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May 8,

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OIJt.4 SOVIET ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE CESSATION OP JEWISH

EMIGRATION PROM W E SOVIET UNION

BY

CRAIG M. ROSENBERG

1HESIS

for the

DEGREE OP BACHELOR OP ARTS

IN

LIBERAL ARTS AND SCIENCES

College of Liberal Arts and Sciences

University of Illinois

Urbana, Illinois

1984 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE...... I

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Chapter I. Soviet Antipathy for Jews .... 8

II. Why the Emigration Began ...... 24

III. Why the Exodus Ended ...... 31 37 NOTES ...... 39 APPENDIX ......

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 40 PREFACE

As an undergraduate preparing a senior thesis for my history degree I gave a fair amount of thought to the necessity or propriety of including a preface in my work, 1 assume that routinely people in my position do not include a preface. How­ ever, I determined that I was obliged to do so in order to give a context to my work and to acknowledge certain people who honestly inspired me to grapple with this most difficult question of emi­ gration of Soviet Jews# or more correctly the lack of emigration of Soviet Jews. I must begin by saying that during the course of my research the composition of my thesis shifted rather sig­ nificantly. I intended to do a systematic Study of what caused the Soviets to so drastically curtail the exodus of the Jews,

X learned, though, that one absolutely must consider another issue when dealing with Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. This issue is the Soviet attitude toward the Jews and their treatment of these pennle. Initially, I felt this was too large an issue to properly address and believed that to deal with it was to create a hopeless nuagmire, I realize now that understanding this prob­ lem (and I must admit that problem is a quite mild word, probably tragedy is more precise) of Jews in the Soviet Union must involve numerous complexities and vagaries# but the pursuit is still worth­ while, This area of study is rich in paradox and contradiction.

Moreover, the nature of study must be speculative (since the Soviet government will not honestly comment on what motivated them to end emigration) and therefore can be terribly frustrating^, Nevertheless one has an obligation to honestly investigate the question he faces* In this spirit I have chosen to devote a great deal of consideration to Soviet anti-Semitism: it is the necessary con­ text for the issue of emigration* One must understand that

Soviet policy toward the exit of Jews from Soviet society is a facet of Soviet attitudes towards Jews in their society*

The cornerstone year in my study is 1979. In this year approximately Si,000 Jews left the U.S.S.R. In 1983 about 1,300

Jewish people were able to emigrate: this represents about two * percent of the total of four years before* And the decline is even worse today. I approach this question as a student of his­ tory. I am trying to understand one dimension of the tragic history of the Jews in the Soviet Union* But the history I study is contemporary, an uncommon situation for an historian*

Hence, I find that the study of history and political science becomes tangled at times. I have done my best to deal with this matter as ashistorian. I am not the one to judge if I have succeeded.

Lastly, 1 must state that it is very difficult to deal with

such an emotional issue in an unbiased way. I, as a Jew, have

very strong feelings on the subject. I have always tried to

remain intellectually honest and open to the evidence. In this

pursuit I have been greatly assisted by several people. Fivst,

Marillyn Tallman of Chicago Action for Soviet Jewry has b e e n

wonderful example of what caring people are involved in the

movement to save Soviet Jewry. Secondly, I owe a great debt

to the staff of the Slavic Library of the University of Illinois

*See Appendix ' ® 3 - ! ' * - • '- < ^ * ..,* -- J - , '* 7 lJ;'i®':* f # *»>; * * * ’’*• 5 Jj* i ' -; ' ^ '.«**k' l - ' s .- i"i "■ ' ’

1 X1

and my Russian friends there. Specifieslly. Irina and

George have helped me to see what it is like to be a Jew in the

Soviet Union and why they had to leave. Lastly, and most impor­

tantly, I dedicate this paper to Yacov, Janetta and Elina,

They know the suffering of the Soviet Jews better than any of

us can, for they have been waiting for permission to emigrate

for the past twelve years. INTRODUCTION

Why did the Soviet union atop letting Jews emigrate?

A at raight-forward question, one would logically hope for an equally direct answer. That is the last thing that I am able to offer. I am convinced that no one can ever tho­ roughly know what motivated the Soviets. First, I do not believe that the cessation of emigration was a carefully calculated and thoughtfully advanced policy. I confidently assert that if the hierarchy of the Soviel Union was prepared

to honestly address this question none of them would be able

to answer it. Their policy of repression of Jewish emigration represents a culmination of numerous anti-Jewish policies. More* over, no one should wonder whether the Soviets would care to honestly deal with this issue. They would not. Inevitably,

if one were to ask a Soviet leader why Jewish emigration has

ceased he would reply, 11 No more want to leave? all the trouble­

makers are gone." The hundreds of thousands of Jews anxiously

awaiting permission to emigrate are positive proof that such

is not the case. Therefore, I must begin my thesis by stating

that I doubt I will prove anything. This is not to say that

I believe my work is inconclusive. Rather, 1 feel all must

realize that study of Soviet policy-making has to be speculative

in nature.

The questions I «n asking are important enough to justify

my inquiries and the need for speculation. While few firm answers

-1* Will be forthcoming* careful, educated speculation may certainly advance several reasonabla theories to explain what motivates

Soviet Policy* In addition, much knowledge is gained by seeking answers to specific questions and even when clear answers are not found the knowledge gathered during the process of trying to find answers may be invaluable* For example, in attempting to understand the causes of the end of emigration one definitely must try to understand how the course of U*S*-Soviet relations impacts upon their internal policy* One probably will not discern any definitive causal relationship between the state of relations between these two superpowers and specific Soviet internal action* However, one will gain valuable insight into the unique nature of relations between these two superpowers and the ramifications of their relationship. So 1 would say that the lack of ability to show absolute proof is outweighed by the advantages that accrue from this process of questioning*

A corollary to the problem of the speculative nature of this study is a problem of methodology* How does one most responsibly gather evidence that will illustrate the problems of Jewish emigration? Again, the best evidence is in the hands of the Soviets* Furthermore, as an undergraduate with a limited knowledge of Russian and access only to the library at my own university, not any archives, X felt an obligation to determine in what way I could make the greatest contribution to an under­ standing of this issue* 1 determined that X would do best to accept my limitations and seafch for ways to creatively capi^ talise on my position. Many scholars more qualified than myself have dealt it length with question# of Soviet Jewry. She

statistics they have compiled and the breadth of their studies

are most impressive and served as very useful tools to me in my

research. I decided that the best way for me to make an original

contribution was in the role of a synthesizer* I have tried

to devote the majority of my research to primary sources. And whenever possible I have used statements of Soviet Jews to

try to piece together a picture of what it is like to be a

in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and what it is like

to leave or not to be able to leave. The congress of the United

States has been most diligent in holding hearings on the crisis

of the Soviet Jews. These hearings have been most useful to

me in that the Congressmen have put together an impressive

array of experts and people who have actually experienced the

gulag that is the Soviet Union. I have spent much time

looking through newsletters of American agencies for Soviet Jews

and in doing so I have been able to enhance my drawing of the

life of a Soviet Jew. The large emigre community at the Uni­

versity of Illinois has also served as an informative and fas­

cinating source. My greatest contribution can be made as one

who attempts to bring together the results of historical re­

search and human emotion to try to understand what has hap­

pened to the great movement of Jewish emigration from the

Soviet Union.

As I have previously mentioned, in order to understand

what has caused this movement to grind to a hault one must have a proper context. First, one must understand how the Soviet government feels about Jews. In fact, I think it is beneficial to have a knowledge of traditional Russian anti-

Semitism during the times of the tsars. However, that discussion is necessarily held for another time simply because an analysis of the issue would transcend the scope of this work. Still, I will briefly try to illustrate that anti-Semitism ia an almost institutionalised part of Russian life. The Soviet govern­ ment is blatantly anti-Semitic today. Except for the end of

Stalin’s reign when Jews were being murdered, the regime has probably never been so anti-Jewiah. 1 believe these feelings account for much of their policy on emigration,

:! stated above that I thought a context was necessary to . study the question of Jewish emigiat ion, l believe that the second requisite aspect of creating that context is a specific appr^a^h to the cessation of Jewish emigration. After the

1/160 in the Soviet inion ?r«»*t ly incr** nr, virulent attacks against n o n ism or'more truth! -ly against

'Jews* Ifieir goal was undoubtedly a further repression «*monq

their eitiaeory of feelings of Jewish pride. program was

counter-productive, Jewish nationalism #roee-.s^-a scale never

m m under the Joviet government. and under these owtdi t ions

..the Jewish exodus movement .began in the lStdg. i believe that

m order to understand why after It** the Soviets stepped letting Jews eeigxate it is mm important m understand why -5- they ever started* That the Soviets would not allow Jews or anyone else to leave their country does not surprise me in the least— this is totally in keeping with their policies. But if we can understand why they ever let Jews out in the first place then there is a good chance we can identify a change in climate or conditions that made them stop letting the Jews out.

Therefore, 1 find a discussion of the beginning of the emigre-* \ tion movement is most in order.

Thirdly# 1 would suggest an approach that I do not find especially widely advocated. I believe that Soviet policy is determined more by their cast of mind than by reaction to specific events. Of course I will argue that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the resulting actions played a significant role in the decrease of Jewish emigration. I think, though, that Soviet response to external events is based on their propensity to view events from within their very limited framework of interpretation. To be more blunt, I believe that the policy-makers in the Kremlin are a group of very conservative, paranoid men who look at all events, necessarily, through the eyes of Marxist-Leninista? that they are very influenced by the Stalinist system they rose through? and that their actions are determined more by this mind-set than by any set of logical criteria. 1 consider an understanding of the Soviet mentality as critical for one who wishes to

interpret their policy* Therefore, 1 approach the problem of

the stoppage of emigration as mm who recognises that events -6- influeneed this policy, but also as one who feels that the

Soviet system and its hierarchy was always likely to decide to end emigration.

I would now shift gears slightly and speak to some issues that must be discussed as a necessary background or preliminaries to the subject at hand. I invariably find that certain miscon­ ceptions prevail when discussing Jews in the Soviet Union* this is most understandable due to the unique situation of Jews in that country* Jews are much more than a religious group in the Soviet t.;nion. In fact, I do not think that Jews are a religious group in that country. The overwhelming majority of Jews there have no idea of what it means to be Jewish*

They have received no religious instruction, have no communal gatherings and no sort of Jewish hostel if e. Jews are a nation­ ality An. the lioviet Union. Every citizen of the Soviet Union has an internal and on it is stamped his or her nationality* whether a Jew is from Russia or the or

Georgia, the passport is still stamped Yevrei--Jew. There are certain inherent contradictions in Soviet treatment of

the Jews that I will address in greater detail later. I will

simply mention here that a supposed goal of the Soviets is

assimilation of the Jews* The Jews are not allowed to study

their religion or their history and suffer restrictions that

are forbidden by the Soviet Constitution and are not imposed

on any other group* Everything is done to make the Jew forget -7- he is a J«v, And yet, any time the Jew looks at his passport

(and he must use it quite frequently) he is reminded that he is a Jew. This paradox makes one question the true intent of

Soviet policy towards the Jews.

I mention that the Jew is treated more harshly than mem* bers of other groups. It is not tr-s# as many assert, that what happens to the Jews happens to members of all religious groups. First, as I have shown# the Jews are viewed as a nationality. Secondly, limitations that may be imposed on members of religious groups would only be imposed on those who practice their religion. Jews are discriminated against on many different levels and much of the repression is against people who are not concerned with religion and merely have

a Jewish name. And thirdly, the attacks against the Jews are more stringent than attacks on other religious groups. The

Soviet Union is a closed society and as such certain repression

is inflicted upon all citizens. The topic of my paper is not

Soviet inequality and I am not addressing Soviet policies

against all of her citizens. To the extent that Soviet policy

is directed against all citizens equally it is not pertinent

to this discussion. That some Soviet policies are rooted in

anti-Semitism and are directed against Jews for no other reason

than they are Jews, does bear upon the question at hand. Chapter I

Soviet Antipathy for Jews

A discussion of the feelings of the Soviet regime for its Jewish citizens is incredibly intricate. The official

Soviet line varies greatly from the actions of the regime.

The Soviet distrust and contempt extends far beyond Soviet aversion to religion. I believe much of the anti-Jewish feeling in the Soviet Union can be traced back to the time when Russia was ruled by the tsars and groups like the Black Hundreds prevailed. The examples of traditional Russian anti-Semitism are endless, one may stop and think of so very many of the

Jews in America or Israel today and wonder why their grand­ parents left Russia. Of course they were looking for a better

life and all the things every immigrant looks for. but the

fear of pogroms that were tolerated and even endorsed by the

Russian government was no small factor in their decisions to

leave. One powerful example of Russian cruelty to the Jews

comes to mind and serves to illustrate how Jews were treated.

Osar Nicholas developed a policy of drafting Jewish boys into

the army in order to force them to convert. The. boys- were

taken away at the age of twelve and forced to serve for thirty-

one years. 1 In addition, visions of Jews as Christ-killers

and beliefs in blood rituals helped make Russian people leery

of Jews and antagonistic towards them. 'Ihe Soviet regime 9- continues to expand upon this age-old Russian hatred for Jews.

One who reads Soviet statements concerning socialist attitudes towards religion would undoubtedly be impressed by the spirit of toleration that is displayed. However, one who believes all he reads in Soviet publications would be incredibly naive. Konstantin Chernenko writes in his book Human Rights in Soviet Society that

Defending the rights of believers, an

attitude of trust by the Soviet state to

the church, is one of the principles of

socialist law. 'The USSR Constitution

guarantees to Soviet citizens the right

to profess any religion and to conduct

religious worship, and prohibits incite­

ment of hostility or hatred on religious 2 grounds.*

Aa historian has an obligation to honestly evaluate both sides of an issue and present a balanced view of his findings.

Nevertheless, such an impartial interpretation of Chernenko's work is impossible. The above quote illuminates two aspects of the Soviet government. First, one sees a Soviet leader falling back on lofty passages of the Soviet Constitution to prove an argument. Second, one finds a very high ideal ringing hollow in light of Soviet practices. 1 believe two lies are present* That the Soviet Union is dedicated to religious freedom is a lie* That Konstantin Chernenko believes all citizens can profess their religious beliefs is a great lie*

In no way is he gullible enough to believe that*

I include this passage in order to admit a bias that I have, and that I feel all who study the Soviet system must have* One must take cynicism to new heights in order to properly evaluate evidence that the Soviets offer. I believe that there is something which by now is inherent in the Russian and indeed the Soviet government, which is anti-Jewish. When one analyzes all the actions that have been taken against the

Jews and tries to understand why these terrible things have taken place, one invariably finds that the only possible reason is to strike out at the Jews* Why else would a man be deprived of living with his wife and children or visiting his dying parents? what state secrets can a man who worked

as a cook in the army have? Why are children called "Jew pigs" by their fellow students and why do the teachers allow

this? Mo logical reason exists for Soviet policy towards Jews*

The first lesson I learned about the study of the Soviet

Union was that logic has little to do with understanding Soviet

policy, Logic only serves as a limitation in the pursuit of

understanding the Soviet regime. I remember that I was reading

about Stalinism and trying to discern the basis of forced

collectivization in order to fund industrialization. I -11- real i2ed that the policy made no sense* Stalin murdered so many and wasted so many resources that his whole program was counter-productive. But Stalin was a very disturbed man and considerations of morality or propriety were irrelevant to him.

I regret that I must state that the leaders of the Soviet Union today, who rose up under Stalin and were indoctrinated in his system, are also unconcerned about decency and moral imperatives. Moreover, I believe a very convincing argument can be made that the main concern of Soviet leaders today is retaining power in their own hands and not the good of the nation. Soviet policy towards the Jews is not based upon con­

siderations of state? it is based upon hatred.

I will show that Soviet assertions concerning the Jews

are based on traditional anti-Semitism and that much of the

propaganda is borrowed from the Nazis. The Soviet government

claims that it opposes international Zionism, which is called

fascism, but that it is devoted to its Jewish citizens. That

is a lie* Sophisticated techniques are used to ensure that the

people of the Soviet Union equate Zionism and Judaism. Soviet

people are overwhelmingly susceptible to these arguments for

they live in a closed society and do not have access to any

information except that endorsed by the government. I know a

man named George Durman who emigrated from the Soviet Union

several years ago. He pointed out to me that when one has

read nothing but the state-sponsored interpretation of all 12- events for one's whole life it is very difficult to realise what is true. George Durman was always distrustful of the Soviet government and felt that what he read in Pravda or Izvestia was untrue« but he says that he still had a difficult time determining what was true or false. All of lif»* is permeated with the government position. Only those who are extremely determined will be able to learn the truth: for the rest it

is much easier to believe the government. And, therefore, when the issue is Jews and the people are not sympathetic

anyhow, why should a person make a great effort to find out -j if all Jews are Zionists or if Zionists really are murderers? .3

The point I am making is that the regime uses all avail­

able tools to make life unpleasant for Jews. Many will argue

that life is much more than unpleasant for Jews-it is impossible

to be a Jew in the Soviet Union. Herein lies the first paradox

that 1 mentioned would be forthcoming in the analysis of

being a Jew in the Soviet Union. It is impossible to be a

Jew in the Soviet Union and it is impossible for a Jew not to

be a Jew in the Soviet Union. I think statistics and expert

statements and the like are all very good and all have their

own purpose: however, I think that the desperation of the

Soviet Jews is best conveyed by those who are experiencing it.

Yuri Tarnepolsky is a Soviet Jew who was arrested on March IS.,

1983 because he wanted to emigrate to Israel. That is the real

reason for his arrest: the official reason is "anti-Soviet

V • - . 1 .. 13 agitation and propaganda with the intent to defame the Soviet

State*N While engaged in a hunger strike he wrote a letter explaining his actions and portraying the life of a Jew who asks to leave. He writes

Dear Friends,

I see that the reason for my hunger

strike is probably obscure for you* I

am going to explain myself one more time*

My point of view is not personally narrow*

I see all the history of the Jews, and 1

see its last tragic chapter, the holocaust*

This chapter is not history for me because

I am living it* £ emphasis added £

I see and I am convinced that my eyes do

not deceive me: The moral holocaust, a

new way to exterminate the Jews, has teen

devised and perfected % It's an exter­

mination, well emneuf laced and slow*

That's why neither public opinion nit

the victims themselves can see its real

nature because they ere sensitised to the

physical extermination only* And even if

they see it, they substitute action to

hope m te|*i to humility % The M i l it 14-

the world are separated. Where are the

guards of the morality* conscience* and

honor of our ancient people? I am neither

a judge nor a prophet. But, I cry like

our ancient prophets cried. We, the

Refuseniks, myself and my family, are

we to be sacrificed to give again a

lesson to the Jews of the world? Wasn’t

the proceeding lesson sufficient? My strike

and my statement have been only so that

this question can be shouted as loudly as

I could. But not all people like it when

someone yells in their ears. As of my

personal situation* it is for the next

time. About this, if I am arrested, I will

not take any part in the inquest and at the

trial. I will not answer the questions

and I won’t sign anything so I will not take

part knowingly in the illegality of the

proceedings, and therefore, will not give

it an air of legality. Thank you, my

friend., for your warm hearts.

Thi. letter i. a very moving testament to what is happening to the Soviet Jews. I quote the letter in ita entirety because of the essential nature of its contents. This man believes that the Jews are again being exterminated and many people agree. T hope all will understand that the evidence I cite cannot be viewed separately; it is part of a program a- gainst the views. And this anti-Semitism is not directed only against vocal Jews, the “troublemakers,H but against all

Jews. Admittedly not all Jews are rotting in prison like

Tarnapoiaky or Scharansky, but all Jews in the Soviet Lnicn

are affected by this campaign.

I have the burden of proof to show that all Jews suffer

from this hatred, which is a.difficult thing to prove. How

does one show that not only activists are tormented by anti-

Semitism? A certain amount of willingness to accept the like­

lihood that all are victimized is necessary. By this I mean

that one cannot positively prove that all Jews suffer, but can % show that this is most likely. For instance, consider a new

game that is played in Soviet schools with the toleration of

the teachers. The game is called concentration camp. A

Jewish child is given a number and then is referred to by that 4 number rather than by his or her name over a period of days.

This cruelty is indicative of what Jews have to live with, I

have spoken at great length with a woman named Irina Faynailburg

who is s Jewish emigre from the Soviet Union, She was never

an activist and she did not leave for religious reasons,

in order to be free and live a fulfilling life with her family. She has spoken of the torment that Jew! face in

the Soviet Union. She stated that she came from a large family with about fifty grandchildren in it and said that of

all these people only two considered themselves to be Jews—

she and her brother. Another paradox in this scheme of paradoxes

that X have noticed is that while none of them will consider

themselves to be Jews, one may be sure that the authorities will view them as Jews. It is both interesting and depressing

to note that the criteria the Soviets use to determine if some**

one is Jewish is quite similar to that of the Nazis— if one

grandparent is Jewish then the person is Jewish.

Before continuing I think some general comments will

unify my line of argumentation and clarify some points. First#

I would like to reaffirm my reason for this in-depth discussion

of anti-Jewish policies and sentiment. The goal is to under­

stand why basically no Jews can leave the soviet Union today

and in the 19?0s hundreds of thousands left. I think that the

best we can do is to recognize how Soviets feel about Jews and

then# in that light, try to determine why they stopped allowing

emigration. Secondly, I think a clarification of definition

would be useful, but unfortunately is impossible. More

specifically, who is a Jew in the Soviet Union? A person who

has mixed parents may choose to be designated as a Jew or as

the nationality of the other parent. The person makes this

dpeice at the age of sixteen. However# Soviets would be aware

ef.ftie person's lineage and would keep the person out of fields prohibited to Jews, such as positions of prominence within the

Party. So is that person a Jew? During the 1970s when Jews were allowed to emigrate there were phony marriages taking

place. Irina Faynzilburg explained to me that a person would

pay a Jew to marry them, use the marriage to emigrate, and

then get divorced. Also, Jews who had never considered them­

selves Jews used their Jewishness to emigrate and then con­

verted, Tfie subtleties of the issue are amazing. One must

be co^ftifint Of the fact that even Jews who try to be Jews

snd learn about their religion have very little sense of what

it is to be Jewish. It is simply impossible for them to live

a full Jewish life in the Soviet Union, they have heard only

terrible things about the Jews and most do not have support

groups, ruch as a synagogue or social group, to provide them

with positive reinforcement. All of the Jews I know who have

left say that they had no idea what it was to be a Jew. Rita

Gluzman, a Soviet Jew who emigrated to Israel with her son

and left her husband behind, had been separated from him for

two years when she testified before a Congressional Hearing.

And what I read in this newspaper today is

that there is no freedom in this country ^tlSSQ/.

Yes, there are no concentration camps for

us yet in this country. But our spirit

is not free and the first quest for people,

if you are not stupid*, is spirit. Ihen 18

your heart. We have freedom where to live,

but if our spirit is not free, and we can*t

be proud that we are Jews— and if we have

to remember every day and every minuce

that we are Jews because it is written

in the first page in our passport and if

you want to enter a university or travel,

in every place you go in this country, the

first question is your nationality and you

write "Jew," and because of this you can't

get a visa, this and this and this, and

many other things, and you have troubles*

And from the other side, I don't know

what it means to be a Jew, The firs*

time 1 saw the Hebrew alphabet in my

life was when I came to Israel, There is

not one Hebrew book in this country: not 5 one Hebrew school in this country* Nothing,

Rita Gluzman speaks of this terrible paradox that I mentioned--

Jews have no peace. They cannot live as Jews, but they are constantly reminded that they are Jews, Prom a religious

standpoint it is truly impossible to live as a Jew because, in

spite of what Chernenko states, Jews are prevented from observing

their religion. No Jew is allowed to learn Hebrew. Ironically,

Russians who are going into the KGB or similar ogranizetions 19 are allowed to learn Hebrew. There are about fifty temples and a handful of rabbis for between two and three million

Jews, while Christianity and other religions are not encouraged, they do not face the obstacles that Judaism does.

Moreover, as I previously stated, the Soviets view the

Jews as a nationality. All nationalities are guaranteed pro* tections under the Soviet Constitution. They are allowed to have their own forms of education, to form and join organizations, and to have publications in their native tongue. Of the more than one hundred nationalities in the Soviet Union, only the

Jews are prevented from publishing in their own language or meeting together. There are no Jewish organizations in the

Soviet Union. The Jews are not allowed to communicate with their co-religionists in other countries as other groups are.

The discrimination against Jews in education is great.

William Korey, the Director of B'nai B ’rith International

Policy Research, writes that

According to samizdat information, Jews are

kept out of the best higher educational

institutions in Moscow through the tech­

nique of having specially selected examiners

give them unusually difficult oral exam­

inations in mathematics and physics....

The situation in the rest of the USSR,

to judge from earlier data, no doubt -20-

6 parallels the Moscow experience.

Dr. Korey discusses one important way in which the government acts against the Jews— unfair admission standards to univer­ sities. Historically the Jews in Russia have been a vital part of the intelligentsia, but these discriminatory practices prevent the Jews from continuing to be a force. Already Jews are prevented from rising in the ranks in the Party, military or other important areas. Dr. Korey continues by stating that

For Soviet Jews, the evidence points to an

overwhelmingly desperate future. If until

the late sixties, they played a major role

in the technological and cultural elite,

(though not in political, diplomatic or

security-related spheres), it was largely

a consequence of a fairly open, merit- oriented university admissions policy.

That has come to an end. Discrimination

is certain to reduce to a minimum the number

of Jews permitted to enter the key scienti­

fic and higher technical areas....What

with their educational future doomed and

anti-Semitism continuing, it is hardly

surprising that the...refusenik document

would warn 'that the Jews of the USSR are 7 facing the threat of a national catastrophe. 1

;;:S - ; k f e - k k ■ v--; i k ; Jk k k . i ' . k k ih -M im E k S k C / o i A ; :Mr These discriminatory practices are not in the best interests of the Soviet Union. It would take far too long to list the contributions of Jews in that country, but one must be aware that Jews have given much to that country and the only motive for these actions can be anti-Semitism.

Before concluding the discussion of anti-Semitic programs in the Soviet Union one further development should be included.

Pravda reported in its issue of April 2 2 , 1983 that an Anti- o Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public had been formed.

There can be no doubt that the organization is directed against the Jews. Anti-Semitic literature has been thriving in the

Soviet Union. One particularly repulsive, but popular, notion is that Zionists collaborated with Hitler. As far-fetched as this is, I have been told that many Soviet citizens seem to believe it. A letter written by a Leningrad Refusenik indicates the scope and severity of this campaign.

Some days ago I have seen a new Television

Programme. I have never seen anything like

it. It was told that Zionists seized power

everywhere, banks, newspapers, governments.

They are even selling icons, crosses, etc.,

in emigrant shop&. Just after this we

have seen Israeli tanks and aeroplanes,

Beirut on fire, crying Arab children,

parading Israeli soldiers, murdered Arabs 22

in Sabra and Chatilla camps. Just after

this, the quote: "Final Solution” was

mentioned, without them mentioning whom

it was directed against. After this we

were given some explanation of Jewish

"choseness"^tlews as the chosen peopl§7

by Yassir Arafat. Then it was told that

Jews were speaking too much about their

victims during the Second World War.

Towards the end, the faces of several

Jewish leaders were shown and it was told

that all these people are enemies of all

that is good in humanity and that any

kind of mercy toward them is a crime Q against humanity.

Soviet citizens are inundated with these disgusting anti-

Semitic slurs. Jews are shown to be outsiders: they are not true Russians or Georgians or Ukrainians. How can it be argued that the goal of Russian policy is assimilation and that is why Jews are prevented from having their own separate heritage? Can one wonder if this is normal Soviet policy

towards a religious group? The answer is absolutely not.

The Soviet government itself states that the Jews are a

national group, not a religious one. The Soviets are op- -23- posed to the Jews, In a country where the dominant attitude is that there are no rights, only privileges, can one be surprised at the ill-treatment given to a despised minority?

Now that one can have a perspective on how the Soviet govern­ ment views the Jews and treats them, a more specific discussion of emigration is desirable. Chapter II

Why the Emigration Began

A discussion of how the Jewish emigration from the

Soviet Union began is much simpler than an understanding of why that same exodus movement has ceased. One has the advan­ tage of more than a decade to mull over the beginnings and consider the causes. In addition, relations between the

Soviet Union and the United States were much warmer than now and one may identify bargaining chips that each side was playing with. Considering that the purpose of the analysis of how emigration began is to provide a context for the primary discussion of why the emigration stopped, this dis­

cussion will be necessarily brief* The main point I would

stress Is that there was a time when the Soviets felt it was

desirable to compromise on Jewish emigration in order to ful­

fill higher objectives. Dr. Maurice Friedburg characterizes

the Jews of the Soviet Union as hostages. I am sure he is

right. The Soviet leadership does not operate under the same

constraints as the United States government. Decisions are

not made on the basis of morality or what seems to be logical

policy. No one in the Kremlin worries about how its decisions

affect people's lives, when the ransom being offered is high

enough, they will let Jews out. But today they do not feel

24 -25- enough is being offered to make it worthwhile to let the

Jews go* And so there is no more emigration.

The key is understanding why* during the 1970s, the

Soviets felt it was in their interests to let the Jews leave and why they no longer feel that way today. One should keep

in mind the nature of the Soviet regime. It is an oligarchy

ruled by considerations of practicality. I find it curious

that the Soviets are no longer willing to take advantage of

the United States. By this I mean that during detente the

Soviets let Jews out because they had to in order to trade

with the United States. And most will agree that the Soviet#

did very well in this process. I know that they could still

profit by dealing with the U.S. government and that is Why 1

find it strange that no negotiating is taking place* The

inflexibility of both governments certainly has much influ*

ence on this standstill, but I will speak to that subject later.

Two facts must be kept in mind when discussing how Jews

have been able to leave the Soviet Union in the past, but are

no longer able to do so. First, one must realize the direct

correlation between the state of u.s.-Soviet relations and

policy concerning Jewish emigration. The influence of the

united States on Soviet Jews is so great as to virtually

overshadow all other considerationi, second, one should bear

in mind what Dr. Korey calls "the essential marginality of

the Soviet Jewish problem."*0 Jews make up one or two percent -26- of the Soviet papulation and are not at all crucial to the

regime. A distinction between the Jews who desire emigration

and the dissidents should be made. The Jews want to leave the

Soviet system--they have no interest in reforming it. The

dissent movement fundamentally challenges the system for it

desires change. Therefore, one may see that Jews constitute

less of a threat. So, despite Soviet rhetoric, Jews are not

a great threat and not very important to them. In a system

like the Soviet one repression is no problem. The Soviets are

more than capable of tolerating unhappy Jews since the Jews

have no way of internally protesting. When the Soviet Jews

were able to impact upon Soviet international relations the

story was quite different.

To state that no emigration would have taken place with­

out detente is, I believe, to state the obvious. As I have

stated| the Soviet# were quite capable of tolerating Jewish

unrest within.their country. However, when the Soviets wanted

to deal with the United States and a policy of linkage between

trade and emigration was advanced, then the Soviets were

faced with a decision. Dr. Korey writes

Lagging productivity rates within the

U*S*S#R* enhanced the drive for detente

and trade. The Soviet Union sought to

acquire from the west large-scale advanced

technology, including computers and and electronics in addition to a variety

of other goods and equipment, in order to

achieve the objectives of its faltering

economic plan* And the acquisition o*

these commodities required massive credits

from the West, an aspiration which was

ineluctably linked to the reduction of

tensions which detente would bring about.

Thus, a certain degree of Jewish emigration

was finally allowed in order both to dimin­

ish a potentially explosive situation

within the U.S.S.R. generated by a dis­

affected and alienated activism among

various categories of Jews, and to pacify

an outraged Western public opinion that

would have certainly circumscribed and

possibly even prevented negotiations for

detente and trade*

Before continuing I should clarify a point I made. I stated

that the Soviets could tolerate Jewish protest. This is true.

But Dr. Korey points out that one of the motivations for eased

emigration was to prevent an explosive situation in regard

to the Jewi* 'fills is also true. X believe that the two state m tits are not contradictory, while the Soviets can manage the -aa-

Jews, they would still prefer not to have to deal with theft.

By letting some out they felt they could avert the problem and also reap material benefits from the West*

THi true cause of the emigration was the Jackson-Vanik

Amendment. This amendment forced the Soviets to face the prob­ lem of the Soviet Jews# In order for the Soviets to receive most-favored-nation status from the united States they had to do something about emigration. Again, Dr. Korey provides an

insightful analysis of the situation.

while the Soviet authorities have, since

1971, accepted the principle of Jewish

emigration, they have nonetheless imposed

brutal and callous restraints designed to

limit and manage the emigration process in

order to soften any internal negative im­

pact and increase potential benefits for

the Soviet state. Eased emigration procedures,

later effected, became a bargaining chip

for realizing Soviet desiderata. The

central issue was not the principle of emi­

gration, but rather the harassment and

intimidation that kept the rate of

emigration low. Ttm 1973-74 Jackson-Vanik

Amendment, with its linkageof trade and

credits to the removal of such obstacles, had 12 precisely this objective in mind. 29-

As Dr. Korey has stated, the leaders of the Soviet Union, when determining their policy, will always weigh the advantages they expect to realize versus the losses they can anticipate.

The relative unimportance of the Jews to the Soviet hierarchy has already been discussed. Also, the importance of trade and receiving credits has also been mentioned. The choice for the

Soviet government was clear. They would let some Jews emi­ grate in return for fulfilling these much more important objectives.

As I said earlier, I believe that understanding the moti­ vation for the implementation of Jewish emigration is relatively simple. Understanding why this stopped is not. A miscalcula­

tion on the part of the Soviets is important to keep in mind.

Irina Faynzilburg, who was still in the Soviet Union at the

time the emigration began, speaks of the nature of the movement.

She states that the first to leave left for religious reasons

and were the leaders of the movement* She ..says,." It' i a always hardest for the first to leave. They are the ones who have

to break down the fencesr then the rest can follow." The

tribulations that these first emigrants had to undergo must

have made the Soviets think that the scope of the movement

would not be terribly large. Again, one finds this attitude

that the troublemakers will all leave and then conditions will

return to normal. What actually happened was just the opposite-

the more who were able to leave, the more people who sought -30 permission to get out* The movement was transformed to a grass-roots campaign* Jews who were average citizens# who had never been involved in protest# now wanted to get out. This was something the Soviet government had not anticipated.

Their response constitutes the latest tragedy in the history of the Jewish people. Chapter III

Why the Exodus Ended

In January of 1984 eighty-eight Jews emigrated* No longer are Jews able to leave the Soviet Union* While it has been estimated that one out of every three Jews has contemplated leaving their homeland, the prospects are very dim* To what can this cessation of emigration be attributed? The difficulty of determining the cause of this end of emigration has already been mentioned. The subtleties of the situation are so great that a clear answer does not seem possible* My belief is that

Jewish emigration coming to a halt is not particularly peculiar. Thoughtful study of the Soviet system makes it clear that it must be opposed to emigration. Nonetheless, for a period of years Jews did have the right to leave. 1foe reasons for this toleration of Jewish emigration have already been elucidated. The fundamental question is why the government of the Soviet Union was willing to allow emigration for a- while, but no longer is willing to do so* Many find the answer quite clear.

These people find the answer in specific international events that have occurred. They will indicate a complete

correlation between the invasion of Afghanistan and the cessa­

tion of emigration. Robert Levgold, a Senior Fellow and

Director of the Soviet Project at the Council on Foreign

-31- -32-

Relations in , testified before the House Subcom­ mittee on Europe and the Middle East on December 8, 1982.

He finds a precise relationship between events and Soviet policy:

In 1973 and 1974 when you people were dis­

cussing the Jackson-Vanik amendment but

before its passage, they (the Soviets)

thought they had a deal with Secretary

Kissinger. In response they permitted a

rapid expansion of emigration, when it

turned out no deal would be cut, and

Henry Kissinger would not be able to fore­

stall the legislation or water it down,

the Soviets told us to go to hell and

emigration from the Soviet Union plummeted

within weeks. It remained at low levels

until 1979 when the Soviets thought there

was a chance Jackson-Vanik would be recon­

sidered, only to collapse again after ■ ■ 13 Afghanistan.

This analysis is not inaccurate, but rather an oversimplifica­

tion. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan the American

response was very firm. Sanctions were imposed and statements

were made to indicate how strongly the United States opposed

the action, strobe Talbot, writing in Foreign Affairs, -33 discusses the action taken by the United States:

The American response was swift, firm and

sweeping, although only time would tell

how effective. Carter summoned home

from Moscow his ambassador, Thomas J. Watson,

Jr.— a step the White House had not taken

even during the Soviet invasions of Hungary

in 1956 or Czechoslavakia in 1968, The

President also sharply cut back on the

sale of grain, and advanced technology to

the Soviet Union, and he asked the Senate

to postpone indefinitely its consideration 14 of the strategic arms limitation treaty.

I agree that these actions greatly influenced Soviet policy

towards the Jews. However, I think that one must not over­

look the nature of the Soviet system and the likelihood that was always present that it would end emigration. Talbot also

states in his article that the clash over Afghanistan climaxed

a set of problems between the United States and the Soviet

Union, and did not really alter the relationship as much as heighten tensions further.1^

The Soviets never actually endorsed the principle of

emigration— they merely tolerated it when convenient. Jews

were allowed to emigrate on the basis of repatriation— a return -34* to one's homeland— and family reunification. Israel was said to be the homeland of the Jews and hence the Soviets were able to say that they were merely allowing people to return home. One may note a great degree of hypocrisy in calling

Israel the Jewish homeland while simultaneously assailing the

Jews for being in Palestine. The point is that any Soviet government must have serious roblems with emigration. They view anyone who applies for permission to leave as a traitor.

One cannot opt out of the Soviet system, one must reject it.

The degree of paranoia is intense. One should realize that almost all Soviet Jews are suspect because they have relatives in Israel or the United States, The Soviets distrust anyone who has contacts with people of another country. The Soviets are not able to reconcile their belief in the greatness of their country with a desire people have to leave. As Pita

Gluzman stated

And Soviet authorities are not afraid

when my father said to them, I don't want

to live here. But when I and my husband,

we are only twenty-three years old and we

were born in Russia, we heard only Russian

propaganda. We heard how wonderful was

socialism and communism. We were students

in the universities and we said we don't

want more of your university, we S\\

go to Israel*1^ 35-

Ttie Soviets cannot tolerate this rejection of their society and, since it is in their power, they can cut it off#

The Soviets are concerned about the precedent that the

Jewish emigration set. They are concerned lest other national groups get the idea that they should also be able to leave.

The fact that the Jews protested and the Americans protested

and therefore the Jews were able to leave is bothersome to

the Soviet government. People should not have the idea

that they have any leverage with the regime or that protest

can accomplish things. During detente the Soviets tolerated

these problems, hut today they do not feel it is in their Interest

to do so. I believe that they were truly surprised by the

magnitude of the movement and felt it was getting out of hand#

The more people who left, the more who applied to leave, and

I believe the Soviets felt something had to be done. Talbot

speaks of a

...pervasive sense in both the United

States and the U.3.3.R. that something

had gone profoundly wrong between them.

If detente is a shared belief in the re­

wards of mutual accommodation and the risks

of confrontation, then detente had long

since been eroded by changes in the environment

of the relationship. ^

Due to this change from a spirit of accommodation to one of

confrontation, the Soviets decided to change their emigration -3b- policies, I do not think it is at all insignificant that a great change came under the leadership of Ranald Reagan.

His rhetoric about the evil nature of the Soviet government fueled the fires of confrontation. His invocations against communism reassured the Soviets that they had nothing to be gained by trying to appease the Americans and they therefore reverted to their true form.

The truth is that the fact that the Soviets ever allowed

Jews to emigrate is amazing. This option really was peculiar for the Soviet system. In a closed society rarely do people have the choice to leave— the government does not want to relinquish control. I do not find it surprising that the emigration movement has halted. The Soviets are simply returning t a policy they always desired. The Jews will continue to be hostages of the Soviet system. And unless the ransome offered for the Jews is quite high, I would be surprised if a new exodus were to begin. MUTES

*Betty Kahn and Marillyn Tollman, Let My People Co

(Chicago: Chicago Action for Soviet Jewry), p. 3 8 *

^Konstantin U. Chernenko,.Human Rights in the Soviet

Union (New York: International Publishers, 1981), p* 71.

3Refusenik (Chicago: Newsletter of Chicago Action for Soviet Jewry, March 1983).

'New York limes, 15 March 1983.

Congress.. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Soviet Jewry, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe.

92nd Cong*, 1st sess., 1971, p. 103. 6 William Koroy, “Soviet Anti-Semitism: A Weapon,**

National, Conference on Soviet Jewry Annual Policy Conference

(May 17, 1982):

7Ibid.. pp. -4.

Soviet Anti* .emitism Flares Up," Business Week. May

3 0 , 1983, p.52.

9Refusenjk (April/May 1P83).

^ v/illiam Xorey, "The Future of Soviet Jewry: Emigration and Assimilation," Foreign Affairs 58, no. J (1979): 75. 11Ibid., pp. 74-75. 13 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,

United States-Soviet Relations, 1982, Hearing before the Sub­ committee on Europe and the Middle Fast, 97th Cong*, 2nd seas

1982, pp. 52-53* *4Strobe Talbot, "U.S. Soviet Relations; From Bad to Worse," Foreign Affairs 58, no*3 (1980): 517-518. ^^Ibici*, p. 518. 16 u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Soviet Jewry. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe,

92nd Cong., 1st sess., 1971, p.102.

^Talbot# p. 518. Jewish Emigration from 1971 to 1983

1971 — 13,02? 197? 31,681

1973 • * — 34,733

1974 — 20,628

1.975 m m m m 1.3,221

1976 m m m m ,14,261

1977 — 10,786 1978 -- 28,864 1979 — r>l , 3 >9 1980 -- 21,471 1981 — 9,249

198? — 2,681 198 3 1,315

Figures from Kefusonik* January 1984*

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uiesel. Bile.

1 Dear Professor

Guidelines regardin’ senior honors and distinction:

In awarding, Distinction in History, please take Into account three factors: the candidate’s grade point average, the quality of the thesis, ami his/her performance on the oral examination.

Pre'ently the guidelines on the grade point average are:

4.5 Distinction 4.75 High Distinction 4.9 Hi ghost Distinction

The oral examination usually lasts one hour, and it tests the student’s understanding of the Implications of his/her thesis, course work, and aware­ ness of the nature and purpose of studying history. The granting of Highest Distinction represents the assessment that the student has an outstanding record,

h you wish to see it, "'■■the candidate's academic record is available in IDO Gregory Hall. Please return the foJder after the examination. Would you also please indicate below the grade of "Distinction" (or lack of) and return to Mary l.ee Spence's box as she must send the results to the Dcan,s Office. ■ . .

Caroline Hibbard Mary tee Spence Honors Advisors

We recommend t h a t ______. be graduated with*

______Distinction

______High Distinction

______Highest Distinction

Wo Distinction (but credit granted)