Patients' Rights in the European Union Mapping Exercise
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KINGDOM of BELGIUM Hugues Dumont, Nicolas Lagasse, Marc
KINGDOM OF BELGIUM Hugues Dumont, Nicolas Lagasse, Marc Van der Hulst, and Sébastien van Drooghenbroeck It is not easy to use simple language to describe something that is not simple, and Belgian federalism is far from simple. Built without preconceived ideas or an overarching doctrine, it accumulates original - sometimes labyrinthine – solutions as it goes along. In this chapter we attempt to describe the distribution of powers in Belgium as briefly as we can, without doing violence to its richness and complexity - concentrating on major characteristics rather than on an exhaustive inventory of rules. After reviewing the evolution of Belgian federalism along with its social and historical context, our chapter examines the principles that govern the distribution of powers in Belgium, paying special attention to the asymmetry of this distribution. The logic behind the development of the distribution of powers, particularly the political logic, is also discussed, as are the various problem-solving techniques used to prevent or solve conflicts stemming from the distribution of powers. The conclusion reviews how the Belgian system is functioning today and deals with the system’s prospects for the future. HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION Belgium has some 10,309,795 inhabitants; its territory measures 32,500 square kilometres. Gross domestic product per capita is €23,690 (or roughly US$28,000). The kingdom’s population is divided into three main groups: six million Dutch speakers (Flemish) in the north and the Brussels area; four million French speakers in the south (Walloons) and in the Brussels area as well; and 71,000 German speakers in a small territory in the east of the country, along the German border. -
Executive and Legislative Bodies
Published on Eurydice (https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice) Legislative and executive powers at the various levels Belgium is a federal state, composed of the Communities and the Regions. In the following, the federal state structure is outlined and the Government of Flanders and the Flemish Parliament are discussed. The federal level The legislative power at federal level is with the Chamber of Representatives, which acts as political chamber for holding government policy to account. The Senate is the meeting place between regions and communities of the federal Belgium. Together they form the federal parliament. Elections are held every five years. The last federal elections took place in 2014. The executive power is with the federal government. This government consists of a maximum of 15 ministers. With the possible exception of the Prime Minister, the federal government is composed of an equal number of Dutch and French speakers. This can be supplemented with state secretaries. The federal legislative power is exercised by means of acts. The Government issues Royal Orders based on these. It is the King who promulgates federal laws and ratifies them. The federal government is competent for all matters relating to the general interests of all Belgians such as finance, defence, justice, social security (pensions, sickness and invalidity insurance), foreign affairs, sections of health care and domestic affairs (the federal police, oversight on the police, state security). The federal government is also responsible for nuclear energy, public-sector companies (railways, post) and federal scientific and cultural institutions. The federal government is also responsible for all things that do not expressly come under the powers of the communities and the regions. -
Libel As Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care
Fordham Law Review Volume 53 Issue 3 Article 3 1984 Libel as Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care Todd F. Simon Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Todd F. Simon, Libel as Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 449 (1984). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol53/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LIBEL AS MALPRACTICE: NEWS MEDIA ETHICS AND THE STANDARD OF CARE TODD F. SIMON* INTRODUCTION D OCTORS, lawyers, and journalists share a strong common bond: They live in fear of being haled into court where the trier of fact will pass judgment on how they have performed their duties. When the doc- tor or lawyer is sued by a patient or client, it is a malpractice case.I The standard by which liability is determined is whether the doctor or lawyer acted with the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed and em- ployed by members of the profession in good standing.' Accordingly, if * Assistant Professor and Director, Journalism/Law Institute, Michigan State Uni- versity School of Journalism; Member, Nebraska Bar. 1. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 32, at 185-86 (5th ed. -
The United States Supreme Court Adopts a Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J.D.B. V. North Carolina
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ADOPTS A REASONABLE JUVENILE STANDARD IN J.D.B. V NORTH CAROLINA FOR PURPOSES OF THE MIRANDA CUSTODY ANALYSIS: CAN A MORE REASONED JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR JUVENILES BE FAR BEHIND? Marsha L. Levick and Elizabeth-Ann Tierney∗ I. Introduction II. The Reasonable Person Standard a. Background b. The Reasonable Person Standard and Children: Kids Are Different III. Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida: Embedding Developmental Research Into the Court’s Constitutional Analysis IV. From Miranda v. Arizona to J.D.B. v. North Carolina V. J.D.B. v. North Carolina: The Facts and The Analysis VI. Reasonableness Applied: Justifications, Defenses, and Excuses a. Duress Defenses b. Justified Use of Force c. Provocation d. Negligent Homicide e. Felony Murder VII. Conclusion I. Introduction The “reasonable person” in American law is as familiar to us as an old shoe. We slip it on without thinking; we know its shape, style, color, and size without looking. Beginning with our first-year law school classes in torts and criminal law, we understand that the reasonable person provides a measure of liability and responsibility in our legal system.1 She informs our * ∗Marsha L. Levick is the Deputy Director and Chief Counsel for Juvenile Law Center, a national public interest law firm for children, based in Philadelphia, Pa., which Ms. Levick co-founded in 1975. Ms. Levick is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University School of Law. Elizabeth-Ann “LT” Tierney is the 2011 Sol and Helen Zubrow Fellow in Children's Law at the Juvenile Law Center. -
The Need for Sub-National Constitutions in Federal Theory and Practice
ISSN: 2036-5438 The need for sub-national constitutions in federal theory and practice. The Belgian case by Patricia Popelier ∗ Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 4, issue 2, 2012 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License E - 36 Abstract Comparative constitutional scholarship identifies sub-national constituent power as one of the defining features of federal systems. Moreover, according to public choice theory, devolutionary federal systems are expected to favor the creation of sub-national constitutions. For these reasons, the absence of real constitutional power for the sub-states in Belgium appears to be an anomaly. The research question of this paper explores the validity of this approach. More generally, the question is: how important is it in a federal state for sub-states to have their own sub-national constitutions? Arguments pro and contra are analyzed and applied to the Belgian case. I argue that sub-national constitutionalism is a matter of political balance between national and sub-national powers, rather than a principle of federal theory Key-words Sub-national constitutions, federal theory, Belgium, devolutionary systems Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License E - 37 Introduction Belgium is a federal state, composed of two types of sub-states: communities and regions. The very first article of the Belgian Constitution informs the reader of this feature of the Belgian state structure. Nevertheless, the Belgian sub-states do not or only embryonically possess constituent power. Moreover, Flanders is the only sub-state demanding more constitution-making power. -
Fraud: District of Columbia by Robert Van Kirk, Williams & Connolly LLP, with Practical Law Commercial Litigation
STATE Q&A Fraud: District of Columbia by Robert Van Kirk, Williams & Connolly LLP, with Practical Law Commercial Litigation Status: Law stated as of 16 Mar 2021 | Jurisdiction: District of Columbia, United States This document is published by Practical Law and can be found at: us.practicallaw.tr.com/w-029-0846 Request a free trial and demonstration at: us.practicallaw.tr.com/about/freetrial A Q&A guide to fraud claims under District of Columbia law. This Q&A addresses the elements of actual fraud, including material misrepresentation and reliance, and other types of fraud claims, such as fraudulent concealment and constructive fraud. Elements Generally – nondisclosure of a material fact when there is a duty to disclose (Jericho Baptist Church Ministries, Inc. (D.C.) v. Jericho Baptist Church Ministries, Inc. (Md.), 1. What are the elements of a fraud claim in 223 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2016) (applying District your jurisdiction? of Columbia law)). To state a claim of common law fraud (or fraud in the (Sundberg v. TTR Realty, LLC, 109 A.3d 1123, 1131 inducement) under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff (D.C. 2015).) must plead that: • A material misrepresentation actionable in fraud • The defendant made: must be consciously false and intended to mislead another (Sarete, Inc. v. 1344 U St. Ltd. P’ship, 871 A.2d – a false statement of material fact (see Material 480, 493 (D.C. 2005)). A literally true statement Misrepresentation); that creates a false impression can be actionable in fraud (Jacobson v. Hofgard, 168 F. Supp. 3d 187, 196 – with knowledge of its falsity; and (D.D.C. -
In the Supreme Court of Mississippi No. 2012-Ca-02010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2012-CA-02010-SCT BRONWYN BENOIST PARKER v. WILLIAM DEAN BENOIST AND WILLIAM D. BENOIST, INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN HIS CAPACITY OF EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF BILLY DEAN “B.D.” BENOIST, DECEASED v. BRONWYN BENOIST PARKER ON MOTION FOR REHEARING DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/20/2012 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. PERCY L. LYNCHARD, JR. TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: GOODLOE TANKERSLEY LEWIS AMANDA POVALL TAILYOUR GRADY F. TOLLISON, JR. REBECCA B. COWAN KRISTEN E. BOYDEN COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: YALOBUSHA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: GOODLOE TANKERSLEY LEWIS AMANDA POVALL TAILYOUR ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: GRADY F. TOLLISON, JR. TAYLOR H. WEBB REBECCA B. COWAN NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES DISPOSITION: ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART ON CROSS-APPEAL: AFFIRMED - 02/19/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 09/25/2014 MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE WALLER, C.J., KITCHENS AND CHANDLER, JJ. KITCHENS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Bronwyn Benoist Parker’s motion for rehearing is granted. The original opinion is withdrawn and this opinion is substituted therefor. ¶2. Parker and William Benoist are siblings who litigated the will of their father, Billy Dean “B.D.” Benoist, in the Chancery Court of Yalobusha County. In 2010, B.D. executed a will which significantly altered the distributions provided by a previous will that B.D. had executed in 1998. Bronwyn alleged that William had unduly influenced their father, who was suffering from dementia and drug addiction, into making the new will, which included a forfeiture clause that revoked benefits to any named beneficiary who contested the will. -
Fraud: Misrepresentations of Opinion W.Page Keeton
University of Minnesota Law School Scholarship Repository Minnesota Law Review 1937 Fraud: Misrepresentations of Opinion W.Page Keeton Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Keeton, W.Page, "Fraud: Misrepresentations of Opinion" (1937). Minnesota Law Review. 2472. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2472 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FRAUD: MISREPRESENTATION OF OPINION FRAUD: MISREPRESENTATIONS OF OPINION By W. PAGE KEETON* INTRODUCTION T is usually stated, in a general way, that fraud can be predicated only on a misrepresentation of an existing or past fact, and consequently, statements as to future events or occurrences cannot be made the basis of fraud which will justify either rescis- sion of a contract or an action in tort for damages. Such state- ments are of themselves of little value, if any, since they furnish no criterion by which to distinguish fact from opinion. The same problem of distinguishing between fact and opinion exists in the law of warranties, where it is held that an expression of opinion cannot amount to a warranty.1 The first and foremost criticism of the cases is that they furnish no satisfactory test-this is not surprising, for, it is submitted, it is theoretically impossible-for differentiating so-called statements of fact and statements of opinion.la In the second place, the exceptions which the courts have set up to the alleged general rule are not well defined, and sometimes a court will so state an exception as to leave substantially nothing of the original principle of non-liability. -
Clery Act Crimes and Offenses Definitions the Following Definitions Should Be Used When Classifying Clery Act Crimes and Offenses
Clery Act Crimes and Offenses Definitions The following definitions should be used when classifying Clery Act crimes and offenses. These definitions are taken from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook (UCR) and the most recent version of The Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting. Aggravated Assault: An unlawful attack by one (1) person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault usually is accompanied by the use of a weapon or by means likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Note: include assaults or attempts to kill or murder, poisoning (including the use of date rape drugs), assault with a dangerous or deadly weapon, maiming, mayhem, assault with explosives, assault with disease (i.e., offender is aware he or she is infected with a deadly disease and deliberately attempts to inflict the disease by biting, spitting, etc.). Arrests: Persons processed by arrest, citation or summons, including: 1. Those persons arrested and released without a formal charge being placed against them. (An arrest has occurred when a law enforcement officer detains an adult with the intention of seeking charges against the individual for a specific offense(s) and a record is mare of the detention.) 2. Juveniles taken into custody or arrested by merely warned and released without being charged. A juvenile should be counted as “arrested” when the circumstances are such that if the individual were an adult and arrest would have been counted. 3. Any situation where a young person, in lieu of actual arrest, is summoned, cited or notified to appear before the juvenile or youth court, or similar official, for a violation of the law. -
Bicameralism in Belgium: the Dismantlement of the Senate for the Sake of Multinational Confederalism by Patricia Popelier
ISSN: 2036-5438 Bicameralism in Belgium: the dismantlement of the Senate for the sake of multinational confederalism by Patricia Popelier Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 10, issue 2, 2018 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License E -215 Abstract Belgium was established in 1830 as a unitary state with a bicameral parliament, with symmetrical powers for the upper and the lower house. While federalism and bicameralism are often considered a pair, the Belgian system shows an inverse relationship. The Senate gradually turned into a house representative of the sub-states, but its powers declined inversely proportional to the level of decentralisation of the Belgian state. This paper inquires how the dismantling of the Belgian Senate fits in the increasingly devolutionary nature of the Belgian state structure. First, it nuances the link between bicameralism and federalism: bicameralism is an institutional device for federalism, but not by necessity, and only under specific conditions. The official narrative is that the Belgian Senate was reformed to turn it into a house of the sub-states in line as a federal principle, but in reality the conditions to fulfil this task are not fulfilled. Instead, the paper holds that bicameralism in Belgium is subordinate to the needs of multinational conflict management, and that complying with the federative ideal of an upper house giving voice to the collective needs of the sub-states would stand in the way of the evolution of the Belgian system towards confederalism based on two major linguistic groups. Key-words Bicameralism, parliamentary systems, federalism, confederalism, multinationalism Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License E -216 Even before its establishment, when Belgium’s founders discussed the design of the new Belgian State, the upper chamber was highly contentious in Belgium. -
Intentional Torts
Torts INTENTIONAL TORTS Intent ‐act intending to produce the harm OR ‐know that harm is substantially certain to result Battery ‐requires dual intent: 1) Act intending to cause harm or offensive contact with person (what is offensive?) 2) harmful contact directly or indirectly results *Vosburg rule used to be only need to intend contact *doesn’t have to know the full extent of the possible harm, just know that it is likely to cause harm *can be liable for any damages, unforeseen or not *thin shin rule *Transferred intent ‐ need not be person who def intended to harm ‐criminal negligence vs. tort negligence ‐small unjustifiable risk vs. big risk, gross deviation from std of care Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 1) Intent to harm (can be imputed from facts) Wilkinson v. Downton (93) o Practical joke where guy tells woman her husband badly injured. o Rule: Such a statement, made suddenly and with apparent seriousness, could fail to produce grave effects under the circumstance upon any but an exceptionally indifferent person, and therefore an intent to produce such an effect must be imputed. 2) Outrageous Conduct RESTATEMENT 2 ‐ 46 ‐ outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress ‐extreme or outrageous conduct ‐ who is deciding? JURY ‐intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress ‐liable for emotional distress and/or bodily harm ‐liable to family members who are present regardless of bodily harm ‐liable to third parties present (not family) IF distress results in bodily harm ‐really does have to be OUTRAGEOUS‐ beyond all decency (Jury decides) ‐expansion from battery to IIED shows expansion of tort law ‐serious threats to physical well‐being are outrageous -The extreme and outrageous character might arise from knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to ED by reason of a physical or mental condition or peculiarity (Amish guy). -
Law, Economics, and Subjective Standards of Care in Negligence Law
Lost in Translation: Law, Economics, and Subjective Standards of Care in Negligence Law Charles R. Korsmo* Abstract The law and economics movement has been a victim of its own success. Over the past four decades, it has generated an enormous specialist literature, often explicitly intended for other specialists. As is so often the case with increased specialization, the result has been escalating technical complexity accompanied by forbiddingly formal mathematics and a tendency to retreat into abstraction. As a result, economic analysis has often failed to provide general legal audiences with insight into important legal questions, even where the tools of economics would be appropriate and useful. This Article examines—and rectifies—just such a failure. In particular, this Article examines departures from a uniform reasonable person standard in negligence law. From an economic standpoint, individuals might be held to different standards of care because: (1) they differ in their costs of taking precautions (e.g., a good driver can take additional precautions more cheaply than a bad driver); or (2) they differ in the accident costs they generate when exercising a given amount of care (e.g., a good driver causes fewer accidents than a bad driver who is exercising the same precautions). Though the two possibilities lead to sharply different prescriptions, the law and economics literature has focused almost entirely on the former scenario, while neglecting the latter. By examining both possibilities, I provide a new and superior explanation of how tort law treats disabilities and professional skill, with the potential to * Assistant Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.