NBP 2020, 25(3): 31-45

Original scientific paper Submitted: 2020-07-01 doi:10.5937/nabepo25-27336 Published: 2020-12-08

THE IDEOLOGY OF “GREATER ” IN THE VISION OF ALBANIAN NARCO-TERRORIST CLANS

Saša Mijalković, Marija Popović Mančević1 University of Criminal Investigation and Studies, Belgrade,

Abstract: The paper reviews the evolution of the ideology and the path of cre- ating the Albanian state in the Balkans, from the moment when it did not exist at all (during the Ottoman Empire) until today, when Albanians live in an internationally recognized state (the Republic of Albania) and in one self-proclaimed state (the so-called “Republic of Kosovo”). In that regard, this paper is based on two theses. According to the first, the focus of the original so-called state-building ideology about the need for all Albanians to live in one state, “”, today is radically changed and diametrically op- posed: “” now do not want to join the Republic of Albania, but want an independent state - the so-called “Greater Kosovo”, which would include parts of the territories of central Serbia, Montenegro, Northern Mac- edonia and Greece where Albanians live. The reason for the essential change of ideology is that the drug bosses of Albanian criminal clans that control the territory of Kosmet, and who were previously commanders of Albanian terror- ist organizations, want their own “drug state”, in which they would control all social flows and enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution. The second thesis on which this paper is based is that the attack on the Albanian mafia is at the same time a blow to the so-called quasi-statehood of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, i.e. on the levers of financial power, which is the backing for political power and international support for the so-called Republic of Kosovo. Keywords: Kosovo and , Kosovo Albanians, terrorism, organized crime, “Greater Albania”, “Greater Kosovo”.

INTRODUCTION

Although there were state-building im- Peninsula did not have their own state. pulses before, until the beginning of the It was only in 1913 that the Principality 20th century, Albanians on the Balkan of Albania was formed, as a consequence 1 Corresponding author: [email protected] Mijalković, S., Popović Mančević, M. (2020). The ideology of “Greater Kosovo” in the vision of Albanian narco-terrorist clans

of making a new political map of the In the second half of the 20th century, the Balkans after the expulsion of the Otto- irredentist-unitarian ideology of the Al- mans, which was also argued by the in- banians was upgraded with the autono- vitation of the Albanians to the so-called mous-(con)federation ideology of the cre- right of the people to self-determination. ation of the “Republic of Kosovo”. Thus, Even during the creation of the Princi- within the existing Socialist Federal Re- pality of Albania, an irredentist ideology public of , the Autonomous was born with the admixture of unitarism Province of Kosovo and Metohija would for the creation of “Greater Albania”, in receive all the attributes of a republic such a way that parts of other states in- member of the federation, which would habited by Albanians would secede from facilitate its secession from the Federa- the motherland and join the Principality tion. of Albania.

Figure 1. Irredentist ideology of Albanian extremists in Kosovo and Metohija development Furthermore, just before the end of the However, the appetites of the bearers of second and at the beginning of the third this ideology were not satisfied, because millennium, the Kosovo Albanians in- the “drug-profit” ideology of creating a vested serious secessionist-terrorist ef- “Greater Kosovo” was born. This crea- forts in the realization of the “Independ- tion would include territories outside ent Kosovo” project. The culmination of the administrative borders of Kosovo this extremist-separatist project was the and Metohija where Albanians live, and state self-proclamation of the so-called it would be an independent state, even independent “Republic of Kosovo”. from the Republic of Albania. Thus, the drug bosses of the Albanian crim-

NBP • Journal of Criminalistics and Law Vol. 25, No. 3 32 Mijalković, S., Popović Mančević. M. (2020). The ideology of “Greater Kosovo” in the vision of Albanian narco-terrorist clans inal clans who control the territory of “drug state”, in which they would enjoy Kosmet, and who were previously the immunity from criminal prosecution. commanders of the Albanian terrorist Those same drug bosses are now the so- organizations, would create their own called Republic of Kosovo political elite.

A REVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOSOVO ALBANIANS EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY

Kosovo and Metohija are deeply rooted Turkey, when the insurgents occupied a in a national identity, but also in the na- significant part of Kosovo and Metohi- tional pride and dignity of the Serbian ja, the northern parts of today’s Alba- people. The collapse of the “Serbian Em- nia and a large part of today’s Northern pire” after the in 1389 Macedonia. Forced to negotiate, Porta is one of the most painful points in Ser- promised the insurgents the formation bian history. It was not only the Serbian of an autonomous “Albanian vilayet”. Af- and Turkish armies that clashed then; ter the end of the Balkan Wars in 1912, in both Islamic and Christian civilizations which the armies of the alliance of Bal- clashed. That clash of civilizations con- kan states liberated the Balkans from the tinues to this day. Turks (the Serbian army encountered The thesis about the clash of civiliza- strong armed resistance from Albanian tions is confirmed by the bloody con- armed groups), a peace conference was flicts during the First and Second World held in London for territorial demarca- Wars, and most of all during the 1990s, tion. In the same year, a decision was precisely in the areas of Bosnia and Her- made on the formation of the Principal- zegovina and Kosovo and Metohija. The ity of Albania, which was formally done state-building idea of the Albanians was in 1913. Thus, one nation, guided by programmatically shaped by the forma- state-building ideology, created an eth- tion of the Albanian Committee in Jan- nic state (Avramovski, 1989: 61–68). jina in 1877 and the Prizren League in However, a large number of Albanian 1878, with the idea of forming a large tribes remained dissatisfied, despite the “Albanian vilayet” within the Ottoman proclamation of the Principality of Al- Empire, in which all Albanians would bania. The reason is that the territory of live together. This would imply the unifi- the Principality included “only” half of cation of four Ottoman provinces: Koso- the territory that Porta promised to the vo, Skadar, Janjina and Bitolj (Borozan, Albanian insurgents in 1912. As a result, 1997: 390). Academician Ljubodrag almost half of Albanians remain living Dimić evaluates this idea, known as in Serbia, Montenegro, Northern Mac- “Greater Albania”, “Natural Albania”, i.e. edonia and Greece. This created great as “Real Albania”, as “a very dangerous, dissatisfaction among Albanians, whose very aggressive idea for the Balkan peo- extremist instincts were beginning to ple” (according to: Lazić, 2019). flourish. They were first manifested as An important event in the realization of the cultivation of an irredentist ideology, the idea of the “Albanian vilayet” was the which aimed to secede from the territo- Great Albanian Uprising in 1912 against ries of the four states inhabited by Alba-

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nians and their annexation - unification ideologically “fed” by Albanian nation- with the Principality of Albania. One of al, religious and left-wing extremism, the most important irredentist move- Marxist-Leninist and Enverist ideology, ments was the “Kosovo People’s Defense and Italian fascism and occupation in Committee” (Avramovski, 1989: 71–86). the Second World War (Đorđević, 1987: Irredentists started hostile actions 180–184). against Serbia. Thus, during the with- The irredentist-violent approach to the drawal of the Serbian army in the First creation of “Greater Albania” had its po- World War through Albania, they killed litical wing consisting of Albanians, but Serbian soldiers and refugees in organ- also certain prominent politicians of the ized armed ambushes and attacks. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia goal was to weaken and even disinte- primarily Slovenian and Croatian (Slo- grate the state of Serbia, in order for its venia’s lobbying for recognition of Kosovo territory to be dismembered and taken. is a surprise for Serbia, 2018). Additional Furthermore, during the Second World support for such a political platform was War, Albania was a protectorate of fas- provided by the intellectual-academic cist Italy. Then, at least for a short time community of Kosmet (primarily Alba- (1941−1943), the project “Greater-Unit- nians from the University of Pristina), ed Albania” came to life in part: all ter- which was supported by the Albanian ritories inhabited by Albanians, except Academy of Sciences and the Albanian parts of Greece, were placed under the University. In such a “whirlpool of irre- rule of fascist Albania. During and im- dentist currents” there emerged auton- mediately after the Second World War, omous-(con)federative ideology of creat- Albanian extremists and armed gangs ing the “Republic of Kosovo” (Petkovic, also committed crimes against the Serb 1997: 40–44; Krstić, 1994: 38–42). population: they were killed, displaced, The goal of the mentioned ideological their property was confiscated or de- current was for the Autonomous Prov- stroyed, symbols of religion and culture ince of Kosovo and Metohija to get all were destroyed (Antonijević, 2005: 157– the status characteristics of a constituent 166). After the end of the Second World republic - a member of the Socialist Fed- War, the borders were again the same as eral Republic of Yugoslavia. In that sense, before the war. first, within the constitutional changes in The extremist activities of Albanians are 1968, the word “Metohija”, a symbol of also characteristic in the post-war pe- Serbianness, but also of Christianity, was riod, when several illegal organizations removed from the name of the province. were founded: “Bali Kombtar”, “Third The goal was to associate the name of Prizren League”, “Legality”, “National the province “Kosovo” with the Kosovo Committee for Free Kosovo”, “National province from the time of the Ottoman Movement for the Republic of Kosovo”, Empire. Furthermore, within the con- “Kosovo Marxist and Leninist Organiza- stitutional changes in 1971, the name tion”, “Kosovars Alliance”, “Croatian-Al- “Shiptar”, which was also used by Al- banian Alliance” and others (Hasani, banians in Albania, was changed to the 1989: 209–218; Kešetović, 1988: 88–93). name “Albanian” (Lukovic, according to Most of these organizations are emi- Garabedjan, 2007: 130). Additional im- grant and extremist-fascist. They are petus to the irredentist ideology is given

NBP • Journal of Criminalistics and Law Vol. 25, No. 3 34 Mijalković, S., Popović Mančević. M. (2020). The ideology of “Greater Kosovo” in the vision of Albanian narco-terrorist clans by the constitutional changes from 1974, goslavia. Through the international fac- which equate the rights of both auton- tor, and without international legal bases omous provinces with the rights of re- provided by the authorized bodies of the publics (enactment of constitutions and United Nations, a reason was created for laws and direct participation in federal the alleged “humanitarian intervention” bodies), thus gaining the prerogatives of against the sovereign Federal Republic statehood. Without the consent of the of Yugoslavia, i.e. against the Republic of provinces, the constitutions of Serbia Serbia, for allegedly bringing the Alba- and Yugoslavia cannot be changed. In nian national minority into a situation addition, the province believes that its of physical extermination (so-called hu- new status implies the right to self-de- manitarian catastrophe). Justifying this termination until secession, which in event, it was assessed as “illegal, but le- political circles was considered the ex- gitimate: illegal because it is not based clusive right of the member republics. In on the decision of the United Nations this regard, Albanian politicians held a Security Council; legitimate, because all referendum in 1991, demanding inde- diplomatic efforts to solve the problem pendence, declaring Kosovo a republic. of Kosovo Albanians who have long been Fortunately, international recognition under repression by the Serbian regime came only from the Republic of Alba- have been exhausted” (Independent In- nia. Furthermore, during the war in Yu- ternational Commission on Kosovo: The goslavia (1991-1995), parallel Albanian Kosovo Report, 1/21/2015). institutions were formed in Kosmet and After two and a half months of NATO passive resistance was waged against the aggression, a Military Technical Agree- Republic of Serbia, which Serbia con- ment was signed on June 9th between sidered as illegal actions, which took the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and place outside the legal order of Serbia the Republic of Serbia, on the one hand, and Yugoslavia. Also, all the time, there and the International Security Assis- have been attempts to internationalize tance Force - KFOR under the auspices the problem, in which Albanians would of the United Nations, on the other (Ste- be portrayed as victims of the genocide vanović, 2015). This ended the agony of of the Serbian state (Garabedjan, 2007: NATO aggression against the Republic 130–132, 134–138). This phase in the of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yu- development of the Albanian irredentist goslavia (Pavlović et al, 2012: 362–363). ideology lasted until 1999, when there The United Nations Security Council was an escalation of terrorism by Alba- passed Resolution 1244, which deployed nian extremists and military aggression international security forces in Kosmet, against Yugoslavia and Serbia. after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav The peak in the realization of the Alba- Army and Serbian police. nian irredentist ideology was reached in Furthermore, at the end of 1999 and dur- 1999, when the terrorism of Albanian ing 2000, there was a “spillover” of ter- extremists escalated. Terrorist activities rorism from Kosovo and Metohija to the took on massive proportions, to the ex- territories of central Serbia (the so-called tent that they had the characteristics of Presevo Valley - Bujanovac, Presevo and an armed rebellion against the constitu- Medvedja) and to northwestern North- tional order and security of the Republic ern Macedonia. The new terrorist or- of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yu-

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ganizations, in Serbia “Liberation Army bania a good solution to Kosovo’s status, of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja – while as many as 96% of Kosovo Albani- LAPBM”, and in Northern Macedonia ans considered independence to be the “Liberation People’s Army – LPA” and best and most prosperous solution for “Albanian National Army – ANA” did Kosovo, within the then borders (Early not differ in any way from the terrorist Warning Report Kosovo - Report No. 17, Liberation Army of Kosovo. Fortunately, 2007: 18). with the quick and skilful actions of the The escalation of events occurred on security forces of Serbia and Northern February 17th, 2008, when the so-called Macedonia, the violence subsided. How- “Republic of Kosovo” self-proclaimed as ever, the idea of annexing parts of the an independent state of the Kosovo Al- territory of Serbia and Northern Mac- banians. The event prompted Albanians edonia to Kosovo has not disappeared to believe that they had “put a stamp” on (see: Stevanović, Mijalković, Subošić & the creation of a new Albanian state. An Mlađan, 2012: 1701–1717). additional incentive was that the Inter- On the other side, there has been persis- national Court of Justice issued an advi- tent and frequent public rhetoric among sory opinion in 2010, according to which Albanians that they have no territori- “it was not forbidden to declare Kosovo’s al claims to the neighboring countries. independence”. At the same time, it does There has been some further arguments not imply the right of Kosovo to do so, that the danger of the alleged “Greater or the right of Kosovo to secede from Albania” scheme, skillfully propagated Serbia (Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ by the Slav and Greek propaganda ma- Opinion, Report N° 206, August chinery and even by some academic and 26th, 2010). government circles in the West, is to a Despite that, the degree of radicalism and certain extent exacerbated and helped to violent extremism of Kosmet Albanians demonize and morally downgrade the is growing day by day, and this prob- Albanian question and that exaggerat- lem exceeds the limits of the so-called ed the risk emanating from the alleged Republic of Kosovo. According to the “Greater Albania” (Hilaj, 2013: 412). Edi UNDP studies in Kosovo in 2017, 316 Rama, the Prime Minister of Albania residents of Kosmet joined armed for- wrote on his twitter once that “Greater mations in Syria. Of that, 245 were men, Albania” is “Serbian nightmare, not Al- 44 women and 27 children. At that time, banian project” (Rama, 2014). about 127 of them returned to Kosovo After NATO bombings of 1999, “Great- from the world’s battlefields. The results er Kosovo” indeed came to prominence of a UNDP survey indicate that about a over the ideology of the “Greater Alba- third of Kosmet residents believe that a nia” both rhetorically and practicaly, larger number of Kosovo residents are as it coincided with an opinion of the influenced by extreme or radical forms Kosovo public that conditions have been of Islam, while about a quarter believe created for the independence of Kosovo. that radical groups have an influence in According to the official United Nations Kosovo (Public Pulse Analysis on Pre- Development Program data from 2007, vention of Violent Extremism in Kosovo, only 3% of Kosovo Albanians consid- 2017: 6−8; Community Level Recommen- ered the unification of Kosovo with Al- dations for Preventing Violent Extrem-

NBP • Journal of Criminalistics and Law Vol. 25, No. 3 36 Mijalković, S., Popović Mančević. M. (2020). The ideology of “Greater Kosovo” in the vision of Albanian narco-terrorist clans ism in Kosovo, 2017: 8). Even today, in in Kosmet, and the national structure 2020, Kosovo has the highest per capi- was as follows: 78% Albanians; 13% of ta number of Islamist returning foreign and 9% of members of other eth- fighters in Europe, facing challenges to nic groups (Pavlović, Marković, 2006: reintegrate approximately 242 Kosovo 233). So it is clear that today Serbs are nationals who have returned from fight- a minority that does not enjoy freedom ing with the ISIS (Jensen, 2020). of movement, does not enjoy the right This is a confirmation of the thesis that to work and lives in fear of attack in en- the terrorism of Albanian extremists is at claves protected by international securi- the same time religiously (radically-Isla- ty forces (The Kosovo Report: Conflict – , mistically) motivated. Hence the urge to International Response – Lesons Learned 2000, “kill the Serbian-Christian civilization”: 260−261). for genocide, urbicide, but also for cul- In addition, the efforts of the so-called turocide (See: Mijalković, Popović, 2016: political leadership of Kosovo for the 140–148; Mijalković, Amidžić, 2012: reception of the so-called Republic of 367–386). The consequence is that today Kosovo to the United Nations and to the there are almost no Serbs and non-Al- specialized educational, scientific and banians in Kosmet: the population of cultural agencies of this organization are Kosmet is about 1.8 million people. Re- evident, primarily to the UNESCO and garding the ethnic structure of Kosovo the International Telecommunication and Metohija, there are no precise data, Union (ITU), as well as to the Council of but it is estimated, according to the last Europe. Unfortunately, Kosovo has be- census from 2011, that the demographic come a member of the European Bank structure in Kosovo consists of Albani- for Reconstruction and Development ans 92.9%, Bosnians 1.6%, Serbs 1.5%, (Serbia and Kosovo: The Path to Nor- Turks 1.1%, Ashkalis 0.9%, Egyptians malisation − Europe Report N°223, 2013: 0.7%, Goranis 0.6%, Romanis 0.5%, oth- 6). This would further operationalize er/unspecified 0.2% (The World Fact- the so-called statehood and strengthen book, June 2020). For comparison, in Kosovo’s international legitimacy. How- 1948, there were 727,820 inhabitants in ever, despite the self-proclamation of Kosmet, and the national structure was the so-called “Independent Republic of as follows: 68% Albanians; 24% Serbs Kosovo”, the appetites of certain extrem- and 8% members of other ethnic groups; ist-irredentist-separatist currents do not in 1981, there were 1,584,558 inhabitants calm down.

“GREATER KOSOVO” AS A STATE OF NARCO-TERRORISTS

From the presented review of the evolu- ans, the idea and vision of the creation of tion of Albanian irredentist ideology, it a “private state” is evident today (in ad- is clear that the idea and vision of today’s dition to the existing Republic of Alba- “Kosovo” is very different from the orig- nia) in which several drug bosses would inal idea of creating an Albanian state in rule Kosmet, without fear of criminal the Balkans: unlike state-building ideals prosecution for crimes they once com- that would create a single state of Albani- mitted, are committing and are about to

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commit. The authors of some previous ey” was used precisely for financing and research also conclude that “a large part arming Albanian terrorist organizations of political life in Kosovo and Metohija and their activities, as well as for smug- today has criminal background, both in gling foreign terrorists and mercenaries terms of dubious sources of funding and to the territory of Kosmet. Although it in terms of the intertwinning of politi- is not terrorism in the narrower sense of cal structures with criminal gangs, es- the word, part of the terrorist strategy of pecially at the local level” (Đurić, 2011: creating “Independent Kosovo” was the 135). The evolution of motives from purchase of Serbian houses and prop- “state-building” to “drug-profiteering” is erty, privatization of Serbian companies evident, with the criminalization of the in Kosovo and Metohija, corruption of highest state functions. some world politicians and the repre- Tamara Makarenko finds in her research sentatives of international organizations, from 2004 that “the most illustrative also by using dirty money. nexus between a criminal and terrorist In addition, Albanian criminal organi- group is the relationship between the zations abused the aspirations of Koso- Albanian mafia and the Kosovo Liber- vo Albanians for Kosovo’s independ- ation Army (KLA) during the Kosovo ence and formed terrorist organizations conflict” (Makarenko, 2004: 132). She that carried out mass terrorist attacks also points out that when afterwards in throughout Kosmet in 1999. In the early 1997 KLA was established as a liberation 1990s, Albanians formed a few terrorist movement to seek an independent state organizations: the “National Movement from Serbia, a very specific relationship of Kosovo”, the “National Movement developed between the political wing for the Liberation of Kosovo” and the of the KLA (the Kosovo National Front “”. Shortly after- (KLF)) and Albanian criminal groups to wards, there were mass terrorist attacks smuggle (Ibid). Other scholars throughout Kosmet. It is interesting that also claim in their research that the close after the NATO aggression on Yugosla- link between heroin trafficking, arms via and Serbia, in the presence of the so- smuggling and financing of the KLA has called international security forces, new been documented in different countries, terrorist organizations are being formed at different levels, and by several intel- in Serbia and Northern Macedonia: “Na- ligence reports and journalistic sources tional Liberation Army”, “Eastern Koso- (Strazzari, 2008: 158). vo Liberation Army”, “Presevo, Bujano- So, it is clear that in Kosovo and Metohi- vac and Medvedja Liberation Army”, ja certain connections between organ- “Plav and Gusinje Liberation Army” and ized crime and terrorism have been es- “Albanian National Army”. At the same tablished for years, in the form of narco- time, the political leadership of terrorist terrorism. There are two dominant types organizations is concentrated in certain of these connections: the organized legally and illegally established political criminal activity of Kosovo Albanians parties (primarily from the territory of took on first European and then world Kosovo and Metohija and the Republic proportions, which created an informal of Albania), and above all in the Revolu- center of financial power from the so- tionary Party of Albanians, the National called Albanian mafia. This “dirty mon- Committee for Defense and Liberation of Albanian Territories, The Front for

NBP • Journal of Criminalistics and Law Vol. 25, No. 3 38 Mijalković, S., Popović Mančević. M. (2020). The ideology of “Greater Kosovo” in the vision of Albanian narco-terrorist clans the National Unification of Albanians, in the world in 1990s (Albanian Terror- the National Movement of Kosovo, the ism and Organized and Democratic Party of Kosovo, the Alli- Metohija, 2003; Ćirić, 2008: 193–215). ance for the Future of Kosovo, as well as All this is well known to the internation- in the parties from southern Serbia: Par- al community, primarily to the scientific ty for Democratic Progress, Democratic and professional public. The following Party of Albanians and in the Democrat- quote confirms that descriptively: ic Union for the Valley (Mijalković, Đi- „Unlike Bosnia, where a certain military nović, 2008: 167–192). balance between ethnic groups has been Today, it is known that the territory of preserved, Kosmet has been handed over Kosovo and Metohija is the source and to the absolute power of the Albanians transit area where numerous Albanian under the auspices of NATO. It ends in criminal clans operate, of which the most a horrific ethnic cleansing whose vic- important are certainly the clan, tims were the Serb and non-Albanian which operates in Pristina, in the Dren- populations of the province. Thus, the ica Valley and in northwestern Kosmet protectorate did not create a multieth- and is under the control of Hashim Thaci nic democracy, but a dwarf state full of – the former leader of the terrorist Koso- malice and revenge. According to the vo Liberation Army, now a high-ranking recognition of the commander of the politician and state official;The Metohi- NATO joint forces in Europe, Gener- ja (Dukadjini) clan operates in the wid- al Wesley Clark, the basic problems in er vicinity of Peja, Decani and Gjakova, Kosmet are organized crime and ethnic which is under the control of Ramush cleansing. Extremists rule in Kosmet! Haradinaj; and the Lab clan, which op- KFOR did not heed the persistent calls of erates in the vicinity of Gnjilan, Vitina the Albanian intelligentsia to take strict and Kacanik and is under the control of measures against members of Hashim Remi Mustafa (Albanian terrorism and Thaci’s army. The highest UN officials organized crime in Kosovo and Metohija, describe the situation in Kosmet as hor- 2003: 10). Criminal clans in Kosovo and rible and chaotic, where various, often Metohija are responsible for the pro- private structures that have power oper- duction and distribution of marijuana ate. The province has turned into a par- and for the distribution of heroin to the adise for mafia organizations of various countries of the region and to Central kinds, which not only control the given and Western Europe (Threat Assessment region, villages and cities, but often also of Serious and Organized Crime (public fight among themselves. Political observ- version), 2015: 23-33; SOCTA 2017 - ers note that almost half of the heroin Serious and Organized coming to the United States and Western Crime Threat Assessment, 2017: 35−38), Europe is delivered by Kosovo’s criminal and the situation is similar with arms Albanian groups, which control the en- smuggling (Strategic Assessment of Pub- tire narcotics market in the Balkans. It is lic Safety (public version, 2015: 41−45). estimated that about 40% of all drug de- All this, as well as the fact that Albani- liveries in Europe come through Hashim an drug cartels are significantly funded Thaci’s people. The monthly income of by extremist and terrorist organizations Kosovo Albanians from drug deliveries in Kosovo and Metohija, was known to is between 80 and 120 million US dol- even the most powerful security services

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lars. Thanks to the fact that the border being made for the international rec- is practically not guarded, as well as the ognition of Kosovo as an independent lack of law enforcement in Kosmet, apart state. In addition, it goes a step further from the drug business, an illegal trade and develops a new irredentist ideolo- in weapons, people and human organs gy: the ideology of “Greater Kosovo”. On also flourishes” (Garabedjan, 2007: 141). April 24th, 2020, the Specialist Prosecu- In the stated conditions of lawlessness tor’s Office for Kosovo filed a ten-count and autocracy, as well as the tolerance of Indictment with the Kosovo Specialist the international community, the condi- Chambers for the Court’s considera- tions are ideal for the development of the tion, charging Hashim Thaci, Kadri Ve- “drug industry”, but also other transna- seli and others with a range of crimes tional criminal activities of the Albanian against humanity and war crimes. They mafia from Kosovo and Metohija. The are charged suspected to be criminally current position of the highest states- responsible for nearly 100 murders of men is being used by drug bosses to ter- Kosovo Albanian, Serb, Roma, and oth- rorize the population and to eliminate er ethnicities (Kosovo Specialist Cham- competition. In addition, the possibility bers & Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, of being held criminally responsible for Press Statement, 24 June 2020), which crimes is minimal, i.e. almost non-exist- demonstrates that now all the interna- ent. However, the question arises: how tional community must be fully aware of long will such a state last and how to the fact who the political elites are in the prolong it? That is why great efforts are so-called Republic of Kosovo.

DISCUSSION

Despite the polarization of the profes- Albanian state ruled by drug cartels in sional and scientific public’s perception the “suits” of Democratic statesmen (Re- of the issue of the co-called “Republic public of Kosovo). The second is the po- of Kosovo”, there are certain conclu- litical logistics, both the “political elites” sions derived from this paper that can from Albania, Albanians from Kosovo be verified and confirmed in numerous and Metohija, as well as the politicians sources. The creation of the “Republic of from other Yugoslav republics who pro- Kosovo” is a complex undertaking, con- vided assistance and support to Kosovo sisting of several components and this Albanians in building their own state. research has identified five basic ones. The third is the terrorist activity of nu- The first is an ideological platform, which merous Albanian terrorist organiza- was created during the Ottoman Em- tions and movements, mostly in the late pire, whose vision is the coexistence of 1990s, after they metamorphosed into all Albanians in a common - independ- liberation movement. The fourth isthe ent state in the Balkans. Ideology has lobbying logistics of some individuals evolved over time, ranging from a sin- from foreign governments, internation- gle state-building (Albania and “Great- al organizations, multinational compa- er Albania”) to the creation of a parallel nies that had an interest in advocating internationally recognized (drug-profit) for Kosovo’s independence. Finally, the

NBP • Journal of Criminalistics and Law Vol. 25, No. 3 40 Mijalković, S., Popović Mančević. M. (2020). The ideology of “Greater Kosovo” in the vision of Albanian narco-terrorist clans fifth is the inevitable mafia activities of Based on the presented facts, general numerous Albanian criminal organiza- recommendations for the security pol- tions and groups that financed terrorist icy of the Republic of Serbia regarding organizations and their actions, as well the “Kosovo issue” can be made. First, as the entire political and lobbying com- the Republic of Serbia must improve ponent, with dirty money, mostly ac- the control mechanisms of all neuralgic quired through drug crime. points on its territory where escalation of In the presented structure of the reali- politically motivated violence is possible. zation of the Albanian irredentist ide- It is about the geospace of the so-called ology, the oldest is the ideological plat- Presevo Valley (Bujanovac, Presevo and form, while the functioning of the pre- Medvedja) and Raska area. In addition, sented structure is not possible without the security services of the Republic of the Albanian mafia. It is clear that the Serbia should be involved, through in- Albanian mafia has been the generator ternational security cooperation, in the and financier of all extremist events in control of extremist movements and or- the last two decades. It created money ganizations in the surrounding countries. with which terrorist organizations were The Republic of Serbia should seriously equipped and financed, from which new dedicate itself to the intensified control “bosses” and “soldiers” of the Albanian of the relations between criminal and mafia were later recruited. Some of them terrorist organizations, and this control are today the political elite, which cre- should be carried out in the area of the ates conditions for further development previously mentioned neuralgic points of the Albanian mafia. This created a in Serbia and in the surrounding area. It vicious circle of the overflow of organ- is especially worrying that cooperation ized crime into terrorism, and vice versa. between the Albanian mafia and irre- That is why the “Republic of Kosovo” is dentists in the Presevo Valley and in the considered a narco-terrorist state. Raska area (Islamists and the so-called The ambitions of organized crime have a Bosniak and Turkish mafia) is possible growing trend of insatiability. It means, in the future as well. In that sense, it is above all, strengthening one’s own posi- necessary to improve international intel- tion within the newly created so-called ligence and police cooperation, primarily state, to strengthen the position of the with Montenegro, Northern Macedonia so-called state in the international com- and Greece. Among the activities that munity, but also to new territorial claims aim to prevent giving legitimacy to the to parts of the territories inhabited by so-called Republic of Kosovo, it is nec- Albanians. The latter is popular from the essary to intensify international efforts aspect of gaining the general support of to prevent the formation of the so-called Albanians for leading the so-called na- Kosovo Armed Forces. The reasons are tional and international policies of the not only the security of the Republic of so-called Republic of Kosovo, and this Serbia (the newly formed Kosovo Army primarily in order to strengthen the es- could not seriously threaten Serbia, but tablished government, and ensure im- would instill insecurity in Serbs and munity from criminal prosecution of non-Albanians in Kosmet), but also the government actors. prevention of giving statehood to the so-called Republic of Kosovo. This in- cludes perseverance in efforts to achieve

NBP • Journal of Criminalistics and Law Vol. 25, No. 3 41 Mijalković, S., Popović Mančević, M. (2020). The ideology of “Greater Kosovo” in the vision of Albanian narco-terrorist clans

the survival of the so-called KLA War privatization procedures in the Republic Crimes Court in Kosovo and Metohija, of Serbia. This entails the improvement because that is one of the main remaining of mechanisms for controlling the inter- ways to reveal the truth about the crimes national movement of vehicles, import of the Albanian extremists against Serbs and export of oil, cigarettes and other and non-Albanians in Kosmet. In the excise goods, as well as migration con- domain of stopping the so-called Kosovo trol, in order to prevent the smuggling state in gaining international credibility, of stolen vehicles, smuggling of excise the Republic of Serbia must make serious goods, smuggling of migrants and hu- efforts to prevent diplomatic and other man trafficking, which are the dominant international (economic, cultural, sports, crime businesses of the Albanian mafia. tourism, etc.) activities of the so-called It is especially important to improve the Republic of Kosovo, especially when it control of international and domestic comes to its efforts to become a mem- trade of precursors and other chemicals ber of international organizations (the used in the production of the so-called United Nations, the , designer (synthetic) drugs. Within the the European Union, the UNESCO, the public sector, especially within the na- FIFA, the FIBA, the Red Cross, the Inter- tional security system, it is necessary to pol, the Europol, the Eurojust, etc). Con- improve the mechanisms for controlling trol of financial resources used in privat- corruption, negligent work and abuse of ization procedures of public companies office. Finally, a contribution is expected and property, the purchase of property from the scientific community, which and residential and business facilities through research activities should spread is also extremely important, in order to the truth about Kosovo and Metohija prevent the participation of Albanian and its quasi-statehood. “dirty” drug profits in investment and

CONCLUSION

In the vision of the so-called Republic the idea is still alive and its realization of Kosovo state leadership, the “Greater will surely be seriously worked on. Thus, Albania” ideology is not at the top pri- the territories inhabited by Albanians, orities list. However, the state leadership which the Ottoman Porte promised to of the so-called Republic of Kosovo has the Albanian insurgents in Kosovo and claims to the parts of the territory of Metohija in 1912, would finally become Serbia (Presevo Valley and parts of the integral parts of the great Albanian state. Raska region), western and northern But, this time, it would not be the real- parts of Northern Macedonia, southern ization of the idea of “Greater Albania”, and eastern parts of Montenegro, and but of “Greater Kosovo”, which before possibly northwestern parts of Greece. that gained internationally recognized This ambition was expressed in 1999 independence and has full internal sov- and 2000, by activating terrorist or- ereignty. ganizations in the Presevo Valley and The huge danger lies in the fact that the northwestern Northern Macedonia. Al- so-called “Greater Kosovo” was ruled by though the goal was not achieved then,

NBP • Journal of Criminalistics and Law Vol. 25, No. 3 42 Mijalković, S., Popović Mančević. M. (2020). The ideology of “Greater Kosovo” in the vision of Albanian narco-terrorist clans the largest political parties, which were justice, in which there will be no truth the political wings of terrorist organiza- and mercy for Serbs, as well as no crim- tions, and which were founded by drug inal liability for terrorists and members clans. In such an environment, the heads of criminal clans. Therefore, the Repub- of the mafia and former members of lic of Serbia has a national interest in terrorist organizations are (or may have restoring and strengthening the violated chance to be) in power. The government territorial integrity and sovereignty over will pass laws and administer selective Kosovo and Metohija.

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