Pragmatics3:3.259 -282 InternationalPrasmatics Association
THE PRAGMATICS OF PLAY: INTERACTIONAL STRATEGIES DURING CHILDREN'S PRETEND PLAY
Keith Sawyerr
1. Introduction
When childrenbetween the agesof three and six get together,they invariablybegin to play.This early form of socialinteraction is predominantlyverbal, and is distinguished by its "fantasy" nature. The children pretend to be parents, relatives, firemen, policemen,and ninja turtles.They establishwhich role each child will enact and what the relationshipsbetween the roles will be. Unlike the play of older children, these rolesand relationshipschange frequently; in a singleplay session,each child takes on a successionof roles, as the play "drama"is continuallyredefined. This type of social behavior is called sociodramaticplay. Sociodramaticplay is characterizedby an abundanceof what Bateson called metacommunication(Bateson 1955,1956), communication about how the interaction itselfis to proceed.Children engagingin sociodramaticplay have not yet masteredthe metacommunicativefunctions of languageto the degreethat adults have (Keenan & Schieffelin 1976). As a result, this language function is foregrounded, and is more noticeablethan in the subtle, mature languageuse between skilled adults. While childrenplay, they are constantly"negotiating" what and how they are playing, how they will continuethe play, and often negotiatinginterpretations of past play events. For Bateson,this was analogousto the negotiationof topic shift in adult conversation. Eventhough this type of negotiationcould be accomplishedthrough an explicitrequest, it is almost always implicilly communicated (Auwarter 1986; Giffin 1984). Children metacommunicate"implicitly" by speakingwithin their play drama role, but with a "hiddenagenda" of directing the play along certain lines.Although adult speechalso containsimplicit and explicit metacommunication,the visibility of this negotiation makeschildren's play speechseem quite different from adult discourse. My current researchinvolves the ethnographicstudy of children in nursery schoolclassrooms for extendedperiods of time, a minimum of one academicyear. The typicalclassroom brings together 24 childrenof agesthree, four, and five for a morning of unstructuredgroup play activity.A fundamentalcomponent of this researchhas been to gatheraudio- and videotapesof children'splay dialogue,for later transcriptionand
^ The author wishes to thank Michael Silverstein, James Stigler, and Thomas Trabasso for their commentson earlier drafts of this paper. 260 KeithSavvyer
detailedanalysis. Unfortunately, Bateson's notions, while helpful,were not elaborated in a rigorousfashion suitable for this sort of microlinguisticanalysis. Bateson implied that metacommunicationoccurs only at the beginningof an interaction, as a stage during which the interaction is defined, and that the interaction is then played out. This approachhas also been characteristicof psychologistsstudying children's language useduring play. However, moreso than "topic"in adult conversation,children constantly redefine and renegotiate their play activity (Ochs 1979; Sutton-Smith 1919). My ethnographicobservations in the nurseryschool have led me to focus on the following questions:to what extent is metacommunicationa fundamental,ongoing aspect of children'splay dialogue?What are the typesof metacommunicativetechniques which childrenuse during play? What guidesa child'sselection of one strategyover another? What are the constraints,if any, on the use of a given metacommunicativestrategy? After a brief summary of current psychologicaltheory, and an elaboration of the metacommunicationconcept by referenceto the pragmaticsliterature, these questions are exploredthrough a micro-analysisof an extendedtranscript of children'splay.
2. Theoretical precedents
Piaget'searly work in the nurseryschool (Piaget 1926)led him to distinguishthe social speechof the older child from the egocenticspeech of the younger child. Although this distinctionhas recently been questioned for somecontexts (Keenan 1974),,and Piaget's "staged"model of linguisticcompetence has been widely criticized,most researchers havenoted that nurseryschool children move through a continuum,from a relativelack of competenceat social play before the age of three, through a progressivelymore advancedcapability for linguisticinteraction towards the agesof five and six. How is it that the older childrencan play togetherin this fashion,when a few yearsearlier they primarily engagein egocentricspeech? For the play to be shared in any meaningful sense,the children must share some understandingof what is going on in the play session.Recent theoriesof sociodramaticplay have focusedon describingthe nature of this shared understanding,and how this shared understanclinginfluences the children'sinteraction. The approach to transcript analysistaken in this paper usesseveral concepts from pragmaticsto elaborateupon contemporarytheories of children'stalk during play. Severalcontemporary researchers have proposedthat the sharedunderstanding takes the form of a frame (Goffman I974, usingBateson's term), an interactionalframework which defines the play drama. The "play frame" is "a set of shared organizational principles that places behavior and events in a context" (Giffin 1984). Before the children can play together,a play frame must first be createdand understoodby the participants,containing "specific transformationsof specific objects, persons,time, space,action, and rules."Giffin has suggestedthat once this frame is created,children communicatetheir desiresto changethe frame by acting "within frame," speakingas their play character,or "out of frame," speakingas themselves.Auwarter (1986) has developed a model similar to Giffin's, which characterizesmetacommunicative play Thepragmatics of play 267 utterancesas either in the "pluy" or the "reality"frame. Many researchershave used a variation of the frame model, the scipt model of Schankand Abelson (1977),including Bretherton (1984), Nelson and Gruendel (1979), and Nelson and Seidman (1984). Variations of this concept go by the term event schemas(Mandler 1979)or interactionalroutines (Peters and Boggs 1985).Nelson and Gruendel characterize the script as a shared context: "to sustain a dialogue the participantsmust each assumea shared topic context within which that dialogue is structured.This sharedcontext determines such things as what is expressedand what is left to inference,the particular answersthat follow from a given question,and the particularsemantic and syntacticlinks that will be establishedbetween utterances."2 A distinctline of studyhas focusedon the role-playingaspects of sociodramatic play.These views gain support from the symbolicinteractionist tradition derived from Mead (1934)and its recentblending with role theory (Stryker& Statham 1985).Roles have also been termed participant structures(Philips 1972).Fein (1985) has proposed that children'splay is directed by affectiverepresentational templates,which are explicitly contrastedwith scriptviews. Role theory viewsof play emphasizethat play is a way of learningabout social roles and their interrelationships.A given play situation arises from the interaction of a given set of role assignments.Certain roles require that complementaryroles be taken by another child; for example,if one child acts as the "baby,"another child must take on the "mother" role. Other researcherswho have focusedon how role-playingstructures play interaction include Garvey and Berndt (1977),Garvey (1982),and Smilansky(1968). Frame and scriptviews focus on staticstructural descriptions of the play drama, a situationaldefinition which mustbe sharedby the childrenbefore play can occur,and characterize"metacommunication" as an attempt by a child to change this frame definition.Children can do this implicitly, usuallyby speakingas their play character, or explicitly, usually by speaking as themselves (in Giffin's model "degree of explicitness"and "role spokenfrom" covilrlr while in Auwarter's they are orthagonal). However,these views do not adequatelycharacterize situations in which a staticframe definition is difficult to identify. Several researchers(Keenan & Schieffelin 1976; Sutton-Smith1979) have observedthat a large percentageof discourseis occupiedby the processof establishingthe situationaldefinition. Conversation analysts and other theoristsof linguisticinteraction have argued that "talk" cannot be understood as a static transcript,but must be viewed as fundamentally"in play" during interaction (Gumperz 1982;Schegloff 1990; Schegloff and Sacks1973).In my own tranicribed data,
'Thea notions of "frame" and "script" are not synonymous with discourse analysis notions of "topic." "Topic" refers to a denotational and referential aspect of the ongoing conversation; for discourse analysts,topic is often considereda noun phrase,and is distinguishedfrom the'comment," a dichotomy often compared to Clark and Haviland's (1977)'given-newn distinction. For Keenan and Schieffelin 'discourse (1976), topic" is a proposition, associatedwith the presuppositions of the prior discourse and its context. The frame and script concepts are more comprehensive and contextual, in that they include social role assignments,relative role relationships, and other sociological situational factors, as well as temporal/durational expectations. 262 KeithSawyer
I have found that children's play is often characterized by a rapidly changing, constantlyfluctuating situational definition, and that it's not uncommonfor children to fail to achieve a single shared frame definition. Gumperz (1982) has criticized the "frame" perspectivefor inadequatelyrepresenting the indeterminacy actually present at each moment of an interaction: "althoughwe are dealingwith a structuredordering of messageelements that representsthe speakers'expectationsabout what will happen next,yet it is not a static structure,but rather it reflectsa dynamic processwhich developsand changesas the participantsinteract." (p. 131) Psychologicalresearch in the abovetraditions has tended to neglectprocesses of frame establishmentand negotiation:how childreninitially establisha sharedframe, or how shiftsin frame definitionare proposed,negotiated, and accepted.The majority of these studiesof metacommunicationand role-takingpresume that a shared interactional reality is alreadyin place.The processby which this reality is initially createdis rarely addressed.If the play frame changesfrequently and dramaticallythroughout the play session,shared static structures may be difficult to detectand charactetize.If the play frame is observedto changeconstantly, the negotiationof the play frame may occupy more of the children'splay than the resulting"within frame" play. The emphasison metacommunicationin the above psychologicaltheories, although not fully developed,is consistentwith theoreticaldevelopments in a variety of fields (including sociolinguistics,interactional pragmatics, and the ethnographyof communication)which emphasizethe importance of metacommunicationin adult interaction.In the next section,I proposea pragmaticelaboration of Bateson'sconcept of implicit metacommunicationwhich will provide a plausibleprocess description of how metacommunicativenegotiation results in a sharedplay frame.
3. Metacommunication revisited
To understandbetter the non-static,fluctuating aspects of children'splay, we need to extend the psychologicalmodels by focusingon the metacommunicativeaspects of pretend play.Such an elaborationmust focuson thesequestions: what is the nature of children's interaction in sociodramaticplay? How can we explain frequent, rapid, transformationsin the play frame? What strategiesdo children use to communicate their play sessiongoals? What is the relative effectivenessof each strategy? What conditionslead to the selectionof a givenstrategy? How are children able to maintain a minimal levelof conversationalcoherence, allowing all childrento participate,despite the existenceof different goals? These questionsrepresent an "unpacking" of the metacommunicationconcept. Bateson argued that metacommunicationis generally implicit, that rather than being explicitly stated,the speakerprojects his conversational goal indirectly. The concept of implicit metacommunicationis complex, and has been Thepragmatics of play 263 a central focus of contemporarypragmatics.3 Our analysisof interactivestrategies of negotiationis based on Peirce'sconcept of indexicality,as elaborated by Jakobson (1960) in the notion of the poetic functiort of language. This analysisjs based on the premise oi microsociologicalresearch (symbolic interactionism,ethnomethodology, and conversationanalysis) that these interactional phenomenacan only be studiedthrough a close,detailed analysis of naturallyoccurring conversationalpractice. Conversation analysis has been the locus for detailed micro-analysisof conversation,and severalof theseresearchers have studiedchildren's play interactions(Corsaro 1985;McTear 1985;Ochs & Schieffelin 1983;Peters and Boggs1985). Although conversationanalysts have argued that "talk" must be viewed as fundamentally"in play" during interaction,these theorists,like the psychologists reviewed above, have rarely analyzed the interactional techniques which conversationalistsuse to negotiate"what is going on" in a conversation.For example, conversationanalysis has, in practice, focused on relatively static "interactional routines,"rather than an explorationof how routinesare coconstructedin interaction, or how the selectionof a given routine is negotiated. This studyuses a model of interactivenegotiation based on Peirce'sconcept of indexicality.In Peirce's trichotomy of signs, an index is a sign which requires an associationbetween the sign and its object. The classicexample of an index is the weathervane,which indicates wind direction. An index is not arbitrary, thus distinguishingit from the rymbol; yet it is not isomorphic to its object, thus distinguishingit from the icon (Peirce193I:243 - 265;274- 307).The conceptof index canalso be applied to languageuse, in referringto linguisticsigns, lexical or otherwise, that have a non-arbitrary relation to their object, usually some aspect of the sociolinguisticcontext. Within pragmatics,the most studiedaspects of the indexicaluse of languageare deictics,lexicalsigns whose referent is determinedby the context of usage(lrvinson 1983).Expanding upon this notion of indexicality,one can observe other forms of indexicalrelations; for example,syntactic structures which indicate that a certaintopic has alreadybeen identifiedas "in play" are themselvesindexical of the topic of the conversation. This has been referred to as indexical presuppositiort (Silverstein I976). As a conversational interaction proceeds, the indexical presuppositionsestablished at each moment act to constraineach speaker,since the speakermust maintain some minimum level of coherencewith the topic structures, registers,and role relationsalready established. Indexicality may alsooperate to project, or regiment,the future contentor structureof an interaction;this could be referred to asindexical entailmenl, since it representsan indexicalrelationship to some presumed future direction of the interaction. For example, in languageswith a systemsof politenessregisters, e.g., the t/v distinctionin Russian,the selectionof a given register
' Among others, Grice's conversational implicarures (Grice 1967), Hasan's implicit semiotic style (Hasan 1984), and Sperber and Wilson's contmunicative intention (Sperber & Wilson 1985) can be viewedas attempts to characterize implicit metacommunication. Most of these approaches focus on the denotationalor referential aspectsof language,and attempt to identiff implicit structuring principles which help maintain the topical coherenceof the linguistic interaction. 264 KeithSawyer by the first speakeris indexicalof how the speakerexpects the statusrelations to play out during the interaction (Friedrich 1971).Likewise, Bakhtin's work on voice and speechgenre suggests that all languageuse is inherently indexical of social relations and group membership(Bakhtin 1981,1986). Peirce'snotion of indexicalityhas been further elaboratedby Jakobsonin his analysisof. the poetic function of language.Jakobson (1960, 197I) notes that some forms of indexicalityare dependenton broader structuringprinciples of a text; for example, a word placedin line-final position has implicit (indexical)relations with other words in other line-final positions,which can vary dependingon the overall structureof the poem. Much of Jakobson'swork was focusedon exploring parallelsbetween poetic languageand everydayspeech.4 Silverstein (1979, 1981)used this concept to analyze "poetic" forms of indexicality in everyday adult conversation, discovering through micro-analysisof transcriptsthat much of the social interaction is played out at this level of indexicality.Kirschenblatt-Gimblett (1979) has argued that Jakobson'spoetic function is a central,foregrounded element of children'splay language. This approach to indexicalitycan provide a rigorous analyticframework from which to explore Bateson's insights about implicit metacommunication.As with indexicality,a metacommunicationmay act to constrain the future utterances of participants, as well as formulating a link of coherence with the indexical presuppositionsestablished by the prior dialogue.The waysthat this balancebetween projectionand coherencemaintenance can be negotiatedare culturallyconstrained, as Cicourel (I974) noted in describing interpretiveprocedures shared by members of a socialgroup. Acquisition of the culturallyapproved set and balanceof strategiesis an essential element of. communicative competence(Hymes 1967). Gumperz (1982) suggestedthat speechcommunities are defined by a sharedset of knowledge about hclw this creativebalance was to occur, in contrastto a linguisticcommunity, which is defined by a shared set of denotationalelements of languagesuch as a lexicon and rules of syntacticstructure. A microanalysisof theseinteractional techniques, and their salience and frequencyof use, could result in insightsabout socializationwithin a culture's characteristic"semiotic style" (Hasan 1984).
3.1. Multiple frames
Before the age of three, children'snursery school speech is largelyegocentric (Piaget, 79?.6,1962; Vygotsky 1982).Auwarter (1986) has noted that the better children get at sharingframes, the less they metacommunicate;by the age of six, children are quite competent at establishing a shared frame, and therefore do not need to metacommunicateas frequently.In contrast,when two or more children of younger agesplay together,they rarelyseem to integratetheir utterancesinto a linked discourse
4 SeeSenderovich (1932) for a reviewof Jakobson'searly work on poetics.More comprehensive reviewsare foundin Krampen(1981) and Stankiewicz(1983). Thepragmatics of play 265 interaction.An analysisof metacommunicativestrategies would then be particularly relevantto childrenwho have not yet achievedskill at establishinga sharedsituational definition. Even after children begin socialplay, it may be inaccurateto speak of a single sharedplay frame. Younger children engagingin pretend play rarely share a single cohesiveplay frame, and very young children may not be capable of creating and maintaininga sharedstructure. Children of this age are not yet expert in enforcingor evenrecognizing consistency and cohesivenessamong the participants,and thus one would expect each child to maintain a distinct perspectiveof the play frame. This suggeststhat there may be multipleframes in play in the interaction of these younger children. For sociodramaticplay to continue in the presenceof multiple frames, each child would need some awarenessof these frames, and would need the strategic competenceto integratetheir frame model with the active set of participant models" We will refer to the recognizedintersection of individual frames as the cocreatedplay frame. This is roughly equivalentto the static play structure of the frame and script models.The older and more skilled that children become,the more coincidenttheir multipleframes become; as their individualframe interpretationsbecome coincident, it would be correct to refer to the cocreatedplay frame as a singleplay frame. This conceptionof the play situationas containingmultiple frames is consistent with Bakhtin's analysisof conversationas fundamentallyheteroglossic (Bakhtin 1981). fu Bakhtin suggested,features of the cocreatedplay frame will demonstratevarying degreesof certaintyor consensus,ranging from well-established,shared frame features to asyet unnegotiatedindividual interpretations and play sessiongoals. The cocreated frame can take on an independent characteras the play sessionevolves; it is usually not coincidentto any single child's frame (although it may be if one older child dominates the session). In such an interactional environment, several metacommunicativestrategies are available to the child. One might expect the sophisticatedplayer to blend frames, even in a single utterance, if it is the most effectivestrategy. Several researchers (Auwarter, Giffin) have noted the "combined frame" nature of many pretend play utterances,with the analysisfocusing on only two frames:a unified "pretendframe" and the "realityframe." In the presenceof multiple playframes, a largervariety of combinedframe statementsmay be detectedin pretend play.
4. Interactional strategies
In sociodramaticplay, each utterance is an opportunityfor childrento project their own play frame interpretation onto the other participants.This indexical entailment is successfulto the degreeto which it regimentssubsequent dialogue. Projection strategies can involve both projecting interpretations of past events and projecting future expectationsonto the other participants. Children's attempts at projection are reconciledthrough both explicit and implicit metacommunicativenegotiation. 266 Keith Sawyer
Each utteranceoccurs at the intersectionof two vectorsof interaction:the first, representingthe indexicalpresuppositions in play,constrains the possiblemoves by the requirement to maintain coherence,and the second,representing the individual play goalsof the child, is projectedonto future utterancesthrough the metacommunication of indexicalentailment (Halliday 1984).On the one hand,children want to project their own frames as stronglyas possible,and on the other hand,they know that the utterance must retain coherencewith the flow of the play session,or elseit will lose its projective power. Coherence must be met in order to fulfill the fundamental requirement of pretend play: the interactionmust be maintainedin sucha mannerthat all childrencan continueto participate. Given the existenceof both implicit and explicitmetacommunicative strategies, what contextual tactors determine the child's selection?Why do children choose an explicit or implicit metacommunicativetechnique? Both children and adults displaya strong bias towards implicit techniques.'Given the complexityof this speechactivity among adults,it is not surprisingto find a developmentalprecursor in sociodramatic play.uThe bias towarclsimplicitness suggests that implicit metacommunicationmay be interactionally more effective in projecting play frame features than explicit metacommunication.If so, childrenwill tend to use more implicit statementsas their competenceincreases. Given the strategic power of implicit metacommunication,the continued occurrenceof explicit metacommunicationrequires explanation. Our abovediscussion suggeststhat the primary constrainton a child'sutterance will be the requirement to maintain coherencewith the set of indexicalpresuppositions established by the prior flow of the interaction.An effectiveimplicit metacommunicativestatement can only be formed within an appropriatelydeveloped discourse context. Thus we would expectthe balance of implicit and explicit speechacts to reflect the coherenceof the discourse. We could characterizethe cocreatedplay frame as havingits own regimenting quality which evolves throughout the play session.When a strongly regimenting cocreatedframe is more similar to a child'spersonal frame, that child can usea greater degreeof implicitness.When either conditionweakens (a weaklyregimenting cocreated frame, or a cocreated frame which does not readily accommodatethe child's play goals),metacommunicative statements must become accordingly more explicit,to retain coherencewith the cocreatedframe (Keenan & Schieffelin1976). We would expect
' Hasan (1984) argues that the degreeof intplicitness of a semiotic style varies across cultures, and presentsdata suggestingthat Urdu speakershave a greater tendencytowards implicitness than English speakers. Note that Hasan's discussion of implicit and explicit semiotic styles is restricted to the semantic,or denotational/referential,aspects of linguistic interaction, and focuseson topical coherence across utterances.
6 Although she does not argue for an implicit/explicit dimension of language use, Ochs (1979) contrasts planned and unplanned discourse, and argues that the more unplanned adult discourse is, the more it becomcs likc children's play dialogue. Four of the five featuresof young (under three years of age) children's discourseshe identifies operate at the poetic level of discourseinteraction, and thus can be understood as implicit metacommunicativetechniques. Thepragmatics of play 267 that skilled children will use the most implicit statementpossible, given the degree of regimentationof the cocreated play frame. This provides us with an interesting empiricalprediction: among skilled children,the degreeof implicitnessof a statement is an indexof the degreeof regimentationprovided by the indexicalpresuppositions in play at that moment, as well as an index of the degreeof compatibilitybetween the speaker'sintention and his perceptionof the cocreatedplay frame. The remainder of this section presents a variety of metacommunicative strategies,what might be called interactionalpoetic strategies,with examples of each taken from the transcript found in the appendix.The salienceof these interactional strategiesin the transcribeddata providessupport for the abovetheoretical approach. The strategiesoutlined fall into two groups:the first group of strategiesare techniques for projection of play frame goals, and the second group are techniques for the maintenanceof coherencewith the existingcocreated play frame.
4.1. Strategiesof play frame projection
The degreeof regimentationof an indexicalentailment is equivalentto the degreeof forcewith which a statementimposes the speaker'sindividual frame onto the group. As notedabove, implicit metacommunicationis more stronglyregimenting than explicit (Giffin refersto this as the "illusionconservation rule," Giffin 1984).This could be due to the difficulty of refusing to respond to an implicit projection; while an explicit projectioncan be deniedexplicitly, an implicit one must be counteredimplicitly, a more difficultact.7 Schegloff and Sacks(1973) termed this type of projection closeordeing, and much of their work focusedon the analysisof one type of implicitly indexically entailingmechanism, the adjacencypair. Four projection techniquesare discussed below:use of play frame proper names,asymmetric movements of tense,asymmetric movementsof degreeof explicitness,and asymmetricmovements between frames.
4.1.1.hoper names
The useof personaldeictics, including both proper namesdefined fbr play frame roles and personal pronouns, is a common strategy of both projection and coherence. Projectionvia play role proper name often takesthe form of a "baptismal"event, as in Heather'sprojection of the "mother"role onto Kathy, in lines (23 - 24) of the transcript in the appendix: (23) H. Annie, let's sayyou gave me a spanking. (24) And I call you Mom.
' Hasan (1984) notes this difficulty, and suggeststhat Urdu speakerscan maintain a more implicit semioticstyle than English speakersbecause their social structure is more rigidly specified (p. 157). As 'at a result of this rigidity, there are lessvariablcs play" in the interaction. 268 Keith Sawyer
Such initial baptismal events must be explicitly metacommunicated,but usually demonstrate continuity with a seriesof implicitly metacommunicativeproper name usages,not only after the baptismalevent but sometimesbefore as well: (20) H. My mother yelled at me. (pre-baptismalusage) (24) H. And I call you Mom. (baptismalevent) (32) H. Mother, I did that because!(post-baptismal usage) The repeated use of the proper name is a role projectionstrategy, which rangesfrom explicit metacommunication in the baptismal event, through implicit metacommunicationin later statements.Throughout the above exchange,Kathy has indicatedher preferenceto be called "Annie,"but she is not successfulat refusingthe "mother" role projection.
4.1.2. Arymmetic movements
These movements are the most complex devicesused by children. The movement involves a change in utterance structure in subsequentparallel statements.This parallelismprovides perhaps the most obviousevidence that Jakobson'spoetic function is at play in these interactions.Projecting movements of tensebegin with a statement in a future tense,followed by a statementin past tense,moving through a projected event in a metaphoricalpresent; this stronglyregiments the event as having occurred. Heather usessuch a parallel seriesin (7 - 9): (7) H. She wants to get married so she'scrying. (8) You should get married. (9) Let's sayyou guyswere alreadymarried, OK? This referentialshift betweenimagined timeframes creates an asymmetricalmovement with the desired projection being that the marriage event has "metaphorically happened,"due to the movementfrom future, throughthe projectedevent, to the past. Projectingmovements of explicitnessbegin with an explicitmetacommunication, followed by progressivelymore implicit metacommunication.In the sequence(23 - 25), a movement from explicit to implicit metacommunicationis used: (23) H. Annie, let's sayyou gave me a spanking (24) And I call you Mom. 'cause (2s) Daddy, I'm crying my mother gave me a spanking and she yelled at me. (23) and (24) first explicitly metacommunicatea play frame alteration, and (25) immediatelystrengthens this projectionthrough an implicit metacommunication,acting within the projected frame. Thepragmatics of play 269
Projecting movements between frames begin with a statement in a frame acceptedby the addressee,followed by statementsmore central to the projected play frame.The initial frame may be the "reality"frame, acceptedby all participants,or the addressee'splay frame. A movementfrom the realityframe to the projectedplay frame is often signalledby a shift in tense:past tenseis usedto shift temporarily out of the playframe and implicitly metacommunicateabout prior play eventsvia "out-of-frame" statements.Past tenseindexes an out-of-framestatement, and presenttense indexes a wilhin-framestatement : (41) K. You didn't talk like that. (42) You say (sweetly)"What's the matter, Mother?" Theseasymmetric movements are effectivebecause they beginwith a statementwhich is acceptedby the addressee,and then use the parallel structure of subsequent utterancesto shift toward the speaker's projected play frame. In addition to movementsfrom the reality frame to the projected frame, the transcript includes severalexamples of movement from the addressee'splay frame to the speaker's projectedframe, providing support for the "multiple frame" perspective. The effectivenessof a given projectionstrategy should be visible in the nature of the subsequentresponse. If the projection strategyis successfulat regimentingthe cocreatedframe, an implicit metacommunicationrejecting the projection should be relativelydifficult. A rejection of a stronglyregimenting projection should require a more explicitmetacommunication in response.
4.2. Strategiesfor retaining coherence
The discussionabove suggestedthat there is a strategic preference for implicit metacommunicationbecause it is more effective in projecting the speaker'sframe interpretation.From this perspective,the occurrenceof an explicitmetacommunication is particularlyinteresting, since it is normally lesseffective. Thus, we should observe that implicit metacommunicationrequires a sufficientlyregimenting cocreated frame, with indexicalpresuppositions which accommodatethe speaker'sintentions. We should expectthe degreeof explicitnessto increaseas the following conditionsarise: (1) the degreeof regimentationof the cocreatedframe becomesso low that insufficientcontext existsfor implicit metacommunicationto be effective; (2) the cocreated frame regimentsagainst a child'sgoal. The former caseshould be easierto handlesuccessfully than the latter; effectinga shift in an establishedframe should be more difficult than simplycontributing to the developmentof the initial cocreatedframe parameters. Children use a variety of strategiesto maintain maximal coherencewith the indexicalpresuppositions resulting from prior interaction.Deictics provide a rich source for analysis.By definition,deictics can only be used in conversationalcontexts which areregimented to a degreewhich would allow the participantsto successfullydetermine the referent.Usage of play frame proper names,personal pronouns, and tense all 270 Keithsawyer presupposea certain minimal sharedplay interpretation.We shouldexpect to observe that the level of usageof thesetechniques correlates with the degreeto which the play frames are shared at the moment of utterance,and the degreeto which the speaker is satisfiedwith his perception of that sharedframe. Proper name usage,by simultaneouslyreinforcing or assumingthe implied referent,can also be a projectiontechnique. In the sequencebelow, proper namesare usedas both projectionand coherencetechniques: (22) K. No, my name is Annie. (23) H. Annie, let's sayyou gave me a spanking. (24) And I call you Mom. Kathy has chosen a relatively implicit self-baptism,stating her play frame name in first-personpresent. Heather maintainscoherence in (23) by addressingKathy with this name, but then combines this implicit acceptancewith a new explicit attempt at baptizing Kathy as "Mom." Note that this baptismcould have been done implicitly,by sayingsomething like *(23) H. Mom, why did you spank me? Sucha usageof "Mom" would havebeen an implicit metacommunicationof the "Mom" role, but perhapswould not have retainedenough cohesion with the cocreatedframe. As expected,the "implicit preference"rule is broken when the speakercannot project the desired frame features and simultaneouslyretain coherencewith the cocreated frame. Personalpronouns are frequentlyused to retain coherence;by usinga pronoun to refer to an establishedwithin-frame role, coherenceis maintained.Pronoun usage is separatedinto two registers:play frame and realityframe. Children could potentially usesuch forms as "she/he"and "l/you" to refer either to the childrenin their play frame role, or to the children outside the play frame. There seemsto be an unwritten rule that suchdeictics will be interpretedas referringto play frame roles(with the exception of the usage of "us" in "let's say" or "let's pretend"), yet occasionallythe ambiguity aft'ectsthe ettbctivenessof the desired projection. In (34), Andy is able to maintain coherencethrough the use of the deicticphrase "her gramma;"this is the first mention of a grandmotherrole, but it is consistentwith the family contextof the cocreated frame: (34) A. I'm callingher grammato keep care of her, everyday.
5. Transcript analysis
The accompanyingdialogue excerpt represents three children,aged 3 Il2to 5, engaging in spontaneoussociodramatic play, with no adultspresent. The dialoguewas videotaped and later transcribed.A transcriptof this length is necessaryto demonstratethe Thepragmatics of play 271, fluctuatingnature of play through time, and to provide sufficient analytic context to understandthe indexicalpresuppositions and entailmentsacting on a specificutterance. Heather,the oldest, is five; Kathy, the youngest,is 3;6; Andy is four. The transcript segmentreproduced in the appendixis an extractfrom a longer,twenty-minute session, whichincluded a wide variety of play situations(renumbered from Giffin 1984).
5.1.Initial negotiation
Heather,the oldest and most skilled player, initiates this segmentwith a series of statementsintended to project her new play dramaidea. Heather's initial frame evolves throughstatement (25), when she seemsto have worked out her own version of the play situation,which is slightly different from the initial idea in (1). Heather first suggeststhat Kathy is "crying in the wedding place (1)." Kathy goes along with this suggestion,and cries (2). Heather then stepsinto her (unspecified)play role to speak to Kathy: (5) H. What's the matter? (6) You want to get married is whY? Now it seemsthat Heather had intended this to be the result of Kathy's crying. BecauseKathy has already agreed to cry, Heather is playing from strength as she projects a role assignmentof "groom/husband"onto Atdy. She forms a strong asymmetricmovement between imagined timeframes, from an imaginary"future" to an imaginary"past," to strengthenher projection of the marriage event onto Andy and Kathy: (7) H. Shewants to get marriedso she'scrying. (8) You shouldget married. (9) Let's sayyou guyswere alreadymarried, okay? The combinationof Kathy'sobvious participation in Heather'sframe, with the strongly regimentingtense movement, strongly projects Heather's frame onto Andy. Andy, who doesnot want to be "married,"is forced to make a seriesof highly explicit statements to rejectthis projection: (10) A. No! (11) I'm going to put on the song. And this is followed by his enactment of a DJ role (12), although he has not successfullyprojected any roles onto Heather and Kathy. Heather then shifts her strategyand suggestsa different relationshipfor Andy and Kathy, which is consistent with Andy'sframe: they will danceto "the song"(13). Kathy immediatelyaccepts this suggestion,and also insiststhat Andy dancewith her (15). Andy's responseis another explicitrejection, but this time he acceptsthe earlier role projection: 272 Keith Sawyer
(16) A. No I [...]Dad. Although Ardy is obviously unhappy about both attempted role projections, first husban-d,then dancepartner, if he wants to stayin the play group, he teahzeshe has to accept one of these role projections,since his own negotiation skills are not well-developed.Note that his accepted role is not identical to Heather's original projection of "husband"or "newlywed,"but by being "Dad," Andy retains coherence while shiftingthe role definition to a non-romantic,authority figure. Heather accepts Andy'sresponse; her next seriesof statementsforms anothertense movement, this time with three parallel acts,corresponding to future, present,and past tense: (18) H. And you saywhat's the matter with me, Andy. (1e) (H. cries.) (20) Mv mothervelled at me. Heather hasrealized that it will be difficult to enlist Andy's cooperation.She suggests the questionfor Andy, and without waiting for him to ask it, respondsto the question as if he had askedit. The cryingact, and Heather'sresponse, strongly project a frame in which Andy actually asked the question.(20) is a complex utterance for several reasons.This is the first time that a "mother" has been introduced.Heather is crying because"her mother yellerJat her." This is an attempt at implicit projection of a new variation of the frame: however,this variation is too dramatic to retain cohesiveness with the existingcocreated frame. Heather seemsto realizeher mistakeinstantly, and the next severalutterances are attempts by Heather to "backtrack"and project her frame variant more effectively.Because the variant in (20) has little cohesionwith the prior interaction, Heather is forced to make a series of relatively explicit metacommunications: (21) H. [rt's sayyou gave me a spanking,Kathy O'Neil. (22) K: No, my name is Annie. (23) H: Annie, let's sayyou gave me a spanking. (24) And I call you Mom. In (21),Heather is attemptingto projectthe new role of "mother"onto Kathy,but (21) is not sufficientlyregimenting to place Kathy in the mother role; it is very indirect, suggestingthat Kathy has spankedher, when she had insteadclaimed her mother had "yelled"at her. Becauseof this weak projection,Kathy is able to reject it; she proposes a ne* role assignmentfrom her own frame, "Annie." This is the first specific role assignmentto Kathy; note that the marriageof Andy and Kathy was not establishedby Andy's acceptanceof the "Dad" role. Heather is able to integratethis responsewith her ensuing projection by addressingKathy as "Annie." She realizes that her prior statementshave been weakly regimenting.In the sequence(23 - 24), Heather creates a stronglyregimenting movement from Kathy's frame, indexedby the use of "Annie," through the shared"reality" frame indicatedby the useof the first-personpronoun "us," The pragmatics of play 273 andinto Heather'snew frame variation.This movementstrongly projects Heather's role as the child of Kathy, as "Mom." Heather completesthis sequenceby repairing her earlierinconsistent use of "yelled"and "spanked:" (25) H. Daddy, I'm crying'causemy mother gave me a spanking and she velled at me.
5.2.Negotiation of role assignments
In thesefirst utterances,we haveobserved a fairly complexprocess of play negotiation. A closereview indicates that althoughHeather's frame seemsthe most fully developed, evenher frame has evolvedfrom (1) to (25) in responseto the actionsof Andy and Kathy.It would not be correct to say that Heather first conceivedof a fully defined frame,and then projectedit onto the othersthrough her greaterskill and age. At the beginningof the interaction,it seemsclear that Heather was not intendingto create a framewith herselfas the cryingchild; note that her initial projectionwas to have Kathy be crying.If "Kathy crying"had continuedto evolveas the cocreatedframe, Heather couldnot at the sametime be the crying child. But even after statement(25), Heather's new frame is different from Kathy's frame,as seenin (27 - 28): (27) K: Pretend I was crying at the wedding place becauseyou... (28) you guysyelled at me... In Kathy'spersonal frame, the children are still at "the wedding place,"even though Heather has moved beyond this point, and Ardy never agreed to this concept. In addition, Kathy is still crying, as she was in (4). Kathy's frame is inconsistentwith Heather'ssuggestion that Heather be crying due to a punishment from Kathy. Heather'sresponse is interesting:she doesnot attempt to "correct"Kathy; instead,she immediatelyresponds with coherenceto Kathy'sframe, despite its obviousinconsistency with her own: (29) H: No I just told Daddy. (30) I didn't yell.
(31) You aren't [...]since I told Daddy what happened. (32) Mother, I did that because! By continuingto addressKathy as "mother," Heather is implicitly reinforcing the originalbaptismal event of (20). Kathy has still not explicitlyaccepted this projected roleassignment, and we could sayit has not yet moved from Heather'spersonal frame into the cocreatedframe. Andy's commentsin (26) and (34) indicate that his own play frame model is quite different from Heather's and Kathy's models. Statement (26), "I'll kill her," containsno regimentingvalue. It is an implicit attempt to metacommunicatea more 274 KeithSawyer active, violent frame, but it fails to maintain coherencewith any features of the cocreatedframe, and thushas no power. Becauseof its lack of regimentingpower, it is ignored by Heather and Kathy. In (34), Andy is more successfulat projecting his frame variant: (34) A: I'm callingher gramma to keep care of her, every day. (3s) Hi. Kathv... This statementsuccessfully maintains coherence, by use of the deictic pronoun "her," and by referenceto a family relationship,"gramma." Note that it is unclearwhether this pronoun is meant to resolveto Heather or Kathy, sincethere are two different frames in play, one with Heather crying, and one with Kathy crying. Nonetheless,no clarificationor correctionis necessary,because (3a) maintainscoherence with both of theseframes. Even though Andy is callinga distantperson, when he speaksinto the phone saying"Hi, Kathy," Heather correctshim, this time returning to Kathy's frame: (36) H: No, her name is Annie. This is odd, since Andy is clearly not calling the "Annie" character, and since in Heather's frame, Kathy has been assignedthe role of "Mom." This statement is representativeof the confusionthat is often presentin play dialogue.It almost seems like Heather is making an automatic mapping of "Kathy" to "Annie," without first consideringthe full context.Perhaps this is Heather'sway of reinforcingher assignment of "mother" onto Kathy, by reminding everyonethat Kathy can be a mother and still have the name "Annie." Kathy then makes a creativeprojection onto Heather, a new addition to what seemsto be the beginningof a more completelyshared play frame: (38) K: You said "What's the matter." Heather respondsto this projectionas if the projectedevent had alreadyhappened in the past,but then enactsthe event anyway,perhaps for the opportunity to project the "mother" role again; Kathy has still not acceptedHeather as "her child:" (3e) H: I know I did! (40) What'sthe matter.Mother? Finally, Kathy accepts the "mother" role, in (42). Her two-part response is an asymmetricmovement . of explicitness:first, an explicit statement,indicated by past tense,followed by an implicit "within-frame"statement, indicated by present tense: (41) K: You didn't talk like that. (42) You say (sweetly)"What's the matter, Mother?" Thepragmatics of play 275
53. Negotiationof "victim" role
The nextfew utterancesonce againconfuse and alter the two primary framesin action, one in which Kathy is a cryingvictim, the other in which Heather is the victim. The playsituation continues in the presenceof thesetwo different frames.The presenceof thesetwo frames is not a precursorto the eventualcreation of a single stable play frame;in fact,the play drama movesonward without the confusionever being resolved. In (43 - 60), the confusion between the two versions of "who is crying" is negotiated.In (43 - 45), Heather works at resolvingher own spankingand crying,with Kathy'scrying: (43) H: What's the matter Mother? 'Cause (44) I told Dad and all your crimes
(45) [...]Well I had to tell Dad. Throughthis statement,Heather addscontext for her cryingand her responseto "Dad" in statements(19) and (20). In (46),Kathy beginsto acceptHeather's frame projection, that Heatherwas treated badly and shouldbe viewed as the victim: (46) K: lrt's say I was really bad to you. But it's too late; Heather'sframe model has moved on, and she no longer wants to be in the "crying"role. In (47 - 57),Heather becomesangry and slamsthe door, providing a reasonfor Kathy to cry. This is again an asymmetricmovement from Kathy's frame into Heather'sframe through a seriesof parallel statementswhich stronglyregiments Kathy'sresponse: (47) H: Mother I'm sorry about that! (48) I'm very angry! (4e) Bye! (s0) H: And I closedthe door (s1) And you start to cry In thisseries, Heather hasbegun with the frame which Kathy projectedin (a6) (which, note,was originally suggested by Heather in (20 - 27)), in which Heather is the crying victim,and through the asymmetricmovement of (47 - 51), has reformed this into a projectionof her frame, in which KathyMom is crying.Heather continuesto project thisnew variant,by being nice to "mother" and offering gifts. Nonetheless,Kathy has not yet acceptedthe projection:however, its strong regimentingpower forces her to rejectit with a relativelyexplicit metacommunication: (59) K: No, I'm not cryingyet. Soonafter this sequence,the play drama beginsto shift even more rapidly, as Andy projectshis "police"frame, beginningwith (76). Minutes after this transcript segment, 276 KeithSawyer the drama has moved through police,jail, and doctor.The segmentanalyzed above, (1) through (59), is a relativelycohesive series, despite the confusionsand discrepancies noted.
6. Conclusion
While previousresearch has focusedon the analysisof play within a static,shared play frame, the above analysishas elaboratedupon current theory by refining Bateson's concept of metacommunication.At this level of micro-analysis,we have identified specificmetacommunicative strategies, relatively sophisticated interactional techniques which childrenseem competent at manipulating.A secondresult of this approachis the suggestionthat eachindividual maintains a distinct,constantly changing play frame. Of course,a certain minimal level of coherencemust be maintainedbefore children can play together.However, without multiple frames,idiosyncratic interpretations of "what is going on" in play, there is less need for metacommunicativenegotiation. When children become competentat sharinga common play frame, near the age of six, the use of implicit metacommunicationduring play drops dramatically(Auwarter 1986). After this age, rule-governedgame playingis predominant. The above analysis presents Heather as the most adept at implicit metacommunication.She employs the complex poetic projection techniques of asymmetricmovement more frequentlythan Kathy or Andy. Shealso seems better able to make judgementsabout the coherenceof each utterance.This could be expected from her age: she is 5, while the others are under 4. Despite Heather's competent performance,she does not single-handedlycreate and project a single,shared play frame. Each child continuesto maintain an individualisticinterpretation of the play frame; Heather acceptsthis, and works well at shiftingand integratingher own frame goals. Between the extreme of Andy, who marginally participates in this excerpt (althoughfrom (76) onward he is more central),and Heather, Kathy participatesto a greater degreewhile retaininga distinct play frame. This micro-analysisof metacommunicationprovides strong support for the two extensionsto psychologicaltheory suggestedabove: (1) the notion that there are multiple active interpretationsof the play situationaldefinition, each of which can be conceivedof as a "frame;" (2) the notion that the cocreatedplay frame, as well as the individual play frames, are frequently in flux and being negotiated during the play. Existing frame and script views have generallynot addressedthose aspectsof play dialoguehighlighted by the aboveanalysis, including the persistenceof distinctmultiple frames over long periods of interaction,and the combinationof multiple frames in a single utterance (e.g.,the asymmetricmovements of frame which Heather employs). As a rule, current theory hasnot attemptedto analyzethe methodswhereby interaction can occur in the absenceof a clearlyidentifiable, shared interactional definition. In this excerpt, most of the interaction is focusedon the creation of such a definition; the processof creation is the focus,and a stableshared play frame is never achieved. If a shared play frame is never achieved,what is the nature of what we have Thepragmatics of play 277 beencalling the "cocreatedplay frame?" In this transcript,one would be hard-pressed to proposea static,shared play frame structureas the contextfor any singleutterance. The above analysissuggests that the constraintsof the cocreatedplay frame can be thoughtof as the set of indexicalpresuppositions at play prior to the moment of the utterance.Each utteranceoccurs in the presenceof multiple interactionalrealities, and eachof thesemultiple frames is frequentlychanging. While the cocreatedplay frame is, looselyspeaking, the unitary play frame of current theory, perhaps this concept refers not to an independent ontologicalstructure, "shared"in some senseby the participants,but rather to a processof negotiationand changein the discourse.For the childrento play together,they must ensurethat their individualframe interpretations are minimallycompatible, that they intersectat certain key points. Without a certain degreeof intersectionand compatibilityamong the differentialframes, the children are no longerengaging in socialplay. Yet this "cocreatedframe" is often in flux, changing to varyingdegrees with each utterance.The "frame" terminology may be used as a convenientmetaphor for this process;however, to definethe frame as a sharedmental structure,with a static ontological status, seems to neglect the fundamentally negotiatorynature of reality constructionin play.
Appendix
The following transcript is extracted and renumbered from the original in (Giffin 1934). Ellipses in bracketsrefer to unintelligible speech.Participants are Heather, age 5; Andy, age 4; and Kathy, age 3;6.
(1) H. (to K.) You're cryingin the weddingplace. (2) t...1 (3) Make the crying sound. (4) K. ("cries.') (5) H. What's the matter? (6) You want to get married is why? (7\ (to A.) She wants to get married so she'scrying. (8) You should get married. (e) Let's say you guys were already married, OK? (10) A. No! (11) I'm going to put on the song. (r2) (The play stove has become a disco booth.) (13) H. Andy has to put on the song and then he'll dance with you. (14) (to A.) Give me the song. (1s) K. You have to come and dance with mc Andv. (16) A. No I [...] Dad. (17) H. And he can't dance. (18) And you say what's the matter with me, Andy (te) ("cries.') (20) My mother yelled at me. (21) [rt's say you gave me a spanking, Kathy O'Neil. (22) K. No. my name is Annie. (23) H. Annie, let's say you gave me a spanking. (24) And I call you Mom. 278 Keith Sawver
'cause (2s) (to A.) Daddy, I'm crying my mother gave me a spanking and she yelled at me. (26) A. I'll kill her! (27) K. Pretend I was crying at the wedding place becauseyou... (28) you guys yelled ar me (2e) H. No I just told Daddy. (30) I didn't yell. (31) You aren't [...Jsince I told Daddy what happened. (32) Mother, I did that because! (33) A. (settles in a corner with a toy telephone) (34) I'm calling her gramma to keep care of her, every day. (3s) Hi, Kathy. (36) H. No, her name is Annie. (37) A. Annie [...] (38) K. You said'What's the matter." (3e) H. I know I did! (40) What's the matter, Mother? (41) K. You didn't talk like that. nWhat's (42) You say (sweetly) the matter, Mother?' (43) H. (imitating) What's the matter, Mother? 'Cause (44) I told Dad and all your crimes 4s) [...] Well I had ro telt Dad. 46) K. lrt's say I was really bad to you. 47) H. Mother I'm sorry about that! 48) I'm very angry! 4e) Bye! 50) And I closed the door, s1) and you start to cry, s2) and I make you some wedding cake, s3) Mommy, I did something nice for you. 54) I made you a wedding ring cake that you can eat for your own self. ss) (She offers empry angel food cake pan to K.) s6) A. (into "phone") So she can bring all of her toys. s7) H. You can eat it with a spoon if you want. s8) I made something cute for you. 5e) K. No, I'm not crying yet. 60) H. I made something cute for you. 61) Here's one piece of candy. 62) She's my mother. 63) I do nice stuff for her. 64) A. Heather, I called her gamma. 6s) And she's gonna keep... (66) she gonna keep care of her. (67) H. Gramma's gonna keep care of you. (68) A. And she can bring all her toys. (6e) H. Yay! (70) K. She is? (7r) H. And she can bring all her toys. (72) A. And bring all her clothes. (73) H. And bring all her clothes. (74) She's gonna take care of you, Mother. (75) A And I told she spanked you. (76) Now I'm going to call somebodyelse. Thepragmatics of play 279
(17) And tell she yelled at you. (78) Now I'm going to call somebody else. (79) H. The police? (80) A. Yeah. (81) H. The police? (82) A. Yeah. (83) H. Better not. (84) I don't want my mother to get hurt. (85) Or get in jail. (86) She's a very good mother. (87) A. She's going to get hurt and she's going to die. (88) They're going to shoot her. (89) H. (gasp) Oh they're going to shoot you mother! (90) Quick! Get in here and we'll lock the door.
References
Auwarter,M. (1986)Development of communicativeskills: The constructionof fictionalreality in children'splay. In J. Cook-Gumperz, W.A. Corsaro, & J. Streeck (eds.), Children's worlds and children's language.New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 205-230.
Bakhtin,M.M. (1981) Discourse in the novel. In M.M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Inngination. Austin, TX: University of Texas P ress, 259-422.
Bakhtin, M.M. (1936) The problem of speech genres. In M.M. Bakhtin, Speech genres and other late ess(tys.Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 60-102.
Bateson,G. (1955) A theory of play and fantasy. In G. Bateson, Stepsto an ecologt of mind. New York: Chandler, 1972: 177-193. (Reprinted from Ameican Psychiatric Associntion Resenrch Reports, 1955.II: 3e-sr.)
Bareson,G. (1956) The message'This is play." In R.E. Herron & B. Sutton-Smith (eds.),Child's play. New York: Wiley 1971, 261-26f.. (Reprinted from B. Schaffner (ed.), Group processes:Transactions of thesecond conference. New York: Josiah Mary, Jr. Foundation, 1956, 145-151.)
Bretherton, I. (1934) Representing the social world in symbolic play: reality and fantasy. In I. Bretherton (ed.), Symbolicplay: the developntentof social understanding.Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1-41.
Cicourel, A.V. (1974) Cognitive sociologt: Language and nrcaning in social interaction. New York: The Free Press.
Clark, H., & S.E. Haviland (19'7'7)Comprehension and the given-new contract. In R. Freedle (ed.), Discourseproduction and comprehension.Hillsdale, NJ: l-awrence Erlbaum, 1-40.
Corsaro,W.A. (1985) Friendship and peer culture in the eartyyears. Ablex Publishing Corp., Norwood, NJ.
Fein, G.G. (1985) The affective psychology of play. In C.C. Brown & AW. Gottfried (eds.), P/ay interactions:the role of toysand parental involvement in children'sdevelopmenl. Johnson & Johnson Baby 280 Keith sawyer
Products Company, 19-28.
Friedrich, P. (1971) Structural implications of Russian pronominal usage.In W. Bright (ed.), Proceedings of the UCLA sociolinguistics conference, 1964. l-os Angeles: Center for Research in t-anguages and Linguistics, Zl4-259.
Garvey, C. (1982) Communication and the development of social role play. In D. Forbes & M.T. Greenberg (eds.), Children's planning strategies.San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,8l-101.
Garvey, C., & R. Berndt (1977) The organization of pretend play. JSAS Catalogueof SelectedDocuments in Psychologt, 1977, Vol. I, page 107, No. 1589. (Originally presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Chicago, August 1975.)
Giffin, H. (1984) The coordination of meaning in the creation of a shared make-believe reality. In I. Bretherton (ed.), Symbolic play: the developntentof social understanding. Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 73-100.
Goffman, E. (1974) Frame anaSsis: an essay on the organization of expeience. Chicago: Northeastern University Press edition, 1986 (original Harper and Row, 1974).
Grice, H.P. (1967) l,ogic and conversation. The William James Lrctures, Harvard University.
Gumperz, John J. (1982) Discourse strategies.Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Halliday, M.A.K. (1934) I-anguage as code and Ianguage as behavior: A systemic-functional interpretation of the nature and ontogenesis of dialogue. In R.P. Fawcett, M.AK. Halliday, S.M. l,amb, & A. Makkai (eds.), The semiotics of culrure and language,Vol 1: Language as a social semiotic.I-ondon: Frances Pinter, 3-35.
Hasan, R. (1984) Ways of saying: Ways of meaning. In R.P. Fawcett, M.A.K. Halliday, S.M. l-amb, & A. Makkai (eds.), The semiotics of culrure and language, Vol 1: Language as a social semiotic.I-ondon: Frances Pinter, 105-162.
Hymes, D. (1967) Models of the interaction of language and social setting. Ioumal of social issues,23(2): 8-28.
Jakobson, R. (1960) Closing statement: Linguistics and poetics. In T.A. Sebeok (ed.), Sf/e and Language, 350-377.
Jakobson, R. (1971) Shifters, verbal categories, and the Russian verb. In Selectedwitings,vol.2, Word and language.The Hague-Paris:Mouton, I3O-147.
Keenan, E.O. (1974) C.onversational competence in children. Jountal of chitd language,1(2): 163--183.
Keenan, E.O., & B.B. Schieffelin (1976) Topic as a discourse notion: A study of topic in the conversations of children and adults. In C. Li (ed.), Subject and topic.
Kirschenblatt-Gimblett, B. (1979) Speech play and verbal art. In B. Sutton-Smith (ed.), Play and leaming. New York: Gardner Press, 219-238.
Krampen, M. (1981) A bouquet for Roman Jakobson.Semiotica,33Q$:26I-299. The pragmatics of plcry 287 lrvinson, S.C. (1983) Deixis. Chapter 2 in Pragnntics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 54-96.
Mandler, J. H. (1979) Categorical and schematicorganization in memory. In C.K. Puff (ed.), Memory organization and structure, New York: Academic Press, 259-299.
McTear, M. (1985) Children's conversation. London: Basil Blackwell.
Mead, G.H. (1934) Mind, self, and sociery.Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Nelson, K., & J. Gruendel (1979) At morning it's lunchtime: a scriptal view of children's dialogues. Discourseprocesses, 2: 73-94.
Nelson, K., & S. Seidman (1984) Playing with scripts. In I. Bretherton (ed.), Symbolic play: the developntentof social understanding.Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 45-71.
Ochs, E. (1979) Planned and unplanned discourse. ln T. Givon (ed.), Discourse and syntox.
Ochs, 8., & B.B. Shieffelin (1983) Acquiing conversational competence.l,ondon: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Peirce,C.S. (1931) Collectedpapers of Charles SandersPeirce. Vol.2. Eds. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. Burks. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Peters,A.M., & S.T. Boggs (1985) Interactional routines as cultural influences upon language acquisition. In B.B. Schieffelin & E. Ochs (eds.), Language socialization across cultures. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
Philips,S.U. (1972) Participant structures and communicative competenc€:Warm Springs children in community and classroom. In C.B. Cazden, V.P. John, & D. Hymes (eds.), Functions of language in the classroom.New York: Columbia University Teacher's College Press.
Piaget,J. (192611955)The language and thought of the child. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Piaget, J. (1962) Play, dreants and initation in childhood. New York: Norton.
Schank,R.C., & R.P. Abelson (1977) Scripts, plans, and knowledge. In P.N. Johnson-Laird & P.C. Wason (eds.), Thinking: readings in cognitive science.New York: Cambridge University Press, 4Zl-432.
'coherence" Schegloff,E.A. (1990) On the organization of sequencesas a source of in talk-in-interaction. In B. Dorval (ed.), Conversational organization and its development. Nonvood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp,5I-77.
Schegloff,8.A.,and H. Sacks (1973) Opening up closings.Semiotica,S:289-327.
Senderovich,S. (1982) Rhythm, trope, myth: The early poeticsof Roman Jakobson. Semiotica,4O(314): 347-3',70.
Silverstein,M. (1976) Shifters, linguistic categories,and cultural description. In K. Basso & H. Selby (eds.),Meaning in anthropologt. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 11-55.
Silverstein,M. (1979) l-anguage structure and linguistic ideology. In P.R. Clyne (ed.), The elements:A I 282 Keith Sawyer parasession on linguistic units and levels. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, 193-247.
'poetry'of Silverstein,M. (1981) On the pragmatic prose:Parallelism, repetition, and cohesivestructure in the time course of dyadic conversation. In D. Schiffrin (ed.), Meaning form, and use in context: Linguistic applications, 181-198.
Smifansky, S. (1968) The effects of sociodramatic pltry on disadvantaged preschool children New York: Wiley.
Sperber, D., & D. Wilson (1985) Relevance: contnunication and cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Stankiewicz, E. (1983) Commemorative essay:Roman Jakobson.Semiotica,44(Il2): I-20.
Stryker, S., & A. Statham (1985) Symbolic interaction and role theory. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (eds.), The handbook of social psychologt,3rd edition. New York: Random House, 311-378.
Sutton-Smith, B. (1979) Epilogue: Play as performance.In B. Sutton-Smith (ed.),Play and leaming.New York: Gardner Press, 295-322.
Vygotsky, L.S. (1982) Thought and language.(Translated by E. Hanfmann & G. Vakar). Cambridge: The MIT Press (original publication in Russian, 1934).