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july 2013 . Vol 6 . Issue 7

Contents The Risks Posed by Jihadist

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Risks Posed by Jihadist Hackers By Christopher Heffelfinger By Christopher Heffelfinger

Reports 5 Fire as a Weapon in Terrorist Attacks By Joseph W. Pfeifer 8 The Syrian Spillover and Salafist Radicalization in By Bilal Y. Saab 12 Anti-Muslim Attacks in Myanmar Threaten Uptick in Regional Violence and Islamist Activism By James Brandon 16 Zaynab’s Guardians: The Emergence of Shi`a Militias in By Christopher Anzalone 21 Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb’s Strategy By Aaron Y. Zelin, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Andrew Lebovich

26 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

he current pool of jihadist hackers. Perhaps as a result, despite hackers (or jihadist hacktivists1) more than seven years of efforts to is youthful, ambitious in its construct and recruit for jihadist hacking goals, and largely lagging attacks via online forums,2 they have yet Tin terms of its technical capabilities. to form a jihadist hacking group that can This is best illustrated by the fact that demonstrably perform effective cyber these hackers have carried out few attacks. effective large-scale attacks to date. About the CTC Sentinel Jihadist hacktivists remain a loosely to There are a range of skillsets, leadership The Combating Terrorism Center is an disorganized set of individual hackers abilities and ideologies among jihadist- independent educational and research who form and disband hacking groups inspired hacktivists, and some institution based in the Department of Social they create, and frequently enter into individual hackers have carried out Sciences at the Military Academy, counterproductive rivalries with fellow small- to medium-scale cyber attacks West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses against U.S. government and private the Center’s global network of scholars and sector targets, with moderate impact practitioners to understand and confront 1 A hacktivist is a who performs cyber attacks in terms of data loss and exposure. contemporary threats posed by terrorism and for a movement or cause. The U.S. Computer Emergency Those attacks also provided jihadist other forms of political violence. Response Team (US-CERT) includes in their definition of hacktivists with clout and a media hacktivist: “Hacktivists form a small, foreign population platform (often predominately social of politically active hackers that includes individuals and The views expressed in this report are those of groups with anti-U.S. motives,” although the term does not the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, explicitly connote an anti-American agenda. For the US- 2 Calls for jihadist hacking units and electronic mujahidin the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. CERT definition, see “Cyber Threat Source Descriptions,” armies have been circulating in al-Qa`ida magazines since U.S. Department of Homeland Security, May 2005. late 2005.

1 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7 media) from which to promote their While jihadist-themed cyber attacks 15-years-old, after “watching videos of message. The range of ideological have been modest and often rudimentary children getting killed in countries like beliefs among jihadist-inspired hackers over the past decade, the advancement Kashmir and Palestine.”6 He described is varied; some hacking groups embrace and ambitions of certain jihadist his actions on behalf of TeaMp0isoN as hard line militant Islamist imagery and hacking groups, individual hacktivists “internet guerrilla warfare.”7 messaging (such as that of al-Qa`ida), and proponents of cyber jihad over the while concurrently incorporating the past one to two years give some cause for Hussain was sentenced on July 27, imagery, ethos and slogans of secular concern in this area, particularly as those 2012, to six months imprisonment hacking collectives such as adversaries are growing more adept at after he pleaded guilty in a London into the informational aspects of their identifying vulnerabilities in U.S. and court to conspiring to commit a public cyber attack campaigns. other government targets, as well as nuisance between January 1, 2010, those in the private sector. Clearly, the This article evaluates existing jihadist damage caused by jihadist cyber attacks “Although cyber attacks cyber attack capabilities, offers a pales in comparison to those under case study on a leading pro-jihadist state sponsorship (prominent cases are becoming a more hacktivist, and examines the rise of the latter include in , common and desirable in interest in cyber attacks among the highly destructive Saudi Aramco proponents of jihadist activism attack, operations conducted means of furthering the generally. It finds that although cyber by the , and global jihadist agenda, attacks are becoming a more common various data breaches performed by the and desirable means of furthering Chinese People’s Liberation Army Unit the overall impact and the global jihadist agenda, the overall 61398, among others). Jihadist cyber sophistication of jihadist impact and sophistication of jihadist attacks also trail those of better known hacktivists’ attacks have been relatively hacktivist groups such as Anonymous hacktivists’ attacks have low and will likely remain as such in the or LulzSec, both in terms of the volume been relatively low and will near term. of attacks, sophistication, and impact. Yet the prospect of jihadists conducting likely remain as such in the Evaluating Existing Jihadist Cyber Attack a high impact cyber attack—such near term.” Capabilities as one against an industrial control In comparison to hackers and hacking system (ICS) target or a series of high groups sponsored or controlled by state profile financial attacks—should not be actors, jihadist hacktivists are clearly dismissed. and April 14, 2012, and “causing behind in terms of the impact of their a computer to perform a function attacks, their diminished technical (aka TriCk): Pro-Jihadist to secure unauthorized access to skillset, and their overall weak Hacktivist, Cyber Criminal a program or data” under the UK organizational and recruitment abilities. One prominent jihadist-inspired Computer Misuse Act.8 A resident of Their hacking activities frequently hacktivist was Junaid Hussain. Born Birmingham, England, Hussain had include website defacements (usually in 1994, Hussain founded the hacking turned 18 shortly before the trial date in against poorly secured websites), group TeaMp0isoN. Between the ages late June 2012.9 His initial arrest—after wherein the attackers leave antagonistic of 13-17, Hussain was a highly active years of maintaining his anonymity as imagery and comments on the victimized hacker using the online moniker a teenage hacker—was prompted by websites.3 Yet the activities of some “TriCk.” Between 2010 and 2012, he a phone-based hack and concurrent jihadist hacktivists indicate there is a targeted NATO, officials and agencies of telephonic denial-of-service (DoS) gradual sophistication of attack modes the UK government and a United States attack targeting the Anti-Terrorist and intended attack impacts, occurring emergency response call line, among Hotline of the alongside a growing contingent of young others, carrying out cyber attacks that Service (MPS) on April 10-11, 2012.10 jihadist enthusiasts who see cyber were typically loosely jihadist-themed attacks as an increasingly effective and and promoting the liberation of Muslims 6 Eduard Kovacs, “Hackers Around the World: It’s No relatively easy way to contribute to the in Palestine, Kashmir and other Muslim- TriCk, He’s Among the Best in the UK,” Softpedia, Feb- liberation or support of “oppressed” majority conflict zones. Hussain’s ruary 18, 2012. Muslims around the globe, which can attacks also included the publication of 7 Ibid. frequently fall under the designation of personally identifiable information on 8 Caroline Grant, “Hacker’s Facing Jail Over Blair Email “cyber terrorism.”4 the leadership of the English Defense Raid,” , June 30, 2012. League (EDL), an “anti-Islamist 9 Tammy Hughes, “‘Team Poison’ Hacker, 18, who Pub- 3 Such imagery typically includes the attacking group’s extremism” group, in April 2011, and the lished ’s Address Book Online Faces Jail,” logo and/or a satire of the victim’s logo, or statements theft of hundreds of Israeli credit card Daily Mail, June 30, 2012. criticizing the victim’s security. holders’ data as part of “Operation Free 10 On the evening of April 12, 2012, TriCk and another 5 4 There is often a thin line between cyberterrorism and Palestine” in November 2011. He stated teenager aged 16 (who was later released on bail after online activism for humanitarian or social causes. As with that he became political when he was police said they did not believe him to be a member of kinetic activities, however, terrorism is distinguished by TeaMp0isoN) were arrested by police at a residence in causing harm to another person or their property in the 5 Hannah Furness, “Team Poison: Profile of the Hack- Birmingham, in West Midlands. See “Two Arrested Af- act of conveying a message, or political agenda. ers,” Telegraph, April 12, 2012. ter Hackers Attacked Anti-Terror Hotline,” Telegraph,

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Following Hussain’s arrest, his he and other TeaMp0isoN members That attack also demonstrated an ability previous hacking activities carried claimed to use to record the phone call, to learn from past mistakes and deliver out under the name TriCk and his he said “the conversation was tapped an improved attack mechanism within group, TeaMp0isoN, were handled by into via a private method, a short-time frame on the part of TriCk the Police Central eCrime Unit, which their phone system is old and we found and supporting TeaMp0isoN members. investigates major cyber crimes.11 This a way to get in via basic but private was due in part to the fact that Hussain phreaking technique.”17 As claimed, In addition to affecting the MPS’ had, in June 2011, breached the personal this hacking method likely enabled the anti-terrorism hotline over a two- e-mail account of Katy Kay, a former hackers to eavesdrop on and record the day period, another significant aspect special adviser to Prime Minister Tony conversations of officers in London’s of the operation from a capabilities Blair, and stole home addresses, phone MPS. perspective is that Hussain was able numbers and e-mail addresses of Tony to eavesdrop on sensitive, confidential Blair, his wife and sister-in-law, as well The targeting of the hotline, Hussain phone conversations among as the personal information of other said in an interview on April 11, 2012, counterterrorism and law enforcement relatives, friends, and contacts in the occurred in retaliation to the fact that officials. That capability was illustrated House of Lords and Parliament.12 “the UK court system has extradited by the leaked recordings on YouTube Babar Ahmad, Adel Abdel Bary and and further evinced when MPS officials Shortly after the telephonic DoS attack a few others” to face unfair treatment acknowledged it in the media—with the on April 11, 2012, ended, Hussain in the United States.18 Babar Ahmad implication being that other hacktivists, posted a four-minute audio recording was allegedly involved in promoting including those directly supporting on YouTube entitled “Mi6: Counter militant jihadist materials online militant groups such as al-Qa`ida, Terrorism Command Phones Hacked - through a prominent website called could use it for counterintelligence Leaked Call Discussing TeaMp0isoN,” “Azzam Publications.”19 Another of the purposes.24 While such a capability that contained an intercepted five men to be extradited was a well- may pose a risk to the security of law conversation among counterterrorism known radical cleric named Abu Hamza enforcement and other government staff discussing the automated call al-Masri who had established links to agencies’ communications if used “hoax.”13 During that recording, one known militant groups including al- effectively by adversaries, gaining employee of the counterterrorism Qa`ida.20 highly-sensitive data from this tactic is office is heard telling a colleague that challenging and uncommon, making it the anti-terrorism hotline had been Implications of TeaMp0isoN’s Phone Hacking unlikely to be employed in a widespread inundated with “about 700 calls” TeaMp0isoN attempted a similar fashion.25 from TeaMp0isoN over the previous telephonic DoS attack on the 10th two nights.14 The employees also anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, but it Similar Groups and Offshoots acknowledged that legitimate callers failed, possibly due to the fact that it Around TeaMp0isoN emerged a had been effectively denied access to the relied on a participatory model that number of like-minded hacking groups anti-terrorism hotline that TriCk and required individual volunteers to (in addition to several others that TeaMp0isoN had targeted.15 work, and it ultimately lacked adequate formed organically, unrelated to TriCk numbers of supporters for the DoS or TeaMp0isoN) that have carried The phone-based attacks, which attack to have any substantial impact.21 out similar jihadist-oriented cyber resulted in the breach and subsequent In the successful telephonic DoS attack attack campaigns. These groups are publication of sensitive conversations on the MPS Anti-Terrorist Hotline in often composed of a majority of young among British counterterrorism April 2012, however, the calls were made Sunni Muslims with membership and employees over the victimized phone by an automated caller program (which support from non-Muslims in various lines, used a somewhat novel hacking continuously repeated the phrase “Team countries.26 ZCompany Hacking Crew technique that had been popular among Poison” in a computer-generated voice), (ZHC), which began in June 2010 as the earliest generation of hackers in using a compromised server based in a spin-off hacking collective from the 1980s known as “phreaking.”16 Malaysia22 running Asterisk software.23 TeaMp0isoN, aims to “end injustice, While Hussain did not disclose any extremism, Zionism, illegal occupation” further specifics about the method 17 “Hackers ‘Eavesdrop on Terror Line,’” Guardian, and other “evils,” with a primary 27 April 11, 2012. focus on Kashmir and Palestine. In a April 12, 2012. 18 Evans et al. December 2011 manifesto, it called for 11 Hughes. 19 “Babar Ahmad and Abu Hamza Among Terror Sus- 12 “‘Team Poison’ Hacker Who Posted Tony Blair’s De- pects to be Sent to US,” BBC, October 5, 2012. that enables users to convert a Linux-run server into a tails is Jailed,” Telegraph, July 27, 2012. 20 Ibid. VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) telephone exchange. 13 Martin Evans, Christopher Williams and Hannah 21 Message posted by TeaMp0isoN members announc- 24 Evans et al. Furness, “Two Arrested after Hackers Attacked Anti- ing “Op911” on September 7, 2011, on pastebin.com, a site 25 Jeremy Kirk, “How Anonymous Hacked the FBI-SO- Terror Hotline,” Telegraph, April 12, 2012. commonly used by hacktivists to post campaign mes- CA Conference Call,” IDG News Service, March 6, 2012. 14 Ibid. sages. 26 As observed from group membership and participa- 15 Ibid. 22 Paul Roberts, “UK Teen, TeaMp0isoN Member, Ar- tion in social media during 2011-2012. 16 Phreaking is the act of hacking into or manipulating a rested For ‘Phone Bomb’ Attack,” ThreatPost.com, April 27 These details are from a manifesto posted by ZHC telephone network. Popularized in the 1980s, it is often 17, 2012; “Hackers ‘Eavesdrop on Terror Line.’” members on pastebin.com and various social media out- considered the precursor to computer hacking. 23 Asterisk software is an open source software product lets in December 2011.

3 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7 members and supporters to “hack USA and published a purported SQL31 Jihadist DDoS Attacks Gain Global Attention websites against Quran burning/draw vulnerability in the First National On January 16, 2012, a Saudi hacker Muhammad (PBUH) or for protesting Bank of Long Island website, then with the moniker “0xOmar” conducted against the killings of innocents in demonstrated the same SQLi (SQL a high profile distributed denial-of- , AFG and ” and to “hack injection) vulnerability on a webpage service (DDoS)36 attack on the websites France websites for protesting ban belonging to the BCD Credit Union in of Israeli national airline El Al and the on hijab.”28 The following month, the the .32 A TeaMp0isoN Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.37 The DDoS group launched a widespread campaign member also claimed to identify a attack also targeted the websites of (which was again primarily composed similar vulnerability on the website of three Israeli banks that same day.38 The of defacement attacks) against Western the National Bank of California.33 Yet DDoS attacks did not impact trading on targets called “Operation 1M_vs_ in these cases, the attackers published the stock exchange, nor did it affect the statements saying that they would not operations of the airline; only the front- release innocent peoples’ credit card facing websites victimized in the attack “These attacks have information, instead urging them to were temporarily inaccessible. resulted in low- to medium- withdraw their money from those and other financial institutions.34 Despite 0xOmar claimed a group called level data and privacy loss, demonstrating a capability, the group “Nightmare” assisted him in the attacks, but a significant distance members shied away from publishing but little information is available to breached credit card data, perhaps out confirm that such a hacking group remains between jihadist of caution. More significant than the existed that was in contact with him hacktivists’ demonstrated attacks, however, is the amalgamation at the time of the attacks. The DDoS of the sometimes jihadist-themed attack tool used by 0xOmar on January abilities and the capability TeaMp0isoN and Anonymous, through 16 was not disclosed. The affected to conduct an effective a shared ethos of aiding the oppressed websites were largely restored to and confronting corrupt governments. normal operations within one business cyber attack on critical Given how such a movement could day, but the media impact of the attacks infrastructure.” appeal strongly to younger recruits, was felt throughout the it could be an early indication of what and bolstered other pro-jihadist and the next, younger generation of jihadist Islamist-inspired hacking groups. enthusiasts-cum-hacktivists looks like. NATO.” On January 9, 2012, it claimed One prominent Muslim cleric who to compromise credit card holders’ TeaMp0isoN and ZHC have also been commented on the media coverage was data from servers located in the United affiliated with smaller offshoot hacking Kuwaiti imam Dr. Tariq al-Suwaidan, States, United Kingdom and Australia. groups such as the Hacking who also hosts a popular television The attackers released a list of targeted Unit (MHU) and Muslim Liberation show. One day after 0xOmar’s DDoS servers on Pastebin,29 but did not readily Army (MLA) that had some overlapping attacks on Israeli targets, al-Suwaidan disclose the method used in the alleged membership with TeaMp0isoN and posted on his account, which had credit card theft. While it may have ZHC. These groups have largely some 240,000 followers, a call “to unify been exaggerated or ineffective, their been composed of young Pakistani the efforts of [Muslim] hackers in the claim nonetheless marked ZHC’s first Muslims espousing a hard line Salafi- endeavor of electronic jihad against the declared foray into causing financial jihadi message and functioned more Zionist enemy.”39 Al-Suwaidan is also a loss as a facet of their attacks.30 as propaganda units than hacking leading member of the Kuwaiti Muslim cells, carrying out low level website Brotherhood, and in May 2007 he was One curious offshoot from TeaMp0isoN defacements and other generally low listed as an unindicted co-conspirator was “PoisAnon,” a collaboration impact activities.35 In addition to these in the U.S. Department of Justice’s case between TeaMp0isoN and purported groups, individual hacktivists have, at against the Muslim-American charity, Anonymous members that emerged times, had an impact on the security the Holy Land Foundation.40 in late 2011 to carry out shared cyber environment. operations such as “OpCensorThis” 36 A DDoS attack employs a botnet of compromised or and “OpRobinHood.” During the voluntary machines as “bots,” which simultaneously week of December 1, 2012, as part of 31 Structured Query Language, or SQL, is a program- send requests to a specified server and, if successful, ren- “OpRobinHood,” PoisAnon identified ming language designed for managing data in relational der it unresponsive. databases. 37 Gianluca Mezzofiore, “‘Nightmare’ 0xOmar Hackers 28 Ibid. 32 “First National Bank of Long Island, Operation Robin Attack ’s Stock Exchange and El Al,” International 29 Pastebin.com is a website that allows users to store Hood Victim,” Softpedia, November 29, 2011. The origi- Business Times, January 16, 2012. text for a certain period of time. The website is mainly nal statement is online at www.pastebin.com/g0Ck- 38 “‘I Want to Harm Israel,’ Saudi Hacker Tells ‘Post,’” used by programmers to store pieces of source code, but rq3u. Jerusalem Post, January 16, 2012. is open to any user to paste any type of text. 33 The claim was made on a TeaMp0isoN member’s 39 In addition to his actual Twitter post, also see “Ku- 30 The theft of databases of credit card holder informa- Twitter page. waiti Imam: Cyber Jihad Effective,” ynetnews.com, Janu- tion is not uncommon among hacktivists. Many employ 34 Ibid. ary 18, 2012. programs to scan for vulnerabilities in SQL or XSS to ex- 35 As observed from group membership and participa- 40 U.S.A. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Develop- filtrate sensitive customer data. tion in social media during 2011-2012. ment, Northern District of Texas, 2007.

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Perhaps unsurprisingly, al-Suwaidan’s such high profile, high impact attacks Fire as a Weapon in call to a unified cyber jihad against remains among jihadist hacktivists Israel produced little tangible effect. and proponents of Islamist militancy. Terrorist Attacks Similar calls to a unified jihad have As the pool of jihadist hacktivists been made among real-world Islamist continues to grow, and some advance By Joseph W. Pfeifer activists for years, yet they have never to more sophisticated attack tools and managed to overcome fragmentation methods, the possibility of an effective This article is adapted from the author’s and in-fighting. This is in part because cyber attack emerging from among these testimony on “Protecting the Homeland the jihadist hacktivist community, like actors becomes more likely. Against Mumbai-Style Attacks and the its kinetic counterpart, is prone to Threat from Lashkar-e-Taiba” presented decentralization, which explains why it The continuance of vulnerable attack to the U.S. House Committee on Homeland has been unable to consistently mount targets and the likely increase in Security’s Subcommittee on Counterterrorism high impact cyber attacks, whether Islamist hacking activity in the near and Intelligence on June 12, 2013. through DDoS tools or exploiting code term combine to form a potentially vulnerabilities and performing data challenging security environment for the use of fire for criminal, gang, and breaches. U.S. and other Western governments terrorist activities, as well as targeting and private companies. Many of these first responders, is not new. During Conclusion potential targets, however, can mitigate the past four decades, the New York To date, jihadist hacktivists and the impact of cyber-terrorists—whether City Fire Department (FDNY) has faced hacking collectives sympathetic to they are jihadist hacktivists or hackers hundreds of intentionally set fires that jihadist causes have largely used from a collective like Anonymous—by would often target people. On March unsophisticated attack methods. taking additional steps to safeguard 25, 1990, however, the unthinkable These include brute force cracking to the integrity of their data and their happened. An arsonist, with a plastic hack into e-mail and web servers and customers’ information, thereby container of gasoline, spread the fuel on other basic techniques such as using reducing the media attention such the exit stairs of the “Happy Land Night open source hacking software that attackers seek to exploit in pursuit of Club” in the Bronx intentionally killing scans for vulnerabilities, or programs their agenda and message campaigns. 87 people, foreshadowing even larger that run pre-programmed exploits. Pro- events to come. jihadist hackers have also used DDoS Christopher Heffelfinger is President attacks (with occasional effectiveness, of AVH, LLC. Based in Washington, The attacks of September 11, 2001, notably in the case of the Saudi hacker D.C., he is also author of Radical are remembered as the first to 0xOmar) and limited spear-phishing41 and in America: Salafism’s employ airplanes as weapons of mass other social-engineering-based network Journey from Arabia to the West destruction, resulting in the deaths intrusion techniques. These attacks have and a former Fellow of the Combating of almost 3,000 people. It was the resulted in low- to medium- level data and Terrorism Center’s FBI program. resultant fires, however, that brought privacy loss, but a significant distance down Towers 1 and 2 of the World remains between jihadist hacktivists’ Trade Center in the deadliest attack demonstrated abilities and the capability on U.S. soil. Seven years later, in what to conduct an effective cyber attack on is described as a “paradigm shift,” 10 critical infrastructure, or even those with terrorist operatives from Lashkar- significant financial cost. i-Tayyiba (LeT) carried out attacks over three days in Mumbai, India, A number of “hacking units” or “cyber in November 2008, using a mix of armies” incorporating al-Qa`ida’s name automatic weapons, explosives and fire.1 or identifying as aiding militant jihad Each of these attacks is remembered for have emerged (or at least announced something other than fire, yet in each their formation) in recent years, yet so it was the fire that complicated rescue far none have managed to gain traction, operations and drastically increased the garner much media attention, or carry lethality of the attacks. out a significant attack. They also appear to lack any skilled membership. While A full understanding of fire as a weapon some on jihadist forums have called for and implications for response are attacks on critical infrastructure targets, essential for homeland security, as it no specific or viable plots have emerged requires new policies and partnerships against them from any jihadist-affiliated to address this emerging threat. Fire is 42 an attractive weapon for terrorists for actors. Nonetheless, the interest in for Electronic Terrorism.” A top priority for this center, several reasons. Igniting a fire requires he described, is the targeting of “SCADA [supervisory little to no training. Fire and associated 41 “Spear-” is a phishing attack against a specif- control and data acquisition] systems to distort the com- ic target, rather than a general population, typically with panies of electricity, gas, water, airports, trains, subway the aim of gaining access to a secured network. trains and central control systems” in the United States, 1 Michael R. Bloomberg et al., FDNY Counterterrorism and 42 On June 11, 2011, in a leading jihadist forum, “Yaman” United Kingdom and France. Yaman claimed the en- Risk Management Strategy (New York: New York City posted a highly detailed message calling for a “Center deavor was a “new center for Qa`idat al-Jihad.” Fire Department, 2011).

5 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7 smoke can penetrate defenses with television cameras outside the hotel attack. Following this incident, similar alarming lethality. Fire makes tactical and would create an image the world arson attacks took place days after response more difficult. The images would watch. In this case, fire was Benghazi against the UN Multinational of fire also increase media coverage, used as a strategic weapon. Yet it also Force in the as well as capturing world attention.2 The FDNY created a condition that complicated at the U.S. Embassy in , Tunisia. has been studying this terrorist trend the rescue planning and challenged the closely and, as a result of those efforts, first responders to deal with not only an While successful attacks are instructive, is leading the national fire service on active shooter threat inside a hostage it is equally important to study this issue. barricade situation, but also one where unrealized terrorist plots as they reveal fire and smoke created a second layer a great deal about adversary intentions, Security personnel and emergency of obstacles to the rescue force—one for motivations, target selection and desired responders must rethink the way that which they were not prepared. tactics. they prepare and respond to incidents and anticipate the use of fire as a On September 11, 2012, the first murder - Arriving in the United States from the weapon, especially when combined of an American ambassador since United Kingdom, al-Qa`ida operative with other attack methods. This article 1988 took place in Benghazi, . Dhiren Barot carried out reconnaissance examines the terrorist use of fire as a Although firearms, IEDs and military for terrorist attacks in New York City weapon, the complexities of responding ordinance were used, it was not bullets and Washington, D.C. Part of his to multi-modality attacks involving or explosives that killed the U.S. research focused on exploiting building fire, and the role the FDNY can play in ambassador, but rather smoke from an vulnerabilities, including gaps in fire national homeland security efforts. arson fire. During the attack on the U.S. protection. He determined that he could cause significant damage to the Understanding Fire as a Weapon Prudential Building in Newark, New The devastating 2008 attacks in “A full understanding Jersey, and the Citi Corp Building in Mumbai, India, represented a game- of fire as a weapon and New York by ramming a loaded gas changer. Over three days, a city of tanker truck into the lobby and then nearly 14 million was held hostage implications for response igniting the fuel. while 166 people were murdered in are essential for homeland multiple locations across the city, - Another al-Qa`ida operative, introducing a new model for terrorist security, as it requires new Brooklyn-born Jose Padilla, determined attacks. The nature of the Mumbai policies and partnerships that a “dirty bomb” attack might be attack confused those providing too difficult to execute, so instead he tactical response, rescue operations, to address this emerging planned to set wildfires, as well as ignite fire extinguishment and mass casualty threat.” high-rise buildings by damaging the gas care. The attackers employed multiple lines in apartments. means of attack, including: improvised explosive devices, assassination, - An al-Qa`ida cell in the United hostage barricade, building takeover, mission in Benghazi, which killed four Kingdom researched means to disable active shooter, kidnapping and fire. Americans,4 terrorists reportedly linked fire suppression systems to increase Despite all of the violence, the most to Ansar al-Shari`a and al-Qa`ida in the the impact of a plot that was ultimately iconic images from that event remain Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) used fuel from disrupted by authorities. the fire at Taj Mahal Hotel. The pictures jerry cans to start a fire in the main of people hanging out of the windows villa, where Ambassador Christopher These failed plots point to a strong of the hotel to escape the fire are Stevens was sheltering in the designated interest in the use of fire as a weapon by reminiscent of 9/11. location with two members of his terrorist groups and those they influence. diplomatic security detail. As the three In its widely disseminated English- Brian Jenkins notably stated in 1974 men attempted to escape the untenable language Inspire magazine, al-Qa`ida that “terrorist attacks are often atmosphere—filled with choking, in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has carefully choreographed to attract the blinding smoke—the ambassador was repeatedly urged aspiring homegrown attention of the electronic media and separated from the one member of the violent extremists to carry out low tech, the international press…Terrorism is detail who was able to escape through high impact attacks in the United States theater.” Directing the Mumbai attack a window. Unfortunately, Ambassador or other Western countries. In one issue from Pakistan, the mastermind asked Stevens and the other agent did not of Inspire, the readers were introduced the terrorists, “Are you setting the follow. Similar to 9/11 and Mumbai, to various methods of conducting an fire or not?”3 He understood that the the world was left with another image attack, including the use of simple fire would capture the attention of the of a building ablaze during a terrorist “ember bombs” to ignite forest fires.5 Equally important, the images from 2 The images of buildings on fire with people trapped at 4 Ambassador Christopher Stevens and information attacks like Mumbai serve as a model the windows captured the world’s attention and provid- management officer Sean Smith were killed inside the for others to follow. ed a dramatic backdrop to the terrorist actions. main villa by smoke and fire. Former Navy SEALs Ty- 3 “Keep Fighting But Don’t Be Taken Alive: Handlers to rone Woods and Glen Doherty were killed elsewhere 5 “Inspire Magazine: The ‘Vanity Fair’ of Terrorism,” 26/11 Attackers,” Times of India, July 6, 2012. during the attacks. CBS, May 4, 2012.

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These events reveal that a group does To address these complex challenges, response scenarios to active shooter not need a great deal of training to the FDNY has reaffirmed its attacks involving fire in multiple conduct a dramatic terrorist attack. relationships with established locations. In April 2013, two men at the partners like the NYPD, and forged Marathon killed three people, injured new partnerships that add essential Leading Role of FDNY in National Homeland 275 others and paralyzed the city. The expertise to develop effective Security Efforts Boston attacks serve as an important techniques, tactics and procedures. As consumers of intelligence, and the reminder that attacks need not be The results of these initiatives are first line of defense when terrorist sophisticated to be deadly. Indeed, a jointly published intelligence bulletins, attacks occur, emergency responders survey of terrorists’ attack plots in forward-looking joint exercises and require the best intelligence to carry out the United States over the past decade information exchanges that are pushing their duties across all mission areas. The reveals a trend remarkable for the response models forward. understanding of the threat environment simplicity of attack plans. Fire as a drives training initiatives, general weapon, by itself or along with other Several partnerships are worthy awareness, safety protocols, operating tactics, presents significant challenges of mention: FDNY began meetings procedures and risk management. that first responders and security with FBI’s New York SWAT team to forces must contend with in planning, explore the idea of joint tactical teams The fire service, however, is more than preparation and drills. simultaneously facing armed terrorists, a consumer of intelligence. It is also fire and smoke, victims and mass a producer of intelligence as a non- Complexities in Responding to Multi-Modality casualties. Discussions and tabletop traditional intelligence partner to the Attacks Involving Fire exercises led to two full-scale exercises intelligence community. Firefighters FDNY research and preparedness efforts that tested this concept. The insights and emergency medical personnel on fire as a weapon have centered on gained from this one-year collaboration offer unique perspectives to more what is now known as the “Mumbai-style with the FBI culminated in the Interagency established intelligence partners and attack method.” The salient features of Tactical Response Model released in June law enforcement, adding richness a Mumbai-style attack include: 2012. and insights in the understanding of the vulnerabilities and consequences - multiple attackers, In May 2012, FDNY began collaboration related to varying threat streams. For - multiple targets and with a group from the U.S. Army that more than five years, the FDNY has - multiple weapon types (guns, explosives specialize in rapid solutions to current produced a weekly intelligence product and fire) and anticipated problems on the called the Watchline, balancing a strategic - deployed over a prolonged operational battlefield. As with the FBI, a series of focus with operational relevance to period leveraging media attention to meetings, training modules and tabletop its primary readership: emergency amplify the effects of the attack.6 exercises led to the group’s February responders. Fire service intelligence 2013 “Red Team” paper on Fire and Smoke serves not only the response community These factors create unique challenges as a Weapon, envisioning a Mumbai-style but its intelligence partners with the for first responders beginning with the attack in a hypothetical Manhattan delivery of tailored intelligence on ability to quickly and accurately gain office building in an attempt to gauge the latest threats, trends, events and situational awareness of the nature and emergency responder preparedness innovations that affect these groups, extent of the attack, the need for several related to this novel attack method. including the use of fire as a weapon on command posts to address multiple the world stage. attack sites and tactics, and techniques After the Benghazi attacks, the and procedures to deal with attacks Department of State’s Diplomatic FDNY has also sent one of its officers to deploying both fire and other attack Security Service leveraged the FDNY the National Counterterrorism Center modalities (e.g., active shooter). to provide advice to its high-threat (NCTC) on a one-year detail where response team—the the officer not only receives the latest Fire presents a qualitatively different Deployment. Diplomatic Security intelligence and threat data, but also type of attack when used in conjunction Service agents were briefed on the provides the intelligence community with other attack means. Fire, and most critical features of fire as a with fire service subject matter expertise its associated smoke, can prove weapon. Agents were then put through on a broad range of issues related to disorienting to a responding force, firefighting training at the FDNY emergency responders. NCTC has inhibit ingress to the target, create training academy, including extrication committed to providing first responders structural dangers and potentially of fortified vehicles and a walk-through with the best threat intelligence so they increase the number of casualties that exercise of a Mumbai-style scenario. can operate safely in performing their the security forces will encounter while life saving mission, and recognizes the trying to resolve the situation. These Finally, the FDNY has worked closely intrinsic value of this non-traditional factors present significant challenges to with the London Fire Brigade on partnership. counterterrorism operations. counterterrorism measures since the 7/7 bombings in 2005. In preparation In addition, the FDNY collaborates for the 2012 Olympics, FDNY discussed with other partners throughout

6 Fire Department in the City of New York, “Defining a with London’s fire service and the the intelligence community on the Mumbai-style Attack,” Fireguard, April, 2011. Metropolitan Police Service possible production of intelligence products. In

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May 2012, the Department of Homeland The Syrian Spillover and stranger to Lebanon’s landscape, having Security Office of Intelligence and existed in several forms since the 1970s. Analysis released Terrorist Interest in Salafist Radicalization in Over the years, it has sporadically Using Fire as a Weapon, written in close Lebanon caused bouts of violence and criminal consultation with the FDNY. Key activity in the northern region and in findings centered on the advantages of By Bilal Y. Saab the Palestinian refugee camps.4 using fire over other terrorist tactics, potential for mass casualties, economic conflict with the Sunnis, who The deadliest encounter between damage and emergency resource constitute the majority of all Muslims in Lebanese authorities and Sunni depletion. the Middle East and around the world, militancy occurred in the summer of is a scenario that severely undermines 2007 when the Lebanese army was Working with the Department of the long-term interests of Lebanese forced to destroy the Palestinian refugee Defense’s Combating Terrorism Hizb Allah. Not only would such a camp of Nahr al-Bared to eradicate the Technical Support Office and New religious war be a costly distraction threat of Fatah al-Islam, a Salafi-jihadi Mexico Tech’s Energetic Materials from the military struggle against group that was growing in size and Research and Testing Center, the FDNY Israel, but it would also be a strategic influence in the northern part of the wants to examine the vulnerability of blunder because of its likely effects of country.5 The most recent violent clash high-rise building fire suppression endangering Hizb Allah’s Shi`a support between the Lebanese army and Salafi- systems. This interagency group hopes base and consequently threatening the jihadis, however, occurred in Abra, to construct a fire protection system organization’s existence.1 For the past a neighborhood in the southern city and building mock-up for the purpose decade, however, Hizb Allah has failed of Sidon, in late June 2013.6 Lebanese of testing blast effects on standpipes to fend off the specter of sectarian war, Salafist Shaykh Ahmad al-Assir, along and sprinklers. Test results could then provoking and alienating the Lebanese with several of his armed followers, be used to inform first responders, Sunni community.2 Yet it is Hizb Allah’s ambushed a Lebanese army checkpoint Homeland Security and the State military intervention in Syria, designed on June 23, causing a two-day battle Department of the level of vulnerability to prevent the collapse of an allied that killed 17 Lebanese soldiers and of a combination attack of IEDs and Syrian government and to maintain dozens of al-Assir’s gunmen.7 Al-Assir’s fire. vital supply lines, that constitutes the fighting force was ultimately defeated most serious and immediate action that and the Lebanese army took control of Conclusion could precipitate Sunni-Shi`a conflict his security compound, but the shaykh This type of interagency and in Lebanon. himself supposedly managed to escape. international collaboration by the His whereabouts are still unknown.8 FDNY demonstrates the importance While it is evident that Sunni-Shi`a of multi-agency solutions to these tensions in Lebanon and the Middle This article provides an assessment of complex problems. In an era of East have risen partly because of the the effects of the war in Syria on the ever constraining resources, it is Syrian crisis, it is less clear how the growth trajectory of Lebanon’s Salafi- critical that organizations such as Syrian spillover has radicalized larger jihadis, clarifying the old and new the FDNY leverage their expertise parts of Lebanon’s Sunni Islamist actors, their clout in the north and in to support broader audiences in the community.3 Sunni militancy is no the Palestinian refugee camps, and their face of a dynamic and resilient enemy. military involvement in Syria. It also The recognition of terrorists’ interest 1 Regional demographics have worked against Hizb Al- looks specifically at the case of Ahmad in the use of fire as a weapon and the lah and the Shi`a. Therefore, even the staunchest Leba- al-Assir, assessing the implications of resulting complexities are important nese Shi`a supporters of Hizb Allah would prefer to be his recent rise and fall in Abra. The considerations for all first responders at peace with Sunni Lebanese and their broader environ- article finds that despite increased and security forces. ment, which is predominantly Sunni. 2 These actions include removing the Lebanese Sunni sentation in Lebanon because the last time the country Assistant Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer is the community’s leader, Saad Hariri, from power in a so- had an official census was in 1932 due to political sensi- Chief of Counterterrorism and Emergency called coup in 2011, and allegedly participating in a spate tivities. Preparedness at the Fire Department of of assassinations of its most influential figures including 4 Bilal Y. Saab, “Lebanon at Risk from Salafi-Jihadi Ter- the City of New York. He is a non-resident former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (the father of Saad) rorist Cells,” CTC Sentinel 3:2 (2010); Bilal Y. Saab, “The senior fellow at the Combating Terrorism in February 2005 and Brigadier General Wissam al-Has- Failure of Salafi-Jihadi Insurgent Movements in the Le- Center at West Point. san, chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Lebanese In- vant,” CTC Sentinel 2:9 (2009). ternal Security Forces, in October 2012. See “Hariri Sup- 5 Saab, “Lebanon at Risk from Salafi-Jihadi Terrorist porters Accuse of Lebanon Coup,” , Cells”; Thanassis Cambanis, “Desolation Awaits Return- January 24, 2011; “Hezbollah Suspects to be Tried Over ing Palestinian Refugees,” New York Times, October 11, Rafik Hariri,” BBC, August 17, 2011; “Hezbollah-led Govt 2007. Blamed for Murder of Top Lebanese Security Official,” al- 6 Mohammed Zaatari and Antoine Amrieh, “Sidon Arabiya, October 20, 2012. Leaders Demand Post-Abra Probe,” Daily Star [], 3 All officially recognized sects that compose Lebanese June 29, 2013. society are considered minorities. Indeed, there is no re- 7 Ibid.; Anne Barnard, “Calm Returns to Lebanese City, ligious or communal majority in Lebanon. It is difficult but Tensions Remain,” New York Times, June 25, 2013. to determine more precise numbers on sectarian repre- 8 Ibid.

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Sunni-Shi`a tensions and political Nasser Sharara claimed that “H.A. Hilwah to Syria in late 2011 along with polarization in Lebanon due to the Dargham,” a Lebanese man, proclaimed cadres from Fatah al-Islam and Jund Syrian crisis and sectarian violence to his followers in February that the al-Sham for the purpose of reportedly in the Middle East, and despite a creation of the Lebanese branch of dethroning Abu Muhammad al-Julani, leadership void in the Lebanese Sunni Jabhat al-Nusra was drawing near.13 the head of Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, political class, Salafi-jihadis still do According to the report, the site of and replacing him as the amir (leader).19 not enjoy a popular following among Dargham’s pronouncement was in the A sizeable but unspecified number of Lebanese Sunnis. Indeed, their presence town of Arsal, located in Lebanon’s his comrades, however, defected from consists of cells and small groups, not Bekaa Valley near the Syrian border, his ranks during travel for unknown a large and armed social movement a Hizb Allah stronghold.14 According reasons, and joined al-Julani instead, that has attained insurgent status. to the Lebanese military intelligence forcing al-Majid to return to Ain al- Nevertheless, Hizb Allah’s intervention services, who were cited in the al-Akhbar Hilwah.20 According to the report, these in Syria is a powerful catalyst for report, Dargham is also an associate of skilled fighters later trained al-Julani’s the radicalization of larger parts of Khaled Hamid who is reported to be a forces, ultimately helping to make his the Sunni Islamist and specifically major “logistical facilitator” between Jabhat al-Nusra the most effective and Salafist communities in Lebanon. This Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria and its allies in resourceful actor in the Syrian militant radicalization process could threaten Lebanon’s north and in the Palestinian opposition.21 Hizb Allah and potentially bring about refugee camp of Ain al-Hilwah in Sidon, Sunni-Shi`a conflict in Lebanon. including Fatah al-Islam15 and Jund al- If a Lebanese branch of Jabhat al-Nusra Sham.16 were to be formed today, it would likely Evidence of Jabhat al-Nusra Activity in be composed of two main battalions: an Lebanon The idea of a Lebanese branch of Jabhat Ain al-Hilwah battalion and a Tripoli As the war in Syria rages, there is al-Nusra reportedly started with the battalion.22 growing evidence of Salafi-jihadi Saudi national Majid bin Muhammad activity in Lebanon. Al-Monitor reported al-Majid, the amir of the Abdullah The Ain al-Hilwah battalion would in April 2013 that “it can no longer be Azzam Brigades.17 In June 2012, the probably include the remaining cadres denied that Jabhat al-Nusra9 has found Abdullah Azzam Brigades announced and fighters of Fatah al-Islam and fertile ground in the Palestinian that al-Majid was their leader, and Jund al-Sham, the Abdullah Azzam refugee camps in [Lebanon], among that the group supports the revolution Brigades and the Platoons of Ziad al- the nearly one million Syrian refugees in Syria.18 Yet the al-Akhbar report in Jarrah.23 The gradual weakening of there, as well as in Lebanese Sunni February 2013—which has not been the secular Palestinian party Fatah areas, especially in ​​northern Lebanon corroborated by other sources—claimed in Ain al-Hilwah has allowed these near the Syrian border.”10 In July that al-Majid traveled from Ain al- Salafi-jihadi entities to increase their 2013, Lebanon’s military charged six presence and mobilize greater numbers alleged members of Jabhat al-Nusra Syria to Southern Lebanon,” al-Akhbar, February 25, of men from the al-Ta’mir area of the with forming an armed gang with the 2013; Nasser Charara, “Coming Soon: Al-Nusra Front in camp, also at the expense of older intent to conduct terrorist attacks in Lebanon,” al-Akhbar, February 25, 2013; Kassem Kassem and larger Sunni Islamist Palestinian 11 24 Lebanon. and Amal Khalil, “Ein el Helweh fi Intithar wiladat fir’ factions such as Asbat al-Ansar, li ‘Jabhat al Nusra,’” al-Akhbar, February 4, 2013; Ja`far Five months earlier, in February al-Attar, “Al Assir...Al Nusra wal Qa’ida,” as-Safir, June 19 Sharara, “Jabhat al-Nusra From Northern Syria to 2013, Lebanon’s al-Akhbar newspaper 24, 2013. Southern Lebanon.” published a report claiming that Salafi- 13 Ibid. 20 Ibid. jihadis in Lebanon could be close to 14 Ibid. 21 Ibid. establishing a Jabhat al-Nusra branch 15 Fatah al-Islam is a militant Sunni Islamist group that 22 These two battalions do not exist in name. The author 12 in the country. Al-Akhbar journalist is inspired by al-Qa`ida’s ideology. Its members are contends that if a Lebanese branch of Jabhat al-Nusra— mostly from various Middle Eastern countries. It or some other coordinated, jihadist entity—were to be 9 Jabhat al-Nusra is a Salafi-jihadi insurgent group op- emerged in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp formed in Lebanon, then its fighters would likely coalesce erating in Syria that has established ties to al-Qa`ida and in Lebanon in November 2006. Its goals are unclear but into two separate factions/battalions. has been designated a “terrorist” group by the U.S. State include the establishment of an Islamic state in northern 23 The “Platoons of Ziad al-Jarrah” is often referred to Department. The U.S. government views Jabhat al-Nusra Lebanon. as a brigade that operates under the command of the Ab- as a “front group” for al-Qa`ida in Iraq. 16 Sharara, “Jabhat al-Nusra From Northern Syria to dullah Azzam Brigades. See, for example, “Who Are The 10 “Hezbollah Prepares for Attacks by Jabhat al-Nusra Southern Lebanon.” Jund al-Sham is a title claimed by Abdullah Azzam Brigades?” Reuters, August 4, 2010. in Lebanon,” al-Monitor, April 26, 2013. several Sunni Islamic extremist entities, all or none of 24 Asbat al-Ansar is a Palestinian Salafi-jihadi group that 11 “Six Men Charged for Plotting Terror Acts in Leba- which may be connected. These entities mostly operate was involved in a number of terrorist operations against non,” Daily Star, July 19, 2013. For other evidence of pos- in Lebanon, Syria and , and their goals include the Lebanese official targets in the past, including the killings sible Jabhat al-Nusra activity in Lebanon, see Jean Aziz, establishment of an Islamic caliphate throughout the Le- of four judges in a courtroom in Sidon in June 1999. Re- “Jabhat al-Nusra Reportedly in Lebanon,” al-Monitor, vant. cently, it reached a permanent truce with the Lebanese December 24, 2012; Mitchell Prothero, “Al Qaida-linked 17 Sharara, “Jabhat al-Nusra From Northern Syria to authorities in return for its intelligence cooperation on al- Nusra Front Rebels Blamed for Bloody Fight Against Southern Lebanon”; Bill Roggio, “Abdullah Azzam Bri- Qa`ida elements in the Ain al-Hilwah camp. For details Lebanese Army in Sidon,” McClatchy Newspapers, June gades Names Leader, Advises Against Attacks in Syria’s of the incident in 1999, see Audrey Kurth Cronin et al., 26, 2013. Cities,” The Long War Journal, June 27, 2012. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” CRS Report for Con- 12 Nasser Sharara, “Jabhat al-Nusra From Northern 18 Roggio. gress, February 6, 2004.

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Ansar Allah,25 , and al-Haraka members defected due to differences number 88 according to court reports al-Islamiyya al-Mujahida,26 which are over ideology, politics, and jihadist and the Lebanese Judicial Council, described by these extremist groups strategy and priorities.32 Today, Jund are among the most problematic and as more “moderate” and insufficiently al-Sham likely consists of a small group powerful prisoners at Roumieh.37 Small committed to supporting the jihad in of fighters who are “looking for action in number compared to others, they are Syria.27 and trouble and the right opportunity to the strongest physically, and the most merge with a like-minded movement,” influential and resourceful.38 As for the “Tripoli battalion,” it would as one Lebanese internal security officer likely comprise militants who follow told this author over the telephone in Perhaps more consequential than Fatah Lebanese Sunni Shaykh Hussam May 2013.33 al-Islam’s presence inside Roumieh Sabbagh.28 Sabbagh has reportedly is the group’s ability to communicate helped smuggle militants across the It is Fatah al-Islam that may have to do with Salafi-jihadi fighters operating in border into Syria, and he has fought the heavy lifting should Salafi-jihadis Lebanon and Syria, as well as manage its with Jabhat al-Nusra rebels against the in Lebanon coordinate their activities. remaining cadre. Although prisoners in al-Assad regime in Syria.29 According Knowing the devastating losses it general have mobile telephones at their to Lebanon’s Daily Star, “The Nusra suffered in the battle of Nahr al-Bared disposal in Roumieh, Islamists, and Front and other Syrian Islamist fighting in the summer of 2007, one would Fatah al-Islam members particularly, groups now use him [Sabbagh] as their carry laptops, allowing them to publish foremost representative in Lebanon, statements on Islamist online forums.39 and [Sabbagh] coordinates between “As the war in Syria rages, various groups who hope to establish there is growing evidence Several escapes and foiled attempts by an Islamic emirate in Tripoli.”30 He has ordinary criminals and Salafi-jihadis approximately 250 followers.31 of Salafi-jihadi activity in from Roumieh have been reported over Lebanon.” the years. Perhaps the single most Fatah al-Islam Still Active important incident, other than the Since Jund al-Sham and Fatah al- case of Walid al-Bustani,40 occurred in Islam would likely be incorporated mid-2012, when five prisoners—four of into a Lebanese branch of Jabhat al- think that Fatah al-Islam is defunct or whom were Fatah al-Islam members— Nusra—or another Salafi-jihadi entity poses a marginal security threat.34 That escaped using sheets to scale the prison in Lebanon—it is worth assessing would be a false conclusion. Although wall. Muhammad Abdullah al-Dousari, their current capabilities. Other than the group’s organizational structure also known as “Abu Talha al-Kuwaiti,” being accurately labeled by Lebanon was crushed, most of its members led the group of four and was described commentators as freelance jihadist killed or jailed (some fled), and its size by Lebanese media in December 2012 fighters lacking any organizational and influence much reduced, it still as “the ambassador of al-Qa`ida in structure or modus vivendi, not much has a presence in Lebanon in the form Lebanon.”41 The three others were else is known about the current state of scattered cells, most notably in the Abdullah al-Shukri and Abdul Aziz of Jund al-Sham. The group used to north, as well as in Ain al-Hilwah and al-Masri from Syria and Abdul Nasser be part of the larger and much more ironically Roumieh, Lebanon’s largest Sanjar from Lebanon.42 Al-Dousari’s influential Asbat al-Ansar until several prison.35 group may have been ambushed by the Syrian military, with one member killed 43 25 Ansar Allah was founded in southern Gaza in No- There are a number of ways that the and the others reportedly arrested. vember 2008 as an armed Sunni Islamist group with group has managed to survive and stay strong Salafi-jihadi credentials. Its goals include the es- active during the past couple of years— 37 Kassem and Khalil. tablishment of an Islamic state in Gaza. even from behind bars in Roumieh. Of 38 Ibid.; Al-Attar, “Lebanon Prison ‘Controlled by Isla- 26 Al-Haraka al-Islamiyya al-Mujahida is a Salafi-jihadi the 480 people suspected of involvement mists.’” group that was founded in 1984 by Jamal Khattab and in the Nahr al-Bared battle, more 39 Ibid. 36 Abdallah Hallaq, allegedly with the help of Iran. Its base than 200 are being held in Roumieh. 40 One notable example of communication and coordi- is the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain al-Hilwah. Khattab Members of Fatah al-Islam, who nation between imprisoned Fatah al-Islam members and has good relations with Hizb Allah and Hamas. like-minded extremists from the outside is the case of 27 Kassem and Khalil. 32 Roger Hardy, “Profile: Jund al-Sham,” BBC, June 4, Walid al-Bustani. Al-Bustani, a Salafi-jihadi who fought 28 Sharara, “Jabhat al-Nusra From Northern Syria to 2007. For more on Jund al-Sham, see Bilal Y. Saab and in the Nahr al-Bared battle, escaped from Roumieh in Southern Lebanon”; Misbah al-Ali, “Who is Sabbagh? A Magnus Ranstorp, “Securing Lebanon from the Threat mid-2012, but was later executed by Syrian rebels in the Look into the Life of the Sheikh and Fighter,” Daily Star, of Salafist ,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30:10 town of Tel Kalakh. For details, see “Fatah al-Islam Mili- January 15, 2013. Sabbagh has called for an Islamic emir- (2007). tants Killed in Syria,” Daily Star, April 24, 2012; Al-Attar, ate that unites all Salafi-jihadi entities operating in Leba- 33 Personal interview, Lebanese internal security officer, “Lebanon Prison ‘Controlled by Islamists’”; Radwan non and Syria under one umbrella and covers geographi- May 2013. Mortada, “Roumieh Prison: Rule by the Sword,” al-Akh- cal areas from northern Lebanon and the outskirts of the 34 Saab, “Lebanon at Risk from Salafi-Jihadi Terrorist bar, October 14, 2012. Syrian city of Homs. Cells.” 41 “Kuwaiti Tried to Set Up Al-Qaeda camp – Report,” 29 Al-Ali. 35 Ibid.; Ja`far al-Attar, “Lebanon Prison ‘Controlled by Daily Star, May 27, 2009. 30 Ibid.; Sharara, “Jabhat al-Nusra From Northern Syria Islamists,’” as-Safir, January 30, 2013. 42 Ibid. to Southern Lebanon.” 36 Kassem Kassem, “Ein el Helweh: Al Lino ya’oud li 43 Doha Shams, “Abu Talha wal mashrou` al Qa’idi fi 31 Ibid. sahk al Nusra,” al-Akhbar, February 20, 2013. Lubnan,” al-Akhbar, December 27, 2012.

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Another significant escape from one and three years, respectively, in The fact that al-Assir’s men lost the Roumieh by Fatah al-Islam members prison.51 battle of Abra in Sidon in June 2013 occurred in September-October 2012. may suggest that Salafi-jihadism in The Lebanese press reported that According to the Lebanese media, Lebanon has suffered a major blow.57 Othman from Syria, Faisal Aqla from Mahmoud, the amir, reportedly entered Unfortunately, that is only partially , and Mahmoud Fallah from Syrian territory through the Mashari true because al-Assir emerged under Palestine managed to escape from al-Qaa region of eastern Lebanon.52 crisis conditions that are still very much the prison and join their comrades From there, he traveled to Syria where in Syria.44 A couple of months later, he became the commander of an armed Roumieh’s administration reported that group stationed at a historic crusader “There is a sense of anxiety prison guards had foiled another major castle in the Krak des Chevaliers in Lebanon about the group escape attempt by more than 20 area.53 Shortly afterward, more than Fatah al-Islam detainees.45 20 Lebanese Salafi-jihadis joined increased potential for Mahmoud there from Tripoli, swearing Sunni-Shi`a conflict.” In addition to those who have escaped, allegiance to him.54 According to the some of the Islamist detainees in Washington Post, Mahmoud is linked to Roumieh who were eventually freed the Lebanese Shaykh Sabbagh, who has have also opted to commit violent acts been reported by Lebanese media to be relevant in today’s domestic and regional against the Syrian government in Syria. recruiting youths in Tripoli to fight in environment: a raging civil war in Syria The case of Khaled Mahmoud, once one Syria.55 pitting Sunnis against and of the leaders of Fatah al-Islam, is well spilling over into Lebanon, extremely known in Lebanese circles.46 Mahmoud The Rapid Rise and Fall of Ahmad al-Assir tense Sunni-Shi`a relations in Lebanon, was released in June 2012 despite his The case of Ahmad al-Assir sheds severe political instability in Beirut, and militant activities against the Lebanese further light on the evolving state of a leadership void within the Lebanese army in Nahr al-Bared. Six months Sunni militancy in Lebanon, and the Sunni community that has allowed after his discharge, he appeared in an outcome of the battle he waged against radical Sunni elements to assume, by online video surrounded by militants the Lebanese army carries important default, more prominent sociopolitical and declared the establishment of the implications for the growth trajectory roles at the expense of secular figures. Syrian version of Jund al-Sham.47 of Salafi-jihadism in Lebanon.56 As long as these conditions exist, another al-Assir could arise. Mahmoud is believed to be responsible for dispatching Lebanese youths to Three important observations on the Syria for militant aims.48 According outcome of the battle of Abra, however, to reports from al-Akhbar, Lebanese 51 Ibid. support the argument that Salafi- security reports indicate that “Yahia 52 Doha Shams, “Layali al Shamal al Hazina Tatarakkab jihadism, despite all the external factors J.,” a close associate of Mahmoud, is al-`Arka al Kabira,” al-Akhbar, February 25, 2013; Deh- enabling its growth and expansion, still in charge of recruiting and deploying ghanpisheh and Haidamous. faces major challenges in finding a solid Salafi-jihadis to Syria, including the 53 Shams, “Layali al Shamal al Hazina Tatarakkab al- popular base and a permanent home in group that was reportedly ambushed `Arka al Kabira.” Lebanon. by the Syrian army in Tel Kalakh in 54 Ibid. 49 November 2012. Such reports suggest 55 Ibid.; Dehghanpisheh and Haidamous. First, despite two public calls by al- that Yahia, who is based in Tripoli, 56 Ahmad al-Assir rose to prominence a year ago when Assir during the battle for Sunnis to along with “Nader H.” and “Bashir he and his followers blocked a main road leading to join him in the fight and for Sunni M.,” are actively involved in recruiting southern Lebanon for a month and a half, a move that al- soldiers to defect from the Lebanese 50 Salafi-jihadi cells. The latter two legedly was part of a broader strategy for creating a Sunni army, the Salafist shaykh’s requests 58 were previously detained on charges of militia that would ultimately face Hizb Allah. The Salafist fell on deaf ears. This same scenario belonging to Fatah al-Islam and spent shaykh began his mobilization campaign by recruiting happened in the battle in Nahr al- young Lebanese using a highly sectarian and anti-Hizb Bared in 2007 when Fatah al-Islam was 44 “Judge Orders Roumieh Warden Detained,” Daily Allah speech. He attracted Lebanese nationals, Palestin- forced to fight the Lebanese army alone. Star, October 15, 2012. ian refugees, Syrians, and other Arabs to his anti-Shi`a Militants from Ain al-Hilwah were 45 “Police Thwart Roumieh Escape Attempt by Suspect- cause. Once established in Sidon, he visited other areas supposed to lend their full support to ed Islamists,” Daily Star, December 13, 2012. including Arsal and Tripoli, hoping to expand his move- Fatah al-Islam in the past and al-Assir 46 Babak Dehghanpisheh and Suzan Haidamous, “More ment and reach the northern Sunni part of the country. at present, but militants in the camp Lebanese Sunnis are Crossing into Syria to Aid Rebellion, From June 2012 to June 2013, he reportedly benefited remained relatively calm, distancing Officials Say,”Washington Post, January 26, 2013. from funding provided by Gulf and local, unknown themselves from the fighting, despite a 47 Kassem; Radwan Mortada, “Khaled Mahmoud: A sources. He allegedly used the money to buy weap- few minor attacks against the Lebanese Prisoner in Lebanon Turns Emir in Syria,” al-Akhbar, ons from Ain al-Hilwah. For details, see Amal Khalil, army in the Ta’amir area by elements January 4, 2013; Dehghanpisheh and Haidamous. “Al Sheikh Assir Wal Thalath Sa’at Al ‘Ro’b Fi Janoub of Jund al-Sham and remnants of 48 Ibid. Loubnan,” al-Akhbar, June 20, 2013; Dana Moukhallati, 49 Ibid. “Breaking Down Ahmad al-Assir: The Man Behind the 57 Ibid. 50 Mortada, “Khaled Mahmoud: A Prisoner in Lebanon Beard,” al-Arabiya, June 25, 2013; “What Happened to 58 Mohammad Saleh, “Al Assir You’lin ‘Harbahou’ ‘ala Turns Emir in Syria.” Fadel Shaker?” al-Monitor, July 4, 2013. al Jaysh,” as-Safir, June 24, 2013.

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Fatah al-Islam led by Bilal bin Badr.59 Conclusion Anti-Muslim Attacks in Less radical Islamist actors who are in From Arsal to Wadi Khaled, from disagreement with Fatah al-Islam and Tripoli to Akkar, and from Sidon to Myanmar Threaten Uptick Jund al-Sham—including the influential the heart of Beirut, black Salafi-jihadi in Regional Violence and Asbat al-Ansar, Hamas, and al-Jihad al- flags and banners have been spotted in Islamist Activism Islami—assisted the Lebanese army and increasing numbers, a picture unseen worked toward preserving the relative before in Lebanon’s history.62 The By James Brandon peace in Ain al-Hilwah.60 These actors, Lebanese people used to take lightly the along with the secular Fatah, played the tirades of al-Assir against Hizb Allah during the last 18 months, a surge of same role in 2007 as a rational attempt and the Shi`a. This is no longer true, communal violence between Muslims to protect their own interests. given the Salafist shaykh’s growing but and Buddhists in Myanmar (formerly still relatively small support base. There known as Burma) has killed at least Second, the battle of Abra would is a sense of anxiety in Lebanon about 180 people and displaced more than have been the perfect opportunity the increased potential for Sunni-Shi`a 120,000, the vast majority of them for the so-called Lebanese branch of conflict. Hizb Allah is on edge and high members of the country’s one million- Jabhat al-Nusra to be established. alert, and despite its strategic interest strong Muslim minority.1 These events, Such a development, however, did not in avoiding civil unrest in Lebanon, accompanied by instances of official occur, and the reasons are unclear. the organization, if it feels threatened, government discrimination against Perhaps the project was not ready for could lash out against fellow Lebanese, Muslims, has prompted a range of implementation, or it was too ambitious. as it did in May 2008.63 attacks on Buddhists throughout the Regardless, it raises questions about region, including an attack in July the prospects, or even existence, of this This tense and sectarian environment 2013 on the Bodh Gaya, India’s most potentially new Salafi-jihadi enterprise in Lebanon, should it explode, is a important Buddhist temple, and in in Lebanon. development that the Lebanese army, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia. due to its modest resources and a Myanmar’s perceived mistreatment Third, despite their anger at Hizb divided political leadership in Beirut, is of Muslims has also galvanized a wide Allah over its military involvement in likely incapable of pacifying. range of Islamist and jihadist groups Syria, major secular political figures from the Middle East to Australia and in the Lebanese Sunni community— Bilal Y. Saab is Executive Director and the United Kingdom. including Saad Hariri and Fouad Head of Research of the Institute for Siniora—condemned the attack in Abra Near East and Gulf Military Analysis This article provides background on and sided with the Lebanese army and (INEGMA) North America. He is also militancy among Rohingya Muslims, state institutions.61 Equally important, a nonresident scholar at the Center for highlights recent regional incidents the most influential Salafist leader Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey of related anti-Buddhist violence, and in Lebanon, Shaykh Da’i al-Islam al- Institute of International Studies. examines the potential for a wider uptick Shahal (son of Salem al-Shahal, the in Islamist militancy over the issue. It founder of the Salafist movement in finds that Islamist organizations, as Lebanon), remained silent and did not well as jihadist groups, are increasingly lend his full support (at least publicly) incorporating developments in Myanmar to al-Assir, making it clear that the into their propaganda campaigns, as Salafist community in Lebanon is not well as including Myanmar’s interests united in its stance against the Lebanese in their targeting selection. army. Indeed, neither Beirut’s nor the north’s Salafists erupted during or after Background the fighting, and al-Assir’s supporters There are approximately one million in Tripoli refrained from starting a Muslims living in Myanmar, a country diversionary battle and opening another of 55 million people.2 Around 800,000 front against the Lebanese army to 62 During the past year, Lebanese news agencies includ- of these are from the Rohingya ethnic potentially come to the rescue of their ing al-Jadeed, MTV, and LBC have reported in their eve- minority, a group concentrated in the “champion.” ning news on the Sunni Islamist and Salafist demonstra- country’s southwestern Rahkine State tions and rallies in Lebanon’s northern region and Beirut, (formerly known as Arakan State).3 showing footage of bearded men waving black flags of al- The Rohingya typically argue that Qa`ida. Also see Dehghanpisheh and Haidamous. 63 In response to the Lebanese government’s decision to shut down Hizb Allah’s telecommunications network 1 “Unpunished Crimes Against Humanity, Humanitar- and sack airport security chief Wafic Choucair (a man ian Crisis in Arakan State,” Human Rights Watch, April close to Hizb Allah), the Shi`a group took over parts of 22, 2013. Rahkine State was known as Arakan State until West Beirut, a move described by its rivals in the pro- 1989. Western March 14 coalition as an “armed coup.” See Rob- 2 Thomas Fuller, “Extremism Rises Among Myanmar 59 Ibid. ert F. Worth and Nada Bakri, “Hezbollah Seizes Swath Buddhists,” New York Times, June 20, 2013. 60 Ibid. of Beirut From U.S.-Backed Lebanon Government,” New 3 Araminta Wordsworth, “Burmese Sleepwalking Into 61 Ibid. York Times, May 10, 2008. ‘Ethnic Cleansing,’” National Post, July 13, 2013.

12 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7 they are indigenous to the area, but conflict, however, news of the latest are difficult to substantiate. Likewise, many Burmese claim that they are violence has impacted Muslims outside in July 2013, radical Islamist websites relatively recent immigrants from of the country. This is largely due to reported that a group of jihadists from Bangladesh, where many Rohingya the growth of social media, which has Bangladesh, Indonesia and Myanmar also live. Regardless, tensions between dramatically raised awareness of the had entered Myanmar and killed 17 Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar plight of Myanmar’s Muslims. The Burmese soldiers and claimed that are long-standing.4 The recent unrest, country may also have gained a greater Rohingya Muslims were being trained by however, is the worst in at least a significance to the global Muslim militants in Bangladesh; the claim was decade—involving widespread attacks community due to high profile U.S. and denied by Myanmar’s government.11 on Muslim homes and businesses. Western engagement with Myanmar during the last two years.8 More credibly, the RSO is accused The violence has primarily been of stoking anti-Buddhist violence in conducted by Buddhist civilians, Rohingya Armed Groups Bangladesh and of involvement with although there are credible reports Myanmar has been challenged by radical Bangladeshi groups.12 For of the authorities turning a blind eye a range of armed separatist groups example, the group was accused of or tacitly supporting the violence.5 representing Rohingya Muslims since involvement in the September 2012 There are examples of Buddhist its independence in 1948 when the attacks in Ramu in Cox’s Bazaar self-described “Mujahidin,” a term district in Bangladesh, in which mobs “The recent uptick both that embraced activists from a range attacked and destroyed 12 Buddhist of groups, began fighting for some temples and more than 50 houses, in intra-communal form of self-government, ranging in apparent revenge for attacks by violence against Muslims from autonomy to full independence. Buddhists in Myanmar, although the Since then, various armed groups have unrest also seems to have been stirred and the government’s been periodically active, such as the up through social media.13 In March latest intolerance toward Rohingya Liberation Party in the 1970s. 2013, Hafez Sanaul Islam, a senior RSO All of these groups have had a limited leader, was arrested by Bangladeshi Muslims could prompt impact, with most being broken up by police over the violence, along with Islamist radicalization.” Myanmar’s efficient security apparatus several other Rohingya refugees, or forced abroad. illustrating the potential for hard line Rohingya activists to use the issue to The most active current group is the stoke violence abroad.14 monks (notably Ashin Wirathu Rohingya Solidarity Organization from the Buddhist 969 movement) (RSO) based largely in neighboring While the RSO stages periodic attacks in inciting hatred against Muslims; Bangladesh. The RSO, which has Myanmar—for example, the government this intolerance can easily lead to a limited capacity in Myanmar, is blamed the group for a minor cross- violence over local issues. There widely accused of working with radical border attack from Bangladesh in are also allegations of some monks Bangladeshi groups, including the November 2012—there is no evidence directly taking part in the violence.6 two banned jihadist groups Jamaatul that militant has enjoyed The Myanmar government itself has Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB) and significant traction among Rohingya. imposed discriminatory measures Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam-Bangladesh This may be because Islamist groups against Muslims, notably a two- (HuJI-B). The RSO has denied these such as Jamaat-i-Islami,15 which can child limit on some Muslim families.7 links.9 Separately, a range of media create environments in which jihadist The unrest has been concentrated in outlets and commentators have alleged the country’s southwestern Rahkine that the RSO, along with the Arakan Qa`ida tape in Afghanistan that showed jihadists train- State, as well as in central towns such Rohingya National Organization and ing in Burma in 1990. See “Exclusive Tapes Reveal al as Meiktila and Shan State in the west. individual Rohingya, have had contact Qaeda’s Capabilities,” CNN, August 23, 2002. In contrast to previous outbreaks of with foreign militant groups such as 11 “Jihad Started in Burma,” Kavkaz Center, July 12, 10 the Taliban. These claims, however, 2012; “Myanmar Bins Reports of Rohingyas’ Military 4 Although the precise origin of the Rohingya is con- Training,” Daily Star [Dhaka], July 13, 2013. tested, it seems likely that while significant numbers of 8 Previously, there was little awareness of Myanmar 12 “Rohingya Rebels Trained JMB Men,” Daily Star, May Rohingya have lived in the area for centuries, others ar- even from regional Islamist groups. 19, 2009. rived from Bangladesh during the British colonial period 9 “RSO Press Release: Statement in Response of the 13 “Man Held for Link with Ramu Attacks,” Daily Star, in 1826-1948. News Reports of , Dhaka, Bangladesh and October 31, 2012; “Rohingya Accused of Sparking Ban- 5 “Unpunished Crimes Against Humanity, Humanitar- Indonesia,” Rohingya Solidarity Organization, May 21, gladesh Riots,” The Irrawaddy, October 1, 2012. ian Crisis in Arakan State”; Kate Hodal, “Video Shows 2009. The Australian government has categorized the 14 “Rohingya Groups Under Scanner,” Daily Star, Octo- Burmese Police Standing by as Buddhists Attack Mus- RSO with groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation ber 7, 2012; “Remand of Ramu Violence ‘Plotter’ Sought,” lims,” Guardian, April 22, 2013. Front (MILF) in the Philippines that are “not primarily BDNews24, March 23, 2013. 6 Hodal; Jared Ferrie, “Buddhist Mobs Attack Muslim anti-Western” and are instead largely motivated by “lo- 15 Jamaat-i-Islami was founded in 1941 in British-run Homes in Myanmar, One Dead,” Reuters, May 29, 2013. cal socio-political and economic grievances.” See “Trans- India by Abu al-A`la Mawdudi, which broke in differ- 7 “What is Behind Burma’s Wave of Religious Violence?” national Terrorism: The Threat to Australia,” Australian ent, but closely-associated, national movements follow- BBC, April 4, 2013; “One Region in Myanmar Limits Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004. ing the creation of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as Births of Muslims,” , May 25, 2013. 10 For example, in 2002 CNN said it had found an al- separate states.

13 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7 groups can flourish, have gained little bomb-making materials.18 The police attack began after Muslim detainees purchase in the country. Similarly, added that the suspects were believed circulated photographs of the violence and other forms of Salafi to be linked to a previous December in Myanmar.26 Islam have made few visible inroads 2012 plot to attack U.S. diplomatic and among the Rohingya, and Islamic commercial interests in Jakarta and A comparable uptick in tensions and practices remain largely traditional, Surabaya.19 The arrests illustrated both related violence is also visible in syncretistic, and Sufi-influenced. the Indonesian government’s ability to normally peaceful Malaysia, with at Additionally, the minimal numbers of contain jihadist groups and an uptick least four Burmese Buddhists killed in Rohingya studying in the West have in Islamist activism over the Myanmar a spate of attacks in the capital Kuala meant that radicalism has not been issue. Lumpur in early June 2013.27 Some imported into the country by returning reports blamed local Malay Muslims; students. Similarly, Abu Bakar Bashir, the others said that Rohingya refugees had jihadist cleric imprisoned for his role carried out the attacks. Members of the Current dynamics, however, could in the Bali bombings, issued an open 969 movement, a hard line Buddhist change. Although the Myanmar letter to Myanmar President Thein Sein nationalist group blamed for much of government’s harsh rule has historically from prison in July 2012.20 The letter the Myanmar violence, had reportedly quashed radical tendencies, the recent characterized the actions of Burmese visited Malaysia in the last year, which uptick both in intra-communal violence Buddhists as “barbarous” and described local activists said had contributed to against Muslims and the government’s how “they burn the homes of Muslims, an increase in tensions.28 Following the latest intolerance toward Muslims forbade [Islamic] worship and slaughter June clashes, Malaysia arrested 900 could prompt Islamist radicalization. them like animals.”21 Bashir also warned Burmese nationals to preempt further Conversely, however, political that if Myanmar did not improve its violence, with a police spokesman liberalization by Myanmar could give treatment of Muslims, “the destruction saying the arrests were intended to Islamists, and particularly non-violent of the lands [of Myanmar] at the hands “send a clear message to stop this political Islamists, more room to of the mujahidin (with the permission nonsense and not bring the violence maneuver.16 of Allah) will take place.”22 over to Malaysia.”29

In a possible sign of incidents to come, Echoing these sentiments, hundreds of Meanwhile, in Pakistan, Tehrik-i- on July 21, 2013, a small bomb exploded hard line Islamists gathered outside the Taliban Pakistan (TTP) threatened to near a Buddhist temple in Mandalay, Myanmar Embassy in Jakarta in May take “revenge” on Myanmar in July 2012. Myanmar’s second-largest city, only 2013 to call for “jihad in Myanmar,” Although its spokesman Ehsanullah meters away from where the 969 carrying banners declaring “we want Ehsan warned that they would “attack leader Ashin Wirathu was speaking.17 to kill Myanmar Buddhists” and “stop Burmese interests anywhere,” the group It was not immediately clear who was genocide in Myanmar.”23 Then, in rarely carries out attacks abroad.30 The responsible for the blast. August 2012, around 1,000 members statement was more likely an attempt of the Islamist group Hizb al-Tahrir to pressure the Pakistani government Regional Islamist Reaction marched in Jakarta “to show solidarity and to justify fresh attacks against In addition to the spillover violence with the Rohingya who the extremist it; Ehsan warned the government to in Bangladesh, Myanmar’s treatment Buddhists are slaughtering, raping and halt relations with Myanmar and close of Muslim civilians has prompted torturing.”24 Myanmar’s embassy in Islamabad or attacks further afield in both South and face the consequences.31 Likewise, on Southeast Asia, providing Islamist and Sporadic violence has also occurred. June 14, 2013, Jamaat-i-Islami held jihadist groups with fresh grievances On April 5, 2013, Rohingya refugees rallies in Lahore where the group’s and a new cause with which to rally from Myanmar killed eight Burmese leaders reportedly told followers that their followers. Buddhists in a clash at an immigration thousands of Burmese Muslims were detention center in Indonesia.25 being “martyred” and that their mosques In Indonesia, although overall support The Indonesian authorities said the were being demolished.32 for jihadist groups is much reduced from the 1990s, recent events in Myanmar 18 “Myanmar Embassy Bomb Plotter Used to have reenergized the country’s small Recruit Followers,” Jakarta Globe, May 4, 2013. and fragmented radical groups. In 19 “Bomb Plot Linked Known Cells,” Jakarta Post, May May 2013, for example, Indonesian 4, 2013. 26 Ibid. police broke up a terrorist cell that 20 “Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Letter to the President of 27 “Burmese Migrant Community in Malaysia Simmers was allegedly planning a bomb attack Myanmar,” Arrahmah.com, August 2, 2012. after Attacks,” The Irrawaddy, June 13, 2013. on the Myanmar Embassy in Jakarta, 21 Ibid. 28 Ibid. arresting several people and seizing 22 Ibid. 29 “Malaysia Arrests 900 Myanmar Nationals in Wake 23 “Radical Rallies in Jakarta Call for Deadly Jihad in of Violence,” Agence France-Presse, June 6, 2012. 16 That being said, given the government’s reluctance to Myanmar,” Jakarta Globe, May 3, 2012. 30 “Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Threaten Myanmar even accept Rohingya claims to citizenship, this appears 24 “Solidarity with the Rohingya Muslims by Hizb ut- over Rohingya,” Express Tribune, July 26, 2012. unlikely at present. Tahrir Indonesia,” Khilafah.com, August 6, 2012. 31 Ibid. 17 “Blast During Sermon by Radical Myanmar Monk 25 “Myanmar Muslims Kill 8 Buddhists in Indonesian 32 “Religious Parties Protest Against Muslim Killings Wounds 4,” Reuters, July 22, 2013. Centre,” Agence France-Presse, April 5, 2013. Today,” The News International, June 14, 2013.

14 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7

Violent protests have also occurred in Gamal Heshmat, another senior FJP death.”45 He blamed the root cause of India, notably in Mumbai in August 2012 leader, suggested a wider conspiracy: the strife on British colonialism and on when two protesters were killed and 50 “Why do some parties—certain world Muslims “rejecting their core values” injured.33 Indian police said the violence powers—not consider the tragedy and “abandoning their din [],” was prompted by inflammatory SMS of Muslims as they scrutinize most closing his talk by calling on Allah (cellular phone text messaging) videos minority issues in the Muslim world?”39 to provide nusra (victory), although of violence in Myanmar—an example In other countries, there have been calls he was careful to urge his audience to of how social media has dramatically for violence. In Lebanon, for example, work peacefully through democratic raised awareness of events in the a prominent Salafist was quoted as channels.46 country.34 Separately, on July 7, 2013, calling for attacks on Buddhists: “Every nine small bombs exploded at India’s person who can get to a Buddhist should Also in the United Kingdom, Hizb most significant Buddhist temple, Bodh kill him because they are killing our al-Tahrir held a protest outside the Gaya in Bihar Province, injuring two.35 people.”40 Bangladeshi High Commission in Although no official statements have yet London in August 2012. The event been made on the motive, Indian media In Western countries, the same emotive was, however, mainly directed at speculated that the attack was revenge propaganda intended to foment anger Bangladesh’s secular government, a for events in Myanmar and cited past and a narrative of Muslim victimhood long-standing opponent of Hizb al- threats by Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LeT) is also visible. In September 2012, a founder Hafiz Saeed to target India over grouping of British Islamists linked “It is clear that Myanmar’s its relations with Myanmar.36 to the Cordoba Foundation, a London- based Muslim Brotherhood “front” treatment of its Muslim Global Islamist Reaction group,41 organized an event entitled minority is rapidly Events in Myanmar have also provided “Burma Bloodbath,” at the East a rallying cry for Islamist groups London Mosque, the UK headquarters becoming a mobilizing worldwide. Some groups seem to of Jamaat-i-Islami.42 Anas al-Tikriti issue for Islamist and have eagerly seized on the issue as it gave a speech describing Buddhists as offers a clear narrative of Muslims being “far more capable of bloodshed jihadist groups—both being victimized by non-Muslims. and violence than we ever gave them regionally and globally.” This is particularly true of the Muslim credit for” and urging the audience to Brotherhood which, at least until the “remember Bosnia.”43 Another speaker, recent military coup in , was Ufuk Secgin, a representative of the eager to deflect attention from its Turkish Islamist group Milli Gorus, also Tahrir’s UK branch, and the West. “The growing image problems in Egypt and compared the violence to Bosnia, saying: West doesn’t care about Muslims— elsewhere. For example, the Freedom “Will we learn the names of the towns they care about business deals,” read and Justice Party (FYP), the Muslim of Burma and Arakhan as we learned one placard. Hizb al-Tahrir’s central Brotherhood’s Egyptian wing, has the names of the towns of Bosnia?”44 office issued a notably more hard line repeatedly seized on the issue, Separately, Alyas Karmani, a Bradford- statement in May 2013, advocating the describing it as “genocide against based preacher widely employed reestablishment of the caliphate as this Burmese Muslims” and the “barbaric by the UK government through the “will cause nations to quiver at the mere cleansing of more than a million counterterrorism “Prevent” program, thought of harming a single Muslim Muslims.”37 In April 2013, the FYP’s gave an emotive talk in Bradford under their rule.”47 Ezzedin al-Komi, chairman of the describing Rohingya Muslims “crying Human Rights Committee of Egypt’s tears of blood” and “being clubbed to Further along the Islamist spectrum, Shura Council, described Myanmar’s groups such as the one run by Anjem actions as “crimes against humanity, Choudary (his group is currently 38 gross injustice and brutal genocide.” Rights Committee Urges International Protection for nameless after its previous incarnations Burma Muslims,” Ikhwanweb.com, April 16, 2013. were banned) also agitated against 33 “Inflammatory SMSs, Pictures Behind Rioting?”Times 39 “Gamal Heshmat: Muslims of Myanmar Victims of Myanmar. On April 5, 2013, the of India, August 13, 2012. Discrimination, Racism and Genocide,” fjponline.com, group protested outside the Myanmar 34 Ibid. March 28, 2013. Embassy in London (as well as the Sri 48 35 “Blasts at Indian Buddhist Shrines of Bodh Gaya in 40 “Syrian Islamists Set Sight on Myanmar,” Now Leba- Lankan one ) against the “continuous Bihar,” BBC, July 7, 2013. non, April 12, 2013. 36 “Buddhist-Rohingya Conflict in Myanmar Spells 41 In 2008, David Cameron, who led the British parlia- 45 Alyas Karmani, “Tears of Blood (Massacre of Mus- Trouble for India,” Times of India, July 8, 2013; “Terror ment at the time, called the Cordoba Foundation a “politi- lims in Burma),” August 15, 2012, available at www.you- Strikes Bodhgaya, Two Monks Injured,” Indian Express, cal front for the Muslim Brotherhood.” tube.com/watch?v=fo1g_Pa5TCY. July 7, 2013. 42 “Burma Bloodbath: Symposium on the Human Rights 46 Ibid. 37 “Freedom and Justice Party Demands Immediate Halt Abuses Inflicted on the Rohingya Muslims,” available at 47 “The Fascist Burmese Regime Presents Birth Con- of Genocide Against Burmese Muslims,” Ikhwanweb. www..com/watch?v=m57w86J5Oik. trol of Rohingya Muslim Women as its latest Weapon of com, August 5, 2012. 43 Ibid. Ethnic Cleansing of Rakhine’s Muslims,” Hizb al-Tahrir, 38 “Freedom and Justice Party Demands Immediate 44 “Ethnic Cleansing of a Forgotten People – New Coali- May 10, 2013. Halt of Genocide Against Burmese Muslims,” Ikwanon- tion Supports Burma’s Rohingya Muslims,” Rohingya 48 There has been a similar uptick in Buddhist intoler- line.info, August 15, 2012; “Egypt Parliament’s Human Minority Crisis Group, September 7, 2012. ance against Muslims in Sri Lanka, but at a much lower

15 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7 atrocities being committed against of Buddhists victimizing innocent Zaynab’s Guardians: Muslim men, women and children…at Muslims—is also much easier to market the hands of Buddhist individuals and to core Islamist audiences than complex The Emergence of Shi`a monks.”49 In Australia, Shaykh Shady intra-Muslim conflicts in Syria, Iraq Militias in Syria Alsuleiman, a Salafist preacher at the and . In addition, anger at controversial Lakemba Mosque, gave Myanmar (as evidenced by riots in By Christopher Anzalone a sermon that “Muslims in Burma are Mumbai and the Indonesian detention being slaughtered.”50 In Myanmar, he center killings) has been repeatedly the public emergence of Twelver Shi`a1 continued, Muslim “blood was so cheap, stoked by the deliberate circulation of foreign fighter militias operating with it was like stepping on a cockroach” or forged or mislabeled photographs—as Syrian government forces loyal to “slaughtering a chicken.”51 He warned well as by Islamists’ routine inflation President Bashar al-Assad, together his audience, however, not to attack of casualty figures.53 Likewise, the with the recent public admission by Buddhists in Australia as this “would characterization of the violence in Lebanese Hizb Allah that it is also not please Allah” and would “bring Myanmar by a wide range of Islamist operating alongside them, is the latest harm upon the Muslims.”52 groups as a “slaughter,” “massacre” in the increasing sectarianization of and “genocide” has resonated in many Syria’s civil war. Sectarianism has long Conclusion Muslim communities, including among been a tool used for social and political Although there is little evidence of relatively more moderate groups.54 mobilization by a variety of actors, Rohingya Muslims being involved in and has historically been employed international terrorist groups, or any It is unlikely that Myanmar’s treatment as much in struggles within the same recent record of Rohingyas carrying out of the Rohingya will ever become a core community as in struggles between any sustained terrorist campaign within issue for Islamist or jihadist groups different communities.2 Historically, Myanmar, it is clear that Myanmar’s globally. Nevertheless, one should not sectarianism has been driven by treatment of its Muslim minority is discount the power of a compelling politics and competition over group rapidly becoming a mobilizing issue and simple “good vs. evil” narrative— identity, and has been a part of social for Islamist and jihadist groups—both promoted by a broad range of Islamist processes to mobilize large numbers regionally and globally. Indeed, in the groups and based on genuine instances of people against other groups. This past year the issue has already generated of anti-Muslim discrimination and remains true today. As conflicts break violence overseas, including in violence—to cause an uptick in Islamist down along sectarian or ethnic lines, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and even violence and radicalization, within identifiers (differentiating one group in normally peaceful Malaysia. It has Myanmar, regionally, and further from another)—such as religious also attracted the attention of Islamist afield. affiliation, nationality, or tribe—become and jihadist groups from Afghanistan increasingly salient. Mobilization to Australia to the United Kingdom—a James Brandon is an associate fellow at frames, which draw upon cultural notable development given that the the International Centre for the Study Rohingya issue had rarely featured on of Radicalisation and Political Violence 1 Shi`a Islam is divided into several different groups: the radar of such groups previously. (ICSR) at Kings College London. 1) “twelver” or Imami Shi`a who believe in a line of twelve divinely-guided religious and temporal leaders, There are several reasons for this. the imams; 2) Ismaili Shi`a, who believe in the same line Western engagement with Myanmar of imams as the “twelvers” up until the sixth, Ja`far al- has raised the country’s profile and Sadiq, who died in the eighth century CE; and 3) Zaydi enabled groups such as the Muslim Shi`a, whose beliefs lie between Sunni and Shi`a. This Brotherhood and Hizb al-Tahrir to link article focuses exclusively on Twelver Shi`a, hereafter Western engagement with anti-Muslim referred to simply as “Shi`a.” There is no evidence of violence. In addition, many such groups pro-regime Ismaili or Zaydi Shi`a militias operating in have a vested interest in raising the Syria. Yemen is the only country in the Arab world with profile of the violence in Myanmar. For a significant Zaydi Shi`a population, and Syria’s Ismaili some beleaguered organizations such Shi`a have actually participated in peaceful anti-govern- as the Muslim Brotherhood, Myanmar ment protests. See Omar Hossino, “Salamiyeh Bombings has been an opportunity to recast Strike the Heart of Syria’s Peaceful Revolt,” Syria Deeply, themselves as defenders of Islam. The February 14, 2013. conflict—which is typically presented 53 For instance, some of the most widely shared photo- 2 See Ussama Makdisi’s seminal study on the political by Islamists as a straightforward story graphs on social media sites which purport to show dead and social utilization of sectarianism in Ottoman Leba- Rohingya actually show Indonesian victims of the 2004 non: Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Com- level. tsunami. munity, History, and Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman 49 “Demonstration Outside the Sri Lankan and Burmese 54 In June 2013, for example, a Maryland representative Lebanon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Embassies Tomorrow,” anjem-choudary.com, April of the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), Marc Lynch, “The War for the Arab World,” Foreign Poli- 2013. while making many accurate points about Myanmar’s cy, May 23, 2013; Geneive Abdo, “The New Sectarianism: 50 “Burma: Where are the Muslims,” August 3, 2012, avail- denial of equal rights to Rohingyas, himself described the The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi`a-Sunni able at www.youtube.com/watch?v=HAw4xFG5xS4. killings of Muslims “as an ongoing genocide.” See Saqib Divide,” Brookings Institution, 2013; Mariz Tadros, “Sec- 51 Ibid. Ali, “In Burma, Let’s Call it What It Is: Genocide,” Coun- tarianism and its Discontents in Post-Mubarak Egypt,” 52 Ibid. cil on American Islamic Relations, June 5, 2013. Middle East Report, Summer 2011.

16 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7 idioms, are created and utilized to drive have also become increasingly blunt in of them are issues of concern for many social mobilization.3 their rhetoric toward Shi`a, who they Shi`a, not only those supportive of Iran accuse of supporting sectarianism in and its allies, and this has been a boon This article examines the gradual Syria.7 The creeping sectarianization for the latter, making it more likely that sectarianization of the of the Syrian conflict is a windfall for their mobilization frames will resonate with a particular focus on the emergence, the Syrian Islamic Front, an umbrella with their intended audience.13 composition, mobilization frames and organization for a number of Syrian media campaigns of pro-Assad Shi`a Salafist rebel groups.8 The ongoing production of pro-Shi`a militias.4 Close attention is paid to the militia artwork and media such as historical and cultural significance of Iran and its regional allies, including poetry recitations (anashid) set to song the mobilization frames and idioms Hizb Allah and Shi`a militias in Syria, as well as the increasing numbers of used to inspire support from a broad are actively trying to sway Shi`a recruits and volunteers to fight in Syria public, particularly Shi`a, for these worldwide toward viewing the conflict are evidence of the resonance of these groups’ participation. Understanding in black-and-white terms, portraying all groups’ mobilization frames.14 While these frames and their historical and Syrian rebel groups as being virulently focusing on the Shi`a fighters’ “defense” cultural resonance, referred to as “frame anti-Shi`a and in league with the “neo- of shrines such as Sayyida Zaynab’s, resonance” in social movement theory imperialists,” namely the United States, militia media operations conceal these literature,5 is vital to comprehending European powers, and Israel.9 These fighters’ reported involvement in the drivers of the mobilization and attempts are meant to frame the Syrian military operations in other parts of the recruitment of Shi`a foreign fighters conflict as one having dire repercussions country. in Syria. It finds that these frames, in for Shi`a worldwide, a messaging tool turn, are the central element at play in that has historically proven both vital the formulation of a sectarian counter- and successful in the recruitment of narrative aimed at delegitimizing the foreign fighters and “international Syrian opposition and Sunni rebel brigades.”10 Reports of attacks on Shi`a groups as well as attracting Shi`a in Syria, the destruction of some Shi`a foreign fighters from abroad to fight for mosques and shrines or the tombs al-Assad. inside them, and claims that major ruary 12, 2013; “The Islamic Resistance, `Asa’ib Ahl al- Shi`a shrines such as those of Sayyida Haqq, Condemns the Heinous Crime Against the Shrine Gradual Sectarianization Zaynab and Sakina bint Husayn have of the Prophet’s Companion Hujr bin `Adi, may God Reports of Hizb Allah and other Shi`a been damaged are mobilizing Shi`a bless him, in Syria,” Asaib Ahl al-Haq, May 3, 2013; “Hizb militias’ involvement in the war around the world to support the al- Allah: Where are the Syrian Opposition [Members] Who 11 in Syria have led to new calls from Assad regime. These events have been Said They Wanted to Defend the Holy Sites?” al-Manar, influential Sunni religious leaders— continuously highlighted and spun in May 2, 2013; “After Threats to Shrine, Iraqi Shiite Fight- such as the Qatar-based, Egyptian the news coverage in the hopes of further ers Prepare for Sectarian Strife at Home, in Syria,” As- Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Yusuf inflaming the public opinion of Shi`a sociated Press, October 25, 2012. 12 al-Qaradawi—for able-bodied Sunnis generally. Such attacks or even reports 13 Attacks on Shi`a Muslims and shrines have been to travel to Syria to fight a military picked up by other Shi`a news sources. See, for example, jihad against the Syrian government 7 “Top Egypt Cleric Condemns ‘Sectarian’ Foes in Syr- “Head of Hawza E Zainabia Martyred by Target Killing and its allies, chiefly Iran, Hizb Allah, ia,” Reuters, June 11, 2013; Lee Keath, “Hezbollah Entry in Syria,” Jafria News, April 16, 2013; “Desecration of 6 and other Shi`a militias. Prominent in Syria Fans Shiite-Sunni Fires,” Associated Press, June Shrine of Hujr bin Adi al Kindi,” May 3, 2013, available political actors and religious officials— 7, 2013; Maggie Fick, “Egypt Brotherhood Backs Syria Ji- at www.coej.org/secretariat/statements/2639-hujr-bin- including Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood had, Denounces Shi’ites,” Reuters, June 14, 2013. adi-al-kindi-statement. and the grand imam of al-Azhar 8 Aaron Y. Zelin and Charles Lister, “The Crowning of 14 Suadad al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ites Flock to Assad’s Side seminary in Egypt, Ahmed al-Tayeb— the Syrian Islamic Front,” Foreign Policy, June 24, 2013. as Sectarian Split Widens,” Reuters, June 19, 2013. Popu- 9 Qays al-Khaz`ali, “Remarks of the Secretary General lar reciters of anashid and latmiyat (mourning recitations 3 For a succinct discussion of mobilization frames and of the Ahl al-Haqq Islamic Resistance Movement on the used in Shi`a ceremonies to commemorate the martyred their role in social movement mobilization, see Quintan Tenth Anniversary of its Founding,” Asaib Ahl al-Haq, imams and other Shi`a historical heroes and heroines) Wiktorowicz ed., Islamic Activism: A Social Movement May 5, 2013. include Lebanese munshid (reciter) Ali Barakat and Iraqi Theory Approach (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 10 David Malet, Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity munshids Ali Abu Kiyan al-Muwali and Muhammad Abu 2004). in Civil Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); `Izra’il al-Karbala’i. Barakat has recorded a latmiyya 4 This article focuses primarily on Shi`a militias exclud- David Malet, “Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Per- entitled “In God’s Protection,” dedicated to the “martyr- ing Lebanese Hizb Allah. spectives and Solutions,” Foreign Policy Research Insti- guardians of Sayyida Zaynab,” in which “the Awaited 5 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Pro- tute, 2010. One’s (Imam al-) soldiers” are said to be “God’s cesses and Social Movements: An Overview and Assess- 11 Ruth Sherlock, “Syrian Shias Flee to Lebanon to Es- party (Hizb Allah),” who are congratulated for “achiev- ment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000). cape Sunni Militias,” Telegraph, May 1, 2013; Patrick J. ing God’s gardens [of Paradise].” Al-Muwali’s nashid 6 “Al-Qaradawi Calls Upon the Able-Bodied to Fight McDonnell and Nabih Bulos, “Syria’s Shiites Offer Differ- “O’ Zaynab” has become a staple song used in many pro- in Syria,” Qaradawi.net, June 1, 2013; Griff Witte, “New ent Picture of War,” Los Angeles Times, March 26, 2013. Shi`a militia videos posted to video-sharing websites Wave of Foreigners in Syrian Fight,” Washington Post, 12 “Senior Shia Cleric Seyyed Naser al-Alawi Assassi- such as YouTube. Al-Karbala’i is identified as a “fighter June 21, 2013; “Sending of Egyptian Mujahideen to Syria nated in Syria,” AhlulBayt News Agency, April 14, 2013; [of Imam Husayn]” and he has recorded a martial an- Stirs Debate among Religious Scholars and Jihadi Orga- “Holy Shrine of Hazrat [Holiness] Sakina (AS) Damaged them, based on a praise poem (qasida) by poet Muzaffar nizations,” Azzaman, May 31, 2013. by Terrorists in Syria,” AhlulBayt News Agency, Feb- al-Jabari, dedicated to Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas.

17 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7

The Emergence and Composition of the Shi`a that splintered from the mainstream Abu Hajer, an al-Abbas Brigade Militias Sadr Movement (Tayyar al-Sadr) led by commander who had been living in Media reports of Shi`a foreign Moqtada al-Sadr, as well as Iranian- Syria as an Iraqi refugee, said that fighters in Syria first surfaced in supported militias originally formed to the al-Abbas Brigade comprised 500 the autumn of 2012 and were largely fight U.S. and coalition military forces fighters.26 According to interviews based on interviews with militiamen in Iraq.20 The latter include Asaib Ahl with unnamed Iraqi Shi`a leaders, the participating in the fighting as well as al-Haq (League of the Righteous/People Syrian and Iranian governments have Iraqi government officials.15 Videos of Truth) and Kataib Hizb Allah (Party provided the militias with weapons, supporting Shi`a fighters began to of God Brigades).21 The involvement of and the latter has organized the travel appear on websites such as YouTube of Iraqi recruits.27 Training camps for around the same time.16 These included “Recruitment of fighters recruits are reportedly located in Iran, videos dedicated to those slain fighting and fighters are aided by local contacts “for Sayyida Zaynab,” the daughter has escalated in Iraq, inside Syria.28 of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the first Shi`a with different Shi`a imam and cousin and son-in-law of the In a March 2013 interview with Russia Prophet Muhammad, as well as footage groups, including the Today, a state-funded satellite television of funeral prayers for them inside the Sadr Movement, forming network, Abu `Ajib, who is identified Sayyida Zaynab shrine.17 in media reports and militia media committees to seek materials as the leader or secretary The fighters are primarily affiliated with volunteers.” general of the al-Abbas Brigade, said Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas (hereafter that the militia was formed “months the al-Abbas Brigade), a militia before” to defend Sayyida Zaynab’s composed of fighters from a variety of shrine from rebel attacks.29 Brigade nationalities including Iraqis, Syrians, these groups can be verified through commander Abu Hajer has said that the Lebanese, Iraqi refugees in Syria, other martyrdom statements, reports of brigade has carried out joint military Arabs, and Afghans.18 Exact numbers funerals of Iraqi fighters slain in Syria, operations against rebel groups when of fighters are impossible to verify, and reports on pro-militia websites.22 fighting erupted in the Sayyida Zaynab but in an interview in late October Photographs of martyrs are often district near the shrine.30 Although 2012 an unnamed militiaman said that emblazoned with the emblems of the its leaders have said that they are not about 200 Iraqi recruits had traveled to groups to which they belonged.23 The concerned with other internal fighting Syria.19 Most were drawn from groups exact breakdown of the affiliation of except with regards to the Sayyida al-Abbas Brigade fighters is unclear, Zaynab shrine and other Shi`a shrines, 15 Al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ite Militants Fight for Syria’s As- although a video commemorating some a brigade fighter, Abu Mujahid, said sad.” of its slain fighters purported to show that the militia also carried out joint 24 16 This is based on the author’s collection and catalogu- each individual’s group affiliation. attacks with the Syrian military ing of videos and other media materials produced by against bases of militias belonging to or for these militias. It is possible, however, that earlier An unnamed official in the Badr the Free Syrian Army (FSA) umbrella 31 media uploads on websites such as YouTube were taken Organization, a powerful Iraqi Shi`a group. down by the uploader or the website administrators. political movement originally trained 17 These videos, which were uploaded online by un- and supplied by Iran in the 1980s to Photographs and artwork released on known individuals whose affiliation with the brigade fight Saddam Hussein, claimed that pro-brigade websites feature fighters seems likely but is unconfirmed, include: The Prayer over Shi`a militias were acquiring “new in front of posters and portraits of the Martyrs in the Shrine of Sayyida Zaynab, Upon Her Be and advanced” heavy weapons for Bashar and Hafiz al-Assad and other 25 Peace, September 2012; Presentation to the Souls of the Mar- use in case the conflict escalates. pro-al-Assad pieces of artwork, tyrs of Sayyida Zaynab, Upon Her be Peace, and to the Souls In an early October 2012 interview, including a comparison of Hizb Allah of the Martyrs of al-Asad’s Syria, September 2012; and Secretary General Presentation to the Souls of the Martyrs of Sayyida Zaynab, 20 Ibid. This is also based on martyrdom statements re- and Bashar al-Assad, who are both September 2012. leased by Iraqi Shi`a militias. shown reading the Qur’an with divine 18 This is based on the militia’s media materials, pro- 21 Ibid. militia media materials, and media reports, including: 22 Representative statements include: “Statement: The 26 Al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ite Militants Fight for Syria’s As- “Syria..National Defense Brigades’ Specific Tasks,” Martyr, Ahmad Mahdi al-Shuwayli,” Kataib Hizb Allah, sad.” Russia Today, March 26, 2013; Figures 12 and 34 in “Vi- April 15, 2013; “Statement: The Martyr Riza Khudayr al- 27 Yasir Ghazi and Tim Arango, “Iraqi Sects Join Bat- sual References,” Views from the Occident blog, June Khalidi,” Kataib Hizb Allah, May 6, 2013. tle in Syria on Both Sides,” New York Times, October 27, 23, 2013, available at http://occidentblog.wordpress. 23 See Figures 13-15 in “Visual References.” 2012. com/2013/06/24/visual-references/. Afghan Shi`a semi- 24 Martyrs of Liwa’ Abu al-Fadl al-`Abbas, June 2013. In 28 Mona Mahmood and Martin Chulov, “Syrian War nary students expelled from Iraq in the 1970s settled in addition to the Sadr Movement, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Widens Sunni-Shia Schism as Foreign Jihadis Join Fight the Sayyida Zaynab district where many of them restart- Kataib Hizb Allah, the video also purports to show mar- for Shrines,” Guardian, June 4, 2013. ed their studies at the Zaynabiyya Hawza. See Laurence tyred fighters from two other militias, the God’s Soldiers 29 “Syria: National Defense Brigades’ Specific Tasks,” Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious Networks in the Brigade and Brigade of the Force of Haydar, an honorific Russia Today, March 26, 2013. Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). title meaning “lion” in used by Shi`a for Imam 30 Al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ite Militants Fight for Syria’s As- 19 “After Threats to Shrine, Iraqi Shiite Fighters Prepare `Ali. sad.” for Sectarian Strife at Home, in Syria.” 25 Ibid. 31 Ibid.

18 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7 light emanating from the pages onto regarding the internal organization of Unity within the brigade has also their faces.32 the al-Abbas Brigade, its individual reportedly come under increasing fighting units, and other Shi`a militias strain.41 Emerging internal divisions The al-Abbas Brigade is composed of are unclear. show that while communal and sectarian several smaller fighting units named identities can be used to initiate social after figures from Islamic history who Recruitment of fighters has escalated and militant mobilization, they are are particularly revered by Shi`a, such in Iraq, with different Shi`a groups, not sufficient enough by themselves to as the Twelve Imams recognized by including the Sadr Movement, forming ensure long-term unity. Shi`a as the world’s legitimate religious committees to seek volunteers.37 Convoys of buses said to be carrying Maintaining social movement cohesion pilgrims have instead been filled with and group unity in the longer term is “By portraying all Syrian fighters and military supplies bound for difficult. Sectarian, ethnic, and other rebels as Salafists, the the front in Syria.38 In October 2012, a group identities are often not enough recruitment committee in Iraq’s Diyala by themselves to maintain unity, and Shi`a militias and their Province, the site of much sectarian political and economic interests often supporters are essentially strife between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi`a come into play. Divergent political and a stronghold of the Islamic State and economic interests can then trump arguing that dialogue is of Iraq, a jihadist/insurgent umbrella shared sectarian and group identity. hopeless.” group dominated by al-Qa`ida in Iraq Localism is also often a factor in militant (AQI), claimed that it had sent 70 recruitment and the formulation fighters to Syria.39 of strategic goals and ideological positions. and temporal authorities.33 These units Although the majority of fighters seems include the Ali Akbar Brigade, Brigade to be drawn from Shi`a communities, Mobilizing Historical Memory and Popular of the Awaited One (named after an al-Abbas Brigade-affiliated sources, Piety honorific title of the twelfth imam, including leader Abu `Ajib, have claimed The mobilization frames used by Shi`a Muhammad bin Hassan), al-Qasim that the group’s fighters comprise actors in Syria play an integral role Brigade, and the Brigade of Malik al- members of multiple groups including in their media operations, which are Ashtar.34 Units likely affiliated with Sunni and Shi`a Muslims and .40 aimed at both attracting recruits as the al-Abbas Brigade include the Determining the truth of these claims is well as more non-military and more Brigade of Zaynab’s Protector and the not possible. The mobilization frames passive types of support from Shi`a Zulfiqar Brigade, which share members and historical and cultural repertoire communities globally. This includes the based on photographs released online from which the al-Abbas Brigade draws creation of pro-militia artwork, video on pro-brigade websites, primarily and the way in which they are deployed montages, and other media as well as on Facebook.35 At least one unit is distinctly Shi`a, which brings into legitimizing, in the public sphere, the is named after an al-Abbas Brigade question whether it can successfully militias’ involvement in Syria. martyr, Ahmad Kayara, of which some recruit outside its Shi`a base. photographs have been released on pro- In formulating its mobilization frames, brigade websites. Members of Iran’s the al-Abbas Brigade and other Shi`a

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and 2013; “Defection of the Secretary General of the Hizb Al- militias draw upon the deep reservoir of other Iraqi Shi`a groups—such as the lah Brigades [in] Iraq and the Formation of the ‘Prince historical and cultural memory of Shi`a Brigades of the Prince of Martyrs (Kataib of Martyrs [Brigade],’” al-Masalah News, April 14, 2013; Islam. The heroic figure of Zaynab, the Sayyid al-Shuhada),the Imam Husayn Marcus George, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Com- sister of Imam Husayn, and the other Brigade, the God’s Soldiers Brigade, mander Says its Troops in Syria,” Reuters, September 16, historical persons referenced by the and the Brigade of Ammar bin Yasir— 2012; “Kazimiyya: The Funeral of a Retired Army Officer brigade and its supporters evoke the are also reportedly active militarily who was Killed One Month after His Participation [Be- tragedy of Karbala in 680 CE when 36 inside Syria. Full details, however, gan] Fighting in Syria,” al-Mustaqbal News, July 10, 2013; Imam Husayn and many of his closest Clash of the Heroes of the `Ammar bin Yasir Brigade in the supporters and male family members were slain in battle against a larger force 32 See Figures 16-18 in “Visual References.” Countryside of Aleppo, July 19, 2013; Figure 36 in “Visual sent by the Umayyad Caliph Yazid I.42 33 “News Report: Formation of a Shi’ite Brigade Com- References.” Ammar bin Yasir was a key supporter and Brigade and pro-brigade media output posed of Iraqis and Lebanese for Defending the Shrine military commander of the first Shi`a imam, Ali ibn Abi contains numerous Shi`a historical of Sayyida Zaynab South of ,” Russia Today, Talib, who was martyred fighting for him at the Battle of and cultural symbols, including March 4, 2013. Siffin in 657 CE. paintings of Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas43 34 See Figures 2-4 in “Visual References.” Also see 37 Ghazi and Arango. Videos of trucks reportedly carry- Clashes of the Al-Qasim Brigade of Liwa’ Abu al-Fadl al- ing Iraqi foreign fighter volunteers have also been posted `Abbas, April 2013. to the internet. 41 Al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ites Flock to Assad’s Side as Sec- 35 See Figure 5 and 6 in “Visual References.” It is also 38 Ibid. tarian Split Widens.” possible that members of the latter two groups broke 39 Ibid. 42 Their martyrdoms are commemorated annually dur- away from the al-Abbas Brigade after recent infighting. 40 “News Report: Formation of a Shi’ite Brigade Com- ing the first 10 days of the Islamic lunar month of Muhar- 36 “Formation [Unit] Calling Itself the ‘Prince of Martyrs posed of Iraqis and Lebanese for Defending the Shrine of ram, which culminates on the 10th day, called the Day of Brigades’ Rejects Sectarianism and Calls for the Unity of Sayyida Zaynab South of Damascus.” Also see Figure 1 in Ashura, when Imam Husayn himself was slain. the Iraqi People,” al-Baghdadiyya News Agency, May 8, “Visual References.” 43 “Abu al-Fadl” is an honorific name meaning “father

19 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7 and Zaynab, Ashura artwork, and flags beliefs are virulently anti-Shi`a, and Muhammad bin Hassan al-Mahdi, who is and standards (`alam) representing that thus there is a long history of polemics a messianic figure in Shi`a eschatology, of al-Abbas.44 Popular religious songs between the two groups. By portraying also has a militia unit named after based on poetry and videos produced all Syrian rebels as Salafists, the Shi`a him, the Brigade of the Awaited Savior by brigade supporters and possibly the militias and their supporters are (Katibat al-Mahdi al-Muntazar).54 brigade itself feature frequent mentions essentially arguing that dialogue is of Zaynab and other Shi`a holy figures hopeless. Brigade and pro-brigade Other Shi`a heroes after whom Shi`a such as al-Abbas. media materials frequently include units fighting in Syria are named include photographs of slain members and Ali Akbar, the teenage son of Imam Shi`a consider Zaynab to have been the commanders from various rebel Husayn, and al-Qasim, his nephew individual most responsible for keeping factions including the AQI-affiliated and son of his predecessor, Imam Imam Husayn’s message, and thus the Jabhat al-Nusra.49 Hassan, both of whom were martyred at purest form of Islam, alive after his Karbala.55 Malik al-Ashtar and Ammar death.45 The pledge of loyalty, “labbayk The al-Abbas Brigade takes its name bin Yasir, two of the supporters of the ya Zaynab,” (“we are at your service, O’ from Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas, who was Prophet Muhammad who became ardent Zaynab”) and vow from fighters that Imam Husayn’s half-brother and followers of the first Shi`a imam, `Ali, “we sacrifice our souls for you, O’ standard bearer at Karbala.50 Al-Abbas also have fighting units named after Zaynab” are frequent features in pro- is the quintessential selfless hero of the them.56 brigade artwork and videos.46 In a bid Karbala story, and his sense of duty is to counter anti-Assad activists, pro- emphasized in Shi`a accounts of his role For their part, Sunni rebel groups have brigade activists have even modified as the defender of Husayn’s family and drawn upon historical narratives and a slogan used previously by an anti- his refusal to allow Husayn’s standard polemics to counter the information Assad Facebook campaign, “From to fall to the ground until al-Abbas 51 [location], here is Damascus,” followed could no longer stand. A popular bol and some anti-Assad Syrian rebel groups have also 47 by a declaration of loyalty to Zaynab. slogan in al-Abbas Brigade artwork is taken it as part of their name. See Statement on the For- “kuluna `Abbasak, ya Zaynab” (“we are all mation of the Zulfiqar Brigade of the Brigade of the Martyrs 52 In the media operations of the al- your Abbas, O’ Zaynab”). of Rusafa following the Military Revolutionary Council [in] Abbas Brigade and its supporters, Deir al-Zur, Zulfiqar Brigade, June 2013; With God’s Help, Shi`a militiamen fighting in Syria are The names of units within or affiliated the Formation of the Zulfiqar Brigade in the Free City of Ja- portrayed as “Zaynab’s guardians” with the brigade are taken from other rablus, following the `Amr bin al-`As Brigade, Zulfiqar Bri- (hurras Zaynab) who are defending her heroes and symbols prominent in Shi`a gade, September 2012; Zulfiqar Brigade of Colonel Muham- shrine and, in turn, her honor, through Islam. These include units named mad Ziyad Qasimu, Zulfiqar Brigade, April 2013; Shield of self-sacrifice (fida’) from Salafist/ after Imam `Ali’s famous two-pronged Zulfiqar Brigade Responding to the Hordes of al-Asad in the Wahhabi hordes, which is how Syrian sword, Zulfiqar, and the Brigade of Towns of Karnaz and the Countryside of Hama, Shield of rebels are described in the discourse of Zaynab’s Protector (Kafil Zaynab), the Zulfiqar Brigade, February 2013. the militias and their supporters; they latter of which again emphasizes the 54 See Figure 3 in “Visual References.” Shi`a Muslims are equated with historical villains such defense of Zaynab’s honor by defending believe that the 12th imam, Muhammad bin Hassan, is 48 53 as the Umayyads. Salafist creedal her shrine. The 12th Shi`a imam, the last imam in a line of divinely-appointed successors to the Prophet Muhammad who possess both religious and of al-Fadl,” the name of one of his sons. `Utba, one of the Prophet Muhammad’s most virulent temporal authority over the Muslim community. 44 See Figures 24-27 in “Visual References.” enemies before his conquest of in 630 CE. For Abu 55 Clashes of the Qasim Brigade of Liwa’ Abu al-Fadl al- 45 She is given the honorific sayyida, which in this con- Sakkar’s reported cannibalism, see Drishya Nair, “Syria’s `Abbas, April 2013, available at www.youtube.com/ text translates to “Lady.” Cannibal Commander Abu Sakkar: Why I Ate My En- watch?v=SZoSKvyW4KI. See Figure 2 in “Visual Refer- 46 See, for example, this video uploaded to YouTube emy’s Heart,” International Business Times, May 15, 2013. ences.” Al-Qasim is known among Shi`a as the “Bride- and other video sharing websites: Presentation O’ Zay- For the poster, see Figure 35 in “Visual References.” groom of Karbala” because it is said he was married on nab: Operations of Liwa’ Abu al-Fadl al-`Abbas, Designated 49 See Figures 28-30 in “Visual References.” the morning of the day he was martyred at Karbala. This to Protect the Shrine of Sayyida Zaynab, Upon her be Peace, 50 An alternative name for the brigade is Katibat Liwa account first appears, it seems, in the 16th century, Per- December 2012. Another example is `Ali Abu Kiyan al- Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas (Brigade of the Standard of Abu sian-language elegiac martyrology of Husayn Va`iz Ka- Muwali’s song “O’ Zaynab.” One pro-brigade video mon- al-Fadl al-Abbas), which emphasizes his role as Imam shifi, Garden of the Martyrs. See Syed Akbar Hyder, Reliv- tage included a part of a scene from a popular Arabic-lan- Husayn’s standard bearer at Karbala. See Figure 19 in ing Karbala: Martyrdom in South Asian Memory (Oxford: guage film about Karbala,The Caravan of Pride. “Visual References.” Oxford University Press, 2006); David Pinault, Horse of 47 See Figures 20-23 in “Visual References.” For back- 51 Sayyid Najmulhasan Karrarvi, Biography of Hazrat Karbala: Muslim Devotional Life in India (New York: Pal- ground of the slogan’s origins and use in a major Face- Abbas (Karachi: Peermahomed Ebrahim Trust, 1974), grave, 2001). It has been published numerous times in book campaign by opposition supporters, see “Here is particularly pp. 49-51 and 78-90. Also see the film Kar- various languages. See Husayn Va`iz Kashifi, Garden of Damascus,” The Syrian, May 29, 2013, available at www. bala: When the Skies Wept Blood. the Martyrs (Qum: Daftar-i Nashr-i Navid-i Islam, 2000 english.the-syrian.com/2013/05/29/here-is-damascus. 52 See Figure 9 in “Visual References.” or 2001). 48 See Figures 7, 8, 30, and 31 in “Visual References.” 53 “‘Zulfiqar Brigade,’ Second Militia for the Defense 56 See Figure 4 in “Visual References.” Malik was ap- Also see Letter from Hezbollah to the Wahhabis, June 2013, of the Shrine of Sayyida Zaynab!” Orient News, June pointed governor of Egypt. Malik was poisoned while available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=vstAoKzA7nA. 9, 2013; ‘Zulfiqar Brigade’...Formation of a New Shi’i- [Mi traveling to Egypt on the orders of Ali’s chief rival for One internet poster from a pro-brigade website compared litia], June 9, 2013, available at www.youtube.com/ leadership of the Muslim state, Mu`awiya ibn Sufyan, Syrian rebels, by association with rebel commander- watch?v=WH7O4hm-P8A. As with many Islamic his- who is reviled by Shi`a but considered one of the Prophet turned-symbolic cannibal Abu Sakkar, with Hind bint torical figures and symbols, Zulfiqar is a contested sym- Muhammad’s companions by Sunnis.

20 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7 operations and messaging of the al- their claims to be engaged in military Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Abbas Brigade, Hizb Allah, and other jihad, it is important not to exaggerate Shi`a actors in Syria. Rebel discourses these jurists’ ability to guide the public’s Maghreb’s Tunisia refer to them and sometimes Shi`a behavior, even that of individuals Strategy generally as being guilty of polytheism who ostensibly follow their religious (shirk) and unbelief (kufr) because of their opinions and rulings. In 2006, for By Aaron Y. Zelin, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & belief in the line of the Twelve Imams. example, following the first bombing of Andrew Lebovich They also refer to Shi`a as the “fire the al-Askari Mosque in the Iraqi city worshippers” or Zoroastrians since they of Samarra, where two of the Twelve during the last two years, Salafist allege that Shi`a Islam is nothing more Imams are buried, Grand Ayatollah activity has escalated in Tunisia. than an offshoot of pre-Islamic Iranian al-Sistani issued several statements Much of this activity—primarily da`wa . Rebel videos showing military calling for patience and forbidding acts (religious outreach) designed to expand operations against the brigade often of revenge and retaliatory violence, the Salafist movement—has taken feature captured Shi`a cultural artifacts explicitly mentioning sectarian attacks place under the auspices of Ansar al- such as paintings of the imams and against Sunnis.61 He and Najaf’s three Shari`a in Tunisia (AST), headed by Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas, Shi`a religious other resident grand ayatollahs were veteran jihadist Saifullah bin Hassine writings and multimedia, and tablets of ultimately trumped by powerful Iraqi (also known as Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi).1 clay used by Shi`a during prayer.57 Shi`a political actors who, together A series of security incidents in and with Iraqi and foreign Sunni militants, around Tunisia, however, have been Conclusion led Iraq down the path of sectarian attributed to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Information on Shi`a militias conflict. Maghreb (AQIM), and more recently operating in Syria is limited, despite to an opaque group known as the Uqba the relative wealth of information Although the influence of Shi`a ibn Nafi Brigade.2 Regional security on pro- and quasi-militia websites. religious leaders is significant, it is not officials have described the Uqba ibn In particular, information on the absolute, and recent history has shown Nafi Brigade as an attempt to establish individual motivations of recruits that in the midst of sectarian violence a Tunisian jihadist group linked to remains unknown due to the paucity they are often overshadowed by virulent AQIM, one that purportedly combines of available primary sources.58 Even sectarian political voices. local recruits from western Tunisia’s when such sources are available, the Kasserine area and some members of declared intentions of fighters need Christopher Anzalone is a Ph.D. student AST under the guidance and leadership to be evaluated carefully since these in the Institute of Islamic Studies at declarations are not necessarily truthful McGill University where he studies 1 Abu Iyadh was part of the United Kingdom’s “Lon- 59 or accurate. Martyr biographies are modern Muslim socio-political movements, donistan” scene in the 1990s, where he became associ- also usually highly and posthumously contemporary jihadi movements, Shi`a ated with jihadist figures such as Hani al-Siba`i and Abu hagiographical in their depiction of the Islam, and Islamist visual cultures. He is Qatada al-Filistini, even being described as Abu Qatada’s 60 deceased and their motivations. also an adjunct research fellow at the Ali “disciple” on some jihadist forums. See “Tunisian Salafi Vural Ak Center for Global Islamic Studies Ansar al-Shari’ah Gaining Hard-line Jihadist Support,” The rise of Shi`a militias and their at George Mason University and managing BBC Monitoring, May 24, 2012; Fabio Merone, “Salafism political backers in Iran and Iraq editor for the center’s new online Islamic in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member of Ansar al- also present a potential challenge to Studies platform, Islamium, currently Shari`a,” Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013. He also became as- the authority of Shi`a maraji` al-taqlid under development. sociated with Algeria’s Salafist Group for Preaching (Shi`a religious authorities), such as and Combat (GSPC) during this period and facilitated Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Iraq. Tunisians’ travel to Algeria so they could receive militant Although the most recognized senior training with the GSPC. In Afghanistan, he co-founded Shi`a jurists, such as al-Sistani, have the , which the United Na- not yet addressed the appearance of tions designated an al-Qa`ida-affiliated terrorist orga- these militias or related questions nization in 2002. For details, see “QE.T.90.02. Tunisian regarding the religious legitimacy of Combatant Group,” UN Security Council, April 7, 2011; Aaron Y. Zelin, “Missionary at Home, Jihadist Abroad: 57 The Free [Syrian] Army Raids One of the Headquarters A Profile of Tunisia’s Abu Ayyad the Amir of Ansar al- of Liwa’ Abu al-Fadl al-`Abbas in the Damascus Countryside, Shari`a,” Militant Leadership Monitor 3:4 (2012); Lorenzo April 2013. Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of Inter- 58 Christopher Anzalone, “A Few Notes on Shi’ism in national Jihad (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005). Syria and the Emergence of a Pro-Asad Shi’i Militia, Liwa’ 2 Uqba ibn Nafi was a seventh century Arab general Abu’l Fadl al-`Abbas,” al-Wasat blog, May 22, 2013. under the who founded the Tuni- 59 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I sian city of Qayrawan. Interestingly, the Uqba ibn Nafi Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice mosque in Qayrawan, a city renowned for its longstand- between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” American Po- ing tradition of Islamic scholarship, has become a bastion litical Science Review 107:1 (2013). of Salafist preaching since 2011. See “Tunisie – Mohamed 60 This is based on the author’s analysis of contempo- Hassen à la Mosquée Okba Ibn Nafaâ: Une foule, survol- rary written and audiovisual Sunni and Shi`a martyrolo- 61 `Ali al-Sistani, statements, February 2006 and Febru- tée, réclame la Chariâa (vidéo),” Business News [Tunis], gies. ary 2007. May 3, 2013.

21 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7 of figures reputedly close to AQIM leader not be satisfied constraining itself to based polity.”8 Those who can be (also known da`wa, and this early theoretical work considered Salafiyya Jihadiyya reject both as Abu Mus`ab al-Wadud).3 Regional emphasized a phased approach wherein democratic participation and also the security officials, therefore, perceive Salafi-jihadis—even while undertaking quietism of Salafiyya `Almiyya. the incidents on Tunisia’s border with da`wa peacefully, in ways they could not Algeria beginning in late April 2013 as under the old regimes—would prepare Although AST has distanced itself highlighting AQIM’s increased focus on to later engage in violence.5 from violence at this time, it has shown Tunisia. a devotion to Salafi-jihadi ideology, Tunisia-based researcher Monica a fact that can be seen from both This article analyzes how AQIM, Marks identified three major divisions their own explanations and threats,9 viewing events in Tunisia through of Salafism within Tunisia: Salafiyya as well as the significant and long- its strategic lens, has responded to `Almiyya (usually translated as scientific standing connections that leaders and that country’s revolution. It finds Salafism, but which Marks believes key members of the organization have that AQIM has tried to insert itself is better understood as scripturalist to transnational jihadists.10 Indeed, into AST’s relationship with the Salafism), political Salafism, and because of these factors, AST has won Tunisian state. AQIM has urged AST Salafiyya Jihadiyya (Salafi-jihadism).6 To the praise of key leaders and intellectuals to be patient to prevent the Tunisian those who can be categorized as Salafiyya in the Salafi-jihadi movement.11 government from cracking down `Almiyya, democracy is “a tempting, on its activities. At the same time, but ultimately dead-end street,” and Its current activities within Tunisia AQIM’s rhetoric toward the Tunisian instead of engaging in party politics are mostly concentrated on da`wa, state has become sharper, opening the they choose “apolitical lives of quietist which has allowed the movement possibility of an increase in AQIM- piety.”7 Political Salafists have much to grow in size and give it influence related violence in Tunisia. in common with Salafiyya `Almiyya, but beyond its relatively small numbers.12 believe participation in democratic AQIM’s Strategic Outlook politics is justified despite its flaws The bulk of the jihadist activities in Understanding AQIM’s policies toward because it “could serve as a vehicle to which the group might be involved Tunisia requires an awareness of the attain a more caliphate-like, Shari`a- have been focused abroad, such as group’s perceptions of the changes promoting the flow of foreign fighters brought by the Arab uprisings, and to Syria, although the group has also how these changes in turn influence 5 Prominent Mauritanian ideologue Abu al-Mundhir al- been accused of orchestrating attacks its strategy toward the region. Salafi- Shinqiti, who is well known for his belief in the necessity on perceived cultural opponents within 13 jihadi thinkers and strategists who of violence, emphasized a phased approach by speaking Tunisia. Although the extent of AST’s are influential to AQIM quickly to the need for leniency while da`wa is predominant. Re- reached consensus about what the ferring specifically to Tunisia, he said that “present cir- 8 Ibid. Arab uprisings meant, formulating cumstances…require that the people of monotheism con- 9 “Abu Iyadh Threatens to ‘Afghanise’ Tunisia in Most their ideas about the revolutionary centrate on the aspect of preaching,” due to ignorance of Serious Salafist Menace,” Middle East Online, May 13, events even while Hosni Mubarak’s Islam caused by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s fallen regime. 2013; Aaron Zelin, “Who’s Who in Tunisia’s Salafi-Jihadi regime in Egypt drew its final breaths. See Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, “Answers to Questions Community: A Look at Key Leaders of Ansar al-Shari`a They agreed that the changes gripping from Our Tunisian Brothers,” Minbar al-Tawhid wal-Ji- in Tunisia,” Militant Leadership Monitor, April 2013. the region were positive, primarily had, December 15, 2011. AST leaders have also articulated 10 Abu Iyadh has said that AST “shared in the same because they created unprecedented a phased approach. Hassan Ben Brik, who heads AST’s manhaj,” or religious methodology, as al-Qa`ida. See 4 opportunities to undertake da`wa. At da`wa committee, has described jihad as “certainly part Zelin, “Missionary at Home, Jihadist Abroad.” For AST the same time, the movement would of our political project,” but said that AST has “no inter- leaders’ explanations of their devotion to jihadist vio- est currently in embarking on violent initiatives, or acts lence, see Galasso, “Intervista ad Hassan Ben Brik”; Mer- 3 See, for example, Benjamin Roger, “Tunisie: sur la of terrorism.” See Sergio Galasso, “Intervista ad Hassan one, “Salafism in Tunisia.” trace des djihadistes de mont Chaambi,” Jeune Afrique, Ben Brik: ‘Non crediamo nella democrazia, ma senza ap- 11 For praise of AST by key Salafi-jihadi figures, see May 7, 2013; Mourad Sellami, “Les précisions du minis- poggio del popolo niente jihad,’” Limes, October 11, 2012. “Journalistic Encounter with the Director of Al-Andalus tre de l’Intérieur tunisien,” El Watan [Algiers], Decem- Another young AST leader told an Italian researcher that Media Foundation,” al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb, ber 22, 2012; “Tunisie-Alqaida-Aqmi: Groupes armés, AST has not “eliminated the idea of jihad from our phi- April 18, 2013; “Web: Jihadists Send Mixed Messages to Larayedh sonne l’alert,” Tunis Afrique Presse, December losophy,” but that the group is not currently engaged in Tunisia’s Salafis,”BBC Monitoring, November 8, 2012. 21, 2012; Andrew Lebovich, “Confronting Tunisia’s Jiha- revolutionary violence because it is focused on da`wa. See 12 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Ansar al-Shari`a Tunisia’s dists,” Foreign Policy, May 16, 2013. Merone, “Salafism in Tunisia.” Long Game: Dawa, Hisba and Jihad (The Hague: Interna- 4 See Ayman al-Zawahiri, “And be Neither Weakened 6 Monica Marks, “Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: tional Centre for Counter-Terrorism-The Hague, 2013). nor Saddened,” al-Sahab, August 15, 2011; Atiyatallah Understanding the Jihadi Current,” Mediterranean Poli- 13 Thomas Joscelyn, “Tunisian ‘Martyrs’ Celebrated by `Abd al-Rahman, “The People’s Revolt...The Fall of Cor- tics 18:1 (2013). This tripartite division is consistent with Ansar al Sharia,” The Long War Journal, March 13, 2013; rupt Arab Regimes...The Demolition of the Idol of Stabil- the strains of Tunisian Salafism identified by other- re Ahmed Maher, “Tunisia’s Radical Divide over Salafi ity...and the New Beginning,” distributed by the Global searchers. See Stefano M. Torelli, Fabio Merone & Fran- Agenda,” BBC, June 6, 2013; Thomas A. Bass, “How Tu- Islamic Media Front, February 16, 2011. For an in-depth cesco Cavatorta, “Salafism in Tunisia: Challenges and nisia is Turning Into a Salafist Battleground,” The Atlan- discussion of early Salafi-jihadi perceptions of the Arab Opportunities for Democratization,” Middle East Policy tic, June 20, 2013. Aaron Y. Zelin has kept a comprehen- uprisings, see Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, 19:4 (2012). sive database of martyrdom announcements issued by “Perceptions of the ‘Arab Spring’ Within the Salafi-Jihadi 7 Marks, “Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Under- rebel forces in Syria that demonstrates both the presence Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35:12 (2012). standing the Jihadi Current.” of AST fighters and also the fact that AST subsequently

22 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7 relationship with AQIM is unknown, “to take advantage of this historical should focus on spreading its message AQIM leaders have repeatedly offered opportunity to spread the manhaj through da`wa while avoiding takfir advice to the group on how to proceed (methodology) of tawhid (monotheism) (excommunication).26 in Tunisia. and jihad.”19 At the same time, Tunisians must “prepare and be ready as the days In a March 2013 statement, AQIM Advising Tunisians, Ennahda, and AST are pregnant and the Crusade war further emphasized the importance In its public statements, AQIM has against Islam and Muslims remains of da`wa by exhorting Tunisians to attempted to act as a wise outsider utmost intense.”20 This statement is stay in their own country rather than providing counsel on the best course consistent with the theoretical work joining the jihad abroad.27 Without a for Tunisia’s future—offering advice to produced by Salafi-jihadi thinkers critical mass of Salafi-jihadis at home, Ennahda and AST. Ennahda, Tunisia’s counseling an initial stage of preaching AQIM warned, Tunisia would be ceded to Islamist political party, contested that would culminate in violence when secularists who “spread corruption.”28 democratic elections after the fall of the the movement is ready (or when its Zine El Abidine Ben Ali government and hand is forced). Yet the tone of AQIM’s statements won a majority of seats. Yet Ennahda’s shifted less than two months later, as a more moderate policies have placed it at AQIM did not release any new confrontation heated up with Ennahda odds with more hard line groups such statements on Tunisia until October and the Tunisian state on one side, and as AST and other Salafists. 2012. The return of its public rhetoric AQIM and AST on the other.29 At the coincided with AST’s ascendance, as time, Tunisia was undertaking military AQIM has a powerful message in the well as Tunisia’s leading Islamist party, operations against the Uqba ibn Nafi form of its warnings that Tunisians’ Ennahda, distancing itself from Salafist Brigade on its border with Algeria, hard-won victory over the former movements following the September and there were also low-level clashes regime could be stolen from them. 2012 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunisian cities due to the state’s This message especially resonates with in Tunis.21 The rhetorical and later cancellation of AST’s annual conference Tunisians who are already sympathetic street confrontation between Tunisian in May 2013. AQIM was evolving to a to AQIM’s worldview. security services and AST gave AQIM more hostile stance toward Ennahda— the opportunity to attempt to insert one that mirrors the increasing anger The first statement AQIM released itself as an arbiter among different of Salafists and Salafi-jihadis toward on the Tunisian revolution came on Islamist movements. Later, AQIM Ennahda, and the worsening AST- January 13, 2011, when the group’s offered support and advice to AST, as a Ennahda relationship. amir, Abdelmalek Droukdel, justified look at a series of AQIM’s subsequent the uprising by painting the regime as statements demonstrates. For the first time, AQIM explicitly “exceeding its boundaries in fighting criticized the Islamist Ennahda Islam like no other.”14 He told Tunisians In October 2012, AQIM took a soft tone party for its perceived wavering on that their movement must be broad and in a public address, noting that it was the issue of Shari`a, and for selling led by the wisdom of the ulama.15 At the only giving advice so as not to “fall in democracy as legitimate under Islam. same time, he offered Tunisians the the traps of the enemies of Islam.”22 “Don’t be deceived by the people who opportunity to train with AQIM for The message to Ennahda was that while call to democracy by decorating it the final battle against the Jews and there might be differences in tactics, under the name of the truth and give Christians, saying that the overthrow both groups want the same end result: it a religious garment,” the statement of the local regime was but one stage in implementation of Shari`a.23 Therefore, implored.30 Therefore, AQIM advised a broader war.16 He framed Tunisians’ AQIM said that it is better to work Tunisians to shield themselves from struggle as part of AQIM’s larger fight: together than to engage in intra-Islamist these provocations by joining “your “Your mujahidin brothers are with you, infighting, which would only help those sincere preachers of Ansar al-Shari`a, your problem is our problem, and your with a secular or liberal agenda.24 who stood next to you.”31 Yet while these happening is ours.”17 AQIM warned against working with statements were hostile toward Ennahda, the United States, and also France Mauritanian AQIM member Abu Yahya A couple of weeks later, AQIM released and the old regime—an allusion to the al-Shinqiti also counseled AST to be another statement highlighting the upstart political party Nida’ Tunis (the opportunities and dangers of the post- Tunisian Call), which has a number of 26 Ibid. 18 25 Ben Ali era. AQIM advised Tunisians leaders from the former regime. AQIM 27 “Call to the Youth of Islam: To Those Who Aspire stated that the “Islamic movement” to Hijrah in the Way of God in the Islamic Maghreb in issued laudatory announcements when they were killed. General and Tunisia in Particular,” al-Andalus Media, 14 Abu Mus`ab al-Wadud, “In Support of the Intifadah 19 Ibid. March 17, 2013. of our People in Tunisia,” al-Andalus Media, January 13, 20 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 2011. 21 Camille Tawil, “Ennahda Reconsiders Ties With Tu- 29 Abu Yahya al-Shinqiti, “O People of Tunisia of al- 15 Ibid. nisian Salafist Groups,”al-Hayat , May 29, 2013. Qayrawan Be Supporters of Shari`a al-Rahman,” al- 16 Ibid. 22 “To the Wise Men of the Islamist Movement in Tuni- Andalus Media, May 18, 2013; Shaykh Ahmad Abu 17 Ibid. sia,” al-Andalus Media, October 22, 2012. `Abd al-Ilah, “Letter of Advice to Ennahda in Tunisia of 18 “To Our People in Tunisia: The Tyrant has Fled but 23 Ibid. al-Qayrawan,” al-Andalus Media, May 21, 2013. the Infidel and Tyrannical System Remains,” al-Andalus 24 Ibid. 30 Al-Ilah. Media, January 28, 2011. 25 Ibid. 31 Ibid.

23 july 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 7 cautious of the Tunisian government’s This is not to say that Tunisian out after authorities tried to stop arms “provocations,” and to demonstrate jihadists were not involved with smugglers.37 The clashes resulted in the “patience and wisdom” rather than their Algerian counterparts during deaths of two militants and the recovery being dragged into “random actions.”32 this period. TCG co-founder Tarek of 34 automatic weapons and nearly AQIM’s public stance has been to Maaroufi worked with GSPC networks $55,000 in cash.38 According to then- counsel AST not to escalate its conflict in Europe, Tunisians trained in GSPC/ with the government, so that it can AQIM camps, and some Tunisiasn maintain its ability to undertake da`wa radicals were captured or killed by “It is likely that the tenor openly. At the same time, AQIM Algerian security services.34 Still, this of the relationship between serves as an ominous presence in the cooperation appears limited. background, a dark cloud hanging over AST and the Ennahda-led Tunisian society. Yet with the Arab uprisings and the fall government will continue of Ben Ali, AQIM’s reported presence AQIM Operations in Tunisia in Tunisia became more visible. In to deteriorate, as will When the Algeria-based Salafist Group May 2011, a gunfight that killed two the relationship between for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) Tunisian security force members became AQIM in 2007, one goal behind (including a colonel) broke out in the AQIM and the Tunisian its founding was to integrate into one southern Tunisian town of Rouhia after state.” structure the various jihadist groups security forces discovered men trying in , including the Tunisian to transport weapons.35 The militants, Combatant Group (TCG). The TCG’s reportedly AQIM members, included Algerians, Libyans, and Tunisians, Tunisian Interior Minister (now prime two of whom were, according to minister) Ali Laarayedh, some of the “AQIM’s public stance Tunisian authorities, part of a group 12 men arrested after the incident had is to counsel AST not of fighters who tried to infiltrate and links to AQIM.39 recruit fighters in Tunisia in 2006 to escalate its conflict and 2007 known as the Suleiman During this period, according to with the government, Group.36 The next year, in Bir Ali Ben Algerian officials, the flow of arms Khalifa, fighting between suspected increased through and within Tunisia so that it can maintain militants and security forces broke (from both Libya and Algeria), a trend its ability to undertake that became noticeable in the Algerian da`wa openly. At the same 34 For information on Maaroufi, see “The United States provinces of El Oued and Tebessa, and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Ter- which border Tunisia, as well as in time, AQIM serves as an ror,” U.S. Treasury Department, August 29, 2002; Chris- close inland provinces like Khenchela 40 ominous presence in the tophe Dubois and Frédéric Vézard, “Le Tunisien d’Al- and Bouira. Qaïda fréquentait un cybercafé de Menton,” Le Parisien, background, a dark cloud October 22, 2002. For information on Tunisians training In December 2012, the situation hanging over Tunisian in GSPC/AQIM camps, see Anneli Botha, “Terrorism in escalated with the emergence of the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Ter- what Tunisian officials termed society.” rorism,” Institute for Security Studies, July 2008. For AQIM’s attempt to set up a branch in 41 information on Tunisians killed or captured by Algerian Tunisia, the Uqba ibn Nafi Brigade. authorities, see Mounir B., “Six terroristes tunisiens arrê- Following security incidents that tés à Annaba,” Le Quotidien d’Oran, April 17, 2005. month in Kasserine and the arrests involvement with the GSPC/AQIM, 35 Frida Dahmani, “Tunisie: échanges de tir meurtriers of 16 militants reputedly linked to however, was limited for a number of entre militaires et membres présumés d’Aqmi,” Jeune Af- AQIM, Laarayedh publicly identified years. Early Tunisian global jihadist rique, May 18, 2011. the group, saying that it was led activity, such as the arrangement for 36 Contemporary reporting identified these two as So- by Algerians close to AQIM leader two Belgian-Tunisians to kill Afghan fiane Ben Amor and Abdelwaheb Hmaied. See Frida mujahidin commander Ahmad Shah Dahmani, “Tunisie: échanges de tir meurtriers entre mili- 37 “Tunisie: violences et défi salafiste,” International Cri- Massoud in 2001, involved direct links taires et membres présumés d’Aqmi,” Jeune Afrique, May sis Group, February 13, 2013. to al-Qa`ida’s core organization rather 18, 2011. The Suleiman Group was built around several 38 Zohra Abid, “Tunisie. La groupe de Bir Ali Ben Khali- 33 than to GSPC/AQIM. The GSPC and jihadists, led by a former Tunisian national guardsman fa est lié à Al Qaïda,” Kapitalis, February 13, 2012. later AQIM were regarded as largely named Lassad Sassi. Sassi had trained with the GSPC 39 Ibid. focused on Algeria. in Algeria, then slipped into Tunisia and recruited and 40 For one notable incident involving an arms convoy trained as many as 40 men before the Suleiman Group that fled from Algeria into Tunisia, see Georges- Mal was broken up by Tunisian security forces in early 2007. brunot, “Un mystérieux convoi armé stoppé en Tunisie,” The group, however, had difficulties with funding and Le Figaro, September 23, 2011. Also see “À Bir El Ater, les equipment, and later analysis has theorized that the contrebandiers préfèrent le trafic d’armes,”El Watan, Oc- 32 Al-Shinqiti, “O People of Tunisia of al-Qayrawan Be group posed somewhat less of a threat to Tunisian se- tober 7, 2011. Supporters of Shari`a al-Rahman.” curity than initial reporting suggested. See, for example, 41 Mourad Sellami, “Cellule d’Al Qaîda démantelée aux 33 Benjamin Roger, “Tunisie: Abou Iyadh, au nez et à la Alison Pargeter, “The Suleiman Affair: Radicalism and frontières: Les precisions du ministre de l’intérieur tu- barbe des autorités,” Jeune Afrique, September 18, 2012. Jihad in Tunisia,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 23:1 (2011). nisien,” El Watan, December 22, 2012.

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Abdelmalek Droukdel.42 Laarayedh Interestingly, at a time when Tunisian itself as a leading voice opposed to a added that the Uqba ibn Nafi Brigade security services were hunting fighters system widely seen as failing. Although was composed largely of recruits from in Jebel Chaambi and El Kef, militant- AST remains numerically small, it the region of Kasserine, which abuts linked violence in the regions of Algeria enjoys influence beyond its numbers. Algeria, and that the group’s goal was to bordering Tunisia appears to have Going to war with the state would provide initial training before sending increased. While it is unclear to what mean sacrificing its ability to engage in fighters along to “real” AQIM camps in extent this violence may have been da`wa openly.51 Algeria or Libya.43 connected to developments in Tunisia or to the Uqba ibn Nafi Brigade, Thus, while it is not clear that this After several months searching for at least one incident in February is the result of coordination between militants in the region of Jebel Chaambi, 2013—a coordinated assault on an the two groups, AQIM has served as Tunisia’s highest mountain, and further Algerian army base at Khenchela— a safety valve for AST. It has urged north toward El Kef, Tunisian security was reportedly conducted by a AST to deescalate its confrontations forces struck a homemade mine on group of fighters bearing a striking with the state, even while AQIM itself the mountain on April 29, 2013.44 resemblance to the descriptions of the has adopted an increasingly harsh tone Between then and early June, at least 20 Uqba ibn Nafi Brigade.49 This could toward the Tunisian government and Tunisian soldiers were wounded, some bolster suggestions that the group is appears to be escalating its activities in seriously, and two killed by improvised using Tunisia largely for recruitment the Algeria-Tunisia border region.52 explosive devices on the mountain.45 and training, while focusing on combat Again, Tunisian officials identified operations elsewhere, such as in Algeria Aaron Y. Zelin is the Richard Borow those behind the bombs as the Uqba or Mali. fellow at The Washington Institute for ibn Nafi Brigade, which they alleged Near East Policy, and maintains the included fighters who had spent time While Tunisian officials have charged website Jihadology.net. in northern Mali.46 While Tunisian that members of AST may have been officials have claimed that the group involved in the Uqba ibn Nafi Brigade Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior has left the mountain, Algerian security and the incidents around Jebel Chaambi, fellow at the Foundation for Defense of forces have stepped up and and that AST leader Abu Iyadh al- Democracies and an adjunct assistant border security operations over the last Tunisi has visited the mountain, this professor at Georgetown University. two months.47 According to El Watan, information is impossible to confirm In 2013, he was a visiting research Algerian forces have even conducted and could be related to the tensions fellow at the International Centre for limited counterterrorism operations in between the Ennahda-led government Counterterrorism—The Hague, where Tunisian territory.48 and AST.50 he produced a major report on Ansar al- Shari`a in Tunisia. Conclusion It is likely that the tenor of the Andrew Lebovich is a Washington, D.C.- relationship between AST and the based researcher and analyst focused Ennahda-led government will continue on political and security issues in North 42 Dorra Megdiche Meziou, “Al Qaïda, menace-t-elle to deteriorate, as will the relationship Africa and the Sahel. vraiment la Tunisie?” Business News, December 21, 2012. between AQIM and the Tunisian state. 43 Ibid.; Roger, “Tunisie: sur la trace des djihadistes du AST has something to lose, however, mont Chaambi.” Other reports indicated the presence of if it moves toward direct confrontation purported training camps in Tunisia as early as last fall. with the state: the group has been able to See Malik Aït-Aoudia, “Tunisie: qui protège les camps provide social services to areas neglected jihadistes?” Marianne, October 23, 2012. by the government, and has positioned 44 “Fifth Mine Explodes in Mount Chaambi, No Vic- tims,” Tunis Afrique Press, May 20, 2013. 49 The attack was conducted by approximately 50 fight- 45 Antoine Lambroschini, “Jihadists Hunted in Tunisia ers, matching some estimates of the Uqba ibn Nafi Bri- ‘Former Mali Fighters,’” Agence France-Presse, May 8, gade’s size, and reportedly involved a mix of Algerians, 2013. Tunisians, and Libyans. See “Algérie: un groupe armé 46 Ibid. attaque une caserne militaire,” Radio France Internation- 47 Amira Masrour, “Government Says Chaambi Attacks ale, February 7, 2013. Planted by Actors Outside the Mountain,” Tunisia Live, 50 According to an El Watan article, “Concerning the June 7, 2013; “Tunisie – l’armée algérienne soupçonne origins of the people captured, Ali Laarayedh indicated les terroristes de se déplacer sous la couverture de con- that the majority of these terrorists are originally from trebandiers,” Business News, June 10, 2013. the Kasserine governorate and were known for their 48 Aziz M., “Frontière algéro-libyenne: Le boom du activities in protests organized by Ansar al-Shari`a.” trafic d’armes,”El Watan, June 21, 2013; “Algérie: surveil- See Mourad Sellami, “Les precisions du ministre de lance renforcé à la frontière tunisienne,” Agence France- l’Interieur tunisien,” El Watan, December 22, 2012. Also Presse, May 4, 2013. If true, the reports about Algerian see Imed O., “Selon les services de renseignement spé- 51 For its part, AQIM might lose traction if it found itself deployments in Tunisia would mark a shift from Alge- ciaux tunisiens: Abou Iyadh aurait visité les terroristes in an actual fight with the Tunisian state, as that could ria’s public stance on the deployment of Algerian forces au mont Chaambi,” Liberté-Algérie, June 15, 2013; Lebo- darken many Tunisians’ perceptions of it. outside of Algerian borders. vich. 52 Al-Ilah.

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Recent Highlights in June 3, 2013 (GLOBAL): The U.S. State whose most effective fighting units, the Department offered a $7 million reward al-Qa`ida-linked al-Nusra Front [Jabhat Terrorist Activity for information leading to the location al-Nusra], were defending the town.” of Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko – Voice of America, June 5 June 1, 2013 (UNITED STATES): Al- Haram in Nigeria. The U.S. government Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) also authorized rewards up to $5 million June 6, 2013 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida released a new six-minute, English- each for information leading to the location chief Ayman al-Zawahiri released a new subtitled audio message addressed “to the of Yahya Abu al-Hammam, a leader in al- audio message, urging Syrians to unite American People.” The message said, “The Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad Boston events…and the poisoned letters and , a former and prevent what he claimed was a U.S. [sent to the White House], regardless leader in AQIM who now heads his own plot to establish a client state in Syria to of who is behind them, show that your militia. It also offered $3 million each protect Israel’s security. – Reuters, June 6 security is no longer under control, and for information leading to the location of that attacks on you have taken off and AQIM leader Malik Abu Abdelkarim and June 6, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): A cannot be stopped. Everyday you will be Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West suicide bomber drove a truck filled hit by the unexpected and your leaders Africa (MUJAO) spokesperson Oumar with explosives into a military base in will not be able to defend you.” Qasim Ould Hamaha. – Daily Post, June 4 Helmand Province, killing at least six al-Raymi, who read the statement, is Georgian soldiers. The Afghan Taliban AQAP’s military chief. – , June 2; June 3, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide claimed responsibility. – Reuters, June 6 CBS/AP, June 2 bomber on a motorbike attacked a passing U.S. military patrol in Paktia Province, June 6, 2013 (RUSSIA/SYRIA): The head June 1, 2013 (IRAQ): The Iraqi Defense killing two U.S.-led coalition service of the Russian security service, the FSB, Ministry said that they foiled a plot by members. The explosion also killed at least said that approximately 200 Russian an al-Qa`ida cell to execute poison gas 10 schoolchildren and a police officer. Islamists who support North Caucasus attacks in the Middle East, Europe and – Guardian, June 3; Voice of America, June 3 insurgents are fighting in Syria for al- North America. The militants may have Qa`ida. “The fact that around 200 fighters been planning to use remote-controlled toy June 3, 2013 (INDONESIA): A suicide from Russia are fighting on the side of planes to distribute the gas. Iraqi officials bomber on a motorbike detonated his the Caucasus Emirate under the flag of said that they arrested five suspects who explosives at a police compound in Poso al-Qa`ida and other related structures had been using three facilities in Iraq in Central Sulawesi, killing only himself. provokes concern in Russia,” FSB chief to try to produce sarin and mustard gas A police source told Agence France- Alexander Bortnikov said. – AFP, June 6 using instructions from another al-Qa`ida Presse that the bomber was suspected group. The cell, however, had not yet of being part of an Islamist terrorist June 7, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber been able to produce any lethal chemical group led by Santoso, Indonesia’s most in an explosives-laden vehicle targeted a agents. – , June 1; BBC, June 1 wanted militant. – Australian Broadcasting convoy of buses carrying Iranian Shi`a Corporation, June 3; AFP, June 3 pilgrims near Muqdadiya, killing at least June 1, 2013 (MAURITANIA): Mauritanian nine of them. – RFE/RL, June 7; BBC, June 7 officials announced that U.S. authorities June 4, 2013 (MALI): A suicide bomber recently transferred Yunis al-Mauritani, blew himself up in the northern Mali city June 7, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. drone a senior al-Qa`ida operative previously of Kidal after being chased by authorities. reportedly killed six suspected militants held in Afghanistan, to their custody. The bomber was the only casualty. – Voice in the Shawal area of North Waziristan – Reuters, June 1 of America, June 4; Reuters, June 4 Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper June 2, 2013 (SYRIA): A car bomb June 5, 2013 (IRAQ): Gunmen ambushed said that it was the “first such attack exploded near a police station in Jubar a bus and executed 15 passengers on a since Nawaz Sharif was sworn in as prime district of Damascus, killing at least eight desert road between Anbar Province minister this week.” – Dawn, June 8 Syrian security forces. It was not clear and Karbala. The dead included 10 which group was behind the attack, but border police and five local residents. June 9, 2013 (IRAQ/SYRIA): Al-Jazira the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Authorities blamed al-Qa`ida in Iraq for claimed to have obtained a copy of a letter suspected that it had been carried out the attack, saying, “Those terrorists hunt from al-Qa`ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri by Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qa`ida-linked people along this road and kill according addressed to the leaders of the Syria- Salafi-jihadi militant group. – France24, to religious sect.” – Reuters, June 5 based Jabhat al-Nusra and the Iraq-based June 2 (ISI). In the letter, June 5, 2013 (SYRIA): Syrian troops and al-Zawahiri said that ISI chief Abu Bakr June 2, 2013 (YEMEN): A suicide bomber Hizb Allah fighters captured the strategic al-Baghdadi was “wrong” to declare a tried to drive an explosives-laden vehicle border down of Qusayr from anti- merger between the ISI and Jabhat al- into a gas pumping station in the southern government rebels. According to Voice of Nusra, adding that al-Baghdadi’s rule port city of Balhaf, but gunfire from America, “the rebels had held Qusayr for was limited to Iraq. Al-Baghdadi had Yemeni guards detonated the vehicle more than a year in their overall struggle appeared to unilaterally announce the prematurely. Besides the bomber, there to topple the government of President merger of the two groups in April 2013, were no casualties and the gas facility was Bashar al-Assad. Its loss to government but was rebuffed by Jabhat al-Nusra, unaffected. – Reuters, June 2 forces represented a major blow to rebels, which said that they pledge allegiance to

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Ayman al-Zawahiri but that they would up when they arrived. In total, 25 people mainly Shi`a city of Sa`da, killing two not merge with the ISI. – al-Jazira, June 9; were killed, including 14 students of civilians. – AFP, June 19 Voice of America, June 10 the women’s university, four nurses and Deputy Commissioner of Quetta June 19, 2013 (SOMALIA): Al-Shabab June 9, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber Abdul Mansoor Kakar. The sectarian militants launched a major attack on the detonated an explosives-laden vehicle at a militant group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi claimed UN Development Program compound police checkpoint outside a Shi`a district responsibility. – Dawn, June 16 in Mogadishu, killing at least 15 people, in northwest Baghdad, killing at least including four foreigners. – BBC, June 19; seven people. – Reuters, June 9 June 16, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber Bloomberg, June 19 detonated explosives inside a crowded June 10, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): café in a largely Shi`a neighborhood of June 20, 2013 (UNITED STATES): The Militants tried to attack NATO’s Baghdad, killing 11 people. – AP, June 16 U.S. federal government charged Eric headquarters at Kabul international Harroun with conspiring to provide airport. The attack, which involved June 16, 2013 (PAKISTAN): Two anti- material support to a designated terrorist suicide bombers, left seven militants polio vaccination volunteers were shot organization and with conspiring to use dead, with Afghan authorities saying that and killed while visiting homes in Khyber weapons of mass destruction overseas. the attack was thwarted. Two civilians Pakhtunkhwa Province. – CNN, June 17 Harroun, a former U.S. Army medic were wounded. – Guardian, June 10 from Arizona, allegedly fought in Syria June 17, 2013 (KENYA): Kenyan against the Bashar al-Assad regime in June 10, 2013 (IRAQ): Two car bombs police shot to death two suspected coordination with the al-Qa`ida-linked exploded and a suicide bomber in another militants after they refused to Jabhat al-Nusra militant group. He was vehicle detonated his explosives at a surrender during a raid on a house in arrested near Dulles International Airport produce market in Jadidat al-Shatt in Mombasa. Police accused the men of in Virginia in March 2013. – Politico, June Diyala Province. The three bombs killed plotting attacks in Kenya on behalf 21 at least 13 people. – RFE/RL, June 10 of Somalia’s al-Shabab militant group. – Reuters, June 17 June 20, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): The June 11, 2013 (SYRIA): Two suicide Afghan Taliban announced that they are bombers detonated their explosives at June 18, 2013 (IRAQ): Two suicide ready to free U.S. Army soldier Bowe a square in central Damascus, killing at bombers shot to death the guards outside Bergdahl in exchange for five of their least 14 people. – AFP, June 11; Los Angeles the Habib ibn Mathaher Shi`a mosque senior operatives held at Guantanamo Times, June 11 in Baghdad, and then detonated their Bay. Bergdahl, the only known American explosives inside the building. The double captive from the war in Afghanistan, has June 11, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): An suicide attack killed at least 31 people. been held by the Afghan Taliban since Afghan Taliban suicide bomber in a vehicle – BBC, June 18 2009. – AP, June 20 attacked the entrance to Afghanistan’s Supreme Court in Kabul, killing at least June 18, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A suicide June 20, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber 17 people. – AFP, June 11; al-Jazira, June 12 bomber detonated explosives in a crowd killed three people at a vote counting of hundreds of mourners attending a center in Ramadi, Anbar Province. – AFP, June 15, 2013 (IRAQ/SYRIA): The head funeral in the village of Sher Garh in June 21 of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Abu Mardan District of Bakr al-Baghdadi, released a new audio Province, killing 29 people. Among the June 21, 2013 (SPAIN): Spanish security message appearing to defy the orders of dead was a recently elected lawmaker who forces broke up an al-Qa`ida-linked al-Qa`ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri not may have been the target. The lawmaker, network accused of sending fighters to to merge with Jabhat al-Nusra, saying Imran Khan Mohmand, campaigned as Syria, arresting eight people. The raids that “the Islamic State of Iraq and the an independent, but later supported the occurred in Ceuta, a Spanish territory in Levant remains [in existence], as long as party of cricketer-turned-politician Imran North Africa. – AFP, June 21 there is blood in our veins and our eyes Khan. – AP, June 18 are blinking…It remains, and we will not June 21, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A bomb tore compromise; we will not give up…until June 19, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide bombing through a Shi`a Muslim religious center we die.” Al-Baghdadi also said, “I chose killed the leader of a provincial political in , killing at least 15 people. the command of God over the command party and four of his relatives in Ninawa – Voice of America, June 21 that runs against it in the [al-Zawahiri] Province. The leader, Yunus al-Ramah, letter.” – AFP, June 15; AP, June 15 was the head of the United Iraq Party. June 22, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber The incident occurred one day before detonated his explosives inside a Shi`a June 15, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A female elections in Ninawa and Anbar provinces, mosque in northern Baghdad, killing at suicide bomber detonated explosives on two Sunni-majority provinces where least 12 people. – Reuters, June 22 a bus carrying students of the Sardar the April 20 polls were delayed due to Bahadur Khan Women’s University security concerns. – AFP, June 19 June 23, 2013 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik-i- in Quetta. After the explosion, a male Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants killed suicide bomber was waiting inside the June 19, 2013 (YEMEN): A suicide bomber nine foreign mountain climbers, including BMC Hospital ward for the arrival of on a motorbike detonated his explosives a U.S. citizen, at a camp at Nanga Parbat, high level officials, and he blew himself in the middle of a market in Yemen’s the world’s ninth-tallest mountain. The

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TTP said that the attack was in retaliation bin Ladin and attempted to travel to CTC Sentinel Staff for the U.S. that killed Yemen to join al-Qa`ida operatives Waliur Rahman, the second-in-command waging “violent jihad.” According to Editor-in-Chief of the TTP, on May 29, 2013. – Washington NBC News, “Investigators said Kaliebe Erich Marquardt Post, June 23 approached an undercover officer about Senior Editor, CTC joining a terror group and admitted he June 23, 2013 (SYRIA): A car bomb followed teachings of terrorist Yemeni Editorial Board exploded in Aleppo in northern Syria, cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and Sheik Omar COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. killing 12 soldiers. Jabhat al-Nusra, a Abdel-Rahman—the blind sheik tied to Department Head Salafi-jihadi group linked to al-Qa`ida, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.” Department of Social Sciences (West Point) claimed responsibility. – AP, June 23; AP, He was arrested on January 21, 2013, at June 25 Kennedy Airport trying to fly to Yemen. COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. – NBC News, June 26 Deputy Department Head June 23, 2013 (SYRIA): Three suicide Department of Social Sciences (West Point) bombers detonated their explosives June 26, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A bomb while trying to break into the Rukn al- exploded on a busy street during rush MAJ Bryan Price, Ph.D. Din police station in northern Damascus, hour in Karachi. The bomb targeted Judge Director, CTC killing five people. Jabhat al-Nusra, a Maqbool Baqir, who has worked on a Salafi-jihadi group linked to al-Qa`ida, number of terrorism cases. The judge and claimed responsibility. – AP, June 23; AFP, eight members of his security detail were June 23; AP, June 25 killed in the blast. – AFP, June 26

June 24, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber June 27, 2013 (UNITED STATES): A killed an Iraqi counterterrorism official as federal grand jury in Boston indicted he left a university in Tikrit. The official, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in the Boston Contact Colonel Ghazi Ali al-Jubouri, was the Marathon bombings, charging him with Combating Terrorism Center head of counterterrorism for Salah al-Din detonating a weapon of mass destruction. U.S. Military Academy Province. – Reuters, June 24 Tsarnaev could face the death penalty or 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall life in prison. – Los Angeles Times, June 27 West Point, NY 10996 June 25, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): Five Phone: (845) 667-6383 Afghan Taliban gunmen and suicide June 27, 2013 (SYRIA): A suicide bomber Email: [email protected] bombers targeted the Ariana Hotel, which killed at least four people in a Christian Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ the Taliban claim is the location for a area of Damascus. – AAP, June 28 CIA base, and the presidential palace in * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 Kabul. The bombers drove at least two June 27, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): A land cruisers similar to those used by suicide bomber attacked a NATO convoy NATO soldiers, as well as fake badges in Farah Province, killing two civilians. and vehicle passes, which allowed at least – AP, June 29 one of the bombers to gain access to a heavily guarded area. The Afghan Interior June 29, 2013 (THAILAND): A roadside support Ministry said that three Afghan security bomb killed eight Thai soldiers in The Combating Terrorism Center would guards and all five assailants were killed. Yala Province in southern Thailand. like to express its gratitude to its financial – New York Times, June 24; AFP, June 25 Authorities suspected that Muslim supporters, for without their support and separatist insurgents were to blame for shared vision of the Center products like the June 25, 2013 (IRAQ): Two suicide the attack. – Bangkok Post, June 29 CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you bombers detonated explosives at a protest are interested in learning more about how camp near Tuz Khurmato, Salah al- June 30, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A suicide to support the Combating Terrorism Center, Din Province, killing at least 10 people. bomber killed at least 28 people in a Shi`a please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call The protesters were reportedly ethnic area of Quetta, Baluchistan Province. Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association Turkmen demanding better security for The sectarian militant group Lashkar-i- of Graduates at 845-446-1561. the area. The dead included Ali Hashim Jhangvi claimed responsibility. – Express Muhtaroglu, the deputy head of the Tribune, June 30; BBC, June 30; Dawn, July 1 Torkoman Front, along with two of his sons. – BBC, June 25; RFE/RL, June 26 June 30, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A remotely- detonated bomb targeted security forces June 26, 2013 (UNITED STATES): U.S. in Peshawar, leaving 17 people dead. federal authorities announced that Justin – BBC, June 30; UPI, June 30 The views expressed in this report are those of Kaliebe, an 18-year-old Long Island the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, high school student, pleaded guilty to the Department of the Army, or any other agency providing material support to terrorists of the U.S. Government. in a secret hearing on February 8, 2013. Kaliebe was allegedly inspired by Usama

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