Venezuela: Analysis of Pro-Government Media Intimidated by the State

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VENEZUELA: ANALYSIS OF PRO-GOVERNMENT MEDIA INTIMIDATED BY THE STATE

A Masters Thesis

Elisa Bermudez

to The School of Journalism

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

in the field of

Journalism

Northeastern University Boston, Massachusetts April, 2011

To my grandparents Hilda and Manuel Mayorca, for their modest contribution to democracy in Venezuela 3

VENEZUELA: ANALYSIS OF PRO-GOVERNMENT MEDIA INTIMIDATED BY THE STATE

A thesis presented

Elisa Bermudez

ABSTRACT OF MASTERS THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Journalism in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Northeastern University, April, 2011

This thesis estimates the number of pro-government or pro-chavista media intimidated and/or censored by the government of Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela between the years 1999 and 2008. It also addresses the complex issue of the state of press freedom and free speech in Venezuela as variable through which human rights and democracy in the South American country should be evaluated.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

First and foremost I have to thank my thesis committee, Professors William

Kirtz, M.A., Nicholas Daniloff, M.A., and Murray Forman, Ph.D., for their tremendous patience and understanding of personal complications that prevented me from completing this thesis earlier. Second, I thank Luisa Torrealba and Miguel

Salazar for agreeing to answer my questions fully, knowing the risks of speaking out in Venezuela (even over the phone). Also, as always, I am grateful to my mother for pushing and keeping me on track – that‘s what mothers do – and for learning to be patient during this process. Last but not least, to my friend and colleague

Candice Novak, M.A., for patiently and diligently editing this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract 4

Acknowledgement 6

Table of Contents 7

Chapter I. Introduction 8

Chapter II. A Glimpse of the Past: Contemporary History of Venezuela 15

The Media 20

Chapter III. Methodology and Investigation 40

Definition of Terms 45

The Cases 47

Limitations 62

Chapter IV. Law and the Hegemony Plan 65

The Cases 66

The Law 69

The Hegemony Plan 73

Chapter V. Analysis: Human Rights, Press Freedom and Democracy 79

Analysis 80

Conclusions 95

Recommendations 103

References 109

Chapter I

Introduction: The Complex Case of Media and Politics in Venezuela

This thesis is an investigation on whether pro-government or pro-chavista media is deprived of freedom of expression and its right to inform the public, in addition to so-called opposition media. Since his arrival to the Presidency of

Venezuela, Hugo Chávez has been constantly criticized by the media as well as local and international human rights and press freedom organization for his crackdown on dissenting media. Venezuela has faced repression, intimidation, and censorship before Hugo Chávez. But the difference between the Chávez government and his predecessors‘ is that, first, there are more reported cases of press freedom violations, and, second, President Chávez has been directly and openly aggressive with media critical of his government – and this is not limited to his rhetoric.

This thesis also addresses the issue of repression beyond the media; it gives a forewarning picture of repression as a method to curtail free speech among citizens.

It is also an exploration of the efforts by President Hugo Chávez to obtain total control of the press and sink the last remnants of democracy, therefore, creating an authoritarian regime in Venezuela. It was initially inspired by the Frontline television series ―The Hugo Chavez Show.‖(1) Additionally, this thesis explores the theory that the first sign of an autocratic government, even if elected by the people, is suppression of dissenting voices among members of the press. Then, mechanisms of repression are extended to other areas of civil society: politicians, non-profit and

(1) Bikel, O. (2008). “The Hugo Chavez Show.” Frontline, PBS (Public Broadcasting Service). Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hugochavez/view/

community organizations, unions, even members of the ruling party, until it finally manages to oppress all civilians.

During this investigation I encountered many challenges. The most prominent challenge for journalists today is that self-censorship is increasing as a way to preserve jobs and avoid danger, resulting in the possibility of press freedom violations not being reported. For the purpose of simplifying a complex subject, initially I wanted to avoid addressing politics, President Chávez, journalism ethics, and other human rights issues in order to concentrate solely on the decaying state of press freedom in Venezuela. But it is impossible to stay away from politics when policymaking legalizes censorship. It is impossible not to talk about the President when he uses mass media to remain omnipresent. It is impossible to avoid talking about journalism ethics when some media managers have contributed to press freedom violations. It is impossible to avoid talking about how citizens and workers have been denied their rights to free speech and to assemble freely. And it is certainly impossible to talk solely about pro-chavista media when the entire press is subjected to subtle forms of intimidation and censorship. At the very least all these variables will be mentioned to explain why the government censors even its own allies in the media.

In addition to press freedom issues in Venezuela, this thesis also touches on a much deeper problem about the absence of a democratic state. I include a summary of contemporary history of Venezuela as background to explain why we still have profound socio-economic problems, why Hugo Chávez was elected president, and 10

why he remains in power. Perhaps more important for historical context, is the section mentioning some of the history of Venezuelan media. I also provide information on this matter to contend that, nowadays, press freedom, human rights, and democracy in Venezuela cannot be seen in black-and-white terms.

This thesis will serve to illuminate the magnitude of the problem with freedom of expression and human rights in Venezuela. A problem that is already extending to other Latin American countries, thanks to Chavez‘s interventionist policies abroad – quite ironic for Chávez, who vociferously complains about ―Yankee imperialism.‖ Sadly, Venezuela has become a model for other governments in the region that want to control information and dissent. Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua have had similar problems with the press. Although it shouldn‘t be surprising that governments attempt to control information. During a journalism seminar taught by Professor Nicholas Daniloff, M.A., students were presented with the following formula: "All governments want to control the press. Democratic governments do it by persuasion; authoritarian governments do it by censorship and intimidation."

For example, all US government offices have press offices. Their role is to use public relations and lobbying strategies to court the media to publish positive stories about the administration in power. We must also keep in mind that like

Venezuela, the US government also uses legislation – or takes advantage of the

absent of legislation in some cases – to repress journalists and prevent information from being released.

For instance, the United States Congress, as of the printing date of this thesis, continues to discuss the Federal Shield Law to protect journalists from revealing their sources or Senate Bill 448, also known as the ―Free Flow of

Information Act 2009. In December 10th, 2009 the Senate‘s Judiciary Committee changed the definition of a newsperson by extending it to bloggers, freelancers and any other person gathering and providing information to the masses. The

Judiciary Committee also introduced clauses indicating when the federal government is authorized to subpoena a member of the media. The law requires a federal agency to obtain a court order and must prove it has exhausted all other sources of information, though the law also has exceptions in case of emergencies and/or national security. During the first quarter of the 112th United States

Congress, Senate Bill 448 had not yet been discussed in the Senate floor.

(www.cpj.org, http://www.firstamendmentcoalition.org/, http://www.govtrack.us/, www.thomas.loc.gov, www.rcfp.org, www.rsf.org). Also, it remains to be seen where this legislation may end up without one of its proponents, former Senator

Arlen Specter, D-PA. The Bill still needs to be approved by the Senate and it will be sent back to the House floor if the Senate makes any changes.

The approval of changes to the Federal Shield Law by the Senate‘s Judiciary

Committee is certainly a step forward. However, such legislative change occurred recently and we yet have to see how the changes to the new law will actually be

implemented. For instance, there is already discussion in Capitol Hill that the federal shield law is not applicable to the case of Wikileaks. The discussion involves whether Wikileaks should be considered a news organization at all

(http://www.firstamendmentcoalition.org/2010/12/has-cablegate-made-the-federal- shield-law-a-lame-duck-in-the-lame-duck-congress/). Aside from this legislative issues, the U.S, also faces serious problems regarding restrictions imposed on the press in Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan in the name of ―the war against terror‖ and ―national security‖ (www.cpj.org, www.rsf.org).

Another example not too far from the US or Venezuela is Cuba. An economic and political ally of President Chávez, Cuba is renowned for its tight grip on the press, dissent, and free speech. The Caribbean island has never really enjoyed a free press, yet in recent years, political dissidents and journalists have been able to work clandestinely, thanks to the Internet and help from exile community in Miami, by creating blogs and websites. All other media (one television, one radio station and two newspapers) are run by the only party in this country, the Communist Party

(www.cpj.org, www.rsf.org).

―The media is of fundamental priority because it is a weapon for the ideological struggle‖

Hugo Chávez, 1998 presidential campaign

Chapter II

A Glimpse of the Past: Contemporary History of Venezuela

According to writers Alberto Marcano and Crisitna Barrera(2), the leftist movement in Venezuela played a key role in communicating, organizing, and mobilizing people to end the regime of General Pérez Jiménez during the 1950s.

Yet, upon the arrival of democracy in the early 1960s, left-wing parties in Venezuela were forgotten and their efforts in forging democracy were not recognized. Later, the parties COPEI (Social Christian), Acción Democrática or AD (Democratic

Accion), and Unión Republicana Democrática or URD (Republican Democratic

Union) signed a temporary power-sharing agreement named Pacto de Punto Fijo

(Punto Fijo Pact) to avoid any more armed uprisings influenced by the Cuban

Revolution and stabilize the country‘s political sphere.

Such political strategy pushed the Venezuelan left from a political group preoccupied with social issues into a guerrilla group which aligned with Fidel

Castro‘s revolution. Also, according to PBS Frontline documentary, ―The Hugo

Chavez Show,‖ the Pacto de Punto Fijo facilitated corruption and prevented new generations of politicians to flourish.(3) The newly-democratic Venezuelan government, helped by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), captured some of the leaders of the Venezuelan guerrilla movement and brought them to justice under

(2) Marcano, C. Barrera-Tyzka, A. (2005). Hugo Chávez sin uniforme: Una historia personal. Caracas: Editorial Melvin. (3) Bikel, O. (2008). “The Hugo Chavez Show.” Frontline, PBS (Public Broadcasting Service). Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hugochavez/view/ 16

charges of kidnapping, murder, extortion, and torture. Others managed to flee to nearby Latin American countries.(4)

Finally, in 1969 then President Rafael Caldera (first term: 1969-1974) pardoned and invited exiled guerrilla leaders to return to Venezuela. Some reunited under the Partido Comunista de Venezuela or PCV (Communist Party of Venezuela) and others founded the Moviemiento al Socialismo or MAS (Movement for

Socialism)(5). The 1970s were much better years because of the nationalization of the oil, iron, and steel industries. Venezuela‘s profits grew enormously due to the rise of oil prices, and the government invested in education and social programs.

Venezuela is also one of the founding members of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries), though the golden years of the national oil industry did not last very long.

In 1983 oil prices collapsed due to a major military conflict in the Middle East and corruption was already crippling most public services(6). The 1980s and 1990s could be described as the downfall of Venezuelan society. There was discontent among the population due to increased inflation, unemployment, crime rates, poverty, and corruption. Brian Nelson, author of ―The Silence and the Scorpion: The

Coup Against Chavez and the Making of Modern Venezuela,‖ provides an explanation of the socio-economic shift in the country:

(4) Marcano, C. Barrera-Tyzka, A. (2005). Hugo Chávez sin uniforme: Una historia personal. Caracas: Editorial Melvin. (5) Tarver, H.M., Frederick, J.C. (2005). The history of Venezuela. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. (6) Insight Guide: Venezuela. (1999). London: Insight Guides 17

… the gains of the 1970s were not limited to consumption: Literacy rose from 77 percent to 93 percent in the course of the decade, and fertility rates fell – an indicator of both better education and increasing gender equality.

But from the early 1980‘s, Venezuelans watched their country – which had seemed so close to first-world prosperity – sink deeper and deeper into recession. Poverty, inflation, and unemployment skyrocketed, while per capita income plummeted. The oil bonanza had been illusory and fleeting. Not only had the government spent lavishly on wasteful projects, but corruption and pilfering were rampant. Capital flight soared, the high oil prices didn‘t last, and the debts piled up. By the end of the 1970s, Venezuela had the highest per capita debt in Latin America and had fallen into the same debt trap that plagues so much of the developing world – exporting its natural resources to finance its debt instead of developing social programs. But perhaps the most revealing indicator of the collapse [was] the increase in violent crime. It seemed that everyone had at least one family member who had been mugged, carjacked, or killed.

Year after year the situation deteriorated, and year after year the collective sense of outrage at the government grew stronger. People knew that this was a nation of extreme wealth and promise – it still sat atop the largest oil deposits outside of the Middle East – but those resources were being squandered by corrupt and incompetent politicians who neglected the 60 percent of Venezuelans who remained poor.(7)

In 1989, the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez imposed austerity measures and public transportation fares increased. Subsequently, citizens unleashed their discontent with the government by vandalizing and looting businesses. Then, the government implemented Plan Avila(8) and protesters clashed with soldiers resulting in a massacre known today as El Caracazo. Years later

(7) Nelson, B. (2009). The silence and the scorpion: The coup against Chávez and the making of modern Venezuela. New York: Nation Books, a member of Perseus Book Group. (8) Plan Avila is a Presidential order to send the National Guard to control disorderly crowds in Caracas 18

President Hugo Chávez implemented the same military plan during the 2002 demonstration that led to a coup attempt on April 11th.

During El Caracazo, then Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez and his comrades realized it was the right moment to carry out the coup d‘état they had planned for years. From their point of view the only way to eradicate all problems in society was to eliminate the old political elite. On February 4th, 1992, Chávez finally executed his plan, but the coup attempt was short-lived. Chávez, who was commanding the troops that invaded Caracas, could not hold back loyal army forces and failed to take control of Miraflores (the Presidential Palace).(9)(10)(11)

―When Hugo Chavez exploded onto the scene in 1992, many people applauded,‖ Nelson wrote. ―In Chavez they saw someone taking a stand against the corrupted system; someone brave enough to risk his life to change Venezuela.

Viewed as an outsider, Chavez, with his coffee-and-cream skin and humble background, seemed more in tune with the needs of the poor and [the] disenfranchised than the light-skinned leaders who dominate politics.‖(12)

Chávez and his comrades were captured and sent to prison. Later President

Pérez was impeached by the Congress on charges of corruption. In 1994 President

(9) Marcano, C. Barrera-Tyzka, A. (2005). Hugo Chávez sin uniforme: Una historia personal. Caracas: Editorial Melvin. (10) Ciudadanía Activa (2005) “¿Cuál Revolución: Hugo Chávez, 1999-2004.” Available at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-3154957126321208432 (Spanish) (11) Bikel, O. (2008). “The Hugo Chavez Show.” Frontline, PBS (Public Broadcasting Service). Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hugochavez/view/ (12) Nelson, B. (2009). The silence and the scorpion: The coup against Chávez and the making of modern Venezuela. New York: Nation Books, a member of Perseus Book Group 19

Rafael Caldera (second term: 1994-1999) authorized a presidential pardon for

Chávez and the rebel soldiers. As soon as he was freed, Chávez founded the party

Movimiento Quinta República or MVR (Fifth Republic Movement) and later won the presidential elections in 1998. The MVR party was later changed to Partido

Socialista Unico de Venezuela or PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela) in a failed attempt to create a one-party system.

The Media

Amid a dire economic situation many Venezuelans were thirsty for a radical change. So when Hugo Chávez showed up as a presidential candidate in 1998, people believed he was the antithesis of Puntofijismo (a nickname for Pacto de

Punto Fijo). Chávez‘s magnetism was so strong that despite his violent rhetoric and lack of political experience, wealthy citizens and major corporations - such as the

Spanish bank Banco Santander - funded his presidential campaign.(13) Later, the media also felt under his spell dedicating air time and space to provide information about the charismatic Hugo

Chávez. Teodoro Petkoff - www.bbc.co.uk

―Without the media, without the support – the promotion they gave to

Chávez, it would have been difficult for the country to get to know him,‖ the late

(13) Marcano, C. Barrera-Tyzka, A. (2005). Hugo Chávez sin uniforme: Una historia personal. Caracas: Editorial Melvin 20

Alejandro Armas, representative of the Constitutional Assembly, said. ―Chávez became well-known thanks to support from the media‖(14)

―All the media supported him. They gave him huge amounts of newspaper space and hours on television,‖ Teodoro Petkoff said during an interview with PBS

Frontline in November 2008. Petkoff is a former member of the Venezuelan leftist guerrilla, former founder member of MAS, former minister, and founder/editor of center-left newspaper Tal Cual (15).

As with any newly elected official, the ―honeymoon‖ period granted by the media was over when the President began campaigning to create a new constitution. The president‘s allies and public officials, his first actions as head of state, as well as his friendly approach to other leaders such as Fidel Castro and

Saddam Hussein, all drew scrutiny and criticism.

Reportedly, according to the Committee to Protect Journalist, the first media outlet to be threatened by the government was La Razón, a political weekly based in

Caracas (http://www.cpj.org/2001/03/attacks-on-the-press-2000-venezuela.php).

More information about this particular case will be in Chapters III and IV. Others followed: the daily newspapers El Nacional, El Universal, but particularly the television stations Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV), Venevisión, Globovisión, and

Televén. It all began when Chávez aggressively campaigned to have a new

(14) Ciudadanía Activa (2005) “¿Cuál Revolución: Hugo Chávez, 1999-2004.” Available at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-3154957126321208432 (Spanish) (15) Bikel, O. (2008). “The Hugo Chavez Show.” Frontline, PBS (Public Broadcasting Service). Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hugochavez/view/ 21

constitution. Instead of following the regulations for reforms stipulated in the constitution of 1961, Chávez organized a Constitutional Assembly with his political allies. He rallied for a referendum in 1999 to elect members of the Constitutional

Assembly where members of his party and other allied parties won the majority of seats. Chávez‘s allies began rewriting the constitution while he was traveling around the world forging friendships with other autocratic leaders.(16)

During the same year a referendum on the proposed constitution was organized and approved by voters. In the new political system Venezuela no longer has a bicameral Congress but a unicameral National Assembly that answers directly to the President. After being elected Chávez was granted the power to rule by decree for six months, a measure that is considered to endow dictatorial powers.

During the rule-by-decree Chávez dismissed all judges from the Supreme Court and appointed judges he thought were friendly to his cause. With a National Assembly that was largely represented by Chávez‘ party, reforming and drafting new laws was easy - most members of the National Assembly nodded in approval to anything proposed by the President. A few years later members of the PSUV and other center-left and left-wing parties, government officials, and parliamentarians would begin criticizing the President and withdrawing their support.

For example, the late Luis Tascón, a parliamentarian and Chávez supporter, once denounced irregularities between the Ministry of Transportation (today is the

(16) Ciudadanía Activa (2005) “¿Cuál Revolución: Hugo Chávez, 1999-2004.” Available at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-3154957126321208432 (Spanish) 22

Ministry of Infrastructure) and the purchase of vehicles to be used for public transportation. He was dismissed from the PSUV as a consequence of his complaint.

Two other strong supporters of President Chávez were later discretely dismissed from office without much explanation: former Vice President José Vicente Rangel and former advisor Luis Miquilena, who later stated he had abandoned the government because of strong disagreements with Chávez(17).

―If Chávez wanted a radical revolution Cuban style, or was thinking of installing a communist government, that would not be possible in the democratic system of Venezuela,‖ Miquilena said. ―I told Chávez, ‗You can't do what Castro did after the Sierra Maestra. You can't do that after an election. These are totally different situations.‘ Chávez did not have a clear idea of the difference between a revolution and a social transformation, with different changes and reforms that the country really needed at that time.‖(18)

The government remained silent about the dismissals of Rangel and

Miquilena.

More recently, in a phone interview with Gregorio Salazar, Secretary General of Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Prensa or SNTP, (National Syndicate of

Press Workers), he said that long-time and staunch Chávez supporter Lina Ron was

(17) Ciudadanía Activa (2005) “¿Cuál Revolución: Hugo Chávez, 1999-2004.” Available at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-3154957126321208432 (Spanish) (18) Bikel, O. (2008). “The Hugo Chavez Show.” Frontline, PBS (Public Broadcasting Service). Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hugochavez/view/

banned from making statements through the state-run television Venezolana de

Televisión (VTV). Ron wanted to denounce a case of corruption she witnessed in one of the government offices in Caracas, but VTV would not allow it; she then went to opposition TV network Globovisión.(19) The network never returned phone calls or answered emails asking confirmation of this event, but it was confirmed by Andrés

Cañizales, Reporters Without Borders correspondent in Venezuela, during an interview in Washington, D.C.(20) Paradoxically, she has physically and verbally attacked members of opposition media. On one occasion Ron and other government sympathizers had caused minor damage to the infrastructure of Globovisión, accusing the network of lying and trying to topple the government of Hugo Chávez.

Ron‘s experience with VTV shows that intolerance is not politically driven since it is not limited to threats against the opposition but occurs even within party lines, government offices, and supporters. It is clear that criticism of the government is simply not tolerated.

Even long-time left-wing parties had withdrawn their support of President

Chávez, temporarily or permanently, because of his autocratic tendencies.

One huge concern in Venezuela is that Chávez has allies in most government offices, so the balance among the government‘s branches – legislative, judicial, executive – has disappeared. The President has refused to delegate power and often interferes with the work of other officials.

(19) I interviewed Gregorio Salazar via Skype from his office in Caracas on February 2010 (20) I interviewed Andrés Cañizales at the National Endowment of Democracy (NED) on June 2010 24

For instance, President Chávez recently ordered the arrest of Judge María

Lourdes Afiuni Mora and gave her a 30-year prison sentence for dismissing the case of a banker who was accused of corruption. There was no investigation, no warrant, no right to defense, and Judge Afiuni was sent to a prison where 14 criminals – all sentenced by her – have threatened to kill her (www.eud.com). She was placed in a dangerous situation thanks to an unchallenged order from the President.

With control of the three branches of government the only remaining sign of democracy is the unruly fourth branch: the press. During the first three years of

Chávez‘s presidency, attacks on opposition media consisted of verbal and physical attacks. Chávez also encouraged his followers and security forces to harass any member of the media deemed an ―enemy of the revolution.‖ Today, however, attacks on the press and freedom of expression consist of intimidation and censorship mostly through administrative or judicial measures.

Luisa Torrealba(21) a representative of the Lima-based Instituto de Prensa y

Sociedad or Ipys, (Institute of Press and Society) said during a phone interview, ―In the context of press freedom and free speech in Venezuela, the relationship between the media and the government has been characterized by conflict. The media has been considered as an adversary rather that a source of information and entertainment. Amid this situation, the rhetoric used by all powers of the state, judicial, legislative, and executive, has had a tendency to criminalize, disqualify,

(18) I interviewed Luisa Torrealba through Skype from her office in Caracas, Venezuela on February 2010 25

threaten, and intimidate the media with judicial and/or administrative sanctions such as the closing of a station. The rhetoric of the President of Venezuela has also been a factor in the current situation‖ (translated from Spanish).

Also, some media executives led their news networks to become participants in political life in Venezuela; by ceasing to be a vehicle of information, they unknowingly helped the President justify his repressive actions against their companies and employees. The climax of this tension between the government and the media reached its peak when some of the TV networks executive managers participated in the April 11th, 2002 coup attempt. First, some members of the private media encouraged citizens to rally the streets to demand the resignation of

Hugo Chávez and protest his abuse of power, and, second, they created a news blackout when chavistas took to the streets demanding the return of President

Chávez. The state television, VTV, did exactly the same: encouraging chavistas to

―defend the revolution‖ and blocking out any information about the opposition.

Chávez was removed from power for three days. High ranking commanders rebelled and disobeyed the President‘s orders to implement Plan Avila (exactly what former President Pérez did during El Caracazo) arguing that it would only cause a massacre. Unfortunately, low ranking commanders – loyal to the President - carried out the orders.

After many citizens were wounded and 19 were killed, the rebellious commanders took control of Miraflores and demanded President Chávez to resign.

Even though a copy of the letter of resignation was not presented to the press,

General Baduel (loyal to Chávez) said during a press conference that the President had resigned. The media believed him. Almost immediately chavistas took to the streets demanding the return of the President, loyal troops regained control of

Miraflores and Chávez was returned to power. Amid this mayhem, some of the media, private and public, played a critical role in mobilizing people through half- truths, political propaganda, and blocking out news.

As Reporters Without Borders‘ Americas Desk Director Benoit Hervieu explained,(22) the political crisis started to intensify in a different arena (the media), creating what is called ―the media‘s war.‖ The political opinion of media members had radicalized to the point that they had actively participated in recent political events with the opposition or the government. As a result, this has prevented audiences from getting vital information. Channels VTV, Venevisión and RCTV, among others, provided only partial information about pro-government or opposition protests that eventually clashed with National Guards and the

Metropolitan Police around Miraflores on April 11th, 2002.

The media was not simply controlling what news was to be released, it was also making it.

On April 12th, 2002, when everyone believed Venezuela didn‘t have a

President, Pedro Carmona Estanga, the leader of FEDECAMARAS (the national

(22) I interviewed Benoit Hervieu over the phone from his office in Paris, France, on April 2007 27

chamber of commerce), was sworn in as the interim president. To his side was

Carlos Ortega, the leader of the Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos or

CTV, (National Confederation of Workers), who reluctantly participated in the interim government.(23)

During the transitional government, the president of Venevisión, Gustavo

Cisneros, offered his office to set up a meeting among members of the opposition and the new government.(23) Cisneros didn‘t merely provide a space for a political meeting, he participated in it. Why was the president of a television station offering his office to set up a political meeting? Why was he participating in such meeting instead of working with the news department to organize coverage of such dramatic events?

Writer Brian Nelson also found out that

Carmona Estanga had actually met with

the directors of all private TV networks,

who agreed to help the interim president

―move the country forward,‖ meaning

that they were not going to broadcast any

Andrés Izarra – www.minci.gob.ve signs of support for Hugo Chávez.(24)

(23)(24) Nelson, B. (2009). The silence and the scorpion: The coup against Chávez and the making of modern Venezuela. New York: Nation Books, a member of Perseus Book Group.

Reports from the Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters Without

Borders, and local press state that it was certainly dangerous for members of the media to be covering the unfolding events during those days. Mariangela Lando,

Foreign News Editor of El Universal, wrote in an email interview that the situation was so dangerous even some newspapers had to send their reporters home.

However, CNN‘s Otto Neustland was covering all the events going on around the presidential palace, as were other news agencies. Then, why did the TV networks not use material from news agencies? Andrés Izarra - a former news producer for

RCTV - resigned the day after he was told by his supervisors not to show any chavismo on TV.(25) Izarra later went to work for the government as Minister of

Communications and Information from 2004 – 2005. Today, he is director and founder of the Pan-Latin American news network Telesur, which is sponsored by the governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.

Before the April 11th coup attempt, media critical of the government was intimidated mostly with verbal and physical attacks. After the April 11th coup attempt, Chávez began a series of legal actions against the media such as the creation of the Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio y Television or Ley Resorte,

(Law of Social Responsibility in Radio and Television) and, recently, the special project to establish a Ley de Delitos Mediáticos (Law of Media Crimes). Other

(25) Bartley, K., O’Briain, D. (2003). “The Revolution Will Not Be Televised.” A documentary produced by The Irish Film Board, NPS & COBO, RTE, BBC, ZDF/ARTE, YLE. Available at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=5832390545689805144 and http://www.chavezthefilm.com/index_ex.htm.

changes in the constitution and the Penal Code have justified the persecution of members of the media and citizens based on their work or opinions.

―The President started to talk tirelessly, even calling publicly on the National

Assembly, about approving immediately the Ley Resorte because the government had to find ways to sanction the media. Clearly, this regulation is meant to retaliate, to criminalize the press. But the media played an important role in this situation. At one point communication theorists, such as Marcelino Bisbal [a professor from the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello - UCAB], were talking about a ‗mediacracy‘ [a combination of the words ‗media‘ and ‗democracy‘]. So they began talking about how the media had stopped being a source of information, entertainment, leisure and, instead, they had assumed a political role,‖ Torrealba said. (26)

The Ley Resorte was created to protect children and adolescents from violent and vulgar content in any radio and television broadcast. As ideal as it may sound, any attempt to regulate content in the media from an autocratic government is suspicious because, historically, it is often a mask to censor information and opinion. In fact, many of the laws in Ley Resorte are vague and can be broadly interpreted.

―Right now [Venezuela] is one of the worst countries … for press freedom in the Americas. This is due to government policies, State policies, which intend to

(26) I interviewed Luisa Torrealba through Skype from her office in Caracas, Venezuela on February 2010 30

achieve public communication hegemony, a strategy put in place since the beginning of Chavez‘s government in 1999 as a way to legalize censorship and aggression against journalists. This objective was supported with special laws for the press, such as the Ley Resorte, which were justified as mere control of schedules to protect minors,‖ Ricardo Trotti(27), IAPA Press Freedom Director and Director of the Press Institute. (IAPA stands for Inter American Press Association; the interview was translated from Spanish).

Filmmaker Jonathan Jakubowicz was sued over his feature film ―Secuestro

Express‖ for defamation against the persons who were in the Llaguno Bridge (in

Caracas) who allegedly shot at a peaceful opposition march on April 11th, 2002.

Jakubowicz used an excerpt of the footage from Luis Fernandez‘s news crew

(Venevisión) where it shows these individuals allegedly shooting at the protestors.

The court did not find Jakubowicz guilty of defamation and stated that the video footage used in the beginning of the film was meant to make a point about the level of violence in Venezuela, especially in Caracas. The lawsuit against Jakubowicz was based on an article from the Ley Resorte. That is Chapter I, Article 3, in a section titled ―General Objective.‖ The article reads, ―To promote the effective enforcement and practice of human rights, in particular, those regarding the protection of honor, private life, intimacy, public image, confidentiality, and reputation, as well as access to opportunistic, versatile, and unbiased information.‖ Also Chapter I, Article

5 (Type of program), section 4, defines violence type ―E‖ (from A to E - E being

(27) In interviewed Ricardo Trotti over the phone from his office in Miami, Florida, on February 2010 31

serious violence) as ―Images or graphic description that represent real or dramatize violence…‖ This description has been used to repress TV networks from showing violence often seen in protests. Mariangela Lando, of El Universal, wrote in an email that protecting children and adolescents from violent, vulgar and obscene content in radio and television is an ―apparent‖ motivation.

―In reality, the intention is to avoid that private networks inform about the violence generated due to crime, the political crisis and government mismanagement. They do not avoid verbal violence of TV programs such as ‗La

Hojilla‘ [The Razor Blade], shown by the government-sponsored Venezolana de

Televisión, which rudely and vulgarly attacks those who do not agree with government policies,‖ Lando wrote.

The most shocking measure against a media outlet occurred when President

Chávez announced in December 2006 that the 20-year concession of RCTV was ending in May 2007. Despite administrative and judicial actions taken by RCTV, the oldest private television network in Venezuela was off the air. Without a proper investigation, due process in court, or the right to appeal, RCTV was accused of participating in the 2002 coup attempt and forced to close. Instead of going after members of the management team who had participated in the coup, the government went after the entire network, left thousands of workers unemployed, and silenced its strongest and most popular critic (RCTV had the highest ratings nationwide). In a country where about 90% of Venezuelan households have at least

one TV set, making television the primary source of entertainment and news,(28) this is extremely worrisome.

The head of RCTV, Marcel Granier, has denied any charges linking the network to the coup attempt. Yet, he ―does acknowledge participating in efforts to mount a recall referendum against Chávez in 2004 that failed when the president won 59 percent of the vote …[Granier] contents that RCTV tries to be fair, offering invitations to government officials [for interviews] that are usually ignored.‖(29)

Torrealba said that after the closure of RCTV other major TV networks,

Venevisión and Televén, resorted to self-censorship to avoid any sanctions imposed by the government because of the participation of some of their managers in the coup attempt.(30) The case of RCTV served well as a warning to all other media outlets that dare criticize the government, encouraging self-censorship.

―…[Venevisión] prohibited its journalists (inaudible) to talk about [the closing of RCTV] under the excuse that they are public figures representing the TV network… Apparently, there was a situation, an internal crisis where about 60 journalists presented letters of resignation. Then management gave in and, to avoid a massive resignation, authorized reporters to attend the protests in support of

RCTV,‖ Torrealba said. ―We know of cases of daily newspapers with a critical

(28) Nelson, B. (2009). The silence and the scorpion: The coup against Chávez and the making of modern Venezuela. New York: Nation Books, a member of Perseus Book Group. (29)Forero, J. (January, 2007). “Pulling the Plug on Anti-Chavez TV.” *24 paragraphs+. The Washington Post *Online Serial] Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/17/AR2007011702003.html (30) I interviewed Luisa Torrealba through Skype from her office in Caracas, Venezuela on February 2010 33

editorial line of the government that have censored their own reporters… There is a word that is being used often, ‗boliburguesía‘ [boli-bourgeoisie, a combination of the words ‗Bolivarian‘ and ‗bourgeoisie‘]. In Venezuela this word is used to refer to the

[nouveau riche] who have profited from the government of President Chávez. So because journalists used the word ‗boli-bourgeoisie,‘ they are censored by their companies.‖(25)

In addition to ethical issues, administrative and legal harassment, verbal and physical attacks, the government also attempts to control information through the so-called hegemony plan. In the journal article ―Chavez Does No Such Thing,‖

Carlos Lauría, Senior Americas Program Coordinator for the Committee to Protect

Journalists, wrote, ―The decision to take [RCTV]… off the air responds to a premeditated strategy by the government of President Hugo Chávez Frías to replace the domination of private broadcasters with state domination… Since the coup, the administration has invested heavily to increase the size of the government‘s communications portfolio. By stacking its personnel, government‘s followers and supporters, Chavez has certainly influenced content while guaranteeing vast amounts of uncritical coverage.‖(31)

During an interview with a university newspaper Andrés Izarra, founder of

Pan-Latin American television station Telesur and former Minister of Information, said, ―For the new strategic scenario … the struggle that falls in the ideological field

(31) Lauria, C (2007). Chavez does no such a thing: Press freedom conditions have seriously deteriorated under his regime. Television Quarterly, 38, 18-21 34

has to do with a battle of ideas to win the hearts and minds of people … we have to prepare a new plan and the one we are proposing is aimed at achieving the state‘s communication and information hegemony.‖(32) Izarra‘s Communications Hegemony

Plan is addressed further in chapter IV.

Hugo Chávez has spearheaded the legalization of state censorship and criminalization of free speech, journalism, and the right to freely assembly. Aside from legalizing methods of censorship and intimidation, the government also uses other government offices not related to telecommunications such as SENIAT (the equivalent of the Internal Revenue Service in the USA) and

CADIVI (control exchange on imports) to put pressure on media companies through taxes and imports. (www.rsf.org and www.cpj.org).

The following is an account from Miguel Salazar, the editor of Las Verdades de Miguel and a friend of Hugo

Chávez. Salazar questioned the status of their friendship due to strong differences between them. (33) Also, he Miguel Salazar – www.noticiaaldia.com preferred not to provide any details about his son‘s problems with the Colombian guerrilla and how President Chávez helped him. He did mention that President

Chávez expected loyalty from him after helping his son, but Salazar refused.

(32) Pradas, M. (January, 2007). “Andrés Izarra: El socialismo necesita un hegemonía comunicacional.” *38 paragrahps] Boletín Digital Universitario [Online serial]. Available at http://www.boletin.uc.edu.ve/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4990&Itemid=38 (33) I interviewed Miguel Salazar via Skype from his office in Caracas, Venezuela, on February 2010 35

―So when we [began denouncing cases of corruption], the enemies of the government (not us) began taking us to court, filing lawsuits, feeling offended. This is the same people who [before Chávez]… felt powerful and [were offended over anything]. They felt invulnerable, but what did they say about others? What did they say to [former President] Pérez? What did they publicly say about [former

President] Caldera? They said he was a thief… they offended him in every way possible and Caldera never took them to a court to accuse them of defamation. [But today,] what is the first thing they do when they feel offended [by my work]? They try to take me to court and persecute me…‖ (translated from Spanish).

He also said that there was already repression against the media before

Chávez came to power, ―Now the problem with Chávez is that he doesn‘t persecute the media but confronts them. He loves to pick a fight and he loves arguing with them… We never heard before a president saying that ‗journalist such and such is an imbecile.‘ Chávez does that, he lowers himself where no other president has ever been and that is shocking to all of us.‖

Salazar said the governments of Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964) and Jaime

Lusinchi (1984-1989) were worse for press freedom, especially Betancourt‘s. He explained that Betancourt had to deal with the first democratic government after the dictatorship of Pérez Jímenez. During this time, the Cuban Revolution was popular throughout Latin America and Venezuela was not an exception. To combat leftist guerillas Betancourt ordered the closing of many media outlets because of their involvement with the guerrillas. 36

― … of course they had to be closed, they were absolutely political… there was no diversity among the press. For instance, you have the case of El Nacional whose owner was a leftist, Miguel Otero Silva. The newspaper was not swept by

Betancourt because they knew how to handle the situation. They always presented the newspaper as a source of information not as a militant media outlet.‖

When asked the same question to Ricardo Trotti, he said that there is not more repression, intimidation, or censorship during the years of President Chávez than in previous democratic governments. But he added, ―I think that if we revise all the annual reports there have always been problems with the media and attacks from the government, all of the Venezuelan administrations. What really stands out

– the total amount of aggressions against journalists and media outlets, between

1999 until today, has been appalling. You can‘t certainly compare this with any other recent period in contemporary history of Venezuela.‖(34)

In a special report, Ipys listed (2007) the problems contributing to press freedom violations (http://www.ipys.org.ve/informes_ipys/Reporte_2007.pdf):

 The abandonment of objective journalism by most of the media in favor of a partisan participation through presentations of one-sided versions and mere propaganda

 The political activism among a group of professional members of the media

 Weak journalism practices

 The government‘s prioritization of the so-called ―media front‖ as part of a political battle

(34) In interviewed Ricardo Trotti over the phone from his office in Miami, Florida, on February 2010 37

 The surge of the public sector as the sole proprietor of media outlets

 The use of tools by the State to indirectly control the press: regulatory laws, court trials used as warnings or to intimidate, government advertising as a way to punish or reward, incentives to introduce private capital considered ―friendly‖ towards government-sponsored media, etc.

Human rights and press freedom organizations have already documented some cases of pro-chavista media critical of public officials that have been censored or intimidated by the government. One may naively assume that at least pro- chavista or pro-government media would have the ear of the government and be able to provide constructive criticism – but that is not the case. Intolerance towards criticism and difference of opinion is absolute. Details about each of these cases of pro-government or pro-chavista media censored by the State are described in the next chapter. Updates in each case and an analysis of the current situation of press freedom and democracy in Venezuela are also provided.

―People don't like criticism. It's human nature. And since the president is always criticized by the opposition, when he hears criticism from his own side, even with no bad intention, he looks at it in the same way as

if it is said by the opposition.‖

Eleazar Díaz Rangel, Editor of newspaper Ultimas Noticias

Chapter III

Methodology and Investigation

This thesis is based in the theory that repression, intimidation and/or censorship of the press are the first indicators that an autocratic regime is raising.

Then repression expands into other groups in society such as unions, community leaders, politicians, etc. It is a step-by-step process towards authoritarianism while it is presented to the public as legitimate democratic practices, in other words, and

―the will of the people.‖ In that scenario, the government of Venezuela is using

Gramci‘s theory of hegemony to present a different alternative through state- sponsored media: a new social order and mindset. Yet Gramci‘s indicates that the population ultimately decides to embrace or not the proposed alternative. The government of Venezuela has presented its proposal through various state- sponsored media outlets. However, before the arrival of Hugo Chávez state-sponsor media had nowhere near the same reach and ratings than that of private media.

Then, the newly elected President Chávez had to force the proposed alternative in order to reach a massive audience; he had to get his message across. And that is how broadcasting stations were shutdown, newspapers were deprived of imported paper for print, and other members of the media were harassed. By imposing political messages through the media, the government in not proposing an agenda as Gramci suggested, it is forcing it.

The numbers of cases of press freedom violations in Venezuela are sometimes entangled with issues in journalism ethics. In theory, the media should remain neutral and serve society as a messenger of news. Contrary to the general assumption, journalism ethics allows members of the press to provide news analysis

and opinion. Opinion articles generally include facts or require expertise in the matter; it is not just personal points of view. Around the world media companies are sometimes founded with a particular editorial line which contributes to media diversity: religious newspapers, political weeklies, business journals, entertainment magazines, etc.

In other occasions, unfortunately, the media ceases to be a witness to history and chooses to participate in politics. Such is the case of some of the news media in

Venezuela. They have become participants in political life, giving the government evidence to prove that media moguls want to topple President Chávez. Yet, in reality the government is taking advantage of the media‘s ethical breach to quell dissent.

Consequently, many cases of press freedom violations in Venezuela are against so-called ―opposition media.‖ Likewise, pro-chavista media have been attacked by supporters of the opposition. This is no surprise since today the media is as polarized by politics as Venezuelans. But it is surprising to find cases of pro- chavista media intimidated by the same government they support (or obtain funding from). One may idealistically assumed that public officials would at least listen to complains made by their comrades, including pro-government media. But public officials are easily upset by criticism from the general public or the opposition, government insiders or supporters who make their discontent public are treated as traitors or dissenters.

Academic research about censorship against pro-chavista media in Venezuela is almost nonexistent. Only a case study of censorship against left-wing weekly La

Razón was found. In order to count the number of cases, I revised and cross- matched online data of cases from Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), IAPA,

Ipys, Provea, and Reporters Without Borders (RWB). I also searched for additional analysis and information about press freedom and human rights with local press syndicates SNTP and Colegio Nacional de Periodistas or CNP (National College of

Journalists), and the international organizations Amnesty International and

Human Rights Watch.

Aside from archived online information from these organizations, I also had the chance to interview representatives from IAPA, Ipys, and RWB to obtain more specific and updated information as well as to interpret data. In addition, I also interviewed Editor Miguel Salazar. The editor of Ultimas Noticias, Eleazar Díaz

Rangel, declined to be interviewed because he did not consider the paper to fall under the category of pro-chavista media.

―Ultimas Noticias is the newspaper with the largest circulation in Venezuela; it is not a pro-chavista newspaper, it does not typically have a left-wing approach neither supports the government of President Chávez, hence I cannot do the interview,‖ Díaz Rangel wrote in response to an email (translated from Spanish).

After he was questioned about his personal relationship with the President and how it could affect the newspaper, Díaz Rangel did not respond to further

emails or phone calls. Two reports from Media Watch Global, Venezuela Chapter, stated in 2004 that even Ultimas Noticias was balanced in its amount of news pro- opposition and pro-chavista with a 52.1% of ―neutral angles towards information.‖

In 2009 the same organization did a content analysis of news information from national media (print and television) during the constitutional referendum where

Ultimas Noticias was still categorized as a balanced source of information. On the contrary, the final report from the Election Observation Mission of the European

Union stated in 2006 that what stood out from their content analysis of Ultimas

Noticias was that 71% of newspaper space dedicated to political news predominantly positive toward the government (the reports were provided by Luisa

Torrealba of Ipys via email). Finally, in Frontline‘s ―The Hugo Chavez Show,‖ the newspaper was labeled a left-wing media due to Díaz Rangel‘s friendship and support of the President(35). When Ted Gesing(36), one of the producers of the show, was asked for any other source of information to confirm such claim, other than interviews with Teodoro Petkoff and journalist Phil Gunson of The Economist, he said various sources provided information ―on background.‖

Freddy Fernández, President of Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias or ABN (the

State news agency), and Gregorio Salazar, Secretary General of CNP, had agreed to an interview but never responded to the questionnaire emailed. They didn‘t respond to follow-up emails and phone calls either. Also, Carlos Correa, director of

(35) Bikel, O. (2008). “The Hugo Chavez Show.” Frontline, PBS (Public Broadcasting Service). Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hugochavez/view/ (36)I interviewed Ted Gesing over the pone in his home in New York City on February 2010 44

Venezuelan press freedom and human rights organizations Espacio Público (Public

Space) and Provea, was contacted to set up an interview but phone calls and emails were not returned.

Likewise, the newspaper La Razón was contacted but trying to interview

Pablo López in Costa Rica proved unfruitful. Though, Andrés Cañizales said he read in a newspaper story that as part of the conditions to remain in exile in Costa Rica,

López is not allowed to talk about his case.(37) Attempts to follow up with calls and emails were made but the editor of La Razón in Caracas did not respond.

Also, Miguel Salazar and Fernández disagreed with the used of the term

―pro-chavista.‖ To clarify these and other terms I have created a list that will explain further some of the words or phrases used throughout the thesis.

Definition of Terms

Cacerolazo: A way to demonstrate discontent and/or disagreement with the government or private sector in some countries in Latin America by banging on kitchen pots and pans in the streets or from home (standing outside one‘s home or from a window). This form of protesting is said to have started in Argentina and

Chile.

Cadena/s: A ―chain system‖ in Venezuela that obligates radio and TV companies to interrupt their programming to broadcast messages from public officials.

(37) I interviewed Andrés Cañizales at the National Endowment of Democracy (NED) on June 2010 45

Chavismo: It is the name given to the left-wing political ideology based on the ideas, programs, and government style associated with the present president of

Venezuela, Hugo Chávez. Chavista is a term to describe strong supporters of

Chávez, which is closely associated with support for chavismo(38)(39)

Gramsci: Antonio Gramsci was an Italian journalist and political leader of the

Partito Comunista d'Italia (Communist Party of Italy). He is famous for expanding the concept of hegemony. Gramsci provided an analysis to explain why a socialist revolution did not take place until the early 20th century. He suggested that capitalism had stronger roots than most people thought and maintained control not just through violence and political and economic coercion but also through ideology, through a hegemonic culture in which the values of the bourgeoisie became the

―common sense‖ values of all. Hence, instead of revolting, the working class believed their ideals were the same as that of the bourgeoisie (Wikipedia)

On Background: A journalism term, used in the USA and Canada, which means that information given by a source may be reported but direct quotes may not be used (Journalism Seminar at Northeastern University; Wikipedia).

Pro-chavista or pro-government media: Private media outlets that have a left-wing or center-left editorial line. Pro-chavista media also includes editors and/or

(38) Porsanik, J. (2005). “Politics & Culture: An anthropological perspective on Venezuela’s political confrontation.” [42 paragraphs]. VHeadline. [Online Serial] Available at http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=7266 (39) Morsbach. (December 2005). “Chavez opponents face tough times.” *28 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4502272.stm

reporters known to have a personal or professional affiliation with the government

(local, regional, or national) or public officials as well as membership to a party.

State-run media is also included in this group. Finally, it also includes private media that openly supports President Chávez, or chavismo.

The Cases

One distinction to make is that not all leftist media should be associated with

Chávez. First of all, the role of the media is to provide checks and balances needed in a democracy. This function is essential because it provides citizens with information so they can make sound decisions and participate in civic activities.

This delicate balancing act – caught in the middle between citizens and the

government – places the media as a very important

agent of democracy. Therefore, those who decide to

join the news business should be instinctively

interested in society and the pieces of the puzzle that

compose it: politics, legislation, economics, public

administration, etc.

Some media outlets tend to present news to different Hugo Chávez – www.nypost.com groups in society. In Venezuela some media may provide news that the working class, rather than the elite, is interested in. Such media is often seen as leftist or center-left. During the last decade, leftist media has been associated with Chávez

because of his initial rhetoric promoting the ―Bolivarian Revolution,‖ which was supposed to bring social change, encourage a true participative democratic process, and alleviate poverty and corruption.

For instance, La Razón is defined by the Miami Herald as a center-left newspaper, providing mostly news about politics and economics.(40) President

Chávez was a columnist with the newspaper from 1996 to 1998. But criticizing the new ―Bolivarian‖ government has cost La Razón a series of judicial procedures, raids, and the editor‘s exile to Costa Rica. Andrés Cañizales, from RWB, hesitated to categorize La Razón with any particular editorial line and said it is rather vague.

―First, it is very difficult – there‘s no tradition, contrary to other countries, among the media in Venezuela to specify their editorial lines. Meaning that they are not traditionally – well, except during the 19th century when the press had clear editorial lines, but later in the 20th century the press opted to have – I don‘t know how to define it, but in any case, the press opted not to define itself politically or ideologically. Yet, they acted politically and ideologically,‖ Cañizales said. ―Today in

Venezuela part of the legacy left by Chávez is, in a way, his appropriation of the leftist discourse. As such, in the present context in Venezuela, one has to be very brave and be very clear when claiming that one is a leftist but not a chavista. From my point of view Chávez doesn‘t belong to the left, but his rhetoric says he is. His is

(40) Johnson, T. (2000). “Chavez, media at odds: critics bullied in Venezuela.” *26 paragraphs+. The Miami Herald [Online Serial]. Available at http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/venezuela/odds.htm

a hegemonic discourse in society… a good portion of society believes Chávez belongs to the left. Therefore, trying to appear as a member of the left and be critical of chavismo is really difficult.‖(41)

From 1999 until 2008, the number of cases of pro-chavista media censored or intimidated by the government is eight, according to data obtain from the

Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters Without Borders. The Venezuelan human rights organization Provea in 2009 released a report stating that in that year there were 121 cases of violations against free speech

(http://www.derechos.org.ve/proveaweb/?page_id=1651). The organizations IAPA,

Ipys, SNTP and CNP reported some of the same cases investigated by CPJ and

RWB. However, CNP, Ipys, and SNTP reported six additional cases not mentioned in international organizations, raising the number of pro-chavista media censored by the government to 12. This includes cases of censorship, intimidation, verbal and physical attacks, and administrative or judicial procedures against a member of the press, media companies or citizens. The number is certainly minuscule compared to the total number from only the year 2009. Yet it shows how pro-chavista media is also under scrutiny and how government insiders and supporters are discouraged from thinking differently. Keep in mind that the numbers above include only reporter cases; in Venezuela the press has also resorted to self-censorship to avoid harassment or intimidation which contributes to cases not being reported, therefore not counted as press freedom violations.

(41) I interviewed Andrés Cañizales at the National Endowment of Democracy (NED) on June 2010 49

Below are the details of additional cases reported by the CNP, Ipys and

SNTP.

****

CNP reported the case of a group of journalists who called themselves

―Revolutionary Journalists of Venezuela‖ and openly support the government of

Chávez. CNP released a letter that was sent by Revolutionary Journalists of

Venezuela to the President complaining about the governor of Anzoátegui, Tarek

William Saab Halabi.

Governor Saab had awarded the Edmundo Barrios Governor‘s Journalism

Award to Alexis Castillo, a journalist friendly to Saab‘s political cause. The group insisted the endorsement of the award was motivated by political interests rather than merit. Revolutionary Journalists of Venezuela said that Governor Saab had dismissed two colleagues from the list of nominees to the award due to political motivations.

―We condemn the actions of the governor as he has stained the prestige of such award. The governor‘s journalism award is given to our colleagues based on the quality of their work, not based on their affinity with the governor. With much effort we have fostered a group of serious, ethical, responsible journalists who are committed to work in the community to promote alternative media. Our intention is to counterbalance the media war that right-wing groups have established… This also gives another reason to right-wing groups to question us, the journalists who 50

identify with the revolutionary process,‖ Revolutionary Journalists of Venezuela wrote (http://www.cnpven.org/data.php?link=3&expediente=154; translated from

Spanish).

Governor Saab is clearly congratulating those journalists who agree with his political cause and punishing those who question him, even those who have aligned with chavismo. Disregarding someone‘s work, such as preventing a reporter from receiving a well-deserved award, is simply a passive-aggressive method of discouragement that can lead to self-censorship. Also, in 2008 SNTP released an updated list of cases for the month of May which included phone threats against two journalists from Ultimas Noticias, Dyahana Morales and Eligio Rojas. The reporters published a news story about police agents who were allegedly involved with the lynching of two civilians (http://www.sntp.org.ve/mayo042008.asp).

Lastly, Ipys provides information about four different cases. Two of them are also cases from the weekly newspaper La Razón but unrelated to the exile of Pablo

López. The first case is about an order by the attorney general to subpoena journalist Luis Felipe Colina. The subpoena aimed to force him to reveal his confidential sources regarding a news story about corruption inside the state-run oil company PDVSA.

―The attorney general also requested personal data from two assistants, a newsroom coordinator, a supervisor, and a manager,‖ Ipys said. ―Omar Estacio, the newspaper‘s lawyer, indicated that article 28 of the constitution and article 8 of the

Law of Journalism Practices protect journalists from revealing their secret sources of information, hence the newspaper cannot be forced to disclose the identity of their sources‖ (http://www.ipys.org.ve/2007/a_CD_NV.htm).

The second case occurred on April 27th, 2007 when the National Guard showed up at the offices of newspapers La Razón and Reporte Diario de La

Economía with an arrest warrant against columnist Leocenis García. He was accused of extortion and complicity in the case involving another journalist and

García‘s co-worker, José Rafael Ramírez, who was detained under charges of extortion of businessmen and public officials.

―…[García] told Ipys that such actions are based on information he published in his column regarding corruption in PDVSA, which implicates high members of the executive team, their families, and some financial entities in mismanagement of company bonds,‖ Ipys wrote. ―Throughout the year García has been subpoenaed by the attorney general‘s office regularly. In one occasion PDVSA‘s Vice President of

Exploration Luis Vierma filed a defamation lawsuit based on publications about allege corruption in the oil company.‖

Two years later after his arrest García‘s lawyer, Dr. Pedro Aranguren, presented an appeal to allow his client to be released from prison while the trial continues.

"The Court of Appeals has repeatedly denied any motion to release García under supervision. García‘s right to a due process and judicial resources have been 52

violated, the court simply blocks any attempt to submit an appeal or limits the function of judges,‖ Dr. Aranguren said in an interview with El Universal. ―Leocenis is being tried without the right to appeal or submit a motion. This is some form of revenge without a cause. We are not witnessing a case of illegal procession of weapons neither property damages in which imprisonment during a trial would have been justified.‖ (www.eud.com).

A third case reported in 2005 by Ipys involves the program ―Dossier‖ which was canceled because its host and producer, Walter Martínez, criticized the government. Martínez mentioned that he had information about a group of politicians close to the President involved in a corruption scandal. The government asked for an apology (which he didn't give) and forced Dossier off the air. (42)(43)

―During his program ‗Dossier‘ on September 15 and 16, Martínez said that there are corrupt groups of politicians close to Chávez who are advocating for a

‗chavismo without Chávez,‘‖ Ipys wrote. ―Martínez said during a radio show at

YVKE, also a state-run media outlet, that on September 21 a low ranking executive from VTV informed him that he had ‗ordered‘ the news program to be removed.

This is despite the fact that in Martínez‘s contract stipulates that he should answer

(42) Human Rights Watch (2008). A decade under Chavez: political intolerance and lost opportunities for advancing human rights in Venezuela. Human Rights Watch. p. 74. (43) Sreeharsha, V. (November, 2005) “Telesur tested by Chávez video”. *19 paragraphs+. Christian Science Monitor. [Online Serial] Available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1122/p07s02-woam.html

only to the Vice President of VTV, who has not communicated with him‖

(http://www.ipys.org.ve/boletines/octubrexv.pdf).

During an interview in June 2010 with a government source from the

Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in Washington, D.C., who asked not to be identified because of the nature of his work, said that ―Dossier‖ was off the air for a while until it was moved to Telesur. Apparently, Martinez‘s show went off the air because one of the sponsors of the program in VTV refused to pay the fee for ad space due to a increase on advertisement fees.

The fourth and final case presented by Ipys is Nelson Flores, a journalist from Las Verdades de Miguel. Flores is the correspondent for the newspaper in the

Andean state of Táchira. He was verbally attacked and threatened by the state‘s

Legislative Council Representative Henry Armando Parra – a member of the PCV- over a series of news reports about alleged irregularities committed by Parra through Misión Sucre (a government program to encourage education).

―Flores told Ipys that he presented himself to the Legislative Council where he was given the right to reply and explained in detail the accusations he posted in his column Verdades del Táchira … Parra promised to send him to prison with the help of the police. Flores added that Parra also said he will file a lawsuit and will not rest until he sees Flores in jail‖ (http://ipys.org.ve/alertas_diputado.htm).

The next cases presented below are reported by international human rights and press freedom organizations as some of the worst cases of press freedom violations in Venezuela.

Miguel Salazar, Las Verdades de Miguel

In 2007 RWB published the case of Editor Miguel Salazar from the weekly

Las Verdades de Miguel. Eduardo Manuitt, then the governor of Guárico state, filed a defamation lawsuit against Salazar over a story about Manuitt‘s involvement in human rights abuses and corruption.

―It is not up to us to assess how defamatory the offending articles may have been, as the case has not yet been tried, but this trial poses two dangers for press freedom. Firstly, the two plaintiffs are public officials and as such should expect to be criticised, especially from an opinion weekly. So it is a problem that the

‗defamation‘ is deemed to be ‗aggravated‘ just because they are officials. Secondly and more importantly, if Salazar is convicted and sentenced, it will encourage self- censorship and endanger free expression. For this reason, we call on the judges to be lenient,‖ RWB wrote. ―Salazar is a supporter of President Hugo Chávez‘s government, although he often criticises [him] in his weekly (whose name refers to his own first name).‖ (http://en.rsf.org/venezuela-call-for-leniency-from-judges-in-17-

04-2007,21765.html).

CPJ wrote, ―[Salazar] was also charged with criminal defamation by Manuitt over a column alleging that the governor had hired gunmen to murder him. José 55

López, director of Las Verdades de Miguel, told CPJ that Manuitt had publicly denied all involvement in the plot to murder Salazar at the journalist‘s trial last month‖ (http://cpj.org/2006/05/journalist-convicted-of-criminal-defamation.php).

Laureano Márquez, Tal Cual

Laureano Márquez – www.laureanomarquez.com

The same year the daily Tal Cual faced a fine due to a satirical editorial written by comedian Laureano Márquez.

―The [CPJ] protests a Venezuelan court decision to fine the daily newspaper

Tal Cual and humorist Laureano Márquez following a satirical letter addressed to

President Hugo Chávez Frías‘ daughter.‖ CPJ added, ―On February 13, a juvenile court (the case was tried here because Chávez‘s daughter is underage) imposed a fine of 40 million bolivars (U.S. $18,600) on Tal Cual Publisher Mosca Analfabeta and said that humorist Márquez must pay another fine whose amount has not yet been determined...‖ (http://cpj.org/2007/02/in-venezuela-newspaper-and-humorist- fined-over-sat.php).

RWB wrote, ―Tal Cual carried an open letter on 25 November 2005, addressed to Rosinés, aged nine, the youngest daughter of President Hugo Chávez in which the writer, comedian Laureano Márquez, asked her to get her father to listen to reason so that he would be more tolerant of the opposition.‖ RWB added,

―Judge Holanda Dam at the juvenile court of Lara state, west of Caracas, ruled on

13 February 2007 that the article damaged ‗the honour, reputation, image, and private life of Rosinés Chávez Rodríguez‘, in violation of Article 65 of the Organic

Law for the Protection of the Child and Adolescent (Lopna)… Laureano Márquez defended himself by stressing that the letter was an exercise in comic style and that

President Hugo Chávez had himself publicly said - including during his weekly TV programme ‗Alo Presidente‘ - that he consulted his daughter on some decisions. It was on this basis that the head of state reportedly altered the coat of arms on the national flag‖ (http://en.rsf.org/venezuela-fine-against-opposition-daily-tal-15-02-

2007,21026.html).

The Anderson Case

In the year 2006 Lawyer Danilo Anderson, who was investigating the murders of the April 11th coup attempt, was killed. Naturally, the media was monitoring the developments of such a sensitive case and, as part of news reports, the press provided information about key witness Giovani José Vásquez De Armas.

One piece of information the media started to question was Vásquez‘s real identity and his connection to the Anderson case. The government then quickly

banned all media from releasing any more information about the case. The ban included state-run media.

―[Reporters Without Borders] condemned the fact that 10 news media are to be investigated under the Law of Judicial Authority and the November 2004 Law of

Social Responsibility in Radio and Television for possible ‗obstruction of justice‘ in their reporting on the case until now. The offence is punishable by a prison sentence of six months to two years in prison,‖ RWB said. ―We fear this ‗obstruction of justice‘ procedure is a judicial device for the government to yet again settle some scores with the privately-owned media and at the same time subject them to state censorship‖ (http://en.rsf.org/venezuela-information-minister-seeks-use-of-23-02-

2006,16264.html).

"This gag order is a shocking attack on press freedom and the right to information of all Venezuelan citizens," CPJ Executive Director Ann Cooper said

(http://cpj.org/2006/01/venezuelan-judge-issues-gag-order-in-highprofile-m.php).

CPJ added, ―Judge Florencio Silano… said he wanted to protect the prosecution's primary witness, Giovanny Vásquez de Armas, from what he called a media campaign of harassment and psychological pressure… Three men have been convicted of killing Anderson, but prosecutors believe others planned the assassination. In November 2005, Venezuelan authorities ordered the detention of four people accused of orchestrating the murder, including journalist Patricia Poleo, a columnist and director of the Caracas daily El Nuevo País who has supported the

opposition in her work. Poleo has been in hiding for nearly three months. The government has said it will present evidence at trial and that the prosecution is not based on Poleo's work as a journalist.‖

Henry Crespo, Las Verdades de Miguel

During the same year Governor Eduardo Manuitt filed a lawsuit against

Henry Crespo, another journalist from Las Verdades de Miguel. Like his boss,

Crespo was also accused of defamation after he too published information about

Manuitt‘s involvement in corruption scandals and human rights violations.

―For a Venezuelan public official to criminally prosecute a journalist for criticizing his conduct in office is a serious abuse of power that sends a chilling message to all Venezuelan journalists,‖ CPJ wrote. ―Laws that criminalize speech that does not incite violence are incompatible with the right to free expression as established under Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which

Venezuela has ratified‖ (http://cpj.org/2006/05/journalist-convicted-of-criminal- defamation.php).

Ultimas Noticias

In 2005 a photographer and a reporter of Ultimas Noticias were intimidated by government supporters when they arrived at a city square to work on a story on homelessness. Both were threaten, bullied and accused of lying.

―[Reporter Mabel Sarmiento] said several individuals began to insult them and threatened to beat them and take their cameras away. One of them said the square was under the control of Lina Ron, a politician closely allied with President

Hugo Chávez, and no photos could be taken without Ron‘s permission,‖ RWB wrote.

―They took the two journalists by force to an office and held them there until Ron arrived two hours later. Ron confirmed that no photos could be taken on the square without her permission. When Sarmiento said she would write about this incident involving Últimas Noticias, Ron replied: ‗Write what you like, no one will believe you, you will be just one more lying journalist.‘‖ (http://en.rsf.org/venezuela- photographers-subjected-to-08-07-2005,14366.html).

Since February 27th, 2004, a number of press workers from the private media were beaten, mostly by security forces. RWB recorded 12 attacks in less than a week. One of these cases concerned another reporter from Ultimas Noticias,

Berenice Gómez, who was beaten by suspected pro-government militants.

RWB released the following information, ―The Venezuelan opposition had called on its supporters to come out on the streets on 27 February when the national electoral council (CNE) challenged the validity of more than a million signatures it had collected to press for the holding of a referendum on the resignation of

President Chávez.‖ The organization added, ―In a statement released on 2 March, a grouping of Venezuelan organisations, including the human rights organisation

Provea, condemned the ‗disproportionate use of force by the National Guard and the

political police, DISIP during the crushing of demonstrations. They also exposed the behaviour of police forces in opposition-controlled municipalities for ‗direct involvement in building barricades‘ and for ‗failing in their duty to provide security‘.

The non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also called on the media to ‗promote tolerance and social life and to refrain from publishing anonymous statements and calls for violence‘‖ (http://en.rsf.org/venezuela-a-dozen-journalists-assaulted-and-03-

03-2004,09427.html).

Pablo López, La Razón

In the year 2000, a little more than a year after Chávez became president, the first recorded case of a pro-chavista media outlet intimidated by the government appeared. Editor Pablo López of newspaper La Razón was accused of defamation by a businessman with close ties to President Chávez and Luis Miquilena (then president of the Legislative Assembly). Businessman Tobías Carrero was allegedly awarded government contracts thanks to his close relation with the government, according to López‘s reports.

―On July 8, 2000, presiding judge David Pérez issued a house-arrest warrant against López for skipping five consecutive court hearings in the suit filed by

Carrero. According to his defense lawyers, the journalist boycotted the hearings to protest alleged violations of procedural rules and Judge Pérez's alleged bias,‖ CPJ said.

―Two days later, Chief Court Inspector René Molina called on Judge Pérez to recuse himself from the case, citing his ‗evident partiality‘ and violations of due process. On July 12, Judge Pérez complied. The case was then transferred to Judge

Graudy Villegas. The next day, Judge Villegas revoked the house-arrest order against López and set a new court hearing for August 4‖

(http://cpj.org/2000/08/house-arrest-for-editor-named-in-defamation-suit.php).

CPJ added, ―On August 4, López again boycotted the scheduled court hearing. Instead he filed an amparo (a writ asserting that an individual's rights are threatened by government agencies or the judiciary) before the Appeals Court.

According to López's attorney, Omar Estacio, the amparo was intended to allow

López's defense lawyers to gather evidence in the United States about an alleged trip to Boston that Carrero, Miquilena, and then-interior minister Ignacio Arcaya took in Carrero's airplane this past January, according to La Razón's reporting. In his suit against La Razón, Carrero denied that this trip had ever taken place. But in a previous ruling delivered August 1, Judge Villegas rejected the defense's request that they be allowed to investigate the matter‖

Limitations on my research

- Limited sources of communication to interview experts. This thesis is based on computer-assisted research as well as documents from the Boston Public Library and Northeastern University‘s Snell Library. Most interviews took place via Skype, phone, or email. Financial constrains, U.S. immigrations law prevented the 62

researcher from traveling to Venezuela to gather information directly from local sources, hence the information presented is limited. Note, however, that performing research in Venezuela does not guarantee obtaining much more detailed information. Investigation in Venezuela is also dangerous unless:

1) It is not regarding socio-economics or politics;

2) You are openly friendly to the government or the opposition.

- No responses to interview requests from sources. They are presumably afraid to speak up, disagree over the topic of the thesis, or are too busy to answer questions. Most negative responses came from government sources or pro- government media, therefore tilting this thesis to be perceived as pro-opposition.

- Lack of official documentation in Venezuela. Access to public archives from the government of Venezuela and public libraries is very limited. Such lack of data hampers the ability to corroborate information and forces investigators to rely almost solely on analysis from experts and witness accounts.

- Lack of appropriate content analysis from media outlets. This would make it hard to define a media as chavista, opposition, or independent, although, it is still possible to rely on the expertise of interviewees and information from the press.

―…there's nothing the government hates more -- and Mr. Chávez, in particular, hates more -- than criticism from his own people.‖

Phil Gunson, The Economist

Chapter IV

Results: Law and the Hegemony Plan

The Cases

Unfortunately, following up with the victims of press freedom violations in

Venezuela is very difficult from overseas. It‘s also dangerous to visit the country in order to do so in person. However, I managed to interview Miguel Salazar, an editor, and Luisa Torrealba, a press freedom advocate, who work in Venezuela.

Most of the cases mentioned in Chapter III have not been concluded because of the lack of judicial independence, bureaucracy, fixed trials, and/or slow criminal investigations.

William Echeverria, president of the National Journalism School of Venezuela, speaks in a loudspeaker during a march of journalists in front of the Public Prosecutors' building urging for freedom of speech in Venezuela and protesting against the aggressions committed to some reporters of the Cadena Capriles Newspapers, on August 14, 2009 in Caracas, Venezuela. (Photo by Ramon Lepage/Orinoquiaphoto/LatinContent/Getty Images). www.gettyimages.com

The first case is that of Pablo López from the left-wing newspaper La Razón.

López is unable to return to Venezuela and will remain in exile in Costa Rica.

Also from La Razón is the case of Leocenis García, which will be taken to the

Organization of Americas States (OAS), the Inter American Commission on Human

Rights (IACHR), and Reporters Without Borders by the Miami-based group

Venezuela Awareness Foundation.

―Patricia Andrade, president of the foundation, explained that the case matches the legal requirements to be considered political persecution,‖ El Universal reported. ―On May 20, 2010, journalist Leocenis García attended Tribunal 20th, run by Judge Gustavo Jiménez, where García was notified that jail time will be prolonged one more year without a trial due to charges against him‖

(http://www.eluniversal.com/2010/05/24/pol_ava_presentaran-a-la- cid_24A3903181.shtml).

Miguel Salazar, the editor of Las Verdades de Miguel, said he was finally allowed to travel since 2008 – after being unable to leave the country for four years

– and no longer has to show up in court every eight days, as he once did. Seven defamation lawsuits against him, all filed by public officials, are still pending. When interviewed, Salazar said that the accusers did not show up to the last court audience and he immediately filed a motion to dismiss the trial based on the absence of the accusers. The accusers appealed to the Supreme Court but the appeal was denied as the district court is still assessing Salazar‘s motion. Salazar clarified that the only reason why the court‘s decision favored him was because the accusers had openly opposed the President, not because justice has been done. Some judges

see critics of the government, even public officials, as enemies. Hence, Salazar‘s case is used to punish them for dissenting, not for any damage they may have caused to

Salazar and his newspaper. If these public officials were openly loyal to the government, then Salazar‘s fate would have been different, according to his own account.(44)

The case of Tal Cual was quickly solved. The newspaper had no other option but to pay the fine imposed by the government, otherwise Laureano Márquez would have gone to jail. The newspaper was able to pay the fine thanks, in part, to donations from citizens. Neither Márquez nor Teodoro Petkoff, the editor, responded to emails or phone calls asking for an interview about this case.

In the case of Ultimas Noticias there were various reports of attacks against its employees by public officials or chavistas. The Cadena Capriles - the company that owns Ultimas Noticias and other newspapers - denounced each of these episodes of violence, but nothing has been done by the authorities. In addition to the cases from Ultimas Noticias, in one occasion Chávez scolded Eleazar Díaz Rangel publicly for a story about the state of health in Venezuela, Rangel spoke to him over the phone, according to a transcript provided from ―The Hugo Chávez Show‖ by

Producer Ted Gesing, and explained to Chávez that they were simply reporting the information they received from a representative of the Ministry of Health.(45) (46)

(44) I interviewed Miguel Salazar via Skype from his office in Caracas, Venezuela, on February 2010 (45) Bikel, O. (2008). “The Hugo Chavez Show.” Frontline, PBS (Public Broadcasting Service). Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hugochavez/view/ 68

Finally, there is the case of a reporter from the ABN news agency who was subpoenaed by the National Assembly along with 19 other citizens and members of the media, including Reporters Without Borders‘ correspondent Andrés Cañizales.

They were accused of receiving grants, training with and working for the US

Department of State to destabilize the government of Venezuela. The National

Assembly relied on information obtained by lawyer Eva Gollinger who filed a Free

Flow of Information Action Act (FFIA) request with the U.S. Department of State.

This information stated that 20 individuals were granted scholarships to study or train temporarily in the USA in various subjects, some in journalism. But not much is known about the ABN reporter, not even his/her name or about the status of the hearings (www.eud.com). In an interview with Cañizales, he said the subpoena for the hearings at the National Assembly seemed to have been forgotten or dismissed since they have not continued with any measures or sent any notifications.(47)

The Law

As explained in Chapter II, perhaps the most feared media law is the Ley

Resorte. Luisa Torrealba provided much more insight and a bit of background preceding the approval and implementation of the Ley Resorte – as well as other laws – from a human rights and legal context. This confirms the government‘s intention to legalize attacks against the media, criminalize the work of the press, and violate citizens‘ right to free speech (translated from Spanish):

(46) I interviewed Ted Gesing over the phone in his home in New York City on February 2010 (47) I interviewed Andrés Cañizales at the National Endowment of Democracy (NED) on June 2010 69

During the years 2002 and 2003, amid the coup of April 11th and the nationwide strike from the oil industry, the Ley Resorte is approved with 35 articles and was labeled as a law highly punitive. For instance, one of its articles… states that there are potentially 78 to 80 sanctions – this is only one article. The Ley Resorte establishes that content that can cause panic, anxiety, or incite public disobedience justifies administrative measures such as the temporary closure of a media outlet or revocation of its concession or permit.

In the year 2005, immediately after the approval of the Ley Resorte, the Penal Code increased the penalty with jail time for crimes of opinion by expanding the number of government officials that are protected from scrutiny. Before the President was protected, now this protection is extended to the Vice President, governors, their families. Also the time-frame of penalties increased. Before, someone who offended the President could have been sentenced from six to 30 months in prison. Basically, sanctions that were months were converted to years…

Additionally, another article is included in the Penal Code that says ―all individuals who release false information via any channel of communication – print, radio, television, telephone, electronic mail, or handouts – intent to cause or actually cause panic or anxiety among the collective will be punished with two to five years of prison.‖

So not only defamation is applicable to a more extensive group of government officials, but also individuals can be summoned for defaming when using any form of communication. Yet a ―form of communication‖ can be anything – a handout! In January or February of 2004 there were a number of demonstrations in various parts of [Caracas] where protesters were burning tires and closed main roads. As a result, the government also included another article in the Penal Code that addresses using objects to shut down any roads or halt public transportation. Whoever attempts to block a road to protest will be penalized with four to eight years of prison. In addition, the government created another article sanctioning the cacelorazo.

Also, Sentence 1492 of the Supreme Court of Justice… says that that no international courts have jurisdiction in Venezuela and any decision made overseas will be interpreted as a violation of the country‘s sovereignty. Many jurists say that this is Venezuela‘s first step toward dismissing the Inter American human rights system. The Supreme Court also authorized Sentence 1013 which limits the right to reply. It says… that the right to reply is a constitutional right granted to all citizens. In the case of journalists, they already have access to the 70

press because they work for media outlets and should exercise their right to reply in those entities. Journalists do not have a right to solicit a reply in the media outlet where they were offended.

More recently, the National Assembly was debating the creation of the Ley de Delitos Mediáticos (Law of Media Crimes) in which the media will be penalized for a series of information considered to be ―crimes.‖ The law was presented as a special project to the National Assembly but the discussion has been stalled at the moment due to lack of consensus among parliamentarians.(48)

Below are excerpts of the Ley de Delitos Mediáticos provided by Torrealba

(translated from Spanish):

Article 1. Purpose. ―The purpose of this law is to prevent and punish the actions or omissions presented through the media which constitute a crime; this is with the purpose to find equilibrium and harmony between the right to free speech and the right to impartial, truthful, and appropriate information with citizens‘ right to safety in accord with the regulations established in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, laws and treaties, agreements and pacts subscribed and rectified by the Republic.‖

Article 3. ―The following persons that can be subjected to this law are… Part B. Independent National Producers, journalists, anchors, panelists, artists, and any other person using print, broadcast, or any other kinds of media outlet to make any kind of expression.‖

Article 4. Definition of media crimes. ―Media crimes are actions or omissions committed through a media outlet harming the right to impartial, truthful and appropriate information, endangering peace, national security and sovereignty, public order, the stability of government institutions, the public‘s mental or moral health, and generating a sense of impunity or insecurity.‖

Article 5. Publication of false news. ―All persons who publish false news through a media outlet that causes a grave damages to public order, causes panic, anxiety and damages of government‘s interests will be punished with a criminal sanction of two to four years in prison.

(48) I interviewed Luisa Torrealba through Skype from her office in Caracas, Venezuela on February 2010 71

The same sanction will be given to the person at the head of the media organization/company.‖

In addition, the CPJ provides an analysis about legislative measures taken by the government of Hugo Chávez. This excerpt was published in the 2005 annual report on Venezuela:

Two restrictive new legal measures—one expanding desacato (disrespect) provisions, the other setting "social responsibility" constraints on radio and television—went into effect during the year. These new measures could be used to silence government opponents and create a climate of self-censorship…

Pro-government legislators gave final approval in January to a bill overhauling the penal code. The changes expanded the categories of government officials protected by desacato provisions, which criminalize expressions deemed offensive to public officials and state institutions, and drastically increased criminal penalties for defamation and slander. The maximum prison term for defamation, for example, went from 30 months to 48 months under the measure. Chávez signed the provisions affecting the press, and they went into effect on March 16. CPJ's analysis shows that the changes were approved hastily, with the intention of quelling dissent and criticism. The right to "truthful" information was incorporated into Venezuela's constitution in 1999 despite objections from media groups.

Under the Supreme Court ruling, journalists may now express opinions only if they do not contain insults that are "out of context, disconnected, or unnecessary for the topic; or offensive, insidious, or degrading." In addition, if a publication claims to be independent, but the majority of its columnists subscribe to the same ideological beliefs, the publication could be in violation of the new standards. The ruling also permits prior censorship in some cases.

Recently, the government began to implement a strategy to control the free flow of information on the Internet.

―Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez … called … for regulation of the

Internet and singled out a website that he said falsely reported the murder of one of his ministers,‖ Reuters reported. ―‘The Internet cannot be something open where anything is said and done. Every country has to apply its own rules and norms,‘

Chavez said. (49) The Associated Press added ―[Chavez‘s] comments came a few days after the state-run telecommunications company, CANTV, announced that it plans to establish a centralized, government-controlled gateway [of] Internet traffic.

CANTV President Franco Silva did not say how the system would work, but denied it would be used to control access to the Web‖

(http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2010/03/14/venezuelan_web_sit e_rejects_chavezs_allegations/).

The Hegemony Plan

Unlike other repressive regimes, the government of Venezuela has been open about its intention to control information. In an interview provided to the daily newspaper El Nacional in 2005, Andrés Izarra, then Minister of Communications and Information, announced the implementation of a hegemony plan and defended the need for such measure. He later spoke to a student/reporter from a university in city of Valencia, further explaining the purpose of this plan.

(49) Chinea, E., Daniel, F.J. (March, 2010). Venezuela’s Chavez calls for internet controls. *8 paragraphs+. Reuters. [Online Serial]. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62D05I20100314

―We must achieve social ideals and values - the collective, solidarity, society – that prevail over the values of capitalism. That is hegemony Gramsci-style, a cultural group convincing the other of its values, principles and ideas. We propose a series of measures in different areas to build communication and information hegemony allowing an ideological and cultural battle to support socialism.‖(50).

So far the hegemony plan has been implemented on two different fronts. The first one is the legal context in which the government has reformed existing communication laws and/or has created more regulations criminalizing the press.

The second one is the transformation of existing state press and the creation of more media outlets supporting Chávez‘s political agenda. Both measures dance together in perfect unison. As some media outlets have been shut down based on policy reform or new laws, then they are acquired by the government to open up state media or friendly community media.

For example, aside from the closure of RCTV in 2007, at least 34 radio stations nationwide were shut down in 2009, and recently the President referred to the Internet as a ―trench‖ where coup attempts are planned. After this statement, the government immediately began training ―communication guerrillas‖ – a group of adolescents and young adults whose task is to use the Internet to expand the

Bolivarian Revolution. In addition to his TV show and the cadenas, President

Chávez created his own Twitter account and a blog.

(50) Pradas, M. (January, 2007). “Andrés Izarra: El socialismo necesita un hegemonía comunicacional.” *38 paragrahps] Boletín Digital Universitario [Online serial]. Available at http://www.boletin.uc.edu.ve/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4990&Itemid=38 74

―Nobody is saying that [hegemony does not allow difference of opinion], and it is not media dictatorship. Hegemony means that we can construct ways in which we can convince, attract, and encourage a series of values and ideas about the world to a whole social group‖ Andrés Izarra said during the interview.(51)

Livia Suárez, Press Attaché of the Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of

Venezuela in Washington, D.C., provided information (in Spanish) stating that 60% of media outlets nationwide are still in private hands, most of them belonging to families who opposed the government. She also showed statistics comparing licenses granted to community media during the presidency of Hugo Chávez and in previous administrations. Clearly, the current government has provided more licenses than any other. Suárez said this is an attempt to end media monopolization

(many media outlets owned by a small group of wealthy families). She also added that it was thanks to community media that the former Mayor of Caracas and member of the MVR party, Freddy Bernal, was not reelected. Community media,

Suárez said, showed citizens that Bernal‘s administration was incompetent.(52)

A government source from the Embassy of Venezuela in Washington, D.C., said that Izarra‘s explanation, or the interpretation of the hegemony plan, is not correct. He clarified that the hegemony plan is not replacing private/capitalistic

(51) Pradas, M. (January, 2007). “Andrés Izarra: El socialismo necesita un hegemonía comunicacional.” *38 paragrahps] Boletín Digital Universitario [Online serial]. Available at http://www.boletin.uc.edu.ve/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4990&Itemid=38 (52) I interviewed Livia Suárez at the Embassy of Venezuela in Washington, D.C. on June 2010 75

media monopolies with a state monopoly. On the contrary, the government is trying to encourage community media and end what they call a capitalistic monopoly.

The idea of creating community media is normally welcome in a democratic society, but in this case the government typically expects loyalty. In normal conditions – that is, in a democracy – independent community media would boost media diversity and audiences will have more alternatives for news and entertainment. In theory, all this sounds as a good initiative as long as the government does not continue to deny concessions, permits, or licenses based on individual opinion or editorial lines.

The government‘s intention with the hegemony plan is not to support independent community media but to create a propaganda apparatus, yet there seems to be disagreement and confusion among public officers and fears of disagreeing with the official version of the hegemony plan. If we pay attention to how the hegemony plan is enforced, rather than the official rhetoric, we will realize that the government is co-opting private media. The government has great interest in dominating audience ratings and monopolizing the media market, thus controlling the masses.

But the government will not compete with private media, as it would normally occur in any marketplace, it wants to grab the public‘s attention by force and as quickly as possible. As mentioned before, the method of this so-called hegemony plan has been, so far, the creation of community media friendly to the government, the transformation of state-sponsor media and the closure of private

media. Moreover, law enforcement is not equal and fair but rather a tool to suppress dissent. For instance, Cañizalez spoke about the case of 34 broadcasters that were shut down in August 2009 because they allegedly did not satisfying certain telecommunication regulations. In reality, there are around 300 stations that still need to file the appropriate paperwork to comply with regulations. Yet, the government goes after the stations that have expressed dissent. (53) More information about this particular case can be found online: http://en.rsf.org/venezuela-34-broadcast-media-shut-down-at-02-08-2009,34056.html

(53) I interviewed Andrés Cañizales at the National Endowment of Democracy (NED) on June 2010 77

―Nada es tan peligroso como dejar permanecer largo tiempo en un mismo ciudadano, el poder‖

Simón Bolívar

(Nothing is more dangerous than power resting in the hands of a single individual for a long time)

Chapter V

Analysis: Human Rights, Press Freedom and Democracy

Analysis

The problem of free speech and freedom of expression in Venezuela is becoming a vast subject to investigate due to political events unfolding since 1999.

Amid this tense environment between the government and media executives – added to decades of socio-economic problems – the Chávez administration has slowly developed and implemented a hegemony plan for the media to promote government initiatives and counter criticism from private, independent, national, and foreign media. Trying to analyze the situation of press freedom and free speech in Venezuela without linking them to politics is impossible. Many of the laws and legislation that has taken place are about telecommunications and information. It is also difficult to try to present contemporary politics without talking about Hugo

Chávez when he has become ubiquitous.

―According to the analysis we have

made, I see two different trends. The

first trend is, evidently, to silence

criticism. There is intolerance towards

criticism which has to do with the

President‘s exacerbated personality. You Student protest in Caracas – www.theepochtimes.com can witness publicity, propaganda [about

Chávez] even in small towns or border towns,‖ Ipys Representative Luisa Torrealba said. ―But basically I think the other trend is [the President‘s] obsession with power,

at least, that is how I perceive it. As long as he can muzzle criticism, he will benefit because criticism implicates to show citizens his vulnerability, his failures, the inefficiency of his administration. And if citizens realized of all these, it can influence in his popularity ratings or at least his image in the media.‖(54)

In addition to the President‘s egocentric leadership style, the media‘s ethical violations have become their Achilles‘ heel. The behavior of some members of the media cannot be generalized and, despite ethical issues, the reaction of government has been exaggerated and unjustified.

―Freedom of expression is in tremendous danger, but why in Venezuela is freedom of expression in danger? Because freedom of expression here has become… in other words, free speech and the media have become political parties, beginning with state media,‖ Miguel Salazar said. ―I tell you, the government seems more like a branch of the PSUV, the government‘s party. [State media] does not seem at all like public media. This has placed most of the media, pro-opposition and pro- government, in a dangerous situation. Why? Because when we go out to cover a story… the media that‘s identified with the opposition is attacked by government sympathizers, the media identified with the government is attacked by the opposition. And this is persistent, it is persistent… We are not safe from any kind of attack… I think we are running a great risk, we going through a bad time.‖(55)

(54) I interviewed Luisa Torrealba through Skype from her office in Caracas, Venezuela on February 2010 (55) I interviewed Miguel Salazar via Skype from his office in Caracas, Venezuela, on February 2010 81

Aside from ethical factors, there are other variables that should be taken into consideration. Despite Hugo Chavez‘s need to utilize the media for political propaganda, it was not until April 11th, 2002, that the government saw the real need to implement a more organized and methodical course of action: the hegemony plan. In addition to all the issues of free speech and press freedom, another problem we must be concerned about is the lack of independence among the three branches of government: legislative, judicial and executive. In Venezuela the executive branch has overpowered the legislative and judicial branches. This is terrifying for two reasons:

1) The government uses lawmaking as a weapon to silence dissent and to masquerade their real intentions;

2) Members of the media and outspoken citizens have been taken to court based on new or reformed laws.

―The judicial branch of government is very dependent on the executive branch… I would say that political propaganda or using the media for political purposes, as Chávez outlined it, is part of his global strategy. I don‘t think these are fixed elements or independent from one another, I do believe there is cohesion, objectives and a well-defined mission planned by the Venezuelan government to solidify its power,‖ Trotti said. ―In the international stage Chávez has a game plan very similar to his strategy for internal affairs.‖(56)

(56) In interviewed Ricardo Trotti over the phone from his office in Miami, Florida, on February 2010 82

In a 2008 special report, Human Rights Watch explained the problem of lack of independence among government branches and the judicial system. Below is an excerpt of that report:

The bodies responsible for investigating and sanctioning infractions under the [Ley Resorte] do not enjoy sufficient guarantees of independence to protect them from political interference. The decision to open an investigation and the application of sanctions for infractions of broadcasting laws are the responsibility of the National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL), a body attached to the Ministry of Communication and Information. CONATEL also decides on the application of preventive measures, which as noted can include prohibiting transmissions. While defined in law as an autonomous body, CONATEL's four-person board of directors and its director general are all appointed by the president of Venezuela and can be dismissed at his discretion…

…the Chávez government has… abandoned [its initial] commitment to judicial independence. In 2004, displeased with a series of controversial judicial rulings, the president and his supporters in the National Assembly launched a political takeover of the Supreme Court. They enacted a new law expanding the court from 20 to 32 members. Since the law allowed the legislature to select new members by simple majority vote, this meant the governing coalition was able to use its then slim majority in the National Assembly to obtain an overwhelming majority of seats on the court. (At the time the court was believed to be evenly divided between Chávez allies and critics.) The law also gave the National Assembly the power to remove justices from the bench with a simple majority vote rather than the two-thirds majority required by the 1999 Constitution. The law, in short, made it possible for the governing coalition to both pack and purge the country's highest court.

Chávez supporters attempted to justify the law as a response to efforts by some government opponents to subvert the rule of law. They claimed, in particular, that Supreme Court justices who opposed Chávez had been disregarding the dictates of the law and deciding cases to advance the opposition's political agenda (http://www.hrw.org/en/node/64174/section/5).

The PSUV gained total control of the National Assembly after the 2005 parliamentarian elections when opposition candidates withdrew from the campaign to protest the lack of transparency and independence from the CNE. That day 77% of registered voters were absent from the ballots, according to local press reports.

Legislation that criminalizes(57) the press combined with the non-existence of the three branches of power is the perfect formula for authoritarianism. Besides using legislation and government offices to intimidate the media, the government has founded or reformed media organizations to turn them into propaganda machines. This is all part of the hegemony plan explained above.

During an interview, Cañizales said that there is a clear tendency for the government to passively but constantly intimidate critical media without causing alarm among the international community or even nationally. He referred to the withdrawal of RCTV International from cable television in 2010 because supposedly they had not satisfied the requirements to broadcast via cable. This measure caused alarm among local and international NGOs, but it did not cause the same uproar among citizens as when RCTV‘s concession in 2007 was not renewed. ―People seem to be exhausted, hopeless,‖ Cañizales said.(58)

A local human rights organization, Provea, said in its 2009 Human Rights

Report (translated from Spanish):

(57) The word “criminalize” is being used by human rights organizations in Venezuela to explain that the work of the press is considered a crime by public officials when presenting a negative image of the government or expressing dissent. (58) I interviewed Andrés Cañizales at the National Endowment of Democracy (NED) on June 2010 84

During [2009], the government continued with its politics to encourage citizen journalism. Under the coordination of the Dirección de Medios Alternativos y Comunitarios del Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la Información [Office of Community and Alternative Media of the Ministry of Communication and Information], in 2008, 13 consultation meetings were run nationwide to discuss the basis to strengthen and consolidate alternative, community-based communication projects. Such meetings among municipal representatives, users‘ committees, communication students from the Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela, Misión Sucre, Misión Cultura, among others [these misiones are social programs], served to talk about the role of alternative communicators and the need to generate content related to national news, to encourage a social controller‘s office, and to exercise social journalism without discriminatory messages, to promote civic engagement, the values of social integration, among other objectives. Provea considers this a positive proposal that endorses civic engagement as part of the foundation of alternative sources of information. However, it also observes that the government includes these groups as part of the national public system which affects the autonomy inherited with community media and converting them into weapons of government propaganda. As a consequence, the mission of these media outlets is obstructed – that is to promote the interests of the collective and communities that they are a part of (http://www.derechos.org.ve/proveaweb/wp- content/uploads/14-informaci%C3%B3n.pdf).

In addition to the hegemony plan, another trend seen in Venezuela by non- profit organizations and the media is the lack of access to official information which may contribute to the political bias perceived from some media outlets. For a member of the media, local or foreign, to get government access to information he/she will have to explicitly declare a friendly approach. Ted Gesing first experienced this when he and his team went to Venezuela in 2008 to begin filming for the documentary ―The Hugo Chávez Show‖ for PBS.

―… Towards the end of that trip things started falling out with the government. Essentially we were … they were taking us on tours, various government programs, meeting with Phil Gunson, The Economist people they thought we should meet with, and at some point www.pbs.org in that process they basically decided that they didn‘t want to continue talking to us. They were uncomfortable with some of the questions we were asking,‖ Gesing said. ―At that point we started hitting a wall in terms of getting access. We were certainly getting access to chavistas in the streets, but in terms of insider access or government access the door started to close. It was clear to us that that was because one of the principal contacts we had been dealing with had decided – he didn‘t trust us. And they have made it clear from the beginning that they have little respect for what we would consider some of the mainstream press in this country.‖(59)

Phil Gunson said, ―[Chávez] discriminates; that's the first thing. Your access, not just to the president but to the government in general, is determined by whether or not you're perceived as a friend. So they're not really interested in giving access to the critical press. If you come along and you have a track record of writing nice things about the revolution, and provided that you stick to that line, then you can't guarantee access, but you at least have a chance. Those of us who don't toe the official line don't get much access. And that's true not just of the foreign press; it's true of the local press as well.‖ (60)

(59) I interviewed Ted Gesing over the pone in his home in New York City on February 2010 (60) Bikel, O. (2008). “The Hugo Chavez Show.” Frontline, PBS (Public Broadcasting Service). Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hugochavez/view/ 86

Human Rights Watch released a special report in 2008, ―A Decade Under

Chávez,‖ about the state of press freedom in Venezuela saying:

President Chávez and his supporters in the Venezuelan Congress have undermined freedom of expression through a variety of measures aimed at influencing the control and content of the country's mass media. They have extended and toughened penalties for speech offenses; implemented a broadcasting law that allows for the arbitrary suspension of channels for a vaguely defined offense of "incitement"; limited public access to official information; and abused the government's control of broadcasting frequencies to punish stations with overtly critical programming. After nine years during which the country has been polarized between Chávez's supporters and detractors, Venezuela still enjoys a vibrant public debate in which anti-government and pro-government media are equally vocal in their criticism and defense of Chávez. However, in its efforts to gain ground in this "media war," the government has engaged in discriminatory actions against media airing opposition viewpoints, strengthened the state's capacity to limit free speech, and created powerful incentives for government critics to engage in self-censorship. Should the government choose to utilize the expanded speech offenses and incitement provisions more aggressively to sanction public expression, the existing political debate could be severely curtailed.

Chávez and his supporters have attempted to justify media restrictions as a response to what they consider to be irresponsible reporting and excessively partisan coverage by journalists and broadcasters. They accuse opposition media of conspiring to remove Chávez from office, and even participating directly in the 2002 short-lived anti-Chávez coup. They also justify the measures as being part of a broader effort to "democratize" the media so that it reflects viewpoints that were largely excluded from the commercial media in the past.

States have a right to sanction media that incite violence, the commission of crimes, or breaches of public order. However, under international norms on freedom of expression, broadcasting regulations must be precisely defined in order to avoid overbroad or arbitrary interpretation by officials that constrain free expression and the public's access to information and opinion. Permissible restrictions on speech do not include sanctions for expressing critical opinions of government officials, however offensive they may be. Governments are also fully justified in seeking to regulate the concentration of media

ownership and in backing public service and community outlets in order to promote a more diverse and plural public debate. However, governments may not abuse their control of broadcasting frequencies to discriminate against outlets whose editorial line is not to their liking (http://www.hrw.org/en/node/64174/section/5).

The government approved laws that repress free speech, as shown in Chapter

IV, meaning that the press is not the only target in this ―media war‖ but also citizens. This literally leaves the country with pro-chavista media as the major source of news which the government can easily control. But as presented in this thesis even Chávez‘s friends, allies, and former co-workers - such as Eleazar Díaz

Rangel, Miguel Salazar, and Pablo López - have not been spared the President‘s wrath. The same fate goes for those journalists from networks such as VTV (Walter

Matínez) and even ABN. So if the media – regardless of editorial lines or political affiliations – is intimidated for criticizing, analyzing, making an opinion or simply providing news, then who has the power to scrutinize public officials?

―There is a paradox here. Freedom of expression exists. Even though the president attacks us constantly, we do have freedom of expression because we are not afraid of the president and his bluster. The people who do not have freedom of expression are his supporters‖ Petkoff said during an interview with Frontline. ―I

see left-wing old friends, irreverent, fighters, sitting [during Aló Presidente] like perfect idiots. That's a painful spectacle‖(61).

Livia Suárez(62), from the Embassy of Venezuela in the United States, provided this researcher a press package in which Bart Jones, a correspondent for the Associated Press, wrote an opinion piece in the Los Angeles Times saying the following, ―Radio, TV and newspapers remain uncensored, unfettered and unthreatened by the government. Most Venezuelan media are still controlled by the old oligarchy and are staunchly anti-Chávez‖

(http://articles.latimes.com/2007/may/30/opinion/oe-jones30).

Phil Gunson, a reporter for The Economist and the Miami Herald, said during an interview with Frontline:

I once asked a minister what he felt about being forced to listen to Chávez's speeches for five and six hours at a time. And he just grinned and he said, ―No comment…‖

Basically, there is a free press here. That's the simple answer to the question. The press is free; you can say what you want. [But there] can be consequences, particularly consequences not on the opposition side but on the Chavista side of the equation, because there's nothing the government hates more -- and Mr. Chávez, in particular, hates more -- than criticism from his own people.

So he's fond of lambasting in public, as he did only recently with one prominent newspaper editor who's always been very supportive of the government, for a critical headline in his newspaper [he is referring to

(61) Bikel, O. (2008). “The Hugo Chavez Show.” Frontline, PBS (Public Broadcasting Service). Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hugochavez/view/ (62) I interviewed Livia Suárez at the Embassy of Venezuela in Washington, D.C. on June 2010 89

Díaz Rangel]. And if you're critical you tend to be excluded from the party, excluded from whatever benefits there might be.(63)

Professor Colette Capriles, from the Universidad Simón Bolívar, said during an interview with Frontline(57), ―We have seen how the ministers tremble at the possibility of being questioned during the show, something the president will do.

The president's Sunday show [Aló Presidente] becomes not only a place where decisions are made, but a place where decision-making is exhibited, showing how the president makes the good decisions while the ministers make mistakes. It's a mechanism, a device to keep the president from bad decision-making. Those who always appear guilty of the mistakes are the ministers, who are judged by the president in front of 15 million viewers.‖

If this is what happens to political allies, imagine what can happen to the average citizen. Citizens who have engaged in demonstrations are repressed by the police or the National Guard, often accused of ―inciting a rebellion.‖ Unlike most democratic countries where the right to assemble is protected, in Venezuela citizens have to obtain a permit to protest and workers‘ unions have to be recognized by the government or else they would be considered illegitimate

(http://www.hrw.org/en/node/64174/section/4).

Luisa Torrealba, from Ipys, stressed the danger of having an authoritarian government running the only telephone company CANTV, which is also the largest

(63) Bikel, O. (2008). “The Hugo Chavez Show.” Frontline, PBS (Public Broadcasting Service). Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hugochavez/view/ 90

Internet service provider, because under the Penal Code any citizen who hears or sees criticism over email, text message, the Internet, or over the phone can denounce it to the authorities. Those who are accused of criticism or dissent will most likely be found guilty of ―treason,‖ ―attempt to incite a rebellion‖ or even

―defamation.‖(64)

For example, the Human Rights Foundation has closely followed the cases of civilians who have been censored or intimidated by the government. The cases of these individuals are named in the website ―Caracas Nine‖

(http://www.caracasnine.com), a blog created by the Foundation. Another example is the arrest of Globovisión‘s President Guillermo Zuloaga over comments he made about President Hugo Chávez during an annual meeting of the Inter American

Press Association held in Aruba. During the same week former governor Oswaldo

Alvarez Paz (state of Zulia) was arrested for saying that ―Venezuela has become a drug-trafficking hub‖ – his comments were aired by Globovisión. Reporters Without

Borders said the following about these two cases:

The arrests of two well-known opponents of President Hugo Chávez for statements made in public, together with the government‘s recently declared intention of regulating the Internet, have raised serious concerns about the future of free speech in Venezuela.

Given the government‘s tendency to treat any criticism or verbal attack as an act of ‗conspiracy against the state,‘ one wonders whether Venezuelans are still allowed to say anything at all about their country and their president.

(64) I interviewed Luisa Torrealba through Skype from her office in Caracas, Venezuela on February 2010 91

Arrested on 25 March and granted a provisional release the same day, subject to his not leaving the country, Zuloaga is facing six to 30 months in prison on a charge of insulting the president (the penalty being increased by a third when the insult is voiced in public) and another two to five years in prison for ‗inciting collective panic by means of false information through the press.‘

It is also questionable whether Venezuela‘s courts have jurisdiction over Zuloaga‘s case as his comments were made in Aruba, a separate country. The prosecution should have been brought before an Aruban court.‖ (http://www.rsf.org/spip.php?page=impression&id_article=36844)

Zuloaga secretly left Venezuela and turned up later in Washington, D.C. to introduce his case to the Inter American Commission on

Human Rights. Alvarez Paz was later released under the following conditions: he is not allowed Marcel Granier, Director of Empresas 1BC, the company that owns RCTV to leave the country, he is not allowed to www.theepochtimes.com address publicly certain topics, and he had to present to court every 15 days until the day of his preliminary hearing.

It is clear that the government of President Hugo Chávez considers the media as a tool for propaganda and for suppressing dissent, not as a tool to provide information. Repression of the press in Venezuela is just the tip of the iceberg.

Deep, strong repression has spread already beyond the media and the President‘s allied parties. Politicians, comedians, artists, even supporters of the government, and citizens have been and will continue to be silenced when expressing dissenting opinions; it is a slippery slope already crippling human rights.

It is obvious that by controlling the media, the government controls dissent and can promote a positive image of the country. But without dissent or a critical voice, without a watchdog (the media), without arts and entertainment (another form of expression), without providing the audience with diverse sources of information and entertainment, the government is ultimately attempting to perpetuate a single individual in power. Without information, power is taken away from the people and, from that moment on, democracy no longer exists.

When asked what an authoritarian regime means for democracy in

Venezuela, Salazar responded, ―It‘s not an authoritarian [government], but it has all the elements to become one. Meaning that the protagonists of this process from one political side or the other… let‘s say… they are authoritarian.

I mean, there is a temptation toward totalitarianism, toward personalismo [political ideology centered in an individual], toward repression, you understand? For

[journalists] that is not good (inaudible) at all. On the contrary, for us it represents a great danger and we don‘t want to recognize it, we don‘t want to recognize it… maybe we will finally understand it when we start seeing military boots, from the left or the right, marching [in our offices].‖(65)

Ricardo Trotti said, ―I think the only thing left is to denounce constantly, perseveringly to the international community. I think there are elements or resources that should be exploited more such as the Inter-American Commission on

(65) I interviewed Miguel Salazar via Skype from his office in Caracas, Venezuela, on February 2010 93

Human Rights, despite the fact that President Chávez ignores any recommendations made by the IACHR or rejected the visit of a committee to analyze the state of human rights. But I think pressure should continue with the international community… about human rights, including press freedom, free speech, and the right to assembly freely.‖(66)

Human Rights Watch made recommendations to improve human rights, press freedom and free speech in Venezuela. What follows are highlights of some of those recommendations, the full text can be found in the web link below:

To prevent future acts of violence and intimidation against journalists, the government should:

- Ensure that all attacks on journalists are investigated promptly and thoroughly; and

- Avoid inflammatory public statements that could be construed as condoning such attacks.

The National Assembly should repeal all legal provisions which contravene international norms on freedom of expression and generate undue pressure for self-censorship. Specifically, it should:

- Repeal all insult laws (desacato);

- Repeal all laws that criminalize defamation of public officials and institutions;

- Ensure that civil damages for defamation are limited so as to avoid a chilling effect on free expression; and

- Amend the language of article 29(1) of the Social Responsibility Law to ensure that the offense of incitement is clearly defined and restricted to situations in which broadcasters directly and explicitly incite the commission of crimes.

(66) In interviewed Ricardo Trotti over the phone from his office in Miami, Florida, on February 2010 94

The government should ensure the impartiality and due process in the procedures by which broadcasting laws are enforced. Specifically, it should:

- Ensure that investigation and sanctioning of alleged infractions of broadcast laws are carried out by an impartial and independent body protected from political interference; and

- Ensure that alleged violators of broadcast regulations are guaranteed the right to contest the charges against them. (http://www.hrw.org/en/node/64174/section/5).

Conclusions

The state of press freedom in Venezuela is complex and delicate. It is certainly not the worst in the world, not even in the continent – Mexico, Cuba and

Colombia are the worst countries in the Americas for the press, according to RWB – but this is no excuse to ignore the constant abuse against the press in Venezuela.

The machinery of repression led by Hugo Chávez is in full force. The government controls information by supporting political propaganda and silencing dissenters.

Regaining free speech and press freedom is now in the hands of the press, civil society, human rights organizations, the international community, and chavista and opposition politicians. However, under an autocratic regime it is difficult and dangerous for all these parties to advocate for press freedom and human rights. The press was the government‘s first victim and it continues to be; the current target is non-profit organizations that receive funds from foreign entities; some politicians and civilians have been threaten, jailed, or fled the country. This is, as once mentioned by Professor Daniloff in a meeting, a ―salami approach.‖ As explained in 95

the introduction of this thesis, the first sign that the government of Hugo Chávez is an autocracy began the moment his government developed methods to curtail the press, then it went on to spread out in other areas of society, until today we find

Venezuelans facing censorship and intimidation everywhere.

In addition, foreign governments and diplomatic institutions have failed to firmly denounce human rights violations in Venezuela which also contributes to

Press Freedom Predators – www.rsf.org

maintaining an autocracy. I suspect that the international community is not willing to press the Venezuelan government through diplomatic means in part because the

U.S. government refuses to recognize that its most trusted source of oil outside the

Middle East is again run by a dictator; of course, the problem is not that he is a dictator, the problem is that he is antagonistic with the U.S. Generally, international bodies do not seem to take action on pressing issues until the United

States take the lead or a disaster occurs. Hence until the U.S. does not solve the problem it has with Venezuela and how it will manage the consequences of breaking a long-standing business partnership, Venezuelans will continue to suffer repression.

Furthermore, with a fractured opposition and some frighten public officials and supporters, all hopes seem to rely with the student movement sparked by the closing of RCTV in 2007. It is in them that relies the birth of a new generations of leaders, managers, politicians who will likely take over the country after Hugo

Chávez. If we look at history of Venezuela the last two dictators, Marcos Pérez

Jiménez and Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935), faced strong opposition movements led by university students. Gómez‘s dictatorship ended with his death in 1935,

Pérez Jiménez was forced to leave the country thanks in part to a clandestine student movement. Would Hugo Chávez also hand over power to a new government led by members of the student movement? Would the opposition finally compromise with university students and put aside political interests?

Finally, this thesis is also a cautionary account about the role of the press in democracy. Some media outlets are accountable for what it is happening today as they also played a role in bringing about press freedom violations. Based on democratic principles and journalism ethics, the press is entitled to have a particular editorial line as long as it also leaves the door open for a discussion. But media executives participating in politics is not an editorial line, it is blatantly manipulating a country‘s political scene. Even though it is only a few members of the media who take up on such role, it has left the press in Venezuela in a shameful position; the public, rightly so, distrust certain media outlets as much as certainly politicians. Between the government repression on press freedom and manipulation of news by media executives, Venezuelans are left with limited choices of information sources. Faced with an autocratic government, this situation is severe because in critical moments such as this is when citizens need information the most. Not only the government needs to amend its mistake, so does the media. Only a small group of media executives have manipulated politics long before the arrival of Hugo Chávez, yet the entire Venezuelan press pays the consequences.

As this thesis was going through its final review, several events were unfolding.

On Monday, July 12th, 2010, RWB called for the immediate release of two citizens who were arrested for posting comments about the banking crisis in

Venezuela on Twitter. They are facing up to 11 years in prison for ―disseminating

false rumors‖ to ―destabilize the banking system.‖ For the first time in Venezuela two citizens are facing jail time for expressing their views in a social networking site (http://en.rsf.org/venezuela-twitter-users-facing-11-year-jail-12-07-

2010,37927.html).

The other matter is the approval of Sentence 745 by the Supreme Court.

According to a news report from El Universal, Judge Carmen Zuleta de Merchán explained that ―access to public information in not an absolute right‖ and that information about salaries and statements under oath by public officials are private

(http://www.eluniversal.com/2010/07/16/pol_ava_cuestionan-limites- d_16A4194291.shtml).

On July 20th, 2010, President Chávez announced that his government was about to purchase a large number of shares from Globovisión – this enables State control over 48.5% of the station‘s capital (http://en.rsf.org/venezuela-hugo-chavez-s- government-tightens-23-07-2010,38012.html).

Ipys and Espacio Publico, two local human rights organization advocating for freedom of expression, are under investigation over foreign funds they received, according to Human Rights Watch.

―… President Chávez publicly stated that prosecutors should ‗thoroughly investigate‘ the ‗millions and millions of dollars‘ that the US State Department gives to Venezuelan NGOs. Since then, the Venezuelan public television station has

repeatedly aired spots criticizing [Carlos] Correa for receiving international funds,‖ the organization said ―…Espacio Público reports that government supporters have been posting Mr. Correa's home address on Twitter, which could pose a risk to Mr.

Correa's safety‖ (http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/08/19/end-harassment- campaign-against-human-rights-defender).

In the political terrain, Venezuelans went to the polls to elect members of the parliament on September 26th, 2010. Surprisingly, the opposition won the majority of votes, although President Chávez argued his allied parties won the majority of seats in the National Assembly. This is certainly confusing, even for Venezuelans.

Local newspaper El Universal explained the problem the following way. Even though the opposition coalition obtained 52% of the votes, it only has 67 seats in the

National Assembly. In comparison, the parties supporting Chávez obtained only

46,4% of votes, yet have 98 seats in parliament. What happened is that constituencies are overrepresented, meaning that there are about the same number of representatives in rural and urban areas. This system, created years before

Chávez, is called malapportionment. In the case of Venezuela this was exacerbated when the 1999 Constitution eliminated the senate and later the National Assembly passed an electoral law regulating the number of representatives. In fact, the results of the elections show that the opposition won mostly in urban sites and the government coalition won in mostly rural sites. That is why the opposition obtained most of the votes but the government still holds the majority of seats in

100

parliament(67)

(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/venezuela/8027319/Vene zuela-opposition-surpasses-expectations-in-parliamentary-elections.html.)

Even if the government coalition won most of the seats, the opposition still won the most votes. Now the question is whether parliamentarians from the opposition will be able to work in the National Assembly. When government opponent Antonio Ledezma was elected Mayor of Caracas in 2008, President

Chávez ordered the transfer of city funds, personnel, assets, and property to a new office appointed by him.

(http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=10717&ArticleId=333870). Would the same happen with elected parliamentarians from the opposition parties? An answer to this question is crucial in a government that uses lawmaking as an instrument to repress dissent and control information.

The answer to the question above came quickly. After the parliamentarian elections on September 26th, 2010, the ―lame-duck‖ session of the National Assembly not only granted 18 months of rule-by-decree to the president but also approved a reform of the Law of Political Parties limiting parliamentarians‘ right to free speech. As usual, we still need to wait how such law would be interpreted and enforce, but the most concerning aspect of the law is Article 30. These articles states that after being elected parliamentarians cannot:

(67) Martinez, E. (2010). “Ley hace que oposición obtenga más votos pero menos diputados.” El Universal. [Online Serial] Available at http://www.eluniversal.com/2010/09/27/v2010_ava_ley-hace-que-oposici_27A4527053.shtml 101

- Vote against members of the party that supported him/her during the

electoral campaign

- Become a member of another party after elected to office

- Support legislation or proposals that differs with the political ideology of

the party that supported him/her during the campaign and/or differs with

his/her proposal presented to voters during the electoral campaign

- Join a cause that differs from the political ideology of the party that

supported him/her during the campaign and/or differs with his/her

proposal presented to voters during the electoral campaign

Because this new legislation was recently approved and it will only be applicable beginning the next generation of parliamentarians that were sworn in on

January 5th, 2011, it is very hard to interpret it or determine how it will be enforce.

Though, from now on any parliamentarian who does not follow the regulations above will be suspended temporarily or permanently from the National Assembly

(http://static.eluniversal.com/2010/12/15/Reforma_Ley_de_Partidos_Politicos.pdf.)

One of the elected parliamentarians, María Corina Machado, said that the government is so afraid of the opposition and their own parliamentarians that they want to ―silent and curtail any possibility of debate and dialogue in the National

Assembly‖ through the reformed Law of Political Parties.(68)

(68) Espinoza, O. (2011, January 6) “Machado: Más temprano que tarde seremos mayoría de diputados.” *10 paragraphs] El Universal. [Online Serial] Available at http://politica.eluniversal.com/2011/01/06/pol_ava_machado:-mas-tempran_06A4941015.shtml 102

To end on a lighter note, I‘m glad to be able to mention that humorist

Laureano Márquez, one of the cases mentioned in this thesis, won the 2010

International Press Freedom Award (www.cpj.org). Such recognition doesn‘t improve the state of press freedom in Venezuela and, obviously, will not make

Márquez immune to further attacks, but it is certainly encouraging to know that the international community is attentive to the situation in Venezuela and other countries in Latin America. Now, all the international community needs to do is to increase diplomatic pressure a notch, they really need to use the leverage they have.

Recommendations

It is the duty of citizens, politicians (including those within the government and within Chavez‘s party), the media, press freedom and human rights organizations, and international institutions to do everything in their power to generate pressure on the Venezuelan government about its record of human rights and press freedom violations. Only after the citizens of Venezuela are able to regain their right to free speech, to assemble freely, to have a free press and gain back their basic human rights, will they be able to concentrate on the other social issues that have plagued the country for decades: corruption, crime, poverty, and unemployment.

Although Venezuelans can rely on local and international human rights and press freedom organizations, members of these organizations also run a great risk when they voice concern over abuses and irregularities. Representatives from Ipys, 103

Reporters Without Borders and Human Rights Watch have been intimidated through judicial, physical and verbal threats. One of them was Human Rights

Watch‘s Americas Director, José Miguel Vivanco, who was detained and expelled from the country hours after releasing the special report mentioned above. Vivanco and his colleague Daniel Wilkinson were accused of working on behalf of the United

States government.

The report, used by the Venezuelan government to justify the expulsion of

Vivanco and Wilkinson and accuse the US government of meddling in internal matters, stated the following about NGOs and civil society:

The Chávez government's ability to address Venezuela's long-standing and serious human rights problems has been undermined by its adversarial approach to civil society organizations. During the Chávez presidency, rights advocates have faced prosecutorial harassment, unsubstantiated allegations aimed at discrediting their work, and efforts to exclude them from international forums and restrict their access to international funding. President Chávez and his supporters have sought to justify these measures by arguing that these civil society organizations, despite their professed commitment to human rights advocacy, are actually pursuing a partisan political agenda aimed at destabilizing the country and removing President Chávez from office. To back this charge, they have cited the fact that some civil society leaders have engaged in partisan activities, and some nongovernmental organizations have received funding from the United States.

It is perfectly reasonable for a government to investigate credible allegations that individuals or organizations have engaged in criminal activity, provided the investigations are conducted seriously and with appropriate due process guarantees. It is also reasonable for governments to regulate foreign funding of civil society groups in order to promote greater transparency, provided those regulations do not interfere with the groups' ability to exercise fundamental rights.

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But the actions of Chávez and his supporters in the National Assembly and other branches of government have gone beyond these legitimate forms of accountability and regulation by:

• Subjecting rights advocates to criminal investigations on unsubstantiated and politically motivated charges;

• Seeking to discredit and undermine rights organizations through unfounded accusations of complicity in subversion;

• Seeking to exclude organizations receiving foreign funding from international forums;

• Pursuing legislation that would allow arbitrary governmental interference in the operations of rights organizations, including fundraising activities (http://www.hrw.org/en/node/64174/section/7).

Amnesty International stated in its 2010 report the following:

Attacks, harassment and intimidation of those critical of government policies, including journalists and human rights defenders, were widespread. Unfounded charges were brought against those who opposed government policies…

Human rights defenders and victims of human rights violations and their relatives seeking justice and redress continued to be attacked, threatened and harassed by the security forces… (http://thereport.amnesty.org/sites/default/files/AIR2010_AZ_EN.pdf#pa ge=298).

Recommendations from this thesis are as follows:

1) The executive branch should meet with those organizations that have requested meetings, namely the Committee to Protect Journalists, the Inter

American Commission on Human Rights and Reporters Without Borders. If

President Chávez is serious about human rights and press freedom, he will meet

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with representatives from these organizations, provide them with information, and listen to their advice and recommendations

2) Content analysis of media outlets should be carried out, in particular in a country where, firstly, some members of the media have taken an open or implicit political stand, and, secondly, editorial lines seem to be defined by the political panorama. This will help investigators corroborate information obtained from witness accounts and experts

3) Investigate what kind of ethical breaches the media have committed, not only during the government of Hugo Chávez but also between 1958 and 1998. Again, this will help greatly to provide accurate information to researchers. Likewise, documenting previous violations of press freedom and free speech before the government of Hugo Chávez is needed. This will aid researches who are interested in looking for historical data that can be used as a point of reference

4) The government (local, state, and national), non-profit organizations, public and private libraries should establish a consortium to reform the national library system:

- Helps retrieve any lost data, statistics and documents

- Appropriately trains and recruits library employees to provide services to students, researches, and the general public

- Creates a comprehensive intranet and online search engine and database.

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5) Specifically about press freedom and free speech:

- If the government is truly interested in providing information and promoting its programs and initiatives, it should allow access to public officials and government documents to the media – including critical media

- The government should also clarify its intention with the hegemony plan in communication and information since there seems to be disagreement and confusion among representatives. The idea of encouraging independent community media is welcomed but the government should not be allowed to use such initiative to create media outlets for political propaganda. The government should also be careful when categorizing the media marketplace as a ―monopoly.‖ It should actually provide evidence of this and other claims. As such, the government is also obligated to abide by laws regulating media monopolies that existed long before the present administration. Even if these laws need to be reformed, the government is urged to apply the law equally without discriminating based on opinions or editorial lines

- Public officials should present feasible evidence of defamation when filing lawsuits. Courts need to be more assertive when assessing defamation lawsuits, making a clear difference between false information harming a person‘s wellbeing versus accurate information in the form of hard news as well as commentary and satire. The courts should remind public officials that as such they are subjected to public scrutiny.

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- The judicial and legislative branches should not fear opposing the executive branch, in particular when their own independence is at risk. The equality of the three branches of government should be restored

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Morsbach, G. (March, 2006). ―Venezuela pushes ties with Africa.‖ [12 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4816478.stm

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Morsbach, G. (October, 2006). ―Venezuela workers in Coke dispute.‖ [14 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6079334.stm

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Sreeharsha, V. (November, 2005) ―Telesur tested by Chávez video‖. [19 paragraphs]. Christian Science Monitor. [Online Serial] Available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1122/p07s02-woam.html

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Webb, J. (April, 2007). ―Anti-Americanism in Venezuela.‖ [21 paragraphs]. BBC .[Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6572615.stm

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Wilpert, G. (November, 2006). Corrupt data. Extra!, 19, 6, 26-28.

(1992, November 28). Chopper fires on palace as coup bid apparently continues. United Press International.

(2004, October). ―Venezuela: Assembly approves more articles of media responsibility law.‖ [5 paragraphs]. VENews [Online Serial] Available at http://www.lexis.com

(January, 2007). ―Venezuela media associations reject ‗communication hegemony plan.‘‖ [12 paragraphs], El Nacional [Online Serial] Available at www.lexis.com

(February, 2007). ―Country profile: Venezuela.‖ [31 paragraphs] BBC [Online Serial]. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1229345.stm

(2007, February). Freedom to agree; Venezuela (The media in Venezuela). The Economist, pp. 44

(March, 2007). ―Venezuela aims for China oil deal.‖ [9 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6492833.stm

(March, 2007). ―Venezuela steps up land seizures.‖ [10 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6494843.stm

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(March, 2007). ―Weller calls for an end to media censorship in Venezuela.‖ [10 paragraphs]. State News Service [Online Serial] Available at www.lexis.com

(April, 2007). ―Venezuelans in TV network protest.‖ [12 paragraphs] BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6580863.stm

(2007, April 18). Venezuelan TV channel chairman speaks out against threatened closure. ABC (Madrid). (Translated from Spanish by Global NewsBank)

(2007, May 27). Venezuelan TV channel to continue fighting for ―liberty‖ – chairman. Union Radio. (Translated from Spanish by Global NewsBank)

(2007, May 29). Chavez shuts RCTV; protests continue. Latinnews Daily.

(2007, June 1). Chavez faces off with Brazil on media license issue. Deutsche Press-Agentur.

(2007, June 6). Venezuela‘s RCTV to stage live programming in public venues. Union Radio. (Translated from Spanish by Global NewsBank)

(2007, June 27). Big march in favor of silenced Venezuelan TV station. EFE.

(2007, July 27). Measure against Venezuelan opposition TV. Latinnews Daily.

(January, 2006). ―Protests open Venezuela meeting.‖ [15 paragraphs] BBC [Online Serial]. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2006/01/060125_worldforum.shtml

(February, 2006). ―Venezuela ‗to buy more weapons‘‖ [20 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4682488.stm

(April, 2006). ―Venezuela quits Andean trade bloc.‖ [9 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4925056.stm

(June, 2006). ―Venezuela to get Russian aircraft.‖ [13 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5082006.stm

(July, 2006). ―Venezuela press freedom ‗worsen‘‖ [16 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5197684.stm

(August, 2006). ―Israel withdraws Venezuela envoy.‖ [14 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5254882.stm

(August, 2006). ―Venezuela to seize golf courses.‖ [16 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5297246.stm

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(October, 2006). ―New life for Venezuela opposition?‖ [41 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5389460.stm

(September, 2006). ―Iran and Venezuela bolster ties.‖ [19 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5284260.stm

(September, 2006). ―Venezuela rejects US apologies.‖ [15 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5284260.stm

(November, 2006). ―Venezuela: AIR worried about threats against media, to closely monitor campaign.‖ [7 paragraphs]. El Nacional [Online Serial] Available at www.lexis.com

(December, 2006). ―Council on foreign relations on-the-record media conference call.‖ (Major leaders special transcripts). (Speaker: Richard Lapper, Latin American editor of The Financial Times and author of ―Living with Hugo: U.S. Policy Toward Chavez‘s Venezuela;‖ a new council special report). Presider: Julia Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller senior fellow and director, Latin America studies, council of foreign relations). [95 paragraphs]. Federal News Service, Inc. [Online Serial] Available at www.lexis.com

(December, 2006). ―Chavez wins Venezuela re-election.‖ [19 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6205128.stm

(December, 2006). ―Polls close in Venezuela election.‖ [22 paragraphs]. BBC [Online Serial] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6203154.stm

(December, 2006). ―Profile: Hugo Chavez.‖ [29 paragraphs] BBC [Online Serial]. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1229345.stm#leaders

(January, 1995). Learning to live with a free press (The media in Latin America) (The press freedom forum). American Journalism Review, 17, 1, 4-15

Websites:

Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias - http://www.abn.info.ve/

Colegio Nacional de Periodistas - http://cnpcaracas.org/

Instituto de Prensa y Sociedad (Venezuela) - http://www.ipys.org.ve/

Provea - http://www.derechos.org.ve/

Reporters Without Borders – www.rsf.org

Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Prensa - http://www.sntp.org.ve/principal23.asp 117

Telesur - http://www.telesurtv.net/

The Committee to Protect Journalists – www.cpj.org

The Inter America Press Association - www.sipiapa.org

Venezuela‘s constitution (English version) - www.constitucion.ve/constitucion_view_en/view/ver_arbol.pag

Speech by CNN‘s Otto Neustland: (http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=1824515047017366029&q=venezuela+cnn +otto&total=2&start=0&num=10&so=0&type=search&plindex=1).

Interviews:

Phone interview with Carlos Lauria, Senior Coordinator of the Americas Desk, The Committee to Protect Journalist (2008).

Phone interview with Benoít Herviu, Americas Desk, Reporters Without Borders (2008).

E-mail interview with Mariangela Lado, International News Editor, El Universal (2008).

Phone interview with Luisa Torrealba, Representative of Instituto de Prensa y Sociedad (Ipys) on February 2010.

Phone interview with Miguel Salazar, Editor of Las Verdades de Miguel on February 2010.

Phone interview with Ricardo Trotti, Press Freedom Director and Director of the Press Institute, Inter American Press Association (IAPA) on February 2010.

Phone interview with PBS Producer Ted Gesing on February 2010.

Interview with Livia Suárez, Press Attaché of the Embassy of Venezuela in the United States of America on June 2010.

Interview with Andrés Cañizales, Correspondent for Reporters Without Borders in Venezuela on June 2010.

NOTE: Most interviews overseas were performed via Skype.

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