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The Phoenix Patriot Is the Offi Cial Publication of Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix V, Authorized Under the Provisions of AR 360-1

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The Phoenix Patriot Is the Offi Cial Publication of Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix V, Authorized Under the Provisions of AR 360-1 The “...From the Ashes...” PHOENIX PATRIOT 3rd. Edition, Volume I Official Publication of Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix V Oct. 9, 2006 Photo By 1st Lt. Timothy Merritt First National Afghan Branch Conference Sets Standard Story by 2nd Lt. units. Maj. Geoffrey Liljenwall, effectively demonstrated fl awless it, is to bring commanders together Amanda Straub conference Offi cer In Charge fi eld artillery procedures and to share ideas and solve common (OIC) and fi eld artillery mentor, expert marksmanship. 4th Kandak problems in communication. Last week approximately 70 said it is extremely important to fi red a combination of Russian D- “The conference was a complete Afghan and American leaders and solidify the fi eld artillery branch 30 122mm Howitzers and mortars. success,” Christensen said. “It was experts from around Afghanistan as an important tool in winning the “We are really spoiled by this reassuring to hear that other units met at the fi rst ever National Field War on Terrorism in Afghanistan. group,” Capt. Dallen Christensen, face the same challenges we do. Artillery Conference at Kabul “Field artillery is a huge combat American Embedded Trainer We shared a lot of tips and tricks.” Military Training Center to share multiplier when used effectively,” for the 4th Kandak, said. “They The fi eld artillery conference ideas and continue improving Liljenwall said. “There is a lot really know what they’re doing.” was the fi rst national branch the Afghan National Army of knowledge on the ANA side. It is common for units separated conference in Afghanistan (ANA) Field Artillery Branch. They are solid artillerymen.” by geographic location to designed to help all elements The conference was modeled The culmination event was a develop differing techniques for function in concert. A similar after similar U.S. conferences live-fi re exercise conducted by the accomplishing their mission, conference targeted at improving designed to facilitate discussion 4th Kandak, 2nd Brigade, 201st especially in a war torn land like methods and communication and standardize fi eld artillery Corps. 4th Kandak fi eld artillery Afghanistan. The goal of the fi eld between units in the engineering procedures amongst diverse unit is the oldest in the ANA and artillery conference, and others like branch is scheduled for this fall. New HA Missions SECFOR INSIDE Chapel Shape Busts THIS Opens at Afghanistan Smuggling Phoenix pg. 4,5,7 Ring ISSUE pg. 3 pg. 6 1 On Point w/ the CSM General Guidance Jungleers, Warriors, On 5 October 2006 the I’m honored to have the International Security As- opportunity to address sistance Force (ISAF), you while I cover down on took over responsibil- CSM Conley’s duties here ity for military operations on post while he is down throughout all of Afghani- range dodging bullets. stan. Many of the mem- I’d like to turn the spot- bers of CJTF Phoenix light on a group of Soldiers V have asked about the that often get overlooked impact this historic event during the discussions of will have on our team and our Task Force. our mission. Our Task Force is a perfect representation of what made Ameri- First let me assure you we are in full cooperation with ISAF ca great, the melting pot of diverse cultures and people that united and have been for some time. Our mission covers all of Afghani- together. We have the warriors from the NAVY, AIR FORCE, and stan and we have been working with ISAF in three-fourths of Afghanistan for many months. Second our mission is not under MARINES. We have NATIONAL GUARD representation from the direct control of ISAF and training and equipping the Afghan 48 states and 3 territories. We have coalition forces, Army Re- National Security Forces will not be an ISAF mission for some serve, and even a few active Army soldiers, but there is another time. Third the future success of the Afghan National Security group that has served their country honorably and thought that Forces will depend on our ability to synchronize the efforts of the they were done, our warriors from the IRR. Afghan National Army and Police Forces. This process will be These great Americans took the hard right over the easy wrong, enhanced by ISAF serving as the single Command and Control they got “the letter in the mail,” and answered the call. They Headquarters for the entire nation. weren’t still in uniform, knowing that deployment was only a Our higher headquarters remains Combined Security Transi- matter of time, let alone volunteering for it. They had executed tion Command – Afghanistan and our direction and focus will be their service to the country and moved out to have a life on the constant and unwavering. We will continue to work closely with outside. ISAF and our Coalition Partners as we assist in the process of They are dressed just like the rest of us, except for an odd left building a professional Afghan National Army and Police Force. sleeve patch that nobody had seen before, so it’s hard to pick them Our partnership with other nations has expanded to 13 nations out in a crowd. They are executing their duties with pride and and will continue to grow as other countries realize the impor- professionalism as are the rest of our warriors. tance of our mission. ISAF facilitates this process and plays the I would like to thank all the IRR soldiers that answered the call, central role in recruiting personnel from other nations to join the placed your life on hold, packed up your unique skill sets, and Phoenix team. joined our melting pot, Task Force Phoenix, to make a difference You are at the leading edge of one of the most important military for the people of Afghanistan. missions in the world. Creating a safe, secure and stable environ- ment where terrorism is not tolerated and defending freedom for everyone is a noble and rewarding mission we can all be proud of. William Elfering Douglas A. Pritt SGM, USA Brigadier General, Operations Sergeant Major Commanding “Men make history, and not the other morph the role and look of the Task Afghanistan were not able to attend way around. In periods where there Force. school. Task Force Phoenix, alongside is no leadership, society stands still. We wipe the sleep from our eyes the Afghan National Army and Afghan Progress occurs when courageous, each morning only to fi nd that nearly National Poilce, has built schools, dug skillful leaders seize the opportunity to change things for the better.” everything we knew from the previous wells initiated medical assistance and Harry S. Truman day has now changed. Sometimes the economic reform. The task force has changes are minor, sometimes they are trained and mentored a national army Fellow Patriots- large. Moving locations, changing jobs, where nothing existed fi ve years ago. working with new teams are all forms We are making a difference here. We In the past few weeks we have seen of change we deal with. are helping Afghanistan rebuild after a lot of change take place throughout Other forms of change are a bit more decades of war. Change in the task the task force. The recent changes with subtle, and can only be seen when you force may come quickly, but the more ISAF, recent changes that expand our take a step back and look at the big permanent changes come after many mission and the infl ux of new faces picture. Only fi ve years ago, girls in years of work. The Phoenix Patriot is the offi cial publication of Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix V, authorized under the provisions of AR 360-1. The views and opinions expressed in The Phoenix Patriot are not necessarily those of, or endorsed by, the U.S. government, or the departments of the Army, Air Force, or Navy. The Phoenix Patriot is a bi-weekly publication distributed to deployed Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors and Marines all over Afghanistan with a circulation of 3500. The Phoenix Patriot is happy to publish photos and articles from the fi eld and we encourage readers to submit original material to the CJTFPHX V Public Affairs Offi ce. All contributions, questions, comments and suggestions should be submitted via e-mail to: [email protected]. Editor in Chief/ Writer/ Photographer - Second Lieutenant Amanda M. Straub - Content Manager Writer/ Photographer - First Lieutenant Cathrin Y. Fraker - Public Affairs Offi cer Writer/ Photographer - Sergeant First Class Tom Roberts - Public Affairs NCOIC Writer/ Photographer - Lieutenant Janette M. Arencibia - Marketing Offi cer The Phoenix Patriot 2 New Chapel Dedicated at Camp Phoenix double doors. Chaplain Andrew Werner, Lt. Col James Randolph, Rabbi Bobby Bethea and Father Christopher Benoist also participated in delivering the dedication message. Refreshments and fellowship followed the ribbon cutting and dedication. All are welcomed and encouraged to attend services throughout the week. Schedule of Services: Sundays 0900 Protestant Service 1030 Church of Latter Day Saints 1700 Catholic Service 2000 Contemporary Service Monday, Wednesday and Friday 0600 Prayer Group The Camp Phoenix Chapel before remodeling. Tuesdays 1900 Woman’s fellowship Story by Lt. Janette Arencibia “A Purpose Driven Life” Devotional Series (Oct 19) Photos by 2nd. Lieut. Amanda Straub Wednesday After great anticipation and several weeks of collec- 1900 Bible Study tive effort from various individuals, Camp Phoenix cel- Friday ebrated the newly remodeled chapel in a dedication cer- 1900 Sabbath Service emony on Sept. 26. The remodeling project started in Saturday mid-August and was completed at the end of Septem- 2000 Gospel Service ber. Civilian and military individuals at Camp Phoenix worked alongside each other to remodel the chapel.
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