Authoritarian Deliberation in China

Baogang He & Mark E. Warren

Abstract: Authoritarian rule in China increasingly involves a wide variety of deliberative practices. These practices combine authoritarian command with deliberative influence, producing the apparent anomaly of authoritarian deliberation. Although deliberation and democracy are usually found together, they are Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/155/1830989/daed_a_00454.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 distinct phenomena. Democracy involves the inclusion of individuals in matters that affect them through distributions of empowerments like votes and rights. Deliberation is the kind of communication that involves persuasion-based influence. Combinations of command-based power and deliberative influence– like authoritarian deliberation–are now pervading Chinese politics, likely a consequence of the failures of command authoritarianism under the conditions of complexity and pluralism produced by market- oriented development. The concept of authoritarian deliberation frames two possible trajectories of political development in China. One possibility is that the increasing use of deliberative practices stabilizes and strengthens authoritarian rule. An alternative possibility is that deliberative practices serve as a lead- ing edge of democratization.

Over the last several decades, authoritarian regimes in Asia have increasingly experimented with public consultation, political participation, and even deliberation within controlled venues.1 China is a particularly important example: though it remains an authoritarian regime, governments, mostly at the local level, have employed a wide variety of participatory practices that include consultation and deliberation.2 In the 1980s, leaders began to introduce direct elections at the village level. Other innovations have followed, BAOGANG HE is the Alfred Deakin including approval and recall voting at the local lev- Professor and Chair in International el, participatory budgeting, deliberative forums, De- Relations at Deakin University, liberative Polls, public hearings, citizen rights to sue Australia. the state, initiatives to make government informa- MARK E. WARREN is the Harold tion public, and acceptance of some kinds of auton- and Dorrie Merilees Chair in the omous civil society organizations. Although very un- Study of Democracy at The Univer- even, many of these innovations appear to have gen- sity of British Columbia, Canada. uinely deliberative elements: that is, they involve the (*See endnotes for complete contributor kinds of talk-based politics that generate persuasive biographies.) influence, from which political leaders take guidance,

155 Authoritarian and upon which they rely for the legitima- these dynamics by stylizing two possible Deliberation cy of their decisions.3 Curiously, these prac- trajectories of political development. One in China tices are appearing within an authoritari- possibility is that deliberative mechanisms an state led by a party with no apparent in- could provide stability for authoritarian- terest in regime-level democratization. We ism in ways that would make it compati- call this paradoxical phenomenon authori- ble with complex, decentered, multi-actor tarian deliberation. market societies. Another possibility, less We make three broad claims. The first is likely at the moment but possible in the fu- oriented toward democratic theory. We ar- ture, is that if the regime were increasing- gue that authoritarian deliberation is theo- ly to rely on deliberative influence for its

retically possible: it combines authoritar- legitimacy, it might find itself locked into Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/155/1830989/daed_a_00454.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 ian distributions of the power of decision incremental advances in democratic em- with deliberative influence. powerments. Under this scenario, democ- Our second claim characterizes China’s ratization would be driven by problems of regime type as deliberative authoritarianism: a governance and led by the current experi- regime style that makes common use of au- ments in deliberation, as opposed to regime thoritarian deliberation. But why would an change following the more familiar “liber- authoritarian regime resort to deliberative al” model in which independent social forc- practices? Our broad hypothesis is func- es propel regime-level democratization– tional: problems of governance in complex, the pattern most frequent in the democratic multi-actor, high-information, and high- transitions of the last several decades. resistance environments give elites incentives to rely on popular input and even pop- In 2012, Xi Jinping assumed office as presi- ular deliberation, especially when they be- dent of the People’s Republic of China and lieve they can use these instruments to pro- general secretary of the Central Committee vide the kinds of proximate and specific of the Communist Party of China (ccp). Xi’s responsiveness that co-opt popular orga- leadership has reversed much of the liber- nizing and substitute for democratic em- alization of the past several decades. Under powerments. These arrangements can pro- Xi, the ccp has increased authoritarian con- duce a unique relationship between au- trols and Party discipline and has height- thoritarianism and deliberation. Such func- ened pressure on dissidents, universities, tionally driven deliberative developments and public spaces. Chinese foreign policy is can be found in several nations other than increasingly aggressive. Xi has also sought China: governments in developed democ- to reassert civilian control over the Peo- racies have been innovating with new ple’s Liberation Army. He has embarked on forms of participatory and deliberative a strong anticorruption campaign, proba- governance over the last few decades in re- bly motivated by concerns that corruption sponse to many of the same kinds of pres- is a kind of “slow political suicide” of the sures.4 What distinguishes China is that regime itself, and certainly aimed at more governance-driven deliberative politics is control over quasiautonomous political developing in the absence of regime-level power centers. Xi is using increasingly au- democratization.5 thoritarian controls to modernize the fi- Our third broad claim is that the contra- nancial sector, to continue to reform state- dictory features of authoritarian delibera- owned enterprises, and, more generally, to tion identify the dynamic qualities of Chi- modernize the economy so that it contin- nese political development that most in- ues to perform well. These developments terest democratic theorists. We illustrate are not entirely surprising: the legitimacy

156 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences of the ccp depends heavily on economic public policy, as has always been empha- Baogang He performance, which in turn depends on re- sized by the ccp’s Mass Line; 2) democracy & Mark E. moving roadblocks to growth–including is a way of ensuring that expertise is includ- Warren entrenched and often corrupt interests–as ed in public policies; 3) consultative democ- well as developing the institutions of a mod- racy is a key resource for developing legiti- ern market economy. The general pattern macy for Party leadership; 4) consultative remains that of regime-level authoritarian- democracy is a way of ensuring social har- ism with no apparent signs of regime-level mony by providing places for the people’s democratization. problems and demands to be heard and Yet although the ccp under Xi has increas- channeled into the political system; 5) the ingly cracked down on “foreign ideas” in long-term goal is to develop not just consul- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/155/1830989/daed_a_00454.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 politics–liberal democracy and multipar- tative democracy in a few places, but rather ty democracy in particular–one such idea a “multi-institutional” and “complete sys- has gained influence. Theccp continues to tem of consultative democracy”; and 6) the develop and deepen what they call xie shang ultimate goal of developing consultative de- min zhu, varyingly translated as “consulta- mocracy is to ensure min zhu: “the people tive democracy” or “deliberative democ- are the masters.” racy.” Except when referring directly to ccp These central directives are both a re- documents, here we will use the term delib- sponse to governance challenges and an erative democracy, in keeping with the mean- incorporation of considerable political in- ing of xie shang, which combines xie (doing ventiveness, particularly at the local lev- things together, cooperation, and harmoni- el. Local governments in China face an in- zation) with shang (talk, dialogue, consulta- creasing number of petitions and social tion, and discussion). So democracy (min conflicts, as well as challenges from com- zhu) is modified byxie shang: discussing is- plex issues. The Beijing government, for ex- sues in the spirit of doing things together. ample, now receives more than one thou- In November 2013, the Party Central sand petititons each day! To manage the Committee held its Third Plenum of the social conflicts these petitions represent, lo- Eighteenth National Congress, in which cal governments have been introducing the deliberative democracy was given official ideas and practices of deliberative democ- encouragement in the form of a directive racy, such as citizens’ juries. From 2014 to to lower levels of government–as is often 2016, Baogang He took several trips to Bei- the ccp’s style of rule. The mention of de- jing, Xiamen, Hangzhou, Shanghai, Guang- liberative democracy (officially, “socialist dong, Zhejiang, Hebei, and Henan to inves- consultative democracy”) in the Third Ple- tigate the recent trends in deliberative pol- num document was no accident, as it was itics over the last few years. Interestingly, followed by documents from the Central He found that the ccp’s program of “social- Committee on February 9, 2015, with direc- ist consultative democracy” appears to be tions for “Strengthening Socialist Consulta- proceeding, even as authoritarian controls tive Democracy,” and on June 25, 2015, out- are increasing. lining the role of the Chinese People’s Po- First, several organizations specifically litical Consultative Meeting in furthering designed for public deliberation have been deliberative democracy. Six ideas were es- set up. An empowered Deliberative Poll pecially prominent in these directives: 1) on local budgeting was held in Wenling in consultative democracy is an ordered way 2005. The process was so popular that it is of absorbing wisdom and strength from the now institutionalized; and studies suggest Chinese people to improve governance and that it not only represents a high-quality de-

146 (3) Summer 2017 157 Authoritarian liberative process, but is also quite demo- ing citizens from other professional bodies Deliberation cratic, owing to representation through its like social psychology. The city guarantees in China near-random selection process.6 A similar that petitioners have the right to choose ju- Deliberative Poll was held in the Puxi Dis- ries from this pool to consider petitions. It trict of Shanghai in 2015.7 The Haicang Dis- has also developed a new practice of mov- trict of Xiamen established a center for pub- ing public deliberation from official offices lic deliberation that organizes and executes to the site of the dispute to help jurists bet- all local deliberative forums. Aitu County in ter understand the issues. Jinling Province set up the “People’s Arbi- Third, the topics discussed are increas- tration Center” through which citizens can ingly substantive. Ten years ago, the issues

call for a public hearing. This center over- put up for public deliberation were compar- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/155/1830989/daed_a_00454.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 saw a much-discussed live telecast of the atively insubstantial, such as tourist devel- public debate between villagers and local opment or developing cultural signage for leaders on the issue of compensation. a city. When Baogang He proposed a public Second, some procedures that empower forum, like citizens’ juries, to deal with the citizens to participate in deliberative pro- petition issue in 2005 in one Beijing work- cesses remain in place or have been further shop, it was immediately dismissed as “too improved. In theory and often in practice, idealistic”: the petition issue was viewed citizens have entitlements such as access to by officials as sensitive and complicated, so information and rights to agenda-setting. much so that it fell into the zone of national For example, petitioners can call for pub- security concerns. Over the last few years, lic hearings in Changshan, Hunan Prov- however, important issues like land appro- ince, or Haining, Zhejiang Province. In the priation, building demolition, and compen- Ronggui neighborhood government of the sation have been hotly debated in public fo- Shuide District in Guangdong Province, all rums. There are other indications that local social policies must be proposed and dis- governments are beginning to use deliber- cussed through a citizen committee before ative forums to manage increasing num- being submitted to the Party Committee bers of petitions from citizens. Local gov- for further consideration. In 2013, Yanjin ernments in Huizhou, Changsha, Huzhou, County in Yunnan Province introduced a and Aitu have started to organize citizens’ new budgeting process in which both ran- juries to examine petition claims. Huizhou domly selected citizens and elected repre- successfully organized a modified version sentatives are able to make new proposals of Deliberative Polling to solve the “mar- about the budget, with majority rule used ried-out” women’s petitions for equal dis- to decide the result. One procedure intro- tribution of village wealth.8 Haining has duced in Haining in Zhejiang Province in developed and improved a set of concrete 2014, required the immediate release of the procedures of citizens’ juries to deal with results of votes cast by citizen jurists on the a series of the petition claims in 2014. Cit- spot. Moreover, citizen jurists can vote on izens’ juries introduced in Aitu County in whether a governmental organization has Jilin Province between 2011 and 2015 have done an adequate job or whether the peti- substantively reduced the number of petitioners in a dispute have legitimate reasons tioners. This causal effect is also indicat- for their petitions. Haining has established ed by public deliberation in Wenling and a pool of one hundred jurists comprising Huizhou. But there is not yet consensus on forty ordinary citizens, twenty locally elect- this issue, with some arguing that public de- ed people’s deputies, nine lawyers, nine liberation may increase the number of pe- mediators, and six social workers, includ- titioners.

158 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences The Chinese Legal Database (Peking Uni- deliberation requires protection from co- Baogang He versity Law Database, Beida Fabao) provides ercion, economic dependency, and tradi- & Mark E. another source of evidence. Documents be- tional authority if deliberative influence Warren tween 2001 and 2016 show a rapid increase is to function as a means of resolving con- in the numbers of provisions on public flict and legitimizing collective decisions. hearings in municipalities, provincial capi- Democratic institutions usually provide tals, and major cities up through 2010, after these protections by limiting and distrib- which the numbers plateau, though at a rela- uting power in ways that provide both the tively high level (Table 1). These documents spaces and the incentives for persuasion, vary from informing the citizens’ right to argument, expressions of opinion, and hold public hearings, to organizing, improv- demonstration. These protected spaces en- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/155/1830989/daed_a_00454.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 ing, and establishing procedures for public able the formation of preferences, enable hearings, issuing public announcements on legitimate bargains, and, sometimes, pro- public hearings, and reporting the results. duce consensus. Because democracy im- Experiments with public deliberation in plies inclusion, collective decisions with- China appear to be increasingly genuine, out it–no matter how deliberative–are substantive, inclusive, and often impres- likely to be experienced by the excluded as sive. But their contributions to regime de- illegitimate impositions. Although highly mocratization remain an open question. imperfect, established democracies have, The ccp continues to control these pro- in addition to their elected representative cesses. Political elites typically define per- bodies, a high density of institutions that missible spaces by issue, scope, and level of generate relatively deliberative approach- jurisdiction. Questions of representative es to politics, such as politically oriented inclusion, especially through elections, but media, law courts, advocacy groups, ad hoc even within deliberative forums that seek committees and panels, and universities descriptive representation, are often sub- with long-standing traditions of academic merged. That is, the pattern does not ap- freedom. Whatever their other differenc- pear to be one of increasingly democratic es, all theories of deliberative democracy deliberation, but rather one in which an in- presuppose a close and symbiotic relation- creasingly authoritarian regime is also mak- ship between democratic institutions and ing greater use of deliberative mechanisms. deliberation.9 Our challenge here is to make sense of this The clear and robust connection between seemingly paradoxical development. democracy and deliberation has led democratic theorists to ignore the difficult prob- The combination of authoritarian control lem of identifying deliberative influence and deliberative mechanisms is not as par- under authoritarian circumstances. To be adoxical as it might seem once we sort out sure, authoritarian regimes are, on aver- our terms of analysis. Among other things, age, unfriendly to deliberative approaches democracy involves the inclusion of indi- to conflict. Decision-making is closed and viduals in matters that potentially affect strict limits are placed on spaces of pub- them, realized through equal distributions lic discourse, such as the press, publish- of empowerments in votes, the opportunity ing houses, the Internet, advocacy groups, for voice, and related rights. Deliberation is and universities. Authoritarian rulers typi- a mode of communication involving argu- cally command; they do not invite the peo- ment and reasoning that generate persua- ple to deliberate. sion-based influence. In many ways, “de- Yet democracy is contingently, rath- liberation” requires “democracy.” Good er than necessarily, linked to deliberative

146 (3) Summer 2017 159 Authoritarian Table 1 Deliberation The Number of Official Documents on Public Hearings in Selected Years, 2001–2016 in China

Year 2001 2005 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Number of 193 945 1,282 1,389 1,833 1,645 1,533 1,426 1,457 1,523 1,476 Documents

Source: Data compiled using Peking University Law Database, Beida Fabao. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/155/1830989/daed_a_00454.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 devices and mechanisms. In theory, de- to the communication: the addressees are liberation can occur under authoritarian persuaded by the claims put to them. conditions when rulers decide to use it as Democracy, in many ways, favors per- a means to acquire information by which suasive influence over other ways of get- to form policies and to gain approval from ting things done, but its root meaning is those affected without giving up powers of rule by the people. Democracy empowers decision. To identify the theoretical possi- those potentially affected by collective de- bility of deliberative politics under author- cisions so they can influence those deci- itarian conditions, we define deliberation sions. The standard means of empower- as a persuasive influence generated by the ment include the rights and opportunities give and take of reasons. Here we follow to vote for political representatives in com- the sociologist Talcott Parsons’s concep- petitive elections and, on occasion, to vote tion of influence as “the capacity to bring directly for policies, as in the case of refer- about desired decisions on the part of the enda or town meetings. In addition, dem- other social units without directly offering ocratic means of empowerment include them a valued quid pro quo as an induce- representative oversight and accountabili- ment or threatening them with deleterious ty bodies; the rights to speak, write, and be consequences.”10 Thus, we understand de- heard; rights to information about public liberation broadly as any act of communi- matters; rights to associate for the purpos- cation that motivates others through per- es of representation, petition, and protest; suasion “without a quid pro quo”: that is, and due process rights against the state and in ways that are not reducible to threats or other powerful bodies.12 coercion, economic incentives, or sanc- Such empowerments can, of course, be tions based on tradition or religion, nor, we highly institutionalized as part of competi- would add, the result of deceit or manipula- tive electoral systems. But democratic em- tion. Persuasion, in this sense, can include powerments can also appear more gener- bargains and negotiations, assuming that ically in nonelectoral contexts. For exam- the procedures can be justified by reference ple, freedom of information legislation in to claims to fairness or other normative va- virtually all the developed democracies en- lidity claims.11 In contrast, commands are ables citizens to monitor public bureaucra- backed by implied threats, quid pro quos, or cies within the appointed parts of the po- the authority of position or tradition. Com- litical system. mands convey information, but the motiva- tion for obeying the command is extrinsic to Although both democratic and authori- the communication. Deliberation, in con- tarian regimes make use of persuasive influ- trast, generates motivations that are intrinsic ence, in a democracy, citizens usually have

160 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences the powers necessary to introduce delibera- agencies exist, there is no effective sepa- Baogang He tive claims into almost any issue at any lev- ration of power within governments and & Mark E. el of government. In authoritarian regimes, no independent oversight bodies (except Warren political elites decide the subject and place where the judicial system operates with in- of deliberative processes. In China, elites creasing autonomy).14 Under President Xi, constrain public deliberation to the prob- discussion of “constitutional” or “liberal” lems of governance they choose; they seek democracy is forbidden. The Chinese state to avoid spillover into nonapproved arenas still maintains a Leninist political structure. and topics. Despite regime control over the Democracy, Premier Wen Jiabao remarked domains and agendas of public delibera- about ten years ago, is “one hundred years tion, Chinese citizens have limited kinds away”–possible only when China becomes Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/155/1830989/daed_a_00454.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 of democratic empowerments within spe- a “mature socialist system.”15 cific domains of governance, ranging from Thus, although we agree with political the negative powers of protest and obstruc- scientist Minxin Pei’s observation that de- tion to the positive powers of some kinds of mocratic change has stalled in China and voice (in organized deliberative forums), is now likely reversed at the regime level, citizen rights (like property rights), ac- when we look below the regime level, countability (like the right to vote on the where we would normally expect democ- performance of village officials), and vot- ratization, we find significant changes in ing (like village elections, intraparty elec- governance, producing a regime that com- tions, and some direct voting for policies). bines authoritarian control of agendas with In China, public deliberations 1) are usually just enough democratization to enable con- more local than national; 2) favor issues re- trolled deliberation.16 While many estab- lated to municipal governance and econom- lished democracies are seeing the emer- ic performance; and 3) channel demand gence of governance-level deliberative bo- into Party-controlled forms of represen- dies–China is not unique in this respect17– tation. These limited governance-focused what distinguishes China is that these empowerments do not add up to regime de- modes of participation are evolving in the mocratization. Rather, they contribute to absence of regime-level democratization. an overall pattern of authoritarian deliberation by empowering some domain-limited Why would elites in an authoritarian re- and scope-limited forms of voice. They also gime decide to devise and encourage new produce functioning pockets of democra- deliberative practices and institute any cy constrained by geographical scope, poli- low-level democracy, even a highly con- cy, and modes of representation.13 The constrained version? We should not rule out junction of these resources with domain normative motivations embedded in po- constraints maps the spaces of authoritar- litical culture. The post-Maoist, neo-Con- ian deliberation that have been emerging fucian culture of China imposes moral re- in China. sponsibilities on elites that are not trivial.18 China lacks, of course, the major insti- But even where such motivations exist, they tutions of electoral democracy, such as in- would need to correspond with the strate- dependent political organizations, autono- gic interests of powerful elites and with es- mous public spheres, independent oversight tablished institutions in order for such prac- and separations of powers, open-agenda tices to evolve. From a strategic perspective, meetings, and, most notably, multiparty the ccp is gambling that opening some con- elections. Although divisions of power strained participatory spaces will channel among layers of government and between political demand into venues the Party can

146 (3) Summer 2017 161 Authoritarian control, containing popular protest and de- Party members with senior positions and Deliberation mands for regime-level democratization. privileges. But simply owing to their num- in China Behind this gamble is a functionalist sto- bers, neither the exit nor the loyalty strategy ry, which, in its broad outlines, is common can be applied to the hundreds of millions to developing contexts. The strategic condi- of ordinary Chinese citizens who are quite tions for deliberative experimentation were capable of collective forms of dissent. Sup- probably the result of decisions in the late pression is always possible and is used selec- 1970s to justify the continuing rule of the tively against those dissidents who have po- ccp as necessary for economic develop- litically mobilized potential or capacity but, ment, in the face of disintegrating ideologi- as with all overtly coercive tactics, overuse

cal justifications. Opening China to market- produces diminishing returns. In the case Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/155/1830989/daed_a_00454.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 oriented development introduced three of China, suppression risks undermining conditions under which deliberation could the growing openness that supports its de- become necessary to maintain ccp rule: 1) velopment agenda, as well as drawing inter- increasing complexity of governance; 2) in- national attention that may also have eco- creasing numbers of veto players as a conse- nomic consequences. Thus, voice is the re- quence of pluralized control over economic maining option for controlling dissent and resources; and 3) changing popular expecta- maintaining order. tions, especially within the growing middle Second, deliberative mechanisms can class, driven by increasing levels of educa- produce information about society and pol- tion and contact with the West. So although icy, thus helping to avoid mistakes in gov- popular deliberative influence may be most ernance. Authoritarian regimes face a di- reliably generated under democratic condi- lemma with regard to information: Under tions, elites may have incentives to generate conditions of rapid development, authori- deliberative influence even without the in- tarian methods are often at odds with the centives provided by democratic empow- information resources necessary to govern. erments. As economist Albert Hirschman Elites need information not only about op- famously noted, the limited options for exit erational and administrative matters, but under one party rule are more likely to in- also about the preferences of citizens and crease internal pressures for voice.19 other actors. Command-based methods, These functional demands do not entirely however, limit communication and ex- explain authoritarian deliberative respons- pression, while increasing the incentives for es. But they do suggest a series of hypothe- subordinates to acquire and leverage infor- ses as to why authoritarian regimes might mation. Controlled deliberation is one re- adopt deliberative mechanisms. sponse to this dilemma. First, and arguably most important, de- Third, deliberation can provide forums liberative mechanisms can co-opt dissent for business in a marketizing economy. In and maintain social order. In the context China, market-style economic develop- of Hirschman’s typology of exit, voice, and ment is greatly increasing the number and loyalty, the ccp faces functional limits with independence of business stakeholders two of the three possible means of con- with independent economic control over trolling dissent. Currently, the ccp controls not only new investment, but also tax pay- much high-profile political dissent with an ments, which can make up the bulk of rev- exit strategy, allowing dissidents to emi- enues for many local governments.20 Pres- grate to the United States and other coun- sures for deliberation thus often come from tries to minimize their domestic impact. In- an increasingly strong business sector. Con- ternally, the ccp purchases the loyalty of sultations among public and private inter-

162 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences ests have become increasingly institution- rule of the ccp, producing a new form of au- Baogang He alized–a process reminiscent of the origins thoritarianism and 2) deliberative influence & Mark E. of many legislative assemblies in England tends to undermine the power of authori- Warren and Europe, in which the middle classes tarian command, thus serving as a vector of bargained with their monarchs for liberty democratization. These two tendencies are and political voice in exchange for their tax currently bridged by limiting the scope and revenues.21 domain of both deliberation and democra- Fourth, public deliberative processes can cy so they can coexist with regime-level au- protect officials from charges of corruption thoritarianism. In the short term, we expect by increasing credible transparency. When deliberative authoritarianism to prevail. But local government revenues depend on busi- deliberation-led democratization could be Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/155/1830989/daed_a_00454.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 ness, officials are usually regarded as cor- a longer-term possibility. rupt, and not only by the public, but often With the first possibility–deliberative by their superiors as well. Officials can learn authoritarianism–deliberative influence to use transparent and inclusive delibera- will increasingly function to stabilize au- tive decision-making to avoid or at least re- thoritarian rule.23 Under this scenario, au- duce accusations that their decisions have thoritarian political resources are used to been bought by developers and other busi- mobilize deliberative mechanisms. Delib- ness elites.22 erative influence is constricted in scope and Fifth, in situations in which decisions are agenda, and removed from political move- difficult and inflict losses, deliberative pro- ments and independent political organiza- cesses enable leaders to shift responsibili- tions. Deliberative experiments are local- ty onto the process and thus avoid blame. ized and skillfully managed so as to prevent In China, the elites are recognizing that “I them from expanding beyond particular decide” implies “I take responsibility.” But policy areas, levels of government, or re- “we decide” implies that the citizens are also gions. By this logic, if deliberation is suc- responsible, thus providing (legitimate) po- cessful at demobilizing opposition and gen- litical cover for officials who have to make erating administrative capacity, it could tough decisions. enable the ccp to avoid regime-level de- In summary, deliberative processes can mocratization. Authoritarian rule would generate legitimacy when ideological sourc- undergo some important transformations, es of legitimacy are declining for the ccp, but these would fall far short of regime-level and development-oriented policies are democratization. The current nascent form creating winners and losers. Legitimacy of deliberative authoritarianism in China is a political resource that even authoritar- would develop into a more consistent and ian regimes must accumulate to reduce the sophisticated type of rule, under which costs of conflict and enforcement. cruder exercises of power would be gradually replaced with more limited, subtle, and Our argument so far has been that the ap- effective forms. Political legitimacy would parently puzzling combination of author- be produced by means of deliberative con- itarian rule and deliberative devices and sultations, locale by locale and policy by mechanisms is conceptually possible and policy, as a complement to the kind of per- empirically extant in the Chinese case. Yet formance legitimacy that depends on con- the Chinese case also highlights two very tinuing economic development. different possible developmental trajecto- With the second possibility, contemplat- ries of deliberative authoritarianism: 1) de- ed by an increasing number of Chinese in- liberative politics effectively strengthen the tellectuals and local officials, deliberative

146 (3) Summer 2017 163 Authoritarian institutions developing within authoritar- citizen expectations. So too, democratic Deliberation ian ones will gradually democratize the re- institutions are easier for regimes to ini- in China gime. New institutions would overlay old tiate than to retract. Once the state grants ones for the intended purpose of enhanc- the people voice and rights, they become ing their effectiveness but, at the same part of the culture of expectations and time, would also transform their character transform supplicants into citizens. in democratic directions.24 If this trajecto- Third, deliberation tends toward insti- ry were to materialize, it would be unique: tutionalized decision-making procedures. we know of no examples of regime democ- The more deliberation is regularized, the ratization as a consequence of progressive- greater the pressures for it not to be dis-

ly institutionalized deliberation. It is, never- continued. Trends toward institutionaliza- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/155/1830989/daed_a_00454.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 theless, a possibility. Although democracy tion can be driven by elite desires to retain and deliberation are distinct phenomena, control of political demand by channeling they are, as we have pointed out, structur- it into scope-specific and domain-specific ally related. Democratic empowerments– venues. But they can also be driven by cit- such as the rights of voting, association, izen expectations that, once established, and free speech–provide the space with- elites will find difficult to reverse. in which persuasion, argument, opinion, Fourth and finally, the logic of delibera- and demonstration can form preferences, tive inclusion eventually leads to voting. Po- enable negotiated bargains, and produce litical elites in China often refer to the rela- consensus. Democracy enables delibera- tionship between deliberation and consen- tion. But can deliberation enable democ- sual decision-making. This relationship is racy? Possibly. Deliberation provides legit- consistent with authoritarian deliberation. imacy only if it has the space and inclusive- Yet when interests conflict, even after delib- ness to generate actual influence.25 Under eration, elites may find it difficult to claim this scenario, four mechanisms could re- that their preferred decisions are the result sult in transformations in the form of rule. of “consensus,” thus eroding the legitima- First, deliberative legitimacy tends to- cy of command authoritarianism. It is in- ward the inclusion of all the people affect- creasingly common for leaders in China to ed by it. When other sources of legitimacy respond to deliberation that results in the fail–ideology, traditional deference, or eco- clarification of conflict by holding votes in a nomic benefits–deliberation provides an public meeting, by submitting decisions to alternative means of generating legitimacy. the community via referenda, or by defer- However, this legitimacy is “usable” by the ring to voting by the deputies of local peo- state only when 1) those whose cooperation ple’s congresses. the state requires are included in the deliberations, either directly or through repre- Our argument should not be viewed as sentation mechanisms, and 2) the partic- a prediction that if China democratizes, it ipants believe they have had influence. As will be governance-driven and delibera- the methods of obstruction (both rights- tion-led. Our argument is both more mod- based and protest-based) and exit are wide- est and speculative: by conceptualizing au- ly available in China, elites have incentives thoritarian deliberation and exemplifying to expand empowerments to those affect- its existence in China, we identify a poten- ed by policies so as to enable more engaged, tial trajectory of democratization that is less disruptive interactions with citizens. conceptually possible and normatively sig- Second, experiences of consultative and nificant. By distinguishing between demo- deliberative engagement tend to change cratic empowerments and deliberative in-

164 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences fluence, we can focus on the legitimacy- and toward the transformative practices Baogang He producing capacities of deliberation. In out of which democratic innovations arise, & Mark E. so doing, we hope to push the democratic wherever they might develop. Warren imagination beyond familiar institutions

endnotes * Contributor Biographies: BAOGANG HE is the Alfred Deakin Professor and Chair in International Relations at Deakin University, Australia. He is the author of In Search of a People-Centric Order in Asia

(2016), Contested Ideas of Regionalism in Asia (2016), and Governing Taiwan and Tibet: Democratic Approaches Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/155/1830989/daed_a_00454.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 (2015). MARK E. WARREN is the Harold and Dorrie Merilees Chair in the Study of Democracy at The University of British Columbia, Canada. He is the author of Democracy and Association (2001) and coeditor of The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy (forthcoming) and Designing Deliberative Democracy (with Hilary Pearse, 2008). Authors’ Note: This essay updates and builds on the arguments in Baogang He and Mark E. Warren, “Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political Develop- ment,” Perspectives on Politics 9 (2) (2011): 269–289. 1 Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Garry Rodan and Kanishka Jayasuriya, “Beyond Hybrid Regimes: More Participation, Less Contestation in Southeast Asia,” Democratization 14 (5) (2007): 773–794; and Larry Dia- mond, “Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democ- racy 13 (2) (2002): 21–35. 2 Baogang He, “Participatory and Deliberative Institutions in China,” in The Search for Deliber- ative Democracy in China, ed. Ethan Leib and Baogang He (New York: Palgrave, 2006); Man- oranjan Mohanty, George Mathew, Richard Baum, and Rong Ma, eds., Grassroots Democra- cy in India and China (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2007); Andrew J. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy 14 (1) (2003): 6–17; and Suzanne Ogden, In- klings of Democracy in China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002). 3 Leib and He, eds., The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China; Shangli Lin, “Deliberative Pol- itics: A Reflection on the Democratic Development of China,” Academic Monthly (Shanghai) 4 (2003): 19–25; He, “Participatory and Deliberative Institutions”; and Ogden, Inklings of De- mocracy. 4 Mark E. Warren, “Governance-Driven Democratization,” in Practices of Freedom: Decentred Governance, Conflict and Democratic Participation, ed. Steven Griggs, Aletta J. Norval, and Hendrik Wagenaar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 38–59. 5 See Gerald E. Frug, “Administrative Democracy,” The University of Toronto Law Journal 40 (3) (1990): 559–586; and Carl J. Bellone and George Frederick Goerl, “Reconciling Public Entre- preneurship and Democracy,” Public Administration Review 52 (2) (1992): 130–134. 6 James Fishkin, Baogang He, Bob Ruskin, and Alice Siu, “Deliberative Democracy in an Unlike- ly Place: Deliberative Polling in China,” British Journal of Political Science 40 (2) (2010): 435–448. 7 Fuguo Han and Kaiping Zhang, “Self-Interest versus Altruism: Deliberative Participatory Budgeting in Urban China,” working paper, 2016. 8 Baogang He, “Deliberative Democracy and Deliberative Governance: Towards Constructing a Rational and Mature Civil Society,” Open Times 4 (2012): 23–36. 9 James Bohman, “Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy,” Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (4) (1998): 400–425; Simone Chambers, “Deliberative Democracy The- ory,” Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003): 307–326; Joshua Cohen, “Procedure and Sub-

146 (3) Summer 2017 165 Authoritarian stance in Deliberative Democracy,” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Deliberation Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 95–119; Amy in China Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: The mit Press, 1996); Mark E. Warren, “Deliberative Democracy,” in Democratic Theory Today: Challenges for the 21st Century, ed. April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); and Mark E. Warren, “Democracy and the State,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory, ed. John Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 382–399. 10 Talcott Parsons, The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 14. 11 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms; and Mark E. Warren and Jane Mansbridge, “Deliberative

Negotiation,” in Political Negotiation: A Handbook, ed. Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Jo Martin Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/3/155/1830989/daed_a_00454.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 141–196. 12 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998). 13 Baogang He, “Participatory and Deliberative Institutions in China,” in Leib and He, eds., The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China. 14 Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March toward Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 15 Scott McDonald, “Wen: China Democracy 100 Years Off,” Time Magazine, March 1, 2007, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1594010,00.html. See also Bruce Gilley, China’s Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead (New York: Columbia Uni- versity Press, 2004). 16 Baogang He, Rural Democracy in China (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007), chap. 13. 17 Archon Fung, “Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance,” Public Administration Re- view 66 (1) (2006): 66–75; and Warren, “Governance-Driven Democratization.” 18 Baogang He, “Four Models of the Relationship between Confucianism and Democracy,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 37 (1) (2010): 18–33; and Baogang He, “Deliberative Culture and Politics: The Persistence of Authoritarian Deliberation in China,” Political Theory 42 (1) (2014): 58–81. 19 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 83–85. 20 Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Gilley, China’s Democratic Future. 21 Robert H. Bates, “The Economics of Transitions to Democracy,” PS: Political Science and Poli- tics 24 (1) (1991): 24–27. 22 He, “Participatory and Deliberative Institutions in China.” 23 See Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience”; and Aviezer Tucker, “Pre-Emptive Democracy: Oli- garchic Tendencies in Deliberative Democracy,” Political Studies 56 (1) (2008): 127–147. 24 See Ogden, Inklings of Democracy, 257; and Kathleen Thelen, “How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis,” in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 25 John S. Dryzek, “Democratization as Deliberative Capacity Building,” Comparative Political Studies 42 (11) (2009): 1379–1402.

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