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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF 1 CULTURE AND AXIOLOGY CULTURA CULTURA 2014 AND AXIOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHYCULTURE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL Vol XI Vol No 1 No 14.05.14 17:43 CULTURA
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE AND AXIOLOGY Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology E-ISSN (Online): 2065-5002 ISSN (Print): 1584-1057
Advisory Board Prof. Dr. David Altman, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Universidad Catolica de Chile, Chile Prof. Emeritus Dr. Horst Baier, University of Konstanz, Germany Prof. Dr. David Cornberg, University Ming Chuan, Taiwan Prof. Dr. Paul Cruysberghs, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium Prof. Dr. Nic Gianan, University of the Philippines Los Baños, Philippines Prof. Dr. Marco Ivaldo, Department of Philosophy “A. Aliotta”, University of Naples “Federico II”, Italy Prof. Dr. Michael Jennings, Princeton University, USA Prof. Dr. Maximiliano E. Korstanje, John F. Kennedy University, Buenos Aires, Argentina Prof. Dr. Richard L. Lanigan, Southern Illinois University, USA Prof. Dr. Christian Lazzeri, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, France Prof. Dr. Massimo Leone, University of Torino, Italy Prof. Dr. Asunción López-Varela Azcárate, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain Prof. Dr. Christian Möckel, Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany Prof. Dr. Devendra Nath Tiwari, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India Prof. Dr. José María Paz Gago, University of Coruña, Spain Prof. Dr. Mario Perniola, University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Italy Prof. Dr. Traian D. Stănciulescu, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University Iassy, Romania Prof. Dr. Steven Tötösy de Zepetnek, Purdue University & Ghent University
Editorial Board Editor-in-Chief: Co-Editors: Prof. dr. Nicolae Râmbu Prof. dr. Aldo Marroni Faculty of Philosophy and Social- Facoltà di Scienze Sociali Political Sciences Università degli Studi G. d’Annunzio Alexandru Ioan Cuza University Via dei Vestini, 31, 66100 Chieti B-dul Carol I, nr. 11, 700506 Iasi, Romania Scalo, Italy [email protected] [email protected] Executive Editor: PD Dr. Till Kinzel Dr. Simona Mitroiu Englisches Seminar Human Sciences Research Department Technische Universität Braunschweig, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University Bienroder Weg 80, Lascar Catargi, nr. 54, 700107 Iasi, Romania 38106 Braunschweig, Germany [email protected] [email protected]
Editorial Assistant: Dr. Marius Sidoriuc Designer: Aritia Poenaru Cultura International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology Vol. 10, No. 1 (2013)
Editor-in-Chief Nicolae Râmbu Guest Editor: Abdul Rashid Moten Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.
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CONTENTS
AXIOLOGY OF ISLAM
Abdul Rashid Moten 7 Social Justice, Islamic State and Muslim Countries
Maszlee Malik 25 The Role of Religion for an Alternative Sustainable Governance Theory
Suwan Kim 47 Framing Arab Islam Axiology Published in Korean Newspapers
Mohd Faizal Musa 67 Axiology of Pilgrimage: Malaysian Shi’ites Ziyarat in Iran and Iraq
Haggag Ali 85 Secularism: from Solidity to Liquidity
Aimillia Mohd Ramli 99 Decolonizing the Study of English Literature in a Muslim−Malaysian Context: An Argument for a Spiritual−based Comparative Paradigm
Patrick Laude 119 Acceptance as a Door of Mercy: Riḍā in Islamic Spirituality
Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani 141 Politico-Religious Values in Malaysia: Comparing Asian Values and Islam Hadhari
Maximiliano E. Korstanje 167 Preemption and Terrorism. When the Future Governs
10.5840/cultura20131018 Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 10(1)/2013: 141–166
Politico-Religious Values in Malaysia: Comparing Asian Values and Islam Hadhari1
Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani The School of International Studies (SOIS) Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM) [email protected]
Abstract. Malaysia has developed its own distinct value system that is accommoda- tive to the country’s rich tapestry of different ethnicities and religions. It is no coin- cidence that previous Malaysian premiers have actively promoted such system. Leading the way is Mahathir Mohamad, the country’s fourth Prime Minister, who was a vocal advocate of “Asian values,” followed by his successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who championed the idea of Islam Hadhari. These two sets of values are not entirely incompatible to each other but rather share some similarities. The concepts of “Asian values” and Islam Hadhari are premised on several fundamental tenets, which include: promoting Islamic values, championing the Malay agenda, protecting cultural values, and challenging Western cultural imperialism. Their origin can be traced from the aggressive attempt by the ruling power – the United Malays Nation- al Organisation (UMNO) – Barisan Nasional (BN) to strengthen and consolidate the political supremacy of the alliance. Inevitably, both of these value systems have been subjected to many criticisms, predominantly under the pretext of misguided and ill-properly constructed values by the ruling regime to justify its autocratic rule. The very nature of such value systems has often triggered political debates in terms of defining Malaysia as a nation. The espoused agenda of Islamisation and possibly assimilation have stirred profound uneasiness among the country’s significantly large population of non-Muslims. The value system brought by “Asian values” and Islam Hadhari can lead to one understanding of Mahathir’s and Abdullah’s leadership and administration in governing Islam and politics in Malaysia. Keywords: Asian values, Islam Hadhari, Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi
INTRODUCTION
There are several sources influencing the values embraced by Malaysians, although one with the most significant importance is religion. For many Malaysian Muslims, the Islamic notions of morality and human dignity dictate their core values. In the context of the Malaysian state, the fusion of religious and political authority in the public life not only has facilitat- ed the avoidance of Western generated moral decadence and irresponsi-
141 Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani / Politico-Religious Values in Malaysia ble politics, but also enhanced co-existence and tolerance between dif- ferent religions in the country. Even in the past, any attempts to disrupt or jeopardise religious harmony are severely dealt by the Malaysian au- thority. In the Western world, the consequent process of secularisation arising from the aggressive separation of church and state – which in effect re- stricted religion to the private sphere – has contributed to a moral void in public life and accentuated negative impulses of individualism (Inogu- chi and Newman 1997: 1−9). Despite a similar process of secularisation and visible religious diversity in Malaysia – chiefly Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity – it has been argued that religion still plays a pivotal role in everyday life of society and contributes to group identity and orientation. Anwar Ibrahim (1996: 2), for instance, has spoken of a Western/Asian dichotomy, noting in particular that, unlike the Western- er, “the Asian man is a persona religiosus. Faith and religious prac- tice…permeates the life of the community.” The introduction of Asian values and Islam Hadhari by the Malaysian leaders was seen to protect the political and cultural identities of the people who strongly embrace religion, particularly the Muslim-Malays. Both concepts appear to align consistently within the framework of Is- lamic values. Nonetheless, critics alleged that they are purportedly used to hide the autocratic rule and tendency of the ruling United Malays Na- tional Organisation (UMNO) and Barisan Nasional (BN)2 in Malaysia. Therefore, this article will analyse Malaysia’s value system vis-à-vis Asian values and Islam Hadhari. Question need to be asked on whether these two particular values complemented each other by incorporating Islamic values? This article will analyse the polemic and debate of Islamic politi- co-religious values in Malaysia, within which it will also elucidate how the society are enriched by such values or otherwise.
THE EMERGENCE OF ASIAN VALUES AND ISLAM HADHARI
There are varied determinant factors attributing to the emergence of Asian values and Islam Hadhari in Malaysia. Whilst the former was a re- sponse to external factors, the latter was likely a product of ruling pow- er’s reaction to the country’s internal politics. One commentator in ex- plaining the strength of “Asian values” argued that the concerned values have already taken shape in the 1990s for four reasons (Mauzy 1996:
142 Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 10(1)/2013: 141–166
212). First, “Asian values” were developed in response to aggressive promotion of foreign policy by the Western powers and their allies, es- pecially the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK), claiming that only the West possesses the best system of government, along with the possibility to democratise governments, anytime, anywhere and under any circumstances (Vincent, 1986: 2; Kirkpatrick, 1982: 11). The “New York Times” (1996) commented that America has always thought of it- self as morally obliged to export its way of life. What the “White Man’s Burden” was to Kipling’s generation (of Britons), the promotion of de- mocracy has been to four generations of Americans. The decision by the US and UK to invade Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respective- ly, along with their support of rebellion for regime change in Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2012-2013 clearly exposed the willingness of the Amer- icans and Britons to use force in toppling foreign governments in the name of freedom and democracy. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states resented not only the West’s belittling of “Asian values”, but also what they perceive to be “Western bullying” (Jakarta Post, 1993). Second, there has been a growing social and political confidence in many Southeast Asian countries, especially Malaysia, buoyed by substan- tial economic successes in the 1990s (Tan, 1996: 3−4). This appears to justify the countries’ adopted policy of placing economic development first, giving priority to order and stability (the “strong state”) and pro- moting what they call “good government” (Far Eastern Economic Re- view, 1995a: 45−124). It is observed that that the “local” values and tra- ditions have served Asian countries well and that they are experiencing, as expressed by the Malaysian former deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ib- rahim, an “Asian Renaissance” in terms of a cultural rebirth and Asian empowerment (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1995b: 23). Third, the widespread suspicion of the West of having a hidden agen- da in maintaining its hegemony by means of slowing down Asian pros- perity and crippling its competitiveness is one of the determinant factors leading to popularisation of Asian values and Islam Hadhari in Malaysia. In achieving its objective, it would require of the West a “changing of the rules” to invoke a new kind of protectionism, with human rights and democracy as the standard-bearers, succeeding the old banners of colo- nialism and Christianity (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1994b: 20−1). In referring to Chandra Muzaffar’s argument, colonialism was the most
143 Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani / Politico-Religious Values in Malaysia massive and systematic violation of human rights ever known in history, adding that the current goal of the West is to maintain dominance of an unjust, unequal global system by using the pretext of human rights or whatever means (Mauzy, 1996: 223). Likewise, the Western media have been frequently portrayed as an accomplice in serving the interest of dominant Western power (Laiq, 1996). Former Prime Minister of Malay- sia Mahathir Mohamad claims that the Western pressure on developing countries over human rights and democratisation, including in Malaysia, is to deliberately instigate “instability, economic decline and poverty. Under such situation, they can threaten and control us” (Christie, 1995: 206). Mahathir underline this in stating:
Free speech is one of the freedoms much touted by the exponents of the so-called Western democracy. Woe betide those countries which do not respect free speech and freedom of the press…The proponents of freedom of speech and the press ap- parently believe that those freedoms are to be confined to condemning the Third World’s own governments only. The world press is controlled by the powerful and has become their instruments to undermine the very freedoms they preach (World Youth Foundation, 1999: 53).
Lastly, the Western model – meaning predominantly the US model – is widely believed to be flawed and particularly unsuitable for Asian countries to adopt. This belief is associated with widespread dismay at the social decay in the Western world (Mahbubani, 1992; 1993; 1994). Asians want to avoid a myriad problems of rampant crime, welfare- induced dependency, and a breakdown of the social fabric (Economist, 1994: 9−10) that seem to be ubiquitous in the US and the West more generally. To many ASEAN leaders, the growing prominence of uphold- ing human rights and freedoms in the West since the Second World War is partly responsible for the social decay (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1993: 5). This perception is visible in Mahathir’s criticism on the Western ideas of free speech that make sexual freedom its pre-condition:
People it seems cannot be free unless they have sexual freedom; a freedom which rejects the inhibitions of traditional and religious values, of marriage and family as institutions of society. Sexual freedom will render fidelity meaningless as much as it renders marriages anachronistic. The new liberalism extends to a new definition of the family, which is to include homosexual pairs, unmarried women with children by unknown fathers, groups of men and women living together with no fixed part- ners and many other combinations (World Youth Foundation, 1999: 117−8).
144 Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 10(1)/2013: 141–166
Mahathir was adamant that freedom of speech is undesirable because it is one of the principle drivers of moral decay in the West. Many scholars viewed Mahathir as the pioneer in advocating the con- cept of Asian values in Malaysia. His successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, in turn popularised the concept of Islam Hadhari, which later became his main public policy for the country. Islam Hadhari itself is a new twist or expansion to the Asian values thesis where it incorporated strong inputs on both Islam and the Malay agenda. Abdullah has neither announced nor admitted that he has ceased to practise Asian values. In his speech entitled “Islam Hadhari and the Malay Agenda” at the UMNO General Assembly on 23 September 2004 in Kuala Lumpur, he argued that Islam Hadhari is an approach towards “progressive” or “civilisation” Islam that emphasises development which is consistent with the tenets of Islam. Among other factors this means a focus on enhancing the quality of life. Attaining this would require the mastery of knowledge and the development of both the individual and the nation (Abdullah, 2006: 3). In addition, through the implementation of a dynamic trading and financial system, Islam Hadhari aims to achieve integrated and balanced development that creates knowl- edgeable and pious people who hold fast to noble virtue, honesty, and trustworthiness while prepared to take on global challenges. It also pro- motes that the government must uphold the practice of good governance, accountability and transparency to the people. Rather than having the credential to be a truly ground-breaking idea in guiding Malaysian politics, the concept of Islam Hadhari, as argued in this article, emulates the same agenda enshrined in Asian values propagated by Mahathir. Islam Hadhari was definitely a politically astute strategy that has succeeded in Islamising UMNO and more importantly, serving the inter- ests of the ruling party. Furthermore, it was successful in nullifying the at- traction of PAS (Islamic Party), especially among the Malay peasants and new professionals. Abdullah made it a key point to assert the civilising function of religion in his formulation of strategy to confront the chal- lenge arising from the concept of “Islamic state” by PAS. According to Terence Chong (2006: 38), Islam Hadhari was a cause celebre in the run up to the March 2004 general election. The prime minister won by a landslide and Islam Hadhari was proclaimed a triumph by the onlooking media. Albeit there is a general consensus within the public sphere that Ab- dullah Ahmaad Badawi is the one who popularised the concept of Islam Hadhari, Zainal Keling takes a different view by arguing that the concept
145 Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani / Politico-Religious Values in Malaysia was initially proposed in 2001 during Mahathir’s administration (Zainal, 2006: 180). He asserted that the concept was actually conceived and de- veloped by a group of Islamic thinkers within UMNO prior to Abdul- lah’s appointment as Prime Minister. Grappling with the loss of 22 seats, the defeat of senior UMNO figures, and PAS’s victory in the state gov- ernments of Kelantan and Terengganu in the 1999 general election, a special information unit was formed within the Ministry of Information to contain the increasing spreading of violent messages of Islam initiated by various factions in the society, as well as messages against UMNO by PAS members. Accordingly, a series of Islamic programmes were launched in search for the most appropriate strategy aimed to reduce the effect of those messages. For this reason, Islam Hadhari was evidently con- structed during the Mahathir administration. Rather than Abdullah, the brainchild of Islam Hadhari was actually Mahathir. This also suggests why Islam Hadhari has many shared similarities with Asian values. By 2002, Abdullah, the then Deputy Prime Minister, began to speak of Islam Hadhari as a general concept for Islamic development, a concept in line with the thoughts of several renown world Islamic thinkers such as Yusuf Qardawi, Muhammad Amarah and Syeikh Mohamad al-Ghazali.3 In the next section, this article will analyse in detail each of the concepts in turn.
WHAT IS “ASIAN VALUES”?
In examining Asian values, Anthony Milner (1999; 2004: 1−11) suggests that they are imbued by a complexity of principles and ideologies that are largely shared by people of many different nationalities and ethnicities living in the region of East and Southeast Asia. Despite many Asians contributing to the formulation of the concept of “Asia” in the first half of last century, Asian values since the 1990s are solely associated with those regions. Such values also draw on historical and spiritual roots of at least two leading Asian cultures: Islam and Confucianism. Neverthe- less, Diane Mauzy (1996: 215) noted that the Asian values are more of relevance and appropriate to Southeast Asia due to a considerable num- ber of shared values and important commonalities. For example, one shared value that transcends across borders and religions in Asia is the idea of moderation (Chandra, 1995: 5; 1996: 4). Traditionally in Asia, the only indigenous concepts that existed were the concepts of duty and re- sponsibility as opposed to Western imported concept of civil liberties in-
146 Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 10(1)/2013: 141–166 dividual rights. Today, Southeast Asian countries emphasise a balance between such rights and duties, although in reality the balance remains tilted towards duty in most of these states (Anwar, 1994: 5). David Hitchcock (1994: 1−76), in his comparative survey on “Asian values” and “American values”, finds that unlike the Americans, East and Southeast Asians are generally more respectful towards authority and prize an orderly society without disregard of honouring new ideas, ac- countability of officials, and free speech, as in concurrence with the West. While Donald K. Emmerson (1995a: 96−100) does not believe “Asian values” represents a single set of common values applicable for all Asians, Hitchcock (1994: 38-39) suggests it would be wrong to simply assume that Asians and Westerners essentially share the same beliefs. Samuel Hunting- ton (1993: 41), the author of a review of one hundred comparative studies of values in different societies concluded that “the values that are most important in the West are least important worldwide.” The point is, for the well-educated Asian at least (and it is likely to be still more true for the less educated), there are Asian values and Western values with important differences between them (Mauzy, 1996: 216−7). There are three common and relatively persuasive arguments in demonstrating the dissimilarity between Asian values and the traditional Western arguments for liberal individualism (Bell, 2001: 1-18). First, Asian values can affect the prioritisation of rights, which becomes a mat- ter of upmost concern when conflicting rights exist, forcing one to make a choice of which to be sacrificed. In other words, different societies may rank rights differently, and even if they are confronted with a similar set of disagreeable circumstances, they may come to different conclu- sions about the right that needs to be curtailed. For example, US citizens are more likely to sacrifice social or economic rights in cases of arising conflict with civil or political rights. The right to healthcare regardless of income can be curtailed if the constitution or policy makers of a demo- cratic state do not support the universal access to health care. In con- trast, the Malays and Chinese in Malaysia may be more willing to relin- quish civil or political liberties to social or economic rights when they are in conflict. There may be wide support for restrictions on street demon- strations if these are necessary to guarantee the right of vendors in the streets. Assigning priorities on rights can also become a matter of con- cern when decisions need to be made on how to spend scarce resources. A notable example of this can be seen in Asian societies with Islamic and
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Confucian heritages, which place a greater emphasis on the value of edu- cation. This may help to explain the large amount of spending on educa- tion in South East Asia compared to other societies with similar or better levels of economic development. For instance, based on World Bank da- ta, the US’ average spending on education as a percentage of government expenditures is 14 percent. In contrast, the average for the five South East Asian countries – Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam – is 18 percent (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2012: 9). Second, Asian values can also affect the justification of rights. In line with the ideas of 1980s communitarians such as Michael Walzer (1983: 8), it is argued that justifications for particular practices valued by West- ern-style liberal democrats should not be made by relying on the abstract and unhistorical individualism but rather on specific examples and argu- mentative strategies that Asians themselves use in everyday moral and political debate. For example, the moral language (shared even by many local critics of authoritarianism) tends to appeal to the value embraced by community in Southeast Asia. One such communitarian argument is that democratic rights in Malaysia and Singapore can be justified on the grounds that they could strengthen ties to such communities, including the family and the nation. Arguably, more secure democratic rights would have the effect of strengthening commitment to the common national good. In fact, Asians favour political legislation that can help to restruc- ture education in such a way that people’s deepest needs in membership and participation in psychological communities are tapped at a young age. For instance, the primary school system in Japan could be a useful model where students learn about ample rewards and benefits of collectivism and group cooperation as opposed to individualism (Reid, 1999). Third, Asian values can offer moral foundations for distinctive politi- cal practices and institutions (or at least different from those found in Western-style liberal democracies). In Asian societies influenced by Con- fucianism, it is widely held that children have a profound duty to care for elderly parents, a duty to be forsaken only in the most exceptional cir- cumstances. In political practice, it means that Asian governments have an obligation to provide conducive and sustained social and economic conditions that facilitate the realisation of this duty. Political debate tends to centre on the question of whether the right to filial piety is best real- ised by means of law that makes it mandatory for children to provide fi- nancial support for elderly parents as happened in mainland China, Ja-
148 Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 10(1)/2013: 141–166 pan, and Singapore, or whether the state should rely more on indirect methods such as tax breaks and housing benefits that simply make at- home care for the elderly easier, as in Korea and Hong Kong. However, the argument that there is a pressing need of securing this duty in Asia is not a subject of political controversy. As enshrined in the Bangkok Governmental Declaration (1993), which was endorsed at the 1993 Asian Regional Preparatory Meeting for the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, governments agreed that human rights must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the sig- nificance of national and regional peculiarities and various historical, cul- tural, and religious backgrounds. Kishore Mahbubani, a prominent Sin- gapore diplomat, is also eloquent in his portrayal of the intellectual en- deavour and contest that has been a part of the “Asian values” debate. He observes that:
It is vital for Western minds to understand that the efforts by Asians to rediscover Asian values are not only or even primarily a search for political values. They in- volve, for instance, a desire to reconnect with their historical past after this connec- tion had been ruptured both by colonial rule and the subsequent domination of the globe by a Western Weltanschauung (worldview) (Mahbubani, 1998: 35).
Mahbubani (1998: 35) also insists that the undertaking of Asian thinkers illustrates an effort to define their own personal, social and national iden- tities towards enhancing their sense of self-esteem in a world in which their immediate ancestors had subconsciously accepted their inferiority within the Western universe. Hence, Xiaorong Li (1996: 1−10; 2001: 37−47) argues that although Asian values vary from country to country, they have commonality in four principal components: cultural factors, strong authority, community approach, and social and economic rights. According to Mahathir, the Malaysian perspective of “Asian values” is premised on Malay-Islamic culture and should be protected against “Western values.” Mahathir rejected universalism or the Western liberal notion of human rights which, he believed, can corrupt Malaysian culture and religious beliefs (Mahathir and Ishihara, 1995: 71−86). The debate between two main theories of human rights, universalism and cul- tural relativism, is closely linked to the arguments of anti-western imperi- alism and protection of local values. Deeply concerned about the influence of Western individualism, and the future of Asian values and
149 Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani / Politico-Religious Values in Malaysia traditions, Mahathir accepted the idea of cultural relativism and launched the “Look East” policy in 1982 as a broader campaign against “Western values”. Mahathir disclosed to the members of UMNO General Assembly in 1982 that the “Look East” policy intended to emulate strong work ethics of Japanese and Korean people and “to rid ourselves of the Western values that we have absorbed” (Khoo, 1995: 69). Errol P. Mendes (1994: 3) labels the Malaysian version of Asian values as “The Mahathir Model” to differentiate it from other types of Asian values, such as the Singaporean School which places emphasis on Con- fucianism, and China Model which combine Chinese-Nationalist- Communist values. “The Mahathir Model,” as mentioned previously, is basically influenced by Malay-Islamic values. Mahathir had the clarion call for Asian values and as Alan Dupont pointed out:
(…) despite the fact that the Islamic ethos of his country differs markedly from the neo-Confucianism of Singapore and other Sino-centred states in East Asia. Howev- er, he (Mahathir) reconciles this apparent contradiction by subsuming Malaysia’s dis- tinctive national character in broader obeisance to Asian Values. (Dupont, 1996: 14)
The utility of this model of Asian values also extends to supporting and justifying the government agenda. Stability and enforced social cohesion in a heterogeneous society has become internalised as a fundamental core of Asian values (Mendes, 1994). Asian leaders, such as Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, also introduced the concept of Asian val- ues in response to the global democratisation, booming economy and political stability of the 1990s, before the currency crisis of July 1997 had shocked Asian countries (Naisbitt, 1997: 51−85; Inoguchi and Newman, 1997: 1−2). The Mahathir model of Asian values incorporates the ele- ments of strong authority, priority of community over the individual, and a strong family-based society, which he argues to find a basis from Is- lamic values (Sani, 2008: 4). The distinctive feature of “the Mahathir Model” is that it draws upon the experience of the Western world in or- der to evaluate state and society in the light of modernity.
WHAT IS ISLAM HADHARI?
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2006: 3) explains that Islam Hadhari is not a new religion, a new teaching nor a new mazhab (denomination). It is an effort to bring the ummah (the worldwide community comprising all ad-
150 Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 10(1)/2013: 141–166 herent of the Muslim faith) back to the basic tenets of Islam, back to the fundamentals as prescribed in the Quran and the hadith which form the foundations of Islamic civilisation. Therefore, Islam Hadhari aims to achieve ten main principles: faith and piety in Allah; a just and trustwor- thy government; a free and independent people; a vigorous pursuit and mastery of knowledge; a balanced and comprehensive economic devel- opment; a good quality of life for the people; the protection of the rights of minority groups and women; cultural and moral integrity; the safe- guarding of natural resources and the environment; and strong defence capabilities. In the Parliamentary session on 27 August 2007, he reiterated that Ma- laysia was a Muslim country and governed according to Islamic princi- ples. He said that Malaysia firmly believed in the principles of Parliamen- tary democracy guided by the country’s highest law, the Federal Consti- tution (Bernama, 2007a). Abdullah argued that the Islam Hadhari ap- proach did not mean that Malaysia was a theocratic country. He ex- plained that:
The government that I lead is a government based on the principles of Parliamen- tary democracy and is answerable to Parliament. At the same time, the Cabinet comprises ministers who profess Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and oth- ers respectively, who reach consensus based on discussions and come out with the national development policies….I also dismiss the argument that it contravenes the social contract negotiated by our past leaders. We must remember that the Federal Constitution was successfully drafted on the basis of compromise and cooperation demonstrated by the three major races in the country when fighting for independ- ence (Bernama, 2007a: 1).
He argued that this administrative approach has been practised by the Malaysian government for over 50 years, and the unique formula had been tested and its effectiveness had been proven. The adoption of Is- lamic principles in the country’s administration did not in any way change the social contract or the constitution (Bernama, 2007a). Islam Hadhari is also viewed as a general framework for the develop- ment of Muslim ummah, shielding them from engaging in the violent trend of jihad, extremism, and militaristic Islamic groups, such as al- Qaeda and Jumaah Islamiah. Malaysia had the experience in dealing with the violent attempts by militant Islamic movements, most notably the al- Maunah and Kumpulan Mujahidin (Militan) Malaysia (KMM) in 2002
151 Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani / Politico-Religious Values in Malaysia and 2003 respectively. Abdullah openly criticised and disavowed the vio- lent streak in the Islamic jihadist movement (Zainal, 2006: 180). The in- troduction of Islam Hadhari is designed to erase Islamophobia among non-Muslims, especially in Malaysia. On the policy front, one of the means adopted by Abdullah was to encourage dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims in order to wipe out the stereotype held by many non- Muslims about the alleged violence nature of the Muslim community. Pertaining to democracy, Abdullah (2006: 114) believes that Islam Hadhari is entirely consistent with democratic principles on the basis that the concept is all about living peacefully and respecting each other in a society. Islam Hadhari encourages consensus building (musyawarah) as an effective approach to resolving problems, and acknowledged the consul- tative process (shura) as the best means of dealing with various societal issues. Abdullah also urges that people of goodwill, NGOs, and institu- tions of higher learning can all play their part in promoting critical dia- logue between the non-Muslim and Muslim world. While it is necessary on their part to find a common ground with people of other faiths, Mus- lims must also open up the discourse within their own faith- a more open and diverse Islamic discourse. The observance of the canon of ac- countability in Islam was often matched by respecting the people’s views. Morally upright Caliphs even accommodated opinions that were differ- ent from theirs. In fact, there is a hadith that even eulogises differences of opinion within the ummah as a sign of divine blessing. It explains why at different points in Muslim history, there were healthy discussions and debates about religious and political matters among scholars and certain segments of the populace (Abdullah, 2006: 39).
COMPARING ASIAN VALUES WITH ISLAM HADHARI
There are many similarities between Asian values and Islam Hadhari. Both stress the importance of culture to Malaysians in general and the Malays in particular. For instance, Mahathir urged that Asian values must be aligned with the notion of “Malayness.” As he highlighted them in his book, The Malay Dilemma (1970), the three most basic tenets of “Malayness” were feudalism, Islam, and adat (traditional customs). He asserted that all of these tenets should be evolved and adapted to modern needs rather then be classified as a set features that to be merely accepted as realities (Barr, 2002: 42). Similarly, Abdullah argues that in
152 Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 10(1)/2013: 141–166 order for the Malays to attain greatness and progress in development and economy, they have to go back and embrace their traditional cultures and values by saying that:
The Malays have to be reminded to return to the noble values that are a part of their culture, a culture that has produced our strength and built our civilisation. Enrich the Malay race with knowledge so that Malays will become a wiser people. The Ma- lays are an industrious people. The Malays know that comfort does not come easy, and that wealth must be earned. We are a people that realise how important it is to be vigilant to ensure our survival; we are aware of how important it is to be pre- pared to face any eventuality. But when there are Malays who are inclined towards adopting negative values, then the Malay race is in grave danger. Then we will have Malays who would sacrifice substance for style, Malays who will betray their own kind in the name of short-term gain (Abdullah, 2006: 20).
In addition, one of the similar characteristics found in Asian values and Islam Hadhari is the upholding of the concept of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy). Mahathir and Abdullah were also Presidents of UMNO, a party that seeks to uphold the concept of Ketuanan Melayu. This concept defends the right of Malays to rule Malaysia, a concept this does not goes well with many non-Malays who feel that they are second class citizens in their own country. After winning the general election in 1995 and successfully warding off the challenge to his leadership at UMNO General Assembly in 1996, Mahathir reminded UMNO and BN leaders that “according to Malay tradition…it is impolite for someone who sits in the same committee or cabinet to challenge another who also happens to be his boss” (Case, 2002: 19). The UMNO’s permanent chair had also made the same point that leadership challenges were formally permitted in the party’s constitution. However, he further explained that “according to Malay tradition, it is treachery” (Case, 2002: 19). This clearly shows how the political elites have exploited Malay culture and Asian values to justify the concept of Ketuanan Melayu. With the same thinking, Abdullah reiterated that:
I understand the apprehension of the Bumiputeras. I strongly uphold the objectives behind the formation of UMNO. UMNO was formed to fight for the right of the Malays. I strongly uphold the nationalist agenda of the Malays. It is important that we think critically and develop strategies to face global challenges. UMNO must not allow the Malays to be defeatists; we must not allow the Malays to believe that they are fated to be weak in perpetuity (Abdullah, 2006: 18).
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During the UMNO general assembly in December 2006, the strained re- lationship between Prime Minister Abdullah and members of his UM- NO party was evident. When opening the party’s annual meeting, Abdul- lah urged his party members to tone down on the rhetorical speech of race and religion, two extremely sensitive issues in multicultural Malaysia. However, both race and religion were featured prominently in shrill tones during the successive speeches by the party’s delegates at the as- sembly, stirring unease among locals and foreigners. Such example was the fiery speech made by Hasnoor Hussein, a delegate from Malacca, who was among those who railed against critics of the special privileges accorded to Malays and the position of Islam as the country’s official re- ligion (Lopez, 2006: 1). Abdullah reminded everyone that race and reli- gious issues are still very sensitive matters (Singh, 2006), but he did not reject the idea of continuing to protect the Ketuanan Melayu. Mahathir and Abdullah also want to preserve the BN’s democratic style of consensus or consociational politics in decision-making process. The outcome of Asian values has been therefore a reassertion in Malay- sia of the idea of gotong-royong (working together) and musyawarah or muafakat (consensus) aimed to create a balanced and harmonious Malay- dominated, but economically developed Malaysia (Jones, 1995: 63). Ac- cording to Zainal Keling (2006: 186-187), BN has always adopted a cau- tious approach, often using consultative and circumspect bargaining methods to reach a common decision. The Prime Minister would make the final decision on certain issues relating to any particular ethnic groups after an open debate and information-sharing. Abdullah revealed that:
All have the right to speak, even if the issue involves matters related to specific races or specific religions. In the BN style, we are confident that we can discuss all issues, even if they involved sensitive topics, in a wise manner and come to a consensus. The key to this is that we must engage in discussion in an attitude of moderation (New Sunday Times, 2004: 1).
The then Deputy Prime Minister, Najib Razak shared a similar desire to adopt the same consultative approach as Abdullah: “We remain as one nation not because of the need to meet the constitutional require- ments, but because we are able to reach political consensus under the BN” (New Straits Times, 2008: 4). The basis of BN decisions were not derived from the voices of the (Malay) majority but rather from a mutual agreement where the small parties had the same rights and voice as the
154 Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 10(1)/2013: 141–166 big parties in the BN. The traditional BN-UMNO coalition has contin- ued with the understanding that each and every political party within the coalition will represent the interest of their respective ethnic group with- in the government. Abdullah does not seem to have made any radical changes to the nature of the relationship or the process of decision- making. The enlargement in the number of Parliamentary seats and state legislative assemblies for the previous general election, including in the 2008 general election, have been allocated to all parties within the con- fines of the general principle and the outcome generally has been accept- ed by all concerned (Zainal, 2006: 187). Moreover, Mahathir defended Asian values by attacking Western lib- eral democracy by saying that:
They (Westerners) still consider their values and political and economic systems bet- ter than any others. It would not be so bad if it stopped at that; it seems, however, that they will not be satisfied until they have forced other countries to adopt their ways as well. Everyone must be democratic, but only according to the Western con- cept of democracy; no one can violate human rights, again according to their self- righteous interpretation of human rights. Westerners cannot seem to understand diversity, or that even in their own civilization values differed over time (Mahathir and Ishihara, 1995: 75).
Likewise, Abdullah (2006: 47) is also critical towards the Western values of individualism and the West, partly for not doing much to resolve the long-standing issues of terrorism and Israeli occupation of Palestinian land. He urges the West to learn about the Muslim world because, in his view, Muslims see themselves as a collective ummah, notwithstanding the occasional disunity among Muslims countries. Unlike Western individu- alism, Muslims have a strong sense of fraternity as a community of be- lievers. Hence, the sense of empathy is strong among Muslims despite the fact that they are not directly affected by poverty or the suffering en- dured by the Palestinian people. Abdullah argues that this is why without addressing and identifying the root causes of terrorism, the war against terror will not succeed. Islam and the Muslims continue to be portrayed as “violent,” “extreme” and “intolerant.” In the post-9/11 Western world there has been the perpetuation of a negative Muslim stereotype, well-documented and now clear for all to see especially by the Western media. Malicious generalisations about Islam have become the last ac- ceptable form of denigration of foreign culture in the West. To their
155 Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani / Politico-Religious Values in Malaysia credit, some Western leaders have repeatedly stressed that “theirs is not a war against Islam”. But this appears trivial when popular sentiment is driven by a sensationalist seeking Western media that focuses almost ex- clusively on extremist discourse. Abdullah (2006: 55−6) hopes that there is a willingness on the part of the West to demonstrate that their policies can change accordingly and try to rectify the erroneous stereotype of the Muslims portrayed by the Western media. One of interesting findings is that Islam Hadhari is not totally compatible with Asian values. In fact, Islam Hadhari is more closely linked to the Islam- ic values than the Asian values. Asian values have a very shallow argument that tries to link itself with Islamic values. Ismail Ibrahim (2001), for in- stance, argues that as long as Asian values or other values are not contra- dicted by Islamic teachings and values, those values should be accepted in Malaysian society, e.g. respect to elderly people and good work ethics. Un- like the Asian values, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Abdullah Mohd Zain explained that Islam Hadhari offered of wasatiyah or a balanced ap- proach to life. It is also traced to the teaching of Islamic philosopher, Ibn Khaldun. Its notion of “progressiveness” is drawn from the adaptive mind- set and practices whereby “nomadic societies moved in a law-like manner from their tribal and primitive origins to a progressive civilisation.” Given the importance that Ibn Khaldun places on laws, social order, and its en- forcement, it is not surprising that the state finds Islam Hadhari attractive (Chong, 2006: 38−9). In contrast, Mahathir’s Asian values has never used Ibn Khaldun as it source of inspiration and argument. Religious scholars such as Ahmad Nakhaie and Abdullah Mohd Zain, who also took part in the construction of Islam Hadhari, were responsible to promote Islam Hadhari as a bastion of Islamic moderation and a model for development for other Muslim countries. Abdullah Mohd Zain said that when Muslims talk about Islam, “there is always the tendency to link it to the past, to the Prophet’s time” (Zainal, 2006: 181). Instead, Islam Hadhari gives equal emphasis to the present and the future. He further argued that “It emphasises wisdom, practicality and harmony. It encour- ages moderation or a balanced approach to life. Yet it does not stray from the fundamentals of the Quran and the practices and sayings of the Prophet” (Sardar, 2004: 1). Thus, Islam Hadhari must follow strict guide- lines of shariah law as practised in the country. In fact, some religious of- ficials have taken this policy to further the Islamisation of society. For instance in 2005, the Federal Territory Religious Department (Jawi) im-
156 Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 10(1)/2013: 141–166 posed “moral policing” and raided a nightclub where Muslims were then asked to take breathalyzer tests to check whether they had drunk alcohol. Muslim women were also being paraded before the officers to ensure that they were not dressed indecently. The raid has sparked debate on the enforcement powers of religious officers and on the legitimacy of en- forcing public morality (Osman, 2006: 1−4). Other case such as in Au- gust 2004 when the Mufti of Perak (the state’s top Islamic official), is- sued a fatwa (religious edit), which proclaimed that the “Sure Heboh” open-air concerts organized local TV station (staged at different times in cities around the country) were haram (forbidden) under Islamic shariah law. He claimed that the concerts were corrupting the Malay youth, fos- tering the mixing of the sexes and encouraging Muslims to neglect their religious duties such as praying (Chin, 2004).
CRITICISMS ON ASIAN VALUES AND ISLAM HADHARI
Both concepts were never shy from criticism. One of the criticisms is that both Asian values and Islam Hadhari were fundamentally political concepts, rather than religious ones. They were propagated to define the UMNO version of values and Islam. Opposition leader, Anwar Ibrahim, has criticised both concepts. On Asian values, he criticises Mahathir’s rule as autocratic by saying that “it is altogether shameful, if ingenious, to cite Asian values as an excuse for autocratic practices and denial of basic rights and civil liberties” (Anwar, 1996c: 28).4 The Asian values’ phe- nomenon can be seen in crude terms merely as a tool manipulated by a political or capitalist regime, or an artificial screen behind which to hide wilfully illiberal government. The Asian values debate of the last three decades, it must be emphasised, is an episode in the long-term, post- colonial political and cultural project. Anwar also criticises Islam Hadhari by accusing the government of ap- pealing to puritanical Muslim sentiment in reinforcing support ahead of the vote previously in the 11th general election in 2004 and then in the 12th general election in 2008. Commentators from multicultural but Mus- lim majority Malaysia have sounded alarm over the growing “Islamisa- tion” of the country and the increasing polarisation of the three main ethnic communities. Anwar, speaking in the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies’ Regional Outlook Forum on 8 January 2008, argued that Malay- sia’s problem is not radicalism but the issue of state-sponsored Muslim
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Puritanism which is more inclined to racist sentiments than religious principles. He asserted that for some reasons it is the belief of the present administration in Kuala Lumpur that playing the puritanical card would be best bet for the UMNO-dominated ruling coa- lition to secure electoral success in the coming (2008) election….By holding them- selves out to be the staunchest defender of Islam, UMNO hope to garner greater support. (AFP, 2008: 1)
From a theoretical point of view, several commentators have ques- tioned the substance of both concepts. Emmerson (1995a: 96−100), for example, claims that it is too simplistic or even absurd to talk about “Asian values” since the region is marked by the diversity of its cultures, religions, traditions, and histories. It must be conceded that the official debate on Asian values has not provided much of a challenge to domi- nant Western political outlooks. The critics argued that Asian values have been manufactured by Asian leaders like Mahathir and are being portrayed as “immutable and impervious” (Robison, 1996: 312). These values are also not intrinsically Asian (Freeman, 1996: 354−5), and they are a cover for a global ideological contest between liberalism and con- servatism (Robison, 1996: 305; Rodan, 1996: 329−36). However, the promotion of values is surely not the issue here – political socialisation is a necessary task of governments, and is found everywhere. Culture evolves rather slowly (Wu, 1996: 412), but it still constantly absorbs, bor- rows, and adapts other cultures. If leaders believed culture was static, there would be no need for them to defend Asian values against what they perceive as the global “Americanisation” of culture. It would be su- perfluous to rush to the defence of the immutable (Mauzy, 1996: 217). Freeman (1996: 355) suggests that in Mahathir’s claim that many of the idea of Asian values were once belong to Western values, the word “once” is misleading. The problem of balancing order and rights has been an ongoing issue in the Western political thought since the seven- teenth century. Asian values tend to place more weight on order than on rights. There are also differences of emphasis among Western societies, some stressing rights more than others. Mahathir is a typical Asian critic of Western values, mainly concentrating on the US without noting that its strong emphasis on individual rights is exceptional among Western political cultures. It is true that many of the values and virtues associated with Asia’s economic successes are similar to – although not entirely
158 Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 10(1)/2013: 141–166 identical with – some Western values of 100 to 150 years ago, such as the so-called “Protestant ethic” or “Victorian values.” These values, includ- ing frugality, hard work, saving, strong family ties and teamwork, which the West seems to have lost or abandoned, are an interesting example of how values can change over time. However, these are not necessarily imported values – they can be found in the great Asian religions and tra- ditions (Mauzy, 1996: 217). When looking into the scope of Islam Hadhari, Abdullah used to pro- nounce during the 2004 UMNO General Assembly that:
Islam Hadhari is complete and comprehensive, with an emphasis on the development of the economy and civilisation, capable of building Malay competitiveness. The glorious heritage of the Islamic civilisation in all its aspects must be used as a refer- ence in order to become the source of inspiration for the Malay race to prosper (Abdullah, 2006: 3).
On closer inspection of Islam Hadhari, Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Os- man, Shahirah Mahmood and Joseph Chinyong Liow (2008: 15−6) and Kamila Ghazali (2006: 140) maintain that it is little more than a repackaging of old ideas especially from Mahathir’s “Penerapan Nilai-nilai Islam” (Inculca- tion of Islamic Values) and Anwar’s “Masyarakat Madani” (Civil Society).5 The similarity of “Penerapan Nilai-nilai Islam” with Islam Hadhari is that the government wanted to implement the best practices in public administra- tion through the Islamic values and teachings. On the other hand, “Masyarakat Madani” is compatible through propagating Islamic civilisation. Clive Kessler (2008: 73), for example, argued that Islam Hadhari is woefully under-explained and under-elaborated. It remains discursively underdeveloped and intellectually impoverished despite the great official investment in seminars, prime ministerial lectures worldwide, and ensu- ing books on the subject. Such an “unpacking” of the term Islam Hadhari might provide the basis for, and so both unleash and give legitimacy to, a genuine modernist Islamic sensibility and politics. But this possibility has not been attempted, nor even glimpsed at by officials in Malaysia (Kess- ler, 2008: 75). Instead of original creative thought in authentic, historical- ly informed Islamic terms, all that is offered substantively is “ten key values” of the utmost blandness, generality and unexceptional conven- tionality. All this talk about “values” is the expression of a crippled, even defunct, sociology that is intellectually vacuous. It is circular, since it ex- plains social reality in terms of supposedly determining values that are
159 Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani / Politico-Religious Values in Malaysia simply “shorthand” summaries of the realities that they are invoked to explain. It is also politically impotent. As current Malaysian experience shows, this approach cannot generate a new Islamic sensibility, an effec- tive human agenda, an authentic and plausible politics, certainly not one to rival the Islamist dynamism of PAS. Islam Hadhari remains a failed challenge and a lost opportunity – if not a still-born child then an intel- lectual orphan. Yet, it is only in such a genuinely understanding of Islam teachings and by recognising the full implications of what Islam Hadhari might imply that the political impetus may be found to counter the ambi- tions of the encircling authoritarian Islamists (Kessler 2008: 75−6). Nevertheless, there are many critics to Islam Hadhari who see it as ra- ther more controversial than Asian values. Malaysian ulama or Muslim scholars also believe that although Islam Hadhari contains principles and values which good for the society, many Malaysians still confuse and wrangle with the concept. PAS attacks the Islam Hadhari as bi’dah, revi- sionism of Islamic tenets and injunctions – and highlighted the failure of the concept to relate the foundation of Islam to the shariah law and its necessity in an Islamic state (Zainal, 2006: 181). PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang accused Abdullah of being “inauthentic” (Chong, 2006: 39). A roadshow was undertaken among its members to spread the message that Islam Hadhari was haram (unlawful) under Islamic shariah law. It is a new Islam, departing from truth (Zainal, 2006: 181). Moreover, Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin, the then Mufti (religious leader) of Malaysian state of Perlis, asserts that when the concept was introduced, the government was working so hard to explain and give understanding to the people about the ambiguous concept. Many questioned why the government needed to introduce the new concept of Islam Hadhari, and some even thought that this was a new sect created by UMNO. Mohd Asri, person- ally, agrees that the word “Islam” in the concept should be replaced with other words such as “Pemikiran” Hadhari (Hadhari Thought) or “Gerakan” Hadhari (Hadhari Movement). According to him, it is improp- er to use the word “Islam” as a label or brand because the word could create misunderstanding to the people. He sees so far Islam Hadhari as just a brand with no product because people do not understand the con- tents of the concept. What people want is not the concept of Islam Hadhari, argued Mohd Asri, instead they want a clean and transparent government from corruption and abuses of power, serving the interests of the people (Yani, 2008: 41−2).
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Islam Hadhari was conspicuously absent in the government’s explana- tion of how it would address a host of challenges. These include the in- tegrity of the judiciary, rising inflation, and polarisation wrought by the deepening of Islamic conservatism and perceived encroachment on non- Muslim rights. In fact, by enunciating “Belief in Allah” as its first princi- ple, the concept of Islam Hadhari marks a discernible shift from the Rukunegara, which has as its first principle “Belief in God.” In so doing, it has inadvertently contributed to the escalation of the Islamisation dis- course and further heightened the reservation of non-Muslims. Ultimately, for non-Muslims, Islam Hadhari has proven to be less about Islam or civili- sation than it has been about the all-too-familiar refrain of Malay primacy. While lip service is paid to the protection of the “rights of minority groups” by the champions of Islam Hadhari, the baggage of ethnic had un- doubtedly weighed it down (Osman, Mahmood and Liow, 2008: 16).
CONCLUSION
Many writers have argued that a value system based on culture and reli- gion plays a significant role in the everyday life of Asian society. Despite the question marks over the practice of value analysis, a number of stud- ies underline the danger of dismissing entirely the role of different cul- tural and religious perspectives in analysing processes of change and in- teraction within the Asian region. In a survey analysis carried out from 1992−1994 on one hundred and twenty interviews with “middle class Malays”, Joel Kahn (1997: 29−30) found that almost all respondents ar- ticulated some form of the Asian values argument. They showed con- cerned about the threat posed by modernisation to Malay culture. They criticised the West for lacking in familial and cultural values, selfishness, uncaring, permissiveness, individualistic and secular in belief. Although the phrase “Asian values” possesses real inadequacies as a descriptive expression, it also argues that we cannot proceed from this point to the further assumption that there is no need to examine the substantial range of cultural perspectives and values which influence behaviour within and between Asian societies. Mahathir, of course, was well aware of the polit- ical usefulness of “Asian values,” but the evidence clearly demonstrates that these Southeast Asian leaders do not by any means construct their ideological packages in a cultural vacuum.
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There is greater similarity than dissimilarity between the concepts of Asian values and Islam Hadhari. This is largely due to the fact that both were introduced by Mahathir even though Abdullah was the one who popularised Islam Hadhari. Asian values tried to promote and strengthen the Malay values that were based on Islam. Similarly, Islam Hadhari at- tempted to blend Islam with the tradition of Malay values. Therefore, both concepts were similar, but the Islamic values are more embraced in the Islam Hadhari than the Asian values. However, both can be consid- ered as concepts that have been purposely utilised to maintain the BN- UMNO agenda of political dominance and protecting Malay privileges. What is clear is that both concepts have had significant impacts on the value system of Malaysian society. Thus, in order to understand Malaysi- an politics, both concepts are definitely relevant in understanding the past and future of Malaysia as a country.
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Chong, Terence. “The Emerging Politics of Islam Hadhari.” Malaysia: Recent Trends and Challenges. Saw Swee-Hock and K. Kesavapany. Eds. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006. Christie, Kenneth. “Regime Security and Human Rights in Southeast Asia.” Political Studies 43(1995): 204−18. Dupont, Alan. “Is there an ‘Asian Way’?” Survival 38.2 (1996): 14−26. Economist. May 28, 1994. Emmerson, Donald K. “Singapore and the ‘Asian Values’ Debate.” Journal of Democ- racy 6.4 (1995): 96−100. Far Eastern Economic Review. June 17, 1993. Far Eastern Economic Review. April 7, 1994. Far Eastern Economic Review. October 12, 1995a. Far Eastern Economic Review. September 7, 1995b. Freeman, Michael. “Human Rights, Democracy and ‘Asian values’.” The Pacific Re- view 9.3 (1996): 352−66. Ghazali, Kamila. “The first keynote address of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi at the UMNO general assembly.” Multilingua – Journal of Cross-Cultural and Interlanguage Communication 25.1 (2006): 129−42. Hitchcock, David I. Asian Values and the United States: How much Conflict? Washing- ton: Centre to Strategic and International Studies, 1994. Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72.3 (1993): 22−49. Ibrahim, Ismail. Interview: Former Chairman of the Malaysian Institute of Islamic Under- standing. October 13, 2001. Interview via The Internet (Email). Inoguchi, T and Newman, E. “Introduction: ‘Asian Values’ and Democracy in Asia.” ‘Asian Values’ and Democracy in Asia, 27 Mac, Shizouka: Shizuoka Prefectur- al Government, 1997.
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1 The author wants to express his gratitude to Prof. Dr. Abdul Rashid Moten of In- ternational Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), Dr. Christopher Wylde of University of York, Dr. Mohammad Zaki Ahmad of University Utara Malaysia (UUM), and unanimous reviewers for their comments and views in improving this article. 2 The BN is a coalition party and comprises mainly: Peninsular Malaysia, UMNO, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), the Gerakan, the People Progressive Party (PPP), and the Indian Democratic Party (IDP); in Sabah, UMNO Sabah, Parti Demokratik Sabah (PDS), The Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), the Sabah People’s Party (SAPP) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); in Sarawak, the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), the Sarawak Nation- al Party (SNAP) and the Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak. 3 These thinkers were regarded as the modern manifestation of earlier Islamic re- formists such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Redha whose influence had made an impact on Islamic reformist movements in many Muslim states during the colonial period (Zainal, 2006: 181). 4 Anwar Ibrahim was a former Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy President of UMNO, who was sacked in 1998 and sentenced to six years in prison on alleged sexual misconduct and corruption charges in 1999 after his popularity seemed to
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threaten Mahathir’s position as Prime Minister. He was unexpectedly released on 2 September 2004, when Malaysia’s highest court upheld his appeal. 5 Mahathir in mid 1980s oversaw the Islamisation of the Malaysian polity and bu- reaucracy, major facet of which was an initiative to construct an Islamic work ethic that could underpin the industrialisation of the country. Termed “Penerapan Nilai- nilai Islam,” this policy effectively formed the base for his developmental and mod- ernisation strategies. A decade later, Anwar coined the term “Masyarakat Madani” to describe his own vision of Muslim governance in Malaysia, one that would be inclu- sive, just and democratic (Osman, Mahmood and Liow, 2008: 15).
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