auter, 2013). The study concludes by stating that while Al-Jazeera showed more professionalism in its infrastructure and the way it conducted its coverages, it also demonstrated more biases than Al-Arabiya against the
Israelis discussed in the research (Elmasry, El Shamy, Manning, Mills, & Auter, 2013).
In another study conducted in 2016 that compared comments within the official websites to Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, out of the top 100 news stories, Al-Jazeera was discussing politics and internal conflicts in 60 of them while Al-Arabiya discussed the same topics in 13 of its stories (Al-Rawi, 2016). This clear focus on politics and conflicts within the region is one of the multitude of reasons why Al-Jazeera is met with hostility across the region as its perceived as a network that seeks to be an agitator and an instigator to the stability of the region (Ajami, 2001; Figenschou, 2010).
Chapter four, which summarizes the findings of this study, discusses more thoroughly the infrastructure and the workings of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news networks. For that reason, their introduction has been kept brief and the emphasis was more on the events that lead to their creation than on the organizations.
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To summarize the previously discussed, Qatar and Saudi Arabiya were once loyal allies. They share the same heritage, culture, and history. They both adopt the teachings of Wahhabism of Islam. Qatar, by moving away from religious infrastructures, began to develop a distant relationship with Saudi Arabia. By creating Al-Jazeera, Qatar now has a tool of influence over the region in which Saudi Arabia tries to control. In response,
Saudi Arabiya backs the creation of Al-Jazeera's main competitor, Al-Arabiya.
II. Theoretical Framework. Having summarized the relationship between the two countries and the creation of their media networks, this section presents a theoretical framework for understanding the propaganda model (PM) proposed by Herman and
Chomsky (1988) and discussing scholarly responses to the model.
Understanding the propaganda model. In 1988, Edward Herman and Noam
Chomsky shocked media scholars by proposing a media theory in their book,
Manufacturing Consent. In it, they argue that media outlets are nothing but an extension of the elite’s control over the media (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). They proclaim that the media does not work against the powers of the elite, but they actively enforce their ideals and work on their behalf to further enhance their wealth and profits (Freedman, 2009).
In a perfect democracy, the media is thought to be as neutral and working on behalf of the public, but the propaganda model theorizes that the media works for the benefits of the elites (Comeforo, 2010). What Herman and Chomsky state is that the media works for powerful groups that not only control them, but own and finance them
(Freedman, 2009). The political economy of the media is not about the public and what
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they perceive, but the structure of the media itself and how institutional organizations mobilize their messages for the controlling elites (Klaehn, 2002).
This adherence to the influence of the elites by the media is not done with force or through intentional and deliberate means. It is a sublime process that has been adapted into becoming the norm. It is a process that is conducted subtly through the selection of journalists that fit a media organization’s ideologies or by editorials that have to pass through an approval phase from the higher ups (Comeforo, 2010).
In Manufacturing Consent, the authors discuss how, due to its infrastructure and the way it generates revenue and profit, the media works for the interests of the powerful elites and not against them (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The PM primarily discusses the workings of large and influential corporations, as there are local presses and independent media that abstain from this model, but the authors indicate that they are far too scarce and lack the funding and the infrastructure to have an effect (Herman, 1996).
What Herman and Chomsky essentially came to agree upon is that the structure of the media is shaped, influenced, and controlled by the powerful elites. At the time of its release, 1988, the book reflected how most of the media was owned by few conglomerates (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Bringing that into 2018, it has been noted that the majority of the media is now controlled by six organizations (Rapp & Jenkins,
2018). The book reflects how in the early years of the newspapers when those powerful corporates started gaining influence, the states issued taxes aimed at newspapers in an effort to weed out the less wealthy ones. While this operation was not functional in obliterating the local press—with the advancement of technology and the increase in wages to keep a newspaper functional—these local presses could not keep up with the
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pressures of the industrialization of the newspaper and they simply faded out in favor of the dominant corporates (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Nerone & Barnhurst, 2003).
The propaganda model is an important theoretical device for understanding the modern media’s structure in contemporary societies (Mullen & Klaehn, 2010). According to the PM, the news the public processes has been passed through a filtration process and has been cleared by the media’s infrastructure in order to gain the approval of the elites and what relays has to be beneficial to them (Herman, 2000).
The five filters. The authors present the PM model with five filters about the process in which news has been processed and taken control of to reflect the opinion of the elites. These five filters can be applied to any media organizational to judge how the products that are emerging out of it are not unbiased coverages, but a reflection of the interests of those in power, whether they come from banking, investors, advertisers, or even governments (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).
Herman and Chomsky propose five filters that the media went through which made journalists and news organizations act on behalf of the powerful elites’ interests
(Allan, 2010). In short, these filters are the media’s ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak, and anti-communism (Mullen, 2010). These filters are not a deliberate process that the media enforced on itself, but they are the outcome of the natural progression of the industry from its earliest years (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).
The first filter, titled size, ownership, and profit orientation of the mass media elaborates how the infrastructure of the mass media became, across the years, profit driven due to multiple factors. The most significant factor being how the ownership of newspapers has transferred across the years into being at the hands of few conglomerates
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in sole ownership of those corporates. Another significant factor is how media organizations receive backing from corporates, advertisers, and banking (Allan, 2010).
In terms of size, it refers to how the industrialization and commercialization of the newspaper made them a widespread phenomenon within each household. With the advancement of technology used for newspapers, the rise of government taxing, the increase in wages, the rapid expansion of corporate newspapers, the local daily press gradually seized to exist in a relentless expansion of corporate newspaper (Nerone &
Barnhurst, 2003).
This means that the media, as controlled by industries and conglomerates, continued to grow in size while regular media, controlled by laborers and workers, began to fade (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Nerone & Barnhurst, 2003). Slowly, local newspapers began to rely on national companies and countrywide wire services, which meant that the news was not coming unfiltered, but by the lenses and filters of the big industries in control of those services (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).
Herman and Chomsky divided the media into groups, top-tier, and bottom-tier.
Those who are on the top are in control of how the bottom-tier media receives their news through wire services, hence, it is a downward trajectory where the top stays on top in control of the message throughout (Nerone & Barnhurst, 2003).
Ownership relates to how media corporations’ rapid expansion alongside the interference of outside influences across the years have brought the issue of its ownership into question. Following the rapid and boundless expansion of those media conglomerates, the ownership has far reached outside the boundaries of families and heirs
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and has been interlocked with stockholders, bankers, powerful corporates, government aids, and so on (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).
The media’s ownership has become inseparable from the dominant elite which is why Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue that it is irrational to believe that those media corporates work against the benefits of the elites owning them (Mullen & Klaehn, 2010).
The media’s ownership falls in line with its agenda and the book makes a distinction that even in light of events that go against the benefits of its owners, in cases of public uproar for example, the media do not single out approaches that would harm the elites, but merely sways the discussion toward a different route (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).
When it comes to profit, it is the natural outcome when the previous filters merge into becoming a powerful cooperation. Media outlets are, first and foremost, made for profit (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Small and local newspapers could not keep up with the industrialization of the press due to the rapid inclusion of advertisements in the latter which was the result of their increasing size and reach (Nerone & Barnhurst, 2003).
Newspapers, and by extension the media, has long existed for the sole purpose of profiting according to Herman and Chomsky (1988). They adhere to the demands and needs of whatever brings them more advertisers, which means they formulate their messages and coverages to benefit those companies first, and the public after (Herring &
Robinson, 2003). This means that if a message goes against the benefits of an advertiser in a bad way, the media will likely not adapt that message and shove it far down the cabinets (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Herring & Robinson, 2003).
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In essence, the monstrous size and outreach of the media, its ownership belonging to banks, powerful corporates, and government aids, and its adherence to the needs and wants of its advertisers state that these news companies cannot share an unbiased story and everything that goes through its barracks has been examined and turned around so that it does not injure the hands of the powerful elite that control every aspect of the media (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). In other words, the media does not bite the hands that feed them.
The second filter is titled the advertising license to do business which refers to the media being turned into an answering machine for the needs of advertisers (Allan, 2010).
It also discusses how, by catering to the affluent market that the advertisers target, the news being broadcasted is targeted for an audience that is of higher stature, as opposed to targeting the general public (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Klaehn, 2002; Allan, 2010).
With the increasing revenue driven from advertising, it is no wonder, then, that media corporations are still influenced heavily by them. Newspapers that are publicly- owned have been shown to run front-page ads more than independent or a privately- owned newspaper (Lee & Irby, 2008). The second filter also proclaims that, due to the revenues generated from advertising, the media adheres and is influenced by those advertising agents (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Lee & Irby, 2008).
Sourcing mass media news is the title of the third filter under the propaganda model. This filter elaborates on the media’s reliance on sources from official authorities, government or experts, and how opinions of those deemed unprofessional are not to be trusted as much (Allan, 2010). The third filter demonstrates how the authorities, by hosting press releases, advance copies of official speeches, news on-the-ready for
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whatever developing story, have an advantage on shaping the message and influencing it
(Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Goodwin, 1994; Klaehn, 2002). News corporates tend to rely upon official sources and expert opinions more than other sources (Wang, 2017).
When it comes to the fourth filter in the propaganda model, titled flack and the enforcers, Herman and Chomsky (1988) discuss how the fear of backlash in the media acts as an influence over the type of stories that pass through its channels. It entails the elites’ abilities to summon groups or lobbyists that are capable of causing havoc to those media organizations (Goodwin, 1994). The media’s constant fears of lawsuits and backlash causes it to tailor and shape its messages in a way that is least likely to make them suffer those consequences (Brahm, 2006). These pressures from those outside powerful sources have an underlying symptom upon the media in the way they address and make its stories (Klaehn, 2002; Zollmann, 2009).
Flack comes in two forms according to the authors. The first is direct, which is any form of organized backlash that is perceived directly by the news cooperation, emails, phone calls, letters, protests, etc. The second form of flack comes indirectly¾which is more in line with how influential figures could reach out to news organizations through informal methods, such as complaints to stakeholders, prominent figures, and employees. Indirect flak could also be through the establishment of think- tanks and lobbyists to work against a certain network’s agenda and alignments or, in extreme cases, the funding of opponents to a certain media’s agenda and catapulting them into higher positions of power (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).
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Among those powers in control of the flak mechanism, the government has a lot of pressure tools under its use (Goodwin, 1994). Not only through the control of legislatures, licenses, and taxes, but through the use of clearances, press passes, and official credentials (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). This allows the government to be a major source of flak which the media has to always be careful in its messages as to not fall into a rabbit hole of a government backlash and press blockades (Comeforo, 2010).
The final filter is titled anticommunism as a control mechanism. At the time of the book’s publishing, 1988, anticommunism ideals were a great concern within the public sphere, and it was mobilized by the media to justify attacks on states deemed friendly to the communist system (Herman & Chmosky, 1988; Herman 1996). The media marginalized and vilified personalities or states that have shown some leniency toward communist beliefs (Goodwin, 1994). The media takes the stance of the “us versus them” in shaping its stories and twisting political beliefs into justifying unfair coverages to communist systems or individuals (Brahm, 2006).
Due to the downfall of anticommunism with the Soviet Union by the end of the
Cold War, the term anticommunism was replaced by different ideologies. These include the fear of the market itself (Herman, 1996; Zollmann, 2009), anti-terrorism (Brahm,
2006), the bad other (Corner, 2003), the war on terror (Sparks, 2007), a different outlook to the war on the Soviets (Mullen, 2009), or the national religion (Goodwin, 1994) among others. What all of this translates to is that the media uses an ideology or a concept in which the public fears in order to influence and tailor messages directed toward the justification of attacks on those particular fears.
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Other concepts. Apart from the propaganda model proposed, Herman and
Chomsky (1988) underline several themes that further prove their arguments. The first of which is the scale of worthy and unworthy victims. By contrasting the media’s coverage over the murder of a priest within an enemy state with the media’s coverage on religious victims in Latin America, the authors reached a conclusion over what defines a worthy or an unworthy victim. Several cases mentioned in the book illustrate how the concepts of worthy and unworthy victims are applied to the news.
Jerzy Popieluszko was a priest who was murdered by the Polish police in an enemy territory to the United States. His case was used as the basis of comparison with other cases including the murder of Archbishop Romero in El Salvador, the rape and killings of four U.S. churchwomen in El Salvador, the killing of 23 religious individuals in Guatemala, and the killing of five officials from the Human Rights Commission in El
Salvador. Aside from Popieluszko, the other cases were conducted on territories that are considered friendly or client-states to the United States, ally and friendly countries with the United States. Popieluszko was deemed to be a worthy victim, meaning his story was covered significantly more than the rest of the victims mentions, who were deemed unworthy (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).
Worthy victims are more favorable for the media to write about and sensationalize because they are victims of enemy states which can influence policies and trades coming from the U.S. with said states (Herman, 1996). They are portrayed in a sympathetic light and receive an extensive and favorable media attention (Entman, 1990). Meanwhile, victims of client-states are less featured in the news and have a lack of coverage aimed at
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them (Goodwin, 1994). The scale of worthy and unworthy is not based upon the impact or the severity of the issue, but upon politics and economics (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).
Another concept discussed is how elections in enemy states would be deemed as illegitimate or useless while in client-states they would be labelled legitimate and democratic by the media, regardless of facts (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The two client- states discussed in the book are El Salvador and Guatemala, whose elections were deemed as democratic, while the state that was considered unfriendly was Nicaragua, whose election was portrayed as a travesty (Entman, 1990).
The conditions under which the elections in El Salvador and Guatemala were held at were far less structured and democratic than the election in Nicaragua, and yet, the media maintained its narrative with the agenda of the U.S. government (Herman, 2000).
In essence, the propaganda model declares that elections in client-states are favorable and a step in the right directions while elections in hostile or unfriendly states are seen in a bad light (Goodwin, 1994).
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Chapter 3
Methodology
This chapter analyzes news coverage from the main websites of Al-Jazeera and
Al-Arabiya about the Jamal Khashoggi assassination. The aim is to find the differences between how both news networks portrayed the events and how the news coverage corresponds with the agendas and benefits of Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The first section of this chapter contains a brief summary of the case as it transpired.
Attributed sources. For the sake of accuracy, the research has assembled the undisputed facts regarding the case of Jamal Khashoggi assassination from these leading, reputable news sources:
1- CNN: https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/10/middleeast/jamal-khashoggi-fast-
facts/index.html
2- BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45812399
3- Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/Middle East/jamal-
khashoggi-facts-what-we-know-missing-saudi-arabia-istanbul-turkey-murder-
trump-a8590381.html
4- New York Times.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/world/middleeast/jamal-khashoggi-
case-facts.html
5- Human Rights First. http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Joint-
Khashoggi-Statement-Jan-2018.pdf
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In order to have a concrete basis for what occurred without doubts of an article being under the influence of a certain media organization or its biases, the previous sources have been gathered from different media outlets across multiple mediums. The shared facts about what occurred to Khashoggi among those sources were taken into account for this summary. The facts that existed in one source without any mention of them in another source were not discussed in this summary. This eliminates the chance of basing the case summary on one particular article without knowing what the agenda of its organization or if there were outside influences on the way the article was written. The selected sources were chosen at random following the guidelines that they are of established news sources and that the case of Jamal Khashoggi is the focal point of the article. The Human Rights First letter is the only non-news source taken into consideration for this summary because it provides an outlook into the facts about the case in a way that is not portrayed from a journalistic point of view.
I. Case Summary. Jamal Khashoggi was born in Medina, Saudi Arabia on the 13 of October 1958. He descends from a line of high-known figures within the Arab region.
His uncle was an arms’ dealer, Adnan Khashoggi, who played a role in the Iran-Contra scandal. His cousin is none other than Dodi Fayed, who was the lover of Princess Diana, who both lost their lives in that tragic car accident. Khashoggi’s lineage made him a close friend with the Saudi royal family and he enjoyed a position of wealth and prosperity within the Kingdom for quite a time, even being appointed by Al-Waleed Bin Talal, one of the wealthiest figures in the royal family, as the head of Al-Arab news channel. It is safe to say that Khashoggi’s knowledge and interconnectivity to the royal family exceeded that of casual greetings to something far beyond.
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Following the 2017 Saudi Arabian purge, a heavy topic worthy of another paper by its own, Jamal Khashoggi went into a self-imposed exile and took residence in
McLean, Virginia, for fears of being arrested in his home country. Because of its relevancy, the short version of the Saudi Arabian purge is that a great deal of businessmen and powerful figures within the Saudi Arabian borders, citizens and those from the royal family, were detained, prosecuted, and sentenced in the name of ridding the country from corruption. One of the most prominent names behind this cleansing was the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman.
Critics of this purge movement, Khashoggi included, declared it as far from an anti-corruption solution, but an aggressive charge to seize over the Saudi crown. In the
United States, Khashoggi found himself being a columnist for the Washington Post in which he began writing extensively about the Saudi regime, singling out Mohammed bin
Salman, and offered great deal of criticism for the government structure as a whole and the royal family’s treatment over other members of the branches that could be considered a threat to the throne.
On the 28th of September 2018, Jamal Khashoggi went into the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey in order to process his divorce papers from a previous marriage so he can wed his fiancé, Hatice Cengiz. Khashoggi described the staff there as being “very warmly” in dealing with him and processing his papers. What the friendly staff at the consulate that day did to Khashoggi was also telling him that he needs to reschedule his appointment to the 2nd of October. And thus, Khashoggi left the consulate on the 28th with a smile, assuring his friends that he was treated well, but they just needed those few more days to process his papers.
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At approximately 03:28 in the morning of October the 2nd, two private jets carrying 15 Saudi agents arrived in Istanbul airport. The men were identified as being in the circle of Mohammed bin Salman or in close ties with associates to him. Security cameras overlooking the consulate showed those 15 special agents arriving at the Saudi consulate at 12:13 afternoon in diplomatic vehicles. Jamal Khashoggi arrived at the consulate and assured his fiancé that she had nothing to worry about, but to be sure, he gave her two phones containing the contact information of an advisor to Turkish
President, Tayyip Erdogan, in case he did not show up. At 13:14 afternoon, Jamal
Khashoggi was seen walking into the consulate, and he never walked out.
Jamal Khashoggi’s fiancé waited for him outside for ten hours and came back the following day asking about him, without getting any answers. The Turkish government went on record on the 3rd of October saying that Khashoggi, contrary to what the Saudi press was declaring, never left the consulate. The Turkish press, especially Yeni Safak and Sabah newspapers, were relentless in their calls for the disappearance to be labeled a
“premediated murder” while the Saudi press continued its grip on the story that
Khashoggi has left the consulate following, as demonstrated by CCTV footage showing a man in his attire wandering around the markets of Istanbul.
With major global outcry, the Turkish government was involved with leaking information to the press in which it narrowed down the fingers pointing at Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the disappearance. By October the 9th, Turkey’s official position was that
Khashoggi was murdered inside of the consulate. Upon further denial from the Saudi government, the Turkish government notifies United States officials that they are in possession of audio and video evidence that a torture session and a murder within the
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consulate that involved Khashoggi took place. On the 19th of October, the official statement from the Saudi government changed into admitting that after an altercation within the embassy, Khashoggi was strangled and killed.
Turkish officials were quick to counteract by saying the tapes indicated that it was not a random brawl as the Saudi press called it, but it was premediated and involved a rigorous torture session before conducting the killing. High-ranking members of the CIA, including Gina Haspell, were able to confirm the existence of those tapes, and the fact that an assassination of Khashoggi took place.
On the 20th of October, Saudi Arabia’s press came out with the official statement that Khashoggi was indeed killed within the consulate in a rogue operation conducted by wanted agents. The Turkish media were quick to dispel those notions by publishing the names and rankings of the 15 men involved in the killing, showing them as high-rankings or hold special positions within the military, with one of them being a forensics expert with over 20 years of experience. The evidence was piling up.
By the 25th of October, Saudi Arabia’s Attorney General came out with the official statement that Jamal Khashoggi was a victim of premediated murder. This marked a shift in the narrative within the Saudi press, especially Al-Arabiya, in which before they were in denial of the existence of Khashoggi, then into denial of a murder taking place, then a denial of an official assassination, into finally accepting the evidence, but still calling the attackers rogue.
On the 15th of November, the Saudi public prosecutor published official details about the Khashoggi murder, and it identified 11 of the men involved in the attack as being detained, with five of them facing the death penalty. Among the report, it has been
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revealed that Jamal Khashoggi was not a victim of a “fight” that broke out in the consulate but a calculated hit that is hard to stomach.
Jamal Khashoggi walked into the consulate and was taken by 15 men into a separate room in which he was tortured, given false hopes of returning to Saudi Arabia, and finally, he was murdered Those who listened to the tapes echoed what little they could hear from Khashoggi, “I can’t breathe. I can’t breathe.” Khashoggi was strangled within the consulate until he no longer could stand still, by which he fell.
He was then injected with a liquid, presumably lethal substance, and was afterwards beheaded. His body was dismembered. What little pieces left of him were thrown into several bags by which, the men left the embassy in their diplomatic vehicles and went to the residence of the consulate’s general. The men were later seen that day boarding two private jets at night and leaving Turkey.
With more evidence that portrayed a horrible picture against Saudi Arabia, international uproar was taking place, both citizen-wide and government-related. The US,
Canada, France, and the UK imposed sanctions on 17 Saudi officials. Germany, Finland, and Denmark halted arms’ sales to the country. International companies and investors were backing out of Saudi-led projects. Global backlash and international condemning were manifesting against Saudi Arabia, with many governments saying the order of attacks came from the highest of ranks.
The Trump administration remained on the stance of condemning the attackers but backing the Saudi government. It should be noted that one of the earliest clashes between Khashoggi and the new royal family came in 2016 when he criticized Trump
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and was met with the Saudi government banning him from Twitter and pressuring his employer, Al-Hayat newspaper, to let go of his editorial columns.
The case of Jamal Khashoggi remains a bitter and harsh reality to accept; and that is the truth comes with a high price, especially in this day and age. Beyond the boundaries of the United States, lies a world in which the rule of an iron fist still governs and Khashoggi was among many who perished for wanting to deliver the same message:
Change needs to happen. Tragically for Khashoggi, his message was ignored when he was alive, he was casted away by the country he so loved many years.
It took 15 men to silence Khashoggi, but they only made his message echo louder.
And on the 11th of December, he was chosen as Time’s Person of the Year. No longer was he talking the audience of the Washington Post, but to the whole world. If there is anything to take from this case is that Khashoggi was not silenced in the end. On the contrary, his voice only grew bigger and his message resonated with millions, but Jamal
Khashoggi finally discovered the true cost of truth: his life (BBC, 2018; Osborne, 2018;
Specia, 2018; CNN Library, 2019; Human Rights First, 2019).
II. Sampling. This research will examine news stories related to the disappearance of Khashoggi and how both networks, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, portrayed the case in their coverage. This study uses the English websites for both channels. Even though there has been discussion about how the English and Arabic websites of Al-Jazeera have different biases, a 2011 study found no such thing. Both websites used the same narrative tone and similar approaches to their packaging and sourcing (Fahmy & Al Emad, 2011). This research was not able to find similar study conducted on Al-Arabiya websites.
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The following points outline the method used to select articles for analysis. The articles chosen must include the murder of Khashoggi as the focal point of their discussion, meaning stories where Khashoggi is not the headline or the main point of the article were excluded. Articles that are opinions or editorials have also been excluded from this sampling.
By using the term Jamal Khashoggi in the search bar of the official English websites for Al-Jazeera (https://www.aljazeera.com) and Al-Arabiya
(https://english.alarabiya.net) news networks and by setting a timeframe of one-week interval between the 3rd of October to the 9th of October of 2018, 18 articles from Al-
Jazeera (n = 18) and 17 articles from Al-Arabiya (n = 17) were retrieved that met the criteria discussed previously and were selected for analysis in this study. The following table lists the number of articles per day during the studied time period.
Table 1. The distribution of selected articles from the Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya
English websites.
Al-Jazeera Al-Arabiya
3rd of October 3 Articles 0 Articles
4th of October 1 Articles 1 Article
5th of October 0 Articles 0 Articles
6th of October 1 Article 1 Article
7th of October 4 Articles 6 Articles
8th of October 3 Articles 4 Articles
9th of October 6 Articles 5 Articles
Total Articles 18 17
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III. Critical Language Study (CLS). Language carries an immense capability to demonstrate the social powers of a society (or a media corporate for this study) and how the use of vocabulary can reveal so much about a particular system (Fairclough, 1989).
Through the use of the critical language study approach found in Language and Power
(Fairclough, 1989; 2001), this paper examines the vocabulary used in selected articles from Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya about Jamal Khashoggi’s disappearance.
CLS can be differentiated from regular critical discourse analyses in that it focuses more on language than other aspects. It should also not be confused with conversational analysis as typical conversational analysis lacks the proper connections between micro, the structure of a conversation, and macro, the structure of a society. CLS aims to bridge that gap; by studying the intricates of the macro in order to define the complexities of the macro’s power dynamics (Fairclough, 1989; 2001).
The part about CLS that is of high relativity to this paper is the hidden powers of the mass media. Due to the lack of a certain audience, the media’s messages and language used is shaped to the mass as opposed to the singular, like the case in face-to- face discourse (Fairclough, 1989; 2001). In its message and the type of language used for it, the media addresses an ideal subject.
What this means is that the media has all of the producing rights when it comes to the way they shape its discourse, the amount of information to include and exclude, the way events and subjects are represented, and how it uses language and specific vocabulary in its creations (Fariclough, 1989; 2001).
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The study of words and vocabulary reveals hidden powers that the media uses in order to address its ideal subject. Those words carry different values and undisclosed meanings that reach beyond the message itself (Fariclough, 1989; 2001). By studying the vocabulary used in articles from Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, this paper aims to understand and differentiate between what the message on the surface of those articles is, and what the hidden message is.
The CLS method demonstrates the power dynamic and the ideology of a certain media outlet (Fariclough, 1989; 2001) and by studying its vocabulary usage, we can determine who those powers and ideologies pertain to.
This research paper uses the framework of language analysis found in CLS to approach its methodology. The vocabulary used from Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya will be examined and contrasted with each other to demonstrate a difference in powers and ideologies. The relational and expressive values of words, specifically, are taken into consideration in this methodology section.
In terms of the relational value, it refers to how words can create social relationships between participants, i.e. the message and the audience (Fairclugh, 1989;
2001). The words used to refer to Jamal Khashoggi in Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news articles would demonstrate the relational value both networks try to create between the readers and how they perceive who Jamal Khashoggi was. By examining the way both networks refer to Khashoggi, we understand the type of relationship they want to establish between him and the readers.
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In terms of expressive value, it means how certain words can reveal a writer’s
(Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news networks in our case) emotional attachment to a certain message and what type of positivity or negativity he/she wants the audience to feel from that message (Fairclough, 1989; 2001). This research paper examines emotionally expressive, mainly negative, vocabulary used in Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news articles to demonstrate the expressive value of their messages. Due to the political nature of this research paper’s case study, the mentions of political parties, mainly Saudi and Qatar, have also been examined in the selected articles. This third category does not carry as much relational or expressive value, but a combination of both.
Taking into consideration the history between the networks in question, Al-
Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, and the complex relationship between their respective owners,
Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the mentions of both countries in news stories about an assassinated journalist were found to be a worthy category for studying.
Taking the previous three in mind, this research paper has divided the vocabulary studied into three groups. The first group, relational, relates to how Jamal Khashoggi was referenced as in those news articles. The second group, expressive, demonstrates the emotional value of the words used in those stories. The third group, a hybrid of sorts, portrays the political influence of Qatar and Saudi Arabia on the writings of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. By taking all three groups into consideration, this study thrives to reach a concrete conclusion about the difference in reporting between Al-Jazeera and Al-
Arabiya and how much state influence plays a role in it.
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Chapter 4
Findings
This chapter sets out the findings with reference to the research questions proposed in the introduction, which were:
RQ1: How do the agendas of Qatar and Saudi Arabia influence the news coverage of state-owned media, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, in terms of how both networks approached the Jamal Khashoggi case?
RQ2: Where do Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news networks fit within the five filters of news assembly taken from the propaganda model?
RA1: The different narratives in Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. In terms of how
Jamal Khashoggi was referenced in the articles sampled for this study, Al-Jazeera (AJ) and Al-Arabiya (AR) both had their similarities and, quite revealing, differences. The most significant contrast between the two networks is the emphasis on labeling
Khashoggi a critic of Saudi Arabia.
Table 2 lists how many times Khashoggi was referenced as a critic (24) and as a dissident (9) of Saudi Arabia in AJ. Both of those labels, even though they are accurate to
Khashoggi’s political stances, have not been used in AR’s reporting when referring to
Khashoggi. What’s interesting is that Khashoggi has made it public his disdain for the current monarch of Saudi Arabia and how he applied for residency in the United States, and yet, AR used citizen (23) the most when it came to how they referenced Jamal
Khashoggi in its writings.
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Writer in AJ (11) and Al-Arabiya (9) took a less prominent usage than journalist
(47) for AJ and (22) for AR. The lack of mentions about Khashoggi being a critic and a dissident in AR’s reporting can be explained by its heavily use of citizen (23) instead. AR did not want to portray Khashoggi as an enemy of Saudi Arabia while AJ were alluding to that throughout its writings, as demonstrated by how much they referenced him being a dissident (9) and a critic (24).
Table 2. How Jamal Khashoggi was referenced.
Reference Al-Jazeera Al-Arabiya
Writer 11 9
Dissident 9 0
Journalist 47 22
Critic 24 0
Citizen 7 23
How Jamal Khashoggi was referenced. 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Writer Dissident Journalist Critic Citizen
AJ AR
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Table 3 demonstrates how Saudi was mentioned 321 times across AJ’s entire articles and 156 times in AR’s articles. For AJ, most of the discussion was about painting
Saudi as being a culprit and highlighting the fact that a Saudi critic has gone missing. As for AR, they took a defensive route and tried to deny whatever accusations were drawn against Saudi Arabia.
The usage of Saudi in AR’s reporting was mostly in refuting the allegations labelled against Saudi Arabia. They have also been consistent throughout its articles with emphasizing how Saudi Arabia was cooperating and conducting investigations on the
Khashoggi disappearance. Several of the Saudi mentions in AR’s writings were a showing of the Kingdom’s willingness to help find Khashoggi.
Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) was mentioned 35 times in AJ’s articles and was featured 8 times for AR. For AJ, the mention of MBS was mostly in relation to how
Khashoggi was a critic of him and the Saudi Arabian government during his reign. AJ emphasized the fact that Khashoggi, a prominent critic of MBS, has gone missing after a visit to the consulate. As for AR, MBS was mentioned primarily in quotes, mostly in relation to how he was helping the investigation.
Qatar was also mentioned in AJ articles (18) and AR articles (9). For AJ, the mention of Qatar mostly followed a discussion about the affairs between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and how they deteriorated as of recent. For AR, the mention of Qatar was in light of how rumors and leaks about Khashoggi being murdered were formed by Qatar and its allies, mostly the Muslim Brotherhood.
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The findings from table 3 beg the question as to why a news report about a missing journalist should evoke great emphasis to mention political parties from both news networks.
Table 3. Mentions of Saudi, Mohammed bin Salman, and Qatar.
Mentions of Al-Jazeera Al-Arabiya
Saudi 321 156
Mohammed bin Salman 35 8
Qatar 18 9
Mentions of Saudi, Mohammed bin Salman, and Qatar. 350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0 Saudi MBS Qatar
AJ AR
Table 4 showcases the prevalence of emotional vocabulary used in both news networks’ websites. For the sake of this research, emotional vocabulary was defined as words that pertain a certain negative emotional association to them. It is clear the overabundance of usage to those words in AJ’s articles but not in AR’s stories.
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In terms of journalistic accuracy, AR demonstrated a more neutral reporting while
AJ’s articles were written from a particular perspective that is antagonistic to Saudi
Arabia. The usage of words such as fear (8), concern (19), dissident (25), conflict (4), critical (11), retribution (2), killed (35), murder 16), assassinate (5), and so on, were featured in AJ’s writings while they showed little to no visibility in AR’s reporting.
Dissident (25) was used in discussions about Saudi Arabia’s treatment of dissidents under MBS’s rulership were far from fair. AJ emphasized the fact that the new
Saudi government was not tolerant to criticism and dissent. Critical (11), criticize (15), and critic/s (26) were also used in the same discussion about how the Saudi Arabian government treats its critics. Most of the arguments in AJ’s reporting revolved around the
Kingdom’s lack of fair treatment to any of its critics.
Throughout AJ’s reporting, the narrative was set perfectly clear. Saudi Arabia had a history of not tolerating critique and one of its biggest critics, Jamal Khashoggi, suddenly disappeared from its consulate in Turkey.
As for AR, they did not rely on such emotional words to convey its messages. In fact, as expected, the treatment of criticism by the Kingdom was not prevalent in its articles because AR didn’t want to make MBS appear guilty of the assassination.
Killed (35) in AJ was quickly used to paint Saudi Arabia as the culprit even though, at the time, the fact that Khashoggi has been killed was nothing more than leaks and rumors. For AR, killing (15) was mostly used to deny those allegations.
Murder was featured 16 times in AJ while only used 2 times in AR. One could argue that murder carries a heavier emotional impact than killed. and its omission from
AR’s stories reflects on the word’s powerful effect.
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For AJ, assassinate (5) emphasized Khashoggi’s role as a critic of Saudi Arabia and how this was an assassination of voices. For AR, assassinate (1) was mentioned once in a quote denying those same accusations.
Table 4. Prevalence of emotional vocabulary.
Vocabulary Al-Jazeera Al-Arabiya
Fear 8 0
Concern 19 5
Fled 5 0
Dissident 25 0
Conflict 4 0
Critical 11 0
Criticize 15 2
Critic(s) 26 1
Retribution 2 0
Killed 35 15
Murder 16 2
Assassinate 5 1
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Prevalence of emotional vocabulary. 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
Fled Fear Killed Conflict Critical Critic(s) Murder Concern Dissidnet Criticize Retribution Assassinate
AJ AR
By contrasting these findings with the worthy and unworthy scales discussed in the propaganda model, Jamal Khashoggi was deemed a worthy victim according to AJ while he was considered an unworthy victim for AR. Saudi Arabia is considered an ideological enemy for Qatar and so, by portraying Jamal Khashoggi as a victim of Saudi
Arabia, AR displays Saudi Arabia in an extremely negative light.
The opposite could be said for Saudi Arabia. By deeming Jamal Khashoggi an unworthy victim, AR omitted significant information about Khashoggi’s role as a critic of the Saudi government and lacked the use of any emotional vocabulary directed at Saudi
Arabia. The fact that AR didn’t publish any article about Khashoggi on the first day the news broke is further demonstrations as to how Khashoggi was deemed an unworthy victim by the network.
From a journalistic point of view, AR demonstrated the more neutral stance in its reporting. Al-Arabiya waited for the proper evidence to show up before accepting rumors as facts and reporting on them. But Al-Arabiya’s Saudi Arabian ownership and funding cannot be ignored, which hinders how we perceive its journalistic accuracy. AJ’s writing
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was thorough, lengthier, and carried more sentimental value with it; constantly encouraging the reader to feel a certain emotion. For AR, its writings were void to a point where the articles seemed to be bareboned.
Tables 2,3, and 4 demonstrate a clear contrast between the way both networks covered the initial breakout news of Jamal Khashoggi’s disappearance. For AJ, the emphasis was mostly on Khashoggi’s role as a Saudi Arabia critic and how the Kingdom knew something about the events that unfolded. Its usage of negative words toward Saudi
Arabia demonstrate a lack of neutrality and an underlying motive to paint Saudi Arabia as a wrongdoer in the ordeal.
The AJ articles had one narrative and kept pushing it through its articles. A Saudi
Arabian critic was killed in the Saudi consulate and the Saudi government was involved somehow. Its writings emphasized Khashoggi’s role as a critic of Saudi Arabia and how the Kingdom had a history of unfair treatment to critical voices. AJ demonstrated a lack of neutrality and an alarming level of animosity toward Saudi Arabia. For AR, it was a different tale. Its articles were mostly used to deny the allegations labelled against Saudi
Arabia and to shift blame toward others, mainly Qatar and its allies.
At first, the narrative in AR articles was that Khashoggi left the consulate. Most of the initial reports about Khashoggi refer to him as leaving the building, which is in contrast to AJ’s articles that insisted Khashoggi was still inside the building. After that, and for a brief period, AR articles focused more on the involvement of Khashoggi’s fiancé as being a culprit in his disappearance. AR articles conducted several interviews with Khashoggi’s family in which they deny knowing about his fiancé, alluding to the fact that she was key in Khashoggi’s disappearance. When evidence piled up to the
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contrary, the final narrative that AR articles displayed was that the rumors and leaks against Saudi Arabia having Khashoggi killed inside its consulate were being spread by
Qatar and enemies of the Kingdom.
AR articles used several narratives to deny the same allegations. They wanted to shift accusations against Saudi Arabia toward other parties. What could be said about
AR’s writing is that it did not feature an emotional language as heavily as the one found in AJ. In fact, AR articles were brief and to the point, wherein AJ’s articles were much longer in length, sometimes even repeating paragraphs mentioned in prior articles.
To summarize these findings, both networks showed clear biases toward their respective countries. For AJ, a network owned by Qatar, it portrayed Saudi Arabia in a negative light throughout most of their writings. AR was quick to become Saudi Arabia’s defense mechanism against the allegations thrown against it. And even though AR’s writing demonstrates a more neutral voice, the knowledge about its Saudi ownership hinders that perception. What could be said about both networks is that they displayed an agenda that correlates with each country involved in the matter.
RA2: Applying the five filters to Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. The propaganda model proposes five filters by which a media organization passes through for it to be applicable (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The first filter was set forth by Herman and
Chomsky as size, ownership, and profit orientation of the media. While those three groups could each have a category by their own, in here, they are interlinked and integral to the existence and survival of one another (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).
Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, in light of the first filter of the propaganda model, share a lot of the constraints Herman and Chomsky (1988) imposed on American media
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at their time. In fact, it is eerie how both those networks cross the list of categories within the first filter. On its official website (https://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/) Al-Jazeera boasts about reaching more than 310 million households in over one-hundred countries, with diverse staff ranging from more than seventy nationalities.
According to www.thalamus.co, one of the world’s leading advertising databases,
Al-Arabiya has around thirty offices worldwide with staff numbers in the range of 500 and 1000. For comparison’s sake, CNN, one of the largest news networks in the United
States, states in its press room webpage (http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/cnn-fact- sheet/) that it has 27 bureaus outside of the US. These numbers just demonstrate that Al-
Jazeera and Al-Arabiya are not only global in their reach, but they have the infrastructure to sustain it worldwide.
When it comes to ownership, that is where both channels completely embrace the propaganda model as portrayed by Herman and Chomsky (1988). The arrival of Al-
Jazeera was welcomed by a fund of $150 million from the Emir of Qatar at the time
(Mitchell, Brown, & Guskin, 2012). The channel is heavily funded by the government that it receives an annual $100 million from the state while having its annual expenditure to be as high as $650 million (Mitchell, Brown, & Guskin, 2012).
There is no doubt about whether Al-Jazeera is influenced by the government or not as most scholars agree upon the notion that the channel heavily reflects the views of the Qatari government towards whatever issue arises, whether it be a foreign or domestic
(Touzani, 2010; Al-Obaidi, 2011; El-Ebiary, 2011; Harb, 2011; Mitchell, Brown, &
Guskin, 2012; Zeng & Tahat, 2012; Samuel-Azran, 2013; Lo & Frkovich, 2013;
Pourhamzavi & Pherguson, 2015; Al-Rawi, 2016).
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While the Qatari state has affirmed multiple times that it does not interfere with the channel’s agendas and programs, that appears to be far from the truth (Samuel-Azran,
2013). In his 2003 study, Samuel-Azran clarifies that “Qatar effectively promotes its public diplomacy goals by operating Al-Jazeera as a hybrid network whose independence is limited by the boundaries of Qatar’s crucial interests” (Samuel-Azran, 2013, p. 1307).
These findings correlate to another study that examined coverage on Al-Jazeera channel about conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt and found that the news channel’s output aligns with Qatar’s attitudes toward said countries (Pourhamzavi & Pherguson,
2015). A different study also examined news coverages across different channels and came to the conclusion that Al-Jazeera was the most sensational and provocative news channel on cable television across the region (Al-Obaidi, 2011). On top of that, Qatar is still giving annual funds of up to $100 million to Al-Jazeera (Brown, Guskin, & Mitchell,
2012). Al-Arabiya channel was funded from various donors through the Saudi-owned
Middle East Broadcasting Company (MBC). Al-Arabiya was Saudi’s first line of defense against the advancements that Qatar has taken in the region through Al-Jazeera. While one could minimize the effects of Al-Jazeera, Saudi Arabia was aware of its powers.
A 2004 study by the Arab Advisors Group found out that approximately 89% of
Arab households in Saudi Arabia own satellite television and a staggering 82% of those households recognize and watch Al-Jazeera (Arab Advisors Group, 2004). Allied Media
Corporation (AMC) estimates that Al-Jazeera’s reach within Saudi Arabia is about six and a half million viewers (Allied Media Corporation, 2005).
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The previously discussed is all to say that ownership of both networks since their foundation years were linked to the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia and they cast a wide reach across the region. This effectively means that, according to the propaganda model, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya being producers of neutral news reporting is suspect when labelled against the first filter proposed by Herman and Chomsky (1988).
When it comes to profit, that is where there was insufficient data to make a concrete conclusion. Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya’s purpose does not seem to be correlated with monetary gains (Byrd & Kawarabayashi, 2003). In fact, since their founding, both networks have either worked at a loss or barely above the margins of profits. And yet, both networks have continued to grow in size and reach across the years from funding and investments. Their monetary reliance is mostly on government funds or investments from the powerful elites, only second-tier is their reliance on profits made through advertisements (Mellor, Ayish, Dajani, & Rinnawi, 2011).
What the previously discussed means is that profit is not the primary purpose of these networks, because they profit by keeping their agendas in line with the people involved in funding them and pouring money in them (Byrd & Kawarabayashi, 2003).
The propaganda model was implemented for the American media market, which heavily relies on advertising money (Herman & Chomsky, 1988), but in societies like the former
USSR, or the Middle-East region for this study paper, the need for profit is not as big of a factor as the need for maintaining control.
In conclusion about the first filter of the propaganda model, Al-Jazeera and Al-
Arabiya both have incredible size and reach, which means they need the monetary support to sustain it. Both of their ownerships are broadly stated to be of the governments
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and the powerful elites of Qatar, for Al-Jazeera, and Saudi Arabia, for Al-Arabiya. Most of their profits are generated through funds and investments taken from their respective owners (Byrd & Kawarabayashi, 2003). All of this effectively means that Al-Jazeera and
Al-Arabiya pass the first filter of the propaganda model with flying colors.
When it comes to the second filter, the advertising license to do business, both networks do not have a proper outlet to officially discuss their revenues, whether it be from advertising slots or programming, but both networks stay sustainable through various funds and investments, via corporates or governments (Brown, Guskin, &
Mitchell, 2012; Mitchell, Brown, & Guskin, 2012). The amount of revenue generated by both networks from advertising remains a mystery, but it remains a secondary source of income to them (Mellor, Ayish, Dajani, & Rinnawi, 2011). While the exact figures are not known, what is public, though, is that both networks do not generate most of their revenues from ads (Byrd & Kawarabayashi, 2003). In fact, if they were to rely on the profits generated from advertisements alone, they would be working on a deficit (Byrd &
Kawarabayashi, 2003). This means that funds and investments, mainly from the governments and the elites, are in control of most of the revenues and the monetary infrastructure of both networks (Byrd & Kawarabayashi, 2003).
What this demonstrates is that the profit filter refers directly to how much funds the networks receive from their owners, the Qatari and Saudi Arabia governments. While that could be seen by some as a restriction on the filters proposed by Herman and
Chomsky (1988), this research argues it skews the propaganda aspect of the networks heavily. It is a scary thought when Herman and Chomsky proposed that the media gains
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most of its money from advertisers and the media aligns its stories to satisfy the money that feeds it (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).
The third filter for the propaganda model reflects upon the sourcing in mass media, and how most powerful news organizations rely mostly on authorities or professionals that know the field (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). In their research about the coverage for the 2014 Gaza war between Israel and Palestine, Kareem El Damanhoury and Faisal Saleh (2017) found that the majority of articles from Al-Jazeera America covering the events have used government or official sources. In a different study about the conflict between Israel and Palestine in Gaza from 2009/2010, it was found that Al-
Jazeera allocated 28% of its on-camera interviews to citizens while Al-Arabiya’s figure was at 7.1% (Elmasry, El Shamy, Manning, Mills, & Auter, 2013).
In a 2006 study, Yeslam Al-Saggaf sampled random articles about Iraq on Al-
Arabiya’s main English website through a two-phase sampling session and found out that
20.59% of the articles within the findings involved interviews with intellectuals, government officials, or politicians (Al-Saggaf, 2006). In another study, 43% of elites represented the major news sources in Al-Jazeera English, with 18% of those coming from establishments and 25% from professionals (Figenschou, 2010).
Li Zeng and Khalaf Tahat (2012) found out similar results in their analysis of Al-
Jazeera and Al-Arabiya coverages about terrorism from 2009 to 2010. Out of 100 news stories, Al-Jazeera was found to have 37 of those come from officials, while experts and professionals represented 46 of them. Al-Arabiya focused more on officials as its news sources, having 56 stories coming from officials and government affiliates, while only 16 were from the experts and professionals (Zeng & Tahat, 2012).
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By sampling the homepage of Al-Jazeera website during the 2003 Iraq War,
Daniela V. Dimitrova and Colleen Connolly-Ahern (2007) found out that Al-Jazeera cited government representatives in 63.6% of its stories while military personnel were cited 50% in its stories. All of this research conforms to the fact that Al-Jazeera and Al-
Arabiya fall in line with the third filter for the propaganda model, in that their sources for where they bring their news are the powerful elites or authorities holding official positions.
In terms of flack, Kai Hafez (2002) remarks that journalism ethics in the Middle
East, and Muslim countries, fall under the restrictions of three taboos: religion, sex, and politics. Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, being owned and operated by Muslim countries;
Qatar and Saudi Arabia, fall under the same restrictions highlighted by Kai Hafez (2002) and they align their news in a way that is not considered overstepping those boundaries, especially religion and sex. While both networks have more than occasionally traversed into politics, it is never in opposition of what their respective countries’ agendas are. In another study, Muhammad I. Ayish (2010) states that broadcasting in the Arabic world falls under extreme forms of pressure from multitude of sides, political and social democratization included, and that the Arabic governments associate broadcasting with attaining stability and so, they have a high grip on it (Ayish, 2010).
In her chapter of the book, Arab Media, Noha Mellor concludes that Arab media are a monopoly, a form of control for the states, and that is due to three reasons. The first one being that these media networks reach a lot of people and that is seen as a powerful tool for the Arab states. The second is that these stations are an integral part of sustaining unity and keeping the public in line with what the dominant agenda is. Third, and most
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importantly, the media is a propaganda tool that the Arab states have a firm understanding of its powers (Mellor, Ayish, Dajani, & Rinnawi, 2011).
As for each channel individually, Al-Jazeera, it being funded and operated by the
Qatari state, is a network that is funded by the autocratic elites, hence, they are very vulnerable to political influences (Figenschou, 2011). In another study, Al-Jazeera was found to have manifested the same attitude and beliefs with the Arab populations, the people out there on the street; which further elaborates how the channel pertains its attitudes to meet the demands of the public (Gerhard & Schafer, 2013).
A different study by Lo and Frkovich (2013) found that Arabic writers for Al-
Jazeera are not completely independent from the pressures of the state as they demonstrated a level of constraint and restrictions that affected their writings, especially when it came to criticizing Qatar, the owning country of Al-Jazeera.
Al-Arabiya, in contrast to Al-Jazeera, does not much scholarly research about it, but suffice to say that the first section of the flack, the one pertaining Arabic media in general, applies to Al-Arabiya. On top of that, Zayani and Ayish (2006) noted that Arabic news satellites are tainted in a sense, in which they pertain to various forms of pressures in the forms of political, cultural, and historical (Zayani & Ayish, 2006). It should also be noted that in the book, Arab Media, it is discussed that Al-Arabiya shows a lot of restraint and sensitivity toward the major Arab states (Mellor, Ayish, Dajani, & Rinnawi, 2011).
Taking the previously discussed in mind, it is safe to assume that both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya fall under pressures of flack and backlash in terms of the agendas and beliefs of not only the nation states in which they are owned by, but by the public of the region they reside at.
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In terms of the fifth filter, anticommunism as a control mechanism, it refers to how Herman and Chomsky (1988) labeled the media as using the fear of communism in its narratives and how the media shapes its messages, interviews, experts, and interviewee profiles based on the public’s angst and fears of communism taking control.
Herman later recounted that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fear of communism has been fading out of the media’s tools and is being replaced by the belief in the market itself (Herman, 2000).
What this filter dictates is that the media uses a concept that is feared greatly by the public in its narratives and the way its shapes and delivers its messages (Herman &
Chomsky, 1988; Herman, 2000). This means that whatever the public thinks of as a threat to its unity and freedom, it perceives it as danger, which the media can use to filter its messages in a way that the public is duped into believing what it is being told.
The same way Herman (2000) adapted his propaganda model to fit the collapse of the Soviet Union into their propaganda model, this paper argues that instead of fears of communism and, later on, the market itself, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya unify their audiences under the fear of instability within the region. Going back to Mellor’s section in Arab Media (2011) about the trends in Arabic media, she states how these channels advocate and showcase a number of displays that pertain to protecting and unifying the
Arab unity (Mellor, Ayish, Dajani, & Rinnawi, 2011). These nation states that are in control of the media know the powerful effect the media has on the public, and they demonstrate a model of Arabic solidarity across most of their programs, whether it comes in the form of national songs and anthems, coverages about the Arabic world, displaying a West against the East narrative across their platforms, the advocacy of using a unified
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and official language, Arabic is divided into accents according to different regions, across all of their channels, these media outlets hold the narrative of “us versus them” in most of their messages. It is no wonder, then, that whenever an issue arises, the stand that these channels hold is the narrative of Arabs first, everything else is second (Mellor, 2011;
Zayani & Ayish, 2006).
In conclusion, within the boundaries of this research, both Al-Jazeera and Al-
Arabiya showed symptoms and alignments with the filters proposed in the propaganda model by Herman and Chomsky in 1988. The only filter that could be left for argument is the second one, the advertising license to do business. In Manufacturing Consent, the argument is that due to the large influx of profits through advertisements, the media is under the influence and the grip of the advertisers.
For the sake of this research, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya both displayed a reliance on government funding, hence, much alike how advertisers have power over the messages, the government and the powerful elites have equal powers over the messages of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. As for the rest of the filters, both channels have displayed qualities that pass them each filter with ease. Taking all of the previously discussed in mind, this research summarizes that Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya work, and have worked, as propaganda tools by their respective owners, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, amid duping the public under a unified Arabia.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news networks have shown to be a prime example of news networks that pass through the five filters of propaganda proposed in
Manufacturing Consent as demonstrated by this research paper. By shaping their messages against the backdrop of the Arab unity, they adhere to the agendas and influences of Qatar and Saudi Arabia while claiming independences publicly.
The case of Khashoggi provided a great venue to study and examine this phenomenon. Not only is it a highly sensitive and a current issue, it provides an outlet to examine the different ways both networks conducted their coverages on it.
For Al-Jazeera, the blame fingers were pointed at Saudi Arabia’s involvement from the moment the news broke. Its usage of emotional and provoking vocabulary throughout its articles indicates a lack of neutrality in their reporting. Al-Jazeera also dedicated large portions of its articles to discuss and emphasis Khashoggi’s role as a leading critic of the Saudi Arabian government, especially during Mohammed bin
Salman’s reign.
The narrative throughout Al-Jazeera’s articles was constant throughout: A Saudi dissident, who was a major critic of the Saudi government, has been killed and Saudi
Arabia knew something about it. For Al-Arabiya, it was a different tale.
Articles featured in Al-Arabiya emphasized the fact that the government of Saudi
Arabia was doing its best to cooperate and assist with the investigation. Khashoggi’s role as a critic of the state was rarely stated. He was constantly referred to as being a Saudi citizen even though he resided in the United States.
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Al-Arabiya’s articles were shorter in comparison and contained significantly less emotional vocabulary than those found in Al-Jazeera’s writings. Al-Arabiya’s articles were consistent in their denial of all allegations labelled against Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Khashoggi’s disappearance. The network became a media defense mechanism where most articles featured different narratives and official quotes that refute whatever accusations put against Saudi Arabia.
For Al-Jazeera, it took a single narrative and worked it through multiple angles, but Al-Arabiya used three separate narratives. Initially, the Al-Arabiya articles took the stance that Khashoggi had left the consulate. The story then shifted briefly to put the blame on the involvement of his fiancé. The final narrative that Al-Arabiya took was that the rumors and leaks about Khashoggi being murdered were spread by enemies of the
Saudi government, mainly Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood. What all of these different narratives from Al-Arabiya have in common is one thing: Saudi Arabia was not involved in the disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi.
Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news networks both pass through the filters of propaganda proposed by Herman and Chomsky (1988) as demonstrated in this study.
This is an important distinction to keep in mind because it allows us to interpret the findings of this research in a different light. Without knowing about Al-Arabiya’s infrastructure, one would think its reporting about Jamal Khashoggi was unbiased.
Knowing about Al-Arabiya’s workings makes us understand that its unbiased reporting was, in fact, a biased reporting leaning toward the defense of Saudi Arabia.
While this research cannot conclude that the difference in coverage is due to an underlying adherence to the influences of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, this study
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demonstrates that Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya took contrasting, and quite different, attitudes when it came to the way they reported about Khashoggi. Both networks displayed an agenda that correlates with the ideologies of their respective owners, Qatar for Al-Jazeera and Saudi Arabia for Al-Arabiya.
Al-Jazeera were quick to blame Saudi Arabia while Al-Arabiya were quick to defend it. What this shows us is that both networks are not subject to a complete and honest journalistic neutrality. Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya showed a lack of accuracy when it came to the way they reported about Jamal Khashoggi’s disappearance.
Taking into consideration how both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya pass through the filters proposed in the propaganda model, it will not be outlandish to claim that both networks are susceptible to state influence, especially when it comes to a news event that captured the world’s spotlight.
Discussion. The aftermath of the Khashoggi affair has not been the main catalyst for how the relationship between the countries involved deteriorated, but it has brought it into the public’s attention. Qatar and Saudi Arabia’s hostility was a known factor on a street level, but never has it been this prominently featured on news headlines. Never has a dividing line among the region been this clear. A separation between countries in support of Saudi Arabia on one side, and states which support Qatar on the other. The region as a whole has turned into factions with each aligning to one of the countries involved. Those are publicly in aid and support of Qatar are seen as untrustworthy by
Saudi Arabia, and vice versa. This has made trade, flight, and communication among countries within the region to be a troublesome affair.
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Limitation. Even though they both have significant online presence, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya are mainly television telecasts. Both networks have dedicated 24-hour news channels that are broadcasted worldwide. Due to manpower and time limitations, this paper did not study how the Jamal Khashoggi case was reported on television across the two channels. Findings demonstrated here represent data taken from the main English websites from both networks. Further research should take the television channels into consideration to have a more concrete conclusion.
Future research. Due to language limitations and lack of access to translated
Turkish newspapers, the role of the Turkish media in the Jamal Khashoggi case has not been discussed heavily in this study, but the Turkish media were the main party involved with breaking news about Khashoggi to other news outlets (Gall, 2018).
Future research could study articles in Turkish media across the same period to showcase the Turkish media’s approach to the disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi, an intriguing angle considering the Turkish government’s relationship with both Qatar and
Saudi Arabia.
Right-wing and left-wing news media in the United States could also make for a fascinating area of study. The United States’ support for Saudi Arabia is divided between political parties and to see how each media reported about the journalist’s disappearance could make for a great research topic.
The influence of Qatar and Saudi Arabia over Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya have been shown to be significant according to this study. This paper establishes that both networks’ infrastructure and the way they tackle news falls in line with those countries’ agendas. Future scholars could approach their research with that knowledge at hand.
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The assumption that Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya work independently from state control should be met with doubt in further scholarly work. Future research could benefit from the understanding that, if they base their research on Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabiya, both networks fall under the subtle control of Qatar and Saudi Arabia. This information could provide a different outlook to how future findings and discussions are approached.
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