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Calculated Adventurism: ’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns

Narushige Michishita

Abstract

On January 10, 2003, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), returning to the situation of 10 years ago. Based on a historical study of North Korea’s military-diplomatic campaigns, this paper will shed light on their patterns and characteristics, and discuss their implications on the ongoing nuclear question. It will show that North Korea has used force to achieve its political objectives (in the Clausewitzian sense), however idiosyncratic they may seem, that its behavior has been shaped and constrained primarily by military balance, and that those factors have largely determined modes and outcome of North Korean actions. Although important events and issues related to North Korea’s military- diplomatic campaigns have been studied, the contents have been either an overview of these events;1 accounts of particular cases; 2 analysis of military operations;3 military leadership;4 crisis management;5 or bargaining and negotiation on the tactical level.6 There has been no comprehensive study of North Korea’s military-diplomatic campaigns on the strategic level, or the ways in which military and diplomatic actions were used to achieve broader political objectives. This article attempts to fix the hole.

The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XVI, No. 2, Fall 2004 182 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 183

Introduction diplomatic campaigns, 1993-2000. Each period involves its own charac- teristic policy objectives and military actions, which will be described The ’s military-diplomatic campaigns can be and analyzed below in the following sequence: Environmental factors; divided into four periods: (a) Genesis of military-diplomatic cam- characteristics of the use and/or threat of force; assessment of the polit- paigns, 1966-1972; (b) Diplomatic use of limited force, 1973-1982; (c) ical results; and negative consequences, if any. Rise of , 1983-1992; and (d) Elaborate and sustained military- Clarifications follow. First, environmental factors refer to the crucial factors that enabled and/or encouraged North Korea to use force. Such * This article is a summarized version of a doctoral dissertation, “Calculated Adven- factors as military balance, strategic environment, and legal setting are turism: North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2000,” submitted to included in this category. the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins Uni- Second, this article will discuss characteristics of North Korea’s use versity, May 2003. The author would like to thank Eliot A. Cohen, Charles Doran, Cho Gab Je, Choi Zoo Hwal, Robert J. Einhorn, Michael J. Green, Taik-Young and/or threat of force, focusing on the four important elements: Loca- Hamm, Han Sung-joo, Bong-Geun Jun, Jung Chang-Hyun, Kang In-duk, Kim tion and timing; forces involved; intensity and targeting; and level of Kyung-Won, Ki-Tak Lee, John Merrill, Don Oberdorfer, Jin Park, Kihl-Jae Ryoo, military-diplomatic coordination. Sang-Woo Rhee, Sim Sin Bok, Stephen M. Tharp, Nathaniel B. Thayer, Aaron D. Finally, the consequences of North Korea’s military actions will be Trimble, Taeyoung Yoon, Yong-Weon Yu, Joel S. Wit, I. William Zartman, and evaluated against the identified political objectives.7 (See Table 1 for other anonymous individuals for comments and assistance. 1 Wayne A. Kirkbride, North Korea’s Undeclared War, 1953- (: Hollym, 1994). This book is comprehensive in surveying all the major incidents, but lacks the 5 Richard G. Head, Frisco W. Short, and Robert C. McFarlane, Crisis Resolution: necessary details to prove the author’s case and suffers from a shortage of Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations (Boulder: analytical framework. Westview Press, 1978); Donald S. Zagoria and Janet D. Zagoria, “Crisis on the 2 Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability (New York: Coward-McCann, Korean peninsula,” in Barry M. Blechman, Stephen S. Kaplan, et al., Diplomacy 1970); Wayne A. Kirkbride, DMZ: A Story of the Panmunjom Axe Murder, Second of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, DC: Brook- Edition (Seoul: Hollym, 1984); Robert A. Liston, The Pueblo Surrender (Bantam ings Institution, 1981); and Tae-Young Yoon, “Crisis Management on the Books, 1988); Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Non- Korean peninsula: ’s Crisis Management towards North Korea proliferation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); Leon V. Sigal, Disarming within the Context of the South Korea-U.S. Alliance, 1968–1983,” Ph.D. Disser- Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton: Princeton University tation, Manchester Metropolitan University, October 1997. Press, 1998); Mitchell B. Lerner, The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of 6 Chuck Downs, Over the Line: North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy (Washington, American Foreign Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002); and DC: AEI Press, 1999); and Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Richard A. Mobley, Flash Point North Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises Negotiating Behavior (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003). 1999). These books come very close to my study in that they a similar set of 3 Park Hee-do, Doraoji Anhneun Dari-e Seoda [Standing on the Bridge of No Return] subject events like the seizure of the USS Pueblo, the Axe Murder incident, and (Seoul: Saemteo, 1988); Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korean Special Forces the nuclear crisis. However, these books focus on tactical aspects of negotia- (Great Britain: Jane’s Publishing Company, 1988); Daniel P. Bolger, Scenes from tion and do not focus on the broader relationship between force and diplomacy. an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966–1969 (Washington, DC: The analysis in this article will provide a broader framework in which North U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991); and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s negotiation activities take place. Korean Special Forces, Second Edition (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998). 7 The most important source of information in this process is the evaluations 4 Commander Lloyd M. Bucher with Mark Rascovich, Bucher: My Story (Garden made by top leaders and/or high-ranking officials of the U.S.-ROK side. In City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1970); Colonel Conrad DeLateur, “Murder particular, their evaluations made in closed settings are the most useful source at Panmunjom: The Role of the Theater Commander In Crisis Resolution,” of information since these are considered to be highly genuine. Also, I have The Senior Seminar, 29th Session, 1986–1987 (Rosslyn, VA: U.S. Department of used North Korea’s official and semi-official pronouncements when they are State Foreign Service Institute, 1987). judged to be genuine expressions of its assessment. 184 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 185 evaluation of major cases discussed in this article.) January 1967, a South Korean naval patrol craft PCE-56 was attacked and sunk by North Korean coastal guns in the Sea of Japan. North Korea claimed that the ship was sailing inside its territorial sea, while History of North Korea s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns the Command claimed it was not.10 On January 23, 1968, North Korean naval vessels captured the U.S. Navy intelligence- Genesis of Military-Diplomatic Campaigns 1966-1972 gathering ship Pueblo and its crew in the Sea of Japan.11 In order to get the crew and the ship back, the United States agreed to hold bilateral After the ceased in July 1953, a relative calm prevailed talks with the DPRK in Panmunjeom. The crew, but not the ship, in Korea. During the 1954-1960 period, North Korea was busy with its returned to the United States in December 1968 as a result of the 11- domestic power struggles and with rehabilitation of its war-torn econo- month-long, first substantial bilateral U.S.-DPRK negotiations in history. my. It was in the 1961-1965 period that North Korea started to pay On April 15, 1969, air-to-air missiles fired by two North Korean MiG-21 attention to the revolutionary agendas vis-à-vis the Republic of Korea fighters shot down a U.S. Navy EC-121M reconnaissance aircraft in the (ROK), or South Korea, and began to invest a large amount of resources Sea of Japan.12 All the crew members aboard were killed. Finally, in on military build-up, which eventually resulted in active military and unconventional offensives against the United States and South Korea in 9 James P. Finley, The U.S. Military Experience in Korea, 1871–1982: In the Vanguard the following period. of ROK-U.S. Relations (San Francisco: Command Historians Office, HQ USFK/ EUSA, 1983), p. 114. 10 This disagreement was natural because the (UNC) Assaults along the Demilitarized Zone insisted on a three-nautical-mile territorial sea limit, while the Korean People’s Army claimed a twelve-nautical-mile limit, though implicitly at this point. North Korea mounted numerous armed assaults directed at U.S.- Ministry of National Defense (MND), Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper ROK forces along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in the latter half of the 1991–1992 (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 1992), p. 358; and 1960s. North Korea started to use larger teams and more heavily armed James Lee, “Panmunjeom San Jeungin Jeimseu Ri Yugseong Jeung-eon (1)” [A Living Witness of Panmunjeom, Oral Testimony of James Lee] Sin Dong-A, operatives in 1966, and its emphasis shifted from intelligence collection No. 459 (December 1997), available at http://www.donga.com/docs/maga- 8 and subversion to overt “harassment.” There were also clashes in or zine/new_donga/9712/nd97120100.html, accessed on July 12, 2002. near the Joint Security Area in Panmunjeom in this period. 11 Description of the Pueblo incident is based on the following sources. U.S. Con- gress, House, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on the U.S.S. Pueblo Conventional Attacks of the Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents, 91st Congress, First Session, March 4, 5, 6, 10, 14, 17, 19, 20 and April 25, 28, 1969, H.A.S.C. No. 91-101 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government In the 1960s, North Korea occasionally mounted conventional Printing Office, 1969); Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability; and Zagoria and attacks at sea and in the air. The first such an attack took place in April Zagoria, “Crisis on the Korean peninsula.” 1965, when two North Korean MiG-17 fighters attacked and damaged 12 Description of the EC-121 incident is based on the following materials unless a U.S. Air Force RB-47H reconnaissance aircraft in the Sea of Japan.9 In otherwise indicated. Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents, pp. 889–91; Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, Vol. 1 (New York: Warner Books, 1979), pp. 472–76; Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years 8 “Armed Incidents Along the Korean DMZ,” Intelligence Memorandum, No. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 312–21; Bolger, Scenes from an 1620/66, Washington, Nov. 8, 1966, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Rela- Unfinished War, pp. 101–109; Public Affairs Office, UNC/CFC and USFK/EUSA, tions of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. 29, Part 1, Korea [hereafter FRUS] Yongsan Army Garrison, Seoul, Korea, “Serious Incidents in the DMZ,” USFK (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), pp. 209–10. Backgrounder, No. 16, current as of June 1993; Bermudez, North Korean Special 186 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 187

June 1970, North Korean high-speed craft seized a South Korean Navy Korean agents infiltrated into Seoul and tried to install a remote-con- broadcasting ship with 20 crewmen near in the Yellow trolled bomb at the gate of the National Cemetery three days before Sea. President Park was scheduled to make a speech there. However, the attempt failed when the bomb prematurely exploded.17 Guerrilla Warfare Environmental Factors North Korea’s guerrilla warfare during this period centered on infiltrations of spies and armed guerrillas into South Korea to construct Several factors enabled and/or encouraged North Korea’s military revolutionary bases or to incite instability there. In other words, North actions. First, the U.S.-ROK involvement in the Vietnam War seemed to Korea was implementing a Korean-style “Vietnam strategy.”13 The have convinced the North Koreans that even if they posed serious mili- North Koreans landed guerrilla teams either through the DMZ or from tary challenges to the two countries, they would not be able to react the sea with fast boats. There were sightings, contacts and firefights boldly.18 Second, the major military buildup initiated in 1962 had almost daily.14 Between October 30 and November 2, 1968, major North equipped North Korea by the late 1960s with sufficient deterrent and Korean infiltration operations took place in Uljin and Samcheok on the defense capabilities against possible U.S.-ROK retaliations.19 In addi- South Korean east coast. Eight operation teams, each with 15 members tion, North Korea had strengthened its conventional offensive capabili- from the 124th Army Unit, a special operations unit created in 1967, ties together with special operations capabilities, giving North Koreans landed in these areas on three separate occasions.15 an edge over South Korea. For instance, North Korea used MiG-21 fighters, newly introduced from the , in shooting down Assassination Attempts the EC-121 in 1969. It was the first successful interception—after failed attempts made in January 1954, in February 1955, in June 1959, and in In the 1966-1972 period, two separate attempts were made to kill April 1965—a sign that the military balance had been gradually shift- the South Korean president. On January 21, 1968, a 31-man assault ing in favor of North Korea. Finally, the treaties that North Korea had team from the 124th Army Unit attempted to mount a raid on the South concluded with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of in Korean presidential residence—the Blue House—to kill President Park 1961 seemed to have worked as a reassurance to North Korea and Chung-hee.16 The second attempt was made in June 1970. Three North deterrence against the United States and South Korea.20

Forces, Second Edition, p. 94; Lee Mun Hang, JSA-Panmunjeom, 1953–1994 (Seoul: Sohwa, 2001); and “North Koreans Down Navy Recon Plane,” Pacific 17 Ibid., pp. 116–17. Stars and Stripes, April 17, 1969, available at http://www.willyvictor.com/ 18 Telegram From the Commanding General, United States Eighth Army, Korea, Korea.html, accessed on May 2, 2001. and the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, Korea (Bonesteel) 13 “The Korean Situation,” Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler), Seoul, Nov. 10, 1966, in (McCain) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler), Honolulu, FRUS, p. 211. Nov. 16, 1968, in FRUS, pp. 447–48; and “Mr. Bundy’s Meeting with Mr. Colby, 19 Samuel D. Berger, Director of the Korean Task Force, wrote in February 1968, June 22, 1967,” Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 22, 1967, in “The temptation to strike back in reprisal is understandable, but it will produce FRUS, pp. 180–81. no decisive outcome.” Telegram from the Department of State to the U.S. 14 Telegram From the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, Korea, Embassy in Korea, Washington, Feb. 12, 1968, in FRUS, p. 372. FRUS, p. 264. 20 Chin O. Chung, between Peking and : North Korea’s Involvement 15 Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, Second Edition, pp. 86–88. in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958–1974 (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 16 Ibid., pp. 83–85. 1976), pp. 57–58. 188 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 189

Characteristics of the Use of Force everywhere and on every front of the world.”23 In December 1967, Kim Il Sung called for early unification of the Korean peninsula.24 North Korea’s military actions during this period were concentrated North Korea’s military actions were quite effective in achieving in the DMZ area and in the Sea of Japan. Infiltration operations were their political objectives. Although North Korea failed to seriously chal- conducted mainly through the DMZ. Both assassination attempts were lenge the stability of South Korea and to assassinate President Park made in Seoul. Chung-hee, it succeeded in diverting U.S.-ROK attention and resources In this period, both conventional and unconventional forces were away from Vietnam,25 in hampering U.S. reconnaissance activities,26 actively employed. In most cases, North Korea resorted to brute force, and in straining U.S.-ROK relations.27 attacking U.S.-ROK military assets and killing both Americans and These positive results were attained at tremendous cost, however, South Koreans. The intensity of North Korean actions was extremely both in the short run and in the long run. In the short run, the sustained high with 326 South Korean military and 91 civilian personnel, as well active operations resulted in a high human toll. In the target period, as as 75 American military personnel, killed.21 Both South Koreans and many as 715 North Koreans were killed in various hostilities, more Americans were the target of North Korean assaults. than double the number of South Korean military personnel killed in There was little visible coordination between North Korea’s mili- the same period.28 In the long run, the massive military buildup during tary actions and diplomatic moves during this period. Political objec- tives were pursued primarily through military actions without the aid 23 Kim Il Sung, “The Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Party,” Report to the of diplomacy.22 What was significant, however, was that the North Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Oct. 5, 1966, in Kim Il Sung Works, Koreans seemed to have learned from the negotiations following the Vol. 20 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1984), p. 322. Pueblo seizure how limited military actions might work, or could be 24 Kim Il Sung, “Let Us Embody the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self- used, to achieve some broader political objectives. Sustenance and Self-Defence More Thoroughly in All Branches of State Activity,” Political Programme of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Assessment of the Political Results Korea, Announced at the First Session of the Fourth Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, December 16, 1967, in Kim Il Sung Works, Vol. 21 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1985), pp. 425–26. North Korea had highly ambitious political objectives during the 25 Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, Seoul, Sept. 19, 1966-1972 period. The assaults along the DMZ diverted U.S.-ROK 1967, in FRUS, p. 276; and “Additional ROK Troop Contribution to Vietnam,” attention and resources away from Vietnam. The seizure of the Pueblo Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, Seoul, Nov. and the shooting down of the EC-121 aimed at discouraging the United 25, 1967, in FRUS, pp. 291–92. States from continuing the reconnaissance activities. Unconventional 26 Editorial Note, in FRUS, pp. 742–44; and footnote No. 4, in FRUS, p. 480. 27 In response to the increased North Korean armed assaults, the South Koreans campaigns were designed to disrupt South Korea. In October 1966, took active retaliatory measures. However, these actions caused tension Kim Il Sung said, “In the present situation, the U.S. imperialists should between the United States and South Korea, because the South Korean raids be set back and their forces should be dispersed to the maximum were executed without the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, a U.S. Army general who at that time exercised peacetime (armistice) operational control over South Korean forces. The United States felt 21 Lee, JSA-Panmunjeom, p. 373. a dilemma in helping South Korea because while the help was certainly needed, 22 The U.S.-DPRK negotiations following the seizure of the Pueblo were more a there was a danger that the U.S. help might encourage the South Koreans to by-product of the military action than a calculated outcome. The North Korean take unilateral, punitive actions, resulting in escalation. Notes of the President’s action to capture the Pueblo could not have been planned before January 10 Meeting with Cyrus R. Vance, Washington, Feb. 15, 1968, in FRUS, pp. 376–83. when the ship departed from a port in Japan. 28 Lee, JSA-Panmunjeom, p. 373. 190 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 191 this period put a heavy burden on the North Korean economy. South North Korean patrol boats frequently entered the areas around the Korea’s per capita gross national product (GNP) surpassed that of North Northwest Islands from 1973 through 1975 to challenge the Northern Korea’s in 1969. In November 1970, Kim Il Sung admitted that the Limit Line, a maritime established unilaterally by the increase in the national defense capacity in the 1960s had been obtained United Nations Command in 1953. In 1975 and 1976, North Korean “at a very great price.”29 fighters frequently flew in the area to the same effect.31 In August 1981, The active military actions also prompted the U.S.-ROK side to North Korea launched SA-2 surface-to-air missiles at the U.S. SR-71 take countermeasures. In the late 1960s, the U.S.-ROK side strength- reconnaissance aircraft as it was flying over the , although ened the defense in the DMZ, started to react more strongly to North they caused no damage.32 Korean provocations, and devised combined counter-guerrilla opera- tions concept programs. Moreover, South Korea established a 2.5-mil- lion-strong counter-guerrilla Homeland Reserve Force.

Diplomatic Use of Limited Force 1973-1982 Hoewirog [Proceedings of the National Defense Committee], No. 1, 91st National There were two types of overt use of force prevalent in this period— Assembly, March 13, 1975, pp. 2–4; Gugto Tongilwon [National Unification conventional skirmishes at sea and in the air, and low-intensity assaults Board], Seohae 5-gae Doseo-wa Geu Gwanryeonmunje-e Gwanhan Yeongu, Nambugg- wangye Daebibangan Yeongu [A Study on the Five Islands in the West Sea and the on United Nations Command personnel. Unconventional activities Related Issues—A Study on the Reaction Plans on South-North Relations] such as infiltrations by sea and assassination attempt continued, but at (Seoul: Gugto Tongilwon, 1977), Serial No. 77-1-1136 (declassified); Kang In-duk a much reduced level. (Institute for East Asian Studies), ed., Bughan Jeonseo, 1945-1980 [North Korean Handbook] (Seoul: Geugdong Munje Yeonguso, 1980), p. 761; Kim Chang Sun, Conventional Skirmishes et al., ed., Bughan Chongram [A General Survey of North Korea] (Seoul: Bughan Yeonguso, 1983), p. 1657 ; MND, Defense White Paper 1991–1992, pp. 361–63; Lee Ki-Tak, “Hanbando-ui Saeroun Gunsa Hwangyeong-gwa Haeyang-eseoui North Korean military activities at sea increased in the 1970s in the Anbo [New Military Environment on the Korean peninsula and Security of the Yellow Sea around the Northwest Islands, five offshore islands under Seas],” Strategy 21, No. 1 (1998); Kim Yong Sam, “Hangug Haegun-ui the United Nations Command jurisdiction which are situated much Jeolchibusim: 56-ham Chimmol hu 32-nyeon man-e Bughan-e Bogsuhanda closer to the North Korean coast than the South Korean coast. In Octo- [Struggle of the ROK Navy: Revenge against North Korea 32 Years After the ber 1973, North Korea instigated a new military crisis around the Sinking of the ROK Navy Ship No. 56],” Wolgan Joseon, No. 232 (July 1999); Lee Northwest Islands, which became known as the “West Sea incident.”30 Ki-Tak, “Seohae-ui Jeonryagjeog-in Jungyoseong-gwa Munjaejeom-deul: Gug- bang Jeonryag Damdangja-deul-ege Alrinda [Strategic Importance and Prob- lems of the Yellow Sea: Informing the Defense Policy-Makers],” Gunsa Segye, 29 Kim Il Sung, “Report to the Fifth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on No. 75 (August 1999), pp. 27–30; and James M. Lee, “History of Korea’s MDL & the Work of the Central Committee,” Nov. 2, 1970, in Kim Il Sung Works, Vol. Reduction of Tension along the DMZ and Western Sea through Confidence 25 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1986), p. 219. Building Measures between North and South Korea,” in Chae-Han Kim, ed., 30 Both North and South Koreans call the Yellow Sea the “West Sea.” Description The Korean DMZ: Reverting beyond Division (Seoul: Sowha, 2001), pp. 87–97. of the incident is based on the following materials unless otherwise specified. 31 Office of the South-North Dialogue, South-North Dialogue In Korea, No. 5 (Feb.- Gugbang Wiwonhoe Hoewirog [Proceedings of the National Defense Committee], July 1974). No. 16, 88th National Assembly, ROK, Dec. 10, 1973, pp. 10–17; Gugbang 32 “Conflict & Tension on the Korean peninsula! A Chronology (Jul. 28, 1953- Wiwonhoe Hoewirog [Proceedings of the National Defense Committee], No. 17, Aug. 98),” obtained from the Secretariat, United Nations Command, Military 88th National Assembly, ROK, Dec. 2, 1973, pp. 36–37; Gugbang Wiwonhoe Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) on July 18, 2001, p. 58. 192 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 193

Low-Intensity Assaults Environmental Factors

Between 1973 and 1977, assaults on United Nations Command per- Several factors enabled and/or encouraged North Korean actions. sonnel frequently occurred in the Joint Security Area and the DMZ, First, acquisition of new military assets such as Osa I- and Komar-class which culminated in the Axe Murder incident.33 On August 18, 1976, fast missile boats gave North Korea a military edge at sea, which two U.S. Army officers were killed in the Joint Security Area by North worked effectively since South Korea had neither comparable high- Korean guards wielding axes. In reaction, the United States mobilized speed maneuverable capabilities at sea nor effective coastal defense its armed forces and concentrated them in and around the Korean systems. In addition, North Korea achieved clear military superiority peninsula in a show of force. An extremely tense situation was created over the South in the 1970s not only in air power but also in ground during the operation, which could have escalated into a free-for-all forces.35 exchange of fire had there been one accidental shot in the area. Second, legal issues concerning the Armistice Agreement gave the North Koreans loopholes to play with. In particular, the North Koreans Assassination Attempt exploited disagreements between the United States and South Korea over the legal status of the . While South Korea Despite the failures in the previous period, another attempt was regarded the Northern Limit Line as legally binding, the United States made on August 15, 1974 to assassinate Park Chung-hee. A North did not.36 Korean-trained South Korean citizen fired rounds at Park. He missed Finally, the international environment was favorable to North Park but, instead, killed the First Lady and a choirgirl.34 Korea. The United States was reducing its military commitment in Asia. Democratic Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter was calling 33 Description of the incident is based on the following sources: U.S. Congress, publicly for withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea. In addition, House, Hearing before the Subcommittees on International Political and Mili- North Korea was mobilizing international support by establishing tary Affairs and on International Organization of the Committee on Interna- diplomatic relations with newly-independent countries and by gaining tional Relations, Deaths of American Military Personnel in the Korean Demilita- seats in international fora such as the Non-Aligned Movement. The rized Zone, 94th Congress, Second Session, Sept. 1, 1976 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976); Head, Short, and McFarlane, Crisis Resolu- debate over the Korean Question in the United Nations General Assem- tion; Kirkbride, DMZ; Park, Doraoji Anhneun Dari-e Seoda; Kim Chung Yum, bly was proceeding favorably to the North Korean side as a result.37 Hangug Gyeongjejeongchaeg 30-nyeonsa: Gim Jeong Ryeom Hoegorog [Thirty Years’ History of South Korean Economic Policy] (Seoul: JungAng Ilbosa, 1995); John 35 Dale Van Atta and Richard Nations, “North Korea: Kim’s Build-up to Blitzkrieg: K. Singlaub with Malcolm McConnell, Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in The North may be tempted to strike while it has the edge,” Far Eastern Economic the Twentieth Century (New York: Summit Books, 1991), pp. 358–380; Jo Seong Review, Vol. 115, No. 10 (March 5/11, 1982), p. 26; and Donald R. Cotter and Gwan, “1976-nyeon 8-wol 21-il Gaeseong Jingyeog Jagjeon Gyehyoeg [Opera- N.F. Wikner, “Korea: Force Imbalances and Remedies,” Strategic Review (Spring tion Plan to Advance into Gaesong, Aug. 21, 1976],” Wolgan Joseon, No. 151 1982), pp. 65–66. (October 1992), pp. 214–28; Yoon, “Crisis Management on the Korean penin- 36 Gugto Tongilwon, Seohae 5-gae Doseo-wa Geu Gwanryeonmunje-e Gwanhan sula”; “Shipwreck of North Korea’s ‘Axe Diplomacy’,” in South-North Dia- Yeongu, pp. 131–32. logue In Korea, No. 11, Office of the South-North Dialogue (March 1976- 37 In the 30th UNGA in 1975, pro-DPRK resolution was adopted for the first time November 1976); Jung Chang-Hyun, Gyeot-eseo Bon Kim Jeong Il [Kim Jong Il together with a pro-ROK resolution. For the debate over the Korean Question, Seen from the Side], Revised and Enlarged Edition (Seoul: Gimyeongsa, 2000), see Oemubu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Hangug Oegyo 30-nyeon, 1948–1978 pp. 200–206; and “Ax-Wielding Incident in Panmunjeom,” available at http:// [Thirty Years of the Diplomacy of the ROK, 1948-1978] (Seoul: Oemubu, 1979), www.koreascope.org/english/ sub/2/nk10_4.htm, accessed on July 14, 2002. pp. 220–24; Oegyotongsangbu [Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade], Hangug 34 Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, Second Edition, pp. 116–17. Oegyo 50-nyeon, 1948–1998 [Fifty Years of the Diplomacy of the ROK, 1948– 194 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 195

Characteristics of the Use of Force Assessment of the Political Results

North Korea’s military and infiltration activities took place mainly North Korea’s political objectives in the 1973-1982 period included at or by sea. Also, the Joint Security Area emerged as a new stage for (a) challenging U.S.-ROK positions on the status of the waters around North Korean military-diplomatic actions. North Korea found new fron- the Northwest Islands and the status of the Northern Limit Line, (b) tiers or South Korea’s soft bellies at which to aim military-diplomatic complicating U.S.-ROK relations, (c) driving U.S. forces out of Korea, offensives. and (d) concluding a peace agreement with the United States. Coopera- Most of the operations in the 1973-1982 period involved a relatively tive elements started to appear in the objectives of North Korea’s mili- small number of forces or assets. It was during this period that potential tary-diplomatic actions. Most significantly, North Korea proposed U.S.- use of force started to emerge in North Korea’s military lexicon. The DPRK talks for concluding a peace agreement for the first time in well-calculated potential use of force seen in the “West Sea incident” March 1974, just five months after it started the naval operations in the was a case in point. The force was used not to kill or to destroy, but to Yellow Sea. In the Axe Murder incident, one of North Korea’s objec- compel the U.S.-ROK side to change or at least review its position on the tives seemed to have been to encourage Americans, including Carter, Armistice Agreement and the status of the Northern Limit Line. The who were advocating the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Korea by Axe Murder was a use of limited force to achieve diplomatic objectives. demonstrating that keeping American boys in Korea was a painful The intensity of North Korean actions was much lower than in the business. previous period. Casualties suffered on the U.S.-ROK side were as few Some of the North Korean actions were fairly successful, but others as 15 South Korean military deaths, 39 South Korean civilian deaths, as were not. In the “West Sea incident,” North Korea succeeded in pub- well as seven American military deaths, almost a ninth of the number licly demonstrating the existence of the dispute in the Northwest of deaths suffered in the previous period. Islands areas and in underlining the arbitrary nature of the demarca- Military operations and diplomatic actions were clearly coordinated. tion arrangements in the area.38 However, North Korea failed to actually Military actions in the Northwest Islands areas were tailored to match enforce the territorial claims it made. North Korea succeeded in high- the argument that the North Koreans were making in the Military lighting the disagreements between the United States and South Korea Armistice Commission meetings in Panmunjeom. North Korea used with regard to the status of the Northern Limit Line. However, it failed the Axe Murder incident to gain support in the Non-Aligned Movement to seriously complicate the U.S.-ROK relations by continuing to exploit summit meeting, and was probably prepared to use it to do the same the disagreements between them. for the discussion of the Korean Question in the United Nations General North Korea tried to use the Axe Murder incident to reinforce Assembly. its diplomatic offensive by claiming that the U.S. presence in South Korea was a root cause of the confrontation on the Korean peninsula.39

1998] (Seoul: Oegyotongsangbu, 1999), pp. 205–17; Se-Jin Kim, ed., Korean 38 On Dec. 1, 1973, the first territorial dispute under the Korean Armistice surfaced Unification: Source Materials with an Introduction (Seoul: Research Center for when the Korean People’s Army/Chinese People’s Volunteers (KPA/CPV) side Peace and Unification, 1976); B. K. Gills, Korea Versus Korea: A Case of Contested claimed its jurisdiction over the sea to a radius of 12 nautical miles from the Legitimacy (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 121–44 and 190–96; and Chi Young North Korean west coast by alleging violations of the Armistice Agreement by Park, “Korea and the United Nations,” in Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han, South Korean naval vessels. Military Armistice Commission, United Nations eds., The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea (New York: Columbia University Command Component, “Three Hundred and Forty-Sixth Meeting”; and Press, 1985), pp. 262–84; and Office of the South-North Dialogue, South-North Telegram from CINCUNC to JCS, “Summary 346th Military Armistice Com- Dialogue In Korea, No. 9 (March-December 1975). mission Meeting,” Dec. 1, 1973. 196 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 197

However, the brutal killing of the U.S. servicemen backfired on North Korean President Chun Doo-hwan in Rangoon, Burma (now Myanmar) Korea. The negative reaction from the international community practi- in October 1983. However, the president survived the attack.42 cally thwarted North Korea’s diplomatic offensive.40 As the Olympic Games in Seoul scheduled for 1988 drew near, The attempt to shoot down the SR-71 failed. The assassination North Korea attempted to disrupt them by launching terrorist attacks. attempt failed again. The infiltration operations for establishing the In September 1986, a bomb exploded in Gimpo International Airport, Party cells in South Korea seem to have been quite successful given the killing five and wounding more than 30 people six days before the pro-North Korean sentiment witnessed among dissident groups in the Asian Games were opened in South Korea. On November 29, 1987, 1980s. However, the number of sea-bound infiltration operations had Flight 858, bound for from , was time- diminished significantly by the end of the 1970s. bombed by two North Korean agents and exploded in midair over the Finally, the North Korean actions at sea provoked reactions from Andaman Sea. All 115 people on board were killed.43 the South Korean side. In the aftermath of the “West Sea incident,” South Korea adopted the “sasu” strategy, or unconditional defense of Environmental Factors the Northern Limit Line, fortified the Northwest Islands, and strength- ened its naval and air forces. A major reorganization of North Korea’s intelligence services in 1982 seemed to have paved the way for the activation of the terrorist The Rise of Terrorism 1983-1992 activities both at home and abroad in the following years. During this period, the Research Department for External Intelligence, whose pri- The 1983-1992 period saw a relative calm in terms of North Korea’s mary mission was the collection of external intelligence and foreign use of military force. There were only sporadic actions in the DMZ or operations, came under the direct control of Kim Jong Il.44 in the Northwest Islands areas. Instead, North Korean efforts to disrupt South Korea continued with a new emphasis on terrorism. Characteristics of the Use of Force In 1983, relatively small-sized infiltration operations against South Korea increased.41 Also, an attempt was made to assassinate South In the 1983-1992 period, North Korea twice executed major uncon- ventional attacks outside the Korean peninsula. North Korea’s terrorist 39 In March 1976, Kim Il Sung said, “Now, if the problem of Korea’s reunification attacks represented actual use of force. However, a distinction must be is to be solved, it is important to rouse the support of world public opinion made between the implications of the different terrorist attacks. While and to expose the outrages committed by the American imperialists in South the bombing in Rangoon was a subversive attempt to undermine the Korea to the inspection of the whole world. . . .” Kim Il Sung, “Talk with the South Korean government, the bombings in the Gimpo International Chief Editor of the Japanese Political Magazine Sekai,” March 28, 1976, in Kim Airport and of the Korean Air plane were coercive efforts to discourage Il Sung Works, Vol. 31 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987), pp. 57–58. foreign tourists from coming to visit Seoul. 40 Brent Scowcroft, presidential national security advisor, and Richard L. Sneider, North Korea’s terrorist attacks caused a large number of casualties, U.S. ambassador to South Korea, shared the view that the August 18 incident most of them South Korean. North Korea’s primary targets during this had “come out better than expected—and apparently to our net advantage.” Sneider thought it would have “a beneficial effect” in the United Nations. “Memorandum of Conversation,” The White House, Sept. 15, 1976, in DMZ Crane Russak, 1990), p. 43. Axe Incident (1976), Korea Information Service on Net (KISON), Korean Security 42 Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, Second Edition, pp. 133–36. Archive, The Special Collections (Washington, D C International Center, 2000). 43 Ibid., pp. 136–39. 41 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Terrorism: The North Korean Connection (New York: 44 Bermudez, Terrorism, pp. 42, 49. 198 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 199 period were the South Korean leadership and civilians. The growing Korea as a terrorist state. In January 1988, the United States designated number of South Korean civilian casualties notwithstanding, few North Korea as a terrorist-sponsoring nation. Americans were killed or wounded by North Korea’s military actions or by terrorist attacks. This North Korean tendency not to target Ameri- Elaborate and Sustained Military-Diplomatic Campaigns 1993-2000 cans has remained intact to this day. In addition, North Korea stopped attacking the South Korean leadership after the Rangoon Incident. After more than a decade of absence, North Korea’s overt military- The 1980s were a decade in which almost no meaningful coordina- diplomatic campaigns came back to central stage, this time with tion was made between military actions and diplomatic moves. The weapons of regional and potentially global strategic implications. absence of diplomacy from conventional or unconventional military actions became even more apparent after North Korea embarked on its Nuclear Diplomacy46 terrorist offensive in 1983. On March 12, North Korea declared its decision to withdraw from Assessment of the Political Results the NPT.47 North Korea’s threat to withdraw from the NPT successfully brought the Americans to the bilateral U.S.-DPRK negotiating table in North Korea’s political objectives during this period were revisionist June. When the talks became stalemated, North Korea began discharging in the first half but relatively status quo-oriented in the latter half. In spent fuel rods from its five-megawatt reactor in May 1994, turning 1983, North Korea clearly tried to destabilize South Korea with an tension into crisis. In June 1994, the United States seriously contemplated assassination attempt on President Chun. However, North Korea’s imposing economic sanctions on North Korea. North Korea declared terrorist attacks in 1986 and 1988 were limited in purpose and arguably that it would regard sanctions as a “declaration of war.”48 “defensive” in nature. What the North Koreans tried to do was not so much to destabilize South Korea as to prevent the Asian Games and 46 Detailed description of the events is based on the following materials unless the Seoul Olympic Games from succeeding. North Korea was making otherwise indicated: International Atomic Energy Agency, The Annual Report for 1994, available at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Anrep/ its final efforts to prevent the Republic of Korea from becoming a stable, Anrep94/index.html, accessed on May 8, 2003; Mazarr, North Korea and the 45 rich, and internationally acclaimed state. Bomb; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear The North Korean actions during this period were unsuccessful at Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995); Don Ober- best and disastrous in terrorist-type attacks. The terrorist attacks, no dorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wes- matter how dramatic the psychological shocks they might have given ley, 1997); Sigal, Disarming Strangers; C. Kenneth Quinones, Kitachousen: Bei- to the people in South Korea and in the world, largely backfired. Bomb- Kokumushou Tantoukan-no Koushou Hiroku [North Korea’s Nuclear Threat “Off the Record” Memories] (Tokyo: Chuuoukouronsha, 2000); Center for Strategic ing of the Korean Air Liner fueled international condemnation of North and International Studies (CSIS), “Nuclear Confrontation with North Korea: Lessons of the 1994 Crisis for Today,” March 20, 2003, Seoul, Korea, available 45 According to Kim Hyeon Hui, a person from the Research Department for at http://www.csis.org/isp/crisis_peninsula/seoulTranscript.pdf, accessed External Intelligence stated that the objectives of bombing the Korean Airliner on May 8, 2003; and Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Flight 858 were to (a) cause major damage to South Korea by disrupting the Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brook- Olympic Games and (b) frustrate the “two-Korea policy” plot of the “South ings Institution Press, 2004). Koreans puppets.” Cho Gab-je, Kitachousen Onna Himitsu Kousakuin-no Kokuhaku: 47 “DPRK Government declares its withdrawal from NPT to defend its supreme Daikankoukuuki Bakuhajiken-no Kakusareta Shinjitsu (Confession of a North interests,” Pyongyang, March 12, 1993, Pyongyang Times, March 20, 1993, p. 1; Korean Female Agent: Hidden Truth of the Bombing Incident of the Korean and “7th Meeting of 9th DPRK Central People’s Committee decides to with- Airliner), trans. by Kikutoshi Ikeda (Tokyo: Tokuma Bunko, 1997), p. 56. draw from NPT,” Pyongyang Times, March 20, 1993, p. 2. 200 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 201

The end of the crisis came suddenly and unexpectedly. During his Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea in June 1999. The resulting naval unofficial visit to Pyongyang in mid-June, former U.S. President Jimmy skirmishes developed into major exchanges of gunfire between the two Carter agreed with Kim Il Sung on ways to defuse the crisis. As a result, Korean navies.53 the U.S.-DPRK talks resumed and, despite the death of Kim Il Sung in July, the United States and North Korea signed the bilateral “Agreed Covert Operations Framework” in October 1994.49 Covert operations against South Korea continued in the 1990s but Missile Diplomacy at a substantially reduced level. Some of the ongoing covert operations were unveiled in 1996 and 1998. In September 1996, a Sang-o-class North Korea’s missile-related activities became an official item on North Korean special-purpose submarine was found bobbing on the the agenda for discussion between the United States and North Korea South Korean east coast in a failed infiltration/exfiltration operation.54 in the first round of missile talks held in 1996. In May 1993, North In June 1998, a North Korean Yugo-class midget submarine was found Korea test-launched a medium-range Nodong missile in the direction off the South Korean east coast with nine corpses inside. Also, a North of Tokyo.50 And in August 1998, North Korea launched a three-stage Korean semi-submersible that had infiltrated the southern coast was rocket based on Taepodong 1 in August 1998, with some unexpected sunk in December 1998.55 technological breakthroughs. It was doubly shocking because the rocket flew over the Japanese main island in the direction of Hawaii.51 52 “Chronology of North Korea’s Attempts to Neutralize the Armistice Agreement,” in Defense White Paper 1996–1997, MND (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Undermining the Korean Armistice Analyses, 1997), pp. 261–65; and United Nations Command, “Report of the Activities of the United Nations Command for 1997,” Annex, obtained from North Korea conducted military-diplomatic campaigns particular- the UNCMAC, 2001, pp. 13–18. ly after 1994 to undermine the Armistice by causing troubles in the 53 MND, Defense White Paper 1999 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1999), pp. 246–49; “Bughan Gyeongbijeong NLL [Northern Limit Line] Chimbeom Joint Security Area, DMZ, and Northwest Islands areas. The North Sageon-deung Hyeonan Bogo [Status Report on the Issues such as the Viola- Koreans conducted annual armed demonstrations in the Joint Security tion of the NLL by North Korean Patrol Boats],” Gugbang Wiwonhoe Hoewirog Area between 1994 and 1996, and provoked an exchange of fire in the [Proceedings of the National Defense Committee], No. 1, 204th National DMZ in 1997.52 Also, they conducted naval actions to challenge the Assembly, ROK, June 10, 1999; “Seohaesang Gyojeonsatae-e Gwanhan Bogo [Report on the Battle in the West Sea],” Gugbang Wiwonhoe Hoewirog [Proceed- ings of the National Defense Committee], No. 2, 204th National Assembly, ROK, 48 Pyongyang Times, June 18, 1994, p. 2. June 16, 1999; “Seohaesang Gyojeonsatae Hyeonan Bogo [Report on the Battle 49 “Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic in the West Sea],” Gugbang Wiwonhoe Hoewirog [Proceedings of the National People’s Republic of Korea,” Geneva, Oct.21, 1994, available at http://www. Defense Committee], No. 2, 204th National Assembly, ROK, June 17, 1999; kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf; and Pyongyang Times, Oct. 22, 1994, “Bughan-ui Bugbanghangyeseon Muhyoseoneon-e Daehan Daechaeg-deung p. 8. Hyeonan Bogo [Report on the Countermeasures to the North Korea’s Declara- 50 Greg Gerardi and Joseph Bermudez, Jr., “An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic tion of Invalidation of the NLL],” Gugbang Wiwonhoe Hoewirog [Proceedings of Missile Testing,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, No. 4 (April 1995), pp. 184–90. the National Defense Committee], No. 1, 207th National Assembly, Sept. 7, 51 For the details of North Korea’s missile development, see Joseph S. Bermudez, 1999; and UNC, “Report of the Activities of the United Nations Command for Jr., A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, Occasional Paper No. 2, 1999,” Annex, obtained from the UNCMAC, 2001, p. 12. Monitoring Proliferation Threats Project (Monterey: Center for Nonprolifera- 54 Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, Second Edition, pp. 160–67. tion Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1999). 55 MND, Defense White Paper 1998 (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 202 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 203

Environmental Factors enabled North Korea to threaten withdrawal and still have a three- month lead-time, which, quite apart from the original intention of the The single most important factor that enabled North Korea to con- provision, served as a deadline for the U.S. negotiators.59 In conducting duct active military-diplomatic campaigns in this period was the devel- naval actions in the Northwest Islands areas, the North Koreans further opment of weapons of mass destruction. In the 1990s, North Korea elaborated its argument concerning the Armistice Agreement and the finally came to possess military capabilities with potentially regional Northern Limit Line and took advantage of their defects.60 The legal and, to an extent, global strategic implications. North Korea’s medium- factors did not play a decisive role, but played an important supporting and long-range ballistic missile capabilities, if combined with nuclear, role. chemical, and biological weapons, would have serious implications for Japan and the United States. Furthermore, North Korea’s ability to sell Characteristics of the Use/Threat of Force these weapons or technologies to foreign countries and/or terrorists added to their importance.56 In this period, locations of North Korean military actions became The second most important factor that enabled North Korea to ride highly limited. Actions to undermine the Armistice were concentrated out potentially dangerous crises, particularly the one in 1994, was its in the relatively confined areas like the Joint Security Area and North- ability to deter preventive military actions by the United States.57 North west Islands. Nuclear and missile developments as well as missile Korea threatened to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” to deter U.S.-ROK launches originated inside North Korea. preventive actions.58 Without such deterrent capabilities, North Korea The important parts of North Korean weapons of mass destruction would not have been able to effectively translate its potential nuclear capabilities were still potential. North Korea was assessed to have and missile capabilities into political gains. produced and diverted sufficient plutonium for at least one nuclear Finally, legal factors provided both military and diplomatic oppor- weapon. However, future nuclear development had greater strategic tunities to the North Koreans. In the nuclear diplomacy, the North implications. The Nodong missile became operational in the second Koreans exploited loopholes in the NPT, which provided that each half of the 1990s, but the Taepodong was still in the developmental party had the right to withdraw from the Treaty and that the with- stage. drawal would take effect three months after the announcement. This North Korea’s use of force in nuclear and missile diplomacy was dominantly potential and coercive. Nuclear weapons were not actually 1999), p. 304; and MND, Defense White Paper 1999, p. 246. used and the possession of such weapons was not officially declared. 56 For a U.S. assessment, see Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive North Korea twice launched ballistic missiles during this period. How- Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, DC: Brookings Insti- ever, it did not attack anybody or anything with the missiles. North tution Press, 1999), pp. 126, 221. Korea’s efforts to undermine the Armistice were also coercive. North 57 As the assessment of the military options proceeded in May 1994, the picture became gloomier for the United States. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, pp. 315, Korea’s logic was as follows: The danger of war is looming large on the 324. 58 On March 19, 1994, the North Korean delegation to South Korea threatened 59 See Article X of the “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the South Korean side by saying that the DPRK would answer “dialogue with (1968),” INFCIRC/140, U.N.T.S. No. 10485, Vol. 729. dialogue” and “war with war.” Then, the North Korean head of the delegation, 60 For the North Korean position on the status of the NLL, see Proceedings of the Pak Yong Su, finally declared, “Seoul is not far away [from the DMZ]. If war Eighth General Officers Talks, July 2, 1999, provided by the UNCMAC. For breaks out, Seoul will become a sea of fire.” Tongilwon [Ministry of National the South Korean position on the status of the NLL, see Arms Control Bureau, Unification], Tongil Baegseo 1995 [Unification White Paper] (Seoul: Tongilwon, MND, ed., The Republic of Korea Position regarding the Northern Limit Line (Seoul: 1995), p. 227. Ministry of National Defense, 2002). 204 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 205

Korean peninsula; military tension is heightened because the current In 1999 North Korea started to publicly announce its intention to Armistice mechanism had become ineffective; in order to avoid another use military force for diplomatic purposes. On June 16, 1999, Nodong war, the United States and the DPRK must conclude a peace agreement Sinmun and Kulloja, a daily and a journal of the Workers’ Party Central or at least establish a better peace mechanism. With its military actions, Committee, jointly issued an article entitled, “Our party’s policy of North Korea tried to create a reality to fit its logic. giving priority to the army is invincible,” which contended that the A few to more than 100 armed Korean People’s Army personnel Party’s military-first policy was “a guarantee for sure victory in diplo- were involved in armed demonstrations in the Joint Security Area or in macy with the enemies.”63 the DMZ. The naval clash in 1999 involved small patrol boats and tor- pedo boats. Although the armed demonstrations in the Joint Security Assessment of the Political Results Area and in the DMZ did not involve actual use of force in many cases, actions in the DMZ in 1997 and in the Northwest Islands areas in 1999 Political objectives in this period were predominantly status quo- involved actual use of force. oriented. The survival of the North Korean regime, rather than destabi- Subversive use of force disappeared almost completely. It was lizing South Korea and unification of the Korean peninsula, seemed to coercive use of force that stood out in North Korea’s military-diplomatic have become the primary political objective. In fact, North Korea pro- campaigns during this period. Despite the active show of force and posed the conclusion of a peace agreement bilaterally with the United bellicose rhetoric, North Korea carefully avoided causing physical States in October 1993,64 and a “tentative agreement” in February 1996 damage to the United States and, to an extent, even to South Korea, a as a first step toward the conclusion of a peace agreement.65 Through departure from the earlier periods. some overlapping military-diplomatic campaigns, North Korea tried to Military actions and diplomatic moves were extremely well coordi- create a mechanism that would ensure its regime’s survival. The nor- nated. The declaration to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993 was malization, or at least improvement, of its relations with the United quickly exploited diplomatically to bring the United States to bilateral States was the single most important means of achieving that goal. talks. The Taepodong missile was launched just two months after North Acquisition of economic gains emerged as one of the most impor- Korea announced that missile exports could be discontinued if the tant political objectives. This was a significant development given the United States lifted the economic embargo and made compensation.61 fact that never in the past had North Korea demanded economic And the naval clash in 1999 was quickly exploited in United Nations rewards in its military actions. Command-Korean People’s Army general-officer talks in Panmunjeom North Korea’s military-diplomatic campaigns during this period to undermine the Armistice and the Northern Limit Line. were quite successful. The most tangible success was won with the The Ministry of Foreign affairs took the lead in the military-diplo- Agreed Framework, in which the United States promised to provide matic maneuvers during this period. It always made major proposals, two light-water reactors to North Korea, provided formal assurances and in fact, one of the major players—the Korean People’s Army Pan- against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and offered to improve munjeom Mission—was under the dual control of the Ministry of Foreign affairs and the Korean People’s Army General Staff.62 1994 to “settle through negotiations with the U.S. army side the issue of taking measures for easing tension and ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula. . . . [Italic author’s]” Lee, JSA-Panmunjeom, pp. 401–402. 61 “Nobody can slander DPRK’s missile policy—KCNA commentary,” KCNA, 63 Nodong Sinmun, June 16, 1999; and “WPK’s [Workers’ Party of Korea’s] policy June 16, 1998. of giving priority to army is invincible,” KCNA, June 16, 1999. 62 Choi Zoo Hwal, a defected KPA officer, interview by the author, Seoul, ROK, 64 Pyongyang Times, Oct. 16, 1993, p. 8. Nov. 9, 2001. North Korea established the KPA Panmunjom Mission in May 65 Pyongyang Times, March 2, 1996, p. 1. 206 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 207

U.S.-DPRK relations, while North Korea promised to freeze its nuclear North Korean military actions during this period produced some development and to accept full nuclear inspections in the future. negative consequences. As a result of the missile diplomacy, closer Together with the discovery of a suspected underground nuclear trilateral policy coordination was institutionalized among the United facility in Kumchangri, North Korea’s missile developments prompted States, South Korea, and Japan; and the United States and Japan decided the United States to undertake a major review of its policy toward the to accelerate their joint technological research on a ballistic missile country. The policy review team, led by former Secretary of Defense defense system. Also, North Korean military provocations caused the William Perry, produced the so-called “Perry Report” in September United States and South Korea to strengthen their military cooperation; 1999. The report recommended the U.S. government seek normaliza- and the naval battle of June 1999 demonstrated that North Korea’s tion of relations with North Korea if North Korea took positive steps on conventional military assets were outdated and were no match for the nuclear and missile developments.66 Subsequently, Jo Myong Rok, their South Korean counterpart.70 the second most powerful man in North Korea, visited the United States in October 2000. The United States and the DPRK issued the “Joint U.S.-DPRK Statement on International Terrorism”67 and the Patterns and Characteristics of North Korea s Military Actions “U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué.” The latter reaffirmed “the principles of respect for each other’s sovereignty and non-interference in each North Korea s Military Actions have been Consistent other’s internal affairs.”68 In the same month, Madeleine Albright visited with its Political Objectives North Korea for the first time as U.S. secretary of state. Although Presi- dent Clinton decided not to visit Pyongyang in the end, a major break- North Korea’s military actions have been consistent with its political through in the U.S.-DPRK relations was in sight. objectives. In other words, North Korean leaders have been rational in At the same time, North Korea succeeded in complicating U.S.- using military force for the purpose of achieving their political objectives. ROK relations and undermining the ROK government’s position par- This observation is supported by the changing patterns of North Korea’s ticularly between 1993 and 1997. In conducting the nuclear diplomacy, military actions, particularly in terms of their intensity and targeting. North Korea successfully drove a wedge between the United States and South Korea by talking to the Americans while sidelining the Changing Nature of North Korea s Political Objectives South Koreans.69 On the economic side, North Korea obtained a U.S. promise to North Korea’s political objectives have changed significantly over provide it with light-water reactors and heavy oil. It also frequently time. First, while North Korea’s political objectives were predominantly received food or other assistance from the countries including the United hostile in the 1960s, cooperative elements began to appear in the 1970s, States partly as a result of its military-diplomatic campaigns. particularly in its relationship with the United States, and became more prevalent in the 1990s. When North Korea proposed the conclusion of a 66 William J. Perry, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State, peace agreement with the United States in 1974, it was trying to get rid “Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recom- of the U.S. presence in South Korea by improving its relations with the mendations,” Oct. 12, 1999. United States. In the 1990s, North Korea’s political objectives came to 67 “Joint U.S.-DPRK Statement on International Terrorism,” Statement by Richard include full normalization of diplomatic relations with the United Boucher, Spokesman, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, States, and the U.S. pledge to adopt a balanced policy toward North Washington, DC, Oct. 6, 2000. 68 “US-DPRK Joint Communiqué,” Washington, DC, Oct. 12, 2000. 69 Quinones, Kitachousen, pp. 286, 334. 70 MND, Defense White Paper 1999, p. 70. 208 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 209 and South Korea.71 Even Rational Actors Can Make Mistakes Second, purely military objectives diminished in importance while diplomatic objectives loomed large over time. The primary objectives A common-sense but easy-to-forget point is that, however rational involved in the seizure of the Pueblo and the shooting down of the EC- the North Koreans might be, they do make mistakes. One typical exam- 121 in the 1960s were primarily military. In the 1990s, diplomatic and ple is the Axe Murder incident. At the time of the incident, the interna- economic objectives came to the fore. North Korea’s military-diplomat- tional environment was quite favorable to North Korea, and it attempted ic campaigns in the 1990s were about trading military capabilities for to exploit a military opportunity in the Joint Security Area to its diplo- diplomatic and economic gains. matic advantage. However, the tactical mistake of killing American servicemen in an extremely brutal manner turned the whole venture Political Objectives and the Patterns of North Korean Military Actions into a disastrous failure. Also, North Korea suffered serious military defeat in the Yellow Sea in 1999. North Korea’s military actions, particularly in terms of their inten- Unconventional actions have also failed. Assassination attempts on sity and targeting, have changed according to the changes in political South Korean presidents have never succeeded; neither have guerrilla objectives. First, the intensity of the military actions and the number of infiltrations done so in any meaningful way; and the bombing of a casualties diminished over time. The number of deaths was 507 in the Korean Airliner in 1987 decisively shifted the attitude of the interna- 1960s, 94 in the 1970s, 17 in the 1980s (excepting the deaths suffered in tional community against North Korea. terrorist attacks), and zero in the 1990s.72 One of the reasons for this For these reasons, the claim that the North Koreans have always phenomenon seems to be that the emergence of more cooperative politi- been highly effective in using force and Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il cal objectives has made it diplomatically unwise for the North Koreans are “military geniuses” is rejected. The North Korean leaders have been to inflict significant human and/or physical damages on the Ameri- voracious utilizers of force, but it does not mean that they have been cans in particular and on the South Koreans to a lesser extent. Killing any better at using it than others. Americans and South Koreans would have certainly been detrimental to the normalization of the U.S.-DPRK relations. North Korea s Military Actions have been Shaped Another indication that the North Koreans tailored their military and Constrained Primarily by Military Balance actions to their political objectives is seen in the shifts in targeting pat- terns. In the 1960s, there was no target discrimination. However, the North Korea’s military actions have been shaped and constrained North Koreans started to distinguish between the U.S. and South Kore- primarily by strategic and/or local military balance. More specifically, an targets in the 1970s. After 1981 the North Koreans stopped attacking North Korea’s military advantages worked as an enabling factor, a Americans, and the focus was put on the South Koreans alone. This determinant of the choice of location for its military actions, and a North Korean tendency continued in the 1990s. determinant of success.

71 “Resolution of the Nuclear Issue: Elements to be Considered,” Oct. 12, 1993, a Military Advantages as an Enabling Factor paper conveyed by a North Korean official to an American official, provided by C. Kenneth Quinones to the author on July 23, 2003; and Quinones, Kitachousen, North Korea’s propensity to use or threaten force has been high, p. 259. particularly when a new opportunity was created by acquisition of 72 Lee, JSA-Panmunjeom, p. 373 (for the 1953-1992 period); and the data obtained from the ROK Ministry of National Defense, dated Aug. 29, 2002 (for the 1993- new military capabilities. Examples abound. North Korea’s assaults 2000 period). along the DMZ, the Pueblo incident and the shooting down of the EC- 210 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 211

121 in the late 1960s were preceded by a major military buildup based over time according to the changing military balance. In the 1960s, on the “Party military lines” adopted in 1962.73 The naval actions North Korea was active along the DMZ. However, when the DMZ was around the Northwest Islands in the early 1970s were made possible by fortified in the late 1960s, the North Koreans shifted their attention in the procurement of high-speed guided-missile boats. The nuclear and the early 1970s to the Northwest Islands areas in the Yellow Sea where missile diplomacy in the 1990s was enabled by the development of they had a local military advantage. Moreover, the North Koreans started nuclear and missile capabilities that had been accelerated in the 1980s. to dig tunnels beneath the DMZ during this period in order to get In this context, it is noteworthy that North Korea was relatively around the fortified DMZ. However, South Korea responded by fortify- inactive in using conventional military force in the 1980s. The changing ing the Northwest Islands and by strengthening its naval forces, shift- military balance on the Korean peninsula explains this inaction or rela- ing the local military balance at sea in its favor. When this happened, tive calm in that decade. By 1986, South Korea had finished its second the North Koreans moved their attention away from the Northwest mid-term Force Improvement Program and the United States and Islands areas to the Joint Security Area, where establishing local mili- South Korea had adopted more offensive elements into its defense tary superiority was relatively easy. Finally, North Korea’s nuclear and strategy.74 South Korea had been outspending North Korea on defense missile capabilities were developed inside its territory. In other words, since 1976 and the overall military balance was shifting in favor of the the nuclear and missile diplomacy resulted from activities inside the U.S.-ROK side. Moreover, North Korea was beginning to put a larger North Korean territory, which served as a sanctuary. share of resources on ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction In the 1990s, the North Koreans in many ways replayed their such as nuclear and chemical weapons with a diminishing emphasis on actions in the 1970s in the Joint Security Area and in the Northwest conventional forces. Islands areas. The frequent armed demonstrations in the Joint Security Area in the mid 1990s were a modern version of the Axe Murder incident Military Advantages and the Choice of Location without blood. The increased naval activities in the Northwest Islands areas in the 1990s had much in common with the North Korean actions The preferred location of North Korea’s military actions changed in the first half of the 1970s. One major difference was that while North Korea enjoyed military superiority in the Northwest Islands in the 73 Nodong Sinmun, Dec. 16, 1962, p. 1. According to Kim Il Sung, the military lines early 1970s, it did not in 1999. Anyhow, although North Korea’s room ordered “to train the People’s Army into a cadre army, to modernize arma- for action shrank over time, limited actions were still possible in these ments, fortify military positions, arm the entire people, and to garrison the small areas. whole country. . . .” Kim Il Sung, “Let Us Strengthen the Revolutionary Forces Unconventional actions followed the same pattern. In the 1960s, in Every Way so as to Achieve the Cause of Reunification of the Country,” the majority of North Korean agents infiltrated the South across the DMZ. Concluding Speech Delivered at the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth When the DMZ was fortified in the late 1960s, however, sea-bound Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Feb. 27, 1964, in Kim Il Sung Works, Vol. 18 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1984), infiltrations increased. Then after the military balance at sea shifted, pp. 222–23. North Korea started to put an emphasis on submerged infiltration 74 Gugbang Gunsa Yeonguso [National Defense Military History Research Insti- methods. The submarine incidents of 1996 and 1998 were partly the tute], Geongun 50-nyeonsa [Fifty-Year History since the Foundation of the Armed results of such a shift. It is also worth pointing out that two of the three Forces] (Seoul: Gugbang Gunsa Yeonguso, 1998), pp. 354–65; Chung Min Lee, terrorist attacks in the 1980s took place outside the Korean peninsula, The Emerging Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia: Implications for Korea’s Defense reflecting the shift in military balance in and around the peninsula. Strategy and Planning for the 1990s (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unifi- cation of Korea, 1989), pp. 195, 198; and Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 91, 93. 212 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 213

Military Advantages as a Determinant of Success skills were at best secondary determinants of the effectiveness of North Korea’s military-diplomatic campaigns. The single most important determinant of success in North Korea’s military-diplomatic campaigns has been military advantages. Where Deterrence as a Crucial Ingredient the North Koreans had military advantages, chances were high that their military actions would succeed. In other words, military balance, Despite the tendency to focus on the offensive aspect of the North instead of negotiating skills, played a decisive role in determining the Korean military strategy, effective deterrence has been a critical enabling outcome of North Korea’s military-diplomatic campaigns. factor in North Korea’s military actions. In exercising military force, Nuclear and missile diplomacy are cases in point. Nuclear diplo- North Korea had to make sure that the U.S.-ROK side would not take macy resulted in the Agreed Framework. The missile diplomacy strong retaliatory actions. almost produced significantly improved relations between the United The United States and/or South Korea seriously considered mili- States and North Korea. However, the same North Koreans failed to tary actions in response to the North Korean raid on the Blue House, obtain any meaningful diplomatic or economic benefit from their mili- the seizure of the Pueblo, the shooting-down of the EC-121, the Axe tary actions in the Joint Security Area, the DMZ, and the Northwest Murder incident, and the nuclear development. However, in all cases, Islands areas in the 1990s. In fact, they devoted just as much diplomatic they eventually dropped the military option. efforts and demonstrated negotiation skills in their campaigns in these One of the sources of North Korea’s deterrent capabilities was the areas as in the nuclear and missile diplomacy. The level of sophistica- “Party military lines.” When Kim Il Sung explained the “military tion and complexity involved in the former was by no means lower lines,” the “arming of the entire population” and the “fortification of than that involved in the latter.75 the entire country” were presented as “the most powerful defense What distinguished these cases was the existence of the nuclear system from the military strategic point of view, a system which is and missile capabilities in the former that exerted tremendous compellent capable of thwarting any enemy attack.”76 Until the 1990s, one of the effects on the concerned countries. The armed demonstrations in the most important reasons why the United States and South Korea did not Joint Security Area, the skirmishes in the DMZ, and the naval clash in take punitive military actions had been the realization that winning a the Northwest Islands areas were not at all trivial. However, in terms of war with North Korea was not possible. strategic significance and compellent value, these military actions were The sources of North Korea’s deterrence have changed over time, no match for the significance of the nuclear and missile capabilities. however. By 1994, North Korea had lost its ability to defend against a This does not mean that tactical factors did not matter. Sophisticated U.S.-ROK counter-offensive. In June 1994, Gen. Gary Luck, Comman- diplomacy and good use of surprise were indispensable in successfully der in Chief, U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command, assessed that translating the nuclear and missile capabilities into substantial diplo- North Korea could be defeated even if it used the one or two nuclear matic and economic gains. However, tactical factors such as negotiation weapons it might have possessed.77 In other words, North Korea had lost denial capabilities by then, and deterrence by denial was replaced 75 For the sophisticated nature of North Korea’s military-diplomatic campaigns, by deterrence by punishment. see Proceedings of the Sixth through Eleventh General Officers Talks, June 15, North Korea’s deterrence now came from its ability to punish 1999, June 22, 1999, July 2, 1999, July 21, 1999, Aug. 17, 1999, and Sept. 1, 1999; Seoul and inflict enormous casualties on U.S.-ROK forces in case of and UNC, “Report of the Activities of the United Nations Command for 1999,” these materials provided by the UNCMAC; “Special communiqué of KPA general staff,” KCNA, Sept. 2, 1999; and “KPA navy command’s important 76 Kim, “The Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Party,” p. 361. communiqué,” KCNA, March 23, 2000. 77 Carter and Perry, Preventive Defense, p. 130. 214 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 215 conflict, although it did not have a chance to win it. In the 1990s, North revealed that there were many aged officials in the Ministry of Foreign Korea deployed a large number of long-range artillery and multiple Affairs and that almost 90 percent of the officials in the ministry stayed rocket launchers along the DMZ, taking Seoul hostage. Despite the in the same bureau throughout his or her life. Such a personnel manage- confidence that the U.S.-ROK side had in prevailing in war, North ment system certainly creates rigidity. However, it also guaranteed con- Korea successfully deterred surgical and/or coercive actions with its sistency, continuity, and a significant level of professionalism.81 ability to “punish.”78 Element of Surprise Extensive Use of Legal Factors An element of surprise has almost always been an important ingre- Legal factors mattered significantly in North Korea’s military dient in North Korea’s military actions. The seizure of the Pueblo, the actions. North Korean policymakers have proved to be extremely shooting down of the EC-121, the Axe Murder incident, the announce- knowledgeable about legal issues and versed in exploiting them to ment to withdraw from the NPT, and the launch of the Taepodong missile their advantage. —all surprised observers of North Korean affairs. Quite frequently, North Korea’s military-diplomatic campaigns It also appears that in recent years, the North Koreans have taken involved legal issues in important ways. In the “West Sea incident” of into account political developments both in the United States and the 1970s, the failure of the Armistice Agreement to define maritime South Korea in deciding when to initiate an action. The nuclear diplo- boundaries was exploited and the validity of the Northern Limit Line macy and the missile diplomacy commenced shortly after new admin- was challenged. Behind the scenes was the emergence of the 12-nauti- istrations came into office in the United States and/or South Korea. By cal-mile territorial water as a new international norm in the early 1970s. doing so, the North Koreans seem to have put U.S. and South Korean The North Koreans took advantage of provisions in the NPT in putting policymakers off balance. Surprise was used effectively and it actually time pressure on American negotiators. The sustained actions in the worked well. Behind North Korea’s effective use of surprise are the Joint Security Area and around the Northwest Islands in the 1990s nature of its political system, its military capabilities, and its tactical were designed to undermine the Armistice by highlighting its defects. skills. In particular, the naval operations in the Northwest Islands areas in June 1999 aimed to exploit the weakness of the Northern Limit Line in Domestic Politics a much more sophisticated manner than in the 1970s.79 North Korea’s ability to make use of legal factors seems to come Domestic political considerations have been of secondary impor- partly from the nature of its political system in which a small number tance or less as motives for North Korean military actions. In 1993, Kim of specialists tends to stay in the same position for a long time, resulting Jong Il was elected Chairman of the National Defense Commission in a deep understanding of technical issues and the retention of organi- about a month after North Korea announced its withdrawal from the zational memory.80 A former North Korean diplomat who defected NPT.82 In 1998, Kim Jong Il was reelected chairman of the National Defense Commission just after the Taepodong missile was launched, and the launch was extensively used for domestic propaganda and 78 Ibid., pp. 128–29. 79 For example, see Proceedings of the Eighth General Officers Talks, July 2, 1999, provided by the UNCMAC. 81 A former North Korean diplomat who defected, interviewed by author, Seoul, 80 Bong-Geun Jun, former Blue House staff, interview by author, Seoul, ROK, ROK, May 15, 2002. May 16, 2002. 82 Pyongyang Times, April 10, 1993, p. 2. 216 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 217 agitation purposes.83 they faced negative international developments does not often hold However, the contention that the North Korean leaders resorted to true. They initiated military actions when the international environment force when they had domestic political problems is not true. North was favorable as well as when it was not. The Axe Murder incident Korea’s use of force actually increased when Kim Il Sung’s position was took place in an environment most favorable to North Korea. The consolidated in the 1960s, while there was not much use of force in the nuclear diplomacy began when the international situation was extremely 1950s after the Korean War when the serious domestic power struggle negative. The Taepodong launch occurred when the international envi- was taking place in North Korea.84 Also, when Kim Jong Il formalized ronment was quite favorable due to the adoption of the engagement/ his position in the Party in the early 1980s, North Korea continued to sunshine policy on the part of the United States and South Korea. In undertake provocative actions such as the Rangoon Incident.85 fact, when the missile was launched, high-level U.S.-DPRK talks were Moreover, North Korea’s military actions could have worked taking place in New York. The June 1999 naval provocations took place against domestic political objectives because some of the actions failed. shortly after William Perry visited Pyongyang. The Axe Murder incident was a major failure. The North Korean navy The international environment does not necessarily determine the was defeated in the 1999 battle in the Yellow Sea. Unconventional outcome, either. The Axe Murder failed disastrously despite the favor- actions such as the and the bombing of the Korean able international environment, while nuclear diplomacy turned out to Airliner also failed disastrously. These cases would have given ammu- be a success under the most unfavorable international environment. nition to Kim Jong Il’s domestic rivals if they actually existed. There is the argument that the North Korean leaders have used Mid-to Long-Term Efficacy of Military-Diplomatic Campaigns military actions to tighten internal order. However, this argument is also flawed. For one, the North Korean leadership exercises stringent North Korea’s military-diplomatic campaigns have in some cases control over the media. If the information is in fact tightly controlled, produced negative mid- to long-term consequences by provoking reac- the North Korean authority can simply make up “foreign military tions from the countries concerned. In the 1960s, sustained assaults aggression,” or something of that kind, to tighten domestic control. For along the DMZ caused the U.S.-ROK side to fortify the DMZ. In the another, if the information is not controlled perfectly and actual mili- 1970s, North Korean naval and air activities provoked South Korea’s tary confrontation is needed to tighten the internal order, then the mili- effort to fortify the Northwest Islands and build up and modernize its tary failures would also be known to the public, discrediting the politi- naval forces deployed in the area. The local military balance in the area cal authority. had become decisively favorable to the South Korean side by the time the naval vessels of North and South Korea engaged in battle in June International Environment 1999. The launch of the Taepodong missile in 1998 encouraged the United States and Japan to renew their efforts on ballistic missile The contention that the North Koreans took military actions when defense programs. These cases have demonstrated the importance of paying attention 83 “Successful launch of first satellite in DPRK,” KCNA, Sept. 4, 1998; and “Kim to mid- to long-term negative consequences in assessing the effectiveness Jong Il’s election as NDC Chairman proposed,” KCNA, Sept. 5, 1998. of North Korea’s military-diplomatic campaigns. Short-term success 84 Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia could turn into mid- to long-term failure. In this sense, the existence of University Press, 1988), pp. 137–57 and 212–37. potential military or other countermeasures can make an important dif- 85 In the Sixth Party Congress in 1980, Kim Jong Il was elected to the Presidium of the Political Bureau, to the Political Bureau, as secretary in the Secretariat, ference in determining the longer-term effectiveness of any military- and to the Central Military Commission. diplomatic campaigns. 218 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 219

Implications for the Renewed Nuclear Crisis particularly Kim Jong Il, are much more rational than they were once considered to be. In recent years, Kim has met all of the top leaders of North Korea s Military Actions will be Consistent the major countries concerned, except the United States. Kim’s frequent with its Political Objectives international exposure has demonstrated that however idiosyncratic his aims might be, he is a calculating and rational actor. One remaining Currently, North Korea is repeating its nuclear diplomacy of 1993- concern is the fact that Kim Jong Il has no experience of making a deci- 94. So far, there is no indication that North Korea’s political objectives sion to back off in major international crises. In crises in 1976 and 1994, have changed significantly since 1994. Regime survival, by normalizing it was Kim Il Sung that made the decision to back off. We have yet to relations with the United States and Japan, and obtaining economic see if his son has the same capacity. assistance from abroad, still holds as its primary goal. At the six-party talks held in August 2003, North Korea presented a proposal for a North Korea s Actions are Shaped and Constrained “package solution” to the nuclear issue. According to the proposal, the by Military Balance United States was to (a) conclude a non-aggression treaty with North Korea, (b) establish diplomatic relations with it, (c) guarantee economic North Korea’s bargaining position is stronger in some aspects but cooperation between the DPRK and Japan, and between the two Koreas, weaker in others than 10 years ago. On the one hand, weaponization of and (d) compensate for the loss of electricity caused by the delayed nuclear materials seems to have advanced; the uranium enrichment provision of light-water reactors and complete their construction. In program has been added to the list; Nodong missiles have been deployed return, North Korea would (a) allow nuclear inspections and not make in large numbers; and the Taepodong missile has been flight-tested. On nuclear weapons, (b) finally dismantle its nuclear facilities, and (c) the other hand, its conventional military forces have weakened, and the freeze the test-firing of missiles and stop their export.86 overall military balance has shifted in favor of the U.S.-ROK side.89 If political objectives remain the same, patterns of North Korean Moreover, the size of the North Korean economy has been shrunk signifi- actions will likely remain more or less the same. In fact, North Korea’s cantly, and the country has become dependent on economic and targeting pattern remains constant. In June 2002, a North Korean patrol humanitarian aid from abroad. North Korea seems to have become boat attacked a South Korean naval vessel in the Yellow Sea, killing six more susceptible to sanctions. men on board.87 In March 2003, four North Korean fighters suddenly The single most important determinant of success in North Korea’s engaged a U.S. RC-135S reconnaissance aircraft in the Sea of Japan and military-diplomatic campaigns has been military advantage. Given the attempted to force the aircraft to land in North Korea.88 (It was a replay better set of nuclear and missile capabilities, it is possible that North of the 1968 Pueblo incident and the 1969 EC-121 incident combined.) Korea will get a better deal than the Agreed Framework in the ongoing The North Koreans killed South Koreans, but they did not physically process. However, such an outcome would be realized only if North attack Americans. Korea decides to give up much more of its military capabilities than it In the meantime, it has become clear that the North Korean leaders, did 10 years ago.

86 “Keynote Speeches Made at Six-way Talks,” KCNA, Aug. 29, 2003. 89 In February 2000, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency testified, “North 87 MND, “The Naval Clash on the Yellow Sea on June 29, 2002 between South Korea’s capability to successfully conduct complex, multi-echelon, large-scale and North Korea: The Situation and ROK’s Position,” July 1, 2002. One of operations to reunify the Korean peninsula declined in the 1990s.” Vice Admiral them died a while later in hospital. Thomas R. Wilson, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, “Military Threats 88 Eric Schmitt, “North Korean Fliers Said to Have Sought Hostages,” New York and Security: Challenges Through 2015,” Statement for the Record, Senate Times, March 8, 2003, p. A1. Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 2, 2000. 220 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 221

Deterrence as a Crucial Ingredient Extensive Use of Legal Factors

In April 2003, the MFA argued that the “physical deterrent force” North Korea will likely continue to use legal issues to its advantage. was needed to protect the security of North Korea.90 It was a significant First, North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, departure from the past, since North Korea had always used the word 2003. However, it is not clear whether the withdrawal actually took “deterrent” with a negative connotation.91 North Korea seems to have effect on April 10. The U.S. administration has not taken a position on used the word to both justify its possession of nuclear weapons and whether North Korea’s withdrawal notification met the requirements enhance credibility of its deterrent capabilities. of Article X of the NPT, and the United States has not tried to reach Since 1994, North Korea’s deterrent capability has been under- agreement on North Korea’s legal status under the NPT after April mined in some aspects but strengthened in others. On the one hand, 10.93 Room is left to be exploited. active adoption of Revolution in Military Affairs has provided U.S. Also, North Korea tried to undermine the Armistice again by armed forces with far more effective offensive and defensive capabili- exploiting the Northern Limit Line issue and will likely continue to do ties. Improvements in counter-fire forces deployed south of the DMZ so. In February, North Korean fighter aircraft crossed the Northern seem to have undercut North Korea’s ability to “punish” the South. Limit Line, two days after the Korean People’s Army’s Panmunjom Adoption of the “preemption” doctrine in the new U.S. National Secu- Mission suggested that the Korean People’s Army side would abandon rity Strategy has increased the possibility of the United States taking its commitment to the Armistice Agreement if sanctions were imposed military actions against North Korea and, therefore, has made it riskier by the United States. The Korean People’s Army claimed that imposition for North Korea to operate on the brink.92 of sanctions would amount to a” blockade,” banned by the Armistice On the other hand, North Korea might have taken Tokyo hostage, Agreement.94 These actions had much in common with the “West Sea in addition to Seoul, with a large number of Nodong missiles already incidents” in the 1970s and the 1990s. fielded in North Korea. Also, given the recent developments in South Korea—the rise of anti-American sentiment and the election of Roh Element of Surprise Moo-hyun who has said that he would be more assertive toward the United States than previous South Korean presidents—any attack on As in 1993, North Korea caught observers by surprises when it Seoul in reaction to coercive action taken by the United States against started the second nuclear diplomacy. In October 2002, North Korean North Korea would be “intolerable” to the South Koreans. Taken as a officials unexpectedly acknowledged that they had a program to whole, North Korea’s deterrent capability based on its ability to punish enrich uranium, in talks with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly. seems to be still credible in 2004. Then after three months, North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT. North Korea might again use surprise to put the countries 90 “Statement of Foreign Ministry spokesman blasts UNSC’s [United Nations involved off-balance. Security Council] discussion of Korean nuclear issue,” KCNA, April 6, 2003. Use of surprise tactics is nothing new and it will continue to play a 91 For example, the KCNA reported, “The U.S. claim that its forces in South role. However, one has to remember that the North Koreans use both Korea are a ‘war deterrent force’ is nothing but sophism intended to justify its military presence in South Korea and its moves to ignite another Korean war.” “Removal of danger of war from Korean peninsula called for,” KCNA, Jan. 20, 93 Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washing- 2002. ton, DC, April 9, 2003. 92 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 94 “Spokesman for Panmunjeom mission of KPA issues statement,” KCNA, Feb. (Washington, DC, 2002). 18, 2003. 222 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 223 positive and negative surprise. In fact, they always use tough and soft Effectiveness of flight-testing missiles as a bargaining tool seems to tactics alternately: first, they use negative surprise to raise the stakes have diminished since 1998. Another missile launch would further and then use positive surprise to cash in on tension or crisis. Policy- prompt development of missile defense systems on the part of the makers must be prepared both for positive and negative surprises. United States and Japan, which China would not like. Using missile launches as part of military-diplomatic campaigns would not work as Domestic Politics well as in 1998.

On June 3, 2003, a decision was announced to hold the election for the 11th Supreme People’s Assembly, or North Korea’s parliament, on August 3.95 This seems to be yet another attempt by North Korea to make domestic use of international tension. In fact, North Korea held the election for the 10th Supreme People’s Assembly, one month prior to the Taepodong launch in 1998. The first session of the newly-elected Assembly was convened five days after the launch. North Korea might use the tension resulting from the nuclear issue to bolster internal soli- darity again in 2003.

International Environment

North Korea had embarked on a uranium enrichment program during the Clinton-Kim Dae-jung era.96 Therefore, the claim that North Korea was reacting to a negative international environment did not hold true this time. It seems that when North Korea sought to import centrifuges, it was trying to prepare yet another tool to be used both for military and diplomatic purposes.

Mid- to Long-Term Efficacy of Military-Diplomatic Campaigns

The United States does not seem to be ready to apply “preemp- tion” and regime change to North Korea—at least for now. However, if North Korea continues to behave negatively, the “preemption” and regime change strategies might gain increased support.

95 “Election of deputies to 11th Supreme People’s Assembly of DPRK to be held,” KCNA, June 4, 2003. 96 “Interview on ABC’s This Week with George Stephanopoulos,” Secretary Colin L. Powell, Department of State, Washington, DC, Dec. 29, 2002. 224 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns Narushige Michishita 225 Stationing of the U.S. Forces the HRF in the ROK Targeting/ Military- Legal Negative brutal oriented high Defense Treaty oriented Oriented Theaterof Force Type Bangkok Table 1 Comparison of Major Cases of Major Comparison 1 Table Fair Subversive Medium FairFairFair HighFair Control- High Subversive Medium Coercive Low Subversive Low Sea the of the NWI FairFair Control-oriented Medium Subversive Medium Poor Dhabi to Coercive High Fair/ High/Fair/ Area n.a.Fair/ Potential/ Military/ High Actual/ Leadership/ Law of Actual/ Fortification Military/ Good Coercive Low but Poor/ n.a. Abu Actual/ Civilian/ Good/ Medium coast Actual/ Civilian/ Good/ High Japan Actual/ Military/ FairFair Coercive Subversive High Medium Establishment of Fair/ n.a. Korea Actual/ Military/ Conclusion of the Good Control- Extremely U.S.-ROK Mutual Good/ n.a. center Actual/ Leadership/ of the DMZ Political/ Overall/ Level of Domestic Environment International Advantage Coordination Fair/ n.a. Actual/ Leadership/ Poor/ n.a. Burma Actual/ Leadership/ Fair Control- Low Poor/ Medium Sea Actual/ Military/ Good/ High Actual/ Military/ of the DMZ Good/ High Japan Actual/ Military/ Fair Good Good/ Medium to NWI Conventional/ ROK Medium AA ROK naval buildup Fair Good Good/ Medium/ Sea of Conventional/ U.S. Low Poor Poor Good/ High/ Seoul Unconv/ ROK Low Poor Fair Good/ Medium/ ROK east Unconv/ ROK Low Negative Fair Fair/ Medium/ KE 858, Unconv/ ROK Low Negative Fair Good/ High/ JSA Conventional/ U.S. High Poor Fair Fair/ High/ Entire Conventional/ ROK & U.S. n.a. U.S. intervention Fair Poor Good/ Medium/ Seoul city Unconv/ ROK Low Fortification Results Results Situation/ Military Intensity Diplomatic Factors Consequences Political Operational Economic Local Poor Poor Good/ Medium/ Seoul Unconv/ ROK Low Poor Poor Good/ Medium/ Yellow Conventional/ U.S. Low Negative Fair Good/ Medium/ Rangoon, Unconv/ ROK Low Good Fair Good/ Medium/ DMZ Unconv/ ROK & U.S. Low Fortification Good Good Good/ Medium/ Sea of Conventional/ U.S. Medium

1968 Guerrilla Offensives Incident Incident 1987 KAL Bombing Attempt 1973-1976 West Sea Incident 1974 Assassination 1976 Axe Murder Incident Attempt EC-121 1969

1950-1953 Korean War

1968

1970 Assassination 1983 Rangoon 1981 SR-71 Incident 1966-1969 DMZ Assaults 1968 Pueblo 226 Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military–Diplomatic Campaigns U.S.-ROK-Japan coordination other anonymous U.S. III author benefited greatly from UNCLOS Fair Potential Low Agreement on the NLL Poor/ Low Actual- Military/ Basic Coordination nuclear Poornuclear Coercive Possibly Very Poor/ Medium Actual/ Military/ Negative Fair Coercive Low (Successful Poor/(Successful n.a. Potential/ Low development) Fair Good Good/ Low/ DPRK & WMD/ Japan & High Development of Fair Poor, Fair/ Low/ DMZ Conventional/ ROK High AA Good Good Fair/ Medium/ DPRK WMD/ n.a./ High NPT good)** launch) missile Fair Japan Coercive Low Closer in 1996) Fair Coercive Low Poor n.a. Fair/ Low/ JSA Conventional/ U.S. & ROK High AA (Potentially (Successful Poor/ n.a. of Sea Potential/ U.S./ the NMD/TMD (Good Very Poor/n.a.Very (Good Potential/ Military/ interviews with the following individuals: Cho Gab Je, Kang In-duk, Kim Kyung-Won, Ki-Tak Lee, Sang-Woo Rhee, Joel S. Wit, and interviews with the following individuals: Cho and South Korean officials. Poor Negative Good/ Low/ NWI Conventional/ ROK High AA Closer U.S.-ROK

JSA=Joint Security Area Limit Line NLL=Northern NWI=Northwest Islands WMD=Weapons of Mass Destruction

*n.a.=not applicable*n.a.=not unconv=unconventional AA=Armistice Agreement HRF=Homeland Reserve Forces Note: Assessments made in this table are entirely those of the author. However, in the process of making these assessments, the Assessments made in this table are entirely those of the author. However, Note: **The missile diplomacy could have produced much better outcome had Al Gore been elected president in 2000. **The missile diplomacy could have produced much Armed Clash 1998-2000 Missile Incidents Diplomacy Nuclear 1997 DMZ 1993-1994 Diplomacy

1994-1996 JSA 1999 Second “West Sea Incident”