A WAY OUT

OF IN

THE MAZE

THE JIHADI

SYRIAN BATTLEFIELD

Table of content:

Chapter 1: Biography of the major players in ISIS and Al-Qaida

Chapter 2: History of Isis

Chapter 3: History of AQ

Chapter 4: Founding of Jabhat al Nusra

Chapter 5: Start of the argument and split of ISIS with AQ/Jabhat Nusra

Chapter 6: ISIS plans Caliphate and territorial/fighter absorption

Chapter 7: What is Mubahala and the motif Adnani did a Mubahala

Chapter 8: Conclusion

Foreword

"In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful."

The scholars (and those who benefit from their insight) recognize the fitnah as it approaches and thus they can save themselves and others from it, by Allaah’s Permission. The ignorant people only recognize fitnah as it leaves (i.e. after it has taken them in and harmed them).

Chapter 1

Short biography of the major

players in ISIS and Al-Qaida

And such is the truth, that people honestly sin- cerely and impartially record, falsehood cannot make use of it in aiding its falsehood.

And even if it tries it will be exposed sooner or later.

Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (short Bagdadi)

Baghdadi was born Ibrahim al-Badari in 1971 in Samarra.

Baghdadi graduated from the University of Baghdad in 1996. (Unconfirmed)

From 1996 to 2003 nothing is confirmed about his whereabouts, work or studies.

In 2003, Baghdadi was imprisoned in Iraq and released in late 2004. (Baghdadi was not detained in compound 14 with the thousands of arrested Sunni rebels)

In begin 2005 Baghdadi founded Jamaat Jaysh Sunnah Jamaah (JJSJ) a couple of months after his re-lease.

In 2006, JJSJ joined Al Qaeda under Zarqawi’s Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC)

MSC was rebranded as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006 after the death of Zarqawi by Abu Umar al Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir

Baghdadi became the leader of ISI in May 2010.

In 2013 ISI became the Islamic State of Iraq and Shaam (ISIS)

Baghdadi announced the formation of a Caliphate on June 29, 2014 and renamed the group the Is-lamic State (IS).

Abu Mohammed al-Adnani (short Adnani)

Adnani was born in 1977 in the town of Binnish in Idlib Syria.

Adnani was killed on 30 August 2016 near Aleppo.

Nothing is confirmed or known about his studies, work or early life.

In the year 2000 Adnani swore allegiance to Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) and its leader Abu Mu-sab al-Zarqawi. JTJ later merged into Al Qaeda's MSC.

In May 2005 Adnani was arrested in Al Anbar Iraq and released in 2010.

Adnani joined ISI in 2010 under its former leader Abu Umar al Baghdadi.

In 2013 Adnani became the official spokesperson for ISIS.

Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi (short Haji Bakr)

Haji Bakr was Born ca. 1958–1964 in Iraq and he died in January 2014 in Syria

Haji Bakr was a member of the Iraqi Baath party and served as an Iraqi Army colonel who had worked on weapons development and in the intelligence services.

Haji Bakr played an influential role in Baghdadi becoming the next ISI leader, and reportedly organized an internal purge, including scores of assassinations, in order to solidify al-Baghdadi's control of the group.

Haji Bakr joined ISI in March 2010

Usama bin Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden (short Usama)

Usama bin Mohammed bin Laden was born on March 10, 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

He was shot in a raid by US special on May 2, 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan

Usama was born to the family of billionaire Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden in Saudi Arabia.

In 1976, he attended the élite Al-Thager School.

He studied economics and business administration at King Abdulaziz University and earned a degree in civil engineering in 1979.

In 1979, Usama went to Pakistan, where he joined Abdullah Azzam and the Mujahidin’s resistance in the Soviet war in Afghanistan

In 1984, bin Laden and Azzam established Maktab al-Khidamat.

In 1988 Usama Bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammad Atef, started a Base of operations for Mujahidin fighting against Muslim oppression and seeking to make Islam victorious and restore its glory.

Only until much later they and others started calling it by its official name Al Qaeda (see Chapter 4)

Abdullah Azzam was assassinated in Peshawar in 1989 by an explosive device planted by the Mossad, after the Mossad found out that Azzam started taking young men from Palestine to Afghanistan to train in special camps and returned them to Israel to execute bombings in Israel.

Under Usama bin Laden’s leadership the Al Qaeda idea and organization spread around the Muslim world, with its biggest branches in North, West and Central Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri (Short Zawahiri)

Ayman was born on June 19, 1951 in Cairo Egypt

Zawahiri studied medicine at Cairo University and graduated in 1974

At a very young age, In 1966 Zawahiri formed a small group of brothers that sought revenge for the execution of Sayyid Qutb and to work towards the vision of Sayyid Qutb, to restore Islam and free Muslims, and establish a vanguard after the original Companions of the Prophet.

Zawahiri and his small group joined the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the 1970’s

Zawahiri became emir of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, after Abbud al-Zumar died.

In 1981 Zawahiri was imprisoned in Egypt and released in 1984.

Zawahiri went on Hajj in 1986. In this year he met Usama bin Laden in Saudi Arabia.

Zawahiri joined Usama bin Laden in 1987 in Peshawar.

In 1988 Usama Bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, Zawahiri and Abu Hafs al Masri were at the cradle of the establishment of Al Qaeda.

In 1998, Zawahiri merged the Egyptian Islamic Jihad into al Qaeda and on June 7, 2001, Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri formally signed a merger agreement.

On May 2 2011 Zawahiri became the Leader of Al Qaeda.

Abu Mohammad al-Julani (short Joulani)

Joulani was born on 1974 in DeireZor Syria.

He studied medicine at the Damascus University in Syria.

In 2003 he stopped his medicine study because of the war in Iraq.

In 2003 Joulani joined Al Qaeda under Abu Musa Al Zarqawi and was his close associate.

Joulani was arrested in 2006 in Iraq and released in 2008.

After his release Joulani was soon appointed head of al-Qaeda operations in Mosul.

In late 2011 when the armed revolution started in Syria, Joulani traveled to Syria and started the Al Qaeda branch in Syria, with the support of ISI.

In January 2012 Joulani announced the formation of Jabhat al Nusra, the name Tandim al-Qa'ida fi ash-Sham was shelved for operational security.

In March 2014 Joulani officially broke all operational ties with Baghdadi.

In July 2016 Joulani started to rule out the vision of one unified army and political body for Syria and this required from Joulani that Jabhat al Nusra broke its bayah [pledging allegiance] with Al Qaeda.

On 28 July 2016 Joulani announced the independent formation of Jabhat Fatah Shaam.

On 27 January 2017 the unity Vision resulted in Haya Tahrir Shaam (HTS).

Joulani was appointed Chief of Military Command in Haya Tahrir Shaam.

Chapter 2

History of Isis

Oh Allah show us the truth as truth and grant us following of it.

Oh Allah show us falsehood as falsehood and

grant us avoidance of it.

The establishment of Al-Qaeda and the global jihad in Iraq began when Palestinian/Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi went to Iraq in 2002.

Al-Zarqawi was inspired by Abdullah Azzam, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada (all three of whom are of Palestinian origin). While in Afghanistan in 1989 al-Zarqawi received operational train- ing conducted by Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri in Al Qaeda training camps. Al- Zarqawi returned to Jordan in 1993 where he was detained and imprisoned in 1994 and released in 1999, at which point he went back to Afghanistan.

In 2002, Zarqawi went to the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. While there he joined Kurdish jihadi Islamist organization called Ansar al-Islam.

In October 2004 al-Zarqawi’s organization joined Al-Qaeda. He swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and was declared the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Al-qaeda fi bilad al-rafidayn)

On June 7, 2006, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in the city of Baqubah, northeast of Baghdad. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, a long standing Al Qaeda veteran was appointed head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, by Al- Qaida central.

Abu Hamza al-Muhajir is to this day considered by ISIS as one of its founding fathers.

Abu Hamza al Muhajir was an Al-Qaeda operative of Egyptian origin, born in 1968, and was close to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In 1982 he joined the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group headed by Ayman al- Zawahiri. Between 2001 and 2002 he underwent training in Afghanistan where he met Abu Musab al -Zarqawi.

Abu Hamza al-Muhajir co-headed Al-Qaeda in Iraq (2006-2010), and he had close contact with Al- Qaeda operatives outside Iraq to receive support and to carry out attacks. Abu Hamza al Muhajir also set up the hub for moving Al-Qaeda fighters from Syria to Iraq.

On October 15, 2006, Al-Qaeda in Iraq established, an umbrella network called the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) for Sunni jihadi organizations.

Abu Hamza al Muhajir had a senior role in the Al-Qaeda in Iraq leadership, retaining it until he was appointed to head the new umbrella network (ISI) together with Abu Omar al-Baghdadi.

Abu Hamza al Muhajir Abu Umar al Baghdadi

Former Baathist and Staff Colonel in the Iraqi army, Colonel Haji Bakr was recommended to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs al-Muhajir by middlemen around March 2010.

Colonel Haji Bakr was accepted into the organization so that ISI could gain a connection and obtain useful information from leaders in the former Iraqi Baathist army. He became close to leaders in ISI and acted as a military advisor to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs al-Muhajir. He provided the leadership of ISI with military information and plans, and linked them to former military commanders from the remnants of the Baath Party. Colonel Haji Bakr was accepted in ISI and quickly rose as an advisor to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs al-Muhajir, when 2 months later tragedy struck ISI. Abu Omar al Baghdadi and Abu Hamza Muhajir were killed when a joint operation of American and Iraqi forces rocketed a safe house 10 kilometers southwest of Tikrit. (Haji Bakr will play one of thebiggest roles later, in the split with Jabhat Nusra)

Gen. Raymond Odierno immediately praised the operation by saying:

"The death of these terrorists is potentially the most significant blow to al-Qaida in Iraq since the be-ginning of the insurgency"

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, wasn't on the Shura council of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, and only become a leader within ISI around the time of Abu Omar's death. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was in ISI but was only a sub-commander of a unit and not near any leading position.

After the assassination of the leaders of ISI, Colonel Haji Bakr told people close to him that he gave bay’ah *swore allegiance+ to a new emir to lead the organization, and that new emir was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This news was quite a surprise to many and to Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden did not know who Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was when he was appointed. Shaykh Usamah bin Laden requested his biography, and Al-Qaidah asked ISI to wait with appointing a new leader until the leadership of Al- Qaidah knew who he was. ( Perhaps one of the main reasons for ISI breaking with Al-Qaidah)

But ISI ignored this and quickly wanted to rise to be the sole power in the Iraqi rebellion and went forward to execute and kill all groups and fighters that opposed them or even simply wanted to stay independent. ISI gained substantial strategic and military experience due to many former Saddam generals and commanders joining ISI. In time one third of ISI were former Baathists and they all had high positions within ISI and an estimated 2/3 of the seats in its Majlis Shura. Haji Bakri was killed by rebels in a safe house in Syria, 36 documents were found in Haji Bakri’s possession that made clear who he was and what his role in ISIS was.

ISI fought against most Sunni Muslim groups in Iraq,, including the Islamic Army in Iraq, the 20th Rev- olution Brigades, Ansar Sunnah later known as Ansar Al-Islam, Jaysh Al-Mujahideen, Jaysh Rashideen and the Hamas of Iraq. Most of these groups formed the Jihad and Reform Front, a coalition against the US-Shia occupation of Iraq.

Because of ISI ruthlessness and claiming sole Rebel authority in the rebellion against the US-Shia oc-cupation of Iraq, ISI was the main motive for Sunni’s in Iraq to join the Awakenings Movement.

The US quickly cashed in on this situation and provided the awakening movement with cash and weapons.

ISI pushed on and killed many Rebel leaders and Scholars in Iraq. They killed Harith Daahir the mili- tary leader of the 20th Revolution Brigades. ISI killed Shaykh Abu Qutaybah and Dr. Abu Haarith, leaders of Jaysh Al-Mujahideen. They killed Abu Bakr Al-Ansari the leader of the Army of Abu Bakr Salafi who was known for rescuing and protecting the Sunni people in Southern Baghdad. They killed the scholar Shaykh Dr. Muhannad Al-Ghareeri in the city of Al-Karmah in Al-Anbar. They killed the scholar Shaykh Khalid Al-Harbi, the Imam of the Shuhadaa Mosque, after Maghreb prayers in April. They also killed Shaykh Haatim Musa Al-Halbusi, the Imam of the central Mosque in Karmah.

They announced an exclusive State, forced others to join it, attacked the refraining resistance groups and killed their leaders and Scholars with the excuse that they refused the Sharia of Allah. This caused the weakening of the rebellion in Iraq and empowered the US-Iraqi government. ISI caused infights and pushed the Sunni Muslim population in the hands of the US-Iraqi government, while re- directing their weapons away from the US-Iraqi government towards the Sunni rebellion in Iraq. ISI repeated this same strategy later in Syria, when they again announced an exclusive State, forced oth- ers to join it and waged war against the groups and leaders who refrained.

The armed resistance in Syria did not repeat the same mistake as the groups and tribes in Iraq did, by laying down their weapons and joining their enemies against ISIS. This is one of the major differences between the Syrian revolution and the land of Iraq known for its turmoil throughout history.

It is highly likely whyﷺrefused to send his blessings on Iraq unlike he did on Syria, as MohammadIraq gave birth to sorcery, it gave birth to many sects like the Shia and the Khawarij, and it will give birth to the Dajjaal.

Ibn Fudail reported on the authority of his father that he heard Salim b. `Abdullah b. `Umar as saying:

O people of Iraq, how strange it is that you ask about the minor sins but commit major sins? I heard from my father `Abdullah b. `Umar, narrating that he heard Allah's( (ﷺas saying while Messengerpointing his hand towards the east: Verily, the turmoil would come from this side, from where ap-pear the horns of Satan and you would strike the necks of one another; and Moses killed a person from among the people of Pharaoh unintentionally and Allah, the Exalted and Glorious, said: "You killed a person but We relieved you from the grief and tried you with (many a) trial" (xx. 40). Ahmad b. `Umar reported this hadith from Salim , but he did not make a mention of the words: "I heard".

ْ َ ْ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َْ ،هع ُنأبً ُ لواحدث ناق ا واللف ُظال ْهب ُن األ ْع لى،و ْأحم ُد َْب ُنعم ُرالوهكٌعهً، ُ حدث نا ْعب ُّدلال ُه َْب ُنعم ُر َْب ُن َْابنف ْضٌل، - أبا ن َُ - أبا ن،وواص ُل َْبن ْعبه ُد ه َ ََ َ َ ه َ َ َُ ََ ََ َ ََه َ ه ََ َ َ

َ َْ َ َ َ َْ َ

َ َْ َ

ُ ُ ُ ُ عم ُر َ َ ٌَقو ُل لال ُه َْ ب ُن َسمعت ْه َُأبٌه ْعب ُد َ َ َّ ع ُن َهالصغٌرة َ ه هوأ رك ْب َك ُم َْهللكبٌرة هه َّلاله،ْب ُن َهعم ُر َ َ ٌَقو ُل ٌَاأ هاللعراق ه هماأ ْسألك ُم َْ قا ل َُسمع ت ْه َُسال ُم َْ ب ُن َ ه ْعبه ُد َ َ َ َ َْ َْ َْ َْ ََ َْ َ َْ َْ َ ُ ُ ُ ُ ُ ُ َّلالهصلىهلال علٌهوسلمٌقول عترسول َ ْ ُ . " ْحٌثٌطل ُعقر ناالشٌطا ُن ُن"المشرق وأو ُمأبٌهد ُه ن ْح ُو. " ُن َهاه نا ت نة َتجً ُء إ ُن "

ه َْ َ َ هم ه َ َ ه َ َْ َ هم ه ا ل هف ه َ َ َ سه ْم َ َ َْ َْ َْ َ َ َ ُ ْ ُ ُ ُ ُ ُ آل َ ْ جلل ُه َّلالعزو الغمُ نفسا َ َ } رع ونخطأ َفقا ل َُ موسىالهذ ي َقت ُل وأنت ُمٌ ْضر ُببعضك ُمرقا ب َُبع ُضوإنما َقت ُل ْ ْ ْ ْ ْ ْ ْ ه فن جٌَنا ك َُه م ُن َوقتلت َُ َ َ َ َ ههف ََ هم ُن َ َ ََ َ َه َه ََ ه َ َ َ

ُ َْ َ َْ َ َ َ َ عت ُ ْ . ُمل ُمٌقلس َُع ُنسه قا ل َُأحم ُد َْب ُنعم ُرهفٌرواٌهت{ و فتنا ك َُفتونا َهم َهال ََْ ْ َ َ ه َ َ َ َ

: Sahih Muslim 2905 Reference

Narrated Ibn `Umar:

(The Prophet) said, "O Allah! Bless our Sham and our Yemen." People said, " Our Najd as well." The Prophet again said, "O Allah! Bless our Sham and Yemen." They said again, "Our Najd as well." On that the( (ﷺsaid, "There will appear earthquakes and afflictions, and from there will come Prophetout the side of the head of Satan."

.ب ُن َْال ح سهن، قا ل َُ ح َ دث ناْاب ُن ع َْ ون، ع َْ ُن نافهع، عه ُن َْابه ُن ع مر، قا ل َُال ل ه ُم َبار ْه ُك َل ناهفٌ شامه نا وهف ٌ ٌمهن نا َْال م ثنى، قا ل َُ ح َ دث ناح س ٌَْ ُن َْ َ ح َ دث نام ح َم ُد َْب َْ َ اله فتن، وه بها و َقا ل َُ َقالوا وهفٌ ن ْجهد نا قا ل َُ َقا ل َُه نا ك َُال زا لهز ُل َ. ه ُم َبار ْه ُك َل ناهفٌ شامه نا وهف ٌ ٌمهن نا َوهفٌ ن ْجهد نا قا ل َُ َقا ل َُالل ُن َقا ل َُ َقالوا َْ .ل ُع َ ْقر ُنال ش ٌَْ طان ُه ٌ ط

Reference : Sahih al-Bukhari 1037

In April 2013, ISI wanted to absorb Al Qaeda’s Syrian branch, Jabhat Nusra and ISI opted for ISI to transform into ISIS "Islamic State of Iraq and Shaam".

However, Abu Mohammad al-Juolani and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leaders of Jabhat Nusra and al- Qaeda respectively, rejected the merger. After a yearlong power struggle, ISIS and al-Qaeda cut all ties in February 2014 (See Chapter 5).

On 29 June 2014, ISIS proclaimed itself to be a Caliphate.

Chapter 3

History of Al Qaeda

“Our Lord! pour out on us patience and

constan-cy, and cause us to die as Muslims.”

Al Qaeda in Arabic means The Base. Al Qaeda is before an organization a message of Islamic revival.

In 1988 Usama Bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammad Atef, started a Base of operations. These 4 men established “A Base” of training and study for Muslims to primarily fight against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. This “Base” later became known as Al Qaeda (Al Qaeda in Arabic literally means “The Base”)

After the victory against the Soviet invasion, Al Qaeda sought to continue its struggle and fight against oppression in Muslim countries and to make Islam victorious and restore its glory. Al Qaeda first focused on Palestine, Saudi Arabia and North and Central Africa in the beginning, later Al Qaeda’s message spread to Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Central Asia.

Al Qaeda made its first worldwide fame with the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings.

Usama bin Laden and Zarqawi saw the United States, Israel, Britain and France as the main cause for the oppression of Muslims worldwide and Al Qaeda’s main strategy, was to focus on the United states, Israel and Zionist interests.

However Al Qaeda made its biggest fur ore, when The United States saw a major attack on its soil with the 9-11 Twin towers bombing.

Osama bin Laden claimed responsibility for the 9-11 attacks in an audio message:

The biggest “gift” for Al Qaeda was the so called Arab Spring. These revolutions are seen as a direct result of Usama’s call upon Muslims to overthrow the tyrants for years.

These revolutions came right after Al Qaeda spread awareness in the Muslim societies about the oppression of their rulers in many of their publications. And not only did Osama call upon the Muslims to revolt, he even predicted these revolutions and the fall of the Arab tyrants. Usa-ma said in April 2007 in his message to the Arab dictators and rulers:

"People have awoken from their slumber and have realized the great transgressions and cor-ruptions you have committed concerning their property and money. You have two options in front of you: return what you have unlawfully taken to the rightful owners in a peaceful way. And let the Muslims choose a Muslim ruler who will govern by the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His messenger (saws). Or secondly, refuse the first option and continue to oppress people, take away their rights, and manipulate a portion of the general public to beat and kill their brothers and kin who rejected your governing. However, you must know matters have exceeded what can be tolerated. You must also know that when the people move to reclaim their right, no one can stop them, not even the best security apparatus anywhere".

Right after the Arab Spring in May 2011 Usama bin Laden praised the revolutions in his very last message. Usama bin laden called these revolutions a revolution of dignity and defiance.

Osama bin laden said in his speech "My Islamic Ummah" :

"We follow with you these great historical events. We share with you the joy and happiness and the delight and gladness. We rejoice for your joy and we grieve for your distress. Congratulations to you for your victories and may Allah have mercy upon your Martyrs, treat your wounded and release your prisoners.

The winds of change were blowing with desire of liberation and Tunisia took the lead. As quick as lighting, the nights of Egypt took what they learned from the noble people of Tunisia to Tahrir square. Another great revolution was launched and what a revolution it was!"

Osama bin Laden was assassinated by a US commando raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on May 2, 2011.

The co-founder of Al Qaeda Zawahiri and then second in command, became the leader of Al Qaeda central.

In Somalia, al-Qaeda has long been working closely with its Somali wing, which was created from the al-Shabaab group. In February 2012, al-Shabaab officially joined al-Qaeda, declaring loyalty in a joint video.

In January 2009 a merger of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Al Qaeda in Yemen resulted in the for- mation of Tanẓīm al-Q ā‘idah fī Jazīrat al-‘Arab, al-Qaeda Organization in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) with its main base of operation in Yemen. AQAP declared an Emirate and shown its capability of governing large areas under its control. AQAP is believed to be stronger now then Al Qaeda in Iraq was during “the surge”. The famous American/Yemeni imam and Islamic lecturer, Anwar al Awlaki joined AQAP. He was assassinated by a targeted US drone strike on September 30, 2011. His son, Ab- dulrahman al-Awlaki (a 16-year-old American citizen), was also assassinated by a targeted U.S. drone strike two weeks later. On January 29, 2017, Al-Awlaki's 8-year-old daughter, Nawar Al-Awlaki, was assassinated by a U.S. commando attack in Yemen.

For Al Qaeda in Syria see next chapter, History of Jabhat al Nusra (Chapter 4)

With the American invasion of Iraq, Al Qaeda expanded its operations in Iraq.

Al-Qaeda fi bilad al-rafidayn under the leadership of Zarqawi, Al Qaeda had a presence in Iraq.

Al Qaeda eventually broke with ISI in March 2014 and has no more presence in Iraq.

Narrated Ibn Hawalah:

The Prophetand( (ﷺsaid: It will turn out that you will be armed troops, one is Syria, one in the Yemen one in Iraq. Ibn Hawalah said: Choose for me, Messenger of Allah, if I reach that time. He replied: Go to Syria, for it is Allah's chosen land, to which his best servants will be gathered, but if you are unwilling, go to your Yemen, and draw water from your tanks, for Allah has on my account taken spe- cial charge of Syria and its people.

ََ َ َ ََ َ َْ َْ َ َ َْ ُ َ ُ ْ ْ ْ ُ ُ ةَبنشرٌح قا ل َُقا ل َُرسولُقتٌلة، ع ُن َْابنح والة، ُ ُ ُ ح د ح دثنابهقٌة، الح ْضرهمً، ح دثنا ْحٌ و عنأبٌه- َ ٌْعهن ٌْا بن ْم عدا ن َُ-ثهن ٌبهحٌ ٌر، عنخاله د،

َ َ ه ه َ َُ َ َ َ َ َ َ َْ َْ َ َ َْ َ َ َ َْ َْ َْ َ ُ ُ ُ ُ ٌ ٌ ُ ٌ ل ٌ ٌا َْابنحوالة قا ل َُ. "راق ب َتكونواجنودامجندةجن ُدبالشا ُموجن ُدبالٌمنوجن ُد سٌصٌ ُراألم ُرإلىأ ُن" َّلال ُهصلىهلالعلٌهوسلم ْ

هخ ُره َ َ هاله عه ه َه ه ه َ َ ه َْ ه َ َ َ ْ ْ ْ ُّ َ َ ْ ْ ُ ْ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ ُ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ ُ كمواسقوا ُ ةلاله ْ رسو ل َ َته ْ ُ ُ أ ْبٌت ُمف ْعلٌك ُم فأماإ ُن ُن ٌْ جتبٌإلٌها َُهنأرض ْعلٌ ك َُبالشا ُمفإنها " فقا ل َُ . َّلال ُهإنأدرك ُت

َْ َ ه َبٌمهن َْ َ َْ َ ه َ هعباده ُه َ هم هخٌ ر َ َ ه ه َ ه َْ هم َ هخٌ ر َ ه ه ه َ ذهل ك َُ َ ه َ َ ْ ْ ََ َ َ َ َ َ . " َُه َتو كلُهلٌبالشا ُموأههل هم ُنغدرك ُمفإ ُّنلال َُ ْ َ ه ه َ َ ه َ ه األ ل با) صحً ن ً (Grade: Sahih (Al-Albani ( ح ح كم

Chapter 4

History of Jabhat al Nusra

said “Blessed is Syria ﷺ The Prophet“ (Shaam), because the Angels of Allah the

Most Merciful lower their wings over it.”

In late 2011 when the armed revolution started in Syria, Joulani started formulating a strategic plan to come to the aid of the revolution in Syria. Joulani named this plan “Nusra (help) for the people ofShaam, from the Mujahidin of Shaam in the battlefields of Jihad”. Joulani submitted this plan to Bagh-dadi and Zawahiri. They both cheered the plan and Joulani’s plan was executed and became Jabhat al Nusra.

Joulani traveled to Syria with 6 men and started the Al Qaeda branch in Syria, with the support of ISI. It was agreed with Zawahiri and Baghdadi that it would not be made public, out of fear that the “brand” Al Qaeda would harm the support from the Syrian population. Baghdadi’s response to this project was: “I agree to every letter written in this book. … The writer of the project didn’t leave anyroom for criticism. … Applying the Iraqi experience to Syria is suicide.”

Nevertheless on February 12, 2012 al-Zawahiri in a video recording urged Syrians not to rely on the West or Arab governments in their uprising to topple President Bashar al-Assad. In the 8-minute vid-eo called "Onwards, Lions of Syria" Zawahiri urged Muslims in Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan to come to the aid of Syrian rebels confronting Assad's forces. al-Zawahiri said, "A Muslim should helphis brothers in Syria with all that he can, with his life, money, opinion, as well as information."

From this statement it started to become clear to Intelligence services and rebels that Jabhat al Nusra was Al Qaeda in Syria and Jabhat Nusra quickly started to gain support from and manpower from all over the Muslim world .

Jabhat Nusra evolved into a highly capable, robust army.

On 11 April 2013 Al Qaeda officially announced Jabhat al Nusra was indeed Al Qaeda in Syria.

Joulani’s strategy for Syria worked very well and it avoided alienating the local Syrian population, which was unlikely to tolerate its long-term objectives and hardline religious beliefs in the early months of the war. Jabhat Nusra gained numerous new recruits and firmly established a base of Syrian fighters and secured the support of other rebel groups. The success of this strategy be-came apparent when the U.S. wanted to designate Jabhat Nusra as a terrorist organization, this sanctioning of Jabhat Nusra by the US provoked protests in support of Jabhat Nusra from within Syr- ia’s moderate opposition. In fact twenty-nine Syrian opposition groups and Syrian Rights groups signed a petition condemning the U.S. designation of Jabhat Nusra as a terrorist group. They went so far as to announce “We are all al-Nusra!” and urged rebel supporters to raise the Jabhat Nusra flag.

In December 2012 Jabhat Nusra was well established and started to grow under the leadership of Joulani. As this growth continued Jabhat Nusra and Juolani gained international recognition. Many more new fighters from the Gulf, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Europe, and Yemen started to flock to Jabhat Nusra in great numbers. This surge in numbers was alarming to Colonel Haji Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi because none of the members of Jabhat Nusra had any loyalty to ISI or to Baghdadi himself.

Colonel Haji Bakr was afraid of the increase in popularity of Jabhat Nusra and Joulani and worried that they might lose control over the popular Syrian battlefields.

Colonel Haji Bakr then compelled Baghdadi to order Joulani to announce on a public audio clip that Jabhat Nusra belongs to ISI. Joulani denied this takeover of Jabhat Nusra by ISI and Jabhat Nusra offi- cially split from ISI in November 2013.

On 29 July 2016 Jabhat Nusra leader Joulani, after counselling with Al Qaeda and asking its permis- sion to break with Al Qaeda, Jabhat Nusra officially split from Al Qaeda. Joulani announced that the group changed its name to Jabhat Fath al Sham and had "no affiliation to any external entity". Al Zawahiri blessed this next step for Jabhat Nusra for the sake of unity and the vision of a unified army and political entity fighting against all the oppressors in Syria, mainly Assad, Iran and Russia and seek-ing to make Islam victorious and restore its glory.

On 28 January 2017 , several groups, including Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, reached a merger agreement, resulting in the formation of a new group called Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham ("Organization for the Libera- tion of the Levant") With Jabhat Fateh al-Sham being one of the most powerful/influential groups in the new formation, its leader Abu Mohammad al-Joulani was appointed the overall military com- mander of Hayat Tahrir Sham. Abu Jaber, (ex Ahrar al-Sham) was appointed Emir of Hayat Tahrir Sham.

Logo of Tahrir Sham Flag of Tahrir Sham

Abu Hurairah narrated that the Messenger of Allah(s.a.w) said:

"Faith is Yemeni, and disbelief is from the direction of the east. Tranquility is for the people of sheep, and wickedness and Riya is in those who boast among the people of horses and the people of camels. Al-Masih – that is Ad-Dajjal- will come, and when he reaches behind Uhud, the angels will turn his face to the direction of Ash-Sham, and its there that he will be destroyed.” (Sahih)

َ َ َ ََْ ََْ َْ َْ َ َ " َ هلالعلٌهوسلمقا ل َُىل ُصه الّل َُ َلوس ُرنأ ،ةرٌْرهٌب ُأنع،ه ْعبه ُدال ْرحمن،ع ُنأبً حدث نا ق ْتٌبة، حدث نا ْعب ُدالعزٌ ُز َْب ُنمحم د،ع ُنالعال ُ َ َ َ َ ه َ ه َ َ َه ه ُء َْبن ه َ َه َ َ َهه َ َ َ َ ْ َْ َ َْ َ َْ َ َْ َْ َْ َ َْ َْ َْ جا ُءدب ُر ُ ُ ُ ُ ُ ُ ُ ُ ْ ُ ُللوب ُرٌأهتٌالمسهٌ ُحإذا أ ْهالل خ ٌْلوأ ْه هفٌالفدادهٌ ن َُ َ َ ُلل غ ن ُموالف خ َْ ُروالرٌا ُء وال سهكٌ نةأل ْه اإلٌمانٌمانوالكف ُرهم ُن َْهقباللمشرق

َ ََ ه َ هَه َ ه ه ه َ ه ه َ َهه َه َ َََ ه

ٌ ٌ ْ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ ُ . ه عٌس ىهذاحهدٌ ُثحس ُنصحٌ ُح ٌه أب و قا ُل .َ ٌ"هلك ُه ال م ال ه ئكةوج ْه ُه هقب ُل َالشا ُم وه نال ُك ه أ ح َُدصرفت ُه َ َْ ََ َ َ َ َ َ ه َ َ َ َ

: Jami` at-Tirmidhi 2243 Grade: Sahih

Chapter 5

Start of the argument and split of ISIS with AQ/Jabhat

Nusra

Adnani arrived in Syria before the battle of liberating of the Taftanaz airport [on 11 January 2013], and Joulani appointed him as governor over the “north” which consisted of (Aleppo, Idlib, and Ha- ma). He started taking pledges of allegiance in the name of the “Islamic state of Iraq” and not “Jabhat al-Nusra,” therefore huge problems occurred between him and the administrators of Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama due to his incorrect interference in the matters of these provinces.

This resulted in Joulani removing Adnani from his position as Commander of the North, and appoint- ed Adnani as the governor over the borders, the muhajireen (immigrants) and the military camp for newly arrived muhajireen. But again this turned out significantly unsuccessful, so Joulani removed Adnani again.

After this Adnani was not placed in a high level within Jabhat Nusra and this made the problem much worse between Adnani and Joulani, so he started to write a report to Baghdadi. Before this report was sent Adnani tried direct and indirect means with Joulani, in order for him to be returned as gov-ernor of the north. Joulani refused and Adnani’s spite increased, and then he sent his report, with most of the sections of his report being taken from individuals oppositely faced on the spectrum to those in Jabhat al-Nusra. These individuals were from other extraneous factions. Adnani also started relaying secret messages to ISIS that Jabhat Nusra was trying to split from ISI and this caused Bagh-dadi to send a personal supervisor over Syria, named “al-Anbari”. Al Anbari will later play a major role in ISIS.

At this time Jabhat Nusra was growing fast and Joulani’s strategy was a big success in Syria.

In April 2012 Jabhat Nusra expands after many veteran jihadists from Lebanese Fatah al-Islam and Palestinian groups joined Jabhat Nusra which gave Jabhat Nusra an even bigger boost in Jihadi cir- cles..

By the end of 2012- Al Nusra units became the shock troops of the armed Syrian opposition. They were the best trained and disciplined of all the rebel groups, Jabhat Nusra could turn the tide wher- ever rebel lines ran into trouble. Senior European and Turkish intelligence officials confirmed that there is a wave of young Muslim men from all across Western Europe and the Arab World flocking to Syria to join Jabhat Nusra and fight Assad.

In early 2013 it was estimated that Jabhat Nusra had between 5.000 and 10.000 first class soldiers.

In the wake of the hoarding and sale of flour by gangsters that made huge profits of the raging war, Jabhat Nusra toke over the distribution of flour in Aleppo in early 2013. This move boosted Jabhat Nusra’s popularity amongst the Syrian inhabitants of Aleppo.

In March, 2013- Jabhat Nusra, Ahrar Sham and other rebels groups controlled large parts of the three provinces that made up northeastern Syria and Ahrar al Sham and Jabhat Nusra controlled the first provincial capital city (Raqqa) This was Syria’s sixth largest city and the first to fall into rebel hands.

Nusra’s battle-stained banners now hang over their newly captured headquarters in Syrian cities such as Raqqa, Aleppo, Homs, Damascus and Assad was on the brink of losing complete control over these cities.

Colonel Haji Bakr was afraid of the increase in popularity of Jabhat Nusra and worried that they might lose control over the popular Syrian battlefields. Due to the fact that neither him nor Baghdadi were present in Syria. Colonel Haji Bakr urged Baghdadi to send an Iraqi group to Syria to investigate the options for ISI. Colonel Haji Bakr also compelled Baghdadi to order Joulani to announce in a public audio clip that Jabhat Nusra merges into ISI, because ISI supported Jabhat Nusra in the beginning.

Joulani took days without releasing anything. Baghdadi then sent Joulani a rebuke and Joulani re- sponded that he needed to consult those around him including the rebels and the Scholars. In the next day’s Joulani sent Baghdadi a letter that said, that an announcement saying that Jabhat Nusra merging into IS would not be in the best interest of the Syrian revolution. He informed that everyone in Jabhat Nusra Shura council agreed with this decision.

Colonel Haji Bakr was outraged, and Baghdadi was very angry. ISI immediately sent spies disguised as rebels and Shura council members from ISI to get close to Joulani and monitor his movements. Joulani became very worried about the prospect of an unwanted merger with ISI.

Joulani knew very well how far Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr were prepared to go from his time in Iraq, thus he started limiting his movements and actions. Joulani kept praising the support Jabhat Nusra received in the beginning from ISI and Baghdadi to those he spoke with, because Joulani feared that matters could escalate and that the project for Shaam would fail.

America’s placing of Jabhat Nusra on the terror list made Joulani go into hiding and not meet with people sent by Baghdadi to monitor him. He isolated himself among a closed command circle of peo- ple of his choosing. All this increased the fears and worries of Colonel Haji Bakr and Baghdadi that this matter will not be solved as quick as ISI wanted.

Joulani all the while walked a thin middle ground in an effort to calm the matters between him and Baghdadi but the fears of Colonel Haji Bakr and Baghdadi remained.

Colonel Haji Bakr began to plan a strategy to test Joulani’s loyalty and a possible merger of Jabhat Nusra and ISI. He advised Baghdadi to direct Joulani to carry out a bombing against the commanders of the Free Syrian Army during any meeting in Turkey. In accordance with this advice, Baghdadi sent an urgent letter to Joulani ordering him to carry out the bombings in Turkey, which would target gatherings of the Free Syrian Army commanders. Baghdadi claimed that it was justified to target the Free Syrian Army because the FSA could the future Sahwat, and agents of America. Baghdadi argued it was best to eliminate them before they built themselves up in Syria and before their popularity became strong.

These orders were received by Jabhat Nusra’s Shura council like a lightning strike, all were stunned. A meeting of Jabhat Nusra’s Shura council was convened and the order was rejected. A detailed reply was sent to Baghdadi stating that Jabhat Nusra had rejected the order. Jabhat Nusra’s Shura council justified the rejection of the order on the basis, that commanders of the Free Syrian Army are not a legitimate target by judging them on their possible future actions and stated that Turkey cannot be targeted because it is a very sensitive country and a supporter to Syria’s fleeing and needy popula- tion and that an attack on Turkish soil would disrupt the Jihad. The Shura council made a reference to the following hadith:

Narrated from Abi Sukainah One of the Companions:

said: Let the Abyssinians alone as long as they let you alone, and let the Turksﷺ) ) The Prophet alone as long as they leave you alone.

ُ ْ ْ ْ ْ َ َ ََ َ َ َ ََ َ ُ ُ ُ ر ُل َدمحمن ُ ُ ا نث دح َُنع،ةرمضا نث دح عنأبٌ س ْكٌ نة، - َُ َنٌررحمالنلجر-ع ُنرجل، ىل ُصٌبنالباحصأن

َ ْبىسٌع ه َ َ َ ُ َْمهلٌ، َ َ َْ َ هال ْس ٌهبهانٌ، َ ه َ َُ َم ه ه َ َ َ َ مه َ َْ ههه

َ َْ ْ ُ َ َ َ َ َ َ ُ ُ ُ َ َُلقهنأملسوهٌلعاللهىل ُصٌبنالنعملسوهٌلعاهلل ُ"َ َ ْركتالاوكرتا ُومكوع دوا ُمةشبحالاوع د َُمكوك رتام " . ْ ْ ه هه َ َ َ َ ََ َ َ َ ٌ ناب ل) أل ا م كح ن سح ( (Grade : Hasan (Al-Albani

This response caused Colonel Haji Bakr and Baghdadi to become extremely angry, as they saw it as an explicit rejection of an order. A strongly worded letter was sent, giving Joulani an ultimatum: Ei-ther execute the orders or we will take our steps against Jabhat Nusra.

(When the jurist and military leader of Jabhat Nusra Sheikh Abu Mariyah Al-Qahtani first came to Syria, Baghdadi also ordered him to kill Sheikh Sa'dun Al-Qadi the leader of Ansar Sunnah in Iraq and Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Al-Jubayri, known as Sheikh Abu Sajad, the deputy of Ansar Sunnah in Iraq. Abu Mariyah Al-Qahtani also rejected this order then and later ISIS tried to assassinate Abu Ma-ria Al-Qahtani. )

Joulani stopped replying, and Colonel Haji Bakr and Baghdadi waited a long time for a reply. Baghdadi then sent a messenger to meet with Joulani and speak to him, but Joulani did not meet with the mes-senger and he went back without meeting Joulani.

Baghdadi viewed these events as very dangerous, since Jabhat Nusra was now a popular and inde- pendent entity and Jabhat Nusra was outside of ISI control. Colonel Haji Bakr then suggested to Bagh-dadi a contingency plan:

Iraqi subdivision commanders will meet with subdivision commanders in Jabhat Nusra to see how popular the idea among them was to merge into ISI and to see how popular Baghdadi was among Jabhat Nusra’s sub commanders. Baghdadi followed this advice, and along with Colonel Haji Bakr, Baghdadi sent ten Iraqis to Jabhat Nusra to join the ranks of the rebels for 2 weeks. These Iraqis met with the rebels in Jabhat Nusra and a few influential people, particularly those from the Gulf and es-pecially Saudis.

The feedback was mixed between support and rejection [for Baghdadi's plan to merge the State with Jabhat Nusra and form a new entity]. There was a large group that supported the ambition of an Is- lamic state that stretched from Iraq to Syria under one leadership. And the most supportive group of Baghdadi's proposition were new members of Jabhat Nusra and those who had a history of conflict with the leaders in Jabhat Nusra. These conflicts arose out of leaders in Jabhat Nusra preventing members from excessive takfir and punishing those that did so. These individuals expressed support for a new entity that would give them more freedom to speak their minds.

Jabhat Nusra gave a 1 month imprisonment for those members who propagated an extremist ideolo-gy. Those imprisoned included the Tunisians Abu Ritaj al-Sussi and Abo Omar al-Abadi; the Moroc-cans Abu DamDam al-Husni and Abu al Hajaj al-Nuri; and the Saudi Omar al-Qahtani, who will later play a big role.

The Saudi Omar al-Qahtani was punished by Jabhat Nusra who took away his weapons and impris- oned him 3 times on account of spreading an extremist and inflammatory ideology against those who opposed Jabhat Nusra. Those that were punished by Jabhat Nusra, and people like them formed the core of support for Baghdadi's plan, but still the plan found little support inside Jabhat Nusra. The Saudi Omar al-Qahtani was one of the first to defect from Jabhat Nusra when Baghdadi later an- nounced ISIS and Qahtani became a Sharia councilor in Baghdadi’s ISIS.

Two weeks later, the Iraqi subdivision commanders sent by Baghdadi returned to Iraq with an un- clear picture on the opinions of Jabhat Nusra members regarding the idea of merging Jabhat Nusra into ISI and the formation of a group under one name. Colonel Haji Bakr suggested to Baghdadi to not make any immediate decisions, and stated that they should travel to Syria to see the situation on the ground for themselves. He also said that the announcement of the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham [ISIS] would have more flare and attract more followers if Baghdadi made the announcement when he was in Syria, arguing that the people will want to see Baghdadi and his per-sonal presence would be a deciding factor in getting recruits to join the newfound group. Baghdadi accepted the idea and sent members of his security team to arrange a secure and secret residence for him. Baghdadi was notified when a safe place near the Turkish border was selected. The depar-ture from Iraq was arranged for Baghdadi, Colonel Haji Bakr, and only four others.

Baghdadi, Colonel Haji Bakr and their security entered Syria 3 weeks before the announcement of ISIS. They headed directly to the arranged residence close to the Turkish border. Here Baghdadi met with Jabhat Nusra subdivision commanders and made them feel like he was loyal to them.

Baghdadi was keen not to show any hostility or disputes between him and Joulani in order to keep the commanders and soldiers he met in a positive moral. Baghdadi and his delegation did sought to show everyone that Jabhat Nusra needed to merge into ISI and to be under his sole leadership.

Baghdadi claimed he came to unite the ranks and to build one entity and that this will happen very soon. He said they needed to form one group to strengthen their unity against the enemy and to prepare for the dangers of a possible Awakening Movement.

Joulani stayed silent and did not display any feelings of dissonance or dispute between him and Bagh-dadi. He also didn't let on that he was aware Baghdadi was in Syria, but he knew about Baghdadi's meetings with those who had influence on members of Jabhat Nusra. The leaders and sub command-ers aware of the situation in Jabhat Nusra now became worried about what Baghdadi planned to do next in Syria.

A short time after Baghdadi arrived in Syria he requested an urgent meeting with Joulani. Jabhat Nusra’s Shura members and Joulani sat with Baghdadi in a long meeting, which lasted three days from 10 to 13 March 2013.

Baghdadi at that time, in the presence of about ten others was asked: Is a direct link to Al Qaeda without consulting you considered splitting from you? Baghdadi answered: Is there anyone who says that?! Baghdadi then was told: Unconfirmed reports had reached me that al-Anbari says that, and it was confirmed to me later on. So Baghdadi answered, with everyone present listening includingAdnani: “Take it from me, and I am the head of the Islamic State in Iraq, a direct link to Al Qaeda isn’tconsidered a departure from us, and I have no problem with Jabhat Nusra and Al Qaeda linking di-rectly.”

Baghdadi was also asked: Do you have a baya to al-Qaeda on your neck, meaning our baya to you is abaya to al-Qaeda? Baghdadi answered by the wording—pointing to his neck:

“I have a baya to Sheikh Usama on my neck, and when he was killed, taqabbalahullah *“may god ac- cept him”+, I wrote a letter renewing my baya to Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, hafidhahullah *“may god protect him”+, and we listen to and obey to our leaders in Afghanistan”.

Jabhat Nusra felt reassured but the problems with ISI remained in this meeting which led Jabhat Nusra to ask Baghdadi if he sees any problem in Jabhat Nusra sending a message to Zawahiri. Bagh- dadi answered: Write and I will send it for you. Jabhat Nusra decided to write the letter. A majority of the Shura council that was reformed, including other leaders in the group, gathered to write a letter of complaint and sign it. They wrote it and the signatures are said to be present in Jabhat Nusra’s archives.

Jabhat Nusra didn’t send the letter through the “State of Iraq group and its Furqan Media” because they feared it may be played with and changed as they did with a previous letter. Joulani sent the letter directly to Al Qaeda central in Afghanistan.

Soon after the meeting Baghdadi sent a message to Joulani telling him that the dissolution of Jabhat Nusra would happen soon anyway and that for the sake of unity Joulani should make the public an-nouncement of the dissolution of Jabhat Nusra himself.

Joulani disagreed with Baghdadi’s plan and Joulani tent a clear and explicit message to Baghdadi that was clearer than previous messages, informing Baghdadi that it would be a fatal error for Jabhat Nusra to merge into ISI. In his message Joulani stated Baghdadi's plan would destroy the popularity Jabhat Nusra had built, and that the people of Syria would categorically reject this decision. Joulani said it would be better for Baghdadi to remain two separate organizations and to let Jabhat Nusra handle matters in Syria as was agreed in Joulani’s first plan for Syria to which Baghdadi and Zawahiri both agreed to.

Colonel Haji Bakr told Baghdadi that Baghdadi would have to issue a public statement dissolving Jabhat Nusra because Joulani clearly wouldn’t accept a merger into ISI. He said that if Baghdadi is- sued the statement in his own name it wouldn't isolate Joulani which might allow Joulani to rethink and accept the merger. Colonel Haji Bakr requested Baghdadi to delay the statement until a battalion of fighters could be prepared inside Syria. This battalion would provide security and the basis for ISI’s strategical plans in Syria.

Colonel Haji Bakr summoned leaders loyal to ISI within Jabhat Nusra and arranged for them to form a battalion which would be the nucleus of Baghdadi's new group. The commanders of this battalion would also react positively to Baghdadi's announcement in an effort to encourage others in Jabhat Nusra to follow Baghdadi. Within 3 days Colonel Haji Bakr managed to prepare the battalion with nearly a thousand fighters. Colonel Haji Bakr secretly notified these leaders when the announcement of the dissolution of Jabhat Nusra would occur.

One day before the announcement, Colonel Haji Bakr told the rest of Jabhat Nusra’s commanders that Baghdadi was in Syria. He did this so that the commanders could prepare to accept Baghdadi's announcement, and be ready to pledge bay’ah directly to him. During this period a statement was being drafted that would officially announce the dissolution of Jabhat Nusra and the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham [ISIS]. Zero hour for the announcement had come.

The announcement was made and the supportive commanders cheered the announcement and demonstrated their joy for the dissolution of Jabhat Nusra by giving bayah directly to Baghdadi. Baghdadi met with these commanders to reassure them about the legitimacy of the announcement and so that they would discuss the meeting with their people and encourage others in Jabhat Nusra to break the pledge to Joulani and pledge allegiance to Baghdadi.

Colonel Haji Bakr advised Baghdadi, that the moment immediately after the announcement was a critical faze and that this faze outweighed security concerns. Colonel Haji Bakr encouraged Baghdadi to personally meet with Jabhat Nusra members, so they could pledge bay’ah to him face to face, ex- plaining that personal meetings would make people feel comfortable. Colonel Haji Bakr argued that Baghdadi's presence would have a large psychological impact and attract a large number of recruits.

After the announcement Jabhat Nusra members were divided 3 ways: a third of them wanted to join Baghdadi, a third wanted to stay with Joulani, and a third chose to remain neutral. Baghdadi felt the danger from the 2/3 who did not want to join him. Colonel Haji Bakr sent a serious and threatening message which said the following: Anyone who remained loyal to Joulani and didn't join Baghdadi's group would be killed because those who didn't join Baghdadi were splitting the jihadi ranks and were disobeying (this is where the later term used by ISIS’s “Suroria” comes from). Colonel Haji Bakr argued that the punishment for these crimes in Sharia law is death.

Colonel Haji Bakr began to send delegates in Baghdadi's name to the leaders in Jabhat Nusra who wished to remain loyal to Joulani. The delegates threatened the leaders saying that if they did not join Baghdadi's group they would be considered dissenters, and everything they owned would be seized and claimed that their possessions belonged to ISI.

Colonel Haji Bakr and Baghdadi were informed that Joulani would not merge into ISI, and there was a possibility that he would issue a public statement rejecting the decision in the media. Colonel Haji Bakr suggested to Baghdadi to deploy divisions from the earlier formed battalion and that these divi- sions would execute two objectives:

The first: Seize all the weapons and ammunitions warehouses held by Jabhat Nusra. Anyone who re-fused to hand over his weapons would be killed immediately. This would deprive Jabhat Nusra of all weapons and ammunition, forcing their members to join ISIS.

This first task was successfully completed and a large group of rebels in Jabhat Nusra who guarded the warehouses refused to hand over their warehouses, so they were killed.

The second task was more dangerous: To form an assassination squad to go after leaders in Jabhat Nusra starting with Joulani and his commanders.

Colonel Haji Bakr formed an assassination squad consisting of fifty people, led by a former Iraqi officer. The assassination squad first sought to find where Jabhat Nusra leadership was located. Next the assassination squad planned on monitoring the movements of this leadership. The assassination squad would assassinate Jabhat Nusra leaders by placing bombs under their cars. These bombs would be detonated with a timing device, causing the car to explode and killing the target and every- one in the car. The assassination squad researched and investigated Joulani’s location by arresting some of his close associates, but the assassination squad was unable to determine where Joulani was located.

The first assassination attempt of this squad was made on Abu Maria al-Qahtani, when his car ex- ploded killing his 2 bodyguards. ISIS assumed the assassination was a success and the news that Abu Maria al-Qahtani and his companions were killed was joyfully relayed to Colonel Haji Bakr and Bagh- dadi. They were pleased that one of the most important members in Jabhat Nusra that hadn't joined ISIS was killed in secrecy. For a full day ISIS was confident that they had successfully murdered him, and it was only until Jabhat Nusra members revealed Abu Maria al-Qahtani was still alive. ISIS real-ized that the operation had failed and Colonel Haji Bakr requested an urgent meeting with the lead-ers of the assassination squad and severely rebuked them for their failure. Colonel Haji Bakr was ex-tremely angry because this failed operation would delay the execution of any similar method of as-sassination for several months.

Abu Maria al-Qahtani became one of the fiercest adversaries against ISIS and Abu Maria al-Qahtani’s role against ISIS in general and his role in the battle for DeireZor in particular was a thorn in ISIS’s eyes. Abu Maria al-Qahtani encouraged fighters to fight the Khawarij (ISIS) very hard and that any fighter was allowed to keep any war spoils taken from ISIS soldiers including their phones and weap- ons, except for the heavy weapons. Later ISIS’s media machine named Abu Maria al-Qahtani, Abu Maria al-Galaxy to ridicule him and smear him in their media campaign, for failing to kill him and his role against ISIS.

In the meantime, the name of the former Saudi officer Bandar al-Shaalan began to appear. Shaalan had a good connection to ISI, but was not an operational member; nonetheless he continued his sup-port for ISI, both before and after the dissolution of Jabhat Nusra. After Baghdadi formed ISIS, Shaa-lan introduced Baghdadi to influential members who were formerly in Jabhat Nusra.

Shaalan first introduced Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani (which we mentioned before) to Baghdadi. Shaa- lan introduced al-Qahtani as an influential man with the right mindset, who could help ISIS, while Qahtani in his time with Jabhat Nusra was a foot soldier and never Shari qualified, ISIS duped him to be one of their top Shari. This was an opportunity for the Saudi Qahtani to go from being a prisoner frequently jailed by Joulani because of his extremist opinions to directly dealing with Baghdadi.

Qahtani met with Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr and pledged bayah to them immediately. He also expressed his willingness to talk to Jabhat Nusra members who hadn't pledged allegiance to Bagh- dadi and win them over. He said he would especially focus on Saudi members. Qahtani was not previ-ously known to IS's leadership, but they saw that he had a strong influence on the Saudi members that still remained loyal to Joulani. Qahtani began a new stage in his jihadi career, going from being a foot soldier and prisoner to being a close confidant of Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr.

Joulani’s refusal to dissolve Jabhat Nusra remained the biggest threat to Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr since they formed ISIS. The Colonel told Baghdadi that he would deal with Joulani’s disloyalty, because Baghdadi became worried about Joulani contacting Ayman al-Zawahiri to settle the dispute and end the infighting.

Around this time the old adversary of Joulani in Syria, the duped official Spokesperson of ISIS, Adnani started a more prominent role in justifying ISIS. Adnani lied at first that the ISIS issue was raised to Zawahiri. Adnani also denied that ISI and Jabhat Nusra had an oath of obedience to Al-Qaeda and Zawahiri. However there is proof that also ISIS themselves raised the dispute to Zawahiri, and that ISI indeed had an oath of obedience to Zawahiri. Sheikh Abu Sulayman AlMuhajir (Abu Sulayman AlMu-hajir will later on be involved in the Mubahala) for example was present in the meeting, when Bagh-dadi testified that ISI had a binding oath to Zawahiri and that ISI would obey his orders if Zawahiri ordered them to retreat to Iraq. Another strong witness report is that of Abu Abdul Aziz Al- Qatari, the leader of Jund Al-Aqsa who was completely neutral in this dispute. Furthermore, Jund Al- Aqsa was known to be sympathetic towards ISI. Adnani even praised Abu Abdul Aziz Al-Qatari in his speech:

"This is not our methodology, nor will it ever be."

Furthermore, Qahtani ISI’s own made Scholar Qahtani testified to the fact that Baghdadi, himself raised the dispute to Zawahiri and said that ISI will accept the judgement and order of Zawahiri, even if Zawahiri would order ISI to retreat to Iraq. Baghdadi probably hoped that Zawahiri will side with him, because ISI supported Jabhat Nusra in its beginning and Baghdadi also probably betted on Zawa-hiri’s sentiments towards an Islamic State.

The turmoil in the Jihadi battlefields of Syria was now wide open to the whole world and this caused the leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Nasser al-Wahayshi, to write a letter to Zawahiri. In this letter Al-Wahayshi requested that he may attempt to mediate this issue, so as to avoid having to make public statements and quell the public turmoil. Al-Wahayshi sent a written message to Joulani and Baghdadi. Baghdadi didn't reply with a single word. Joulani replied to Al-Wahayshi with the same justifications he expressed to Baghdadi and Zawahiri, stating that the pres-ence of Baghdadi in Syria was the single biggest mistake in Syria's revolution. Al-Wahayshi agreed with Joulani and told Zawahiri that Baghdadi didn’t reply to his attempt to mediate and that as a re-sult his mediation had been a failure. Al-Wahayshi recommended that Zawahiri himself issues a statement.

Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakri now realized that the situation was starting to escalate.

Also the Kuwaiti Hammed Hamad al-Ali met with Joulani to mediate and defuse the crisis. Joulani expressed his justifications and firmly stated the seriousness of Baghdadi's presence in Syria. The Ku-waiti was convinced by the justifications and that Jabhat Nusra should not merge into ISI. Al-Ali be-came convinced that the existence of ISIS in Syria was a political error and a Sharia mistake, so he asked a close confidant of Baghdadi, Abu Ali al-Anbari, to arrange a meeting. This meeting was held and documented by an audio recording.

During this meeting Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr justified the legitimacy of ISIS. Hammed al-Ali expressed the importance of unity in jihad and that ISIS was causing separation, dispute and Fitnah (turmoil). Eventually Baghdadi and Hammed al-Ali agreed to the following:

Wait for what Zawahiri decides, and then document Zawahiri's statement in the media.

Colonel Haji Bakr expressed his unwillingness to abide to any negative decision for ISIS by Zawahiri, but Baghdadi told him to remain calm. Hammed al-Ali left the meeting, and Colonel Haji Bakr stressed to Baghdadi that he could not link the fate of their ISIS to Zawahiri’s decision. Colonel Haji Bakr requested to be allowed to end Jabhat Nusra, and remove Joulani and other leaders from the picture.

Colonel Haji Bakr discussed a second contingency plan with Baghdadi incase Zawahiri’s decision was in favor of Joulani:

-First: re-activate the assassination squad.

-Second: recruit influential Scholars and Sheikhs who would pledge bayah to Baghdadi, thereby in-creasing ISIS legitimacy.

-Third: increase online propaganda by strongly praising ISIS and Baghdadi in media, highlight ISIS op- erations, and spread false rumors against Jabhat Nusra and its leadership online.

When the Fitnah was raging even the son of late Osama bin Laden, called towards unity.

Hamza bin Usama bin Laden said in his letter:

"Greetings of Salaam to the people of Islam" :

"My Mujahid brothers in Iraq and Shaam. The enemies of Islam, despite their various differ-ences, religions, and denominations, have united to fight you. They are the Crusaders, the Jews, the Alawite Nusayris, the Safawid Rafidah, and the apostate mercenaries from various countries. They gathered to eradicate you. We will not be able to repel their aggression, break their union, and destroy their structure unless we unify our ranks and pass over our differences. We realize the size of the danger that threatens our Ummah and the Muslims. Our Lord is one, our religion is one, our Prophet is one, our Book is one, and our enemy is one. So why do we disagree and argue in fighting a unified enemy?"

The first letter of Zawahiri arrived which nullified the merger of Jabhat Nusra into ISI and to remain two separate armies, ISI in Iraq and Jabhat Nusra in Syria, but ISIS ignored it.

Zawahiri then sent the following letter on 23 may 2013 letter with the final and clear decision:

Dear brother/ Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Hosseini and his brothers in the Shura of the Islam-ic State in Iraq; May Allah protect them. Dear brother/ Sheikh Abu Mohamed al-Joulani and his brothers in the Shura of Jabhat al-Nusra in al-Sham; May Allah protect them. Peace and blessings be upon you and those around you, may Allah join us upon what he likes and chooses of world-ly bounties and triumph in the hereafter.

1. The proponents of Jihad were all dismayed by the dispute that occurred on the media be-tween our beloved brothers in the Islamic state of Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra in al-Sham.

2. We have neither been asked for authorization or advice, nor have we been notified of what had occurred between both sides. Regrettably, we have heard the news from the media.

3. At the outset, I have to remind all the Mujahidin and all Muslims of the role played by the Islamic State in Iraq in aborting the crusaders’ plot for occupying and splitting the heart of the Islamic world, along with repelling of the elite Rafidhi expansion that aimed at dominating the

Levant, Iraq and the Arab Peninsula. We have to admit the good deeds done by our brothers; in particular, their Emir Sheikh Abu- Bakr al-Baghdadi in supporting Jihad in al-Sham by sending in the most capable fighters and money, to alleviate their suffering. We have admired our broth-ers in Jabhat al-Nusra who were praised, along with their Emir Sheikh Abi Mohamed al-Joulani, by Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

4. I have to remind all the Mujahidin and all Muslims of the job done by our brothers in Jabhat al- Nusra for the people of the Levant in reviving the obligation of Jihad and their revival of the Umma hopes in liberating al-Aqsa and soon reinstating the Khilafa, by the will of Allah. We also praise them for repelling the Batini and secular Rafidhi aggression against the backlog of Islam in our beloved Levant. We also appreciate their praise to their brothers in the Islamic State in Iraq for the support they had offered.

5. When the dispute emerged between the two Jihadi groups, I sought to resolve the dispute by sending a message on 1st Jumada in 1434 to sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and to Abu Mo- hamed al-Joulani for freezing the dispute at the point preceding its breakout, prior to finally resolving it.

6. I received messages from both sides and from other sides. Accordingly, after holding consul- tations with my brothers in Khorasan and outside of it, after asking Allah for guidance, and for support to make me capable of putting out the fire of sedition and dispute between the two sides, I resolved the issue, by the help of the Almighty, as follows: a- Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was wrong when he announced the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant without asking permission or receiving advice from us and even without notifying us. b- Sheikh Abu Mohamed al-Joulani was wrong by announcing his rejection to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and by showing his links to al-Qaeda without having our permis-sion or advice, even without notifying us.

c- The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is to be dissolved, while Islamic State in Iraq is to continue its work. d- Jabhat al-Nusra, is an independent entity for Qaedat al-Jihad group, under the (al-Qaeda) general command. e- The seat of the Islamic State in Iraq is in Iraq. f- The seat of Jabhat al-Nusra for the people of al-Sham, is in Syria. g- Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been approved as the Emir for the Islamic State in Iraq for one year, as of the date of this ruling. The Islamic State in Iraq Shura (council) would then sub-mit a report to the general command for Qaedat al-Jihad group about the progress of work.

The general command would then decide whether to extend the mandate for Sheikh Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi as Emir, or appoint a new Emir. h- Sheikh Abu Mohamed al-Joulani has been approved as the Emir for Jabhat al-Nusra for the people of al-Sham for one year as of the date of this ruling after which Jabhat al-Nusra Shura council submits a report to the general command of Qaedat al-Jihad about the progress of work. The general command would then decide extending the mandate for Sheikh Abi Mo-hamed as Emir, or appointing a new Emir. i- The Islamic State in Iraq would supply, as far as it could, to Jabhat al-Nusra for the people of al- Sham, what they need of fighters, arms, money shelter and security. j- Jabhat al-Nusrah for al-Sham would supply to the Islamic State in Iraq, as far as it could, what it needs of fighters, arms, money, shelter and security. k- The two sides would cease any attack, by words or by deeds, against the other side. l- The two sides and all the Mujahidin, would respect the sanctity of Muslim blood, honor and property. No one of them would attack a Muslim or a Mujahid, unless a judicial ruling was is-sued, as detailed below: m- Muslim blood is a off-limits for other Muslims. Whoever changes sides from one Jihadi group to another, is not an apostate, instead, he enjoys the protection accorded to other Mus-lims and the Mujahidin, even if he was wrong in changing sides. n- Whoever sheds the blood of his Muslim brothers and the Mujahidin, the group would take a tough stand against him as based on the principle of “defending virtue and preventing vice”. o- Sheikh Abu Khalid al-Sury, is the best of men we had known among the Mujahidin, so we have chosen him as our delegate in al-Sham as regards the following issues: Firstly: Any dispute arising from the interpretation of this ruling would be resolved by him. Secondly: In case any side attacked the other side, I hereby authorize him to set up a Sharia justice court for giving a ruling on the case.

p- I hereby obligate all my brothers in Qaedat al-Jihad group, and I call upon all my Muslim brothers and the Mujahidin, to stop arguing over this dispute and to stop sedition among the Mujahidin and to seek harmony and unity, along with winning hearts and uniting ranks among Muslims and the Mujahidin. They should recognise the good deeds of the two Jihadi groups and to mention only their good deeds.

7- Copy of this ruling would be handed over to :

a- The Islamic State in Iraq

b- Jabhat al-Nusra for the people of Sham

c- Sheikh Abu Khalid al-Sury. (I wanted reform to the best of my ability, but will only suc-ceed by the will of Allah, I would rely on Him and resort to Him)

Your brother, Ayman al-Zawahiri

Rajab, 13, 1434

ISIS first tried to [ostensibly] doubt its authenticity, despite them having knowledge of it that the letter was accurate. The judgement and order of Zawahiri, was that ISIS had to retreat to Iraq and that Abu Khalid al Suri had been the overseeing representative for Al Qaeda in Syria (Jabhat Nusra) and that he will remain as such in overseeing the turmoil that occurred between Jabhat Nusra and ISI.

Abu Khalid Al Suri is a veteran in Jihad, in the 1980’s he was at the center of the Muslim uprising against Hafez al Assad and when Hafez brutally slammed down the uprising by killing between

25.000 and 40.000 Muslims. Abu Khalid al Suri was able to leave Syria to Afghanistan and continue his work under and with Al-Qaida.

Abu Khalid was the co-founder of Ahrar Shaam, when he re-entered the Syrian Jihad in 2011.

Abu Khalid al Suri walking alongside Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri at the Al Farouq camp in Afghani-stan in 2000.

In a speech Adnani acknowledged that Zawahiri gave ISIS a binding border, which ISIS chose to reject with some excuses to reject Zawahiri’s order.

Adnani said in this speech:

"Apologies oh leader of Al-Qaeda"

“This is al- Qaida that ran through our blood and dwelled in the depths of our hearts, we respected it, we supported it, we revered it, we honored it and held it in high esteem; and we were not to obey anybut it's (Al-Qaeda’s) leadership. It's leadership themselves are symbols, we do not allow any suspicion,a mere suspicion, to pass in the minds of any of us or in the depths of any of us, and thus to slander one of its symbols, or to revile or deprecate one of its leaders by speaking against them. Yes, and why? Because they are the people of precedence, because they are the people of favor, because they are the people of sacrifice, because they are symbols of the Ummah and its leaders in this time, the reviver's of the Religion. This is our relationship with al- Qaida, the base of Jihad, and because of this the State sent via Abu Hamza al- Muhajir a message to the leadership of al- Qaida, confirming in itthe alliance of the State (ISI) to the symbols of the Ummah, the best examples of Al-Qaeda, and it wasto inform them that the united word of the leadership of Jihad in the world was to them, despite the settlement of your organization upon the land of the State, that the word would remain to you in or-der to protect the unity of the Mujahidin and to unify their ranks. For the reasons of all that we have mentioned, the leaders Islamic State remained addressing Qa'idat ul- Jihad with the speech of soldiers addressing their leaders, the speech of a student to his teacher, of an apprentice to his elder, of a young boy to an older man.”

With a smooth tongue and beautiful words, Adnani said in this same speech that ISI doesn’t have a Bayah to Al-Qaeda. This caused much distortion and the way Adnani spread this dis-information, was both a masterpiece of deception and fuel for the Fitnah.

Adnani said:

“The State is not a branch that is subordinate to Al-Qaeda, nor was it as such in any day”

Meanwhile ISIS’s media machine was working hard by publishing several media publications in which they slandered Zawahiri. ISIS went out of their way to character-assassinate Zawahiri.

ISIS for example said that Zawahiri was holding on to the Sykes-Picot borders because he ordered ISIS to retreat to Iraq. This is one of the biggest character-assassination attempts on Zawahiri, as he spent his life exposing and confronting Sykes-Picot. Zawahiri continuously tried to spread awareness about Sykes-Picot and the enforced borders in the Middle East.

Although the current borders are enforced on Muslim countries, this does not mean that the Muslim world is a stranger to the concept of borders.

himself said that there will be an army in Shaam an army in Yemen and an army inﷺ The Prophet time and Zawahiri's order was in line with thisﷺ Iraq. These regions were bordered in the Prophets Prophetic revelation.

So dividing armies over these regions is nothing new, strange or defying in Islamic history and Had-iths.

Zawahiri didn't ask all the fighters of ISIS to return to Iraq, he simply ordered that the command structure for Iraq should remain in Iraq, because it would be a strategic suicide to establish and en- force an ISI Modus Operandi in Syria.

ISIS upgraded their Khawarij manhaj [methodology] and Takfir gradually. In the beginning of the fit-nah Adnani said that they did not consider Jabhat Nusra to be Sahwat (kafir).

But by now those that want to see have discovered the Takfiri Manhaj of ISIS on all the factions in Syria and worldwide. A Khariji Manhaj which they kept hidden until they gradually revealed it and thus the ignorant gradually accepted it and with it the crimes of ISIS. Everyone who has read the Dabiq magazines will realize how ISIS slanders the Scholars and rebels. Even the wives of the Rebels were not spared by ISIS’s Sheikh Maysarah Al-Shami.

This Maysarah with a distorted knowledge of Islam and no manners befitting a Sheikh and a bad tongue officially called Sheikh Al-Maqdisi and Sheikh Abu Qatadah donkeys and sissy pimps and he called the leaders of Al-Qaida the Jews of Jihad. Maysarah called the Taliban Taghut and Mullah its leader a Dajjal. (Anti-Christ, False Messiah).

And only recently ISIS ordered the killing of numerous esteemed scholars that have always stood firm behind Rebels.

Joulani was said to have proposed that he would resign and let Zawahiri choose a new leader for the Syrian Al-Qaeda branch. Baghdadi refused this proposal and shortly after Baghdadi released a state- ment in his deviant speech: "It will remain! In Iraq and Syria"

Announcing tat he has “Shari’a and Manhaj issues” with the letter of Zawahiri. While the situatiom clearly had nothing to do with Shari or Manhaj issues, but with Baghdadi’s expansionist plans.The split of ISI and Al Qaeda/Jabhat Nusra now became a definite fact, but a glimmer of hope remained for a reunification.

Chapter 6

ISIS executes its plan for a Ca-liphate and territorial/fighter absorption

Jabhat Nusra became stronger and more internally unified as a result of the war and split with ISIS.

Baghdadi and those around him were very disappointed by their failure, and he felt that he should go back to Iraq, but the following two people strongly insisted for him to stay:

Colonel Haji Bakr, who categorically refused to accept Zawahiri's ruling, saying that he would stay in Syria even if Baghdadi.

Qahtani caused many Jabhat Nusra members to join ISIS from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia by telling them that Sharia scholars had issued fatwas to leave Jabhat Nusra and join ISIS. Qahtani also prom- ised Baghdadi that Sharia scholars from Saudi Arabia would issue fatwas in an effort to keep mem- bers in ISIS, and defy Zawahiri.

Qahtani stepped up his efforts to recruit important Sharia scholars and media personalities to lend support to Baghdadi and reinforce ISIS. He took two approaches to increase support for ISIS:

First, contact jihadi’s with relationships in the Gulf and urge them to support ISIS.

Second: form a media team to promote ISIS online.

The first approach: Qahtani contacted Saudi jihadi’s to find fatwas supporting ISIS and Baghdadi based on the Sharia.

These attempts ended in failure, so he contacted the Saudi former officer Bandar al-Shaalan, and re-quested for him to be the ISIS representative in Saudi Arabia. He wanted Shaalan to form a nucleus of individuals that would increase the legitimacy of ISIS and Baghdadi in the Gulf. Shaalan agreed to the task of being ISIS's representative in the Gulf and frequently coordinated his work in the Gulf with Qahtani who remained in Syria. He began his role by holding meetings with supporters of ISIS and Baghdadi and telling Qahtani what he learned in these meetings.

He reported that the first Scholar to state his support for ISIS was Nasser al-Thaqeel. Shaalan met with Nasser al-Thaqeel several times as part of his efforts to increase the popularity of ISIS and Bagh-dadi. His efforts broadened to include those in Bahrain, and he communicated with the Bahrain-based Turki al-Binali, who expressed his support for ISIS and Baghdadi.

Shaalan worked long hours every day to further the popularity of ISIS and Baghdadi in the Gulf. Eventually, he formed a committee devoted to this task. The committee was made up of relatively unknown people. Their names were:

Nasser al-Thaqeel

Turki al-Binali

Allioui al-Shammari

Hamoud al-Mutairi

Hamad al-Rayes

Saleh al-Hudaif

Abu Bilal al-Harbi

Abdul Aziz al-Omar

Ali al-Jabal

The common denominator between all of these individuals is that they are relatively unknown among Scholars and unknown in the media.

Shaalan's efforts were of minimal impact, but they did give a glimmer of hope that ISIS would suc- ceed. Colonel Haji Bakr and Qahtani considered Shaalan's efforts to be very significant and the latter told Shaalan to arrange regular meetings with Scholars so that they would be aware of the latest de- velopments in Syria. This would also allow ISIS to be ready to mitigate public relations damage should the Scholars have any criticisms of ISIS.

All Scholars were hesitant to publicly announce their support for ISIS and Baghdadi. Only Turki al-Binali issued a fatwa that called for a pledge of bayah to ISIS and denounced Jabhat Nusra as illegal according to Sharia, but Turki bin Ali refused to issue the fatwa in his real name. So when Turki al-Binali issued his fatwa titled 'Extend the hands and give bayah to ISIS', he did so under the fake name:

Abu Humam Bakr bin Abdul Aziz al-Athari.

In addition to forming groups in support of ISIS in the Gulf, Qahtani also formed a committee in Syria that supported and worked to increase the legitimacy of ISIS. Including Qahtani himself, this com-mittee consisted of the following individuals:

Abu Ali al-Anbari

Abu Jafar al-Hattab Tunisi

Abu Ali Ibrahim al-Sultan al-Najdi

Othman Ibn Nazih

Othman ibn Nazih jobs was to protect group cohesion among ISIS members. Nazih enforced the rule that any ISIS member that leaves the group should be considered a dissenter and killed, to promote group cohesion, a statement was made showing the positive attributes of Baghdadi and the ad-vantages of being in his group. A book written by Abu Jafar al-Hattab Tunisi was distributed to ISIS members that gave several justifications for their continued participation in ISIS.

Qahtani worked hard by going after anyone that challenged ISIS or gave speeches critical of Bagh- dadi, working to alienate those who criticized ISIS by accusing them of being Sahwaat [Awakening members] or agents of the West as to give ISIS “Sharia legitimacy” while this is considered by Sharia as unlawful takfir and a trait of Extremism (a trait of Khawarij) ISIS used this same tactic in Iraq, which was mentioned before in Chapter 2.

No negative information on ISIS was permitted, allowing Baghdadi to put a positive spin on his ac- tions to those in Syria and abroad. To gain international support there was an urgent need to form a media wing that would focus on presenting ISIS and Baghdadi in a positive light.

Colonel Haji Bakr and Baghdadi realized that there was an urgent need for a media wing that would work 24/7 to promote ISIS and defend it from criticism, gain International support and present Bagh-dadi and Adnani in a positive light. They recognized that those in Saudi Arabia were most susceptible to believing negative information about ISIS. As a result, it was decided to include those with Saudi names in the media committee. Since Qahtani knew many eligible Saudis (he was a Saudi himself), it was agreed that he would form the media committee as quickly as possible.

Qahtani proposed that two committees be formed: the first would be comprised of Saudis who were on the ground in Syria, and the second would be a committee of Saudis still in Saudi Arabia. He called these committees "The Supporters of the Mujahedeen (media wing)" and appointed a leader in each committee. These committees had members who worked day and night. Qahtani contacted the for- mer Saudi officer Bandar al-Shaalan, (Qahtani owed his high level position in ISIS to him) and request-ed that Shaalan speed up the formation of the media wing committees. Shaalan responded positive-ly and told Qahtani he would contact him when the committees were ready.

The media committee in Saudi Arabia was formed and a report on the committee was submitted to Baghdadi. He ordered that Abu Dujana lead the committee. Abu Dujana is Saudi and his real name is Ryan Abu Himd, and his twitter account is (@almohajer8225). The Shura council of the media com- mittee in Saudi Arabia was led by the Saudi Abdullah al-Fayez. Al-Fayez's twitter account is @a_alfaiz but he also maintains several fake accounts. The membership of the media committee is controlled by the Saudi Adel al-Khalidi Abu Omar al-Najdi (also known as al-Sororia Tabor Khames @bmr8000). The media committee attracted the attention of a lot of enthusiastic young people online. Al-Fayez was a former fighter for AQI / ISI. He was injured while fighting in Iraq and subsequently jailed in Saudi Arabia. When al-Fayez was released from prison he became a key foreign supporter of ISIS and Baghdadi. Several members of the Saudi media committee had already reached out to Qahtani to see if there was any way they could help ISIS. They were very excited to work when the media committee was formed.

The other media committee was focused on advocating support for ISIS and Baghdadi from inside Syria. The local media committee was led by Qareen al-Kalash (@K_L7) and managed by the Saudi Abdul Majeed al-Thubaiti al-Otaibi.

This local media committee included Saudis in Syria who advocated for ISIS from the front lines. Qahtani made sure that the media committee did not speak to educated individuals or anyone who spoke critically of ISIS or Baghdadi. Membership in the local media committee was controlled by Abu al-Leeth Aldegmi (@abo_aleeth). The activities of this committee were managed by the Saudi Mo- hammed Falah al-Dwairy al-Shammari. Other members of the internal media committee included Abu Gabal (@abojabal2012); the Saudi Muaz Bin Mohammed al-Shamrani; and Abdul Rahman Mar- zouki (@a_s_m2010).

A taskforce was formed that closely linked the two media committees allowing them to coordinate closely on news reports and swiftly attack opponents. Qahtani spread a fatwa to the two media com-mittees advising them that lying and tricking the enemy in the time of war was allowed for them and that they may lie in support of ISIS and Baghdadi. This fatwa was issued by ISIS’s Sheikh’s Turki al-Binali and Nasser al-Thaqeel.

The media committees worked very hard, but Colonel Haji Bakr and Baghdadi felt that not enough was being done to promote ISIS and counter the negative distortions others used against ISIS, so they emphasized to Qahtani the importance of obtaining fatwas in support of ISIS from prominent sharia scholars. Qahtani worked hard to obtain these fatwas by communicating with those who knew Saudi sharia scholars. In particular, Qahtani tried to get fatwas from the Saudi Sulaiman al- Alwan and the Saudi Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi, but all his efforts ended in failure.

Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr realized ISIS was becoming increasingly unpopular and discontent was growing. ISIS reputation was especially damaged when they killed civilians, decapitated rebels and spread their Khawarij ideology through Syria and the world. The extent of ISIS’s unpopularity reached unprecedented levels when they killed Ahrar Sham commander Mohammed Faris by decapi-tation.

ISIS justified the killing of Mohammad Faris by saying that he was an Apostate and a spy for Shia’s.

Mohammed Faris in an Ahrar Sham video

Qahtani was forced to use his own Twitter account in support of ISIS, defending the killing of Mo-hammed Faris trying to use Islamic justifications for his death.

The erroneous killing of Mohammed Faris had a profound impact on ISIS, and Colonel Haji Bakr was extremely angry because the incident greatly affected ISIS members. He contacted those who killed Mohammed Faris and asked the killers to deny their affiliation with ISIS in a video, but the killers re- fused to deny their association with ISIS, and stated that the killing of Mohammed Faris was carried out based on the order of Baghdadi. ISIS eventually published a message that they made a mistake by killing Mohammed Faris and that they thought that he was a Shia mercenary fighting for Assad.

With ISIS becoming increasingly unpopular, Colonel Haji Bakr summoned Qahtani and reprimanded him. Haji Bakr asked Qahtani to use the media committees to do anything they could, to counter the negative information directed at ISIS and to focus on preventing Scholars from issuing fatwas against ISIS.

Qahtani stated that the media committees he had formed had no Scholars and that the committee had little public influence. Qahtani revealed that the leaders of the media committees were young and inexperienced and that there were no senior jihadists willing to publically support ISIS. Qahtani suggested to Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr that they use covert and underhanded methods to counter those spreading negative information about ISIS. He suggested two specific projects:

-The first project would be a public campaign to spread information that the critics of ISIS were Sahwa [Awakening members].

-The second project would be to record private conversations with respected individuals to obtain blackmail to be used against them.

The project to record influential people as to blackmail them into refraining from criticizing ISIS would begin by recording influential commanders and influential members of ISIS praising the organi-zation. If a recorded member later deserted ISIS these recordings would be used against him. This project was sensitive because Qahtani planned to record prominent figures without their knowledge.

Qahtani began executing the second project and formed a taskforce to document and record pro ISIS statements from current ISIS members.

This taskforce consisted of three Saudis:

Ryan Abu Himd

Abdullah al-Fayez

Adel al-Khalidi

Bandar al-Shaalan Qahtani informed Baghdadi that the taskforce had been formed and was activated.

The 3 objectives for this taskforce’s secret recordings were::

1) Recommendations to pledge bayah directly to Baghdadi

2) If this wasn't possible, then they would seek statements that they praised giving bayah to ISIS and advocated joining the organization.

3)If they could not obtain the above two types of statements, the cell would try to record: Insults, challenges, and questioning statements directed at Joulani, Zahran Aloush [leader of the Islamic Front and Jaysh al Islam], Abu Abdullah al-Hamwi [leader in Ahrar al-Sham]

The taskforce began its task by making frequent visits to influential individuals and recording them. The members of the taskforce met a wide cross section of influential people, but the most prominent was the Saudi Suleiman al-Alwan. The taskforce asked Alwan questions designed to produce a pro ISIS response. Al-Alwan was recorded several times, at an estimated five meetings, with the longest recording being a half hour. These recordings were edited together to make it sound like al-Alwan stated the following: “Praise for ISIS and the vilification of the leaders of some rebel groups, especial-ly Zahran Aloush.” These recordings were sent to Qahtani, who in turn sent them to Baghdadi.

Qahtani’s recording-taskforce continued its work by targeting the following Scholars:

Saudi Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi

Kuwaiti Hammed al-Ali

Moroccan Omar al-Haddoshi

The Saudi Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi is an influential Scholar who was outspoken in his criticism of ISIS. Tarifi is popular among jihadis because he speaks out against secular governments, and is clearly not being paid by any state. The Kuwaiti Hammed al-Ali is an influential Scholar who is popular in the media.

The Moroccan Omar al-Haddoshi is an influential Scholar from the Maghreb, he was popular among those from Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya in particular.

The cell wrote to Qahtani telling him the difficulty of recording and documenting convictions on these three. The Saudi Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi held no private meetings, was involved in no organizations, and made few public statements. The Kuwaiti Hammed al-Ali owned large media publications, in which he put out numerous criticisms of ISIS, so his opposition of Baghdadi was well known. The Mo-roccan Omar al-Haddoshi was difficult to get in contact with because he resided far away and ISIS had no contacts that were in the Maghreb to contact Haddoshi.

The difficulties in going after these figures, made Baghdadi order that the recording- taskforce stopped its work.

Qahtani's second project was to use the media to attack those against ISIS.

The second team on Qahtani's secret council consisted of activists across the internet. Their task was to stir up rumors against influential people critical of ISIS and Baghdadi online.

The team was led by al-Girees Abu Omar Najdi. He was a Saudi and he worked with other Saudis like 'Hydra' (@hydra_q) and managed the account of Abudall al-Qasim. Al-Najdi also worked with anoth- er Saudi named Abdullah al-Faiz (@a_alfaiz), who managed an account in his own name, and directly supervised several other accounts that attacked the so called "al Sororia" (Splitting ranks) Qahtani mentioned al-Faiz in a meeting attended by Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr. Qahtani claimed that al- Faiz was the most influential active figure on the internet and the effort he was putting on behalf of Baghdadi must be appreciated. After this al-Faiz received special thanks through Qahtani from Colo- nel Haji Bakr regarding his efforts to confront the so called "al Sororia" on twitter and other social media.

This team started two paths:

-A religious path responding to their opponents with Quranic verses (these Quranic verses were often taken out of its context)

-A media path: distorting any opponent by saying that he is an intelligence agent. (Muhaysni was a prime target)

Qahtani allowed them to be cunning with the adversaries and opponents and terrorize and intimi-date them with a whirlwind of rumors and try to silence them from attacking ISIS.

The most important Scholars with influence against ISIS were the Saudis Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi , Sulei-man al-Alwan, Yousef al-Ahmad and the Moroccan Omar al-Haddoshi.

Qahtani met with the Shura council headed by Colonel Haji Bakr to speak about how to eliminate the influence of these four dangerous Scholars for ISIS. Several scenarios were placed to confront and try to bring these Scholars down by an organized campaign by a dedicated team..

The Saudi Abdul Walid al-Muhajer recorded a call of religious questions and answers from the Saudi sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi. The recording was handed to Baghdadi, Colonel Haji Bakr and al- Qahtani. But Colonel Haji Bakr said the recording was not enough to be effective and Qahtani suggested in attempting to bring down all these Scholars that were a threat to ISIS, under the principle of them being agents of the Gulf tyrants and foreign intelligence agents for Al Sororia.

ISIS began to crack from the inside when his soldiers began talking about defections and the projects of Qahtani to protect ISIS began to fail. Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr heard that Abu Omar al- Shishani, the leader of Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar was thinking about defection. Al-Shishani leads the largest group belonging to ISIS, with a strength of approximately 1650 fighters, of which he is the top military commander. Just the defection of al-Shishani from ISIS would mean the collapse and cracking of ISIS’s whole project.

Colonel Haji Bakr ensured Baghdadi to take over the matter of Commander al-Shishani, and his first step was to assign a spy dedicated to spying on al-Shishani who was Abdul Waleed al-Muhajer (@AbuAlwalidMhajr).

Al-Muhajer informed al-Shishani that he is just a Sheikh accompanying him for religious consulting only. Al-Shishani became comfortable and informed al-Muhajer that he is seriously considering leav-ing ISIS, so al-Muhajer was sure that this possibility existed and that it may happen any second.

Colonel Haji Bakr and Baghdadi summoned Qahtani and the Colonel reportedly insulted him and said: “The State is splitting and you are sleeping!” Qahtani then directly asked the Saudi Othman al- Nazih to meet with Commander al-Shishani and talk to him in a way that does not make him lose confidence on his companion Abdul Waleed al-Muhajir. Al-Nazih told al-Shishani that it was obligato- ry to pledge bayah to Baghdadi, that the ISIS’s Sheiks made it obligatory for anyone and that ISIS is the only hope for the project of the soon to be announced Islamic Caliphate.

Shortly after Qahtani informed Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr that they had made al-Shishani under-stand that he had to stay, but a few days later al-Muhajer send a message to Colonel Haji Bakr ex-plaining that Shishani was still undecided and did not take the pledge of bayah to Baghdadi yet.

Qahtani decided to send another Saudi figure, Abu Ali al-Najdi (@aboalialsultan) whose name is Ibra- him Ali Sultan. He asked him to deliver an explicit and clear message to al-Shishani. Colonel Haji Bakr followed this up and sent a private message to al-Shishani, asking him to declare the bayah in the media. Omar al-Shishani then met with the other Chechen leader Salahuddin al-Shishani, and with two Saudis commanders:

Abu Azzam al-Najdi

Abdul Wahab al-Saqawb (@ abdulwhabSaqawb).

Omar al-Shishani explained the Colonel that if he pledged allegiance he was going to lose half of his 1650 soldiers, but Colonel Haji Bakr insisted on the bayah and the public declaration of it.

Abu Omar al-Shishani eventually pledged allegiance to Baghdadi, and immediately Salahuddin al- Shishani left with 800 of their fighters. His departure was one of the biggest disasters for ISIS, and they tried to hide it from social media. To contain the disaster Colonel Haji Bakr sent Qahtani, Abu Ali Ibrahim Ali al-Sultan, Othman al-Nazih and the Iraqi Abu Ali al-Anbari to go and meet with Salahuddin al-Shishani and his commanders, to tell them that anyone who talks about the withdrawal on twitter or other social media will be killed. Everyone got the message and stopped talking about the with- drawal and Colonel Haji Bakr ordered to widely celebrate the pledge of allegiance of Omar al- Shishani on all media.

There still were many defections from ISIS after this. Everyday fighters left ISIS and Colonel Haji Bakr and Baghdadi felt intense fear. Colonel Haji Bakr suggested the requisition of the passports from all the immigrants and of any document in their hands for fear of desertions. This is when multiple vide- os of ISIS were released that showed its members burning and destroying their passports. The Colo- nel also suggested recruiting Iraqi spies urgently in all groups in Syria, so that they could be informed about any person who intends to defect to take the necessary actions. Everyone agreed on this sug- gestion, and it was also suggested to intensify visits to their soldiers, to remind them of the rule of obedience to ISIS.

Abu al-Atheer (Amr al-Absi) was one of the first to visit Baghdadi and pledge bayah, first in private and later in public. He always remembered the death of his brother Firas and wanted to take revenge and was looking for the opportunity to avenge his brother. He always expressed his pain and misfor- tune due to the death of his brother to Colonel Haji Bakr and Baghdadi.

Amr al-Absi was very loyal to ISIS and desperately tried to find Saudi supporters, using connections of his father, who had worked in Saudi Arabia in the past. The extremist reputation of Amr al-Absi in Syria and the killing of his brother were reasons for fighters to leave his group and his image tar- nished in Syria nevertheless he began seeking to win Scholarly supporters for ISIS abroad, especially in Saudi Arabia. Amr al Absi also sent a commission to Saudi Arabia made up of 4 people. This com- mittee, led by a brother of Amr al Absi, met with several Saudi Scholars to seek support from them for ISIS among them were;

Sulaiman al-Alwan

Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi

Abdul Rahman al-Barrak

Abdullah al-Ghunaymaan

The brother of Amr al-Absi met with Al-Alwan, but he refused to support ISIS until ISIS comes with a well-known and respected personality that also supported ISIS.

Al-Tarifi objected to the designation of ISIS, saying that a Shura with other mujahedeen is a must to create an Islamic State, after which he expelled Amr al-Absi’s brother.

Abdul Rahman al-Barrak and Abdullah al-Ghunaymaan apologized for not being able to receive him and hear his topic.

About this time the Islamic Front was formed, being composed of Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, Suqour al-Sham and al-Tawhid brigade.

Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr now also felt the danger from the Islamic front and the idea of pro- claiming the Islamic Caliphate began to grow in power. Mainly to block the threats they felt from Jabhat Nusra and the Islamic front and because they probably sincerely saw the re-installment of an Islamic Caliphate as their goal.

The top 8 people in ISIS agreed to establish a Caliphate but what steps should they take?

Amr al-Absi suggested to Baghdadi to inform for pledges of allegiance for a future Caliphate from Chechnya, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Sinai. Baghdadi formed a com- mittee to summon people who have joined ISIS with a network in those countries. Their task was to videotape pledges of bayah so that they could be published at the same time when the Caliphate was declared, as if these pledges came from everywhere non-stop.

Baghdadi sent a message to Nasser al-Wahayshi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Yemen, but al-Wahayshi immediately refused the idea. The same happened in Afghanistan and West-Africa, but Baghdadi did receive pledges from Sinai, Tunisia and Libya. The pledges of Bayah to a future Caliphate were disap-pointing and frustrating for Colonel Haji Bakr and Baghdadi. Qahtani meanwhile requested from the Saudis support for the Caliphate and told them that its announcement is imminent.

In mid-January 2014 Colonel Haji Bakr, the first man and the strategical mastermind behind Baghdad-i’s ISIS is killed by rebels during a heavy battle for North Aleppo. Baghdadi was in shock and ordered to conceal the news and if it leaked to deny it. The place of the Colonel has been taken by the Iraqi Abu Ali al-Anbari. Abu Ali al-Anbari position now gave ISIS religious depth and some more legislative power for Baghdadi.

-Two ex-Baathist officers also came power to a leadership position and were working in the shadows. They are Major General Mohammed al-Douri and Major General Saeed Mohammed al-Dghayman.

Abu Ayman was selected by al-Baghdadi as governor of the Coast, he is from the clan al-Bdour from the south of Iraq and he was a Shiite recently converted to the Sunni sect.

The security operatives are found in ISIS starting by the general command, and the general com- mand, headed by al-Anbari since the death of Colonel Haji Bakri. The direct head of the Security Committee is Abu Ahmed al-Alwan, the mayor of Diyala. He too was a lieutenant-colonel in the mili- tary intelligence of Saddam’s army and a Baathist. Al-Alwan, was part of the choir that joined ISIS by recommendation from Colonel Haji Bakr. Given his experience, he was tasked with the Security Com- mittee. He structured the organization in Iraq and later in Syria, to cells and units, run by security op- eratives loyal to him and whose faces were never revealed and identities were never known. Like other Baath officers, Al-Alwan had connections with the Baath leadership in Syria before and after the revolution.

The recent flow of defections made Abu Ali al-Anbari feared the withdrawal of ISIS’s Saudi members and rumors reached al-Anbari that Qahtani was thinking about defecting and planning an escape from ISIS territory. Al-Anbari asked Qahtani directly about these rumors and Qahtani told him that it was true, but for family reasons. Al-Anbari then reportedly said to Qahtani: “we entered togetherand we will die together or live together, and you kill me if I withdraw, and I will kill you if you with-draw”. Qahtani was then put under tight surveillance by order of Baghdadi. ISIS’s system of“tightening security” on an important member is to put one man above the subjects rank and one man under his rank, thus every move the subject makes is secured.

Abu Ali al-Anbari asked to bring the Saudi Othman Al-Nazih and asked him to teach all immigrant fighters to fight what ISIS described as Apostate and Awakening groups. Othman al-Nazih was seen as a weak personality by Baghdadi and Abu Ali al-Anbari and not fit for leadership but he was consid- ered fit enough to deceive the Saudis and influence them. Ali al-Anbari in the past several months appointed several tasks to Othman al-Nazih namely:

1 - Talks to ISIS members and encourage them to remain steadfast with Baghdadi.

2 - Visit Omar al-Shishani and emphasize to him religiously that Baghdadi is right.

3 – Talk to the prisoners of ISIS and advise them and then draw up a list of those who

deserve to “repent” and those who deserve death sentence in the field or to remain imprisoned.

Around this time Amr al-Absi presented a kill-list of for leaders from the Islamic Front and the Free Syrian Army, justifying killing them to dismantle the resistance to Baghdadi.

Baghdadi also requested his secondants an inventory of his army and most loyal manpower. Abu Ali al-Anbari informed all the groups of ISIS that were dispersed throughout Syria, to inform him about their inventory and the number of fighters, many ISIS’s fighters were from four countries:

-The first: Tunisia

-The second: Saudi Arabia

-The third: Libya and Algeria

Baghdadi requested statistical analysis of the nationalities with more defectors. It was reached that most of the defectors are from Saudi Arabia and that they usually defect to Jabhat Nusra. Baghdadi ordered to put protective measures to this crisis and he asked to work on reviving ISIS by any means necessary to show their power. It was ordered to demonize the rest of the fighters and bring advisory opinions and intensify the efforts of the media and the military.

The advisory opinions, especially from Saudis, proclaimed the apostasy of Jabhat Nusra and the Is- lamic Front in order to convince his fighters to fight them and leave the frontlines against Assad and his army. The advisory opinions were brought by Qahtani, and they were from three Saudis and one Bahraini. Baghdadi asked Qahtani to try to protect these advisory opinions from any Scholarly oppo-sition to ISIS with a huge media distortionary campaign. Qahtani contacted the committee managed by the Saudi Abdullah al-Fayez to intensify the media campaign to promote ISIS.

The Saudi Abdullah al-Fayez intensified his media work and employed new members for his task- force. Qahtani requested from al-Fayez to not include any new members for the media department unless he had raised their names to him to approve them. The reason for this is that Qahtani will pro-vide the media department with very sensitive news, so it is important for these members to be on a high level of confidence, a security clearance if u will. Abdullah al-Fayez send the names of active members, being the most prominent the Saudis:

Abdul Rahman Sultan al-Mojil

Ryan Abu Himd

Adnan al-Shaalan al-Khalidi

Tamim al-Qadi

The taskforce stepped up the intensification of support to ISIS by confronting the Scholars opposed to Baghdadi under fake accounts and started to widely promote what ISIS called Al Sororia.

Baghdadi now saw the time ripe to order Abu Ali al-Anbari and Omar al-Shishani to leave the front- lines against Assad and work on fighting what ISIS labeled apostates (the apostates in ISIS’s eyes were Jabhat Nusra and the Islamic Front). Abu Ali al-Anbari requested from Baghdadi to order a serious order and request from the Saudis, Qahtani and Othman al-Nazih to justify their soldiers the need for self-sacrificial operations against Jabhat Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham and that this is the greatest type of martyrdom. A list was compiled of ISIS members willing to use VBIEDS and other self-sacrificial oper- ations against Jabhat Nusra and Ahrar Sham.

Baghdadi then said about this order: “You cannot defeat the apostates except by two things: suicideattacks against the groups and bombings in Turkey and the Western world”.

There were desperate attempts from ISIS to bring pledges of bayah to cover the daily shortages, but most of it ended in failure. Baghdadi ordered to establish a targeted Hijra campaign (Migrate to ISIS) for Tunisians because the Tunisians were known for their loyalty. This campaign was put under the control of Abu Jafar, a Tunisian who was provided with money for his mission. Abu Jafar’s work be- gan and he used representatives in Tunisia, Libya, Turkey and Egypt to start organizing without being noticed by intelligence services.

Baghdadi ordered his Syrian representatives to try to offer money to lower level leaders of the Islam-ic Front, especially Ahrar al-Sham, to make them defect and join him, but all of this with no result.

Influential people were leaving ISIS, among them the Saudis:

Abdul Wahab al-Sqaub

Abu Al Bara al-Zahrani

Abu Azzam al-Najdi

Also Abdullah al- Qasim

And many from other nationalities also defected:

The Egyptian Abu Ibrahim

The Tunisians Abu Saad and Abu Aiman and Abu Abdul Rahman al-Qayrawani

The Libyan Abu Isra and some Gulf figures especially Kuwaiti and Emirati.

This caused Baghdadi to take more precautionary measures by ordering to “tighten security” with each field commander to fortify ISIS from defections and as to have early knowledge on them if they wanted to leave ISIS.

People close to Baghdadi provided him with the names of the figures responsible for the defections in ISIS.

There was a consensus on the two persons most responsible for the defections:

Sheikh Abdullah al-Muhaysni

Sheikh Hajjaj al-Ajmi

These two Sheiks were loved in the field and they both had many and good relations with senior Scholars. Muhaysni and al Ajmi relentlessly proved with Islamic laws that ISIS was wrong in killing Muslims and making takfir on them.

Baghdadi directed the creation of a private security detachment to assassinate the two Sheikh’s. Baghdadi stated that their killing was in the public interest and to stop the division in the Muslim community.

Baghdadi took more precautionary measures to treat the cracks of ISIS and asked them to work to restore the confidence in ISIS through legitimate influencers from outside of Syria. New supporters were needed and they should express their support to ISIS explicitly. Amongst the possible new sup- porters where the Saudis Abu al-Zubair Alhaula and Adel al-Murshidi.

The first, Abu al-Zubair, was a former fighter in several countries close to some prominent jihadi fig-ures. Abu al-Zubair refused to support the group publicly. Nonetheless he promised to bring Saudi jihadists to pledge allegiance.

He contacted several groups, including the Green Battalion, led by Abu Nasser Hossam al-Shammari. He asked them to join ISIS but they refused arguing they would not join except with advisory opinion from the Scholars al-Alwan and al-Tarifi. He also contacted a group called Hawks of al-Ezz which con-sisted mainly of Saudis, but the response was the same.

Baghdadi noted the lack of supporters at home and abroad, especially from Scholars.

There was a large campaign to compensate for the loss and to maintain the remaining fighters but the[audio/video] clips of the Saudi cleric Dr. al-Muhaysni disrupted the initiatives of ISIS to compen- sate for the loss of fighters. ISIS leadership became angry, which made Baghdadi approve the offer from Amr al-Absi, to execute the previous plan for VBIED attacks and suicide missions against Jabhat Nusra, Ahrar Sham and the Islamic Front. In light of this crisis, al-Anbari ordered the Emirs of ISIS to tighten the supervision of their soldiers and ordered the use of guards over their soldiers, so that no one of them should leave alone unless it was to carry out an attack on Jabhat Nusra/Ahrar Sham or under intense supervision. The departure without permission was considered disobedience, and ISIS reserved the right to kill them for that crime. This order further minimized the desertion of ISIS sol-diers.

Complaints reached Baghdadi from Qahtani, explaining that there is a campaign of arrests in Saudi Arabia against ISIS supporters, which lessened ISIS’s media support. Hamoud al-Mutairi apologized to Qahtani, and the same did Abullah al-Fayez, Allioui al-Shammari and Abu al-Zubair, for reducing their media activities for ISIS as the Saudi government cracked down on ISIS supporters and two influential Saudi figures of ISIS were already arrested: Bandar al-Shaalan and Ryan Abu Himd.

Due to this problem, an alternative figure appeared, and this is the Saudi Abdul Rahman Sultan, which took control of the administration of the Saudi Arabia media taskforce. Abdul Rahman Sultan supervised the twitter and social media accounts that attacked Syrian rebels Jabhat Nusra and the Islamic Front continuously. Abdul Rahman Sultan supervised many accounts and was receiving direct feeds from Syria through Qahtani. Abdul Rahman was told to intensify media work to promote ISIS and to distort enemies with influence over ISIS like al-Muhaysni.

Meanwhile it was suggested to Baghdadi to kill influential leaders whether inside or outside Syria. ISIS designated the following two as the most dangerous figure for ISIS inside Syria:

-Abdullah al-Muhaysni, the Saudi cleric.

-Abu Khalid al Suri. (The Al Qaeda veteran assigned by Zawahiri to quell the ISIS and Al Qaeda rift)

Al-Muhaysni, a popular and charismatic Sheikh, who is loved by the rebels, was seen as the biggest threat to the unpopularity of ISIS and as one of the biggest reasons rebel fighters, Sheikhs and com- manders were very hesitant to join ISIS. Al-Muhaysni had an extensive following on Twitter (with over 520.000 followers at one point). He denounced ISIS and their killing of Muslims and rebel fight-ers for wrongly accusing them of being an Apostate (Takfir).

Speech of Al-Muhaysni at the battle for Aleppo’s Central prison.

Al-Muhaysni calls on ISIS to stop the infighting and leave their Khawarij ways.

Muhaysni continued to use his Twitter account as a platform to encourage ISIS members to defect to other groups. ISIS did not succeed in killing him, instead ISIS used its media machine to smear Al- Muhaysni, by spreading many lies, for example, that he is a spy for the US and an intelligence officer in the service of Saudi Arabia.

On 16 January 2014, Abu Khalid al-Suri, tweeted that ISIS was seeking to corrupt the jihad as it had done in Iraq and that militants should direct their bombs at the Shia and Alawites, not at their fellow jihadis.

On 21 of February 2014 ISIS retrieved the specific location of Abu Khalid al-Suri through an Iraqi officer.

Two commanders quickly organized an attack on Abu Khalid al Suri, they were:

Amr al-Absi

Abu Asama al-Iraqi

These 2 commanders recruited 2 suicide bombers that didn’t know that they will target Abu Khalid al -Suri, but were told that they were about to kill the criminal Jamal Maarouf. The 2 commanders made sure Abu Khalid al Suri’s assassination would succeed, by having a back-up suicide team if the first team’s mission didn’t succeed. The back-up team was composed of 3 fighters with a 10 ton VBIED to storm the location and blow away what is in it.

ISIS managed to assassinate the second person on their primary kill-list, Abu Khalid al-Suri, the high- est Al Qaeda representative in Syria and the arbitrator appointed by Zawahiri. The assassination was the final blow to any hope of reconciliation between Al Qaeda/Jabhat Nusra and ISIS.

Joulani released a statement shortly after the assassination of Abu Khalid al Suri warning ISIS for the dangerous path of Extremism(Takfir) they are in. His statement was the following:

“In the name of Allah, prayers and salutations upon the Messenger of Allah

Surah Al-Ahzab 23

Of the believers are men who are true to that which they covenanted with Allah. Some of them have paid their vow by death (in battle), and some of them still are waiting; and they have not altered in the least

Shaam(Levant) has been pained by the loss of the wise man, the compassionate the knight. Abu Khalid al-Suri. He fought the Nusayris 30 years ago then traveled the world fighting the enemies of God wherever he went. He was the friend of Osa- ma bin Laden and Zawahiri, not to mention Abu Musab al-Suri and others from the leaders of Jihad and scholars. He did not belong to Ahrar or Nusra but he belonged to all the Mujahidin. A man of solutions not a man of confrontations. Oh Abu Kha-lid how I wish you eulogized me and I didn't eulogize you. May the scholars and poets, remember you.

We say to his killers may your hands and your act be damned You & whoever ordered you & who produced Fatwa for you made us miserable. Have you not learned the meaning of Sahwat? Sahwat in Iraq are those who stopped fighting Americans & Shia & started fighting the mujahidin. (Meaning ISI during its purge of rebel groups in Iraq).

As for Sham, who is the one that stopped fighting the Nusayris and started fighting those who fight the Nusayris? Should you not wonder? How many positions on frontlines did you fight with people that were fighting there & you didn't take their place or let other rebels take it. (Meaning abandoning frontlines with Assad, and Assad could take without a shot fired)

It was almost impossible for West & agents to create a Sahwat project, but infighting which you caused created a opening for them. Then the Sahwat project started with "National Army" but have you heard of Sahwat calling for judging by Gods Law in disputes? Then ISI doesn't respond but Sahwat does !?! Why don't you take this chance if you have clear proof that they are Sahwat.

We do not deny that there are groups that are fighting you that have fallen in apostasy. Such as the Coalition and SMC. And whoever is working on the "National Army" project to install a secular government and to eliminate the Islamic Project. But majority of groups that are fighting you haven't been proven to be apostates. But everything you are saying is just suspi-cions.

And some Haram things that they have done which are not things you can judge apostasy on them. And here are groups you made Takfir of in ignorance and you made their blood legal, requesting that you & them be judged by Gods law. We put ISI in front of followers & nation 2 implement Gods law on ourselves 1st before implementing it on people with no pre- conditions. Conditions you mentioned were legitimate in its origin, but misplacing it where it does not belong makes it void.

Until preparations of proceedings are done, military ops between us will stop & your Fatwas of Takfir of other groups will be cancelled. And you will come and present all your proof and even your suspicions to respectable scholars such al- Maqdisi, Abu Qatada, Al-Alwan. Then we take the Fatwa from the scholars and whatever they say will apply to everyone and we are committed to it.

We will wait 5 days for your official response from the day of this message & if you refuse, then know we have been patient with you for over a year. A year of infringements, fake accusations, distorting our image, but we ignored this to prevent greater evil and we wavered our rights.

You know the bitterness you tasted in Sharqiyah & you know that till now we did not leave a single frontline against Nusayris like you did. And by God, if you refuse the Law of God again and do not stop your infliction on the nation. The Mus-lim nation (Al Qaeda?) will carry your infringing ignorant ideology/ideas and banish it, even from Iraq!!! And you know hun-dreds of the distinguished brothers in Iraq, that are waiting for the signal.

So wake up, O ISI group and come back to your organization, (Al Qaeda) and its Scholars and Leaders. For it will not let you down and it will forgive your mistakes and you will complete with it the Project!”

The Killing of Abu Khalid al Suri added much resent towards ISIS both within its ranks and outside its ranks. Then there came the most surprising move by ISIS, the Mubahala! ( See chapter 7)

[*Note. One of the deceptions Adnani made in the Mubahalah was his denial that ISIS made takfir on everyone who fights against them and that ISIS did not make Takfir on the basis of unintended con-sequences and uncertainties. But Adnani clearly said in a later speech:

"Oh our people respond to the caller of Allah."

Adnani now revealed the true colors of ISIS when he said in this speech:

"By fighting against the Islamic State you (consequentially) fall into disbelief whether you real-ize it or not."

This is called a political Takfir and not based on the required Sharia evidence, this Takfir was clearly made to neutralize everyone who fought in defense against ISIS’s brutal quest for dominating the Jihadi battlefields, as they declared an all-out war against all Rebel groups and not caring about spill-ing Muslim blood.

ISIS remained on its path and planned for their strategical survival in Syria and not long after ISIS kicked of its campaign "Revenge for our chaste women".

ISIS started this operation by spreading a lie through its media machine about Muhajiraat (foreign women coming to ISIS) being raped in Northern Aleppo by other factions, they used this lie to hurdle an army of supporters and gain sympathy. The prime reason for this operation was to se- cure the vital border with Turkey and oilfields in Raqqa and DeireZor. This strategical operation was planned beforehand and perfectly executed by instigating their soldiers with operation

"Revenge for our chaste Women"

This campaign turned out as a success for ISIS and they captured many villages in Northern Aleppo ISIS retreated from western Syria and began consolidating its control over eastern Syria, the area closest to Iraq, and the location of Syria’s oil fields. Jabhat Nusra and ISIS fought viciously, in and around the city of Raqqa, the Euphrates bank and DeireZor.

Baghdadi was still in Syria in the city of Raqqa, while the battle against Jabhat Nusra and other rebel groups was raging in DeireZor. Thousands of militants were killed in the raging war between ISIS and Jabhat Nusra/other rebel factions, with senior commanders killed on both sides.

ISIS came out victorious from their operation “Revenge for our chaste Women” and now had sole control over large parts of North Aleppo countryside (Turkish border) and over Raqqa and DeireZor (oilfields).

After the success of this campaign it became clear that the story (that Muhajiraat were being raped by the other rebel factions) turned out to be a big lie. One of ISIS’s own defected soldiers, Abu Ah- mad Al-Muhajir Al-Misri confirmed this. Sheikh Abdullah Al-Muhaysni also tried to investigate this accusation, but not one single piece of evidence was presented until this very day. He even ques- tioned the widow of Colonel Haji Bakr, and she denied the accusations that she was kidnapped and she denied the accusation of rape, saying "We only heard about it on Twitter like everybody else butwe did not see anything." While sh live in Tal Rifat among th sisters who were supposedly raped.Muslim Abu Walid Sheeshaani, leader of Jund Shaam, and Salahuddinne Sheeshani, former leader of Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar, also tried to investigate the case in Aleppo. But not one single evi-dence was presented, they couldn't even point out one woman who was supposedly raped.

On 26 May 2014, the widely respected Scholar al-Maqdisi, who remained impartial during the Al- Qaida and ISIS crisis, deemed the negotiations dead and, issued a fatwa against ISIS:

“It has become necessary that we tell the truth, after we exhausted all the possibilities of advice and all hopes of making ISIS return to the path of truth,”

Sheikh Maqdisi called ISIS a rebellious organization, that has no Islamic pretext. Baghdadi, his com- manders, and his Sheiks disobeyed the orders of their leaders and head Scholars. He instructed ISIS soldiers to defect to Jabhat Nusra and decreed that no Muslim should spread ISIS messages.

Al Qaeda now officially broke all ties with ISIS and declared themselves free from their crimes, in the latest message from Zawahiri in “The reality between pain and hope” published in May 2014. He said:.

The considerations of this decision could be divided in two matters. The first, is the difference between the two methodologies. Our methodology is focusing on the modern-day idol America and its Crusad-er-Zionists allies and their treacherous agents, and gathering the Ummah and inciting it to wage Ji-haad against them and to stay away from offshoot battles. And our methodology is carefulness with blood and refraining from operations which could spill blood without legitimate justifications; on mar-kets and Mosques and public neighborhoods, rather even between the Mujahid groups. And we have published numerous statements about this from Shaykh Usama bin laden and Shaykh Mustafa Abu Al -Yazid and Shaykh Atiyatullah Libi and Shaykh Abu Yahya Libi, may Allah have mercy on them. I like-wise talked about this subject several times. That is why we published the document “General guide-lines for Jihaad procedure.” After consulting and sending it to all the brothers. And one of the reasons for us publishing this document was the fear for what is happening now. I hope that everyone now realizes, after this fire of turmoil has intensified, what the dangers are which this document sought to prevent. And our methodology is also keenness on mobilizing and uniting the Ummah around the proclamation of monotheism and working towards the return of the righteous Caliphate which is es-tablished on mutual consultation and compliance from the Muslims.

That is why we published “The paper for supporting Islam” to all those who work for Islam to unite them on one shared word. That is why we are not able to unite the Ummah if our image is that of an occupying force over them which takes away their rights or oppresses and subjugates them. As for the second issue, it is the lack of sticking to the principals of cooperation. Like announcing states with- out permission, rather even without choice, as the guidelines of the general leadership was that we must not declare any open presence of Al-Qaedah in Shaam and this issue was even agreed upon by the brothers in Iraq. So we were surprised by the announcement which gave the Syrian regime and America the opportunity they were longing for. And they made the general people of Shaam ask “What is wrong with this Al-Qaedah which is inviting disasters upon us? Is Bashar not enough for us? Do they want to invite America on us also?” And for example their lack of sticking to the decrees of the leadership concerning the division of interests, or concerning the halt of infighting. And one of the most important reasons for the known breakup (with ISIS) in the problem of Shaam, was our fear for the bloody turmoil which is eating up the souls of thousands of Mujahideen today. And perhaps eve- ryone realizes that this breakup, if everyone endorsed it then the blood of thousands would have been preserved and the efforts would have increased in the fight against the enemies of the Muslims, in- stead of busying themselves with fighting against the Muslims.

Another issue which is of the utmost importance is that Al-Qaedah by the Grace of Allah is a message before it is an organization. Shaykh Usama bin Laden (may Allah have mercy on him) persisted on this and his brothers in Al-Qaedah were also very persistent on this. So Al-Qaedah is a message before it is an organization. If we distort this message we have lost, even if we would expand organizationally and materialistically. Because we would fail in our most important goal which is the mobilization of the Ummah towards Jihaad against its enemies so that they can judge with their Islamic law and re- gain its Caliphate. And if we were with ten who present the Ummah with a good example and a mes- sage in which the words are upheld with actions, it is better for us then being with tens of thousands which make the Ummah run away from them and from their actions and manners. If the Ummah wit- nessed us fighting over the war spoils before being established and race towards taking away the right of the Ummah and its nobles in mutual consultation and governance; and if they witnessed us participating in infighting in which the blood of our Mujahid brothers is spilled and their honors and belongings are violated; and if the Ummah witnessed us spoiling the fruit of Jihaad before it is ripe by actions which are not thought through and hasty individual decrees; then how will the Ummah trust us and how will they answer us? Rather we would present our enemies the greatest opportunity to distort our image and turn the Ummah away from us. And the secularist and the Americanized lack- eys will say to the people: Look at what the Mujahideen are doing against each other so image what they would do with you?”

A secret meeting between ISIS and the Naqshbandi Army (by cooperating with Naqshbandi ISIS’s transgresses its own rules of takfir, that they applied on Rebels in Syria!) took place near Qayyarah district, south of Mosul. ISIS and Naqshbandi planned for a huge operation in Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul. Representatives from Izzat al-Douri and Baghdadi attended the meeting.

On June 10, 2014 ISIS captures the city of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, Iraqi forces reportedly flee. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declares a state of emergency.

ISIS DECLARES A CALIPHATE IN SYRIA AND IRAQ ON JUNE 29 2014

On June 29, 2014 ISIS declared a “Caliphate” across controlled areas in Syria and Iraq while calling for global allegiance. Baghdadi declares himself the leader or Caliph - of the 1.8 billion Muslims all over the world. Baghdadi also calls for all Muslims to gather to his new land and unite to “capture Rome” and own the world.

On July 5, 2014 Baghdadi is recorded in his first public appearance, at the Grand Mosque in Mosul, calling on all Muslims to obey him.

Chapter 7

What is Mubahala and the motif Adnani did a Mubahala

Adnani swore in one of his speeches that ISIS does not refuse to submit to the Sharia law in a court however, at the same time ISIS kept refusing the many initiatives of multiple Scholars and Sheiks.

On numerous occasions Scholars and Sheikh’s plead ISIS to resolve the infighting in an independent Sharia court. ISIS was even given the option to appoint an even number of its own Sheikh’s in a joint court with independent Scholars.

A small list of some Sheiks and Scholars that pleaded ISIS to solve this infighting in a Sharia court:

Yusuf Al-Ahmad

Ayman Zawahiri

Abdullah Al-Muhaysni

Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi

Ibrahim Rubaysh

Sulayman Al-Ulwani

Besides the above six people many influential and respected Scholars and Leaders ( names cannot be mentioned for now) pleaded ISIS to solve the infighting in a Sharia Court.

ISIS started to feel the enormous pressure both form outside and inside the battlefields, to accept an independent Sharia court, where all proofs, secret documents and communication could be present-ed by both parties.

ISIS had nowhere to hide anymore and needed to do something quick. Adnani found the answer to ISIS’s problem to get them out of the rabbits hole, a Mubahala.

What is a Mubahala?

Many Muslims, especially those living in the western world had no or little clue on what a Mubahala is, while this a contrary case in the Arab world. In the Middle east it is very common that TV pro-grams are filled with, Islamic Scholars, Sheiks and Shia preachers challenging each other to a Mu-bahala to proof that their adversary is lying. The one lying on either side of the religious issue of the Mubahala, will be struck with the curse of Allah, which can result in suffering and usually a violent death.

This “trend” of Mubahala’s in TV programs made Adnani no stranger to this method of settling dis- putes in religious matters. Many times a Mubahala is used as a kind of ordeal in which the instigation or call to the ordeal, may be more important than execution of the Mubahala, i.e. bluffing the other party out of the disagreement. The event (Mubahala) is referred to in the Qur'an.

Surah Al-E-Imran

And whoso disputeth with thee concerning him, after the knowledge which hath come unto thee, say (unto him): Come! We will summon our sons and your sons, and our women and your women, and ourselves and yourselves, then we will pray humbly (to our Lord) and (solemnly) invoke the curse of Allah upon those who lie. (61)

نارمعهآل ُةرۡوس

َ َ ۡ ۡ ُ ََ َ َ َ َ َ ۡ ۡ ٓ ۡ ۡ ۡ ۡ ُ ٌف ُه َ اجحكهنم ُه َُ هبعد ُ ْ ۡ ۡ ۡ ۡ ۡ ۡ ۡ ۡ ن َ م ف ٓ َ َ ءاكجام لعهّلُ َمه ُعن د ن َ َُ و ُل عا َت ُل َقف ُم ا ن ٓءا نبأ ُمَك ٓءا نبأو َُ َ تنعللع جنف َ ُلَہت ب نَ ُمث ُمَكسفنأوا نسفنأو ُمَك ٓءاسهونا ن ٓءاسهون لّلُّ ه ىل ع َ َ ۡ َ َ َ َ َ ه َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ ه َ َ َ ١٦ َُ ٌَنهبذ هـڪ ّل ) ٰ (

A good reason for Adnani to block the initiatives by these scholars to bring an end to this fitnah and to show ISIS’s followers and those fighters still confused on whether Jabhat Nusra or ISIS was lying, Adnani dared Abudullah Ash-Shami to a Mubahala in his speech on 21 March 2014:

"Then let us invoke the curse of Allah upon the liars".

In it Adnani invoked the curse of Allah on himself (Adnani) and on Abdullah Ash Shami and Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir( 2 leading Sharia Scholars in Jabhat Nusra.)

*Note - A Mubahalah is when two parties both ask Allah to send His curse upon whichever of them is lying, the liar of the two involved in the Mubahala usually dies shortly after.

Adnani’s challenge to a Mubahala on Abdullah Ash Shamiwas uttered in Adnani’s speech:

"Then let us invoke the curse of Allah upon the liars"

Here I shall mention some of them to which I invite him to a Mubahalah over and he shall agree to this Mubahalah if he is truthful.

So O believers, be secure and invoke the curse of Allah upon the liars.

O Allah, verily Abū ʿAbdullāh Ash-Shāmī claimed about us:

- That we raised the affair to the Sheikh (Ayman) Adh-Dhawāhirī and that both parties were pleased with an eventual judgment and the judge.

- That the State (ISIS) is using lies and deceit to infer that its manhaj (methodology) is correct, and that it began a campaign that slandered and distorted the ʿAqīdah and manhaj of the leaders of Ji- had.

- That it (ISIS) began raids into Ash-Shām with a series of successive and intense attacks against the headquarters and warehouses of the Front (Jabḥat An-Nuṣrah) as well as its military camps.

- That whenever anyone opposes it (ISIS) or advises it(ISIS), that it (ISIS) works to overthrow it (Jabhat Nusra and other rebels) by all means

- That from its (ISIS) customs are treachery and betrayal

- That it (ISIS) breaks covenants and treaties

- That from its (ISIS) customs is making false oaths

- That it (ISIS) fools its soldiers to change them to be against Jabḥat An-Nuṣrah and to make them be-lieve that Jabhat Nusra is of the Ṣaḥawāt

- That the State (ISIS) repeatedly threatened Abū Khālid As-Sūrī

- That it (ISIS) refuses to submit to a Sharīʿah court

- That it (ISIS) declares disbelief upon some people upon hearing that they sat with a disbeliever

- He claimed that the State (ISIS) declares others as disbelievers based upon suspicions, conjecture and possibilities as well as what he calls Shinshinah (rumours, empty claims)

- That it (ISIS) ruled that all of those who opposed it (ISIS) are members of the Ṣaḥawāt

- That it (ISIS) placed snipers in Al-Raqqah and began to kill any Muslim that passed by

- That the Shaykh ʿUmar Ash-Shīshānī broke promises that he made with Abū Khālid As-Sūrī

- That the State (ISIS) views everyone that fights it (ISIS) has become a fighter against Islam (ie. may be fought) that has left the Millah (Ummah/Religion)

- That it (ISIS) declares disbelief based upon accessories, similarities, possibilities and conjecture

- That it (ISIS) tests people in regards to their beliefs and that it (ISIS) kills the people of Islam but leave the people of idolatry

- That from its (ISIS) attributes is Taqiyyah, breaking of promises, treachery, false oaths and debauch-ery

- That it (ISIS) refuses to obey and to submit to the Law of God

- That it (ISIS) began the aggression and oppression towards others

- That it (ISIS) is considered as the greatest obstacle in the path of Jihad and defense against the Nuṣayrī aggressors

O Allah, verily I testify to you that what I mentioned previously from what your servant Abū ʿAbdullāh Ash-Shāmīsaid are lies and slurs against the State (ISIS), and that it is not from its (ISIS)manhaj nor from its beliefs, and neither does it (ISIS) intend to do any such things, rather it (ISIS) repu-diates whoever does such things.

O Allah whoever from among us is lying then impose your curse upon him, and show us a sign through him, and make an example of him

O Allah whoever from among us is lying then impose your curse upon him, and show us a sign through him, and make an example of him

O Allah whoever from among us is lying then impose your curse upon him, and show us a sign through him, and make an example of him

O Allah, all who conspire against the Jihad and the Mujahidin, return his plan back to his throat, and uncover his belongings, reveal his secrets and make him an example for those who consider. O Allah shed upon him maladies and trials.

Sheikh Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir replied and accepted Adnani’s Mubahala in his own name and in the name of Sheikh Abu Abdallah al-Shami.

Shaykh Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir accepted Adnani’s Mubahala in his speech:

“Silsalah al-Shahada: Chain of Testimonies”

Shaykh Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir

َْ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َ َْ َْ ٌلٌهبس ُهذهـ هلُق ـلالىإلوع ْدأه َرٌ ُةصب ُىل ُع َُ ٌنهعبتا ُنموا نأ ـلالُ َناح ْبس ُوه َُ َمهنا نأام ُو َُ َنٌكهرشمال َٰ ه ه ٰ ه َ َ ه َ َ َ َ َ َ َ ه

}Tell them plainly: "This is my way: I call you to Allah, on the basis of clear perception - both I and those who follow me. Allah - Glory be to Him - is free of every imperfection. I have nothing to do with those who associate others with Allah in His Divinity.", *Qur’an 12:108+

In the name of Allah, the Entirely Merciful, the Especially Merciful.

Praise be to Allah, and blessing and peace be upon Rasul Allah and his family and his companions. Allah says:

{But those who wrong follow their [own] desires without knowledge. Then who can guide one whom Allah has sent astray? And for them there are no helpers.} *Qur’an 30:29+

And He also says:

{And thus do We detail the verses, and [thus] the way of the criminals will become evident.} *Qur’an 6:55+

This is my testimony of some of what I have seen and heard in Sham, being asked about it on the Day of Judgment, when there will not benefit [anyone] wealth or children, but only one who comes to Al-lah with a sound heart.

I offer this testimony to my Muslim brothers, to banish suspicion and establish the proofs, and show what is correct to the people.

And to enable them to distinguish the honest from the liar.

And corrupter from the peacemaker.

And Allah Knows the corrupter from the peacemaker.

And I didn’t provide this testimony until I saw its necessity after seeing the people talking about the Muslims and the mujahidin in particular, inside al-Sham and outside of it, regarding the matter of Ja-maat al-Dawla.

And I didn’t provide it until the brothers asked me to provide it after the Mubahala of Adnani.

So it was a must to present what I know.

Allah says:

{And do not conceal testimony, for whoever conceals it - his heart is indeed sinful, and Allah is Know- ing of what you do.} *Qur’an 2:283+

The Messenger of Allah said:

"Shall I not inform you of one of the gravest of the cardinal sins?"

We said: "Yes, O Messenger of Allah!"

He said:

"To join others as partners with Allah in worship and to be undutiful to one's parents."

The Messenger of Allah sat up from his reclining position (in order to stress the importance of what he was going to say) and added:

"I warn you making a false statement and giving a false testimony. I warn you against making a false statement and giving a false testimony."

The Messenger of Allah kept on repeating this (warning) till we wished he would stop .

Ibn Abbas said: “The witness must provide his witness whenever he is asked.”

So I say, seeking the help of Allah…

First, in regard to the baya’a from Jamaat al-Dawla to Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahri.

I mention here a story which occurred in front of me in a meeting of some brothers, and that when Jamaat al-Dawla accepted me as a mediator between them and Jabhat Al-Nusra in the first fitnah when they declared the establishment of their Dawla [into al-Sham.]

When the news started to spread that the Bay’a of their Sheikh *Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] to Sheikh Ay- man was not full Bay’a, but as they claim it was a Bay’a of “love and support” only; as it was de- scribed by their Shari’Abu Bakr al-Qahtani in the terms he defined it and I don’t know what kind of Bay’a he was speaking about.

So we were amazed about this issue, and we told al-Baghdadi about this matter in front of this Shari’*AbuBakr al-Qahtani+, and the response of Baghdadi was: “I seek refuge in Allah, I have a true binding Baya’a to Sheikh Ayman, to hear and obey, in hardship and in ease!”

And he affirmed to us what we already know, that he is a soldier in the command of al-Qaeda and that he listens and obeys like the other Umarah of other regions [affiliated to Tandheem al-Qaeda].

Oh Allah Witness that I heard Sheikh al-Baghdadi saying: “I have a binding Baya’a to Sheikh Ayman al -Zawahari”.

Secondly; concerning the issue of the conflict between Jabhat Al-Nusra and Jamaat al-Dawla and it being referred to Sheikh Ayman to judge in it. And I mention here another incident which happened during my first mediation. Al-Baghdadi said to me when we were discussing how to solve the prob- lem:

“If Sheikh Ayman commanded me to assign the issue of Sham to someone else I would do so.” *End of his quote.]

The matter of waiting for the response was known and spread among the people and all the mujahi-din kept thinking about it; “when will the response be released.”

And another evidence proves that they accepted the judgment of our and their Amir Sheikh Ayman, is that after they asked me to establish a court to separate between Jabhat al-Nusra and Jamaat al- Dawla during the first fitnah, they refused establishing the court and retreated, justifying their action by saying that they are waiting for the response of Sheikh Ayman.

Oh Allah witness that al-Baghdadi declared that he was satisfied by the judge of Sheikh Ayman, but al -Adnani declared the reverse, oh Allah curse the liar among us and allow one of your proofs to show on him.

Thirdly; the extremism in justifying the killing of the Muslims.

In another meeting with al-Baghdadi, (it was probably the same meeting when he admitted that he had a Bay’a to Shaykh Ayman or maybe the meeting before), al-Baghdadi threatened to kill Sheikh Abu Maria and asked me to transmit the following words to Abu Maria:

“I swear to kill Abu Maria like I killed his cousin Nazim al-Jbori.”

Then he said about Sheikh Abu Maria:

“He came to us as a repentant cop *member of the Iraqi security forces+, and the brothers accepted his repentance, and I will treat him as a police officer [i.e. as an apostate] if he does one of the follow-ing: If he fights the Dawla, if he urges the people to fight the Dawla, or ‘educates’ the people against ISIS.” I asked him what do you mean by “educates” he *al-Baghdadi+ said: “talks”.

And he [al-Baghdadi+ said: “I swear to Allah if it is proven that he is behind the last fitnah (meaning linking Jabhat Al-Nusra with the main leadership in Khorasaan) then I will deal with him as I dealt with Nazim al-Jbori”.

And he also threatened Sheikh al-Fatih [Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani+ by saying: “I swear if it’s affirmed that he is behind linking the group to Khorasaan directly I will kill him.”

Then al-Baghdadi tried to justify this criminality by saying: “But I swear to Allah I won’t betray them, if I want to kill one of them, then I will give him three days to change his routine [security] and pre- pare .Lo how these people justify killing people in such a way, and they think that they are doing well in work.”

And when I objected on that and said: “How do you kill the mujahidin?”He *al-Baghdadi] said to me: “La holawa la quwataIlabi Allah *there is no Power except with Allah+”and asked his vice Abu ‘Ali al- Anbari to reply, Abu ‘Ali said:

“Al-Nawawi mentioned in his explanation to Sahih Muslim: ‘Whoever’s evil won’t be excluded except by killing him, then he must be killed.’”

And I was shocked because of that corrupted ruling.

And al-Baghdadi said: “I won’t treat the Syrians as I treat the Iraqis, because the Iraqis know the poli- cy of the jama’a. *i.e. the methodology of Dawla+”

SubhaanAllah, how these people come and deprecate Sheikh Ayman’s judgment, claiming that he recognizes the borders of Sykes-Picot. And here, look what they say/do.

And we note here that all what Shaykh Abu Abdullah al-Shaami mentioned represents the Islamic position of Jabhat al-Nusra, and his statement has been released by its Islamic committee.

Oh Allah the Lord of the Heavens and the Earth, The Most Powerful and Exalted in Might, The Superi- or, The Avenger, our Lord and Lord of everything, your slave Abu Muhammad al-Adnani has deniedwhat Abu Abdullah al-Shaami said in his statement, and I witnessed of what I saw and knew, if I lied or mixed the truth with falsehood in my testimony then make your curse upon the liar and make him a sign to the others.

{And those who do wrong will come to know by what overturning they will be overturned}(Quran 26:227)

And praise to Allah, Lord of all that exists Adnani died shortly after on 30 August 2016

Abu Abdallah al Shami and Abu Sulayman al Muhajir are still alive

ISIS released the above statement about Adnani’s death, not explaining how he died or with any pic- tures of Adnani’s body. ISIS’s eulogy of Adnani’s death was shrouded in mystery instead of clarity. Adnani’s mysterious death is explained by the following two facts and a rumor:

On 30 August 2016the Pentagon published the following statement:

“Today coalition forces conducted a precision strike near Al Bab, Syria, targeting Abu Muhammad Al- Adnani, one of ISIL's most senior leaders.”

But on 31 August 2016 Russia defense ministry @mod_russia tweeted:

“#SYRIA Su-34 strike near Maaratat-Um-Haush (#Aleppo) eliminated large concentration of #ISIS mili- tants(up to 40 men)”

The rumor stated that Adnani was not killed by an airstrike, instead Adnani was killed by an IED placed under Adnani’s car.

On August 31, the rumor started on Telegram and Twitter that it was neither a Russian nor a Coali-tion airstrike that killed Adnani, but ISIS’s members themselves killed Adnani,; an inside job.

This rumor claimed that Adnani was killed by an IED (improvised explosive device IED) placed under Adnani’s car by those loyal to ISIS’s former Governor of Raqqa Abu Luqman. Abu Luqman was said to be aiming to become the successor of Baghdadi, instead of Adnani.

In another speech by Adnani, he also invoked the curse of Allah if ISIS is the “wrong” party. This was done by Adnani in the speech:

“This was not our methodology and it will never be”

Adnani said:

“O Allah if this State is a State of the Khawārij then break its back, kill its leaders, bring down its banner, guide its soldiers. O Allah if is an Islamic State, ruling by Your Book and the Sunnah of Your

Prophet, fighting Your enemies, then keep it firm, honor it and grant it victory, and establish it uponthe earth, and make it as the Khilāfah upon the Way of Prophethood. So sayĀmīn O Muslims.”

1- “Then break its back” – We can see that ISIS is continuously losing territories. To such an extent that Adnani in his last speech even prepared his soldiers to retreat towards the desert due to loss of all their lands, and he encouraged them to not lose hope, and instead be always determined to fight.

2- “Kill its leaders“– All of its core leaders except for Baghdadi have been killed.

3. “Grant it victory and establish it upon the earth” – ISIS has collapsed everywhere. ISIS in Iraq is mostly reduced back to underground guerilla warfare and controls only small villages and desert ar- ea. In Syria ISIS has no more major cities in full control, except Raqqa, which is now practically sur- rounded. ISIS’s hard-fought borderline with Turkey is completely lost, including the famous city of Dabiq and the territory they still control in Syria consists of 70% desert. In Afghanistan, Yemen and Libya, ISIS is practically not present anymore.

4- “And make it as the Caliphate upon the Way of Prophet hood” – It has become crystal clear that; a) ISIS is not a Caliphate since a Caliphate unites the Muslims and protects them whereas ISIS has split the ranks and Muslims everywhere and can’t even protect themselves, let alone the Mus-lim community. b) b) They are not a Caliphate upon the way of Prophet hood because one of the first characteris-tics of the Prophet is that he was truthful in speech.

Chapter 11

Conclusion ISIS has two faces, one is Khawarij from its external, and the other is Baathist from its internal.

Two strategical differences appear from these events.

When a strategy and methodology is well known and sound, it does not really matter if your leader- ship ranks are infiltrated by deviant individuals. Because they cannot go against the general out- lined strategy and methodology, and if they do, then they could easily be sidelined, expelled or dis- obeyed as they are clearly contradicting the strategy and methodology of the organization. This is important to mention because it is perhaps the major reason for numerous infiltrations on high levels in ISIS within their media wings, jurists and military leaders. The Baathists generals of Saddam Hussein were able to infiltrate into ISIS with ease because it did not have a strong and clear strategy and methodology.

Al-Qaeda broke its ties with ISIS because they did not share the same enemy, meaning they did not prioritize the same main enemy. One of the most binding factors between Islamic groups, movements and rebel factions is their shared enemy. Tactical alliances between many Islamic groups are formed because they prioritize their enemy instead even if these groups have different views and methodologies. The Islamic principles of a defensive war allow such tactical coalitions. The biggest examples are Afghanistan against the Soviets and Jaish al Fateh against Assad. This is one of the most important criteria for cooperation and coordination in today’s battlefields, since there are numerous different views and Schools of thought in Sunni Muslim countries. That is why counter-revolution powers focus on breaking up the factions by destroying the binding factor, of a shared enemy

MAY ALLAH UNITE THE BRAVE REBELS AGAINST THE MODERN TIME HITLER OF MUSLIMS, BASHAR AL ASSAD. MAY ALLAH GIVE THE REBELS THE POWER TO CAPTURE BASHAR AL ASSAD ALIVE AND THAT THE PEOPLE OF SYRIA CAN DECIDE HIS FATE IN THIS WORLD.

I bear witness that there is no god except Allah- alone without any partners. And I bear witness that Muhammad is His 'abd (servant) and Messenger.

Surah As-Saaffat, Verse 180:

ُس ْب حا ن ر ِّب ك ر ِّبا ْل ِع َّز ِة ع َّما ٌ ِص ُفو ن

Glorified be thy Lord, the Lord of Majesty, from that which they attribute (unto Him)

و س ال ٌم ع لىا ْل ُم ْر سلٌِ ن

And peace be unto those sent (to warn).

لِلَّ ِه ر ِّبا ْل عا ل ِمٌ ن وا ْل ح ْم ُد

And praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds!