IVE NN RSA NEGOTIATING AND th A R 0 Y IMPLEMENTING THE 1 LAND CLAIMS AGREEMENT NUNAVUT 1 Terry Fenge and Paul Quassa 0 e E A IR NN RSA Paul Quassa and Terry Fenge, chief negotiator and research director, respectively, of IVE the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut, which negotiated the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, recall how “who were enfranchised federally only in 1960 and who were largely seminomadic until the early to mid-1960s and had very few formally educated leaders,” successfully negotiated a modern treaty “that literally changed forever the face of Canada.” They identify pressing and unresolved problems in implementing this agreement and other modern treaties, and conclude that a formal policy is needed to ensure that federal agencies fulfill their implementation obligations and responsibilities.

Paul Quassa, négociateur en chef des revendications territoriales des de 1989 à 1993, et Terry Fenge, alors directeur de la recherche à la Fédération Tungavik du Nunavut, l’organisme chargé de négocier ces revendications, se remémorent les étapes clés des négociations ayant mené à la création du Nunavut, puis recensent les obstacles qu’il reste à franchir pour assurer la pleine mise en œuvre de l’Accord. Puisant à leur expérience personnelle, ils décrivent comment un peuple « qui n’a obtenu le droit de vote qu’en 1960, qui était encore en bonne partie semi-nomade au milieu de cette décennie et qui ne comptait alors qu’une poignée de leaders dûment instruits » a négocié avec succès un traité moderne « qui a littéralement et à jamais changé le visage du Canada ».

n April 1, 2009, Nunavut Commissioner Ann recognizing the inherent right of Aboriginal self-govern- Meekitjuk Hanson laid out the legislative priorities ment and permitted this topic to be addressed in compre- O and vision of the government of Nunavut in hensive land claims negotiations. Tamapta, an ambitious document whose title literally trans- Notwithstanding the unresolved national debate lates as “all of us.” Speaking almost 16 years after ratifica- about Aboriginal self-government, the lack of supportive tion of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (hereafter the precedents and numerous policy obstacles, Inuit refused to Nunavut Agreement), which promised to establish countenance an agreement that separated land rights and Nunavut, and on the 10th anniversary of the formal creation political development. Reflecting their overwhelming of the territory with its own territorial government, she majority status in the eastern Arctic, Inuit conceived the noted: “In building Nunavut, the challenges have some- Nunavut project as a combination of land rights and self- times been as daunting as the opportunities have been government, through division of the promising.” Quite so. (NWT), to establish a Nunavut territory with its own pub- When the Nunavut land claim was negotiated in the lic government. 1970s and 1980s, Inuit and the Government of Canada dis- The 25-year Nunavut campaign involved negotiation, agreed on whether and how political development should litigation, political action, community consultation, be included. At the same time, Aboriginal self-government appeals to the Canadian public, two NWT-wide plebiscites was discussed in three constitutional conferences that failed on the concept of dividing the NWT and on the actual to establish in the newly patriated Canadian constitution dividing line, an Inuit-wide ratification vote in 1992 and the right of Aboriginal peoples to govern themselves. It was parliamentary votes in 1993. Pursuant to article 4 of the not until 1995, two years after the Nunavut Agreement was Nunavut Agreement, the Government of Nunavut came ratified, that the Government of Canada adopted a policy into being on April 1, 1999.

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Behind these dry facts are numer- With the establishment in 1971 of most of British Columbia, the territo- ous and often very colourful personal- Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) as a rial North, northern Quebec and ities, federal policies on northern national advocacy organization for Labrador. Hydro-Québec’s plans for political development ignored or cir- Inuit and of regional Inuit associa- massive hydro development in the cumvented, appeals to national pride tions by the mid-1970s, Inuit in northern portion of the province pre- and conscience, and significant inter- northern Quebec, Labrador, the east- cipitated fast-tracking of the negotia- est on the part of the press in Canada ern Arctic of the NWT and the tion of the James Bay and Northern and in the United States and Europe. It Beaufort Sea had political institutions Quebec Agreement with Inuit and Cree, which was concluded Several of the Inuit who in the 1970s initiated the Inuit land in 1975. claims “movement” and the Nunavut project first met in It was in this broad and Churchill during a period of national and international rapidly evolving political and legal context that the ferment that gave rise to Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” original Nunavut proposal and Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s “Just Society.” was prepared by ITC in 1975. Negotiations with the is no exaggeration to say that the and were able to make coherent Government of Canada were slow and Nunavut project changed the map of demands to the governments of hesitant; the parties had very different Canada and the perception of many of Canada, Quebec, and Newfoundland views as to the scope, intent and pre- the nature of the country. and Labrador. The 1973 Calder deci- ferred outcome of the exercise. To Ten years after the creation of sion by the Supreme Court of Canada speed up the process, the mandate to Nunavut, it is interesting to recall the on the land rights of Nisga’a in British negotiate the Nunavut land claim was key steps taken to get there and the Columbia prompted the Government withdrawn from ITC in 1982 and given obstacles remaining on the road to the of Canada to renew negotiation of to a newly established Inuit organiza- successful implementation of the treaties with Aboriginal peoples whose tion, the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut Agreement. title to land had not been superseded Nunavut (TFN), created for the sole by law or ceded to the Crown through purpose of negotiating a modern treaty n his recently published biogra- historic treaties, which was the case in with the Government of Canada. I phy, John Amagoalik, who for many years was intimately involved in the Nunavut project, recounts BOX 1. SUMMARY OF INUIT RIGHTS AND BENEFITS DEFINED IN THE NUNAVUT how in the 1960s many young Inuit AGREEMENT were taken from their families to be educated at the Vocational Institute • Right to harvest wildlife throughout • Fee simple ownership of approxi- in Churchill, Manitoba. Several of the settlement area based upon need mately 352,000 square kilometres of the Inuit who in the 1970s initiated and regardless of land ownership land (16.5 percent of the settlement the Inuit land claims “movement” • Representation on the Nunavut area), of which nearly 37,000 square and the Nunavut project first met in Wildlife Management Board, a new kilometres includes the subsurface Churchill during a period of nation- instrument of public government to • A share of federal royalties resulting al and international ferment that manage wildlife in the settlement area from the development of Crown gave rise to Lyndon Johnson’s “Great • Compensation if development affects land and natural resources Society” and Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s the Inuit hunting-based economy • The right to negotiate impact and ben- “Just Society.” • Three national parks and provisions efit agreements with would-be devel- For many Inuit this was the first governing the establishment and opers of subsurface resources on land time they had stood up for, defended management of additional national where Inuit own the surface estate and advocated their Aboriginal rights. and territorial parks and conserva- • Cash compensation totalling $1.14 The newly educated and increasingly tion areas billion, to be paid over 14 years politically active Inuit leadership • Representation on a new system of • Assistance in accessing government rejected Jean Chrétien’s 1969 White boards to manage and plan for the contracts Paper proposing assimilation of development of land and water • The establishment of a social devel- Aboriginal people into the larger and to evaluate the impact of opment council Canadian collective. They saw the development • Recognition of the Inuit role in pre- 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement • The exclusive right to use water on, in serving and displaying the Inuit Act as a more appropriate model for or flowing through Inuit-owned land archaeological heritage Inuit and Arctic Canada.

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Negotiations continued through cessfully navigated the conditions, The promise in article 4 of the the 1980s, with a hiatus in 1985 and particularly the territory-wide bound- Nunavut Agreement to create the new 1986 that resulted in the federal cabi- ary plebiscite, the Nunavut project territory was complemented by article net approving substantial changes to would gain considerable, perhaps 23, which aims to “increase Inuit par- the comprehensive land claims policy unstoppable political momentum and ticipation in government employ- under which the negotiations were public support. This is precisely what ment in the Nunavut Settlement Area conducted. An agreement in principle happened. to a representative level.” Inuit form was signed in in April 1990, Article 4 of the 1993 final agree- approximately 85 percent of the pop- and the final agreement was signed in ment was quite explicit in stating: ulation of Nunavut, and this article Iqaluit on May 25, 1993, and ratified “The Government of Canada will rec- promises that at some future but by Parliament only weeks later. ommend to Parliament as a govern- unspecified date they will enjoy 85 The 42 articles and nearly 300 ment measure, legislation to establish, percent of the government positions pages of the Nunavut Agreement, within a defined time period, a new in the territory. This objective has which is a comprehensive land claims Nunavut Territory, with its own generated considerable comment. agreement or modern treaty, define Legislative Assembly and public gov- the terms and conditions of an ernment, separate from the ow did it prove possible for Inuit, exchange. In return for the rights and Government of the remainder of the H who were enfranchised federally benefits defined in the agreement, Northwest Territories.” only in 1960 and who were largely Inuit agreed to cede, release and sur- This article also provides for TFN, semi-nomadic until the early to mid- render to the Crown in Right of the Government of Canada and the 1960s and had very few formally edu- Canada all their claims, rights, titles Government of NWT to negotiate a cated leaders, to negotiate a modern and interests to land and waters in political accord on the timing of the treaty with the Government of Canada the settlement area, and vouched establishment of Nunavut and the that addressed land rights and political never to undertake legal action based powers and financing of the new gov- development and that literally on those claims, rights, title and ernment. Unlike the other provisions changed forever the face of Canada? interests. As a result, the Government of the Nunavut Agreement, however, Drawing upon our personal experience of Canada obtained legal certainty of this article was not accorded consti- in the negotiations, we offer the fol- ownership of land and natural tutional protection enabling the lowing explanations. resources in more than 20 percent of Government of Canada to continue G Inuit politicians and negotiators the country, enabling it to issue to to claim that its policy distinguishing were consistent in their vision for third parties unencumbered rights to land rights from political develop- the future and displayed patience develop those resources. The Inuit of Nunavut How did it prove possible for Inuit, who were enfranchised obtained a wide variety of federally only in 1960 and who were largely semi-nomadic constitutionally protected until the early to mid-1960s and had very few formally rights and benefits, which are summarized in box 1. educated leaders, to negotiate a modern treaty with the Government of Canada that addressed land rights and rticle 4 of the 1990 political development and that literally changed forever the A Nunavut agreement in face of Canada? principle affirms the “sup- port in principle” of Canada and the ment remained intact. Be that as it and tenacity in their demands to NWT for the establishment of may, the narrow “win” by Inuit in achieve this future. Nunavut, but “outside the claims the May 1992 NWT-wide plebiscite G Inuit politicians representing the process.” It also includes a commit- on the division boundary, the politi- three regions of Nunavut — Kitik- ment to hold a territory-wide cal accord agreed to in early 1993 and meot, Baffin and Keewatin — plebiscite on the boundary and to the formal ratification by Inuit and remained united throughout the negotiate an agreement on the divi- the Parliament of Canada of the negotiations, including when sion of powers. This was the first time Nunavut Agreement later that same there were tensions and uncertain- that political development was year opened the way for the estab- ty over drawing the boundary to addressed in cold, hard type in a com- lishment of the Nunavut Implemen- separate the Inuit and Dene land prehensive land claims instrument, tation Commission to plan the claims settlement areas that could albeit not a final agreement. In hind- creation of the new government, have resulted in the regions being sight, this was a major step forward which was formally established on split into sub-Nunavut, regional for Inuit. TFN was aware that if it suc- April 1, 1999. settlements.

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G There were close and coopera- ttawa’s close attention was the part of key federal politicians tive relations between staff, O required if the Nunavut project (although this is difficult to evalu- many of whom were kabloona was to move in a reasonable amount ate). David Crombie, for example, (white), and Inuit politicians of time from an agreement in princi- was a keen Nunavut supporter during and negotiators. ple to a final agreement. In that his tenure from 1984 to 1986 as min- G The parties were willing to com- sense, the collapse of the ister of Indian affairs and northern promise on issues the Govern- Dene/Métis Final Agreement in 1990 development. His successor, Bill ment of Canada considered to be probably assisted Inuit in that it McKnight, obtained cabinet approval matters of principle, such as the brought the Nunavut project to cen- for reforms to the land claims policy Crown retaining title to most of tre stage at a time when policy-mak- that were first proposed by Crombie, the subsurface, and the boundary ers in Ottawa needed to provide including the application of provi- separating the Inuit and Dene direction on the issue of political sions to the offshore, without which land claims settlement areas. development. the Nunavut Agreement could not G A forward-looking and practical We suggest, as well, that the have been finalized. approach was adopted that aimed Government of Canada’s negotiators Tom Siddon, another Indian to avoid embarrassing the Gov- approached their task with profes- affairs and northern development ernment of Canada for minister, signed the Nunavut past mistakes, such as the agreement in principle in involuntary relocation of We suggest, as well, that the Igloolik in April 1990. Seeking Inuit from northern Que- Government of Canada’s negotiators to build connections with bec to the High Arctic approached their task with him, Inuit leaders took him islands in the 1950s, but professionalism, diligence and and his spouse out on the rather to use negotiations land, where they slept on cari- to plan a positive future creativity. While ministers of Indian bou skins in an iglu on the sea for Inuit within the Cana- affairs and northern development ice. On his return, he had sup- dian framework. Inuit sug- came and went during the 1980s, per with Inuit leaders and told gested they were joining the federal chief negotiator, Tom them that they could count Canada at a time when on his ongoing support for many in Quebec said they Molloy, a Saskatoon-based lawyer, their project. He was still min- wanted to leave. and the senior negotiator, Barry ister in 1993, and he personal- G The focus was concentrat- Dewar, a career civil servant, stayed ly called Prime Minister Brian ed on the Nunavut project with the process for years, providing Mulroney to recommend that through the establish- the Government of Canada ment of TFN, whose man- continuity and corporate memory support both the land rights date and sole purpose was that spanned the governments of and the political development to negotiate an agreement different political persuasions. provisions of the final agree- with the Government of ment. In 2005 he told one of Canada. the co-authors of this article G There was a willingness and ability sionalism, diligence and creativity. of the importance of this experience to draft provisions and respond While ministers of Indian affairs and on the land and of his deep respect quickly to the positions of the northern development came and for the Inuit leaders, negotiators and Government of Canada in order to went during the 1980s, the federal elders. Clearly, personal relations “drive” the negotiating process. chief negotiator, Tom Molloy, a count for something in the world of G Relatively few third-party rights Saskatoon-based lawyer, and the sen- policy, legislation and negotiations. and interests to land and natu- ior negotiator, Barry Dewar, a career Many urban Canadians who ral resources were subject to civil servant, stayed with the process have never been to the North have a negotiation. for years, providing continuity and positive or stereotypical image of G The process was aided by the fact corporate memory that spanned gov- Inuit that, in a very general sense, that in 1986 the Government of ernments of different political persua- supported the Inuit intent to negoti- Canada adopted a Comprehensive sions. On the ratification of the ate an agreement on land rights and Land Claims Policy that broad- Nunavut Agreement, Molloy correctly political development. Inuit leaders ened the rights and benefits and characterized the agreement as an characterized themselves as proud narrowed the requirement to cede “achievement shared.” Canadians who support Canada’s Aboriginal title through negotiat- The Nunavut project also bene- Arctic sovereignty, which con- ed agreements. fited from personal commitment on tributed to this image. Indeed, the

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Inuit contribution to Canada’s ral resources, and to identify who “substantially complete,” 46 were Arctic sovereignty is referred to in should do what to implement specific “partially complete” and 49 were the preamble to the Nunavut obligations, negotiators had to invent “largely unmet.” These bald figures Agreement. In short, if the the assumptions upon which to base tell only part of the story. Relatively Government of Canada could not financial forecasts and commitments. simple, one-off tasks such as the conclude an agreement with Inuit — The very breadth and conceptual transferral of cash compensation and proud Canadians who stood up for ambition of the agreement has creat- land to Inuit had been carried out on Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic — ed implementation challenges. Huge time, but the review reports signifi- with whom could it do so? changes were required in educational cant problems in the implementation infrastructure to enable Inuit to of “softer” obligations that require he implementation of the develop the skills that are needed so innovative, coordinated action on the T Nunavut Agreement raises issues they can assume the implementation part of federal agencies. The review and challenges that are very different positions in newly established Inuit team reports “a pattern of missed deadlines and slow starts, a The renegotiation and renewal of the implementation lot of unproductive and contract to cover the period 2003 to 2013 has proved painful extended discussions, and unsuccessful, leading some to suggest that the backsliding on obligations, loss of corporate memory Government of Canada had virtually lost interest in and capacity, and the con- implementing the Nunavut Agreement and was sumption of resources concentrating on negotiations elsewhere. without a full result.” The report recommended that from those faced in negotiating it. In institutions, resource management the Nunavut Implementation Panel the Government of Canada’s Compre- boards and the government of be reinvigorated, and it urged the par- hensive Land Claims Policy there is Nunavut. It is sobering to recall that ties to agree on the panel’s “central only one sentence on implementation, in order to attain a degree or a pro- role in managing the implementation which requires that an implementa- fessional qualification, with the effort.” But from a standing start this tion plan be in place upon ratification exception of those for a few profes- was, perhaps, a mildly encouraging of settlements. We can attest from per- sional programs such as nursing, beginning. sonal involvement that implementa- people in Nunavut still have to go The second independent review, tion was rarely discussed during the south to attend university. Standards which deals with implementation negotiation of the agreement. in primary and secondary schools in from 1999 to 2004, was published in The implementation provisions of Nunavut are still well behind the 2006. It reports a number of accom- the final agreement provide for a national average, and the drop-out plishments, such as the “inclusive Nunavut Implementation Panel of fed- rate is well above the national norm. drafting” of legislation to implement eral, territorial and Inuit re- presentatives, which is to Relatively simple, one-off tasks such as the transferral of cash “oversee and provide direc- compensation and land to Inuit had been carried out on time, tion on the implementation but the review reports significant problems in the of the Agreement.” Unfor- tunately, this body has implementation of “softer” obligations that require proven largely ineffective, innovative, coordinated action on the part of federal agencies. in part because the parties disagreed on the nature of key obliga- Inuit are struggling to come to grips the wildlife provisions and the con- tions and because of the inability of with the pace of social, economic clusion of impact and benefits agree- federal representatives to make or even and cultural change, and this strug- ments that cover national parks and accede to decisions. gle is manifested in the high rates of Nunavut’s first diamond mine, but it A detailed 10-year implementa- social pathologies such as suicide, raises major questions about the tion plan with contractual status was drug and alcohol abuse and spousal ineffective resolution of disputes negotiated in 1992, entirely apart from assault. between the parties. Covering the negotiation over the final agreement; Notwithstanding this difficult start-up period of the government of understandably, it attracted little polit- context, an independent review of Nunavut, the review identifies sever- ical interest at the time. In order to implementation from 1993 to 1998, al barriers to effective implementa- deal with funding for the boards to published in 2000, concludes that of tion. These include differences in manage wildlife, land, water and natu- 193 specific obligations, 98 were interpretation regarding objectives

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Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. Paul Quassa, President of the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut, and Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, hold up the signed Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, on May 25, 1993. They are flanked by John Amagoalik, Titus Allooloo, Indian Affairs minister Tom Siddon, James Eetoolook, and Nellie Cournoyea, Premier of the Northwest Territories. and obligations, disputes over fund- interest in implementing the NTI. Conciliation by former justice ing, a lack of collaboration and the Nunavut Agreement and was concen- Thomas Berger in 2006 proved unsuc- absence of a process to monitor trating on negotiations elsewhere. It cessful. NTI agreed to it but the implementation. Once again, it rec- was frequently alleged that the Government of Canada never formally ommends reinvigorating the Department of Indian Affairs and responded to his report, which recom- Nunavut Implementation Panel and, Northern Development (DIAND) mended a vigorous commitment to tellingly, it urges the Government of could not get other federal agencies bilingual /English education Canada to increase its implementa- to fulfill their obligations under the to enable Inuit to develop the capacity tion accountability, saying: “The agreement. Nunavut Tunngavik to fully benefit from the Nunavut issue of trust, at least in terms of Incorporated (NTI), the Inuit organi- Agreement. trusting the Government of Canada, zation implementing the Nunavut In 2003 NTI was instrumental in is that the process itself conveys no Agreement, suggested that the man- the formation of a coalition of First certainty or accountability to the date of the federal government’s Nations and Inuit organizations that parties involved in working through implementation contract negotiator had modern treaties to jointly press problems and developing solutions.” was inadequate and was, in any the federal government to adopt a pol- event, committed to the status quo of icy to fully implement comprehensive he renegotiation and renewal of the first implementation contract land claims agreements and to alter T the implementation contract to covering 1993 to 2003. the machinery of government to cover the period 2003 to 2013 has The federal government’s blanket ensure the adoption of “whole of gov- proved painful and unsuccessful, refusal to agree to arbitrate disputes, as ernment” approaches. In 2004 NTI leading some to suggest that the Gov- provided for in the agreement, epito- petitioned the Commissioner of Envi- ernment of Canada had virtually lost mized a growing gap between it and ronment and Sustainable Develop-

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ment in the Office of the Auditor Gen- from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. attention and commitment on the eral of Canada to examine the failure NTI President Paul Kaludjak did not part of both partners. It is difficult, on the part of DIAND to implement mince words when filing the suit: however, to see how the agreement the environmental and socio-econom- The Government of Canada can be used to full advantage unless ic monitoring provisions of the agree- keeps Inuit dependent and in a and until the Government of Canada ment. Soon afterward, a formal audit state of financial and emotional departments that have implementa- of implementation of the Gwich’in, despair despite promises made tion obligations commit themselves Nunavut and Sahtu agreements by the when the Nunavut Agreement firmly to achieve them, and do so in a co-ordinated way. The Nunavut Agreement was a triumph of political statecraft, Whether the Depart- and while much has been accomplished, its full promise has ment of Indian Affairs and Northern Development not been realized. In 1993 the expectations that the Nunavut has the ability and clout in Agreement would “solve” difficult social and economic Ottawa to ensure a “whole problems were probably too great. Nevertheless, the of government” approach agreement does provide many tools that the Inuit of Nunavut, needed to implement the Nunavut Agreement and the Government of Nunavut and the Government of Canada other modern treaties is can apply to address challenging public policy issues. very much an open ques- tion. Certainly the Land auditor general of Canada supported was signed in 1993. The Claims Agreement Coalition con- the coalition’s analysis and position. Government of Canada is not cludes that it does not, and it recom- In the second half of 2005 repre- holding up its end of the bar- mends an independent agency be sentatives of the coalition met regu- gain. Canada got everything it established through a cabinet- larly with representatives of federal wanted immediately upon sign- approved modern treaty implementa- agencies to jointly draft an imple- ing the Nunavut Agreement. tion policy to persuade, encourage mentation policy. These negotiations Inuit are still waiting for full and cajole federal departments to were terminated by the new govern- implementation of the implement modern treaties and to ment immediately following the Agreement. audit and report on their perform- January 2006 federal election. The ance. Without this type of policy Senate Committee on Aboriginal he Nunavut Agreement was a tri- commitment, modern treaties, Affairs held formal hearings in late T umph of political statecraft, and including the Nunavut Agreement, 2007 and early 2008 into the imple- while much has been accomplished, are unlikely to be fully implemented. mentation of modern treaties. The its full promise has not been realized. committee heard the same story of In 1993 the expectations that the Terry Fenge is a consultant who works unfulfilled obligations and foot-drag- Nunavut Agreement would “solve” part time for Nunavut Tunngavik ging by the Government of Canada from each and The agreement is best viewed as a marriage and not a divorce every coalition member. between the Inuit of Nunavut and Canada, and like all NTI was a particularly prominent and voluble marriages, it requires care, attention and commitment on the witness. part of both partners. These various experi- ences prompted NTI to file a lawsuit in difficult social and economic prob- Incorporated, the Inuit organization the Nunavut Court of Justice in lems were probably too great. implementing the Nunavut Agreement. December 2006 seeking $1 billion in Nevertheless, the agreement does pro- From 1985 to 1993, he was director of damages for alleged breach of contract vide many tools that the Inuit of research for Tungavik Federation of by the Government of Canada. Nunavut, the Government of Nunavut (TFN), the Inuit organization NTI’s statement of claim, posted on Nunavut and the Government of that negotiated the agreement. The for- its Web site, is very broad and reflects Canada can apply to address challeng- mer mayor of Igloolik, Paul Quassa, the Inuit view of the substantive, proce- ing public policy issues. joined TFN in 1985, and from 1989 to dural, financial and other failures by The agreement is best viewed as a 1993 he was TFN’s chief negotiator. the Government of Canada to fulfill its marriage and not a divorce between The views and perspectives expressed in duties and obligations, which were so the Inuit of Nunavut and Canada, this article reflect the personal opinions painfully and meticulously negotiated and like all marriages, it requires care, of the authors.

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