Sebastian Law Best Dissertation Prize Winner MSc Political Science and Political Economy 2017-8
[email protected] Ballot-Structure and Corruption: A Natural Experiment from French Municipal Elections A dissertation submitted to the Department of Gov-ernment, the London School of Economics and Political Sci-ence, in part completion of the requirements for the MSc in Po-litical Science and Political Economy August, 2018 Word count: 9,932 Abstract Electoral reforms continue to be a highly debated topic in many democracies. However, although great progress has been made in recent years, our knowledge of the effects of var- ious institutional specifications remain unsatisfactory. Importantly, there is a lacuna to be bridged with regards to our knowledge of the specific causal mechanisms through which electoral systems influence levels of corruption. This paper contributes to the literature by utilising a rare natural experiment in small French municipalities. It uses a regression discontinuity design and examines the effect of closed- and open-list ballots in local elec- tions on the probability of corruption in municipal councils in France. Municipalities with populations equal to or larger than 3,500 are required to use a closed-list proportional- representation (PR) system, while municipalities with less than 3,500 inhabitants are pre- scribed an open-list plurality system. I take advantage of this population threshold to test the theoretical prediction made by Persson and Tabellini (2000) that voting for a closed lists rather than an open list should attenuate incumbents’ incentives to signal competence and so increase rent extraction relative to open-list elections.