Japan's Engagement and Policy in the Arctic

Stretching the icecap : Japan's Engagement and Policy in the Arctic

Thèse

Julie Babin

Doctorat en sciences géographiques Philosophiæ doctor (Ph. D.)

Québec, Canada

Résumé

L'augmentation des températures dans les régions polaires et les conséquences écologiques, sociales et économique qu’elles entrainent, pousse les gouvernements, le milieu académique et la presse à se questionner quant aux cadres de gouvernance polaires. A cela s’ajoute l’émergence d’acteurs non-limitrophes soulignant la légitimité de leurs préoccupations pour cette région en développant des stratégies dédiées à l’Arctique. Bien que l'attention générale se soit principalement concentrée sur la Chine et ses ambitions, le Japon, avec sa longue tradition de recherche polaire, développe une stratégie basée sur la coopération internationale pour soutenir ses intérêts dans et au-delà de l'Arctique.

Au travers sa politique arctique, le gouvernement japonais souhaite légitimer son ambition de contribuer aux grands débats de gouvernance présents et futurs, tout en assurant de son soutien constant à la souveraineté des États arctiques. La stratégie arctique japonaise s’aligne sur sa politique océanique nationale. Elle vise à renforcer les normes juridiques internationales, garantissant la stabilité et la prospérité politique et économique, dans l’Arctique et au-delà. Cette politique s’appuie sur l’expertise japonaise en matière de recherche et d’innovation permettant de renforcer la coopération économique et diplomatique avec les États de l’Arctique et en particulier le long de la Route du Nord. Cela renforce ses relations diplomatiques et commerciales et ainsi, peut permettre un rapprochement autour de dossiers sensibles, tels que le différend territorial avec la Russie sur les Territoires du Nord.

Basée sur des théories constructivistes issues du domaine de la géopolitique et des relations internationales, cette thèse vise à souligner qu'une fois de plus, ce qui se passe dans l'Arctique ne reste pas dans l'Arctique. La politique arctique du Japon ne fait pas exception à cet adage, et répond à des objectifs plus larges que la seule région arctique. Cette thèse interroge les fondements et les intérêts des acteurs impliqués dans l'élaboration et la promotion de la politique arctique du Japon. En mettant en évidence les éléments arctiques de cette politique, cette thèse met en lumière les différentes stratégies du Japon pour soutenir ces intérêts à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur de l'Arctique.

Abstract

With the increase in global temperature and climate change in the polar regions, governments, academics, and the press, question the polar governance frameworks. Can it cope with environmental, social-economical rapid changes in these vulnerable regions? Moreover, as the Arctic ice melts, non-bordering states underline their interest and concerns for this region, rising interrogation on the role of emerging actors who have or are perceived to have an interest in the polar regions. Beyond the icecap, non-bordering states are developing strategies to support their interests for this region. Although general attention has focused on China and its Arctic agenda, Japan, with its long tradition of polar research, is developing its strategy based on international cooperation to support its interests in and beyond the Arctic.

In its Arctic policy, the Japanese government wishes to legitimize its ambition to contribute to the present and future governance debates while always ensuring its support to the Arctic States' sovereignty and to the international legal framework. Japan’s arctic strategy builds on its research and innovation expertise to strengthen economic and diplomatic cooperation with the Arctic states and especially with Russia. This allows it to strengthen its diplomatic and commercial relations and thus advance specific sensitive issues such as the dispute over the Northern Territories with Russia. Japan’s Arctic policy aligns with the National Ocean Policy and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. It is based on the promotion and support of the international legal framework, freedom of navigation, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts that ensure political and economic prosperity.

Based on Geopolitics and International Relations' constructivist theoretical assumptions, this thesis aims to highlight that once again, as the saying goes, what happens in the Arctic does not stay in the arctic. Japan's arctic policy makes no exception and responds to broader goals than just the arctic. This dissertation questions the foundations and interests of the actors involved in developing and promoting Japan's Arctic policy. By highlighting the Arctic elements of this policy, this thesis highlights Japan's different strategies to support these interests inside and outside the Arctic.

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Table des matières

Résumé...... ii

Abstract ...... iii

Table des matières ...... iv

Lists of figures and tables ...... viii

List of Figures ...... viii

List of Tables ...... ix

Notes on names, language and considerations ...... x

List of abbreviations and acronyms ...... xi

Acknowledgments ...... xiv

Introduction ...... 1

Plan ...... 6

Theoretical and operational perspectives of the research ...... 8

Literature Review...... 8

Research question and hypotheses ...... 12

Methodology ...... 15

Chapter 1: A Japanese Arctic policy? ...... 23

Conceptual framework ...... 25

Constructivism in International Relations ...... 25

Policy...... 28

Part 1: Actors involved in Japan’s policy-making process...... 30

The Japanese Iron Triangle ...... 30

Relationship within the Iron Triangle ...... 34

The Iron Triangle or Three Pillars theory and Japan’s Arctic Policy ...... 38

Part 2: Structure of Japan’s Arctic Policy...... 46

Early initiatives and recommendations from the Japanese bureaucracy and interest groups to the government for further involvement in arctic affairs...... 46

Structuration of Japan’s Arctic policy, the inscription of the Arctic in Japan’s Maritime Policy . 53

Japan’s Official Arctic Policy of 2015, a comprehensive policy ...... 61

The development of the Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (2018) ...... 69

Discussion ...... 76

Chapter 2: Japan’s international cooperation in and for the Arctic, a balance between science diplomacy and geoeconomics ...... 81

Part 1: The tradition of polar research and scientific cooperation to promote Japanese Arctic policy ...... 85

Science diplomacy ...... 85

Science Diplomacy in Japan and its role in the Arctic Policy ...... 89

The development of science diplomacy in Japan ...... 89

From Polar Sciences to Science Diplomacy in Japan’s Arctic Policy ...... 96

International cooperation in research activities in the Arctic ...... 103

Japan and the Arctic Council ...... 115

Achievements of Japan’s science diplomacy in the Arctic ...... 125

Part 2. The Japanese Arctic economic policy, an extension of its Indo-Pacific strategy or a policy specifically dedicated to the Arctic? ...... 130

The rise of geoeconomics ...... 130

The Role of Economic diplomacy ...... 134

Japan’s Arctic Economic Strategy ...... 137

Overview of Japan’s Arctic relations with Northern American and Europe, the extension of its

traditional diplomatic relations? ...... 153

Cooperation with Nordic States ...... 157

Japan and Russia relation in the North, from territorial dispute, interregional cooperation, to economic cooperation ...... 162

Economic ties between Tokyo and Moscow in the Arctic ...... 170

Conclusion...... 181

Chapter 3: Hokkaidō: from the ‘Road to the Northern Sea’ to ‘Japan’s gateway to the Arctic’ ...... 185

Conceptual framework ...... 188

Regionalism and Open Regionalism in international relations ...... 188

Paradiplomacy and subnational governance ...... 191

Conceptualizing North/ Northern/ Nordicity/ Northerness and Arcticness/Arcticity ...... 204

Hokkaidō’s role in Japan’s northern history: the ‘Road to the Northern Sea’ ...... 213

The development of the Northern Region Plan/Hoppōken kōso ...... 219

The conceptualization of Hokkaidō as a northern region, Hoppōken kōso ...... 220

The North in Hokkaidō Development Plans:...... 225

The shared Northerness, Hoppoken Kōso in Hokkaidō paradiplomatic activities in the North ...... 232

Hokkaidō in the Northern Forum, from founding member to business partner ...... 232

« Winter is a Resource and an Asset », the International Association of Winter Cities for Mayors, Sapporo city’ diplomacy...... 236

World Winter Cities Association for Mayors (WWCAM) ...... 237

Hokkaidō: Japan’s gateway to the north and to the Arctic...... 243

Hokkaidō University and the Arctic Research Center ...... 243

How does the government perceive these paradiplomatic Hokkaidō initiatives with other

northern regions? ...... 247

The development of port infrastructures oriented towards the Northern Sea Route...... 250

Conclusion...... 253

Concluding remarks ...... 256

References ...... 263

Annex A: Dispatch of Experts to Arctic-related Meetings (Data provided by NIPR 2020/08/18)...... 293

For the 2015 Fiscal Year (FY) ...... 293

FY2016...... 293

FY2017...... 294

FY2018...... 295

FY2019...... 296

Annex B: Brief overview of international activities between FY2015-2019 per institute...... 297

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Lists of figures and tables

List of Figures Figure 1: Arctic Definition ...... 2 Figure 2: Word cloud of occurrence in Japan Official Arctic Policy (2015). Personal compilation. ... 21 Figure 3: Composition and relation among the Iron-Triangle in. Compiled by author...... 35 Figure 4: Composition and relation among the Iron-Triangle in Japan’s Arctic Policy. Compiled by author...... 39 Figure 5: Effects of Science diplomacy in the Arctic. Compiled by author...... 87 Figure 6: Trends for Japan’s Science and Technology Budget Between FY2001 & 2019 [科学技術関係予算の推移]. Source: Cabinet Office Policy Director (2019). In Yellow Initial Budge [当初予算], In Red Science and Technology Promotion Costs [うち科学技術振興費], In Grey the Supplementary

Budget [補正予算], In Green the Reserve Fund [予備費], And in Yellow Dots for Local Governments [地方公共団体分]...... 93 Figure 7: Number of research achievement during the ArCS project (2015-FY2019). Source 北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] (2020, 164); Sustainability (2020, 15)...... 113 Figure 8: Strands of economic diplomacy: Japan. In Okano-Heijmans (2012, 65), slightly modified from Okano-Heijmans (2011)...... 136 Figure 9: Map on the Northern Territory Disputes from the Japanese Perspective (Nadeau 2016)...... 166 Figure 10: Winter and Summer Routes from Yamal LNG plans to Asian and European markets. Source: Eco R. Geo (2017)...... 172 Figure 11 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (Source: Ministry of Land 2008a)...... 203 Figure 12: 1802 map of Hokkaidō, Sakhalin and Kuril Islands assembled by Kondo Morishige (courtesy Hokkaidō University Library). In Irish (2009, 70)...... 216 Figure 13: 1802 map of Hokkaidō, Sakhalin and Kuril Islands assembled by Kondo Morishige (courtesy Hokkaidō University Library). In Irish (2009, 70)...... 216 Figure 14 : Source: Hoppōken-Sentā, 1982, p. 61 ...... 222 Figure 15 Source : WWCAM Membership Procedure (World Winter Cities Association for Mayors (WWCAM) 2019)...... 240 Figure 16: source: https://www.arc.hokudai.ac.jp/en/international-collaboration/...... 244 Figure 17: source Arctic Research Center (2019)...... 245 Figure 18: The Arctic Board Game, Photos: ArCS (2019)...... 247

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List of Tables Table 1 : Differences between the Iron Triangle and Three Pillars approach. Compiled by author... 40 Table 2: This table summarizes various measures initially recommended for the establishment of an Arctic policy on the part of Think Tank (OPRF, JIIA), and in official documents (Blue Book, Basic Plans, and official policy). Compiled by author...... 78 Table 3: Institutes and associations involved in arctic research activities in Japan (Compiled by author)...... 99 Table 4: Total Budget (FY2018) 3,684,529,000yen (34Million USD). Source: National Institute of Polar Research (2020)...... 100 Table 5: GRENE Arctic Climate Change Research Project (former project of the ArCS) budget per year in yens. Data provided by NIPR (2020/08/18)...... 107 Table 6: ArCS Budget per year in yens. Data provided by NIPR (2020/08/18)...... 109 Table 7: Dispatch of Experts to Arctic Council-related Meetings between FY 2015 and FY2019 (Data provided by NIPR 2020/08/18)...... 120 Table 8: NUMBER OF MEETINGS ATTENDED BY JAPANESE EXPERTS BETWEEN FY2015 AND FY2019 WITHIN THE ARCTIC COUNCIL (COMPILED BY AUTHOR)...... 121 Table 9: Evolution of the Budget dedicated to the GRENE and ArCS projects between Fiscal Year 2011 and 2019 in yens (data provided by NIPR 2020/08/18)...... 126 Table 10: Paper presentations: The following are the papers published in academic journals, conference proceedings, books, etc. Information extracted from: 北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] (2020, p. 164)...... 127 Table 11: Presentations at academic conferences, public lectures and media coverage. Information extracted from: 北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] (2020, p. 164). 127 Table 12: Japanese EPA and FTA agreements. Source: Japan's 2019 Economic Bluebook, p. 260...... 140 Table 13: Source: HIECC, 2015: 3...... 204 Table 14: successive plans in Babin & Saunavaara 2021...... 229

Notes on names, language and considerations

For Japanese names, this thesis follows the Japanese convention that family names precede personal names like Abe Shinzo. However, the names of Japanese authors of English-language work follows the English practice of the personal name preceding the family name like Abe Shinzo. Moreover, macrons are put on long Japanese vowels like Hokkaidō or Dōgakinai Naohiro.

The utmost effort was made to collect and analyze the Japanese stakeholders' voices and views through written documents, participant observation, and semi-structured interviews conducted in Japanese. However, due to the author's limited Japanese skills, the analysis of policy documents is mainly based on English translation translations when available. When these documents were not available in English, a translating tool (google translate) was used to translate Japanese to English. In order to respect the accuracy of terms in Japanese, they will be written in this dissertation in English as well as in Japanese (when possible).

Since the official Japanese documents (Basic Plan and Arctic Policy) 1 prefers in its English translations the expression of “Arctic Sea Route” (hokkyoku kai kōro) to the term “Northern Sea Route” (also hokkyoku kai kōro), the two expressions will be used in this dissertation to analyze Japan’s interests and strategies in this region (Rafnsdóttir 2019). We can observe a parallelism with China, which in its most recent documents, prefers Arctic Silk Road, to the expression Northern Sea Route.Finally, although the Northern character of the Ainu people, Hokkaidō indigenous people, alone deserves a study, this dissertation will focus on a Wajin perspective, Japan's main ethnic group, representing Japan’s national level.

1 The expression “Arctic Sea Route” is used 7 times in the 2013 Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, 10 times in the 2015 Arctic Policy, and 9 times in the 2018 Basic Plan, while “Northern Sea Route” is only used once: in the 208 Basic Plan.

List of abbreviations and acronyms

AC: Arctic Council ADS: Arctic Data Archive System AEPS: Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy AERC: Arctic Environment Research Center AMAP: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program AMBI: Arctic Migratory Bird Initiative AMSA: Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASM: Arctic Science Ministerial ArCS: Arctic Challenge for Sustainability ARC: Arctic Research Center ASSW: Arctic Science Summit Week CAFF: Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna CLAIR: Council of Local Authorities for International Relations CSTI: Council for Science, Technology, and Innovation CSTP: Council for Science Technology Policy EEZ: Exclusive Economic zones EGBCM: Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane FOIPS: Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy FTA: Free Trade Agreement FY: Fiscal Year GRENE: Green Network of Excellence GRIPS: Graduate Institute for Policy Studies HCDP: Hokkaidō Comprehensive Development Plan HIECC: Hokkaidō International Exchange and Cooperation Center IASC: International Arctic Science Committee IC: International Cooperation ICT: Information and Communication Technologies IMO: International Maritime Organization INSROP: The International Northern Sea Route Program IPY: International Polar Year ISAR: International Symposium on Arctic Research JAMSTEC: Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology JANSROP: Japan Northern Sea Route Program J-ARC NET: Japan Arctic Research Network Center JARE: Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition JAXA: Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency

JBIC: Japanese Bank for International Cooperation JCAR: Japan Consortium for Arctic Environmental Research JETRO: Japan External Trade Organization JGC: Japan Gaz Company JIIA: Japan Institute of International Affair JOGMEC: Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation LDP: Liberal Democrat Party LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas MAFF: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries MARPOL: International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships METI: Ministry of Trade and Industry MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology MIC: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications MLIT: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport MoD: Ministry of Defense MoE: Ministry of the Environment MoF: Ministry of Finance MoFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs MOHA: Ministry of Home Affairs MOL: Mitsui Osk Line NAL: National Aerospace Laboratory of Japan NASDA: National Space Development Agency of Japan NF: Northern Forum NGO: Non-governmental organization NIDS: National Institute for Defense Studies NIPR: National Institute of Polar Research NPARC: North Pacific Arctic Research Community NSR: Northern Sea Route NSS: National Security Strategy NSR: Northern Sea Route NWP: Northwest Passage OSA: Official Development Assistance OPRF: Ocean Policy Research Foundation, within the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (now OPRI) OPRI – Ocean Policy Research Institute, within the Sasakawa Peace Foundation PAME: Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment PCRC: Polar Cooperation Research Center PM: Prime Minister R&D – Research and Development SAO: Senior Arctic Officials (Arctic Council)

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SCTF – Scientific Cooperation Task Force SDWG: Sustainable Development Working Group SLCP: Short-lived Climate Pollutants SNG: Subnational government SOF – Ship and Ocean Foundation (in the Sasakawa Peace Foundation) SOLAS: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea S&T: Science and Technology STI: Science, Technology and Innovation SWIPA: Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WWCAM: World Winter Cities Association for Mayors

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Acknowledgments

The completion of this doctoral thesis would not have been possible without the support and help of many people. As such, I would like to express here my sincere thanks to all the people who, in one way or another, have supported me in this long adventure.

First of all, I would like to thank my thesis director, Mr. Frederic Lasserre, for supporting this doctoral thesis from its conception and having accompanied me through all these years of research. He has been a constant support. His listening skills and invaluable advice enabled me to refine this research. I would like to thank Mr. Ohnishi Fujio and the entire ARC laboratory at Hokkaido University for welcoming me on several occasions on my field trips and internships, and for making many and crucial resources available to me.

I extend my thanks to Ms. Tonami Aki, professor at Tsukuba University for her comments and help on this dissertation. Her work and scientific support have contributed significantly to my understanding of Japanese polar policy. I also wanted to thank Mr. Etienne Berthold, professor at Laval University, and Bernard Bernier from University of Montreal, for their participation in my thesis jury.

My thanks also go to my friends, Guillaume, Jaewon, Yoni, Elodie, Leslie, and Isabelle. I would like to thank you for your visits in Quebec, skype sessions, Korean food, and supporting me during all those years. I also thank my neighbors, Manon, Annabelle, and Gabby, for all the study, crafting and cooking sessions during this long confinement. I also think of my family in Japan: Sou-san, Aiko, Shu, Sō, and Kaori, who welcomed me so many years ago into their home and family. Your unwavering support has undoubtedly contributed to my great interest in the geopolitics and international relations of Japan.

I address my deepest thanks to my family, particularly to my mother, Béatrix Caruel for her numerous advices and proofreading, and my father and my sister, for their continuous support. Without your moral and financial support, I doubt that this thesis could have been completed.

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Introduction

It seems impossible to open a dissertation in geography without starting with a map presenting the subject of study, and in this case, the Arctic. The Arctic, derived from the name arctos (bear) in ancient Greece, stands in opposition to Antarctica. It blends ocean, ice, and land and connects all the northern hemisphere with the European, American, and Asian continent. Already in the 1970s, the renowned geographer Louis Edmond Hamelin underlined the question of the many definitions of the North that are still found today in the definitions of the Arctic. These definitions can be geographic2, climatic3, biological4, political5, demographic, etc. He further noted that a "simply climatic or botanical definition of a country is not sufficient for a scientist interested in ensembles" and "that a single physical factor, taken in isolation, cannot provide the boundaries of the North and, consequently, bear witness of all this region" (Hamelin 1980, 75-77).

The following map illustrates some of these definitions and their more or less inclusive character, depending on the criteria selected or the objectives sought. This dissertation retains the Arctic Council's limits, including the eight-member states: Canada, the United States of America (US), Denmark (Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. This map further recalls that, although being the subject of this dissertation, Japan is not a border state of the Arctic. If we can observe proximity between the northern islands of Japan (Hokkaido, Kunashiri, Etofuru) with the Russian territory of the Sakhalin, the fact remains that the Japanese archipelago is not part of the Arctic region.

2 Line of the Arctic Circle, including the Aleutian Range, Hudson Bay, and parts of the northern Atlantic Ocean. 3 With the limit of 10 ° C July isotherm. 4 Limit of tree line, extent of permafrost, or sea areas covered by ice. 5 With the five Arctic coastal States: Canada, the United States, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, and Russia (also called the A5).

FIGURE 1: ARCTIC DEFINITION

In the Arctic, the natural environment’s rapid changes, such as the decrease in sea ice and the collapse of permafrost, are closely associated with significant changes in new socio-economic activities in the circumpolar region. With the increase in global temperature, climate change, and the various socio-economic issues in the Arctic, the Arctic states are questioning the role and the influence of non-Arctic actors interested in this polar region or perceived as such (Steinveg 2020; Youngs 2012; O.R. Young 2005). As several climate models show a link between climate change in the Arctic Ocean and prevailing conditions in Eastern Asia, major Asian powers argue argument that they have a legitimate place to contribute to debates on governance and protection of the Arctic (Bertelsen and Gallucci 2016; Gadihoke 2013; Holroyd 2020). This interest in the Arctic is linked to the development of natural resources extraction and Arctic sea routes utilization. To justify their interest in the Arctic region, non-bordering states like China have

articulated the concept of “near-Arctic State” (Bertelsen and Xing 2016; Lanteigne 2017)6. However, despite those claims, these States do not possess any Arctic territory and must play along with Arctic States to participate in Arctic debates and institutions such as the Arctic Council7.

The admission of Asian States as Observers at the Arctic Council in 2013, especially China, has raised negative reactions and triggered speculations about their agenda in the Arctic (Babin and Lasserre 2019; Manicom and Lackenbauer 2013; Wright 2011)8. The control and management of Arctic resources (mineral, living), as well as maritime routes (Bering Strait), might therefore provoke power rivalries in order to take advantage of their control (Gonon and Lasserre 2001). Therefore, the Arctic territory is more than ever at the heart of the concerns of political actors in and outside this region, generating power rivalries that are the central subject in geopolitics studies.

Despite Mike Pompeo’s speech at the Rovianiemi (Finland) during the Arctic Council meeting in 2019, questioning the place of non-arctic States, and in particular China, in this region, the emergence of the concept of GlobalArctic9, and of an Arcticization process, can be seen as a symbol pointing toward the loosening of the stakeholdership in Arctic affairs where non-state actors that are very much connected and somehow stretch the boundaries of the Arctic region (Väätänen and Zimmerbauer 2019; Finger and Heininen 2019; Pompeo 2019) (Babin & Saunavaara 2021).

Papers seem to have focused on China's interest in the Arctic region, assimilating Asian states' interest in this region. Although we can observe certain similarities in China's policies, Japan and

6 For China and Korea: "near-Arctic state", for the United Kingdom: "sub-Arctic nation". 7 The Arctic Council, which was formalized in 1996 by the Ottawa Declaration, is the leading regional forum for cooperation and collaboration in the Arctic. It is composed of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Russia, Sweden, Norway, United-States, Iceland (member States), and Permanent Participants representing the Arctic indigenous people. 8 “Two views emerge from western academic articles on Polar Orientalism that Dodds define as ‘a way of representing, imagining, seeing, exaggerating, distorting and fearing 'the East' and its involvement in Arctic Affairs’, which is only amplified by the application and admission of Asian States to the Arctic Council (Dodds and Nuttall 2016). On one side there is a vision of a threatening Asia led by China willing to invade the AC and reshape it. The second view would be the idea of Asian States wishing to participate in an inter-State forum for collaboration while respecting the rule of indigenous peoples and Arctic States”. In Babin and Lasserre (2019, 6). 9 A comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach conceptualizing the Arctic as “a multifaceted region within a changing global context, which is both affected by it and affecting it.

Korea, these three states have developed three distinct Arctic strategies. While climate change and the development of resources (mineral and sea routes) pose many political, economic, and technological opportunities, Japan proposes to use its expertise in research and development to respond to the challenges in the Arctic.

Changes in the Arctic environment have political, economic, and social effects, not only in the Arctic but also globally. Resulting opportunities and issues are attracting the attention of the global community, both of Arctic and non-Arctic states.

Japan is called upon to recognize both the Arctic's latent possibilities and its vulnerability to environmental changes, and to play a leading role for sustainable development in the Arctic in the international community, with foresight and policy based on science and technology that Japan has advantage in order to achieve sustainable development (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015).

While the interest on the Arctic from non-bordering states seems to be growing, Japan is emphasizing its role as a pioneer, especially in Asia, in polar research to justify its attachment to this region. The first Japanese polar expeditions date back to 1911-1912 with the expedition of Lieutenant Shirase Nobu, which left for Antarctica in the context of conquering the poles, the last unexplored territories on earth. Although this expedition was not conclusive for Japan, it remains the starting point of a century of expeditions and research programs dedicated to the polar regions. Beyond ecological considerations (global warming, pollution, consequences, consequences on the precipitation regime, etc.), Japan underlines the potential economic opportunities for its companies, and in particular, of hydrocarbon resources. Consequently to the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, which caused the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power station, Japan had to make a drastic shift from nuclear energy to other energy resources, including Liquefied Natural Gaz (LNG)10 (Shibasaki et al. 2018). Following this incident, and in a context of heightened tensions in the Middle East, Tokyo realized that it must diversify its energy import sources to ensure its energy security. In this perspective, the Arctic hydrocarbon resources appear to catch the interest of the Japanese government. Furthermore, while supporting the Arctic states' sovereignty and primacy in the region, Tokyo wishes to be included and participate

10 Natural gas cooled down to liquid form (-162°c), allowing to reduce the storage capacity and making its transport easier and safer.

in present and future debates regarding governance and the development of the normative framework for the Arctic.

From the 2010s, the Japanese government took up questions related to the Arctic to reorganize research and make it more efficient (GRENE network, J-ARC, ArCS, ArCS-II), define its strategic objectives, and inscribe its Arctic policy in its Ocean Policy. In 2015, and during the Arctic Circle's annual meeting11, the Japanese Ambassador for Arctic Affairs, Mrs. Shiraishi Kazuko, unveiled Japan's official policy for this region, adopted the very same day. The Cabinet's adoption of this comprehensive document made it possible to structure arctic-policy-related issues by defining objectives and a series of initiatives to address them. This policy is a part of Japan's Ocean Policy, clarified in 2018 by adopting the Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. It revolves mainly around international cooperation with the Arctic-States and Institutions for research and economic development in the Arctic.

The lack of empirical studies on the Japanese government's objectives in the Arctic limits our understanding of this phenomenon. Beyond these elements, one can wonder what is arctic in the Japanese Arctic policy: Is it merely the reorganization of arctic research? The rebranding of bi and multilateral relations with the Arctic states to fit into the general trend? Beyond scientific and economic considerations, does this policy respond to political vocations such as a rapprochement with Russia to advance specific issues such as limiting China's influence in the region and securing new LNG sources important to support its energy security, or solve the dispute over the Northern Territories? Therefore, this doctoral thesis's objective is to paint a contemporary portrait of the Japanese government’s strategy in the Arctic by exploring the policies formulated, the scientific and economic agreements developed in this region.

Peer-reviewed scientific publications on Japanese Arctic policy remain limited. While it is easy to find scientific content on Chinese strategies or general comparative analysis of China, Korea, and Japan, very little is written about the Japanese Arctic strategy and its objectives. At present, the

11 The Arctic Circle is the largest Arctic-themed conference, founded by former Iceland President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson. It is a place where various stakeholders such as politicians, government officials, indigenous peoples' groups, and industry stakeholders in the Arctic and Arctic Council observer countries gather.

main sources of information come from private organizations (OPRI), government publications (MoFA), general or more specialized media, and Japanese researchers (Tonami Aki, Ohnishi Fujio, Ikeshima Taisaku). To overcome the relative lack of empirical studies, primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews. Then, statistical data was drawn through secondary sources, and information was collected from national press articles.

On the other hand, if these sources contain relevant information, the use of interviews requires prudence and discernment, particularly because of the biases resulting from the narrator’s representations and biases, even with official declarations that often reflect policy and diplomatic objectives. This research was designed as multidisciplinary in its approach and covered International Relations, geopolitical science, economics, law, and social sciences in general. From the first moments of this thesis project's design, this consultation of the literature provided the necessary tools for establishing a theoretical, conceptual, and methodological framework to address the present problem in all its complexity.

Plan

The first chapter of this thesis focuses on the study of the structure of Japan’s Arctic policies. The way Japan understands its own arctic policy will be underlined through the different initiatives, documents and the actors (governmental, private interest, and bureaucracy) involved in this policy(ies). Is there something specific to the Arctic in this policy(ies) or are they the continuation of Japan’s current Ocean Policy.

Chapter 2 will focus on the role of International Cooperation in Japan’s Arctic strategy. A first sub-chapter will be dedicated to the role of Science Diplomacy in Japan’s strategy concerning the Arctic, and the means to implement this strategy in Japan and in international platforms such as the Arctic Council. The second sub-chapter will assess Japan’s geoeconomic strategy in the Arctic with its relationship with the Arctic States. This chapter makes it possible to put into perspective and better understand the Arctic part of the bilateral relations maintained between Japan and the Arctic States, and more particularly with Russia. Is the Japanese Arctic policy Japan's policy for the Arctic a summation of its economic relations with the Arctic states? Does this cooperation between Japan and Russia correspond only to scientific and economic

partnerships, or does it respond to political objectives such as resolving the dispute over the northern territories?

This second chapter partially includes three articles published in 2019: the first is a paper cowritten with Frederic Lasserre for the peer review journal Polar Geography “Asian states at the Arctic Council: perceptions in Western States”. The second paper, “Les gouvernements infrarégionaux le développement de la paradiplomatie”12, was published by the French journal Relations Internationales, and the third paper “Les nouvelles routes de la soie chinoises: perspectives japonaises”13 was published in Cahiers du GÉRAC, Groupe d’études et de recherche sur l’Asie contemporaine & Université Laval.

Chapter 3 is based on an article accepted under minor revision in the peer-reviewed journal Asian Geographer “Hokkaido: From the ‘Road to the Northern Sea’ to ‘Japan’s Gateway to the Arctic’ on March 2021. This chapter will outline how foreign relations of subnational entities are currently understood in the framework of North to Arctic relation. This chapter, which constitutes an essential section of the thesis, questions the role of the Japanese province of Hokkaido as the North of Japan: first as the Road to the Northern Sea, then as a gateway to the Arctic. More specifically, it aims to determine the initiatives put in place by sub-national governments with other regions of the North, redefined as arctic region, their role in Hokkaido's development policy, and their use in the national arctic policy of Japan.

Finally, the general conclusion aims to recall the research hypotheses while presenting the main conclusions of this study, the necessary justifications, and suggests avenues for future research and summarizes the key findings of this study.

12 Sub-regional governments the development of paradiplomacy paradiplomatie published in 2019. 13 The New Chinese Silk Roads: Japanese Perspectives, published in 2019.

Theoretical and operational perspectives of the research

This section first presents a synthesis of the literature review carried out in the first stages of the research project, but since revised, and secondly allows to introduce the research question and the hypotheses, to finally detail the methodology applied within the framework of this project.

Literature Review

The literature compiled for this research project includes statements, assessments, research works from scholarly journals (Japanese and international) and policy think tanks, news agencies, Foreign Policy Magazines, and commentary pieces from media outlets and experts. The literature mobilized concerns general literature on Japanese foreign policy, international cooperation in the Arctic, and more specific areas such as subnational governance in Japan. It includes generalist approaches on the organization of Japanese public policies, on arctic institutions, the environment, security, arctic resources (mineral and fishery). These aspects are studied across many disciplines and involve geography, political science, international relations, history, international law, sociology, economics, anthropology, and natural sciences studies and theories.

The end of the Cold War marks a turning point for the Arctic with many studies on cooperation and geopolitics in this region (Bloomfield 1981; O.R. Young 1985, 1987, 1992b). The International Northern Sea Route Program (INSROP) organization, by Russia, Norway, and Japan in 1991 is unprecedented for this time. It is the first comprehensive study on the utilization and commercialization of the Northern Sea Route (NSR)14 with a non-bordering state like Japan (Ship & Ocean Foundation 2001). This study is considered particularly pioneering for its time in terms of cooperation and for the results obtained. This study was conducted on the Japanese side by the precursor of the Ocean Policy Research Institute (OPRI) and with support from the Nippon Foundation (Sasakawa - Nippon Peace Foundation). The INSROP, and later of Japan Northern

14 The Northern Sea Route runs along the Russian coast in the far north following the continent extending from the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait. Also known as Arctic Sea Route in English translations of official Japanese government documents.

Sea Route Program (JANSROP), made it possible from the 1990s to obtain very detailed data concerning navigation in the NSR. The OPRI notes that compiled data (topographical on energy, mineral, forest, and fishery resources) from Far Eastern Russia were compiled into the world's first geographic information system (JANSROP-GIS). The results were included in official publications such as the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report (Arctic Council / PAME 2009). Following INSROP and JANSROP, there was a pause in comprehensive publications and studies on the Arctic until the end of the 2000s.

Following the application and admission of new observers, particularly from China in 2013, publications regarding Asian strategies for the Arctic have increased significantly since 2013 (Lasserre 2010; Alexeeva and Lasserre 2012; Wright 2011; Chen 2012; Bennett 2015; Lanteigne and Ping 2015; Kossa 2016; Enge 2018). These studies and press articles have mainly focused on China's ambitions for the Arctic and on comparative studies of Chinese, Korean and Japanese strategies (Holroyd 2020; Tonami 2019; Beveridge et al. 2016; Sakhuja and Narula 2016a; Hasting 2014; Bennett 2014; Jakobson and Lee 2013; Zhuravel 2016; Babin and Lasserre 2019). The studies focusing on the Japanese Arctic strategy are more numerous than for China. They mainly focus on the development and organization of this policy between the second Basic Plan on Ocean Policy and the official policy of 2015 (Rafnsdóttir 2019; Grzela et al. 2017; Ohnishi 2016; Tonami 2014d).

While the studies on the Arctic region in geopolitics and international relations have been increasing since the end of the Cold War, it is only in the 2010s that studies on this subject began developing in Japan. The role of the Ocean Policy Research Institute (called OPRF and SOF in the past) must be highlighted in the organization of conferences and workshops to promote interest and research on the Arctic (The Arctic Conference Japan 2012). From the literature, it can be observed that the existing literature on Japanese polar research has long concentrated on Antarctica and natural sciences studies. However, with the opening of the Arctic in the 1990s, the literature has gradually opened up to this region and the humanities (Enomoto 2017).

For decades Japanese literature on polar issues was divided by sector: Antarctica on the one hand (Joyner 1989; Hamre 1933; Wouters 1999; Goodman 2010), the Arctic on the other (Jakobson and Lee 2013; Ken Coates and Holroyd 2015). Japanese literature dealing with the

Arctic (natural science and humanities) has grown in recent years, with publications in Japanese and English and mainly since the launch of the national ArCS project in 2015 (Stensdal 2013, 2016; 北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] 2020). Articles and books are increasingly the objects of collaboration with other researchers outside Japan, and increasingly multidisciplinary approaches. Much of the literature in social science and press release devoted to Japan and the Arctic focuses on 1: the past of polar research activities, 2: the arrival and the contribution in the Arctic Council, 3: projects related to resources extraction, transformation and transport (Liquid Natural Gaz). Humanities studies devoted to Japan and the Arctic are, for the most part, written by Japanese scholars (in English and Japanese) (Tonami 2018, 2017; Ikeshima 2016; Ohnishi 2016; Kamikawa and Hamachi 2016; Ikeshima 2015; Ohnishi 2015, 2014; Tonami 2014c, 2014d, 2014a), reports from private organizations (JIIA 2013; Carnegis Moscow 2016; Ocean Policy Research Institute 2015; Enomoto 2017; Center 2019), or the subject of student’s dissertation (Rafnsdóttir 2019; Grzela et al. 2017).

Ohnishi Fujio, Tonami Aki, and Ikeshima Taisaku, are the main researchers in Japan working on Japanese Arctic policy issues. Ikeshima's articles focus on the aspect of security in the Arctic and their impacts for Japan (Ikeshima 2015, 2014, 2017), and the Chinese strategy for this region (Ikeshima 2013). He also questioned Japan's involvement and contribution as an observer in the Arctic Council and the limitations that entail (Ikeshima 2016). Tonami and Ohnishi focus their studies on the development of Japanese Arctic policy and underline that well before the Japanese government began to be interested in Arctic affairs, researchers in Japan had long been actives in the polar regions. They note that interest from shipping companies and private emerged in the 1990s with the development of studies on the Northern Sea Route (INSROP), and again 2010s with mineral resources development have been lobbying for the Japanese government's involvement (Tonami and Watters 2012; Ohnishi 2013a, 2013b; Tonami 2013; Ohnishi 2014; Tonami 2014d; Ohnishi 2015, 2016; Tonami 2017, 2018). If Tonami uses the Iron Triangle approach theorized by Drifte in 1996, Ohnishi prefers to use an approach based on three pillars. Despite two different denominations, their respective approaches underscore the role of bureaucracy, government and business actors in shaping and sustaining Japanese Arctic policy.

In one of her papers, Tonami highlights a related conception of Japan's polar regions (Tonami 2017). Although the polar regions are linked in the collective imagination (cold, isolated places), and although Japanese polar research centers and institutes are interested in the study of the two polar regions (with a particular focus on Antarctica), Japan does not have a unified polar policy (Tonami 2017, 2016b). Indeed, if Japan published its official Arctic policy in 2015, it does not have a policy specifically dedicated to Antarctica. Tokyo recognizes the legal framework specific to these two regions: such as the Antarctic Treaty, the sovereignty of the Arctic States over their exclusive territories and zones, but also the rule of international law embodied in the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the application of the Polar code, etc. Despite many similarities and the traditional association of polar regions, this geopolitical differentiation highlights these two regions' differences. While the proposal, emphasized by several researchers and author of an Arctic treaty based on Antarctica, seems more unlikely, it raises the question of understanding a polar policy (Tonami 2017, 489).

In her article, Exporting the developmental state: Japan's economic diplomacy in the Arctic, Tonami (2018) discusses the role of economic diplomacy in Japan’s arctic strategy to promote its foreign policy by underling the developmental state of Japan. According to her, Japan traditionally uses its involvement in science and technology to promote and achieve economic security and growth (for example, through Official development assistance agreements -ODA), and uses the same approach in the Arctic.

Although Japanese government delegates were able to make statements regarding Japan's Arctic strategy from the early 2010s (Horinouchi 2010), developing working groups and task forces, it was not until 2013 that the Arctic is emerging in Japanese ocean policy (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013). The literature further emphasizes China and South Korea's role in the Japanese government's interest in the Arctic (NIPR 2017; JOGMEC 2019; ARC 2019; Holroyd 2020; Knecht 2016; Tonami 2016a; Sakhuja and Narula 2016a; Tonami 2014a; Hasting 2014; Bennett 2014). A second overarching message put forward by popular and academic articles is that attraction of natural resources, and sea routes are the driving force behind Japan’s policy (Mroczkowski and Hsiao 2012; Rowe and Lindgren 2013). The Japanese government declared its interest in the region basing its statements on (i) climate change occurring in the region, (ii)

potential discoveries and exploitation of natural resources in the future, and (iii) emerging new routes for navigation.

Research question and hypotheses

The climatic upheavals that have been unfolding on a planetary scale since the end of the 20th century and which significantly affect the polar regions point to the possibility of a wide range of activities in the Arctic, including commercial shipping, fishing, tourism, and mineral resource extraction project in the Arctic. Since the beginning of the 2010s, and in parallel with the development of Chinese and South Korean interest in the Arctic, the Japanese government has decided to tackle issues relating to the Arctic by reorganizing the Japanese arctic research sector. Being the world's largest importer of Liquefied Natural Gaz (LNG), Japan is particularly interested in developing projects related to the extraction and transport of natural gas to Asian markets, including the Japanese market.

This doctoral dissertation in geographic sciences deals with Japanese Arctic policy, development, organization, and implementation. It aspires to highlight the types of actors and their nature, public, private, mixed, or other, the internal and external factors and issues, political, diplomatic related to the development and support of this Arctic policy. Thus, the thesis is interested in the intentions or real capacities of Japanese policy dedicated to the Arctic and the representations that accompany them. It aims to highlight a set of variables that determine these Japanese actors' interest in getting involved or investing in the Arctic region. These factors can be political, economic, diplomatic, logistical, and geophysical and are accompanied by representations of an unfolding phenomenon on the territory's scale.

Research question:

Considering these elements, this dissertation proposes addressing the following question: What are the foundations and actors involved in the development and promotion of Japan’s Arctic policy, and to what extent does this policy respond to economic and political objectives that go beyond the Arctic?

This dissertation's overall objective is to investigate and define the dynamic interactions among governmental, academic, and economic actors in Japan concerning Arctic interests, emphasizing the Russian Arctic region. This analysis makes it possible to assess the current governmental, academic, and industrial interests in the arctic region. But also, to help determine what the Arctic is in Japan's Arctic policy. To analyze Japan’s northern province Hokkaido's role and exchanges with other northern/arctic regions, together with its role in Japan's overall arctic strategy. Finally, to assess the extent to which the Japanese government's interest in the Arctic corresponds to a general trend and strengthen bilateral relations with the Arctic states, mainly Russia, to advance political issues.

Hypotheses

Although general and specific objectives were established from the first moments of this thesis's project, they have evolved during the research in three hypotheses. The research's originality compares Japanese Arctic policy to its scientific and economic diplomatic strategies to underline its objectives. Specific objectives had been established from the first moments of this thesis's project, which evolved during the research in three hypotheses. The research's originality is to compare Japanese Arctic policy to its scientific and economic diplomatic strategies to underline its objectives.

The first hypothesis, examined through chapter 1, postulate that Japanese Arctic policy is part of the extension of its oceanic policy and in continuation of the principles promoted in its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy: proactive contribution to peace, ensure the Rule of Law, promote international cooperation, and Panoramic diplomacy. The development of a formal Japanese Arctic policy has enabled Japan to structure and strengthen its base, providing it with strategic objectives. While recognizing the Arctic States' primacy and sovereignty, and the present legislative frameworks, it aims to support Japan's involvement in future governance debates and economic opportunities.

The second hypothesis, verified in the second and in the third chapter, postulates that the official Arctic policy's development corresponds to a general trend where non-Arctic states are taking a stand for this region. Indeed, even though Japan was the first Asian State to start polar

exploration, external factors such as the growing Chinese and South Korean interests for this region are significant factors influencing Tokyo's interest. The Japanese government's involvement in Arctic-related issues is a way for it to develop its image as a scientific and technological leader and mediator in the area of peaceful conflict resolution. This involvement also allows it to develop or strengthen its bilateral relations with the Arctic States and promote its national interests (economic or diplomatic). It relies on its long history of polar research activities, renewed scientific cooperation with the development of specific programs such as GRENE, ArCS, and ArCS-II, and its contribution to international forums such as the Arctic Council or the Arctic Circle. It is also based on economic collaboration, particularly with projects on the extraction and transport of hydrocarbons (LNG) to Asian markets, including Japan. This scientific and economic collaboration around the Arctic allows Japan to strengthen its bilateral and multilateral relations with the Arctic States, and in particular, with Russia (Yamal).

Finally, the third and final hypothesis, which will be verified through chapters 2 and 3, postulates that Japan’s strategy in the Russian Arctic relies on economic and political objectives, including an economic partnership to ensure Japan energy security (LNG) and a diplomatic rapprochement to resolve the dispute over the northern territories and finally conclude a peace treaty. It further builds on the pre-established relationships between Japanese and Russian subnational governments to establish a dialogue between Tokyo and Moscow.

Methodology

A varied methodology was implemented with an analysis of the collected documentary corpus to carry out this thesis. It is supplemented by the realization of studies of various kinds (analysis of interviews, statistical data analysis, comparative studies, etc.). This research is also based on comparative studies of the Arctic policies of Asian states prepared for the dissertation of a master’s degree in Geopolitics and International Security.

The corpus of primary sources is composed of official documentation (statements, assessment, research work) extracted from various Japanese ministries (MEXT, MoFA, MLIT, METI, Cabinet office), Research Institutes and Think Tanks (OPRI, JIIA), Arctic institutions (Arctic Council, Arctic Circle, Northern Forum, etc.), but also from other actors involved in the region (States, indigenous peoples, NGOs, regional governments, multinational companies) to understand their position with the strategies developed fully. The Analyze and the comparison of the available resources, such as discourses and interviews, led to creating a representative sample of government officials, business actors, and researchers in the Arctic.

The relationship of the researcher to the human subjects of the study: research ethics

An exemption was provided exempt from Ethics Committees for Research with Human Beings of Laval University (CERUL)15 for this the project, as it fulfills the first exemption condition present in section A of form VRR-103 received and approved on 2015 November 28th, i.e.:

“Research involves interacting with people who are not personally targeted by the research, in order to obtain information. For example, a researcher may collect information about organizations, policies, methods, professional practices or statistical reports from employees who are authorized to share this information or data in the normal course of their work. These persons are not considered to be participants within the meaning of the Policy if, and only if, apart from information of a public nature related to their employment, no other question relates to the respondent himself (ex: his/her opinions, his/her qualifications, his/her socio- demographic information, his/her personal experience at work or in any other sphere of his/her private life, his/her memories, etc.)”.

15 The CERUL aims to achieve the highest ethical standards in the field of research.

Following the CERULs directive, and as discussed with interviewees, this dissertation will make no mention of individual names to ensure their anonymity.

Survey: method and protocol

Field trip studies were critical to complete and fill the literature gaps though interviews and participant observation. The first step (December 2016 to March 2017) consisted of attempts to contact members of the government, research institutes and think tanks, and Japanese and arrange meetings either at their headquarters in Japan or at the premises of the Arctic Research Center of the University of Hokkaido. Japanese officials within the MoFA, MEXT, MITI and MLIT, research institutes and think tanks (NIPR, OPRI), and executives in Japanese companies such as MITSUI, Japan Gaz Company (JGC), or NEDO were contacted to build a sample constituent.

The second step consisted of designing a survey, both in English and in Japanese. Three surveys of 10 questions were developed to correspond to interviewee profiles: officials, business actors, and academics respondents. The surveys were designed as semi-structured interviews to have a set of similar questions to analyze. It also allowed respondents to add details or complementary information, should they felt necessary to do so. When asked, the surveys were sent by e-mail to the selected respondents in English and Japanese to facilitate comprehension and preparation. The interviews were conducted at the head office of the companies, ministries, and institutes concerned.

The first field trip in Japan was planned during this phase to maximize the number of interviews, participation in events and conferences, and visits of research institutes' infrastructures and develop an exchange network. Since Japanese society often operates through formal introductions, the conference's attendance inviting researchers, government officials, and Japanese companies to discuss issues related to the Arctic during the first days of this 2017 field trip helped break the ice and establish contacts. On this occasion, Dr. Ohnishi introduced the various members present, allowing me to exchange business cards (essential formality in Japan) to then make an appointment for interviews in the following weeks. He also helped to establish contact with members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the years.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted during fieldtrips in Tokyo and Hokkaidō from February to May 2017, February 2019, and from September to December 2019 (internship in the Arctic Research Center, Hokkaido University) with national, regional, and local actors (government officials, port-authorities officer, researchers) involved the arctic region policy, arctic research or business activities. Several interviews were also conducted on the sidelines of international seminars and workshops. At the request of the interviewees, most of the interviews were not recorded. Instead, a pre-established grid for the interviews was used in order to transcribe as faithfully as possible the information transmitted during the interviews. Finally, questionnaires were sent to several officials that were not able to meet for interviews.

However, it should be noted that one of the difficulties encountered was the lack of interest shown by certain types of an actor to conduct an interview or even discussions, like business companies. Certain companies, contacted on several occasions and via various communication channels, did not respond to the requests. Several difficulties are inherent in conducting the interviews, such as the ability to remember events or partiality. Although the researcher did her best to remain objective throughout the process and tried not to formulate suggestive questions, there was certainly some partiality, particularly the conviction of the value of participation in international relations, the researcher being a student in this field. The interviewee's memories of events may also be affected by their emotions and experiences throughout their involvement. One of the main difficulties of this study is the extent and distance of the terrain that has led to the targeting of key events in Japanese Arctic life. The participation in international conferences on the Arctic was one of the privileged instruments to observe a new place of cooperation and meet its multiple actors. Participation in international conferences and workshops 16 made it possible to meet researchers, officials, politicians or international institutions, leading to informal discussions in a less strict framework than the interviews. Due to the specificity of Japanese culture and language favoring ambiguity (aimai / aimaina kotoba)17, many informal discussions and

16 Arctic Change 2017, Isar-5 Tokyo 2018, Model Arctic Council 2018, 34th International Symposium on the Okhotsk Sea & Polar Oceans 2019, Korea Arctic Academy 2019, Thorvald Stoltenberg Conference on the Arctic in Asia and Asia in the Arctic: Opportunities and Challenges 2019, Arctic Frontiers 2020. 17 Also called kuuki yomenai (someone who has difficulty in reading social situations) highlighting the importance of understanding meaning ambiguity in Japanese. For more details see Adnyani (2020).

interviews took place outside the formal framework of offices or political corporate. It includes high arctic representatives of MoFA, representatives research international institutions, business companies’ managers.

Processing techniques and data analysis method

This article relies on the field's traditional research methods, such as the external and internal source criticism and contextualization of sources, i.e., the study of the information included about the source’s purpose and functional connections. This study also incorporates elements of the ‘entangled’ approach, emphasizing entangled processes rather than similarities and differences between separate entities, into the comparative design.

In this study, the qualitative approach was utilized to analyze the official declarations and communications to decipher better the strategies and objectives pursued in establishing and supporting Japan’s Arctic Policy. While leaning on the external and internal source criticism, contextualizing sources, and a systematic comparison, this study is based on extensive reading of English and Japanese (using translation tools) language materials. The analysis of primary sources is based on policy documents, official statements, declaration, and report such as the official Arctic policy of 2015, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (2008, 2013, 2018), the annual Diplomatic Bluebooks since 2011, reports from the Ocean Policy Research Institute (2015, 2017), and the ArCS project (2015; 2020). It includes publications from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' official websites or the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport. It provided the necessary background for studying Japanese Foreign Policy, Arctic policy, research and economic policy, and subnational governance system. Comparative studies of national arctic policies, international activities of subnational government were used to contextualize this research. The secondary sources used show the multidisciplinary inclusion of this research.

The qualitative method also relies on the analysis of 25 interviews conducted between 2017 and 2019 using the software Nvivo. The qualitative method includes discourse analysis through a constructivist approach. Interview profile information was transcribed in a Word or Excel file, and if allowed, recorded. Following the completion of semi-directed interviews using the Grounded Theory Method (GTM), data were processed on a qualitative data approach to the synthesis of

speech (Lejeune 2019; Glaser and Strauss 2009; Guillemette 2006). It aims to empirically report on this "material" considering their feelings and understanding of the situation. The GTM can have its various phases (field phases and readings, descriptions and analyzes) tangled. This approach, focusing on the representation from the analysis of various protagonists and their arguments and views, is essential in geopolitics studies: it provides insight into the complex relationship of a group of actors with a territory (Lasserre, Gonon, and Mottet 2008).

The interviews were analyzed to understand the logic and reasoning by which an actor justifies its position, strategy, priorities, and choices. The primary and secondary data collected was coded in Nvivo to list and organize specific sentences, key-words, or paragraphs connected to the context of the analysis into meaningful units (DeCuir-Gunby, Marshall, and McCulloch 2011; Miles 1994). The set of concepts brought up in the survey were very limited and revolved around:

1. Policy initiatives (a. Ocean Policy, b. International and Arctic Regulation Framework including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Polar Code, c. involvement of Think Tanks and lobbies),

2. International and regional cooperation (a. scientific & diplomatic, b. business cooperation through bi and multilateral cooperation agreements),

3. Security issues (a. Environmental Concerns, b. Energy security, c. Freedom of navigation, d. Territorial disputes in the arctic with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and outside with the Northern Territories dispute between Japan and Russia, and also the various territorial dispute in Asia).

This step, revisited several times during the analysis, allowed the development of a codebook, defined by DeCuir-Gunby, Marshall, and McCulloch (2011, 138), as a "set of codes, definitions, and examples used as a guide to help analyze interview data. Codebooks are essential to analyzing qualitative research because they provide a formalized operationalization of the codes". Later the authors underlined that data could be added, modified, and transformed during the coding process, which is constantly evolving as it is used, allowing the researcher to establish new connections between ideas and concepts.

During the analysis, it was clear that the data collected from diplomats and staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be taken with circumspection. Indeed, as argued by several researchers, information and individuals are strictly sequestered within Foreign Ministries, making it challenging to utilize standard research methods like participant observation and interviews (Kuus 2011; Tuathail 1999; Neumann and Sending 2010; Neumann 2002). According to Plouffe (2020, 79) “as objective reality does not exist in foreign policy behavior or, indeed, in international relations overall, scholars must recognize their own subjectivity in the conduct of their research”. This context leads this chapter to rely more heavily on published textual material (diplomatic statements, international agreements, official reports). To maintain consensus within the ministry and with others, diplomats must compromise in their discourses. The information thus obtained during interviews is extremely calibrated to reflect official statements. Hence, the first step to support the research hypothesis was to review and analyze government declarations found on official websites and media. Therefore, the use of statistical data has proved particularly interesting to analyze the Japanese government declarations concerning its Arctic shipping strategy, which gives a necessary background of the hypothesis verification.

Statistical data were drawn from both primary and secondary sources. From primary sources, it relies on the analysis of official documents, declarations, presentations of members of the Japanese government between 2011 and 2020. The quantitative method relies on secondary sources with data collected from academic papers, media material, memoirs, and other introspective sources. If these sources contain relevant information, their use requires prudence and discernment, mainly because of the biases which result from the partiality and sometimes militant positions of the consulted presses. Theoretical and methodological works were consulted and covered the International Relations, geopolitics, and other social sciences fields. From the first moments of this thesis project's design and all along with the project, this literature's consultation provided the necessary tools for establishing a theoretical, conceptual, and methodological framework and address the research question. The research question made it possible to elaborate four hypotheses, which are starting point of the verification-process. Through the presentation of the theoretical and conceptual framework, the dissertation will attempt to verify these research hypotheses. The conceptual framework of this essay is integrated directly into the chapters attached to it.

The NVivo software, designed to conduct qualitative and mixed methods analysis, was used to analyze Japanese-Arctic-related documents. This software helped organize, analyze and find insightful content among unstructured or qualitative data such as interviews, open survey responses, articles, social media, and web pages. To operationalize the corpus analysis, 50 groups of words and their related forms or lemmas were selected (e.g., sciences, scientists, scientific, scientifically, to be examined using Nvivo software. Pronouns and verbs have been redacted in order to highlight the main keywords. This analysis was used for exploratory purposes in order to bring out lexical tendencies. Through these methods (see Figure 2), we can observe that in the 2015 Arctic Policy, the most popular words revolve around International Cooperation, research activities, environmental protection and awareness issues, and development and use of the Arctic Sea Route. The use of the software consists of a quantitative dimension of the analysis. This software broadened the analysis because of the quantity of processed data where the non- software investigation could not have provided such in-depth results.

FIGURE 2: WORD CLOUD OF OCCURRENCE IN JAPAN OFFICIAL ARCTIC POLICY (2015). PERSONAL COMPILATION.

The second method used in the research is a comparative analysis to determining convergences and contradictions in the parts of the documents regarding the scientific research or economic cooperation. Textual markers were coded into broad categories and subdivided into political,

science diplomacy, and economic factors. These markers correspond to the theoretical framework's concepts and dimensions and are linked to elements drawn from the literature that we are trying to measure.

Following the presentation of the theoretical and methodological framework, research question, and hypothesis, this thesis proceeds in three chapters, followed by a discussion presenting the research results.

Chapter 1: A Japanese Arctic policy?

What image does the phrase “Arctic Ocean” bring to mind? An ocean covered with vast sheets of ice. A vast, white wilderness, whose night sky is often illuminated by the unearthly kaleidoscope of the aurora. Both these images suggest a harsh but ethereal natural beauty, where human activity is but a distant rumor (Sasakawa Yohei in Ship & Ocean Foundation 2001, preface).

The planting of the Russian flag at the North Pole in 200718, the publication of the USGS report in 2008 on the potential of undiscovered resources, and Arctic Sea Routes' opening fueled the interest of non-bordering states in the arctic, including Japan. Following the application of China (2008), Tokyo applied in 2009 to become a permanent Observer19 at the Arctic Council (AC). Although its application was rejected, this did not falter Japan’s interest in the Arctic region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2009; Ohnishi 2015). Indeed, in April 2010, Mr. Hidehisa Horinouchi, deputy director-general of the International Affairs Office (MoFA), outlined Japan's interest in the Arctic in a speech at the Japan-Norway Polar Seminar (Horinouchi 2010). He was the first member of the Japanese government to present Tokyo's position for the Arctic and highlighted Tokyo's commitments and concern in research activities, its application to the AC, and prospects. And although the official Japanese Arctic policy was not revealed until 2015, a series of initiatives were implemented since the 2000s to support the legitimacy of Japanese interest in this region and its application as Observer at the Arctic Council (Tonami and Watters 2012; Ohnishi 2014).

Following these events, the think-tank the Japan Institute of International Affair (JIIA)20 and the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF) both published reports in 2012, presenting recommendations to the Japanese government for further involvement in the Arctic region. These reports covered Arctic issues such as climate change, sustainable development, and governance in the Arctic Ocean (JIIA 2013; The Arctic Conference Japan 2012). According to Tonami, this report helped draw the Japanese government's attention to Arctic affairs (Tonami 2014d; Tonami

18 Which had given rise to a wave of publications and concern about a potential "cold war". 19 While at first there were Ad-Hoc and Permanent Observer, this status no longer exists in the Arctic Council, it was replaced by Observers (see chapter 3). 20 Founded in 1959 as a private, the JIIA is a non-partisan policy think tank focused on foreign affairs and security issues.

and Watters 2012). The Japanese Arctic Policy was officially unveiled by the Arctic Ambassador in October 2015 during the Arctic Circle conference and is an extension of the Second Basic Plan on Ocean Policy developed in 2013. This policy revolves around the strategic interests of the Arctic underlined by climate change: the exploration, development, and exploitation of Arctic Sea Routes and resources (mineral and living), but also the evolution of international legal framework in the Arctic. This policy is multidisciplinary and relies on international collaboration (IC) and how Japan should further contribute to the arctic institutions including the AC. While the 2015 policy recognizes that, at present, the conditions are not yet conducive to navigation, it recommends that the government and the private sector should work more closely together for future opportunities in the Arctic Sea Route. Finally, in this official document, Japan is trying to present itself as a possible mediator in Arctic affairs (Babin 2019a; Babin and Ohnishi 2019). While not directly affected by Arctic challenges, Tokyo underlines its key role in the formulation of environmental policies such as the Kyoto protocol (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015).

The development in recent years of official Arctic policy from non-Arctic states such as Japan (2015), China (2018), Korea (1rst Master Plan 2013), France (2016), Germany (2019), Scotland (2019), etc. raises the question of what an Arctic policy is. The Arctic already has several definitions depending on very various criteria responding to different political objectives. As highlighted in several papers, despite a large number of articles, events, and institutions related to the Arctic, there is still no consensus about what is Arctic, whether we are talking about Arctic politics or security Pic and Lasserre (2019); (Rowe 2018; Ohnishi 2014; Tonami 2017).

Secondly, the same problem arises to define what is an Arctic Policy. Is it an official text from a government stating its intentions with a roadmap? The pursuit of goals and actions to achieve the goals based on national resources and certain specificities (environment, distance, resources, indigenous population, etc.) (Ohnishi 2014)? A re-branding 21 of all bilateral and multilateral relations with one or several Arctic States? Or the combined set of these practices? Is the Arctic

21 Concerns about image and reputation.

in “Arctic Policy” just a political label, a popular trend, or can we outline ‘Arctic specific’ issues in the Japanese arctic policy?

Moreover, how does Japan imagine the polar region and more specifically the Arctic, consider its role in the context of a GlobalArctic22 and integrate it into an actual Arctic policy? Who are the actors involved in elaborating and supporting those regulations, and how do they interact together?

Hence, this chapter will try to answer these questions in two sub-chapters. After the definition of the conceptual framework with a discussion around “policy” and “policies” in foreign policy under constructivism theories, which are the core of geopolitics studies, Part 1 will the composition and organization of the actors composing “Japan’s Iron Triangle” with their relations (support, competitive interests) and involvement to the state’s arctic policy. In Part 2, initiatives and policies of Japan concerning the Arctic will be outlined from the late 1990s (I), the Basics Plan on Ocean Policy (II), the elaboration of Japan’s official arctic policy of 2015 (III), to the establishment of the second Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (2018) (IV). This chapter will conclude with a discussion on what is arctic in the Japanese arctic policy and its connection to Japan’s Ocean Policy.

Conceptual framework

Constructivism in International Relations

In this dissertation, Japan’s arctic strategies are defined as a social-political construction process in constant evolution and reformulation. Hence, the conceptual framework proposed in this chapter is based on a constructivist approach of governance and international relations in order to understand the notion of policy in the sense of a governmental tool.

22 Conceptualization of the Arctic as "a multifaceted region within a changing global context, which is both affected by it and affecting it" (Finger and Heininen 2019, 2).

The term constructivism appeared in international relations in the late 1980s (Macleod 2004). According to Lynch and Klotz (1999), constructivism was born and developed outside the political science field: essentially in sociology, social psychology, philosophy, and anthropology. It connects social practices' production and reproduction through historical, political, economic, and geographic contexts. The constructivist school sees the (political) world as a constant social construction (or phenomenon), with a focus on the social aspect in opposition to a focus on material aspects or forces, although these two are linked (Paasi 2009, 133; 1986; Hettne and Söderbaum 1998, 2000; Flockhart 2012; Lynch and Klotz 1999; Fierke 2001; Adler 1997; Wendt 1999; Tuathail and Toal 1996). This construction process is induced by the interaction between various actors (individuals, states, non-state actors), broader environment, and structures (Adler 2013; Wendt 1987). The concepts of identity and social norms (positivists or conventional constructivists), identity and social discourses (post-positivist or interpretive) are central to the constructivist paradigm in a similar manner that power and control are to realism (and post- structuralism); and wealth and laissez-faire to liberalism (Lebow 2016; Tonami 2017; Flockhart 2012; Wendt 1992b). Zehfuss (2001, 55) argues that for Alexander Wendt (1992b, 1992a). Constructivism in international relations revolves around the concepts of identity, meaning, and interactions. According to Zehfuss (2001, 55), “our ideas about ourselves and our environment shape our interactions and are shaped by our interactions; thereby they create social reality”. For N. Onuf (1989, 36), the social world is created by human practices23, and he argues that “people and society construct, or constitute, each other” through deeds (physical actions or speaking of words). One of the basic assumptions of constructivism is that states' ideas, norms, and identities are socially constructed and shaped by interactions giving them meaning (Balaam and Dillman 2015). Moreover, actors tend and conform to social norms (norm entrepreneurs) even when they have the power not to or when it does not benefit them materially and diffuse these norms globally (Balaam and Dillman 2015; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Buzan et al. 1998; Wendt 1999). Wendt (1992b) and Flockhart (2012) notes that constructivists understand the world

23 And the rules are essentially social and provide orientation for people (also in Zehfuss 2001, 58-60).

as becoming rather than existing as a pre-given entity. Flockhart (2012, 84) underline four key constructivist propositions and concepts:

1. A belief in the social construction of reality and the importance of social facts. 2. A focus on ideational as well as material structures and the importance of norms and rules. 3. A focus on the role of identity in shaping political action and the importance of ‘logics of action’. 4. A belief in the mutual constitutiveness of agents and structure, and focus on practice and action (Flockhart 2012, 84).

Flockhart (2012, 93) states that in international relations, “constructivism asks where the interests come from and assumes that different identities will have different interests, which will lead to different foreign policies”. According to Fierke (2007, 84) and Checkel (2008, 74), international institutions, states, alliances and the international system are all social constructions. Checkel (2008, 74) stresses the bureaucracy's central role in the constructivist approach to international relations. Indeed, he notes that although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, secretaries of state playing key roles. Head of state or government, parliaments, and parliamentary committees are also important actors in the decision-making process. According to Checkel (2008, 74-76), ndividuals are deeply social; hence, the communicative understanding of rationality is fundamental to explaining foreign policy decision-making. Checkel then paraphrases Finnermore and states that “much of foreign policy is about defining rather than defending nationals interests” (Checkel 2008, 74; Finnemore 1996, ix). He explains this phenomenon because, according to him, arguing (and persuading) is about discovering what individuals want or what is their national interest, and therefore it supplements bargaining in the institutions' interactions (Checkel 1998, 2008).

Analyzing how policies are implemented (and not just formulated) means studying discursive categories' operationalization in governments and international organizations' activities (Milliken 2015, 150). Following Foucault (1977); (Tuathail and Toal 1996), she later argues that in “term of examination of how corporate actors order, control, and shape bodies and spaces” is often pursued in geopolitical studies. The constructivist approach allows us in this chapter to better understand the policymaking process of Japanese Arctic policy shaped by its interactions with

Arctic and non-Arctic States, global geopolitical context (development of resources, environmental change etc.), but also private interests and agendas of the actors involved (e.g., competition between ministries).

Policy

Following Kuus (2011) arguments on the central role of the bureaucracy in contemporary foreign policy, geopolitics is, in this chapter, understood as the practices by which international policy is spatialized. In this context, policy and geopolitics are intertwined and co-constitute each other. Despite a large number of papers, events, and institutions related to the Arctic, there is still no consensus to date about what the Arctic is (Penikett 2020). What would be ‘Arctic’ in “Arctic Policy”? How could it be defined? (Pic and Lasserre 2019; Rowe 2018). Is it just a political label or can we outline “Arctic specific” issues in the region's security system? This research project raises the question of the Arctic Policy of Japan's definition and how to define it.

While politics can be defined as a science or art of governing, the exercise of executive power, or for N.G. Onuf (2001, 236) “the practices in any society to which its members attach the most significance”, polity the political organization of the society, policy (or policies) is an overall plan that embraces the general goals of a government, a company etc.24. Policy (e.g., public, private, foreign etc.) are the outcome of policy-making and can be defined as a system of principles or rules to guide and orient decisions to achieve rational outcomes (Stein 2005). It is also defined as a commitment or statement of intention, a course, a procedure, or a protocol. If the government generally adopts the policy, it may also apply to private sector organizations, groups, and individuals. While policies are typically promulgated through various official written documents, it can also be informal regulations.

The literature provides various definitions of what constitutes public policy. It has been defined as “anything a government chooses to do or not to do” (Dye 1992; cited in Howlett and Cashore 2014), “the product of the activity of an authority invested with public power and governmental

24 Welch (2020, 474) argues that “Politics is (or should be) about protecting things worth protecting, providing public goods, and doing today what need to be done to enable our children to have a better tomorrow”.

legitimacy” (Mény and Thoenig 1989), or a set of regulation, rules, guidelines or principles that guide the decisions of a political, business or government group (Cambridge University). Public policies are policies meant to regulate and govern a society and its actors (Paquin, Bernier, and Lachapelle 2010). Public policies (regulatory, distributive, redistributive, or constitutive) are produced by a variety of governmental, administrative, and private actors to solve specific societal problems (e.g., economic, environmental, health care, education etc.) or achieving an objective (Muller 2000; Lowi 1976). Public policies often describe the sector in which they apply (e.g., social policy, agricultural policy, etc.) and result from a careful examination and discussion between governmental actors and administrative, economic (e.g., lobbies, companies), etc. actors. The state can intervene in the economic sphere through regulations and public policies it implements (Rival 2006). “Business is not only economic but also the result of specific interactions between real actors, in conjunction with a singular socio-political environment” (Huault 1998). Specialists in public policy find various stages in the policy-making process, including agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making, or evaluating the policy (Bridgman and Davis 2004; Althaus, Bridgman, and Davis 2013; Stein 2005).

According to Carlsnaes (2008), foreign policy is an empirical subject result from a coalition of active actors and groups that straddle the boundary between the internal and external spheres of a state in complex internal and international environments. It involves processes such as bargains and compromises that affect the interests of domestic and national groupings (Carlsnaes 2008, 86). For Hills (1993, 28), “foreign policy-making is a complex process of interaction between many actors, differently embedded in a wide range of different structures”.

For K.S. Coates and Holroyd (2020, 530), politics in the Arctic context could be defined by a powerful and effective public policy response to the twenty-first century Arctic challenges. There is no conceptual discussion on what an Arctic policy is in the Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy (Kenneth Coates and Holroyd 2019). Ohnishi (2014), in his paper on Japan’s Arctic Policy, defines policy as the pursuit of goals and actions to achieve goals based on national resources. According to him, to support an official arctic policy, the government needs to implement new policies that aim to resolve a public problem (e.g., social, economic) through measures (decisions and activities) decided by the political authority. In Japan’s Arctic Policy, the METI works with the Agency for

Natural Resources and Energy of Japan and JOGMEC to plan the energetic and resource's policy meant to be a guideline for the companies (Helgesen 2013). The ministry can provide financial support, technology development to support Japanese companies. Even before the official arctic policy of 2015, the government of Japan has been acting on the polar scene by accessing funding to several research institutes (e.g., NIPR, ArCS, GRENE), joining international treaties (e.g., Svalbard 1920, Antarctic 1959), organizations and committees such as International Arctic Research Committee (1991) or the Arctic Council (2013) (Ohnishi 2013a, 2013b, 2014; Tonami and Watters 2012; Tonami 2014c). Moreover, Japan's Cabinet adopted in 2013 a basic plan on Ocean policy that included the Arctic with a particular focus on international cooperation, reinforcement of observations and research on the Arctic, and the study of the feasibility of the Arctic Sea Route. Can we define these first initiatives as policies dedicated to the Arctic, like Arctic policies in the absence of a unifying document?

Following the official Arctic Policy of 2015, in this chapter, policy will be defined as strategic initiatives supported by the government, the industry, and academia, in various fields such as diplomacy, environment, transportation, resource development, and science and technology to support its national interest in the Arctic.

Part 1: Actors involved in Japan’s policy-making process

The Japanese Iron Triangle

Several articles highlight the government’s role and the legislative branch (bureaucracy) in foreign affairs (Hagström 2000). Despite multiple different analyzes (see: Hagström (2000); C. Johnson (1982); Van Wolferen (1989); Q. Zhao (1993); Hughes (2013); Calder (1988); C. Johnson (1995); Drifte (1996), the Japanese political organization is mainly analyzed around a triptych of actors, whether with the Iron Triangle theory (C. Johnson 1982; Watters, Tonami, and Heininen 2012; Sinclair 2014; Drifte 1996; Van Wolferen 1989; Curtis 1995; Hagström 2000; Colignon and Usui 2001; Howe 2010), a tripod (Q. Zhao 1993), or three pillars (Ohnishi 2016, 2013a). Drifte (1996, 16) states that “the cooperation between the three main actors has been successful by creating big powerful companies and effective administration despite unimpressive party politics, but also at the same time economic prosperity which brought tangible benefit to a majority of Japanese”.

In this chapter, we will use the theory of the Iron Triangle proposed by Drifte in 1996 and used by Chalmers Johnson (to explain the role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, MITI, today is known as the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry METI) to highlight the relationships between institutional, economic and bureaucratic levels also called kan-sei-gyo bureaucracy (kan), the dominant party (sei), and major corporations (gyo) (Howe 2010; Woodall 2004; Drifte 1996; C. Johnson 1982).

Politicians

Since the constitution of 1947, Japan (the government of Japan) is a constitutional monarchy (power of the emperor is limited and relegated to its ceremonial functions) in which the government is divided into three branches: the executive power (the Cabinet), the legislative (National Diet, Kokkai) and judicial power ( Saikō-Saibansho). The Japanese bicameral parliamentary system was built after the British system with the upper house, also called the House of Conciliators and the lower house: The House of Representatives 25 compose the Japanese Diet. It also has many similarities with the American system in the rules of procedures (Hayes 2009). The constitution stipulates the role of the Diet and the Cabinet in several articles (Hagström 2000).

- Article 41: “The Diet shall be the highest organ of the state power and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State” (Kenkyusha 1997:69).

- Article 65: “Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet” (Kenkyusha 1997:97). - Article 73: pronounces that the Cabinet, in addition to other general administrative functions, shall: (i) Administer the law faithfully; conduct affairs of state; (ii) Manage foreign affairs; (iii) Conclude treaties. However, it shall obtain prior or, depending on circumstances subsequent approval of the Diet; (iv) Administer the civil service, in accordance with standards established by law; (v) Prepare the budget, and present it to the cabinet orders in order to execute the provisions of this Constitution and of the law. However, it cannot include penal provisions in such cabinet orders unless authorized by

25 Holding the majority of the power.

such law; (vi) Decide on general amnesty, special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights (Kenkyusha 1997:105).

The Cabinet (Japanese government) is composed of the chief executive (the prime minister, hereafter PM) elected by the Diet. The PM is the leader of the legislative branch (the lower house) and appoints ministers26 (in the Diet). Hayes (2009, 55) notes a very strong political instability in Japan, where for a long time, the prime minister usually remained in office for one year, leading to a lack of coordination and influence on ministries. The Cabinet has its bureaucracy composed of the Cabinet Secretariat, assisting the ministers and the PM’s secretariat (Hayes 2009, 56). The Liberal Democrat Party (LDP, Jiyū-Minshutō) is a coalition established in 1955 between the conservative parties: the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party.

Bureaucrats

According to Hagström (2000); and Tonami and Watters (2012), the Japanese bureaucratic tradition has been developing since the Meiji restoration in 1868 and was left almost untouched by the U.S occupation allowing it to strengthen its position relative to politics and big business during this period27. The major bureaucratic actors in Japanese foreign policy are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Trade and Industry (METI), and the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Although the MoFA is in charge of security policymaking and foreign policy, it is subordinated to domestic imperatives, increasing tension and competition between the MoFA and the METI (Hagström 2000; H. Zhao 2018; Van Wolferen 1989; Drifte 1996; Colignon and Usui 2001).

The collaboration within that Japanese bureaucratic organization is based on ringisei(do) or bottom-up (system for approval by the circulation of document ringisho). According to this decision-making process, policy plans and proposals are written by a low-ranking and well- informed official administrator and then circulated upwards to all the actors concerned, who formally approve (level after level) of a document by affixing their seals to it, allowing internal consensus to be reached (Hagström 2000; Howe 2010; Tonami and Watters 2012). Through this

26 According art 2 of the constitution, the PM can appoint a maximum of 20 minister of state. 27 Also in Hayes (2009, 58).

process, “the highest executive is expected to approve it without change or modification because of this long process of prior scrutiny by lower administrator” (Tsuji, K. (1968), p.458 cited in Howe 2010, 1329). Sakakibara (2003, 54-55) adds that the bureaucrats in each ministry develop close relationships with “parliamentary tribes” (governing party) that is even stronger than the ties they have with their ministries. According to him, chronic ministerial instability would only accentuate this link between bureaucracy and parliamentary tribes. During the second term of Abe’s administration (2012), there has been a concentration and power to the cabinet while establishing bureaucrats dedicated to work exclusively for the prime minister's office and carry out its policy.

Groups interests

The Japanese non-governmental sector plays a substantive informal role in foreign policy through lobbying (Calder 1988; Nester 1990). Also called Zaikai, the main Business Actors of the Iron

Triangle are composed of the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keizai-dantai Rengōkai or Keidanren)28, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Shōkō Kaigisho), the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Dōyukai)29, and the Japan Federation of Employees Association (Nikkeiren)30 (Hagström 2000; Van Wolferen 1989; Q. Zhao 1993). “Zaikai interests sculpt the national agenda through four national corporate organizations whose political and policy efforts complement each other” (Nester 1990, 180).

The gyōkai gurūpu or keiretsu, industrial groups, and exporting corporations replaced after WWII, the zaibatsu family business controlled the Japanese industry (mining, merchandising, financial services, shipping) during the Meiji and Taisho periods and had a strong political influence (Sakakibara 2003). The LDP relies on the local support groups (Kōenkai) to serves as pipelines through which funds and other support are conveyed to legislators and through which the legislators can distribute favors to constituents in return (Bouissou 2018; Hagström 2000; Hayes 2009).

28 Established in 1946. 29 Formed by the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations Keidanren, established 1946. 30 Founded in 1948.

According to Hagström (2000), these business groups play a substantive informal role in foreign policy with lobby groups actives in foreign countries (Nester 1990; Calder 1988). Tonami and Watters (2012) argues that civil service and business actors are interdependent in Japan. For example, the civil service depending on business actors to gather political and technical information.

Others

Although outside of our Iron Triangle, we can also note the contribution of the opposition parties, news media, organized groups, researchers at universities and think-tanks, gangster syndicates (yakuza), police, prosecutors, and public opinion in the policy-making process or influencing this process (Nester 1990; Calder 1988; Van Wolferen 1989; Hagström 2000; Q. Zhao 1993). The Advisory Councils (shingikai) composed of members within and outside the Triangle, advise the government on policy issues more or less independently. Tonami and Watters (2012, 94) argue that Japanese business actors play an informal yet substantial role in foreign policy through lobbying. Just as Japanese lobbyists are present abroad to support their interests, foreign lobby groups are present in Japan (Calder 1988).

Relationship within the Iron Triangle

The government31 receives its legitimacy from the elections and appoints ministers to carry out and establish its political decisions. The government provides financial, diplomatic support to the

Japanese companies through administrative guidance or suggestions (gyōsei shidō), incentives,

31 The currently governmental coalition is composed of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito 公明党.

threats, and sanctions (Hagström 2000; Q. Zhao 1993; Takashi 1991; Tonami 2014b). According to Drifte (1996, 16), t the government will oppose the bureaucracy to protect its interests.

O. Young (1992a, 239) argues that bureaucracy (individual government agencies and factions

• LDP • National Diet Government

Appoint Ministers. Oppose to Provide legitimacy for the policy made, bureaucracy because of special develop favorable Legislation interest to protect (constituents)

IRON TRIANGLE

Write the Legislation, make Lobbying through Koenkai. Fund politicians policy (electoral support) to influence them and curtail the bureaucratic control

Bureaucracy Business Groups • MoFA Influence business through its ability to Lobbying, provide future employments, • Japan Business Federation • METI Amakudari • Chamber of Commerce and Industry • MoF develop regulation/licenses (low regulation, special favors), administrative responsibility • Japan Association of Corporate and policy-making Executives • Japan Federation of Employees Association

FIGURE 3: COMPOSITION AND RELATION AMONG THE IRON-TRIANGLE IN. COMPILED BY AUTHOR. operating within political systems) has interest of its own that may or may not coincide with the national interest. Moreover, many researchers agree on emphasizing the preponderant role of bureaucracy in Japanese politics even though its influence has declined since the 1970s (Nester 1990; Drifte 1996; C. Johnson 1982; Howe 2010; Tonami 2014b), also called the Iron law of oligarchy. Hagström (2000) notes that, although the bureaucracy is constitutionally subordinate to the Diet, there is plenty of evidence suggesting that top-level bureaucrats still play a crucial role in the drafting, deliberation, and implementation of long-term Japanese policy. Ministerial instability only increases the bureaucracy's power, which remains stable in its foundations: “the politicians reign, and the bureaucrats rule” (C. Johnson 1982, 154). Japan bureaucrats create general outlines, while politicians struggle with details (Curtis 1995). The bureaucracy provides the legal framework within which the government and the companies can act.

The bureaucracy and business groups have a close clientelist give-and-take relationship: the bureaucracy influences the business sphere through its abilities to create policies and regulations.

This cooperation is called Amakudari (descent from Heaven), interinstitutional cooperation forged by university (gakubatsu), carriers (kyodobatsu), and marriage ties (keibatsu) (Howe 2010; Drifte 1996; Hayes 2009). It gives directives and objectives to achieve to have a cohesive work motivated by the possibility for retired bureaucrats to find employment in private and public companies and other non-governmental organizations (Van Wolferen 1989; Hagström 2000; Q. Zhao 1993; Colignon and Usui 2001; Okimoto 1988; Bowen and Kassiola 2016; Drifte 1996; Hayes 2009). This last point had given rise to corruption scandals not only concerning collusion with not only the private sector but also with the government. A high percentage of former bureaucrats were prime ministers, cabinet members, and influential members of the Liberal Democratic Party (Glen and Pempel 1998; Colignon and Usui 2001; Bowen and Kassiola 2016). Drifte (1996, 16) states that “the heart of this corruption is the need for business to oil the wheels of the complicated and costly regulatory system and the ability of politicians and bureaucrats to benefit from either in terms of money and/or influence”. This principle of Amakudari leads to the elaboration of abundant literature to analyze the relationships and relations between government, bureaucracy, and business groups in Japan (Schaede 1995; C. Johnson 1995; Colignon and Usui 2001; Calder 1988; Glen and Pempel 1998). Colignon and Usui (2001, 867) refer to it as “the glue in the networks representing policy commitments among elites and as fusing relations among the bureaucracy, Diet, and business” (Glen and Pempel 1998, 74).

Amakudari is described as “maintaining coordination and cooperative interactions among the state and the public and private sectors–an aspect of what the Japanese call nemawashi (informal negotiation processes, literally translated as “preparing the groundwork”) and what others describe variously as consensual decision making or the interlocking directorate among the bureaucracy, the conservative party, and the business community” (C.A. Johnson 1978, 113; Colignon and Usui 2001, 868 cited in).

Later Johnson, refer to amakudari as a contribution to a common orientation, a "channel of communication for government, business community, and the political world (C. Johnson 1982, 71). According to him, amakudari is present in the different relations of the Iron Triangle. For Van Wolferen (1989, 44-45), amakudari “ensure smooth communication between industry and the ministries” and “mingle and busily monitor the economy and maintain social control”. Calder (1988, 392) present amakudari as a result of private firms’ struggle to “manipulate and induce predictability in their political environment”, giving the business companies access to

information’s “concerning both likely regulatory actions by their former employers and more general economic and political developments". Moreover, the bureaucracy relies on business groups to gather political information of interest and intelligence capacities.

Several authors underline a formal and informal web between the government and the business groups in Japan (Colignon and Usui 2001; C. Johnson 1982, 1974). Zaikai, business groups, develop trade policy by protecting its national interests (regulation of the competition) through heavy lobbying both to the government, which relies on private funding for its election campaign and the support groups Koenkai, and to the bureaucracy through amakudari. The business sphere support finances the politicians and influences them to filter the policies proposed by the bureaucracy. It heavily depends on the METI for support and guidance on trade-related issues. However, the government dependent on the business. Japan’s trading houses, banks, and manufacturing corporations gather political information of interest to the government, relying on their intelligence capabilities (Nester 1990).

Following this organization around three main actors, Hagström (2000) argues that the Japanese bureaucrats, the LDP-politicians (Liberal Democratic Party), and (organized) business cooperate works intimately on several issues. He observes a separation of opinion between researchers with, on the one hand, the elitists who consider that all the actors in the tripod are composed of the elite and other researchers that have argued that the real elite consists of bureaucrats. The bureaucracy takes the lead over politicians, business people, and other societal groups (C. Johnson 1982; Q. Zhao 1993; Drifte 1996). Van Wolferen (1989), however, maintains that no one is ultimately in charge in Japan: “There is, to be sure, a hierarchy or, rather, a complex of overlapping hierarchies. But it has no peak; it is a truncated pyramid ” (cited in Hagström 2000, 5; Van Wolferen 1989). Since its second term, the Abe administration has been trying to change that by concentration of power to the cabinet.

“In the popular mind, [all Japanese policy-makers and power-holders] act as one,” (Emmott 1992, 53) but, “In practice, they are divided or are even competitive with one another” (Hughes 2013, 162; cited in Hagström 2000, 4). This competitiveness between policymakers and powerholders is regularly highlighted both in the literature and in field interviews (Ohnishi 2016, 2013a, 2013b; Tonami 2016a, 2014d, 2014a; Watters, Tonami, and Heininen 2012; Hagström 2000; Q. Zhao 1993;

Drifte 1996). According to Calder (1988) and Drifte (1996), the Japanese political system is in “perpetual domestic conflict driven by political cycles, interest groups pressures and bureaucratic machinations in complex interrelations with one another” (Calder 1988, 533). Tonami (2014b) notes that ministry employees tend to be loyal to a single ministry, reducing horizontal cooperation between ministries.

According to Nester (1990), the ministry staff is relatively small and is mainly issued from the Law Department in Tokyo University in order to facilitate cooperation based on a common background (gakubatsu) (Q. Zhao 1993). For Calder (1988, 517-541), this fragmented character of state authority in Japan combined with competitivity and conflicting agendas within the Triangle's different actors makes decisive action more difficult than in countries with strong chief executives (Also in Howe 2010). For Van Wolferen (1989), the essential characteristic of Japanese decision-making is that ‘no one is ultimately in charge (in Howe 2010). Howe (2010, 1328) highlights the model proposed by Allison and Zelikow of decision-making in foreign affairs resulting from the compromises, conflicts, and confusions between officials with diverse interests and unequal influence (Zelikow and Allison 1999; Allison and Zelikow 1990).

The Iron Triangle or Three Pillars theory and Japan’s Arctic Policy

Although O. Young (1992a), in his chapter The Arctic: Distinctive Region or Policy Periphery, focuses on the Arctic State policy, his analysis still emphasizes the role of a tryptic of actors: national government, bureaucratic interests, and Group interests32. He argues that those actors might have very different interests in arctic affairs depending on their objectives. The same organization and arguments might be used to define and explain Japan’s arctic policy organization. The “Iron Triangle” paradigm proposed by Drifte (1996) to explain the Japanese's political organization is also used by different researchers (Tonami and Watters 2012; Ohnishi 2016, 2014; Sinclair 2014) to explain the organization of Japan's Arctic Policy which is revolving around polar research (with primary concerns on climate change, Arctic's environment, and eco-system), navigation, and natural resources (Jakobson and Lee 2013; Holroyd 2020; Tonami and Watters

32 “Unofficial interest groups that work to influence public policies in the light of their worldviews and policy preferences” (O. Young 1992a, 241-242).

2012; Shiraishi 2016a).

• LDP Others • National Diet • OPRF • JCAR Government • JIIA • NIPR Appoint Ministers. Oppose to Provide legitimacy for the policy • JAMSTEC bureaucracy because of made, develop favorable Legislation • JOGMEC special interest to protect (constituents)

IRON TRIANGLE Lobbying through Koenkai. Fund politicians (electoral support) to influence them and curtail the Write the Legislation, make bureaucratic control policy Bureaucracy Business Groups

Influence business through its ability to Lobbying, provide future employments, • Japan Business Federation • MoFA Amakudari • Chamber of Commerce and • MEXT develop regulation/licenses (low regulation, special favors), Industry • METI • Japan Association of Corporate • MoF administrative responsibility and policy- making Executives • Japan Federation of Employees Association

FIGURE 4: COMPOSITION AND RELATION AMONG THE IRON-TRIANGLE IN JAPAN’S ARCTIC POLICY. COMPILED BY AUTHOR.

These researchers also use the Iron Triangle concept to illustrate the multi-layers of the Japanese's political system and the difficulties to implement an official Arctic policy that requires the different actors of the Triangle to work together (government, the research sector, and companies). However, those actors, and especially business actors, need to have a clear interest in the NSR region to allocate resources. The “Iron Triangle” and “Three Pillars” approaches agree on the interconnection and interdependence between the three types of actors in elaborating an Arctic Policy. Western researchers also tend to point out the complexity of the Japanese political system, often paralyzed by a powerful bureaucratic system. Internal and external sources seem to agree that the Japanese government, despite its evolutions, is hindered in its Arctic policy because of a lack of interest in national enterprises (Holyroyd 2012).

Framework Iron Triangle (Drifte/ Tonami) Three Pillars (Ohnishi) Government Actors Bureaucracy Business Diplomacy Science Business (LPD) Emergence Post SWW Post SWW Post SWW 1920 1990 Cold War Expertise Participation, Arctic Motivations Expertise Economic Interests and Economic Interests Internationals Affairs Council Knowledge

Depending on Depending on Engagement Sporadic Continue Sporadic Continue opportunities opportunities Inter-dependence of the actors. Controlled by the Support Self- Links Self-sustainable bureaucracy Science Sustainable Possible Prospect Paralysis of the Triangle and its actions Status Quo Possible Expand Expand

TABLE 1 : DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE IRON TRIANGLE AND THREE PILLARS APPROACH. COMPILED BY AUTHOR.

The “Three Pillars” approach proposed by Ohnishi highlights the evolution of diplomatic, business, and science actors' involvement in the past decades. First, with the pillar of diplomacy endorsed with the Svalbard Treaty. However, until the 2010s, this pillar has stayed in a retreat position.

o National interests

The national interest in the Arctic varies greatly depending on whether if it is an Arctic State or not. In the first case, the government may, like Canada, seek to exercise its “authority over a huge, sparsely populated segment of the Arctic” (O. Young 1992a, 236). Or, wish like the US, to “exhibit the interest of a superpower in maintaining freedom of access to all parts of the region and opposing Arctic development that could prove detrimental to American interests in other parts of the world (O. Young 1992a, 236).

Japan’s national interests are, first of all, to maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity; to ensure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security grounded on freedom and democracy and preserving its rich culture and tradition (Government of Japan 2013, 4).

Japan is not an Arctic State and has no territorial claim in terms of international law. As expressed in its official Arctic Policy (2015), the Japanese government wishes to promote and ensure the Rule of Law (UNCLOS) across the globe. Hence all legal issues related to the Arctic Ocean should be addressed within the existing legal framework. Japan also seeks to protect its business companies' present and future commercial opportunities and secure its energy security (security post-Fukushima) by insuring multiple supply sources. In 2016, during a speech at the Carnegie event held in Moscow, the ambassador to the Arctic Affairs, Mrs. Shiraishi, defined Japan’s national interest in the Arctic as threefold: climate change and research activities, the Arctic Sea Route, and living and mineral resources development (Shiraishi 2016b). These interests stem

directly from the development of the region linked to the impacts of climate change. "Challenges in the Arctic are extremely serious because they can impact the entire global climate". In addition, as in many speeches, the ambassador stressed that "Climate change has brought about sea- level rise and higher frequency of extreme weather events in high and middle latitude regions, including Japan”. In his speech at the Arctic Circle conference, Foreign Minister Kōno Tarō promoted Japan’s vision on an “Ideal Arctic”. This ideal is based on understanding and clarifying the “mechanisms of environmental changes in the Arctic”, “sustainable economic activities” while “respecting the ecosystem and the life of indigenous peoples” and finally, “the rule of law must be ensured and international cooperation must be promoted in a peaceful and orderly manner” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2018e). The former Minister of Justice and member of the House of Representatives, Mrs. Kamikawa Yoko, has also been firmly committed to sustainable development goals in the Arctic. She was involved in the Parliamentary League of Arctic Frontier Study, various study groups related to Water and Ocean, sustainable use, the sustainability of traditional life and culture of indigenous peoples taking into account the industry, government, and academia perspectives. Despite those public discourse, Ikeshima (2016) argues that Japan has not concretely identified its national interest in Arctic affairs besides its proactive contribution in science and observation, leading to a lack of national interest.

Bureaucratic interests

In Japan's arctic policy, the bureaucracy consists of various ministries and research centers funded by these ministries. The interest and involvement of these agencies and ministries in the Arctic might differ depending on their privates’ interest in specific issues.

One of the leading players in Japanese arctic research is the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), that is in charge of scientific research and allocates funds to the National Polar Institute (NIPR) but also JAMSTEC, the AERC (2011), JCAR, the former GRENE (2011) and ArCS (2015) projects and now the ArCS-II. 2010 the MEXT submitted reports on institutional cooperation within the scope of observations within the cryosphere. In June 2010, the Arctic Research Examination Working Group was established in MEXT, and in August 2010, the Group published its periodical report. The prepared report offered to create a Consortium for Arctic Environmental Research to facilitate and intensify the cooperation between

research institutions. (Intermediate report of the Arctic Research Examination Working Group, 2010). In May 2011, the Japan Consortium for Arctic Environmental Research was created as a platform meant to coordinate research activities. In June 2011 (as mentioned), MEXT introduced the “Green Network of Excellence” (GRENE) – a program created to simplify implementing ecological innovations and environmentally friendly technologies (Tonami and Watters 2012).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) is in charge of Japan's representation on the international scene. Ohnishi (2014, 190) argues that, despite being a member of the Svalbard Treaty since

1920, the MoFA had not formulated a position or exercised its rights33 regarding the treaty. As with many other states, this attitude began to change with the end of the Cold War. In 1993, Japan was accepted with observer status at the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and sent a delegation to attend the Arctic Council's first meeting in 1996 in Ottawa as an ad-hoc observer (Ohnishi 2014). According to some interviews with researchers and members of Japanese think- tank, Japan could have gained the status of (ad-hoc) Observer member of the AC at that time (NIPR 2017; JOGMEC 2017; OPRF 2017). However, because of the lack of interest from the Japanese government, this did not happen. However, despite sending envoys at the Ottawa meeting, there is no documentation supporting these comments.

Moreover, at the time of the creation of the AC, the status of Observer was not yet established. The MoFA established an Arctic Task Force under the International Legal Affairs Bureau, Ocean Division, in September 2009. The senior of the MoFA, Ms. Hashimoto Seiko, formally announced Japan’s application to the Arctic Council in 2009 at the ministerial meeting of the Antarctic Treaty-Arctic Council Joint Meeting in Washington DC (Ohnishi 2014, 200). This led to creating an Arctic Task Force in 2010 engaged in the economy, security, environmental and legal analysis (Zhuravel 2016). From the end of the 2000’s, and following the declaration of application to the AC, Japan has been regularly sending envoys (e.g., senior vice minister) and experts to attends AC meetings and also appointed in 2013 M. Nishibayashi Masuo, already Ambassador in charge of

33 “The rights of fishing and hunting in the territories and waters of the archipelago (article 2), liberty of access and entry (article 3), the establishment of an international meteorological station (article5), and the same treatment (of nationals of the signatory countries) as the nationals of Norway’s, ‘with regard to methods of acquisition, enjoyment and exercice of the right of ownership of property, including mineral rights, in the territories’ (article 5)” (cited in Ohnishi 2014, 190).

Cultural Exchange be concurrently in charge of Arctic Affairs. According to Tonami (2016a, 56), the Arctic Affairs moved in 2013 to the Maritime Security Policy Division in the Foreign Policy Bureau, suggesting that the Ministry’s approach towards the Arctic has moved from a legal- centered to a policy-centered one.

Japan is outside the Arctic region, yet since Japan is a sea state and a state paying considerable attention to global environmental issues, it has to be properly engaged in international discussions related with the Arctic. By appointing the ambassador of the Arctic affairs, Japan demonstrates its engagement in polar matters. What is more, this appointment may help make the politics of Japan in the Arctic more coherent, as currently there are many agencies engaged in actions within this region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2013).

The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT) is responsible for formulating the ocean policy and providing information on the Arctic Sea Route and its possibility (Tonami 2018). The MLIT published in 2012, with related ministries, private businesses, and advisors, a report to indicate the Northern Sea Route (NSR)34 could be a “frontier” for Japanese businesses (Tonami 2014c). It also set a task force to examine the feasibility of the NSR, taking into consideration the economic benefits, safety warranties, and natural environment protection, the logistics needed for Japanese shipping companies, and the role of Japanese ports in the North such as Tomakomai (see chapter 4) (Ohnishi 2014, 198; Jakobson and Lee 2013; Tonami and Watters 2012). In 2013, the MLIT conducted an on-site inspection and allocated a small amount of funding to study further the issue, particularly the practical legal implications of using the NSR along the Russian coast (Tonami 2016a). In 2014, a Public-Private Partnership Council for the Northern Sea Route composed of ministries delegates, shipping companies, and trading and electric power companies were established to provide information on the Arctic Sea Route to Japanese companies (Ohnishi 2014, 198-199). The icebreakers Soya and Teshio are owned by the Japanese Coast Guards and used as patrol boats, operating from Hokkaido in northern Japan and tourism activities (drifting sea-ice) (Tonami 2016a).

34 Also called the Arctic Sea Route in Japanese documents.

The Ministry of Defense and the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) released an annual report titled “Overview of the East Asia Strategy 2011” that contained a chapter on “The future order of the Arctic” in 2011. Tonami (2014c, 118) states that the report summarized “the environmental, political and security situations in the Arctic region and proposed a number of recommendations for the Japanese government”. She also argues that this report resulted from a request for discussion for a US-Japan Defense Policy Dialogue on climate change impacts on security policy. Hence, according to Tonami, the report concluded that the changes in the Arctic do not pose direct security threats to Japan; based on this understanding, the interest of the Ministry of Defense in the Arctic has, thus far, been relatively subdued (Tonami 2014c, 118; 2016a, 57). The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force is in charge of the icebreaker Shirase. The icebreaker is used as a supply vessel for the Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition (JARE) under NIPR (Tonami 2016a).

Following the Japan-Russia summit in spring 2013, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (METI) set up a Public-Private Coordination Meeting to promote the Japan-Russia Relationship to facilitate bilateral cooperation in the Far East and East Siberia. The same year, the minister of the METI also visited Russia to promote joint projects (Ohnishi 2014, 201-202). 2014: Public-Private Coordination Meeting for Promoting the Japan-Russia Relationship in Tokyo with 450 Russian business leaders and 450 Japanese business leaders35. The meeting included discussions on the urban environment, automatize industry, local municipal economic exchanges, agricultural business, medical services, small and medium enterprises, economic zones, and industry.

Although less active than previous ministries, the Ministry of Environment (MoE) has been sending delegates to the various meeting of the AC Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) working group meetings.

Group interests

O. Young (1992a, 241-242) states that “all societies contain unofficial interest groups that work to influence public policies in the light of their own worldviews and policies preferences. […]. The

35 With delegates from the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy and JOGMEC.

concerns of these groups are particularly suggestive in connection with the discussion of the treatment of the Arctic in policy terms”. In Japan, the interest groups involved in the Arctic policy are large Japanese companies in the energy, navigation, port infrastructures, and think tanks involved in research and cooperation, local government (see chap 4).

The Ship & Ocean Foundation (SOF) 36 , inside the Nippon Foundation (Sasakawa Peace Foundation), is a think-tank and a lobbying organization for the Japanese shipping industry and related manufacturing industries (Tonami 2014c). It has conducted several research projects on the Arctic since the early 1990s (INSROP/JANSROP), especially regarding the Arctic Sea Route development and prompted the Diet to adopt new legislation on ocean governance (Ohnishi 2014, 192). Tonami (2018) states that the Nippon Foundation is Japan’s most prominent philanthropic foundation but is based on profits from public speedboat racing, with annual revenue of 46 billion JPY (approximately 417 million USD) in 2016, and provides financial assistance for maritime shipping activities, welfare projects, and international development. Later, she argues that the Nippon Foundation supports the government, the research community, and business groups by providing financial assistance for their extensive activities. According to Tonami, this is a salient example of new strategic sectors still being managed under Japan's coordinated market system (Tonami 2018, 9-10).

The literature and the various testimonies collected during field trips from members of ministries, researchers, companies, and think-tanks all underlined the importance of the role and the investment of M. Sunami Atsushi in the development of the Japanese Arctic policy. Former Director of the Science and Technology, Innovation Policy Program at the National Graduate Institute (GRIPS), Sunami Atsushi, is today the president of the Ocean Policy Research of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (OPRI-SPF), Executive Director of SPF, member of the Advisory Board of the Arctic Circle. In January 2018, the Chairman of The Nippon Foundation, Sasakawa Yohei, and Dr. Sunami delivered a policy recommendation titled "Japan's Future Priority Areas of Arctic Policy" to be considered on the Development of the Third Revised Basic Plan on Ocean Policy by the Minister of State for Ocean Policy. The different interlocutors interviewed tend to

36 Now the Ocean Policy Research Institute (OPRI).

agree that his interest in science & technology and science diplomacy has influenced Japan’s Arctic policy.

A second particularly active think tank concerning research on arctic issues is the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), a private, non-partisan policy think tank founded in 1959 closely related to the MoFA (Tonami 2014b). Its research focuses on foreign affairs and security issues. The JIIA has conducted and organized several studies, reports, and meetings on Arctic issues since the early 2010s.

Part 2: Structure of Japan’s Arctic Policy

Early initiatives and recommendations from the Japanese bureaucracy and interest groups to the government for further involvement in arctic affairs

In this dissertation, policy is defined as strategic initiatives supported by the government, the industry, and academia, in various fields such as diplomacy, environment, transportation, resource development, and science and technology to support its national interest in the Arctic. If Japan did not have an official Arctic policy for years, we could still observe an Arctic policy's development through various measures according to this policy definition.

a. From the bureaucracy

The agencies involved in Japan’s Arctic Policy include the Cabinet Office (CAO), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science and Technology (MEXT), the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), the Ministry of the Environment (MoE) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD).

In April 2009, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Japan Hashimoto Seiko attended the 50th- anniversary celebration of the Antarctic Treaty and Arctic Council Joint Meeting in Washington, DC. She announced Tokyo’s intentions to apply for observer status to the Arctic Council stated Japan’s desire to participate in international discussions on issues relating to the Arctic’

connecting Japan to the Arctic political framework (Ohnishi 2013b; Horinouchi 2010; Tonami and Watters 2012). In a speech prepared in 2010 at the Japan-Norway Polar Seminar by Horinouchi Hidehisa, the Deputy Director-General at the International Legal Affairs Bureau in the MoFA presented Japan's position regarding the Arctic (Horinouchi 2010).

1. According to him, Japan observes the growing impact of climate change and global warming in the Arctic. 2. The decrease of ice-covered areas due to climate change will result in new navigation routes, reducing the navigation distances between Japan and Europe. However, he qualified his point by recalling that an economy in terms of distance did not necessarily go together with an economy in transportation costs. 3. The decrease in the ice-covered areas will facilitate resource development in the Arctic Ocean for energy, mineral, and living resources. 4. Japan's position is that the current and future legal issues related to the Arctic Ocean should be addressed within the existing legal framework (UNCLOS, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf) with substantial participation by interested States and not only the Arctic States and the Arctic Ocean coastal States.

After emphasizing Japanese research commitment in the Arctic, Mr. Horinouchi reaffirmed Japan's desire to gain observer status in the AC and contribute to the AC's activities. This participation would allow Japan to bring the expertise gained through its research institutes' activities with the Arctic States and the Permanent Participants, and the Observers. After thanking Norway for its support to Japan's application, Mr. Horinouchi concluded his declaration by stating that:

The Arctic should be recognized as a part of the common heritage of mankind. The international community should protect this area and use it for peaceful purposes. [...] The international community as a whole should have access to the potential benefits that the Arctic offers. At the same time, sustainable development of the Arctic should be pursued, paying due attention to the environmental concerns. The Government of Japan intends to participate actively in the discussions at the various fora in this field and cooperate with their efforts at the several levels (Horinouchi 2010).

Between 2009 and 2013, the Japanese government was invited to several AC-related meetings as Ad Hoc Observer, including the Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) meetings and AC working groups. In 2009 Japan attended the SAO meeting and the Sustainable Development Working Group

(SDWG) meeting in Denmark. In 2010, delegates from JAMSTEC attended the Arctic Monitoring and Evaluation Program (AMAP) Working Group Meeting in the USA and the Deputy Ministers' Meeting in Denmark (April). The same year, the Ministry of Finance delegates attended the SAO Meeting in Greenland and in the Faroe Islands. In 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Arctic Task Force in order to make a cross-sectoral approach (including international legal perspectives) towards the foreign policy on the Arctic and to “take appropriate policy measures” in order to support its Observer application to the AC37 (Ken Coates and Holroyd 2015, 93). Its mission included controlling and monitoring changes within the arctic region in legal, economic, safety, and environmental protection perspectives. In 2011, Japan sent delegates to the SAO Meeting in Denmark, to the Ministerial Meeting in Germany, the AMAP Working Group Meeting in Russia (JAMSTEC), and the SAO Meeting in Sweden. In 2012 to the SDWG Meeting, two SAO meetings, the Deputy Ministers Meeting, the Observer, and Ad Hoc Observers Meeting in Sweden. In 2013 the newly appointed Arctic Ambassador attended the SAO Meetings and the Ministerial Meeting in Sweden, Denmark, and Canada. Japanese delegates from the MEXT also participated in the SDWG meeting (Sweden and Canada), the AMAP Working Group Meeting (Denmark) SDWG Meeting (Canada) (Head Office), the Scientific Cooperation Task Force (SCTF) Meeting (Sweden), and the Task Force on Black Carbon and Methane (TFBCM) Meeting (Sweden) (University of Sweden) etc. Japan became Observer at the Arctic Council in May 2013 alongside China, South Korea, Singapore, India, and Italy.

The Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 2011 devoted a section to Japan’s Foreign Policy in Major Global Issues: stating that “Concerning the Arctic region which is being affected by climate change in recent years, there has been a growing international debate on such issues as environmental problems, the opening of shipping routes, and development of natural resources in that region”. Recognizing the need to be involved in such debate appropriately, “Japan is strengthening its participation in international discussions regarding the Arctic region” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2011, 23). The climate change effects in the Arctic Ocean and the necessity to ensure the Rule of Law globally have been regularly mentioned

37 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Blue Book 2011, p. 23.

in the following Bluebook (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019b, 2018a, 2017a, 2015b, 2016a). Ken Coates and Holroyd (2015, 93-94) notes that following the Bluebook's recommendation and its numerous contributions, the government-appointed Mr. Sunami Atsushi (mentioned above), a highly regarded international affairs specialist and long-time advisor to the government, to lead policy development efforts.

In 2012, Japan’s former Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Kira Shuji attended a meeting between the Arctic Council’s Swedish chair and the council’s observers and ad hoc observers in Sweden. In his statement, the Vice Minister asserted that Japan deserved permanent observer status because of its active contribution to the activities under the Arctic Council (e.g., AMAP working group), and assured the council that Japan would respect the sovereignty of the member states, their sovereign rights, and jurisdiction (Ohnishi 2013b; Kira 2012). During his speech, the Vice Minister requested the Arctic states’ support for the approval of Japan’s application for permanent observer status in the AC and reaffirmed Japan’s will to contribute to the AC's diverse activities.

After a study by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) in 2011, the MLIT established a group in 2012 to examine the feasibility and logistics for Japanese shipping companies for navigation in the Arctic Sea Routes. In parallel, the group also conducted studies concerning the impact of arctic navigation for the ports in the northern part of Japan. The MLIT gathers relevant information through its internal (local network) and external channels. The groups concurred the conclusion of the NIDS annual report, the East Asia Strategic Review, that stated that “Japan will necessarily be involved in the Arctic” and recommended that Japan “build a reliable relationship with the Arctic states” (Ohnishi 2013b).

Under the pressure of the OPRF, a think tank with a close relationship with the Japanese's shipping industries and related manufacturing industries, in 2013, an inter-ministerial committee on the Arctic was established as a Liaison Committee (Hokkyokukai Ni Kakaru Shomondai Ni Taisuru Kankei Shocho Renraku Kaigi) among Ministries and Agencies on Various Issues Related to the Arctic (Tonami 2014b, 2016a; Moe and Stokke 2019). According to Tonami (2016a, 56) the committee meetings are held according to the AC's Working Group Meetings schedule to facilitate sharing information among various ministries. Tonami (2014d) argues that already in 2014, there

were discussions concerning the construction of a new icebreaker for Arctic research. Also, in 2013 the MoFA created the charge of Ambassador of Arctic Affairs38.

These various initiatives on the part of the ministries show the lack of structuring and inter- ministerial collaboration. Each of the actors involved (MEXT, MoFA, MLIT, METI) pursuing its objectives and agenda and is influenced by the interest groups they are closest to.

Group Interests

The OPRF (now OPRI), a private think tank, argues that “there had been sporadic researches at the national level on the Arctic, since the significance of the region has not been sufficiently recognized in the society. Although data and information of the Arctic issues have been flooded in the web, until the early 2010s, the Government had not taken any initiative to establish an academic policy for the Arctic issues. As a consequence, the industry, in particular, has hopelessly been bewildered in making decision of its business strategy in the Arctic” (The Arctic Conference Japan 2012).

The Arctic Ocean Quarterly Bulletin in 2009 and Arctic Conference Japan in 2010 were launched, with experts in international law, security, climatology, oceanography, polar science in general, marine technology, navigation, and regulations of classification society. Every couple of years, the conference members met to establish a unified view of multi-faceted Arctic issues, “including the current state of the region, trends, and challenges”. But also, to address Japan’s policy and strategy in the Arctic. The conference members developed a report for the government on April 25, 2012, with height policy recommendations” (Ocean Policy Research Institute 2015; The Arctic Conference Japan 2012).

1. Establish the nation's Arctic policy and joint chiefs of staff 2. Bolster every research activity in the Arctic 3. Actively take part in protection and preservation of the environment 4. Participate much more directly in Arctic natural resources development 5. Promptly respond to logistical changes in the seaborne trade by opening the Arctic

38 2013: Nishibayashi Masuo. 2015-2017: Shiraishi Kazoku. 2017: Ide Keiji. 2018: Yamamoto Eiji. 2019: Mari Miyoshi.

seaways 6. Design a new national security program via the Arctic seaways and shipping 7. Contribute largely to the establishment of an order of the Arctic 8. Make haste to strengthen Japan-Arctic states dialogues, in particular between Japan and Russia

The report urged the government to get more involved, establish and organize a task force under the Headquarter of Ocean Policy dedicated to "designs Japan’s Arctic policy and supervises Arctic-related measures in a versatile and integrated manner" (The Arctic Conference Japan 2012, 5). The Japanese Arctic policy should include “science, technology, natural and living resources, the environment, logistics, security and diplomatic activities”. One of these conferences' outcomes was the elaboration of the Green Network of Excellence program (GRENE) project organized by MEXT.

In 2013, the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) organized a workshop as one of the platforms for formulating Japan’s comprehensive policy on the Arctic. Its objective was to bring a comprehensive approach to the Arctic debate with Japan’s science, technology and diplomacy. And to provide interdisciplinary policy analysis on the Arctic issues by bringing together policymakers and academics, both natural and social sciences (Sunami 2013 ppt). Following this initiative, the Ocean Policy Research Institute of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (OPRI-SPF), with co-organizers the Nippon Foundation and the GRIPS, hosted the "Study Group for the Future of the Arctic" in 2016. The group comprises 80 members from the industry leaders, researchers from the natural and social sciences, representatives from relevant national government ministries and agencies, local governments, and Members of Parliament. In 2018, the second "Workshop on Arctic Governance” took place in Tokyo and brought these members together and the Minister of State for Ocean Policy, representatives of the Arctic States, Asian Observers at AC. The objectives of these workshops were to "to discuss the future of the Arctic from the perspectives of conservation, use, and sustainable development of the region, in addition

to discussing how Asian countries, including Japan, can cooperate in these areas, and make clear what measures Japan should prioritize "39.

The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and closely related to the MoFA, organized a research project called “Arctic Governance and Japan's Foreign Strategy” in 2012. The MoFA funded this project as one of its international affairs research recommendation projects and, in collaboration with the JIIA, published a report in 2013 for Japan’s strategy on Arctic issues. This report was organized around seven chapters on Arctic Governance, Arctic Circle Energy Resources and Japan's Role, Commercial Perspective of the Northern Sea Route, The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense, Environmental Problems in the Arctic Circle and an Overview of Japanese Policy, Arctic Governance: Possibilities and Limitations of Existing Frameworks, and the Arctic Problem and East Asian International Relations40. The report was followed by six recommendations* to the Japanese government:

- Japan’s financial means and technology should be used in the area of resource exploration and development to build win-win relationships with the Coastal States” (Asari 2013, 3). - In the area of marine transportation, appropriate application of the [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] should be ensured on the basis of the principles of the right of innocent passage (in the territorial waters of Coastal States) or freedom of navigation (in the waters beyond the territorial waters of Coastal States) on Arctic shipping routes (Asari 2013, 4). - “On the security front, the Japan-US cooperation should be further strengthened, taking into account implications for the strategic environment if power projections in the Arctic Ocean become easier” (Asari 2013, 7). - Fully taking into consideration the delicate environment of the Arctic Ocean, Japan should harness its expertise and technology to play a leading role in the area of environmental preservation” (Asari 2013, 8). - Active diplomacy should be pursued so that governance founded on a peaceful and stable international order [can] be ensured in the Arctic Ocean” (Asari 2013, 10) - The Japanese government’s Arctic policy structure should be reinforced (Asari 2013, 11;

39 https://www.spf.org/en/opri/news/workshop_on_arctic_governance_in_tokyo_2018.html. 40 With a translation of certain chapters in English *

cited in Ohnishi 2013b; JIIA 2013).

These initiatives from think-tanks, private lobbies and research institutes to promote a Japanese Arctic policy through activities and recommendations to the ministries and the government will, over the years, lead to an investment of politicians to build a structured Arctic strategy.

Structuration of Japan’s Arctic policy, the inscription of the Arctic in Japan’s Maritime Policy

Surrounded by oceans on all sides, Japan has jurisdiction over one of the largest ocean areas in the world corresponding to approximately twelve times the national land area of Japan. It is incumbent on Japan to protect the seas in order to secure the safety of its people and to protect the national territory, to utilize the seas as the basis for the existence and growth of the economic society, and to leave future generations a legacy in the form of the ocean as a valuable basis for the existence of humankind (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 1).

As an archipelago, Japan is entrusted with the world's sixth-largest Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ). Japan has developed strong fishing and maritime industries, with a long tradition of ocean research and development activities, and its contributions to ocean governance were uninspiring until the enactment of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy in 2007 (Terashima 2012). Although this Basic Plan does not mention the Arctic, this policy nevertheless remains the basis of Japan’s oceanic policy on which the Arctic strategy will be inscribed later.

a. First Basic Plan on Ocean Policy - 2008

In 2005, the Japanese Think-Tank the Ocean Policy Research Foundation presented a “Proposal for a 21st Century Ocean Policy” to Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe. In 2006, under the impulsion of the OPRF, the LDP, it was decided to form a multi-partisan Basic Ocean Law Study Group focusing on developing a Guideline for Ocean Policy and Basic Ocean Law (kaiyo kihonho kenkyu kai) (Ohnishi 2014, 192). The group was composed of political leaders, scholars and experts in various ocean fields, and observers from relevant government ministries and agencies. Japan set out the Basic Act on Ocean Policy that came into force in 200741 (Cabinet Order No. 33 of 2007)

41 The National Ocean Policy of Japan was approved by the National Diet of Japan (Act n.33 of 27 July 2007).

and released the First Basic Plan in March 2008 (Terashima 2012; Cabinet Office of Japan 2018). It is, according to Ohnishi (2014, 192), the consequence of Japan's adaptation to the request of UNCLOS (1996) to adapt to a new form of ocean governance, for a mode of governance where standards and policies are produced one after the other42.

In Japan, the Ministry for Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) oversees many ocean-related areas. Although the MLIT has not been explicitly designated as the lead agency for ocean policy, it also serves as the Ocean Policy Minister (Terashima 2012). The Headquarters for Ocean Policy was established in 2007 following articles 29 to 38 of the Act to promote measures about the oceans intensively and comprehensively. It is composed of the Director-General of the Headquarters for Ocean Policy (the Prime Minister, art.32) in charge of the general coordination, the Advisory Council for the National Headquarters for Ocean Policy, two deputy heads of the Headquarters appointed, the chief Cabinet secretary and the minister for Ocean Policy (art.33), all ministers of State other than the head and the deputy head (art.34) (Terashima 2012)43. This organization was completed with and advisory group of experts: Sub-committee and three Project Team, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF) alongside the Nippon Foundation.

The Headquarters is in charge of all the matters regarding the drafting and the promotion of execution of the Basic Ocean Plan, the coordination of implementation efforts by all relevant administrative bodies (ministries and agencies) based on the Basic Ocean Plan. And finally, matters regarding the planning and drafting of important measures concerning the oceans and coordination (Ohnishi 2014; Terashima 2012). The Cabinet Office of Japan is in charge of the tasks covering basic policies to promote measures with regard to the oceans comprehensively and systematically44. The Basic Act on Ocean Policy states that “clarify the responsibilities of

42 The Basic Plan states that “As a result of this Convention [UNCLOS], a new framework of international order of the sea emerged, in which coverage of high seas was reduced and freedom of activities on high seas was restricted, while coastal countries increased their powers. Now, new international norms for the sea are being formulated in various fields based on this new framework or for the purpose of supplementing it” Cabinet Office of Japan (2008, 2). Later it adds that “In the meantime, the international society has also been actively taking measures for managing and exploiting the sea. UNCLOS, which Japan ratified in 1996, outlined a new framework of international order of the sea, and concrete efforts are still underway to formulate new norms in various fields based on this new framework or for the purpose of supplementing it. Also, in international trends concerning development and environment, management and exploitation of the sea has been discussed. Japan needs to respond to these international moves, clearly showing its stance from the viewpoint of managing the sea” Cabinet Office of Japan (2008, 4). 43 The Headquarters Secretariat Office was established in the Cabinet Secretariat in July 2007. 44 https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/english/index_e.html

the state, the local governments, business operators and the citizenry” through 12 comprehensive measures45 (Cabinet Office of Japan 2007 art 1). In its Ocean policy, Japan should keep “bearing in mind the changes on the situation concerning the oceans, as well as based on an evaluation of the effect of measures with regard to the oceans, the Government shall review the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy almost every five years, and shall make necessary changes” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2007 art 16-5).

The new ocean policy, making the principle of the “coexistence of the oceans and mankind” an ultimate goal, it emphasizes the need to protect the marine environments for present and future generations and “securing the use and safety of the oceans” as a foundation for the continued existence of the human race. It would work toward “sustainable development and use” of the oceans to equitably meet present and future generations' needs. To that end, it would endeavor to “enhance scientific knowledge” about the still little understood oceans through research and development, and to achieve a “healthy development of marine industries”. Moreover, based on this, it would strive for “comprehensive management of the oceans,” whereby the government and private sector could join forces in comprehensively addressing the closely interrelated problems of the oceans. Given the oceans' physical unity and international nature, it would also work to assume a leadership role in creating an international ocean order, making “international coordination” a basic tenet of national policy (Ocean White Paper 2008, 16 cited in Terashima 2012).

The objective of the first Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was to “contribute to the sound development of the economy and society of our State (Japan) and to improve the stability of the lives of citizens as well as to contribute to the coexistence of the oceans and mankind” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2008, 4). And to support and ensure the Rule of Law (UNCLOS ratified in 1996 by Japan) in international navigation. To achieve these objectives, the Plan aimed for Japan to

45 Articles on the Promotion of Development and Use of Ocean Resources (art 17), Conservation of Marine Environment, etc. (art18), Promotion of Development of Exclusive Economic Zone, etc. (art 19), Securing Maritime Transport (art 20), Promotion of Ocean Survey (art 21), Promotion of Ocean Survey (art 22), Promotion of Research and Development of Ocean Science and Technology, etc. (art 23), Promotion of Ocean Industries and Strengthening the International Competitiveness (art 24), Integrated Management of the Coastal Zone (art 25), Conservation of the Remote Islands, etc. (art 26), Securing International Coordination and Promotion of International Cooperation (art 27), and Enhancement of Citizen's Understanding of the Oceans, etc. (art 28) (Cabinet Office of Japan 2007).

promote “smooth and sustainable utilization of the marine zone where Japan can exercise its jurisdiction, while keeping a good balance with the preservation of the marine environment” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2008, 4). Marine peace and security also need to be secured to support the stability of Japan’s industry and citizens’ life (Cabinet Office of Japan 2008, 5). And Finally, Japan needs to “contribute to coping with panhuman issues, such as realization of sustainable development in the sea and formulation of international order for using marine resources” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2008, 5). To support its objectives, the Basic Plan announce 12 measures already introduced in the Basic Act (see footnote 17) (Ohnishi 2014, 193).

Although this early Japanese ocean policy made no mention of the Arctic, it states the basic philosophy and principles underlying Japan's Ocean Policy and establishes a basic framework and mechanism to cope with comprehensive ocean management (Terashima 2012). With the acceleration of international trade and the creation of free trade areas, the ocean plays an increasingly key role in securing food, resources and energy, trade exchanges, and environmental protection. Other issues included contamination of the marine environment, declining fishery resources, and a string of incidents that could potentially impact Japan’s marine interests. While the Basic Act on Ocean Policy outlined guiding principles on ocean-related matters, with the aim of comprehensively and systematically addressing ocean policy across all government ministries and agencies, the basic plan declares the concrete measures to be taken during the next five years.

Second Basic Plan on Ocean Policy - 2013

The context in which this second Plan was drawn up was quite different from the first Plan with, on the one hand, the Great East Japan Earthquake and its consequences, social and economic changes, and the evolution in international and regional relations. Hence, the 2nd Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was formulated in 2013 to present a new vision of Japan’s oceanic policy, including those changes (Ohnishi 2014, 194). The new Plan set out a number of priorities to establish or reinforce Japan’s position as a maritime country. The Plan included measures for the “International cooperation and contribution to international community,” “Wealth and prosperity through ocean development and utilization of the sea,” a change of perspective “From a country

protected by the sea to a country that protects the sea,” and that “Venture into the unexplored frontier” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013).

According to Ohnishi (2014, 193-194), the various initiatives implemented by the government and supported by the OPRF since the development of the first Basic Plan have made it possible to change perceptions of social circumstances surrounding the sea in Japan46 but also in the Arctic Ocean47 (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013, 5). Hence, the Basic Plan introduces the Arctic into its policies for the first time in its second Plan in 2013. The plan highlights the effects of climate change in the Arctic (the decline of sea ice extent, ocean acidification, fisheries) and the Arctic Sea Route development. The plan then notes measures to address these changes: measures responding to changes in the Arctic Ocean caused by climate change. It finally underlines the need to promote comprehensive and strategic measures to tackle these issues (Ohnishi 2014, 188-189; Cabinet Office of Japan 2013, 6,8). As noted by (Ohnishi 2014, 198), the Plan emphasizes arctic issues related to science with a lesser focus on other matters such as sea routes. Indeed, the term “arctic” appears only 17 times in the text48, and while this may seem little, it is a first step at the intergovernmental level to recognize the Arctic Ocean as an ocean and structure the action of the Japanese government and to include the Arctic in its oceanic policy (Ohnishi 2014). In the section dedicated to “international coordination with regard to the sea”, the document only mentions that [Japanese] “government should make concerted efforts to gain observer status at the Arctic Council” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013, 52-53) with however providing concrete measures. Nevertheless, Japan did obtain the status of Observer at the Arctic Council in 2013 alongside China, South-Korea, Singapore, India and Italy.

Several points stand out in this Plan, illustrating Japan's position vis-à-vis the Arctic: first, climate change with its impacts in the Arctic and the world (the decline of sea ice extent, ocean acidification). The second point addressed is the development of the Arctic Sea Route. Japan is a nation whose trade is essentially based on maritime commerce, the very temporary opening of

46 “Review of Energy Strategy and Disaster-Prevention Countermeasures after the Great East Japan Earthquake” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013, 5) 47 “Other changes in social circumstances” about the Arctic Ocean (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013, 6). 48 Out of these 17 times, the document utilizes 7 times the expression “Arctic Sea Route”, 3 times “Arctic Ocean” putting a strong focus on the marine aspect.

shipping routes represents a strategic interest for it (cost reduction, maritime safety, preservation of the environment). And the third is the need to promote research around Arctic maritime traffic is stressed and the development of scientific international cooperation and collaboration both in the Arctic and in the Antarctic regions. Those three points are strongly connected in the Plan as it recommends scientific activities related to the Arctic Sea Route to provide data and tools applicable by industries (Ohnishi 2014, 200-201; Ikeshima 2014; Tonami 2014c).

a) Other changes in social circumstances, etc.

Although the Plan here makes express mention of the Arctic Ocean, it is only mentioned in the category "other changes", after the Review of Energy Strategy and Disaster-Prevention Countermeasures after the Great East Japan Earthquake, the development of the use of the sea and the conservation of marine interest (Ohnishi 2014, 195; Cabinet Office of Japan 2013, 6).

[1(1.d)] “Given changes in the Arctic Ocean caused by climate change, including the decline of sea ice extent, global concern has been mounting over the impact of such changes on the global climate system and potential for use of Arctic Sea Route. In Japan, there have been expectations for promotion of research and survey activities with regard to the Arctic and reform in maritime transport by reduction of transportation costs. Other trends are observed as well such as changes in the ocean environment attributed in part to global warming and ocean acidification, rapid shift of Japanese consumers from fish amid growing demand for fishery products in the rest of the world, and increase and changes in the distribution of goods via the oceans associated with the remarkable economic development of East Asian countries” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013, 6).

b) Measures responding to changes in the Arctic Ocean caused by climate change

[2(6b)] “Measures responding to changes in the Arctic Ocean caused by climate change: Given the changes in the Arctic Ocean caused by climate change, Japan has been facing diverse issues to study and address, such as securing maritime transport, securing the safety navigation, promotion of research and survey activities, conservation of environment, and promotion of international coordination and cooperation. Comprehensive and strategic measures should therefore be promoted to tackle these issues” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013, 8).

c) “Improvement of Scientific Knowledge of the Oceans”

[3(3)] “Observations, surveys and research of the Arctic, Antarctic and other areas are important for assessing the impacts on climate change and future projections on

the global scale and in Japan and areas around it. Above all, observations, surveys and research of the Arctic will lead to assessment of the potential for future use of Arctic Sea Route, so the government should continue and promote such activities” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013, 11).

The potential of an Arctic Sea Route and resources is also slightly underlined in this Plan which proposes to promote “talks with relevant countries on the possibility of use of the Arctic Sea Route, which has recently been attracting interest, and under coordination with shipping operators, shippers and other parties, examine the possibility of the opening of shipping routes, technological issues, economic issues and other challenges” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013, 26). But also to “conduct experimental test to create sea ice flash charts for safe navigation along the Arctic Sea Route, by using sea ice observation data collected by satellites such as the Water Circulation Change Observation Satellite (GCOM-W) and Advanced Land Observing Satellite-2 (ALOS-2)” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013, 34). Later, it mention the coordination between ministries to “implement demonstration experiments to understand the situation of ship navigation in marine zones, including outer sea marine zones, by using a satellite equipped with automatic identification system (AIS) receivers, and implement demonstration experiments related to the creation of sea ice flash chart to secure safe navigation of ships on the Arctic Sea Route” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013, 39). International cooperation and exchanges are closely linked to science as the Plan underlines that “Japan should actively promote international cooperation for marine observations conducted in coordination with related agencies of Japan and other countries, including bilateral cooperation based on agreements on cooperation in science and technology, etc. in order to promote marine observational research to assess the impacts of atmospheric fluctuations in the Arctic, Pacific and Indian Oceans on the environment, which have been drawing increasing attention globally” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013, 53).

Following the development of the new Basic Plan, the Parliamentary League for Arctic Frontier was established in October 2013 to initiate policy discussions on the Arctic in the Diet and support Japan’s contribution to the Arctic (Tonami 2016a; Zhuravel 2016). This League participated in the “Formulation of the National Policy on Arctic, and Proper Allocation of Government Resource for the Arctic Related Activities”. Since its establishment, the League has made proposals to the government to promote Arctic research, increase the budget dedicated to

Arctic research, develop Japan’s first Arctic research icebreaker (included in the 2018 budget plan). The former Minister of Justice and member of the House of Representatives, Kamikawa Yoko, was a founding member of the League49, also participated in the Global Agenda Council on the Arctic under World Economic Forum (WEF) in September 2014 (Sunami 2013 ppt (Green and Treadwell 2016). According to Green and Treadwell (2016), the WEF has worked in the global investment community to “demystify” the Arctic and recently unveiled a protocol with guidelines for sustainable investment working with Arctic residents. Ms. Kamikawa has been participating in study groups related to Water and Ocean, sustainable use, the sustainability of traditional life, and indigenous peoples' culture, taking into account various perspectives: the industry, government, and academia.

The resolution of the League “Formulation of the National Policy on the Arctic, and Allocation of Sufficient Budget for Arctic-related Activities” called for the formulation of a Comprehensive National Policy on the Arctic. It also established cabinet-level meetings on the Arctic and inter- ministerial meeting and created a platform for a comprehensive policy on the Arctic, including business leaders. This platform aims to support a better mechanism of science, informing both policy leaders and the general public within Japan and the world actors. To increase Japan’s participation in international conferences and workshops on the Arctic and contribute through our scientific and technological capabilities. Finally, to secure the allocation of government resources for the Arctic activities.

Under the Second Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, cross-sectional policies involved several ministries as determined by the Headquarters for Ocean Policy, including Japan’s Arctic Policy, were approved by Cabinet decision (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 2). The Government Annual Report had been publicized each following fiscal year, showcasing the political measures enforced on each policy identified within the five-year Basic Plan (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018). While the Government Annual Reports and in Councilors' Meeting reports have underlined in their reports the necessity to keep evaluating the effect of measures undertaken in the Arctic Ocean, there

49 Where she served as the Secretary General.

are few documents on the evaluation of the effectiveness of measures implemented with regard to the oceans, and especially the Arctic Ocean50.

Japan’s Official Arctic Policy of 2015, a comprehensive policy

[Today is] the most important day ever for Japan’s Arctic policy. Just 6 hours ago, Prime Minister [Shinzo] Abe adopted a comprehensive Arctic policy for the first time in history…Economic opportunities and environmental challenges…the entire global environment. This recognition is the basis of our action” (Shiraishi Kazuko, 2015) 51.

On October 16, 2015, the Japanese Arctic Ambassador, Ms. Shiraishi Kazuko, announced during the Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavík, Japan’s first official Arctic Policy for which had just been adopted that very day by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet in Tokyo. It marks the recognition of the increased importance of Arctic issues by the Japanese government. This policy is based on the 2013 Basic Plan on Ocean Policy and intended to define Japan’s Arctic policy through several specific measures. Aiming to use a multidisciplinary approach to the Arctic, in this policy, Japan sees itself as being:

Called upon to recognize both the Arctic’s latent possibilities and its vulnerability to environmental changes, and to play a leading role for sustainable development in the Arctic in the international community, with foresight and policy based on science and technology that Japan has advantage in order to achieve sustainable development” […]

From the standpoint of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, the policy defines strategic initiatives in the fields of diplomacy, national security, environment, transportation, resource development, information and communications, and science and technology, from a multidisciplinary perspective with contributions from industry, academia, and the government. It aims to set Japan as an important player that contributes to the international community through its action to Arctic issues (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 2).

50 H. Nakahara, "Japan's First and Second Basic Plan on Ocean Policy and the Government Annual Reports; Considering the Formation of the Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy," 2018 OCEANS - MTS/IEEE Kobe Techno-Oceans (OTO), Kobe, 2018, pp. 1-4. 51 Ms. Shiraishi Kazuko speech at the Arctic Circle, ‘Japan’s new Arctic Policy’, October 16th, 2015, https://vimeo.com/143398544

In its policy, Japan refers itself as one of the states ‘surrounding’ the Arctic (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 6). However, Tokyo recognizes that Japan does not have a legal basis to participate in formal discussions regarding the Arctic or territorial disputes. As most Japanese companies are not ready to invest in Arctic-related project, the government does not have a short-term vision for this region. Instead, this policy aims to ensure the status quo and prepare for future opportunities. Hence, as a comprehensive, all-englobing policy, the document list seven priorities that Japan aims to address in the Arctic:

1. Global environmental Issues 2. Science and technology 3. Natural resources development 4. Arctic sea route 5. Ensuring the rule of law and promoting international cooperation 6. indigenous peoples of the Arctic 7. National security

For the sake of understanding, these measures have here been grouped into 4 points: Global Environmental Issues, Science & Technology (a), Resource and the Arctic Sea Route (b), International Cooperation and Security (c), and indigenous peoples (d). In order to support its policy, the policy also outlines three specific initiatives on which Japan should focus its action: Research and Development (R&D), International Cooperation (IC), and Sustainable Use.

Global Environmental Issues, Science & Technology

In its section "Need to Address Arctic Issues", Global Environmental Issues is the first mentioned, thus illustrating Japan’s concerns on climate change and Environmental protection. The policy notes that the changes in the Arctic will have effects domestically, regionally, and globally. By stating that “there are also concerns that change in the Arctic environment could increase the frequency of extreme weather events in Japan and other mid-and high-latitude states”, Japan’s is justifying and legitimizing its interest in the Arctic. It also uses the competencies and expertise of Japanese’s researchers to fully participate in research activities concerning climate change and environmental protection.

Japan has played a leading role in formulating the Kyoto Protocol, the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, and other agreements through which the international community has responded to global environmental problems such as global warming and the loss of biodiversity. While strengthening international cooperation, including collaboration with the Asia Pacific states, Japan has proposed advanced efforts in both mitigation and adaptation. Japan should use its experiences and findings to contribute significantly to addressing these global environmental issues stemming from the environmental changes in the Arctic (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 3).

The policy does not present any specific initiative for environmental issues but highlights its implication and involvement in establishing environmental protection. Later, the policy emphasizes its contribution to scientific knowledge and data-sharing. The long Japanese contribution to polar research and the contribution of Japan in international activities and events are underlined in this policy.

At the same time, Japan should move toward establishing observation and research stations strategically in Arctic states, leading international initiatives, and training and supporting young researchers who can be active contributors to international discussions (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 4). […] Work toward a comprehensive understanding of the environmental changes in the Arctic and their effect on the rest of the globe, assess their socio-economic impact, and convey robust information to stakeholders to enable appropriate decision-making and problem-solving involving the Arctic via strengthened research and projects such as the Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Projects (ArCS), which began in fiscal year 2015 (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 6).

The policy lists a series of specific initiatives to support its research and development activities in the arctic.

- Promotion of Arctic research to contribute to policy decision-making and problem- solving

- Strengthening observation and analysis systems and developing the most advanced observation instruments

- Establishment of a research network in Japan - Establishment of research and observation stations in Arctic states - Data sharing and management - Training and supporting researchers

- Arctic research vessel

Work toward a comprehensive understanding of the environmental changes in the Arctic and their effect on the rest of the globe, assess their socio-economic impact, and convey robust information to stakeholders to enable appropriate decision-making and problem-solving involving the Arctic via strengthened research and projects such as the Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Projects (ArCS), which began in fiscal year 2015 (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 6).

Concretely, these measures will have enabled the establishment of the ArCS project, GRENE's successor from 2015 to 2020, followed by ArCS-II for 2020-2025. Detailed in more detail in the second Chapter of this dissertation, the ArCS is a multi-disciplinary project contributing to regional and global knowledge. It carries out capacity-building research programs on climate science, which contributes to regional and global knowledge research. Its main objectives are to: “elucidate the changes in the climate and environment, clarify their effects on human society, and provide accurate projections and environmental assessments for internal and external stakeholders so that they can make appropriate decisions on the sustainable development of the Arctic region. [...] This is being done by comprehensively promoting research on climate, weather, ocean environment changes, the material cycle of short-life air pollution materials, and ecosystems and biodiversity, and also by providing a data management system as well as examination from the point of view of the humanities." (ArCS Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Project 2015).

To support its Arctic policy, Japan aims to make full use of its strength in science and technology and give full consideration to the Arctic environment and ecosystem.

Although the policy invites to “consider the design of a research ship for the Arctic as a new international Arctic research platform” the negotiations for the construction of such a vessel are still unsuccessful (funding).

Sustainable development: Resource and the Arctic Sea Route

In a footnote of the introduction of the policy, the rights of the Arctic coastal states and their sovereignty over the resources in their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelves are recalled, highlighting the attachment of Japan to the international legal framework and well as

its neutrality in territorial disputes in the Arctic (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 1). The section concerning resources is divided between mineral resources and marine living resources. Using the numbers put forward in 2008 by a survey by the US Geological Survey on the estimations of natural oil and gas resources in the Arctic Ocean52, the policy stresses however, the problematic character of their exploitation (extreme cold, sea ice etc.). Hence, “under these circumstances, resources should be addressed steadily over the mid and long term from the viewpoint of continued diversification of resources supplies, considering progress in resources development technology in sea ice regions, cooperative relationships with coastal states, and factors such as needs of the private sector” (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 5).The policy offers two specific initiatives for Arctic resources: concerning the mineral resources, to "continue financial support for Greenland Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. which is participating in an exploration project in an ocean area northeast of Greenland, via the Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC)" (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 8-9).

Concerning marine living resources, the policy states that “it is necessary to promote through due cooperation with the coastal states and secure the need for food security in a balanced manner while ensuring the sustainability of the resources based on scientific evidence” (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 6). Following this point, the policy stresses the need for the “formulation of rules for preservation and management of fishery resources in high seas of the Arctic Ocean” (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 7). Under the section on “Sustainable Use” the policy underline the need to "cooperate with other interested states, to consider establishment of a conversation and management framework for achieving their sustainable use based on scientific evidences and with consideration of the Arctic environment" (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 8-9).

In its Arctic Policy, Japan links the development of arctic shipping to the development of new rules for navigation safety. The focus on arctic shipping is here mainly centered around the Arctic Sea Route (NSR) and does not mention the Northwest Passage.

52 Undiscovered estimated resources; 90 billion barrels of petroleum (13% of world total) and 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (30% of world total).

Japan should actively participate in the international debates regarding the drafting of new rules. It is also important for Japan to put its expertise in science and technology to use in developing effective new technologies to secure the safety of navigation in the Arctic Ocean. Considering measures to support Japanese companies, for greater awareness of business opportunities in the Arctic and networking with companies and individuals in the business communities of Arctic states (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 5)

The policy invites to "consider measures to support Japanese companies, for greater awareness of business opportunities in the Arctic and networking with companies and individuals in the business communities of Arctic states”. It also highlights the need to identify the natural, technical, systemic, and economic challenges of the Arctic Sea Route, to promote the preparation of an environment for its utilization by Japanese shipping companies and others, by constructing systems to support maritime navigation such as a system to predict sea ice distribution and one to forecast weather (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 8). To support its Arctic policy, Japan aims for economic and social compatibility with climate and environmental changes and resource development, and further development of the Arctic Sea Route. As argued by Moe and Stokke (2019, 29), this policy's tone concerning business opportunities is both very neutral and very formal. The Japanese government uses sensitive language to underline its desire not to step on the toes of Arctic coastal states in their sovereign rights.

International Cooperation and Security

In this policy, international cooperation is to be promoted for research activities and governance mechanisms. As stated by the policy, “from the standpoint of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation” Japan sees itself as a potential mediator in Arctic issues. This trend follows Japan’s international policy strategy based on the Rule of Law and international cooperation. The policy recalls, in a footnote, article 34 of the UNCLOS relating to "ice-covered areas" and the need to cooperate "with coastal states to ensure an appropriate balance between the freedom and safety of navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment under the principle of international law" (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 4). Japan stresses that the “Freedom of navigation and other principles of international law must be respected” (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 4).

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has developed the "Polar Code", a binding international framework to specify standards for maritime safety in polar seas, protection of the marine environment, and the manning, certification, and training of sea farers. The code is being implemented as amendments to existing treaties, namely the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW). Continue to be an active participant in the discussions based on opinions from related industries (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 7).

The policy highlights Japan’s participation in organizing international conferences and events such as the Arctic Science Summit Week (ASSW) in 2015 in Toyama. The policy emphasizes the need for Japan to involve itself further in Arctic Institutions and participate in elaborating international agreements and rules regarding the Arctic. On this point, Japan has, since the elaboration of this policy, been participating in the process of developing the Polar Code in 2017. Moreover, the Japanese government signed the moratorium on fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean in 2018.

From this perspective, it is important for Japan to put its scientific knowledge and advanced technology to use in order to make further contributions to the activities of the Arctic Council (AC). It is also important for Japan to participate actively in international forums other than the AC, and to initiate constructive discussions based on its scientific knowledge when necessary. In parallel with multilateral initiatives, it is also important to develop bilateral discussions and cooperative relationships with Arctic and other states concerned (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 5).

The policy recommends for Japan to contributes further to arctic institutions like the Arctic Circle or Arctic Frontiers. Concerning its contribution to the AC activities, Japan should participate actively in the working groups, task forces, and other council meetings. But also in the discussions concerning the role of observers and its possible evolutions (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 8). It also encourages Japan to expand its bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Arctic and non-arctic states in polar research and related fields (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 7-8). Through various measures, Japan’s Arctic policy wishes to ensure the rule of law, promote international cooperation in a peaceful and orderly manner, and pay full attention to security developments in the Arctic.

As argued by Welch (2020, 474), “Security is not at stake in any meaningful sense in the Arctic, but is very much at skate because of it”. Non-military issues such as the environment are currently being seen as security threats. For Ikeshima (2014, 82-84), the threats in the Arctic both involve traditional and non-traditional security actors, including states, non-states (domestic or international), and non-human entities (Buzan et al. 1998). And, the threatened factors may include states and non-states (individuals). Already in 2013, the National Security Strategy (NSS) elaborated by the government of Japan defined Japan as a Maritime State pursuing “Open and Stable Seas” and where the seas are regarded as a global commons53 (Government of Japan 2013). In its NSS, the government notes that “there is a growing risk of incidents at sea and possible escalation into unexpected situations” (Government of Japan 2013, 8). The NSS argues here that “the Arctic Sea is deemed to have enormous potential for developing new shipping routes and exploration of natural resources. While it is expected that states concerned work together under relevant international rules, such potential could provide new causes of friction among them” (Government of Japan 2013, 9). According to Tonami (2016a, 60), in July 2015, the National Security Council of Japan conducted a ministerial meeting on Arctic affairs and especially on the Arctic Sea Route's viability showing the growing concern of the Japanese government on those issues. Although security issues are usually avoided in Arctic discussion (cf Arctic Council), in its Arctic policy, Japan discourages the Arctic region's militarization. It states that “some Arctic states, with a view toward securing their national interests and protecting their territories, have become active in the area of national defense. Moves toward expanding military presence may have an impact on the international security environment” (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 1).

Like the 2013 Basic Plan, the 2015 Arctic policy argues that there is a “risk” that the development of the shipping routes and natural resources in the arctic could result in “friction among states”. Moreover, under the Abe administration, Japan's National Security Strategy stated that “the Arctic Sea is deemed to have enormous potential for developing new shipping routes and

53 Ikeshima (2014, 84) invites discussion on the definition of the term "global common" which is both comprehensive and controversial. It can include outer space and cyber space, maritime space and, depending on the author and politic goals, the Arctic as well.

exploration of natural resources (Ikeshima 2016). Despite the cooperation among the concerned states, those resources' potential could provide causes of friction among them (National Security Strategy of Japan, p. 52 cited in Ikeshima 2016). Hence, the Japanese Arctic state that it is “important to prevent moves to strengthen military presence in the region from leading to tension and confrontations”, and in this perspective, Japan aims to pay a full attention to security developments in the Arctic (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 6).

Indigenous People

The 2015 Arctic Policy marks the first time that an official Japanese document mentions the Indigenous Peoples and their rights. This policy recognizes the Arctic as the homeland of four million people, including indigenous peoples with a wide variety of languages, cultures, and traditions. As Indigenous peoples are easily affected by environmental change and expanded economic activity in the Arctic, Japan recognize here the needs to examine how it can contribute to achieving a sustainable development in which indigenous peoples can see benefits while protecting the foundations of their traditional cultures and lifestyles (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 3). In its Arctic policy, Japan wishes to uphold indigenous peoples' rights to continuity in their traditional economic and social foundations.

The development of the Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (2018)

In 2017, the Advisory Council Meeting established a Sub-Committee on Maritime Security54 which is the main pillar of the Third Basic Plan (Kanehara, 2018). The other pillars are the promotion of the industrial use of the ocean, the maintenance and protection of the marine environment, the improvement of scientific knowledge, the promotion of the Arctic policy, international collaboration and cooperation, and finally develop human resources with knowledge of the ocean and to advance ‘citizens’ understanding.

Based on evaluation of progress under the 2nd Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, the report recommended that recent changes in Japan’s maritime situation should be considered when

54 “The measures combatting military threat, terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, piracy, environmental/ resource destruction, and illegal seaborne migration (Kanehara 2018).

formulating the 3rd Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. In particular, the report stressed the need to consider recent environmental changes and threats in the oceans surrounding Japan and progress with initiatives aimed at creating open and stable oceans based on the rule of law. The report also recommended the existing Basic Act on Ocean Policy to be fundamentally restructured and encompass maritime security on a broader scale. Proactive measures must be taken to guarantee safety and peace of mind for Japan's people and safeguard its national marine interests. Another area covered in the report was scientific knowledge. It included taking steps to expand marine resource development and offshore wind power to ensure stable supplies of resources and energy, using international frameworks to preserve the marine environment, enable comprehensive management of coastal areas, and secure and develop human resources to reinforce Japan as a maritime country. The report also recommended measures based on international cooperation and arctic policy. To implement these various measures with efficiency, the report recommended stepping up processes to reliably verify, evaluate and review implementation and progress based on process management (PDCA cycle), and advised using easy to understand wording to help members of the public to understand.

Following the GRIPS initiative, the OPRI published in November 2017 a report entitled "Japan’s Future Priority Areas of Arctic Policy" to prepare the new 3rd Plan on Ocean Policy (hereafter the Plan or the Basic Plan) on Ocean Policy formulated in spring 2018. This report argues that “while there are broadly common elements between Arctic policy and ocean policy, policies on the Arctic should be treated as an independent section in the Third Revised Basic Plan on Ocean Policy in order to make the content of Arctic policy more concrete and effective” (Ocean Policy Research Institute 2017, 3). The OPRI argues that the future Basic Plan should also have a cross- sectoral and multidisciplinary approach in order to be able to take into account the various issues related to the Arctic (e.g., environmental, social, economic, and political, etc.). This report comprises five policy elements to be considered for the development of the new Basic Plan, with specific initiatives.

1. Enhancement and Promotion of Arctic Research (1) Enhance initiatives related to Arctic research (2) Strengthen and support infrastructures for scientific research in the Arctic Ocean

2. Protection of the Marine Environment of the Arctic Ocean: Responses and Contributions (1) Efforts to address environmental change in the Arctic Ocean (2) Ensuring Conservation of the Marine Environment of the Arctic Ocean 3. Promotion of the Ocean Economy (Blue Economy) in the Arctic (1) Support innovations for promoting a sustainable blue economy in the Arctic (2) Create Arctic-related business opportunities 4. Securing Safety and Security of the Arctic Ocean (1) Contribute to maintaining the “rule of law” in the Arctic Ocean (2) Enhance maritime domain awareness (MDA) in the Arctic 5 Promoting International Cooperation on the Arctic 5. Promote international cooperation in the Arctic (1) Contribute to the process of international rulemaking on the Arctic (2) Promote international Arctic scientific and technological cooperation (3) Develop and foster human resources to be able to contribute to solving problems in the Arctic (4) Contribute to achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the Arctic

Moreover, the report recommends that the government establish a unified and coordinating system between the relevant ministries and agencies for the implementation of its arctic policies under the general coordination of the National Ocean Policy Secretariat of the Cabinet Office. This “control center” will help to coordinate an “All Japan” perspective in arctic affairs(Ocean Policy Research Institute 2017, 3). The report once again recalls Japan's need to have its own icebreaker for arctic research, stressing that South Korea and China have already had vessels for several years.

The objectives of the 3rd Basic Plan (2018-2022) are to set Japan as an important player that contributes to the international community through its action to Arctic issues.

As well as formulating Japan’s Arctic Policy (decided by the Meeting of the Headquarters for Ocean Policy in October 2015), current efforts concerning a policy for the Arctic draw on Japan’s strength in science and technology with a focus on the three areas of research and development, international cooperation, and sustainable use (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 9).

Research and Development

In this third Basic Plan, the Arctic is first mentioned in the section dedicated to Changes Involving Improved Scientific Knowledge of the Oceans, the Arctic Policy, and International Collaboration and Cooperation, but also in several sections concerning the arctic within the Plan (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 6, 9-10, 35, 38, 105-106). In the continuation of the 2015 policy and the ArCS project, the 2018 Basic Plan proposes various measures and recommendations to promote its Arctic Policy. The first axis is centered around research and development (1) and divided into four sub-sections (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 105-107).

a. Strengthening Research Initiatives in the Arctic Region b. Strengthening the Observational and Research System Pertaining to the Arctic Region c. Promoting International Cooperation in Science and Technology for the Arctic Region d. Developing Human Resources to Contribute to Solutions for the Arctic Region

In this Plan, Japanese polar research's responsibility is entrusted to the MEXT, particularly for programs concerning the study of climate change and its impacts. However, the Plan also mentions the MoFA's role in dispatching experts and developing bilateral agreements on cooperation in science and technology (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018). The Plan echoes the famous expression that what happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic (e.g., raise global sea levels and increase the frequency of extreme weather) (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 38, 93).

Japan fully recognizes the importance of the Arctic to Japan and will focus on promotion of research and development, international cooperation as well as sustainable use in the Arctic, while taking account of enhancement of our presence by resolving global challenges through promotion of observation and research, active participation in the formulation of international rules and the promotion of international cooperation which contributes to Japan’s interest. In doing so, we recognize the potential of the Arctic and its vulnerability to climate change, and we respect the resilience of the traditional socioeconomic infrastructure of the indigenous people in the Arctic (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 37).

The impact of environmental change in the Arctic poses challenges for the international community, regardless of whether they are Arctic states. Bilateral and multilateral international cooperation is indispensable in order to respond to the challenges. Environmental change in the

Arctic could have impacts not only around Japan but also on the international community. While making use of the Arctic Policy, Tokyo aims to build cooperative relations on various diplomatic occasions and create an international environment that contributes to Japan’s interests (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 38).

These sections bring together different measures and objectives to support and strengthen the objectives of ArCS which are:

- To promote scientific and technology cooperation in polar research, obtain and analyze scientific data (MEXT) - To develop sophisticated satellites (MEXT) - To bolster continuous observation using research stations and research ships (MEXT) - To promote advanced technology development such as AUV (MEXT) - To consider the construction of an Arctic region research ship with icebreaker capacity (MEXT)55 - To encourage interdisciplinary initiatives by means of networked research hubs of several Japanese universities and research institutes (MEXT, MLIT) - To strengthen international collaborative research (MOFA, MEXT, MOE) - Promote data-sharing (MEXT, MLIT) - Support young careers scientist in natural, social and humanities sciences (MEXT).

Based on the Arctic Challenge for Sustainability (ArCS), Japan promotes international joint research though collaboration in the natural science and the social science disciplines. This cooperation aims to develop a comprehensive understanding of the Arctic environmental changes, clarify the social and economic impact, and provide data to stakeholders to facilitate appropriate decision-making and solutions (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 105). The ArCS program ended with the end of the fiscal year in March 2020. A new program, ArCS-II, followed. According to interviews, ArCS-II was supposed to be inscribed in a new version of the Arctic policy announced for 2020. However, it was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

55 The development or purchase of a new icebreaker dedicated to Arctic research has still not been confirmed despite the numerous recommendations and speeches in this direction.

International Cooperation

The second axis presented to support Japan’s Arctic policy is based on international cooperation (2) and is closely linked to Research and development (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 107-109). This section of the Plan is divided into three sub-sections focusing on:

b. Proactive Participation in the Formulation of International Rules based on the Rule of Law (as the standard for all ocean activities) c. Promoting Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation with the Arctic States and Others d. Further Contribution to the Activities of the Arctic Council (AC)

Bearing in mind the economic and security environments surrounding the Arctic, Japan will proactively work with other countries by making use of multilateral fora including the Arctic Council and bilateral dialogues with the Arctic States so that principles of international law including freedom of navigation is respected in the Arctic Ocean based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

We are facing challenges caused by the impacts which the environmental change in the Arctic region poses to the global environment including climate change. We will share our scientific knowledge based on Japan’s observation and research on the Arctic with the international community through multilateral and bilateral frameworks. As a major player in the discussions on the Arctic, we will contribute to resolve global challenges through a wide range of our international cooperation. For that purpose, Japan will consider the possibility of further engagement, including setting a new agenda responding to actual challenges, bearing in mind the promotion of our activities in the Arctic region such as economic activities. (MOFA, MEXT, MOE) (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 107).

Japan's position on the Arctic is coherent in its positioning as a leading role in formulating new frameworks and support the rule of law (UNCLOS) as well as its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy56 (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 9, 38, 107-108). The Basic Plan sets out Japan's desire to become more involved in bi-lateral and multi-lateral cooperation with Arctic institutions (CA, Arctic Circle, Arctic Frontiers), and the Trilateral High-Level Dialogue (implemented since 2016) by sending high-level representatives, experts, and also hosting events (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 108). This enhanced cooperation for the promotion of international joint research, research

56 The peace and prosperity of international society depend on a free and open maritime order. Maritime order must therefore be encouraged throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Through this strategy, Japan intends to promote the fundamental values of the rule of law, democracy and freedom of navigation (Aizawa 2018, 8; Babin 2019b, 7).

exchanges with the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) is placed under MEXT and MIC's direction. As this Plan focuses on Japan’s maritime policy, it supports the enhancement of “International cooperation in the field of oceanographic observation in coordination with the relevant organizations in Japan and abroad including bilateral cooperation based on agreements on cooperation in science and technology (MOFA, MEXT, MOE)” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 113). The Plan aims to further promote policy dialogues with Arctic states to strengthen Japan's contributions to the Arctic issues as an important player (MOFA, MEXT, MOE) (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 108-109, 113). This desire for involvement was reflected in the organization of many international events in Japan in 2020, such as the international conference Isar-6, the 3rd Arctic Science Ministerial, or a Regional edition of the Arctic Circle forum57.

Sustainable Use

“Since the Japanese climate ranges from the subarctic to the subtropical, it is necessary to promote regional measures to facilitate responses to the diverse marine environments” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 126-127). The third axis presented in the Basic Plan concerning the promotion of Japanese arctic policy is the sustainable development of this region. It revolves around three main points:

a. Utilizing the Arctic Sea Route b. Securing Protection of the Marine Environment in the Arctic Sea c. Promoting a Sustainable Maritime Economy in the Arctic Region

In its section (4) and (7) on promoting Japan’s Arctic Policy, the Basic Plan reviews Japan's participation in the LNG Yamal project, the use and promotion of the Arctic Sea Route. As in other Japanese official documents, the attention to Arctic shipping routes but also natural resources is mainly focused on the Russian arctic sea-line regions and does not mention the Northwest Passage (NWP)58 (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 37, 109-110). This underlines the

57 Although several events had to be either postponed, canceled or moved to online sessions due to the Covid 19 pandemic. 58 The Northwest Passage runs from the Labrador Sea and plunges into the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, between North America and Greenland, to join the Beaufort Sea and ultimately the Bering Strait.

focus of the interest of the Japanese government and companies for the NSR façade (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013, 2018; Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015). To promote this maritime route, the Plan announces the development of studies and data-sharing supported by the MEXT, METI, and the MLIT on the infrastructure and navigational support systems, including sea ice projection systems and weather forecasting systems. It also includes the conduction of "experimental tests to create sea ice flash charts for safe navigation by using sea ice observation data collected by satellites such as the Water Circulation Change Observation Satellite (GCOM-W) 59 and

Advanced Land Observing Satellite-2 (ALOS-2) (MEXT)” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 109). The Plan also highlights the importance of the conservation and management of fishery resources in the high seas, echoing Japan's resolution to support the fishing moratorium agreement in the central Arctic Ocean(Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 37, 110).

The Basic Plan concludes by highlighting the need to strengthen collaboration between the government (MEXT, METI, MLIT), the private sector, and research institutes to promote the development of the Arctic region (still focused on the Russia-Europe facade) "in a manner that is compatible with environmental protection" (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 110).

While the report from the OPRI in 2017 recommended the government to reinforce the capacity of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the Arctic in order to respond to changes in the safety and security environment of the Arctic Ocean, the 2018 Plan make no mention of security or safety (Ocean Policy Research Institute 2017, 11). The report connected the security in the Arctic region to the promotion of international cooperation, collaboration in research activities60.

Discussion

O. Young (1992a) argues the “most distinctive way for a region to become distinctive in policy terms is for it to emerge as the site of one or more severe regional conflicts that engage the

59 “Global Change Observation Mission – Water. GCOM has built a system for continuous and long-term (10-15 years) global observation to clarify the global scale of climate change and the water cycle mechanism. The purpose is to demonstrate the effectiveness and to use the data for climate change research, weather prediction, and fisheries” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 109). 60 Make progress in charting and mapping the Arctic Ocean and waterways, creating sea ice flash charts for safe navigation along the Arctic Sea Route, together and in cooperation with the Arctic coastal states, and sharing this information with other concerned states (Ocean Policy Research Institute 2017, 12).

interest of the great powers” (O. Young 1992a, 243). Despite some tensions (e.g., Norway/Russia, Bering strait), it will not probably be the case for the Arctic region in the foreseeable future as the region's powers are deeply committed to peaceful settlements. Later, Young underling the Arctic paradoxes: being a region where the power is firmly committed to peaceful collaboration and cooperation, the Arctic might hence “achieve the status of a distinctive region for policy analysis and public decision-making” (O. Young 1992a, 244). The uniqueness or exceptionality of the Arctic has often been put forward in academic, press and government literature to support certain interests. Beyond the myths (remoteness, inhospitable region, etc.), rapid climate change in the Arctic, the sustainable development of this region are ways of emphasizing its exceptional nature and the need to promote specific policies. The report by Ocean Policy Research Institute (2017, 3) rightly argues that ocean waters cover nearly two-thirds of the Arctic region, but, "unlike Antarctica, there is no single comprehensive legal regime governing the Arctic region. Therefore, the Law of the Sea, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is the main legal regime governing the Arctic. In this context, it is appropriate that Arctic policy is recognized as part of the ocean policy”.

As pointed out by Ide (2019, 43), a former Japanese Ambassador for Arctic Affairs, “the ocean is very important for Japan in the context of trade routes, sources of various resources (including fish and minerals) and security as a whole”. Japan projects itself as a maritime state and identifies its Arctic policy is as a part of its oceanic policy developed within the Headquarter for Ocean Policy (Ikeshima 2014; Väätänen and Zimmerbauer 2019; Tonami 2018; OPRF 2019). This trend was already observed in the 2013 Basic Plan, which included the Arctic for the first time in a government-level document. It was confirmed again in the official Policy of 2015 and in the 3rd Basic Plan of 2018 elaborated in the headquarters. The Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, adopted by the Cabinet in May 2018, positioned the Arctic as one of the main measures in Japan's ocean policy.

2011 2012 2012 2013 2015 2017 2018

Arctic OPRI Blue Book 2nd Basic Official Arctic 3rd Basic Conference JIIA Report Recommendation MoFA Plan Policy Plan Japan - OPRF Report

Environmental Establish Arctic Natural Climate Promote Arctic 1 S&T S&T protection policy resources change Policy

International Environmental Environmental 2 NSR S&T NSR R&D Regulation protection protection

Natural Environmental International Ocean/blue 3 IC R&D IC resources protection Regulation economy

Natural Environmental Indigenous Sustainable 4 IC IC National Security resources conservation peoples Use

Arctic National 5 NSR IC diplomacy Security

National Sustainable 6 Arctic policy security Use

Arctic Sea International 7 Route & Regulation resources

+ Specific 8 IC initiatives

TABLE 2: THIS TABLE SUMMARIZES VARIOUS MEASURES INITIALLY RECOMMENDED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARCTIC POLICY ON THE PART OF THINK TANK (OPRF, JIIA), AND IN OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS (BLUE BOOK, BASIC PLANS, AND OFFICIAL POLICY). COMPILED BY AUTHOR.

Reading this table, we note many similarities in the measures established or recommended for Japan in the Arctic.

1. The Arctic Sea Route opening and resources (living and mineral) developments are the arguments/measures that come up most regularly in the various political texts and recommendations to the Japanese government

2. Ambassador Shiraishi announced research and development as a key element of Japan's Arctic Policy during her speech at the Arctic Circle in 2015. The texts consulted all mention this point, whether it is “research and development” (R&D) or “science and technology” (S&T). Scientific cooperation is the basis of the international collaboration process in the Arctic, both in the development of commercial opportunities and in its environmental protection. The various plans, policies, and reports from the government or Think Tanks all highlight Japan’s need to have its own research icebreaker dedicated to the Arctic. However,

despite these recommendations, negotiations are still underway to finance and construct such a vessel.

3. International Cooperation (IC) is mentioned in all documents except the official policy of 2015. It remains present in scientific cooperation, sustainable development and the fight against climate change.

4. Although it does not always receive a specific recommendation or measure in these documents, Climate change in the Arctic is always specified, in particular to justify Japan's interest in the Arctic. The second Basic Plan inscribes the Arctic in its section dedicated to Other changes in social circumstances, which mention’s climate change.

5. In these documents, Japan stresses the need to support the international legal framework such as with the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Polar Code (SOLAS / MARPOL etc.,) and participate in the establishment of future regulations. These international frameworks will ensure the sustainable development of the Arctic region and protect its environment and people.

6. The support and establishment of these frameworks must ensure safety and security, especially maritime, in the Arctic. However, this point is not directly mentioned in the 2012 OPRF report, the 2015 policy and the 2017 OPRI report.

7. Both the 2015 policy and the 2018 Basic Plan directly mentions the rights of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic and in 2019, the newly appointed ambassador for Arctic Affairs, Mrs. Miyoshi Mari announced at the Arctic Circle that Japan would be welcoming students of Alaskan indigenous groups in Japan (Miyoshi 2019)61.

It is also necessary to underline the importance of Japanese think tanks and institutes in the involvement, albeit late, of the government in Arctic affairs. Through the study of literature and interviews, we noted numerous reports and contributions from OPRI and Japanese arctic researchers and experts in the government and inter-ministerial consultation spaces. Despite the government's promotion of its arctic interest, Moe and Stokke (2019, 25) underline the fact that because maritime-sector bureaucracies have been closely involved in policy development, the

61 The students would participate in guide tours in small-scale waste disposal facilities or a recycling facility and meet the Japanese Ainu community's indigenous people in Hokkaido.

Japanese Arctic policy reveal soberness rather than optimism concerning the Arctic sea routes. Japan’s arctic policy also stress the remaining limitations for arctic navigation, the need for more in-depth feasibility studies (“the Arctic Sea Route is not ready yet for safe and reliable use”). Moreover, data collected during interviews and participant observation during field trip underline the general tendency for Japanese business companies to greater industry-level bail and restraint investments because of the economic and political risks associated with Arctic routes (Mitsui Osk Line (MOL) 2017; JOGMEC 2019; Japan Gaz Company (JGC) 2017; JOGMEC 2017).

In a speech at the 2018 Arctic Circle, Japan’s Foreign Minister, Kōno Tarō, described the “Ideal Arctic” as having three elements: 1) understanding and clarifying the ‘mechanisms of environmental changes in the Arctic’; 2) ‘sustainable economic activities’ while ‘respecting the ecosystem and the life of indigenous peoples’; and lastly, 3) ‘the rule of law must be ensured and international cooperation must be promoted in a peaceful and orderly manner’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2018e). Foreign Minister, Kōno Tarō underlined the importance of the Law of the Sea, from marine environment and climate change to the arctic issues during a phone call with the President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), Dr. Park Jin- Hyun (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019c). During the 18th meeting of the Headquarters for Ocean Policy at the Prime Minister’s Office in June 2019, the Prime Minister declared that “the importance of the Arctic as the next frontier is also growing further. Four years ago, we compiled Japan’s first Arctic Policy. I ask you to accelerate research and development efforts further, including the use of arctic research vessels, in order to advance the utilization of the Arctic Sea” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2019). The annual report on the progress scheduled for implementing the Basic Plan led to the redaction of a report recommending the Government to promote an organic harmony of the three main pillars of Japan’s Arctic Policy: R&D and Sustainable Use. It also recommends developing the Ice Navigation Support System, to promote research and development on an Arctic research vessel with icebreaker capability (Miyoshi 2019).

Japanese Arctic policy appears to be part of the continuation of its foreign policy and the principles established in its strategy for a free and open Indo-Pacific (MoFA 2019). Thus, the Japanese Arctic policy is meant to be comprehensive, anchored in respect for sovereign Arctic

states' rights, international law, and regulations such as the Law of the Sea, the Polar Code. This international normative framework allows Japan to safeguard its present interests and future in the Arctic and be integrated into future debates and exchanges on governance frameworks. This desire for the Japanese government to remain neutral, both concerning land claims in the Arctic and have a policy in the form of non-binding recommendations. It aims to present itself as a potential partner or mediator for the states bordering the arctic and not as a threat.

To conclude, the short-term office of Japanese ambassadors responsible for Arctic affairs should not be unnoticed. Indeed, since the establishment of this position in 2013, six ambassadors have succeeded in this post. These appointed ambassadors, coming from various backgrounds, are often new to the arctic world and issues. Therefore, one can wonder about this position's role: are the ambassadors genuinely concerned and invested in developing Japan's Arctic strategies, or is this a temporary position to a more prestigious position?

Chapter 2: Japan’s international cooperation in and for the Arctic, a balance between science diplomacy and geoeconomics

In the Arctic, the natural environment’s rapid changes, such as the decrease in sea ice and the collapse of permafrost, are closely associated with significant changes in new socio-economic activities in the circumpolar region. The Arctic states - Canada, the United States, Russia, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, and Denmark with Greenland - are questioning the role and the influence of non-Arctic actors interested in this polar region or perceived as such (Steinveg 2020; Youngs 2012; O.R. Young 2005). Emerging players - international organizations, sub-national entities, European and Asian states such as Japan - are involved in the Arctic region through various means, including scientific research and economic cooperation (Steinveg 2020; Moe and Stokke 2019; Rowe and Lindgren 2013). International scientific cooperation agreements, such as the international scientific cooperation in the Arctic signed during the ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council in Fairbanks (Alaska) on May 11, 2017, highlight research as a privileged tool of

polar diplomacy between States whose diplomatic relations can be strained elsewhere62. In recent years, this has been the case with science diplomacy between Arctic states and communities on the one hand and non-Arctic states and institutions on the other.

On the basis of increased interest from the international community over the Arctic, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, adopted by the Japanese Cabinet in 2013, outlines the following as focus areas to be pursued strategically and comprehensively: (1) observation of and research on the Arctic from a global perspective; (2) international cooperation on the Arctic; and (3) examination of the feasibility of the Arctic Sea Route (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 2).

Japan is not an Arctic state. It has no territory or maritime space to manage in this area and cannot claim full membership of regional cooperation organizations. Therefore, it must use other tools (diplomatic and commercial) to participate in current and future governance debates concerning the region. The 2015 official Arctic policy argues that “the climate and weather of Japan are being influenced by changes in the Arctic environment” (Ocean Policy Research Institute 2015, 4-5). Hence, Japan is feels concerned by the various issues linked to the Arctic, such as global environmental protection, sea lanes, and resource development. Moreover, the policy states that:

There is a need for Japan to be involved appropriately in formulating international agreements and rules regarding the Arctic. From this perspective, it is important for Japan to put its scientific knowledge and advanced technology to use in order to make further contributions to the activities of the Arctic Council (AC). It is also important for Japan to participate actively in international forums other than the AC, and to initiate constructive discussions based on its scientific knowledge when necessary (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 4-5).

To support its interests in the region, Japan needs to strengthen its bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the Arctic and non-Arctic states and contribute to various international frameworks for advancing the agenda on ocean governance (Ocean Policy Research Institute 2017, 13). As observed in chapter 1, Japan’s 2015 Arctic Policy revolves around several strategic interests of the Arctic underlined by climate change: the exploration, development, and

62 Thus, the tensions between the United States and Russia during the crisis in Ukraine, etc. (Berkman et al. 2017; Binder 2016).

exploitation of Arctic Sea Routes and resources (mineral and living), but also the evolution of international legal framework in the Arctic (Moe & Stokke, 2019. If the 2015 policy recognizes that, at present, the conditions are not yet conducive to navigation, it recommends that the government and the private sector should work more closely together for future opportunities in the Arctic Sea Route. In its Arctic policy, Japan promotes cooperation with other countries in the Arctic, especially with the Arctic countries supported by science and technology. This policy relies on international collaboration (IC) within international institutions such as the Arctic Council and bilateral agreements and cooperation with the Arctic States.

Tonami (2018) argues that Japan’s Arctic policy can be understood as an extension of its economic diplomacy to achieve economic security and export the Japanese developmental state model to the Arctic Region using science and technology as a vehicle. The Arctic Ocean and region have been included in Japan’s Economic Diplomacy for the past several years. The climate change in the Arctic Ocean and the necessity to ensure the Rule of Law have been regularly mentioned in various Diplomatic Bluebooks (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019b, 2018a, 2017a, 2015b, 2016a). In its economic diplomacy, Japan wishes to use its strengths in science and technology to address Arctic issues and create new transnational and global opportunities. Several authors and researchers have also argued that China and South Korea’s interest for the Arctic since the late 2000s has fueled the interest of the Japanese government to involve itself further in Arctic issues (NIPR 2020c, 2017; ARC 2019).

“Japan’s soft power derives from its economic, financial, and technological power” (Drifte 1996, 87). Japan is an archipelago and is separated by the sea from its main export markets with scarce natural resources (energy, raw material, etc.). In this particular geographical context, the maritime logistics that facilitate this trade activity cannot be replaced by any other means of transportation due to geography and large cargo volumes. Hence the Japanese geoeconomic strategy is strongly linked with security concerns such as energy security, navigation security, international order to support Japan’s economic prosperity and stability. In the Arctic environment and its very particular conditions, business strategies are gradually overtaken by geopolitics. Neither states nor companies can claim to play alone. Companies demand guarantees to the State to protect and support their investment and remain competitive on a global scale as they evolve in a space

with numerous transnational markets (across the national borders of two or more states) and bilateral agreements. Companies need a deep understanding of the business environment and its specific requirements they invest in to be able to show a competitive advantage (Porter 1990).

In the 2015 Arctic policy, the International Cooperation (IC) initiative introduces three special initiatives to be addressed: First, to promote active participation in response to global issues regarding the Arctic and formulation process of international rules for the Arctic. Secondly, to further contributions to activities of the Arctic Council. And third, expand international and bilateral cooperation with Arctic and other countries (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015). The chapter on International Cooperation continues by listing international frameworks for maritime safety and protection of the marine environment in the polar seas and how Japan is, among others, implementing the “Polar Code” from the International Maritime Organization (IMO); and how Japan aims to “continue to be an active participant in the discussions based on opinions from related industries” on these issues (Rafnsdóttir 2019).

First, this chapter aims to analyze the role of science diplomacy and geoeconomy in Japan’s Arctic Policy. Secondly, to analyze the implications of this geo-strategy and geopolitical transformation for its Arctic Policy in its relations with the Arctic States. To what extent does the promotion of international, scientific, and economic cooperation enable Japan to support its strategy for the Arctic? Hence in this chapter, the author will answer these questions in two sub- chapters. The first part will be focusing on the role of Science Diplomacy to promote Japan’s interest in the Arctic region with arctic and non-arctic partners. The second part of this chapter will be focusing on Japan’s Arctic economic policy and assess to what extent it is an extension of its Indo-Pacific strategy or a policy specifically dedicated to the Arctic.

This chapter is based on the study of science diplomacy and geoeconomics insofar as economic and diplomatic power relations/rivalries are at the heart of the Japanese arctic strategy,

Part 1: The tradition of polar research and scientific cooperation to promote Japanese Arctic policy

Japan is called upon to recognize both the Arctic’s latent possibilities and its vulnerability to environmental changes, and to play a leading role for sustainable development in the Arctic in the international community, with foresight and policy based on science and technology that Japan has advantage in order to achieve sustainable development (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015).

The long Japanese tradition in the field of polar research, especially in Antarctica, since the beginning of the 20th century, is one of the main arguments put forward by Tokyo to justify its interest in this region. But also its willingness to participate in governance forums dedicated to the Arctic. A second point explaining Japan’s interest in the Arctic concerns the magnitude of climate change in this region and its impacts on Japan. Therefore, the Japanese government has used science diplomacy for several years to justify its interest in the Arctic, participate in international cooperation platforms such as the Arctic Council, and defend its political and economic interests. As argued by Tonami (2018, 8), the epistemic community's initiatives constitute the majority of efforts to promote Japan's arctic diplomacy by using their scientific knowledge gained from nationally-funded research projects. Hence, the first part of this chapter will be dedicated to scientific activities as a privileged tool for diplomacy in the Arctic, then to the place of science diplomacy as an instrument for Japan to defend its political and commercial interests and assert its legitimacy in the Arctic region. Finally, we will develop the example of Japan's participation in the Arctic Council and its Working Groups to show how this science diplomacy allows a non-Arctic State to participate in the main platform for cooperation and collaboration in this region.

Science diplomacy

Science diplomacy is a fluid concept providing tools, techniques, and strategies to foreign policy to adapt to a world of increasing scientific and technical complexity. Science diplomacy is used between states or entities to strengthen relations and establish scientific cooperation between these actors, leading to political cooperation (Ruffini 2016; Binder 2016; Łuszczuk, Padrtova, and Szczerbowicz 2020). Science diplomacy combines the fields of traditional diplomacy (foreign

policy, cooperation, dialogue, and negotiation) and science, i.e., research activities, all disciplines combined, and the resulting accumulation of knowledge (Ruffini 2016; Bertelsen and Xing 2016). Paradiplomacy and Science Diplomacy involve relations between at least three states, non-state actors (NGOs, firms, interest groups, lobbies, etc.) on various international issues (war and peace, human rights, trade, environment, etc.) (Petiteville and Placidi-Frot 2020). Therefore, it allows States to reach several objectives, including the conclusion of direct agreements with international partners and can serve as a bridge between two states in tension or conflict, such as during the Cold War or, more recently, the Ukrainian crisis. Science diplomacy can also attract foreign investment; create a positive image of the regions; establish cooperation with international organizations, or provide scientific expertise on the environment, health, etc. (Ruffini 2016). The Royal Society of Canada and the American Association for the Advancement of Science define the threefold objectives of science diplomacy: to inform foreign policy objectives with scientific advice, to facilitate international science cooperation, and use science cooperation to improve international relations between countries (Bertelsen 2019; Bertelsen and Xing 2016). These three dimensions can be summarized as "science in diplomacy, diplomacy for science and science for diplomacy" (Ruffini 2016; Binder 2016). For Binder (2016, 160), science in diplomacy focuses on the scientific consultation (reviews, debates, etc.) by experts for policymakers to formulate adopted policies. Binder (2016, 160) notes that cooperation between political and diplomatic initiatives helps to achieve joint research projects in diplomacy for sciences. Science for diplomacy is a soft power approach where the state achieves national objectives by reinforcing its scientific capabilities.

Within the framework of the Arctic region, science diplomacy has had three significant effects: the creation of a network of researchers constituting a legal framework for collaboration and cooperation; the use of science to develop or improve political, technical, or technological solutions intended to solve Arctic problems (navigation, pollution, etc.); finally, strengthening institutional cooperation and creating international partnerships (Binder 2016; Ackrén 2014). It differs from the soft power theorized by J. Nye because it globally strengthens the Arctic Council and not a State or a particular group within it, whereas soft power is for States a diplomatic tool allowing to fix agendas, establish priorities, and thus create shared values and disseminate standards (Binder 2016; Bertelsen 2019). Science and technology are an essential aspect of

different national arctic strategies and are a means, particularly for Nordic states with low military budgets, to exert influence within supranational institutions. Science diplomacy applied to the Arctic facilitates the establishment of a legal framework that encourages efforts and cooperation between researchers but also between States and serves as a basis for the conclusion of international agreements, in particular within the framework of environmental protection, the protection of indigenous peoples, the development of infrastructure and even polar navigation. The information and observations collected by researchers can then be organized into data and analyzed to reveal trends, patterns and guide decision-making in governance systems by highlighting needs, gaps, and hazards (Berkman et al. 2017).

Three major effects:

→ The creation of a legal framework for the collaboration and the cooperation between researchers, → Helps to develop or to improve political, technical or technological solutions concerning Arctic issues (navigation, pollution, etc.),

→ Strengthen institutional cooperation and the creation of international partnerships (MoU, agreements etc.).

Examples:

→ The International Arctic Science Committee (1990),

→ The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (1991),

→ The Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017),

→ The Polar Code (2017),

→ The International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (2018),

→ ASM (2020 Tokyo), etc.

FIGURE 5: EFFECTS OF SCIENCE DIPLOMACY IN THE ARCTIC. COMPILED BY AUTHOR.

Historically, scientists interested in polar research contributed to the rapprochement between East and West, especially during the Second World War and the Cold War with the organization of the International Polar Year, then the Geophysical Year international, including that of 1959, which gave rise to the creation of the Antarctic Treaty. This treaty freezes all territorial claims, makes the Antarctic continent a territory intended for scientific research. Nevertheless, after years of tension in the Arctic due to the Cold War, Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk in 1987 paved the way for environmental protection and international peaceful cooperation and collaboration in the region (Gorbachev 1987). In 1990, the International Arctic Science Committee placed scientific research at the heart of international cooperation in the Arctic. Created in 1991 to reduce

pollution and prevent the risks arising from climate change, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) is the first intergovernmental collaboration organization between circumpolar states. These various initiatives led in 1996 to the Ottawa Declaration and the creation of the Arctic Council, the objective of which is to:

[…] Fostering cooperation, coordination and interaction between Arctic states, with the participation of indigenous Arctic communities and their other inhabitants in the face of common Arctic problems, more specifically the problems sustained development and environmental protection in the Arctic (Arctic Council 2020a).

Science diplomacy is at the core of this Declaration for the responsible development and environmental protection of the Arctic region. The Council's originality is not only to bring the eight circumpolar states together but to give central importance to the representatives of indigenous peoples who are "permanent participants”. It also welcomes non-Arctic “observers” who are States, NGOs, and institutions (Ikeshima 2016).

The international scientific cooperation agreement of May 11, 2017, signed by the eight Arctic States' Foreign ministers, sets the following objectives: maintain peace, stability, and constructive cooperation in the Arctic. This agreement illustrates the place of scientific cooperation in the Arctic geopolitics and international relations and the interdependence between politics and science in this region (Heininen 2019). It legally compels states to encourage scientific cooperation and facilitate marine, terrestrial and atmospheric research in the Arctic (Berkman et al. 2017). The decisions of the Arctic Council as an intergovernmental institution inspire policy recommendations, provide better access to existing infrastructures, facilitate the obtaining of visas for international researchers, therefore scientific exchanges, and the training of young researchers, and encourage scientific cooperation through Arctic Council (AC) Working Groups and Task Forces. The epistemic community formed by the University of the Arctic is sometimes a partner in negotiations such as those leading to the Stockholm Pollutants Convention in 200163. Science diplomacy has its limits, however. During the Ukraine crisis, cooperation could not prevent

63 According to Haas (1992, 3) p. 3, an epistemic community is defined as « a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”. The University of the Arctic (UArctic) is a transdisciplinary network bringing together nearly 200 universities in and outside the Arctic region; its researchers collaborate on many themes and interact with students during the Arctic Science Summit Week (Bertelsen 2019).

several states from boycotting certain working groups and conferences in Russia and Canada, in this case, by withholding the visas of participants (Berkman 2014). These tensions, however, have not so far had a detrimental effect on cooperation within Arctic regional institutions (with, for example, the development of the Polar Code, cooperation within the Arctic Council bodies, etc.).

Science Diplomacy in Japan and its role in the Arctic Policy

The development of science diplomacy in Japan

While scientific research can help develop public policies, research policy makes it possible to organize the latter, finance it, and give it guidelines and insights (Mendéz 2012). Research policy aims at fostering scientific research. It is in this aspect that we will concentrate our research. Indeed, this aspect seems most relevant to Japanese polar research. Moreover, we will focus on academic and industrial research within the framework of polar research policy and the category of science and development. Like many other states, Japan uses scientific and technological diplomacy to establish relations with foreign countries, create partnerships, support its companies in their investments abroad, and particularly in Asia, thanks to the Aid Fund’s public development. Recent policies tend to combine research, technology, and innovation. In Japan, the terms of Science and Technology (S&D) and lately Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) are more commonly used than Research and Development (R&D) in terms of Japanese research policies (Stenberg and Nagano 2009).

Japan's research policy follows the Iron Triangle's traditional political organization theorized by Drifte in 1996, and revolves around universities and research institutes, government, and the Japanese industry. According to Tonami (2018, 10), there is a shared narrative among the bureaucracy, politicians, and business groups of Japan that science and technology are essential in Japan's economic development. Those actors also compose the Council for Science Technology Policy (CSTP) created in 2001 and reorganized as the Council for Science, Technology, and Innovation (CSTI) in 2014 with the Minister of State for Science & Technology Policy, and chaired by the Prime Minister (Tonami 2016b; Stenberg 2004). The CSTI defines the main lines of the Japanese science, technology and innovation policy (Tonami 2016b; Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Etrangères 2020b). The Council's three primary objectives are to draft

a comprehensive strategy of science and technology to respond to national and social issues in a timely and appropriate manner. Secondly, consider social sciences and humanities to improve the relationship between science and society in ethics. And third, to express opinions to the Prime Minister or other Ministers on essential issues of science and technology at its discretion.

Since the mid-1990s and facing the emergence of science and technology policies from China, Korea, or India, Japan has made the development and promotion of science and technology an essential part of its economic growth and national wealth. The adoption of the Basic Law of Science and Technology in 1995 was an effort from the government to create a more cohesive policy for the national research policy. It aims to “achieve a higher level of science and technology […] and to contribute to socio-economic development and the improvement of the well-being of the Japanese people." Hence, the Japanese government introduced a five-year plan to organize the direction and priority fields of research” 64 (Stenberg 2004; Tonami 2016b). The national research policy highlights the main priorities and strategic areas to find concrete solutions to the State's challenges and the means favoring excellence in research and teaching, with the budget allocated to the research (Mendéz 2012). It is the case of Japan with the Science and Technology Basic Plan first introduced in 2001. The second Plan (2001-205) underlined that S&T's promotion would help secure Japan’s international position and national security (Sunami, Hamachi, and Kitaba 2013). While not making direct mention of science diplomacy, this Plan does underscore the role of S&T in international cooperation.

In 2008, the concept of science and technology diplomacy was formalized in a report by the Council for Science and Technology Policy, as all actions linking S&T to foreign policy, promoting the development of science and technology policy, and mobilizing science and technology for the promotion of Japanese diplomacy (Sunami, Hamachi, and Kitaba 2013). The importance of international S&T for Japan is underlined again in the 4th Basic Plan and reaffirmed in the 2016 White Paper. The plan declared that international strategic development combined with scientific and technological diplomacy is essential for Japan. In 2018, the Advisory Board for the Promotion of Science and Technology Diplomacy and Study Group Meetings were held. As a result of these

64 Cabinet Office of Japan, The Science and Technology Basic Law (Unofficial Translation).

discussions, recommendations on the utilization of science and technology in the Arctic, under the Advisory Board for the Promotion of Science and Technology Diplomacy, were submitted to State Minister for Foreign Affairs in March (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019b).

Science and technology constitute the foundational elements for peace and prosperity that support socioeconomic development and play a vital role in security. In this regard, Japan’s advanced science and technology attracts a high level of international interest and expectations. Japan, by promoting science and technology diplomacy, harnesses its unique strengths in science and technology to contribute to the development of science and technology at home and abroad, the promotion of relations with other countries, the peace and stability of the international community, and the resolution of global challenges. Japan is also putting effort into initiatives implemented through the activities of the Science and Technology Advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2018a, 273-274).

In the 2019 Diplomatic Bluebook, the section on employing Science and Technology for Diplomacy states that “Science and technology constitute the foundational elements of peace and prosperity, and MOFA is advancing initiatives that utilize the power of science and technology in diplomacy in both bilateral relationships and multinational frameworks” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019b, 26). Supported by the MoFA, this approach of science for diplomacy illustrates once again a soft power approach where the state achieves national objectives by reinforcing its scientific capabilities (Binder 2016).

Science, Technology and Innovation in the Japanese Budget:

Since 2011, Japan's national budget for Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) has increased. Japan has a vast sector of research institutes and universities funded by the government (Stenberg and Nagano 2009). The Council for Science, Technology, and Innovation (CSTI) is involved in allocating the government budget for STI: chaired by the prime minister, it allocates the STI budget65 envelopes across ministries. According to a report from the Cabinet Office Policy Director in charge of science and technology and innovation, Japan's public budget for STI stood at 42 billion yen66 for FY2018, with the MEXT concentrating 51.6% of the total budget (Statistics

65 The budget refers to science and technology promotion costs such as expenses grants of national universities, private school grants, etc. 66 Around 397 billion USD.

Bureau and Communications 2019; Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Etrangères 2020a; Cabinet Office Policy Director 2019). After the MEXT, the METI is the ministry funding the largest STI budget, with approximately 16% of the total budget for the 2019 fiscal year. Since 2018, all public works projects that use new technologies have been considered internal research and development expenditure, including the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT). Consequently, it received a 60% increase in its budget for science, technology, and innovation compared to the fiscal year 2018, and allocating it approximately 6.9% of the total STI budget for FY2019. The rest of the budget is allocated to the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (5.5%), the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF, 4.7%), Ministry of the Environment (4%), Defense (3%), etc. (Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Etrangères 2020a).

FIGURE 6: TRENDS FOR JAPAN’S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BUDGET BETWEEN FY2001 & 2019 [科学技術関係予算の推移]. SOURCE: CABINET OFFICE POLICY DIRECTOR (2019). IN YELLOW INITIAL BUDGE [当初予算], IN RED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROMOTION COSTS [うち科学技術振興費], IN GREY THE SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET [補正予算], IN GREEN

THE RESERVE FUND [予備費], AND IN YELLOW DOTS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS [地方公共団体分].

In order to support creative and pioneering research projects, the Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (KAKENHI) was established to promote the development of all scientific research (from the humanities and the social sciences to the natural sciences) through the call of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). The Grant-in-aid (KAKENHI) is partially under the hospice of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT). Moreover, the 2001 reform also gave more latitude to research institutes in their funding, allowing private sector funding (Stenberg 2004).

One characteristic of the Japanese research policy is the industry's strong involvement in financing the research effort, with, for example, Toyota. This represents up to 4/5 of the funding (Stenberg and Nagano 2009). If, for decades, Japan has been the leader in research in Asia and a rival for the United States and Europe, we observe that there has been a stagnation of the budget allocated to research (see figure 3). Despite this increase in the budget allocated to STI, Japan ranks third in R&D spending globally, behind the United States and China. However, the Bureau

of Statistics of Japan points to an increase in the number of researchers: 874,800, in March 2019, an increase of 0.9 percent from the previous year.

Japan’s S&T diplomacy has proven successful in Asia in the past, building trusting relationships with developing states. Japan uses this reputation to legitimize its place and role in the various Arctic debates. While many non-Arctic states such as China and South Korea are developing an interest in the Arctic region, Japan cannot remain inactive. The loss of its leadership in Asia vis- à-vis China, the rapid rise of the Korean economy and research, environmental and economic issues, the stagnation of the Japanese economy: all reasons that force the Japanese government to invest more in a region where, despite a long history of scientific research, it has lagged. Japan today invokes this past to reassure and justify its interest in the Arctic region in the form of science diplomacy, even before the development of official policy (Sakhuja and Narula 2016b). In 2008, an interim report from the Japanese government underlined the Arctic current and future strategy. It stated that “the strategic importance of Arctic research and the need to establish an integrated research project and a consortium to coordinate work among Japan’s Arctic researchers”(Jakobson and Lee 2013).

Science Diplomacy to promote Japan’s Arctic Policy

The long tradition of Japanese polar research is regularly highlighted by its researchers and government members, including the Ambassadors responsible for Arctic Affairs. However, although the first research dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, governments only started to get involved in the late 1990s, to varying degrees depending on the administrations and priorities (Tonami 2016b). The Japanese government's interest in Arctic affairs has increased in parallel with China and South Korea. From the mid-2000s, the Asian states' growing attention to this region worried part of the scientific community, especially the Western press (Exner-Pirot and Gulledge 2012). Like these countries, Japan uses science diplomacy to reassure the Arctic states of its peaceful intentions and legitimize its place in the region (Lanteigne and Ping 2015; Bertelsen and Xing 2016; Li and Peng 2019). As early as 2009, Japan, China, and South Korea applied for observer status on the Arctic Council. Its candidacy having been initially rejected, Japan took a series of initiatives to promote its application: the launch of the GRENE program, the creation of a Task Force and working groups, and that of an ambassador to Arctic affairs

(Kamikawa and Hamachi 2016; Tonami 2018). However, it was only in the Fourth Basic Plan for Ocean Policy (2013) that the Arctic was mentioned in an official document as a region where Japan should be more involved. The official Japanese Arctic policy, unveiled in 2015, is based on science and technology (Kamikawa and Hamachi 2016).

Based on “Japan’s Arctic Policy” adapted in 2015, Japan will ensure its strong presence on the issues over the Arctic by its contribution to the whole world, making full use of its strength in science and technology (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2018a, 273).

Polar research policies in Japan are organized along the same lines as research policies and placed under the authority of the relevant ministries (MEXT, MLIT, etc.), the National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR), a university network, and the industry which funds a significant share of the research effort (Tonami 2016b). Thus, the Japanese polar research policy is organized under the classical Japanese model: governmental, academic, scientific actors, and industry. The industry can influence certain research lines through its considerable financial support (Tonami 2014d). Japanese Arctic research during the 1990s was almost exclusively turned around natural sciences and was reserved for scientists. In the 2000s, the Japanese political and economic sphere began to take an interest in Arctic issues and develop an Arctic research policy (Tonami 2016a). In 2004, the Council for Science and Technology Policy put in place a strategy for earth observation that included the polar regions (Tonami 2016b). The Council decided that it was ‘Japan’s aim to realize a long-term, continuous observation of the Polar regions [sic] and cryosphere’ This interest has led to the development of new economic and social policy questions for the Arctic region.

From Polar Sciences to Science Diplomacy in Japan’s Arctic Policy

The long tradition of Japanese polar research to support its science diplomacy in the region

Japan’s interest in the polar regions goes back to the early twentieth century with expeditions to the Arctic and Antarctica, including the expedition led by Lieutenant Shirase Nobu in 1911- 1912 Kainan Maru67. This expedition happened during the race to the South pole, where most of the western countries dispatched explorers to the 80th south parallel and claimed these new lands (Tréguer 2010, 75-94; Hamre 1933, 411-423). Due to very harsh conditions, the expedition set to “open up the South” failed and was beaten by quicker expeditions. However, during the second part of the expedition, the crew carried scientific research and observations. Nonetheless, a Japanese icebreaker was named after the explorer, the Shirase. This first initiative was based on private funds, in the absence of financial support from the Japanese government, which found the venture ridiculous (Wouters 1999). Shirase appealed to Count Okuma Shigenobu, former Prime Minister of Japan, and public subscriptions to finance his expedition (Tréguer 2010; Turney 2012, 587). The second polar expedition was led by Taketomi Eichi and commissioned by the Bureau of Fisheries in 1923, which provided a small ship to navigate the Arctic Ocean. This expedition aimed to research oceanography, polar meteorology, and various phenomena that could concern the Japanese fishing industry. With the Second Polar Year preparation, Taketomi had hoped to get funds for another Arctic expedition. However, Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 put a hold on all polar projects for a decade. In 1941 a Japanese vessel, the Kaiho, sailed towards the NSR with the ambition to rejoin Europe (Tonami 2016b). It was stopped at the Bering Strait during the war and forced to sail back to Japan.

After the Second World War, Japanese polar research remained for a long time focused on Antarctica, with larger budgetary resources, the creation of research bases (Syowa in 1957, Mizuho in 1970, Asuka in 1985, Dome Fuji in 1995), and programs focused on the natural sciences and the development of advanced technologies (Kamikawa and Hamachi 2016). In 1955, initiatives were put in place to promote and finance an expedition to Antarctica. The expedition took place

67 The ship left Japan on 1910 December 1rst for New-Zealand first.

in 1956 lead by a scientist Nagata, with the icebreaker Sōya (Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition - JARE) lead to the establishment of Japan’s first Antarctic base on East Ongul Island, Lützow-Holm Bay as a symbol of the Japanese polar interest, Syowa in 1957 (Ohnishi 2013a). Research in different fields began: meteorology, geology, aurora, polar oceanography, ionospheric physics, etc. (Launius, Fleming, and DeVorkin 2010).

These polar expeditions, the development of international research programs with the Geophysical Year in 1957, and the Antarctic Treaty's adoption in 1959, helped Japan set up research institutes and programs dedicated to the polar regions. Indeed, on the Third International Polar Year in 1955, Japan had set up the Antarctic Special Committee (Yoshida 2007) under the Science Council of Japan (the ancestor of the Council for Science and Technology Policy). This committee's objective was to study the Antarctic environment (geography, glaciology, oceanography, etc.) during a three-year program (JARE-I).

The rise of the Arctic in Japan’s Polar research

The Japanese Polar Department was founded in 1962 and the National Institute for Polar Research (NIPR) in 1973. Since 1983, NIPR has been running two aurora observation stations in Iceland in cooperation with the University of Iceland and residents, stations in Antarctica. In 1991, Japan became the first non-Arctic state to establish an observation station in the Arctic when the Arctic Environment Research Center (AERC) opened its research station in Ny-Ålesund Research Station in Svalbard (National Institute of Polar Research 2020). The AERC was established in 1990 under NIPR by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) to promote sea ice study, oceanography, marine ecology, terrestrial ecology, atmospheric science, glaciology, and upper atmospheric science 68 . AERC’s main tasks are managing the research station and facilitating research activities for Japan’s research organs in the Arctic region (Stensdal 2016, 2013). It conducted satellite, ocean, and land observations and simulations at a high level, and received a high evaluation from the international scientific community. Japan was the first non-Arctic state to join in 1992, the International Arctic Science

68 The Arctic Environment Research Center, about us, [website] https://www.nipr.ac.jp/aerc/e/about.html (Accessed 22 February 2019). Note: AERC was reorganized in 2004.

Committee (IASC) was established in 1990. Japan joined the European Incoherent Scatter

Scientific Association (EISCAT), which conducts atmospheric and ionospheric measurements with radars located north of the Arctic Circle69.

The NIPR also conducted comparative research projects across the poles (Tonami and Watters 2012). While Japan’s NIPR focused more on dry land research, Japan Agency for Marine, Earth, Science, and Technology (JAMSTEC) research focuses on the Arctic marine environment and carries out a research program on the Northern Hemisphere Zone (Tonami and Watters 2012). The current oceanographic research vessel MIRAI (“future” in Japanese) is operated by JAMSTEC (Ocean Policy Research Institute 2017, 4). In 1998, JAMSTEC sent the MIRAI on its first research cruise to the Arctic, and it has carried out more than ten missions since then. However, since it has no icebreaking capabilities, it has limited marine areas and periods for research and observation in the Arctic. Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) also undertakes scientific observation using special satellites that monitor water circulation in the sea, the effect of greenhouse gases, etc.

In 1996, Japan ratified UNCLOS and was the sole Asian state present at the signing of the Ottawa Declaration by the Arctic states, which led to the Arctic Council’s creation70. As mentioned in Chapter 1, according to some interviews with researchers and members of Japanese think-tanks, Japan could have gained the status of (ad-hoc) Observer member of the AC at that time. However, because of the lack of interest from the Japanese government, this did not happen. Despite sending envoys at the Ottawa meeting, there is, however, no document supporting these comments. Moreover, at the time of the creation of the AC, the status of Observer was not yet established.

The MEXT established in 2005 the Earth Observation Facilitation Committee with the Working Group of Arctic Research Examination under its responsibility, and in 2009, Japan officially applied for the first time to become an Observer at the Arctic Council. To support this application, the

69 European Incoherent Scatter Scientific Association, About EISCAT, [website], 2016, https://www.eiscat.se/about/ 70 Arctic Council, Ottawa Declaration, 1996, available from https://oaarchive.arcticcouncil.org/handle/11374/85,

MoFA established a Task Force under the International Legal Affairs Bureau, Ocean Division the same year (Tonami and Watters 2012). Concurrently, the MEXT drafted a report called “Regarding institutional cooperation for the observation of the cryosphere” and established the ‘Arctic Research Examination Working Group’ August 2010. The Working Groups submitted a report in 2010 supporting the establishment of a consortium for Arctic environmental research and the facilitation of research and observation on impacts of climate change in the Arctic (Ohnishi 2014, 197). It led to the establishment in May 2011 of the Japan Consortium for Arctic Environmental Research (JCAR) to strengthen Japan’s research activities and capabilities concerning environmental protection and human resource development by planning scientific research in the Arctic (Tonami and Watters 2012). JCAR was placed under the supervision of the NIPR and the MEXT.

Institutional bodies

• Arctic Environment Research Center (AERC) at National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR) • Arctic Research Center at Hokkaido University (ARC-HU) • Institute of Low-Temperature Science, at Hokkaido University (ILTS-HU) • Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, at Hokkaido University (SRC-HU) • Polar Cooperation Research Center (PCRC - Kobe University) • Institute of Arctic Climate and Environment Research (IACE) at Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC) • Japan Aerospace Explosion Agency (JAXA)

Association, network:

• Japan Consortium for Arctic Environmental Research (JCAR) • Japan Arctic Research Network Center (J-ARC Net) hosted by ARC-HU, NIPR, JAMSTEC • Japan Association of Siberian Studies

TABLE 3: INSTITUTES AND ASSOCIATIONS INVOLVED IN ARCTIC RESEARCH ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN (COMPILED BY AUTHOR).

We can emphasize that if the reports of the governmental and institutional bodies were, first of all, concentrated on the environmental and ecological aspect of the Arctic, they evolved towards a multidisciplinary approach around oceanographic problems: both from a scientific angle natural than human and social with studies around navigation, safety, etc.

As argued by Rafnsdóttir (2019), as this budget is allocated through various ministries and agencies, is it challenging to obtain accurate budget numbers for arctic research and activities (see fid 9). However, in Japan, the MEXT still allocated the largest funding for Arctic activities by financing the GRENE, ArCS, and ArCS-II projects in particular (see fig 10). For the 2018 fiscal year, the NIPR had an entire budget of 34 million US$, divided for all its activities (National Institute of Polar Research 2020). The MEXT announced an increase by 0.3 billion yen to advance R & D in maritime and polar regions through Arctic research's strategic promotion, bringing the final annual budget for FY2020 to 1.4 billion yen71 (Ministry of Education and Technology 2020). These expenses include support for national programs, maintenance, and upkeep of research

TABLE 4: TOTAL BUDGET (FY2018) 3,684,529,000YEN (34MILLION USD). SOURCE: NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF POLAR RESEARCH (2020). stations, etc.

71 12,282,434 USD.

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As Arctic science goes beyond the Arctic region's science, science plays a central role in Japan’s Arctic policy (Enomoto 2017). The “Arctic Policy of Japan” formulated by the Japanese government in 2015 calls for the strategic development of research and observation centers in Arctic countries as one of the R&D issues that Japan should tackle. The “Development of International Collaboration Bases” specific initiative of this project responds to this request. As a basis for international collaborative research and human resource development by Japanese researchers, the five Arctic coast countries (US, Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark) pledged to establish an international collaboration center that can continue after the completion of this project, promote closer international cooperation through local observation and joint research projects, and dispatch human resources by dispatching young researchers (Sustainability 2020).

During the 12th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (CPAR) in 2016, Ms. Kamikawa Yoko noted Japan’s support for guidelines encouraging corporate social and environmental responsibility, such as the Arctic Investment Protocol. She also reiterated Japan’s desire to participate in joint Arctic science research projects such as the Japan-Russia young researchers’ exchanges and the Japan-Canada Arctic Research Workshop (Parliament of Canada 2016).

Science and technology is Japan’s greatest strength where leadership on Arctic policy is concerned. It is an extremely important tool when participating in the formulation of international rules and promoting international cooperation. Given a situation where other countries are engaged more proactively in the Arctic, it is with a sense of urgency that we plan to further strengthen frameworks for observation, research, sharing research outcomes, and international coordination, to contribute to resolve global issues and then enhance Japan’s presence in the international community (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 38).

Since 2018, a round-table conference on the arctic between government officials and researchers is held twice every year. On March 7th, 2018, the Arctic Study Group submitted the recommendation on the science and technology for the Arctic, “Achieving Innovative Solutions for Arctic Challenges: Science and technology for the Arctic, Japan’s role through five “i”s; International, Interdisciplinary, Inclusive, Ingenuity and Innovation”, which was produced under the initiative of the Arctic Study Group Leader, Mr. Yasuoka Yoshifumi, to the State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nakane Kazuyuki. During these conferences, government delegates and the

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researcher exchanged opinions and information on recent topics on arctic issues, on the Arctic Council and the working groups, and concerning the second Arctic Science Ministerial (ASM) (MoFA 2019). Reports of meetings attended by government requests to ArCS experts, such as the AC Working Group, were sent to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of the Environment (Sustainability 2020). However, these experts note that they rarely received feedbacks from MEXT and MoFA on their activities.

The 2019 Diplomatic Bluebook argued that the risk that rapid changes in the Arctic environment caused by global warming will have a drastic and irreversible impact on the ecology and the lives of those living in the Arctic, including indigenous peoples. It also underlines the growing economic opportunities, such as the Northern Sea Route and the development of resources. Since the establishment of the position of Ambassador in charge of Arctic Affairs, the various ambassadors have attended the Senior Arctic Official meetings of the Arctic Council (AC), bilateral consultation, and various international conferences on the Arctic organized by arctic and non- arctic States (China, South Korea) where they presented Japan's engagements and thoughts over the Arctic.

In October 2018, for the first time, the Japanese Foreign Minister Kōno Tarō attended the Arctic Circle and delivered a keynote speech on Japan’s Arctic Policy at the meeting. As mentioned in chapter 1, during his speech, M. Kōno emphasized the particular importance of clarifying the mechanism of environmental changes in the Arctic and understanding its impact in order for the international community to appropriately address the arctic “issue” of adverse impact on the ecosystem, while also recognizing the “Opportunities” emerging in the Arctic, such as the development of natural resources. Furthermore, he proposed the idea of an “Ideal Arctic” for the international community that would consist of

(1) clarifying the mechanism of environmental changes and sharing the responses within the international community with the ArCS project, (2) pursuing sustainable economic use while respecting the ecosystem and the life of indigenous people and encouraging Japanese companies to pay more attention to arctic businesses (Hokkaido is a gateway from Asia to the Northern Sea Route), and,

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(3) promoting international cooperation in a peaceful and orderly manner based on the rule of law.

At the event, Japanese experts introduced the national arctic project Arctic Challenge for Sustainability (ArCS) during a session. He presented the activities, results of the project, and underlined the points of contact between research projects and society, such as how to collaborate with indigenous people and the future prediction of the Arctic. The research carried out in ArCS was linked to Japan's "Arctic Policy" and the United Nations' 2030 agenda.

International cooperation in research activities in the Arctic

Japanese arctic research developed relatively late compared to Antarctica. However, this did not prevent him from participating in the 1990s in a multidisciplinary and international study: International Northern Sea Route Program (INSROP). From the 2010s, and thanks to the increasing attention of the Japanese government for the Arctic, the MEXT has organized in collaboration with Japanese polar research institutes (NIPR, JAMSTEC, Hokkaido University), a series of five-year projects that started in 2011 with the Green Network of Excellence (GRENE). It was followed in 2015 by the Arctic Challenge for Sustainability (ArCS) and ArCS-II in 2020 to support Japanese polar research and better structure its organization.

The INSROP & JANSROP: pioneer international and multidisciplinary research programs on the Arctic Sea Route (NSR)

In 1993, the precursor to the current Ocean Policy Research Institute (OPRI) and former Ship & Ocean Foundation (SOF) within the Sasakawa Peace Foundation started a six-year international research project to investigate the potential of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) (Tonami 2016a). The SOF wanted to assess the ecological, environmental, economic, political, and strategic aspects of the NSR and gain access to Russian data concerning shipping in the region (Kitagawa et al. 2001). The International Northern Sea Route Program (INSROP) was created as a joint venture with the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) in Norway, the Central Marine Research and Design Institute in Russia (CNIIMF) and the Ship & Ocean Foundation (SOF) in Japan. This six- year program conducted research with around 390 researchers from over 14 countries (Kitagawa et al. 2001). INSROP was “one of the first international research projects that aimed to prove

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the technical feasibility of the NSR as an international commercial sea lane”. Its primary objective was to stimulate Asian states' interest in the Northern Route and Russia's northeastern seaside. According to OPRI, INSROP “showed it was technically possible to traverse the Arctic Ocean year-round”, while still noting challenges to come. The project yielded results on a broad specter of topics such as “natural conditions, ice navigation, environmental factors, trade and commercial aspects, political and legal factors and so on”, which created a corpus of 167 technical reports, books chapters on the natural, social, economic and legal environment of the NSR, such as the INSROP Geographical Information System (GIS) Database and the NSR Environmental Atlas (Kitagawa et al. 2001).

The INSROP's scientific cooperation in the 1990s with Russia and Norway was promoted by the OPRI, a lobby close to Japanese shipowners and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, we can wonder about this project's purpose: mainly scientific or to promote economic and political interests. The objective of JANSROP, the second project, was clearly announced to promote the economic development of the NSR among Japanese companies. Except for the more recent Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) in 2009, INSROP “was the most comprehensive maritime transport study ever undertaken”. According to these studies, this shipping route has several advantages: its proximity to Japan, time and fuel economy for transport to northern Europe, and access to arctic natural resources such as liquid natural gas. The INSROP demonstrated this route's technical feasibility thanks to digital simulations of cargo ships designed explicitly for crossing in polar conditions. This study was the first of its kind, and it is remarkable to note that Japan, without territory and established policy for the arctic, took part in it.

As the INSROP was an internationally focused project, the SOF decided to initiate a separate Japan program focused on the NSR alongside the Japan Northern Sea Route Programme (JANSROP). It aimed “to bring a uniquely Japanese perspective to NSR research” with “particular emphasis on the technological aspects of the NSR”, but also to stimulate the interest of Asian States on the NSR (Tonami and Watters 2012). It was conducted in two phases from 1993 - 1995 and 1996 - 1997. The program conducted a wide array of projects, such as on vessels for NSR navigation, studies on ice, and how it impacted ice-transiting vessels. JANSROP conducted a voyage via the NSR with Japanese, Canadian and Russian researchers and a Russian

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crew, “gathering basic data for the establishment of safe and efficient NSR navigation” (Kitagawa et al. 2001, 60).

JANSROP was started up again in a new phase called “Development and Operation Programme for Environmental Sustainability in East Eurasia” from 2002 - 2005, focusing on the Far East Russian regions and the Sea of Okhotsk, dubbed JANSROP II. The primary goal “was to stimulate the interest of Asian countries in the NSR and Russian Far East” by “providing updated information on legal and socio-economic issues, as well as, on the state of preserved natural resources and transport infrastructure in the relevant areas” through the first geographic information system in the world, JANSROP-GIS, accessible via the internet (Kitagawa 2006). JANSROP-II International Forum, “Resource Development in the Northern Seas and Environmental Protection”, held in November 2003 in Tokyo and the International NSR Conferences, “New Era in Far East Russia & Asia” which was held in Tokyo and comprised the “International Experts Meeting” on June 30th and the project through invaluable presentations, discussions and encouraging suggestions by the chairman of the Sasakawa Foundation, the Russian and the Norwegian ambassadors to Japan (Kitagawa 2006). To conclude the study, a report called JANSROP-GIS on the collected information was compiled. Despite the significance of JANSROP/INSROP to understand the conditions of the NSR, the Japanese shipping industry concluded that, based on the results from JANSROP/INSROP, there were too many uncertainties related to shipping in the NSR for economic gain in the near future, resulting in a reluctance to invest in arctic shipping (Tonami and Watters 2012). Since 2007 the OPRF (now OPRI) has carried out an annual survey of the Arctic academic and business activities and compiled it annually into the INSROP Follow-up Report (The Arctic Conference Japan 2012).

To promote Japan's Utilization Strategy for the Northern Sea Route, the OPRI invited since 2014, key persons from arctic states such as Russia, Norway, and the United States to participate in international seminars considering the advantages of commercial development of the North Sea Route. According to OPRI, while many Japanese companies understand the NSR's benefits, they remain tentative about utilizing it. Hence, the institute is working to enable Japan to fully capitalize on the benefits of the shipping lane by establishing a national utilization strategy and drawing up specific policies and a roadmap aimed at further facilitating commercial use (Ocean Policy

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Research Institute 2015). Since 2014, there has been more intense research cooperation under governmental direction, which resulted in joint Japan-Russia workshops (Hirose 2018; Steinberg 2006; Bukh 2010; Rafnsdóttir 2019; Bukh 2012). In 2016, the former Minister of Justice, Ms. Kamikawa Yoko, attended the 12th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (CPAR) in Canada. She expressed Japan's will to strengthen and further expand scientific cooperation in Russia's Spasskaya Pad Scientific Forest Station and Cape Baranov station.

GRENE (2011-2015)

In 2011 the Green Network of Excellence (GRENE), a five-year Arctic Climate Change Research Project focusing on international cooperation on Arctic research, was launched. The GRENE financed research project and revolved around four strategic research target focusing on understanding the mechanism of warming amplification in the Arctic (1), the arctic system for global climate and future change (2), the evaluation of the impacts of arctic change on weather and climate in Japan (3), marine ecosystems and ﬁsheries, and the projection of sea ice distribution and Arctic sea routes (4). These strategies were carried out through seven research projects carried out by researchers in various universities in Japan (NIPR 2020b; Tonami 2016a).

1. Improvement of coupled general circulation models based on validation of Arctic climate reproducibility and on mechanism analyses of Arctic climate change variability 2. Change in the terrestrial ecosystems of the pan-Arctic and effects on climate 3. Atmospheric studies on Arctic change and its global impacts 4. The role of the Arctic cryosphere in global change 5. Studies on greenhouse gas cycles in the Arctic and their responses to climate change 6. Ecosystem studies on the Arctic Ocean’s declining sea ice 7. Projection of sea ice distribution and Arctic sea routes.

The GRENE project involved the NIPR as the Core Institute, JAMSTEC as an Associated Institute and was funded by the MEXT (NIPR 2020a). It involved around 300 scientists from 35 organizations. The project annual budget revolved around 550 to 600 billion yen between FY2011 and FY2014 and with a decrease in FY2015 with the end of the GRENE and the launch of a new program (fig. 4).

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FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 TOTAL 655,126,000 551,172,000 575,120,000 593,364,000 390,241,000 2,765,023,000 TABLE 5: GRENE ARCTIC CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROJECT (FORMER PROJECT OF THE ARCS) BUDGET PER YEAR IN YENS. DATA PROVIDED BY NIPR (2020/08/18).

In June 2010, the Japanese Cabinet decided upon a new strategy for growth: the "Strategy for becoming an environment and energy power through green innovation." In response to this strategy, the Council for Science and Technology Policy brought out their report "The Science and Technology Basic Plan" in December 2010 in which they also positioned "green innovation" to be one of the main pillars supporting responses to the issues of energy and climate change.

Following on, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) initiated the Green Network of Excellence (GRENE) in FY2011. Through a strategic collaboration between universities and research institutions, GRENE aims to promote both the highest level of research in the world and the training and development of human resources. In addition to its work in the Arctic Climate Change Research Project, GRENE is also involved in research in the areas of environmental informatics, botanical science, and advanced environmental materials (NIPR 2020a).

In 2013, with the merger of the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), the National Aerospace Laboratory of Japan (NAL), and the National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA), the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) was established. This agency conducts integrated operations from basic research and development to utilization and supports the Japanese government’s overall aerospace development and utilization (Sagawa 2015). And following Japan’s development’s R&D strategy, JAXA became a National Research and Development Agency in 2015. Concerning arctic research and observation, JAXA conducts satellite observation of the Arctic (cryosphere, glaciers) and monitors and records changes in Arctic sea ice (Northern Sea Route), sea surface temperature. JAXA Global Change Observation Mission for Water (GCOM-W) satellite, also known as SHIZUKU, is equipped with the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer 2 (AMSR2), observing and recording forecast on sea-ice movement (Sagawa 2015). This program led to Newsletters, a pamphlet, and research papers both in Japanese and in English. According to Ohnishi (2014, 198), focusing on natural science in this project illustrated the driving force behind Japan’s Arctic strategy in science-related issues. It would help serve Japan’s interests in the longer, whether concerning the impact of climate change and its global implications and to develop potential business opportunities.

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Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Projects (ArCS 2015-2020)

Japan’s official Arctic policy emphasizes Japan's contributions to scientific research in the Arctic and its technological participation for regional economic development and its respect for the international legal framework. It aims to convey robust information to stakeholders to enable appropriate decision-making and problem-solving involving the Arctic via strengthened research and projects such as the Arctic Challenge for Sustainability (ArCS). The ArCS project was an interdisciplinary network program connecting Arctic science, society, and Japan's policies for 2015-2020 following the GRENE program72.

The Arctic Challenge for Sustainability (ArCS) is specified as a Japanese scientific project in the official Japanese Arctic Policy and implementing it. The policy defined both the responsibility and the outcome of this project. This program was launched under the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and collaborated with the National Institute of Polar Research, Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology and Hokkaido University. The ArCS project was established as a top-down national project with a purpose, rather than an aggregate of research by the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (KAKENHI). While in KAKENHI-funded research, the individual scientific output (output) shown in the paper presentation is important, in national projects, the project's social outcome is essential. The importance of ArCS is highlighted in the Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (2018) as a unique Japanese scientific research program concerning arctic issues. It involved more than 290 researchers belonging to about 90 institutions within Japan and abroad, including participating institutions commissioned by these three

72 There is 6 division in the ARC: The Atmosphere and Hydrosphere Research Group, the Terrestrial Research Group, Cryosphere Research Group, the Practical Research Group, the Social Science & Humanities Research Group, the Satellite Observation and Modeling Research Group and the International Collaboration Division.

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institutions (北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] 2020)73. Its budget was around 6 million USD (2015).

FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 TOTAL 259,291,000 758,181,000 821,837,000 822,123,000 755,562,000 3,416,994,000 (YEN)

TABLE 6: ARCS BUDGET PER YEAR IN YENS. DATA PROVIDED BY NIPR (2020/08/18).

ArCS is a multi-disciplinary project to which contributes to regional and global knowledge, foster exchanges, and Dispatches expert to arctic-related international meetings. It revolves around the previously mentioned five « i »’s:

• International, • Interdisciplinary, • Inclusive, • Ingenuity, • Innovation.

The ArCS aims to promote the Arctic Policy of Japan, and its main objectives are to “elucidate the changes in the climate and environment, clarify their effects on human society, and provide accurate projections and environmental assessments for internal and external stakeholders so that they can make appropriate decisions on the sustainable development of the Arctic region. [...] by comprehensively promoting research on climate, weather, ocean environment changes, the material cycle of short-life air pollution materials, and ecosystems and biodiversity, and also by providing a data management system as well as examination from the point of view of the humanities" (ArCS Website). Introducing the viewpoint of humanities and social sciences into one scientific project is still rare in a state-led research project and is a major feature of this project. To promote international collaborative research, seven research themes centered on natural

73 In Japan: Hokkaido University, Kobe University, Tohoku University, Mie University, Waseda University, Nagoya University, Kyushu University, University of Tsukuba, Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology, National Museum of Ethnology, University of Tokyo, Yokohama University, Niigata University, University of Toyama, Osaka Prefecture University, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), and Kitami Institute of technology. Abroad: Utrecht University, the Arctic University of Norway, University of Lapland, University of Akureyri, University of Helsinki, Dalhousie University, University of Calgary, European Commission, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Free University of Berlin, China-Nordic Arctic Research Center.

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sciences and engineering, humanities and social sciences programs were established to directly share the scientific results with society and people (Sustainability 2020)74.

The ArCS also aims to deliver robust scientific information to stakeholders for decision-making and solving problems through, for example, the Arctic Data Archive System (ADS). As the focus of theme 8 in the ArCS project, ADS is a data center collecting and storing various observational and model simulation datasets obtained through the various Japanese research projects from physical data to cultural anthropological data. It also works as a workbench for data utilization, distribution of data and its processed products (北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] 2020). The collected data are stored in databases (like GEO data) and available for researchers on the web (although a national taxes funded project, it still belongs to Japan). The sharing of data collected and analyzed by Japan as part of ADS supports an international collaboration set by the official Arctic Policy. It also led to a stronger resilience from the international research community on Japan's Polar expertise.

ArCS research theme 1 focuses on forecasting the weather and sea ice conditions in the Arctic Ocean and integrating information on the Arctic Ocean route assistance. As a concrete result, the collected and analyzed information on sea ice forecasts can be delivered to ships and used by commercial vessels that sail in the Arctic Ocean for safety and risk mitigation. Completing the ArCS, the Japan Arctic Research Network Center (J-ARC Net), was established and launched in 2016 by the AERC, Hokkaido University Arctic Research Center, JAMSTEC’s Institute of Arctic Climate and Environment Research. By promoting interdisciplinary research, the J-ARC Net aims to make “the best use of research infrastructures of the three research centers such as research vessels and overseas laboratories” and “mediates between research communities, industries, and government offices activities” for problem-solving in the Arctic. This network organizes several meetings and seminars each year between researchers (within and outside of Japan), industry representatives (shipping, marine, energy, mining, harbor, trading), government delegates, and other stakeholders.

74 Theme:

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Japan's Arctic Policy underlines the need to strategically establish research and observation stations in the Arctic states as one of Japan's issues through its research and development activities in the Arctic. The ArCS project defines on-site international collaboration as "a research and/or observation facility strategically deployed in the Arctic states to achieve the goal of ArCS as an infrastructure for international collaborative studies and capacity building"(Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Project 2020a). Thereby, the first completed achievement of the ArCS project concerns the establishment of research and observation stations to conduct joint research programs, such as black carbon observations, isotope observations of snowfall and snowflakes, and CO2 / CH4 flux observations. ArCS concluded several agreements for the shared use of the following ten sites for research and/or observation activities (Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Project 2020b, 2020a). According to the ArCS this achievement helped promote and support close international cooperation through on-site observations and joint research projects and promote efficient capacity building by dispatching young researchers to the stations. The ArCS project maintains research and/or observation facilities75 to support on-site observations carried out by international collaborative studies.

Following the 2015 policy initiative on the training and support of researchers76, ArCS notes its second effective achievement with the success of its Overseas Visits by Young Researchers. During the ArCS project, this program supported 52 young researchers (22 for short-term, 30 for medium and long-term)77 to visits to research organizations related to Arctic studies and for data acquisition and sample analyzes the eight Arctic countries and the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research (AWI) in Germany (Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Project 2020c,

75 IARC [Research and Observation Center, USA] International Arctic Research Center in the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, and the Poker Flat Research Range Flux (PFRR) Super Site Observation base (study of terrestrial environment changes) in the United States. CHARS [Research/Observation Base, Canada] Canadian High Arctic Research Station and the Northern Research Center station [CEN - Centre d'études nordiques], Observation base with Laval University, University of Rimouski [Université du Québec à Rimouski] and the Center of Water, Earth and Environment [Eau, Terre et Environnement] of the National Institute of Scientific Research [Institut national de la recherche scientifique in Canada] (for biology, microbiology, geography, geology, engineering, archeology and landscape management research activities and observations). Spasskaya Pad Scientific Forest Station and the Cape Baranov Station as Observation Base to study atmosphere-sea ice interactions in collaboration with the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) in Russia. Ny-Ålesund Research Station [Research/Observation Base] and the University Center in Svalbard (UNIS) in Norway. Elaboration of a research base within the Greenland Institute of Natural Resources (GINR) and in collaboration with the East Greenland Ice-Core Project (EGRIP) Observation base focusing on deep Ice Sheet Drilling Project site in Greenland (Denmark). 76 “Work to train young scientists, and dispatch young scientists to overseas research organizations and universities to allow Japan's arctic research to continue developing and develop the personnel who are able to play a leading role in international discussions of Arctic issues and their solutions” (Ocean Policy Research Institute 2015, 7) 77 This project supports foreign travel for periods from half a month up to a year.

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2020d). But also participated in international conferences on arctic studies (Arctic Science Summit Week-ASSW), visits to explore novel fields of arctic studies, and conducted regional comparative studies. The program underlines that “it is essential to actively engage the next generation of young researchers who share a concerted field of vision in addressing Arctic concerns well beyond the borders of government, industry, and academia” (Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Project 2020d). The ArCS also collaborates with North-Eastern Federal University (Russia); Northern Federal University (Russia); Saint-Petersburg State University (Russia); Yakutsk Science Center, Siberian Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia); Central Marine Research & Design Institute (Russia); University of Helsinki (Finland); Center for East Asian Studies and Pan-European Institute, University of Turku (Finland); Norwegian Barents Secretariat (Norway), Belmont Fund project - C budget of ecosystems and cities and villages on permafrost in eastern Russian Arctic (COPERA) for exchange programs.

The ArCS project is based on the dissemination of its research results. Hence, completing ArCs third achievement, 86 experts from ArCS were dispatched to 65 assemblies, including 19 AC working groups and expert groups related meetings and international conferences between 2015 and 2020. In 2015, 73 papers were published in peer-reviewed academic journals, 104 papers in 2016, 118 papers in 2017, 161 papers in 2018, and more than 114 papers for the 2019 (北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] 2020, 154). The ArCS final report also notes 53 press releases (including 20 international press releases) were actually covered between 2015 and September 2019 in 92 newspapers/news, 36 televisions, 6 radios, 22 magazines, and 28 web contents (see figure 3). During ArCS, a total of 20 seminars were held for each research theme with guests from the industry. The themes covered were the Arctic Sea route and navigation support, marine ecosystems, extreme weather (arctic region fluctuations and heavy snowfall in Japan), predictability of Arctic lows and typhoons, and international arctic law (北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] 2020, 153). Furthermore, the research results under the ArCS projects and opportunities for researchers were regularly posted on the ArCS website and blog.

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FIGURE 7: NUMBER OF RESEARCH ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE ARCS PROJECT (2015- FY2019). SOURCE 北極域研究推進プロジェクト [ARCTIC CHALLENGE FOR SUSTAINABILITY] (2020, 164); SUSTAINABILITY (2020, 15).

Open lectures (with Q&A) were held during the project once a year, with around 100 to 250 participants from the general public and members of the Diet78. The main purpose of these lectures was to get people other than researchers to understand the arctic's importance and why its research is now necessary for Japan. In parallel, several workshops for residents were held during field trips in the arctic. These lectures aimed to gain a higher level of interest in the Arctic from the Japanese public, but also to introduce the research team's activities and exchange information on research with local communities (北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] 2020, 153). While people in the Arctic region are interested in research teams that come from outside the region, researchers do not always provide sufficient explanation about their research objectives and achievements to the residents, sometimes leading to dissatisfaction and distrust. Hence the ArCS project aimed to share its work and results through workshops. In that aspect, Japanese researchers maintain particular good relations with communities in the northwestern part of Greenland, established through years of cooperation and exchange with the residents' research results. As the Japan Geoscience Union meeting (JpGU) is the main scene in Japan to attract researchers and young researchers (high school students and undergraduate

78 The conference in 2016 title was “Arctic research and Japan-Why we study the Arctic" with 158 people attending, in 2017 a seminar on "Arctic future and science" with 152 people attending and in 2018 year on "Changes in the Arctic environment and its impact on people” with 122 people (北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] 2020).

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students), ArCS delegates presented the project and activities like the ADS, arctic sea ice distribution prediction, international cooperation base development, etc. to the public (北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] 2020, 154).

ArCS-II (2020-205)

The final report of the ArCS project concluded that Japan needs further to deepen its scientific research in the Arctic region. This experience and expertise will help Japan enhance its international contribution to establishing a system for promoting international scientific cooperation. It also needs to support the creation of an international system that will allow researchers to fully understand the impact of the Arctic Ocean routes and resource development in the Arctic region and on residents' natural and living environment. Finally, exchanges and cooperation with the indigenous communities should aim to improve the sustainability of the Arctic. Hence, Japan aims in the incoming years to play a more active role in maintaining a coordinated international order in the Arctic and take an inclusive and integrated approach to sustainable Arctic use. As the ArCS project finished in March 2020, it was followed up by the ArCS-II project launch in June 2020. Drawing on the GRENE and ArCS projects' experiences, the new five-year project funded is by MEXT and jointly managed by NIPR, JAMSTEC, and Hokkaido University (Arctic Challenge for Sustainability II 2020b). ArCS-II sets the following four strategic interconnected goals to realize a sustainable society: An “Ideal Arctic” as the Foreign Minister M. Kōno Tarō mentioned in his speech to the Arctic Circle in 2018.

1. Advanced Observation of Arctic Environmental Change 2. Improvement of Weather and Climate Prediction 3. Impact of Arctic Environmental Change on Society 4. Legal / Policy Response and Research Implementation for a Sustainable Arctic.

The ArCS-II project highlights two priority subjects to disseminate and implement the knowledge and information acquired. First of all, to improve capacity building and research promotion via an international research exchange program, an overseas fellowship program, and the call for complementary research projects. The second priority is the strategic dissemination of Arctic Information through the Arctic Environmental Information website, the Arctic Sea Ice Information Center, education and outreach, and the expert participation in international forums and

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information sharing with policymakers(Arctic Challenge for Sustainability II 2020a). Therefore, the ArCS-II project is a continuation of its predecessor while aiming to improve connectivity between the various research axes, increase exchanges and international cooperation, and improve the visibility and expertise of Japanese Arctic research. Through the ArCS projects, Japan promotes international cooperation for research and human resource development at research and observation stations in the U.S., Canada, Russia, Norway, and Greenland (Denmark).

Japan and the Arctic Council

Another effect of science diplomacy in the Arctic is that it gives engaged actors, both Arctic and non-Arctic, to enter cooperative apparatuses like the Arctic Council. It is an approach adopted by several Asian states, including Japan, which became an observer at the Arctic Council in May 2013, alongside China and South Korea. The 2017 Japanese Diplomatic Bluebook stated that in the area of international initiatives concerning the Arctic, Japan will (1) actively participate in addressing global issues on the Arctic and in international rule-making process over the Arctic; (2) further contribute to the activities of the Arctic Council (AC: An intergovernmental forum led by Arctic states); and (3) expand bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the Arctic and other countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017a).

About the Arctic Council

Following the speech of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 where he stated that that the Arctic Ocean was an international entity and emphasized his desire for the creation of "an area of peace and cooperation fruitful" in the region, the Arctic has become a space for regional cooperation (Gorbachev 1987). This gave rise in 1989 to the proposal for cooperation for the protection of the Arctic environment and in 1991, the creation of the AEPS (Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy) with the Rovaniemi Declaration, a diplomatic milestone in the creation of the Arctic Council (AC). It was in 1996 that this idea of intra-Arctic cooperation was finally materialized through the AC, formalized by the Ottawa Declaration, which aimed to "foster cooperation, coordination and interaction between the States of the Arctic, with the participation of the indigenous communities of the Arctic and its other inhabitants concerning the common problems of the Arctic, more specifically to the problems of sustained development and environmental

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protection in the Arctic" (Arctic Council 2020b). The AC is formed by the eight coastal states: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Russia, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, the United States and also by a representative of the Indigenous Groups of the Arctic (AIA, AAC, GCI, ICC, SC RAIPON)79, called Permanent Participants. Since its creation, the Council has become the intergovernmental forum for regional arctic cooperation and is the primary forum for cooperation and collaboration in the Arctic region favored by both the arctic states and states around the world (Tonami 2019). Under Article 1 of the Ottawa Declaration of 1996, the Arctic Council should not deal with « matters related to military security ».

The Arctic Council seeks to promote sustainable development and environmental protection through six Working Groups80, several Tasks Forces and Experts Groups81. The AC also provides the framework for the negotiation of important legally binding agreements such as the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic in 2011, the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic in 2013, and the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation in 2017 (Binder 2016).

The role and limits of Observers within the AC

Since 1998, the Arctic Council has welcomed non-Arctic states82, but also Intergovernmental and interparliamentary organizations 83 and Non-governmental organizations 84 to participate in its

79 The Aleut International Association (AIA), Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Inuit Circumpolar Council (CCI), Gwich’in Council International (GCI), the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) and the Saami Council (SC). 80 The Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group, the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) Working Group, the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) Working Group, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), the Arctic Fauna and Flora Protection Group (CAFF). 81 It excludes discussing on military security issues. 82 1998: UK, Netherlands, Germany, Poland. 2000: France. 2006: Spain. 2013: Japan, South Korea, China, Singapore, India, Italia. 2017: Switzerland. 83 1998: Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR), United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). 2000: International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO). 2002: United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 2004: Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO). 2017: World Meteorological Organization (WMO), West Nordic Council (WNC), OSPAR Commission, International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). 2019: International Maritime Organization (IMO). 84 1998: International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH), Northern Forum (NF), Worldwide Fund for Nature, Arctic Program (WWF). 2000: International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA), Association of World Reindeer Herders (AWRH), Circumpolar Conservation Union (CCU), Advisory Committee on Protection of the Sea (ACOPS). 2002: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), University of the Arctic (UArctic). 2004:

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activities as Observers. At Council meetings, observers are invited to propose projects to permanent members to contribute to Arctic knowledge development (Duyck 2015). After several applications85, it was in 2013 that Japan, alongside China, Korea, Singapore, India, and Italy, obtained observer status at the Arctic Council, the main forum for cooperation and collaboration between Arctic and non-Arctic states. This has led to the rise of several interrogations concerning the Observers' role and capacities within the Arctic Council. On the one hand, some researchers and politicians have considered the Observers’ arrival, particularly China, as a threat to the predominance of the Arctic States and indigenous people in the AC (Pompeo 2019; Wright 2011). Others have underlined the limits of Observers' role and their capacities to contribute to the AC activities (Knecht 2017; Chater 2016; Babin and Lasserre 2019).

The role and status of the Observer are clearly stated in the Manual for the Observers adopted in 2013 at the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting. As set out in the Declaration on the Establishment of the AC and governed by the AC Rules of Procedure, observer status in the AC is open to non- Arctic States; inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, global and regional; and non-governmental organizations that the Council determines can contribute to its work (Arctic Council 2020b; Babin and Lasserre 2019; Knecht 2017; Chater 2016). Moreover, Observers must accept and support the AC's objectives defined in the Ottawa declaration. These objectives include recognizing the Arctic States' sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic. Observers must also recognize the legal framework such as the Law of the Sea and its application to the Arctic Ocean. They must pledge their respect to the values, interests, culture, and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants and demonstrated concrete interest, a political willingness and financial ability to contribute to the work of the Permanent Participants, Arctic indigenous peoples. To avoid tensions, the AC also created a ceiling on funds (50 percent of project funding) that Observers can allocate to the AC. Within the AC meetings framework, Observers are invited to participate and demonstrate their Arctic interests in the various Working Groups and Takes Forces, propose projects to Member-States, and make written statements86.

Arctic Institute of North America (AINA). 2017: Oceana. 85 Application since 2006 for China, 2008 for South Korea, 2009 for Japan, Singapore and India in 2012. 86 As Observers are not entitled to vote in ministerial decisions their statements remain purely advisory.

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Hence, like all other observers on the Council, in order to participate and maintain its Observer status, Japan faces the following limitations:

(1) participation in the Working Groups and Task Forces, (2) can only propose projects through an Arctic State or a permanent participant, (3) its financial contribution to a project must not exceed the level of funding of the Arctic States (Li and Peng 2019).

Therefore, these different rules limit the Observers' ability to influence Arctic governance, which ensures the pre-eminence of Arctic states and indigenous communities. Thus, Japan's opinions are purely advisory, and the country has little weight in Council meetings (ARC 2019).

Contribution in the Working Groups

The real contribution of observers, and therefore of Japan, to the Arctic Council, consists of their participation in Working Groups, Task Forces, and Expert Groups, which allow them to contribute financially (within limits imposed), technologically, and scientifically to projects (Pulkkinen 2013). As they support the AC in implementing legally binding agreements on protecting the Arctic environment, the Working Groups are fundamental tools for international scientific cooperation (Binder 2016). All Council members, Member States, permanent participants, and observers are invited to contribute to these Working Groups. Their work, passed on to senior officials (SAO), contributes to developing the Arctic policies and standards. These groups meet regularly and issue press releases to protect better and manage the Arctic heritage. Through these working groups, States highlight their researchers' skills in new technologies that can subsequently be economically profitable (Binder 2016). However, the influence of the Working Groups' reports to the Council also has its limits: they are only advisory, and the groups do not always participate in ODS negotiations. This was the case for the cooperation agreement on aeronautical and maritime search and rescue in the Arctic of 2011, or the cooperation agreement on the preparation and response to marine oil pollution in the Arctic from 2016 (Binder 2016).

Before the ArCS project launch in 2015, Japanese participants to the working group meetings were government officials from the MoFA, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports Science and Technology (MEXT), or the Ministry of Environment (MoE) accompanying some scientists from

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JAMSTEC or NIPR. Following the establishment of the ArCS project in 2015 and then ArCS-II from 2020, member affiliated with ArCS became the main participants in the working group meeting (北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] 2020). Members from the MoE officials are the last to continue to attend CAFF meetings. The working groups being divided by study areas and the observer states not being able to be present in all, the latter tends to send representatives, scientists and professionals, to meetings of those of the groups which most interest them and where they present outcomes of their research on the Arctic and contribute to discussions (Chater 2016). As noticed in previous papers, the activity reports published by Asian observers in the Council provide partial information on observers' involvement, and complementary data was provided by the NIPR (Chater 2016; Knecht 2017; Babin and Lasserre 2019).

ATTENDANCE OF JAPANESE DELEGATES FOR THE 2015 FISCAL YEAR (FY)

MEETING HOME INSTITUTION VENUE AMAP 29TH MEETING JAMSTEC TROMSØ (NORWAY) NIPR HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY CAFF BOARD MEETING NIPR TROMSØ (NORWAY) EGBCM 1ST MEETING NIPR REYKJAVÍK (ICELAND) SCTF 8TH MEETING KOBE UNIVERSITY ARLINGTON (USA)

FY 2016

MEETING HOME INSTITUTION VENUE EGBCM 2ND MEETING NIPR HELSINKI (FINLAND) SCTF 9TH MEETING KOBE UNIVERSITY OTTAWA (CANADA) CAFF BOARD MEETING NIPR LONGYEARBYEN (NORWAY) PAME II-2016 HOKKAIDO PORTLAND (USA) UNIVERSITY EGBCM 3RD MEETING NIPR WASHINGTON DC (USA) AMAP 30TH MEETING JAMSTEC HELSINKI (FINLAND) CAFF BOARD MEETING NIPR KAUTOKEINO (NORWAY) SDWG REGULAR MEETING HOKKAIDO KOTZEBUE (USA) UNIVERSITY CBIRD REGULAR MEETING NIPR FAROE ISLANDS (DENMARK)

FY2017

MEETING HOME INSTITUTION VENUE AMAP CONFERENCE HOKKAIDO RESTON (USA) UNIVERSITY AMAP SLCF EG 1ST MEETING NIPR VICTORIA (CANADA)

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AMAP 31TH MEETING JAMSTEC REYKJAVÍK (ICELAND) PAME II-2017 HOKKAIDO HELSINKI (FINLAND) UNIVERSITY SDWG REGULAR MEETING HOKKAIDO INARI (FINLAND) UNIVERSITY CAFF BOARD MEETING NIPR BETHEL (USA) EGBCM 4TH MEETING NIPR HELSINKI (FINLAND) AMAP SLCF EG 2ND NIPR HELSINKI (FINLAND) MEETING CAFF BOARD MEETING NIPR FAIRBANKS (USA) PAME I-2018 HOKKAIDO QUEBEC CITY (CANADA) UNIVERSITY CBIRD REGULAR MEETING NIPR CAMBRIDGE (USA) SDWG REGULAR MEETING HOKKAIDO KITTILÄ (FINLAND) UNIVERSITY SAO PLENARY MEETING HOKKAIDO KITTILÄ (FINLAND) UNIVERSITY

FY2018

MEETING HOME INSTITUTION VENUE CAFF BOARD MEETING NIPR DUTCH HARBOR (USA) EGBCM 5TH MEETING NIPR HELSINKI (FINLAND) AMAP 32ND MEETING JAMSTEC KIRUNA (SWEDEN) PAME II-2018 HOKKAIDO VLADIVOSTOK (RUSSIA) UNIVERSITY SDWG REGULAR MEETING HOKKAIDO ROVANIEMI (FINLAND) UNIVERSITY AMAP SLCF EG 3RD MEETING NIPR BOLOGNA (ITALY) EGBCM 6TH MEETING NIPR HELSINKI (FINLAND) CAFF BOARD MEETING NIPR ANCHORAGE (USA) PAME I-2019 HOKKAIDO MALMÖ (SWEDEN) UNIVERSITY CBIRD REGULAR MEETING AKUREYRI (ICELAND)

FY2019

MEETING HOME INSTITUTION VENUE CAFF BOARD MEETING NIPR STOCKHOLM (SWEDEN) PAME II-2019 HOKKAIDO REYKJAVÍK (ICELAND) UNIVERSITY SDWG REGULAR MEETING HOKKAIDO ÍSAFJÖRÐUR (ICELAND) UNIVERSITY AMAP 33RD MEETING JAMSTEC TROMSØ (NORWAY) AMAP SLCF EG 4TH MEETING NIPR ANN ARBOR (USA) CAFF BOARD MEETING NIPR GÄLLIVARE (SWEDEN) PAME I-2020 HOKKAIDO OSLO (NORWAY) UNIVERSITY

TABLE 7: DISPATCH OF EXPERTS TO ARCTIC COUNCIL-RELATED MEETINGS BETWEEN FY 2015 AND FY2019 (DATA PROVIDED BY NIPR 2020/08/18).

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As can be observed in the tables above, Japanese experts have been active participants of the Working Groups' meetings and activities and within several Task Forces and Expert Groups, which are privileged spaces for science diplomacy in the Arctic.

AMAP 10

PAME 7 EGBCM 6 SCTF 2 CAFF 9 SDWG 5 CBIRD 3 SAO 1

Table 8: NUMBER OF MEETINGS ATTENDED BY JAPANESE EXPERTS BETWEEN FY2015 AND FY2019 WITHIN THE ARCTIC COUNCIL (COMPILED BY AUTHOR).

Through the years, Japanese experts have mainly been active in AMAP, CAFF, and PAME. Within AMAP, Japan had the opportunity to present its observations and results and develop an updated assessment of Short-lived Climate Pollutants (SLCP) by Japan’s advanced measurement technologies for airborne Black Carbon particles its SLCP Expert Group. Japanese experts contributed as author or reviewer of several of AMAP’s scientific reports such as the Assessment on Arctic Ocean Acidification and Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) in 2017, the report Adaptation Actions for a Changing Arctic: Perspectives from the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort Region of AMAP and its project Adaptation Action for Changing Arctic (AACA) in 2017 and the report on Arctic Ocean Acidification (AOA) in 2018 (ArCS Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Project 2019; Sustainability 2020). Japanese delegates have attended meetings from Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention (TFOPP) and the Task Force on Black Carbon and Methane (TFBCM) between 2013 and 2015 and provided a report for the later.

Japanese delegates have also attended all meetings from the Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane (EGBCM) since its creation and submitted national reports in 2015 and 2017 on the Reductions in Black Carbon and Methane Emissions "to assist the Council of the Arctic in its

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efforts to reduce” these emissions87. These reports follow the request from the ECBCM to submit a national report on the emission of black carbon and methane. Japanese delegates have also attended almost all ministerial meetings since 2013. And in 2016, during the 8th meeting of the Scientific Cooperation Task Force (SCTF), Dr. Shibata Akiho from Kobe University submitted a written statement on the draft Agreement on behalf of the Japanese government Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation. Observer states participated in the redaction of the Scientific Cooperation Agreement, especially concerning the provisions relating to non-Arctic states' benefits. Ambassador Shiraishi underlined Japan's contribution to this expert group during her speech at the Arctic Circle in 2015.

Japanese research teams (Hokkaido University and NIPR) conducted seabird tracking and ship- based seabird observations in the Pacific Arctic region since 2016. The data collected was made available in the online database CBird’s Seabird Population Inventory. It provides general breeding and population information collected across the Arctic as part of CBird's monitoring plan. It will help assess seabirds conditions quickly and identify spatial and temporal patterns of change in the Arctic (ArCS Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Project 2019). Scientists from NIPR provided their observation results to the AC’s CBird expert group (Chuffart 2020). This implication in the expert group was followed by a report on the annual report on Japanese research activities: Circumpolar Seabird Expert Group Implementation Update in 2019 (Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna 2019). This report underlines Japanese researchers' involvement in scientific activities and international cooperation and the importance of science and technology in Japan’s Arctic Policy. In 2018, a member of Hokkaido University and a delegate from the official of the Ministry of Environment participated in the Arctic Migratory Birds Initiative (AMBI) Phase 2 Planning Meeting, where they presented Japan’s domestic legal framework on conservation and hunting issues in AMBI East Asian-Australasian Flyway Workshop held in January 2017 in Singapore (ArCS Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Project 2019; Sustainability 2020).

87 Kazuko Shiraishi, 16 October 2015. « Charting Japan's Arctic strategy » Brookings. Disponible sur : http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/10/19-charting-japans-arctic-strategy, accessed July 19, 2018.

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The contribution in the preparation of reports such as on the Reductions in the Assessment on Arctic Ocean Acidification and Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) in 2017, the report Adaptation Actions for the Changing Arctic: Perspectives from the Bering-Chukchi- Beaufort Region of AMAP and its project Adaptation Action for Changing Arctic (AACA) in 2017 and the report on Arctic Ocean Acidification (AOA) in 2018 underline the involvement of Japanese researchers in arctic institutions (ArCS Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Project 2019; Sustainability 2020). It also helps the Japanese government justify its interest in the Arctic region apart from simple economic interest and participate in the drafting of reports that could potentially contribute to the governance of this region, allowing it to demonstrate its expertise in the concerned fields (Chater 2016). However, Observers' contributions, such as Japan in the AC remains limited. Despite being a privileged space to express themselves, papers have pointed out Observers’ delegates' limited participation in working group meetings (Chater 2016; Knecht 2016; Babin 2019a). In fact, in a study of Arctic Council meetings, Observers like Japan speak little and do not attend all the working group meetings they are involved in (Chater 2016). However, it should be taken into account that first, Japan has only been invited to participate in meetings since 2013 and, secondly, although the Japanese government has been slowly getting more involved in Arctic issues, it is not a priority region for Japan which do not priorities Arctic institutions over others (Chater 2016). The budget and resources allocated to Council meetings and polar research remain relatively low compared to other research sectors such as AI, robotics, etc. If, since the launch of the ArCS project in 2015, more Japanese researchers have indeed been able to participate in AC activities, this involvement seems to reflect their interest in Arctic research rather than an instigation from the government.

While there have been interrogations concerning the agenda of Observer in the AC (and particularly of China), Japan's involvement within the AC institution tends to support its pledge to respect the principle of the primacy of the Arctic States within the AC. With its contribution and participation in the AC, Japan aims to assure the Arctic States of its will to contribute to the protection of the environment and Arctic populations, the development of scientific collaboration but also, if the statutes of the AC allow it, to contribute more in the future governance debates for the Arctic (Hammond 2017). Within the framework of the Council, and under the environmental and science diplomacy developed by Japan in recent years, Japanese polar diplomacy is based

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on the idea of presenting Tokyo as a potential mediator, capable of proposing multilateral solutions to the problems posed, in short, to constitute a constructive force. Japan's official arctic policy is therefore constructed in the form of general recommendations. The Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (2018) encourages the Japanese government, universities, and institutes to send more experts to the Working Groups to contribute to the responsible development of the Arctic. The Arctic Council, the main forum for cooperation and collaboration today, represents an essential platform for Japan to exercise its science diplomacy.

Concerning the evolution of the AC and Observers' role within, Japan’s Arctic Ambassador Shiraishi stated in March 2017 that Japan “expect that in the future Arctic Council meetings should incorporate some opportunity for observer countries to speak before the gathered representatives” (Hammond 2017). She added that she was not “suggesting that observer nations should have the opportunity to speak at every plenary session. However, she noted that during the 2015 AC meeting in Canada, the United States had organized a special session for observers to voice their perspectives and concerns. Japan would like to regularly encourage holding such a session to provide a wider window for presentation, discussion, and interactions between member states, permanent participants, and observers. For Japan, a larger role within the AC would benefit to arctic states, their indigenous communities.

While the Arctic Council is often considered the favored cooperative and collaborative platform in the Arctic, it does not prevent experts and government members from supporting the influence of polar research and Japanese Arctic diplomacy from being mandated to participate in other forums. Japanese delegations regularly attend the annual meetings of the Arctic Frontiers or the Arctic Circle forums. The Ambassadors for Arctic Affairs Shiraishi Kazuko was present for the annual assembly of the Arctic Circle in 2015, as well as her successors Ide Keiji in 2017, Yamamoto Eiji 2018, Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kōno Tarō in 2018, and the newly appointed Ambassador for Arctic Affairs Miyoshi Mari in 2019. During an Arctic Circle meeting in Reykjavik in 2015, Ambassador Kazuko Shiraishi unveiled the brand-new official Arctic policy, reiterating Japan's commitment to ensuring the protection and responsible development of the Arctic. During the Arctic Circle Forum Assembly in 2019, Japan presided the first session by an Asian Observer incorporating a dialogue with the Arctic indigenous people “Science Meets

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Society: Toward the Co-Designing of Arctic Research”. It was also the first time that the Minister of Foreign Affairs mentioned the Ainu as an indigenous Japanese people and established a rapprochement with the Arctic indigenous people.

Achievements of Japan’s science diplomacy in the Arctic

Scientific research's importance to the political sphere is subjected to different views and interests (Łuszczuk, Padrtova, and Szczerbowicz 2020). While science is / or should be based on objective evidence and be independent of the influence of politics and ideology, the political domain is characterized by various and fluctuating influences and interests. However, as argued by Łuszczuk, Padrtova, and Szczerbowicz (2020), cooperation between scientists and political decision-makers helps reach more effective and responsible policy measures. As mentioned earlier, science diplomacy provides foreign policy objectives with scientific advice, facilitates international science cooperation, and uses science cooperation to improve international relations between countries (Bertelsen 2019). Łuszczuk, Padrtova, and Szczerbowicz (2020, 2) add that “while science diplomacy typically constitutes an element of a state’s foreign policy and serves its interests, international scientific cooperation focuses on scientific progress and is animated and conducted by individuals or groups of individuals”. In the Arctic context, scientific research constitutes a starting point for regional cooperation with, for example, IASC or the Arctic Council (Łuszczuk, Padrtova, and Szczerbowicz 2020, 3).

Concerning Japan, the government emphasizes the importance of making scientific contributions to contributes to Arctic affairs. In particular, the 2015 policy states that Japan full use of its “strength in science and technology from a global viewpoint” to address arctic issues88. The document provides three specific initiatives to cover: Research and Development, International Cooperation, and Sustainable Use. Additionally, the 2018 Basic Plan on Ocean Policy document suggests that research should inform policy. Furthermore, it emphasizes a need to support

88 Global Environmental, Indigenous Peoples, Science and Technology, Ensuring the Rule of Law and Promoting International Cooperation, Arctic Sea Route, Natural Resources Development, and National Security.

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Japanese scholars and institutions involvement in international cooperative such as the International Arctic Science Committee, or the Arctic Council working groups.

FY2011 655,126,000 (6,214,480 USD) FY2012 551,172,000 (5,228,298 USD) GRENE FY2013 575,120,000 (5, 455,464 USD) FY2014 593,364,000 (5,627,813 USD) FY2015 390,241,000 (3,701,275 USD) FY2015 259,291,000 (2,459,105 USD) FY2016 758,181,000 (7,190,557 USD) ARCS FY2017 821,837,000 (7,794,299 USD) FY2018 822,123,000 (7797012USD) FY2019 755,562,000 (7,165,408 USD) TOTAL: 6,182,017,000 (58,627,457 USD) TABLE 9: EVOLUTION OF THE BUDGET DEDICATED TO THE GRENE AND ARCS PROJECTS BETWEEN FISCAL YEAR 2011 AND 2019 IN YENS (DATA PROVIDED BY NIPR 2020/08/18).

Table 9 underlines here the budget's evolution to national arctic research support programs by the Japanese government. If the budget for 2019 is slightly lower than in previous years, it will be completed with the launch of the ArCS-II project in 2020.

The three strategic areas in Japan's Arctic policy revolves around (1) observation of and research on the Arctic from a global perspective; (2) international cooperation on the Arctic; and (3) examination of the feasibility of the Arctic Sea Route. The ArCS project was designed as a national-flag program designed to implement the Science and Technology objectives to support these objectives. As part of the Research and Development initiative, seven specific objectives were established by the 2015 policy:

1. Promotion of Arctic research to contribute to policy decision-making and problem- solving 2. Strengthening observation and analysis systems and developing the most advanced observation instruments 3. Establishment of a research network in Japan 4. Establishment of research and observation stations in Arctic states 5. Data sharing and management 6. Training and supporting researchers 7. Arctic research vessel

Out these seven objectives, the ArCS website notes three achievements completed which combine these objectives: (1) the establishment of research and observation stations to conduct joint research programs, (2) the Overseas Visits by Young Researchers, and (3) the dispatch of

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experts to AC and international activities. Concerning the dissemination of information and data, we can also underline that although most of the information concerning the GRENE and ArCS projects is in Japanese, we have observed a real desire to share information with the proliferation of press over the years releases and reports in English. Articles about ArCS members' activities are regularly updated in Japanese and English on the blog of ArCS. Likewise, numerous conferences and seminars are organized each year in Japanese and English, with international researchers and experts' participation. The number of publications in international journals and collaboration with researchers abroad is increasing.

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TOTAL REFEREED PAPER 73 104 165 233 171 779 (PUBLISHED) PAPERS WITHOUT PEER 9 24 47 66 27 173 REVIEW (PUBLISHED)

TABLE 10: PAPER PRESENTATIONS: THE FOLLOWING ARE THE PAPERS PUBLISHED IN ACADEMIC JOURNALS, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, BOOKS, ETC. INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM: 北極域研究推進プロジェクト [ARCTIC CHALLENGE FOR SUSTAINABILITY] (2020, P. 164).

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TOTAL PRESENTATION 215 463 540 513 209 1940 PUBLIC LECTURE 9 66 87 102 20 284 PRESS COVERAGE (NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, 17 30 44 66 27 184 TV, ECT.) PRESS RELEASE (MAINLY REGARDING 4 12 11 22 4 53 THE PUBLICATION OF PAPERS) TABLE 11: PRESENTATIONS AT ACADEMIC CONFERENCES, PUBLIC LECTURES AND MEDIA COVERAGE. INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM: 北極域研究推進プロジェクト [ARCTIC CHALLENGE FOR SUSTAINABILITY] (2020, P. 164).

Tables 10 & 11 summarize the national and international publications and conferences during the ArCS project (2015-FY2019). Most research papers in international journals, books, and reports were written both in Japanese and English. Seminar and sessions were held locally and in overseas places: for example, Japan organized a session in "Arctic Circle Assembly" at Reykjavik (Iceland), a conversation with a local community at Cambridge Bay (Canada), Nuuk, and Qaanaaq (Greenland), Sakha, etc. (NIPR 2020c).

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To nuance the achievement underlined by the ArCS report, we can note that some could not be reached despite the various initiatives launched by the ArCS project (publications, interviews, open seminars). Despite these events, the number of students who started Arctic research in Japan remains very limited. To increase Japanese polar research visibility at the national level, the scientific community requires more in-depth support of policy-makers (NIPR 2020c, 2017; ARC 2019). To fill this gap and gather the support of public opinion and the policy-makers, a 56 pages pamphlet called "Future North Pole" was elaborated and distributed within the relevant ministries, to Diet members, and school libraries (北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] 2020). Moreover, despite the Japanese government's stated desire to promote arctic research with the construction of a new icebreaker89, Japan's current capacity to conduct research in the region remains limited. Already in a report in 2014, the OPRI underlined the need for a new Japanese research icebreaker capable of Arctic expeditions year-round “to help Japan contribute to solving the issue of global climate changes as well as bolster relations with Arctic states through regional development efforts” (Rafnsdóttir 2019). The report also emphasized the need to consider ways to “utilize Japanese engineering and experience as well as necessary aspects in building and operating an Arctic research vessel capable of supporting international research” like the Korean icebreaker Araon that has promoted Korean arctic diplomacy since its launch. Despite discussions before the Budget since 2019, there has been no news of Japan commissioning a new research icebreaker.

One of the concrete effects of Japanese science diplomacy in the Arctic is the organization in 2020 of the third Science Ministerial Meeting (ASM3) in Tokyo90. The ASM aims to promote research and observations, and responses to major social issues in the Arctic and further foster scientific cooperation among relevant countries and with groups of indigenous peoples. In November 2020, Japan will co-chair the meeting with Iceland, the third ASM, and it will be the first meeting held in Asia. The organization of the ASM3 in Tokyo highlights the height expectations for Japan's scientific contribution and science diplomacy regarding the Arctic.

89 The 2015 policy recommended to “consider the design of a research ship for the Arctic as a new international Arctic research platform, with functions to enable participation in international Arctic observation projects using equipment such as autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV)” (Ocean Policy Research Institute 2015, 7). 90 Event disrupted by the Covid-19 epidemy.

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Similarly, an important outcome would be greater visibility in the press and the media of issues related to the Arctic. This region is now presented as being an important region or sea area for Japan.

Underlining the connection between research and economy, Łuszczuk, Padrtova, and Szczerbowicz (2020, 10) argue that there is a tendency to present research as an inevitable component of the many forms of human activity with the states stressing their role in economic activities. The policy notes that “in addition to the importance of scientific understanding of the changes in the Arctic, there was renewed recognition of the importance of understanding the impacts on society, politics, and economy as well as the importance of cooperation among industry, academia, and government” (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 4).

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Part 2. The Japanese Arctic economic policy, an extension of its Indo-Pacific strategy or a policy specifically dedicated to the Arctic?

The tradition of Japanese scientific research in the Arctic and its inclusion in Japanese science diplomacy allows it to build bridges with the Arctic states. This strengthens its image as a scientific and technological leader on the international scene and helps to export this image to strengthen or promote commercial partnerships between Japanese companies and / in the Arctic. If Japanese scientific cooperation in the Arctic is present in North America, Northern Europe, and Russia, what about economic partnerships? While in the 1990s, the OPRI, supported by the lobbies of Japanese shipowners, participated in a study on the use and profitability of the northern route, one can wonder what role these economic interests play in developing partnerships with the Arctic states. Do these bilateral and multilateral exchanges have characteristics specific to the Arctic, or are they an extension of a pre-established and rebranded Arctic relationship in a context where non-bordering states pay more attention each year to this region?

The rise of geoeconomics

With the end of the Cold War, the coercive capacity (missiles, bombers, etc.) of developed states has no longer been the main factor in their international power. Traditional weapons are being replaced by economic weapons (sanctions) supported or guided directly by the state (Aligica and Tarko 2014; Lorot 2009). In a globalized interdependent world, States obtain power by developing international economic partnerships to maximize both their influence (maintain dependence on other States) and their autonomy (reducing reliance on others) (Diesen 2018; Olsen 2019). Geopolitics is based on the analysis of political, economic, geographic, and social observations and offers an approach for the study of the stake power rivalries and influences on a given territory (Gonon and Lasserre 2001; Lacoste 1993). It is an approach method based on the analysis of spatial dynamics (and inertias) that can be used better to decipher International Relations in terms of power and influence.

Already in 1990, Edward Luttwak underlined the concept of geo-economics, an “admixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of commerce- or, as Clausewitz would have written, the logic

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of war in the grammar of commerce” Luttwak (1990, 3). Luttwak’s articulation of geo-economics as the “geostrategic91 use of economic power92” by a state is supported by several researchers such as Lorot (2001, 1999), or Wigell and Vihma (2016) (see also Aligica and Tarko 2014). They define Geoeconomics as the strategic environment operated, shaped, and managed by a state to support its national interests through economic tools. Here, the strategic economic perspective is at the heart of the analysis and gives a structure to foreign policy (Sparke 2013, 292). The number of publications (institutes, think tanks but also government documents) on geo-economics since the early 2010s is on the rise, attesting of the central role of economic issues in current foreign policy affairs (Funabashi 2020; Scott 2019; Olsen 2019; Vihma 2018; Katada 2018; Diesen 2018; Käpylä and Mikkola 2016; Mattlin and Wigell 2016).

Vihma (2018, 4-5) notes that in Luttwak’s analysis, the geo in geo-economics refers to geo- dimension (power relations between international entities) instead of geographical conditions as an explanatory factor for world politics or economics. However, for other researchers, geoeconomics refers to the economic aspects of geographical space (Mattlin and Wigell 2016, 129; Aaltola et al. 2014). Both Vihma (2018, 9) and Mattlin and Wigell (2016, 129) note that for Sparke, or Cowen and Smith, geoeconomics is a geostrategic social discourse, built to mitigate geopolitical threats and provide security in economics terms (Sparke 2007; Cowen and Smith 2009; Moisio and Paasi 2013; Aaltola et al. 2014). Following Dodds (2001, 469), Domosh (2013, 945) argues that global economics strategies are informed and perhaps even guided by geographical understandings. She has a constructive approach of geoeconomics as "it conjures up a range of meanings, cultures, and places through which description can happen. Geoeconomics, in other words, does not refer simply to a description of economic spatial strategies but instead encompasses a way of seeing the world in which those strategies come to be seen as plausible and desirable". Geoeconomics is defined in this chapter as the rivalries of power between states, based on strategic economic weapons (sanctions, incentives, coercive measures, etc. that we will call economic diplomacy tools) to support their national interests on a given territory. The localization and development of resources can give rise to geo-economic rivalries, as is the

91 Competitive or cooperative. 92 As goals or means.

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Mediterranean case between Turkey and Greece, or in South-East Asia with the dispute over the Paracel Islands.

In recent years, governments worldwide have tended to use economic instruments (sanctions/incentives/economic support for specific firms/coercive measures) to assert their international capacities and protect their political interests (Olsen 2019). Economic wealth has become one of the main tools to attest to state’s power in an approach close to the soft power theorized by Joseph S. Nye93. The globalization and liberalization of markets have led states to embark on policies to conquer foreign markets and control sectors of activity considered to be strategic. The 2017 Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) White Paper stated that “Trade and investment and infrastructure development are being used as instruments to build strategic influence, as well as to bring a commercial advantage. In the past, the pursuit of closer economic relations between countries often diluted strategic rivalries. This geoeconomic competition could instead accentuate tension” (cited in Dolven and Vaughn 2020, 16). The rise of China, tensions on the energy market, the Ukrainian crisis, and the financial crisis of 2008 have led to subsequent shifts in the global economic power and highlighted the link between economy and security (Vihma 2018; Mattlin and Wigell 2016).

Moreover, as observed by Mattlin and Wigell (2016, 128), geopolitics and geoeconomics tend to be either juxtaposed or interchangeably used in the current literature (Cowen and Smith 2009; Sparke 2007; Bost and Rosière 2018; Käpylä and Mikkola 2016; Lasserre 2013; Lorot 2009, 2001; Moisio and Paasi 2013; Wigell and Vihma 2016). It is sure however, that geopolitics and geoeconomics are now intertwined together. For Diesen (2018), “the geoeconomic reasoning for developing and expanding trade blocs bears a resemblance to the geopolitical utility of the formation of military alliances”. However, Lorot (2001, 47-48) highlighted one of the differences that while geopolitics includes various actors (states, companies, human groups, politically constituted or not, etc.), geoeconomics mainly involves states, institutions as well as large

93 While hard-power refers to tangible military and economic assets employed to compel, coerce, influence, or defeat enemies and competitors, soft-power relies on persuasion and mutual exchange (cultural exports, information flows, diplomacy) to convince others that the ideas and values it sponsors are legitimate and should be accepted or tolerated (Balaam and Dillman 2015).

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companies. This point is contradicted by Santos Neves (2017, 94), who argues that geoeconomics (and economic diplomacy) involves various actors at the international, macro-regional, national and sub-national levels. Lorot further argues that geoeconomic policies' ultimate goal is not to control territories (as is geopolitics), but to acquire technological and commercial supremacy. Diesen (2018) notes that the transition from geopolitics to geoeconomics underlines a shift from State power mainly stemming from territory and military might lead to a situation when it now increasingly derives from the ability to control strategic markets, transportation corridors, and financial institutions (Diesen 2018, 585). Governments, Foreign Ministries, and Ministries of Defense integrate more than ever geoeconomic perspectives in their discourses, national interests, and national security analyses (Sparke 2013, 296). R. Jain (2019, 30) uses the example of the territorial dispute in the South-Chinese sea. He distinguishes geoeconomics in service to geopolitics as statecraft in economic diplomacy and military exercise means (ships, forces, etc.) in service to geoeconomics. According to Youngs, geoeconomic is “the use of statecraft for economic ends; a focus on relative economic gain and power; a concern with gaining control of resources; the enmeshing of state and business sectors; and the primacy of economic over other forms of security” (Youngs 2012; cited in Mattlin and Wigell 2016). For Mattlin and Wigell (2016, 129), geoeconomics emerges as “an economically oriented geopolitics, a form of neo-mercantilism in which “states will tend to act geo-economically simply because of what they are: territorially defined entities designed precisely to outdo each other on the world scene’” (citing Luttwak 1993, 64).

For Käpylä and Mikkola (2016, 203), the economic geography approach highlights the interconnection between territory and economy and includes the commercial value of and action in a specific region. As seen above, Lorot (2001, 47-48) argues that geoeconomic policies' ultimate goal is not the control of territories (unlike geopolitics), but to acquire technological and commercial supremacy. Insofar as cooperation and collaboration between States are privileged within the Arctic economic development framework, the geoeconomic approach seems to be highly relevant to analyze Japan's economic policy concerning this region (Lasserre 2013; Käpylä and Mikkola 2016).

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Many papers have highlighted the growing importance of geopolitics and geoeconomics in the Arctic (Aaltola et al. 2014; Lasserre 2013; Finger and Heininen 2019; Heininen 2019; Käpylä and Mikkola 2016; Brutschin and Schubert 2016). These papers underline two geoeconomic consequences of the melting of Arctic sea ice. First, the improved access to potential new sources of hydrocarbons and minerals, as highlighted by the 2008 USGS survey. Secondly, the Arctic Sea Routes development resulted from the reduction of transit distances between North- East Asia and Northern Europe. Considering Finland's case in their report, Aaltola et al. (2014, 13) argue that the traditional geopolitical competition in the Arctic is still a dynamic that co-exists with patterns and tendencies related to geoeconomic. According to Mattlin and Wigell (2016, 132) and Käpylä and Mikkola (2016), the economic potential of the Arctic seems to have, so far, induced cooperation rather than competition between states and entities even considering the Ukrainian Crisis. However, in their paper, Mattlin and Wigell (2016, 132) underline that despite many similarities or connections between geopolitics and geoeconomics in the Arctic, there can be considerable tension between them. During the Ukrainian crisis, western sanctions were focused on the Russian Arctic side (e.g., prohibition on the exportation of goods, services, and technologies for Russia’s offshore oil development in the Arctic, access to capitals for Arctic-related projects) (Käpylä and Mikkola 2016, 216). Mattlin and Wigell (2016, 132) argue that external geopolitical dynamics can affect cooperation in the Arctic and negatively impact its economic potential.

The Role of Economic diplomacy

In the literature, the distinction between geoeconomics and economic diplomacy is quite blurry. Some authors tend to use these two terms together interchangeably or without making a clear distinction between them (Santos Neves 2017). However, if researchers in Geography seem to prefer the use of the concept of geoeconomics (Lorot 1999; Cowen and Smith 2009; Lasserre 2013; Käpylä and Mikkola 2016; Wigell and Vihma 2016; Vihma 2018; Scott 2019; Olsen 2019), we observe that those in International Relations tends to prefer economic diplomacy (Okano- Heijmans 2011; Bayne and Woolcock 2011; Tonami 2018). In this chapter, geoeconomics is understood as the economic strategy established by States to support and protect their national

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interests in power rivalries with other states on a given territory 94. Economic diplomacy is understood as the economic (and financial) actions, measures, and tools used to support and carry out this strategy in the frame of the relations between states and international actors.

Bayne and Woolcock (2011), quoting Bull (1995:156), define diplomacy as “the conduct of relations between states and other entities withstanding in world politics by coccidial agents and by peaceful means”. It also concerns the management of those relations, be they at international or local level. (Barston 2006, 1). According to Balzacq et al , diplomacy can be defined as “the actions and (the) manner of representing one’s country to a foreign national and in international relations”, but also as the “external policy of a country, of a government” or the “branch of political science which concerns international relations” (Balzacq, Charillon, and Ramel 2020).

Particularly present in the 1960s, and after the decline of studies on economic diplomacy in the 1980s, this topic has again been the subject of much research since the early 2000s (Bayne and Woolcock 2011). For Badel (2020, 211), economic diplomacy concerns the mobilization of various actors (public, semi-public, and private) under the supervision and support of the public authorities (at several levels: local, national, and international) to support national economic interest by “endorsing the commercial and financial expansion of national companies into foreign markets and by promoting the appeal of the national territory to foreign investors”. Economic diplomacy can be understood as the process of international economic decision-making to “serve the country’s national interests in terms of economic prosperity or political stability” and involve the creation or the enforcement of binding rules and punitive measures (sanctions) and is (Bayne and Woolcock 2011).

Okano-Heijmans, in her works, use a more comprehensive definition to encompass the broad national interests that include political and strategic as well as economic security dimensions (Okano-Heijmans 2012, 2011). For her, economic/commercial and political interests are interdependent and reinforce each other’s (Okano-Heijmans and Asano 2018; Okano-Heijmans 2016). She defined economic diplomacy as “an umbrella term that encapsulates a diversity of

94 It does not include other strategy components, such as political or military strategies.

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activities of a foreign policy strategy that is based on the premise that economic/commercial interests and political interests reinforce one another and should thus be seen in tandem” (Okano-Heijmans 2012, 63). The public and private sectors aim to achieve commercial objectives that advance national interests. In her paper, Okano-Heijimans analyzes five strands in Japan’s economic diplomacy since the 1990s: (1) commercial diplomacy (trade, investment or tourism promotion, business advocacy, cooperation in science and technology), (2) trade diplomacy (bilateral and multilateral Free Trade Agreement, licenses), (3) financial diplomacy (monetary policy), (4) inducements (ODA, grants, loans, etc.), (5) and sanctions (embargo, boycott) (Okano- Heijmans 2012, 63-65; Tonami 2016a, 12-13; Santos Neves 2017, 93-94).

FIGURE 8: STRANDS OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: JAPAN. IN OKANO-HEIJMANS (2012, 65), SLIGHTLY MODIFIED FROM OKANO-HEIJMANS (2011). For Tonami, economic diplomacy and its different tools (commercial, financial and trade diplomacy as well as inducements and sanctions) are used by governments and business to promote and support its national economic security and prosperity and achieve political stability (Tonami 2016a, 12). International Relations theories can be used to underline the interests and trends leading the decision-making process in foreign policy. Bayne and Woolcock (2011, 25) state that since the constructivist approach argues that interests and values can be socially determined, this approach can be used to understand the central role of negotiations in economic diplomacy. They also stress the role of the socialization process and persuasion in the negotiation process.

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In the context of this chapter on Japan’s international cooperation with the Arctic, Geo- economic and Economic strategy conceptual frameworks are interesting in order to highlight the tools used by Japan to promote its economic and political strategy with this region. Bilateral relations aim to structure, promote, and support national interests and international negotiations and are the founding and essential element of international relations (Pannier 2020). This political tool goes through multiple channels: Foreign affairs ministries, embassies, consulate, etc. which role is to represent, inform, negotiate, and cooperate; or political parties, the private sector, and civil society (Pannier 2020; Bayne and Woolcock 2011).

Japan’s Arctic Economic Strategy

Geoeconomics has become a vital component of powerplays between states. In the Arctic environment, with its particular conditions, business strategies are gradually overtaken by geopolitics. Neither states nor companies can claim to play alone. Companies demand guarantees to the State to protect and support their investment and remain competitive on a global scale. The company strategy is now deployed in a fast reconfiguration space with the proliferation of transnational markets (across the national borders of two or more states) and bilateral agreements. In its Arctic policy of 2015, Japan underlines the economic potential of the Arctic region, in terms of mineral (LNG), maritime (fishing), sea route (NSR), and human resources (local communities). Japan emphasizes arctic responsible development in continuity with its oceanic policy based on international law, freedom of navigation, and sustainable development to promote a "blue" economy.

The age of Geoeconomics, Japan’s international economic strategy

Since the Meiji (1868-1912) and Taisho (1912-1926) periods, the zaibatsu family businesses (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, etc.) have controlled the Japanese industry (mining, merchandising, financial services, shipping) through active economic diplomacy (Sakakibara 2003; Badel 2020). The zaibatsu were replaced after the Second World War by the gyōkai gurupu or keiretsu industrial groups that kept a very close relationship with political parties. With its defeat in the Second World War, Japan gave up developing military power-projection capabilities preferring to support the Pax Americana (receiving economic and security benefit) and develop one of the largest, most

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expensive defense forces in the world. Despite this attitude seen as passive for many Western observers, Japan has been protecting its national interest and projecting power through a non- traditional security agenda. The “comprehensive security” (sogo anzen hosho) was developed in the 1980s under the direction of Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki (Howe and Campbell 2013). It focuses on regional and global security arrangements like the Official Development Assistance (ODA), or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but also food, energy, environment, communication, transport, and social security and is still effective today (Howe 2010, 1317-1320; Akaha 1991; Badel 2020). Hayes (2009, 250) states that since the Petroleum Act enacted in 1962, the Japanese government exercises control over the industry through licensing. The 1973 and 1978 oil shocks led to an economic shock worldwide and an intense inflammation for Japan. However, according to Tonami (2014b), the Japanese business groups play an informal, yet substantial role in foreign policy- making through lobbyism.

Since the late 1970s, the "Japanese economic miracle" has enabled Japan to get involved in the construction of connectivity infrastructure (transport, but also energy, telecommunications, and information technology) in Asia and deploy funds to finance projects through the Asian Development Bank (ABD) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (Bhagawati 2016). Despite the financial crisis of the 1990s, 2008, this funding remains one of the priorities of the Japanese government's investments abroad (H. Zhao 2018). Japan is a member of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) and its DAC (Development Assistance Committee) and has been particularly active in regional cooperation in central and East Asia with, for example, the Hashimoto Doctrine of 1997 for cooperation, broader and deeper economic exchanges, and joint approaches to regional problems. The Confluence of the Two Seas95 of Abe Shinzo in 2006, the Abe Security Diamond96 in 2012 and the Free and Open Indo- Pacific97 strategy from 2012 are other examples of Japan’s involvement in regional cooperation

95 Japan's vision of the Indo-Pacific as a region based on common values such as democracy, freedom and respect for human rights (Rossiter 2018). 96 Strategy by which Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. state of Hawaii form a diamond to protect the common maritime resources that stretch from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific (Rossiter 2018). 97 Promotion of the fundamental values of the rule of law, democracy and freedom of navigation and encouraging economic prosperity thanks to the solidity of port and rail infrastructure (Babin 2019b; Yoshimatsu 2018).

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(Howe and Campbell 2013; Dadabaev 2018b; Yoshimatsu 2018; Aizawa 2018; Dadabaev 2018c). The strategy for Japan to support its economic stability and its expansion abroad is organized around its economic diplomacy and through ODAs, Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), which are fundamental tools of in the Japanese economic diplomacy. Among various multilateral agreement, Japan is a member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (2016), the Japan-EU EPA (2017), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) (2013), Japan-China-ROK FTA (2018), Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) Concept.

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TABLE 12: JAPANESE EPA AND FTA AGREEMENTS. SOURCE: JAPAN'S 2019 ECONOMIC BLUEBOOK, P. 260. In her paper “Exporting the developmental state: Japan’s economic diplomacy in the Arctic”,

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Tonami (2018) uses the concept of developmental state introduced by C. Johnson (1982) concerning the role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan economic development. According to Johnson, the economic bureaucrats elite within the MITI facilitates collaboration and coordination between the state and big businesses. Tonami (2018) notes that Calder nuances this approach and underlines the private actors' predominant role in the consensus-building process and coordination of industrial policies (Tonami 2018; Calder 1988).

Although the Japanese government has long adhered to a policy that integrates economics, politics, and security, the concept of economic diplomacy was explicitly mentioned in the early 2010s (Okano-Heijmans 2012, 66). The function of ambassador in charge of economic diplomacy was added in 2011 to the Foreign Ministry’s Economic Affairs Bureau while this position had been in place for a few years already. Its mandate is mainly in the field of trade negotiations (the World Trade Organization, Trans-Pacific Partnership) as well as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Okano-Heijmans 2012, 66). The ministries involved in trade talks are the MoFA (chief negotiator), the METI (all other trade negotiators), MoF (supervising policies related to customs procedure and tariff revenues), and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) (Okano-Heijmans and Asano 2018).

Since 2011, the annual Diplomatic Bluebooks have integrated the promotion and support of Japanese companies’ development abroad as a pillar of Japan’s economic diplomacy (Okano- Heijmans and Asano 2018). Economic diplomacy is one of six key areas98 promoted by Japanese diplomacy in 2019 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019b, 259). In 2017, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated the need to strengthen the “economic diplomacy as a means of driving the growth of the Japanese economy is regarded as one of the three pillars of Japan's foreign policy, alongside strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and enhancing our relations with neighboring countries. Japan has made earnest efforts to strengthen it” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017a, 287). Following the line of the current foreign policy, Japan’s Economic strategy is organized around three points: (1) rule-making to bolster free and open global

98 Strengthening the Japanese-American alliance and developing networks with friendly and allied countries, (ii) Strengthening relations with neighboring countries, (iii) Promoting economic diplomacy, (iv) Measures taken to deal with to global issues, (v) Contribution to peace and stability in the Middle East, (vi) Promotion of a "Free and open Indo-Pacifique area”.

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economic systems; (2) supporting the overseas business expansion of Japanese companies through the promotion of public-private partnerships; and (3) promoting resources diplomacy along with inward investment toward Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019b, 21, 259). The MoFA, on its official website, also notes 14 different areas for its Economic Diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2020).

1. Agriculture, Fisheries and Forest 2. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 3. Energy 4. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 5. International Investment Agreement (IIA) 6. G7 / G8 7. G20 (Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy) 8. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 9. Government Procurement Information 10. Intellectual Property 11. Japanese Economy 12. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 13. World Economic Forum (Davos) 14. World Trade Organization (WTO)

From the standpoint of a proactive contribution to peace, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy presented by the Japanese Prime Minister Abe since the beginning of his second term, is based on the following assumption: the peace and prosperity of international society depend on a free and open maritime order99. In this strategy, Japan intends to promote the fundamental values of the rule of law, democracy, and freedom of navigation. It wishes to promote economic prosperity thanks to the solidity of the port and railway infrastructures. Japan calls for closer cooperation on maritime security, fight against piracy, and terrorism (Yoshimatsu 2018; Babin 2019b). In 2019, the Bluebook on Foreign Policy stated that in order to support the steady growth of the Japanese economy, the MOFA has proactively carried out various activities to support Japanese companies in foreign markets (e.g., counseling to Japanese companies, public-private collaborations, events

99 “Japan’s prosperity is based on maintaining and strengthening the free and open international economic system, which also leads to the stability and growth of the global economy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019b, 259)

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to promote Japanese products, overseas diplomatic missions, …) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019b, 22)100.

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIPS) and Japan's support for institutions and rules governing regional economic order are central to its geoeconomics strategy. The practice of economic diplomacy has been a key characteristic of Japanese foreign policy since the end of the Second World War to assist business abroad and support global and regional development (Okano-Heijmans 2012). Indeed, Japan’s Foreign policy has been using economic tools for foreign policy purposes and facilitated by the "developmental state" characterized by an interventionist government that guides and supports social-economic development through industrial growth in a capitalist environment (Okano-Heijmans 2012, 64; Okano-Heijmans and Asano 2018).

The age of geoeconomics will pose a grave test for Japan, which depends on imports for many natural resources, including oil. An end to “freedom of navigation” will pose the greatest threat to Japan’s economic security. Given the country’s dependence on trade with both the U.S. and China, it will be left hamstrung in the event of their decoupling. Japan’s relative weakness in platform and digital innovation means it will lose out in any competition for big data (Funabashi 2020).

Following this interventionist tendency of the Japanese government to promote Japan's economic development through international partnerships, Tokyo promotes collaboration towards the Arctic. The 2019 Diplomatic Bluebook states that “In the area of economic use, Japan encourages more Japanese companies to pay attention to Arctic business to take advantage of the Northern Sea Route. Japan can rely on good relations (no images of Japanese imperialism or neo-colonialism, but an economic power) established for a long time with the European Arctic States, its American ally, Canada, and according to the administrations and the tensions linked to the questions of the territories of the North, of Russia (Dadabaev 2018b). Similar to the approach adopted for relations with Central Asia, the recent visit of PM Abe in the Arctic States, particularly with Russia, testify a practical approach to cooperation focused on functionality and practicality (Dadabaev 2018a).

100 “In addition, from the perspective of connecting Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Japanese economic growth the Government of Japan is achieving win-win cooperation that contributes both to the development of Japanese companies’ business overseas and to the socioeconomic development of recipient countries, through proactively promoting the orders for ODA projects with Japanese companies, and using ODA for the development of overseas business by Japanese small and medium-sized enterprises” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019b, 22).

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As demonstrated by the Yamal LNG project in Russia, Japan is advancing comprehensive energy development cooperation with Russia in the Arctic Region while giving full consideration to the Arctic environment (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019b, 255). The policy invites to consider measures to support Japanese companies for “greater awareness of business opportunities in the Arctic and networking with companies and individuals in the business communities of Arctic states, through events such as tours of the Arctic and involvement of Japanese companies in the Arctic Economic Council, which was founded in September 2014” (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 8). The third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (2018) states that in order to promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the Arctic and non-Arctic states, Japan will:

Further promote discussions with the relevant countries including the Arctic States, while taking account of appropriate balance of bilateral and multilateral frameworks. Japan will make the best use of international frameworks on the Arctic such as the Arctic Science Ministerial, the Arctic Circle90, the Arctic Frontiers and the Trilateral High-Level Dialogue on the Arctic among Japan, China and ROK. Japan will strengthen to disseminate its views and thoughts as well as the results of its observation and research on the Arctic to the international community in order to enhance its presence. To that end, we will consider sending high-level representatives to such fora and hosting ones. (MOFA, MEXT). […] As part of international cooperation, Japan will promote international joint research, exchanges among researchers, and secure research and observation stations in the Arctic region. In so doing, we will make active use of ICT. (MIC, MEXT) (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018, 108).

Sustainable Development or the promotion of a Blue Economy in Japan’s Arctic Economic strategy, a continuation of its Ocean Policy?

The decreasing amount of sea ice has expanded the navigable area, enabling the opening of shipping lanes in the Arctic Ocean and other new economic uses. Amid increasing interest in economic activities in the Arctic, including the development of mineral and marine living resources and utilization of the Arctic Sea Route, discussions are underway at the Arctic Council (AC), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and other forums regarding economic activities that can be carried out in a sustainable manner while preserving the vulnerable and low resilient Arctic environment as well as international rule-making (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015).

Japan’s vision for the Indo-Pacific seems quite similar to its policy for the Arctic region. For the Japanese government, economic development and governance in these regions must be based

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on universal values such as democracy, freedom, respect for human rights, and the rule of law (Rossiter 2018; Dadabaev 2018a; Babin 2019b). And it is in the interest of the Arctic and non- arctic states, such as Japan, to forge a close partnership to ensure the prosperity of this region, and without saying so, contain Chinese influence in the world (Yoshimatsu 2018). With the announcement in 2013 of China's New Silk Roads project, and later its section devoted to the “Arctic Silk Road”101, Japan has stepped up its efforts to become more involved in projects by promoting "open regionalism"102. Indeed, China's growing political, economic, and military presence has prompted both Japan and India to promote bilateral and multilateral partnerships to maintain influence in this region. Given Beijing's financial strength and overwhelming influence, upholding international standards is a useful and achievable diplomatic strategy for Japan (Mardell 2017). This strategy allows Japan to maintain a stable regional order while preserving its national interests, including the free movement of its goods and the continuity of maritime and communication lines (Babin 2019b). The objective for Japan, whose economy is essentially based on maritime trade, and to ensure respect for coastal states' sovereign rights and the freedom of navigation on the high seas as established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Recent events, including the military activities of Chinese territorial expansions in the South China Sea, have led decision-makers in Tokyo to conclude that these conditions necessary for economic prosperity must imperatively be ensured (Rossiter 2018).

In 2012, Prime Minister Abe introduced in 2012 the concept of diamond security strategy, also called the diamond of Asian democratic security, in an essay written for the international organization Project Syndicate (Abe 2012). The objective was to establish a "strategy by which Australia, India, Japan and the American State of Hawaii form a diamond intended to protect the common maritime resources which extend from the region of the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific, in particular facing the Chinese military expansion (Rossiter 2018; Babin 2019b; Yoshikatsu 2016; Aizawa 2018). One of the major points of Japanese foreign and maritime policy

101 The Northern Sea Route is now referred to as Arctic Silk Road in Chinese government documents and statement. 102 "'Open regionalism’ represents an effort to resolve one of the central problems of contemporary trade policy: how to achieve compatibility between the explosion of regional trading arrangements around the world and the global trading system as embodied in the World Trade Organisation. The concept seeks to assure that regional agreements will in practice be building blocks for further global liberalisation rather than stumbling blocks that deter such progress" cited in Bergsten (1997).

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today is to uphold the rule of law and freedom of navigation. This is the position adopted by Japanese diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific, Arctic region or its recommendations for space diplomacy, to ensure that international standards are respected. To do this, "strengthening the rule of law, supporting maritime security, establishing legal systems, and strengthening the capacities of law enforcement authorities and their representatives" is essential (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017b). Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy is based on the desire to ensure peace and stability in the waters and airspace from the Arctic Ocean to the Sea of Japan, from the Pacific Ocean to the Ocean Indian, allowing the development of economic activities with a Blue Economy (Babin 2019b; Abe 2016).

The blue economy concept seeks to promote economic growth, social inclusion and preservation or improvement of livelihoods while at the same time ensuring environmental sustainability — all issues integral to the 2030 Agenda. So, to build a blue economy, we will need to put sustainability at its center. This will require careful attention to all decisions and their cross ‑ sectoral implications. We will need to ensure that policies do not undermine each other and that interlinkages are leveraged for the benefit of people, planet and prosperity (United Nations 2019).

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defines the concept of a blue economy as the utilization of ocean resources for the human benefit to sustain the overall ocean resource base into perpetuity (United Nations Development Programme 2018). It refers to integrated efforts to conserve the world’s oceans while also acting to take advantage of marine resources' economic and social benefits (Ocean Policy Research Institute 2017). The OPRI notes that a blue economy can include established ocean industries such as shipping, fisheries, offshore renewable energy, marine biotechnology, and natural assets and ecosystem services provided by the oceans (Ocean Policy Research Institute 2017). It recommends in its report for the elaboration on the 3rd Basic Plan on Ocean Policy of 2018 that Japan should take measures to stimulate the economy such as infrastructure development for the promotion of the use of the Arctic Sea Route. It should also raise public awareness, establish a favorable investment environment, and inspire and support innovation and emphasize the environmental and biodiversity impact in the Arctic. The reports also argue that impact assessments are already used to assess various risks of the Arctic region's economic activities, including climate change impacts. Hence, for the OPRI, it is crucial to give similar consideration to both the environment and the economy in future measures. This report

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highlighted four main initiatives to support and promote the development of a sustainable blue economy in the Arctic:

• Related government ministries and agencies, local governments, private corporations, and academic institutions should cooperate to collect information and conduct research on scenarios of commercial use of the Arctic, such as the utilization of the Arctic Sea Route, the development of natural resources in the Arctic Ocean, and tourism in the Arctic Ocean that are compatible with the conservation of the Arctic environment. For this purpose, Japan should establish a forum for industry-academia-government collaboration and continue its discussion. • Through collaboration with the industrial, academic, and governmental sectors, Japan should support formation of the business model and innovation on the utilization of Arctic Ocean and Arctic Sea Route, including demonstration projects conducted by the government and utilizing public funds. • Strengthen activities for raising awareness and increasing publicity of economic activities with regard to the Arctic, including organization of events such as seminars or symposium on these topics. • Take proactive measures to improve and expand the infrastructures, such as new or upgraded harbors, railways, airports, and the trunk road network connecting the Arctic Sea Route, including the development of laws, with a particular focus on Hokkaido by giving the future potential of this route serious consideration (Ocean Policy Research Institute 2017).

Already in the 2015 Arctic Policy, two out of the seven measures set out by the official arctic policy emphasized economic possibilities for Japan in the Arctic region. Those initiatives aim “for economic and social compatibility with climate and environmental changes, and to seek possible economic chances for the use of the Arctic Sea Route and the development of resource”.

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The policy invites to “consider measures to support Japanese companies, for greater awareness of business opportunities in the Arctic and networking with companies and individuals in the business communities of Arctic states" to work toward more significant involvement of Japanese companies in economic activities in the Arctic. Japanese Arctic policy highlights three areas to develop in the Arctic: the shipping routes (mainly the Arctic Sea Route also called NSR), the mineral and the living marine resources.

Development of the Arctic Sea Route

In Japan, under the pressure of Japanese shipping lobbies, the MLIT has supported the investment on the new shipping routes such as the NSR (Tonami 2018, 9). In the 1990s, the Ship & Ocean Foundation (OPRF, now OPRI) under the Sasakawa Peace Foundation 103 , a philanthropic foundation, had launched a research program with Russia and Norway to study the development and commercialization of the NSR. In 1993 the Ship & Ocean Foundation, in cooperation with two research institutes from Russia and Norway initiated a 6-year research project on the technical feasibility of the NSR as an international commercial sea route, the International Northern Sea Route Program (INSROP). An experimental voyage was organized in 1996 from Yokohama to Kirkenes (Moe and Stokke 2019). The INSROP was followed by another program: JANSROP in 1993.

From 2011, few Japanese ships have the NSR to bring resources from Norway or Russia to Japan. In 2011, a ship owned by a Japanese shipping company transported iron ore from Murmansk to China via the Arctic Ocean, followed by another journey in 2012 from Hammerfest (Norway) to Kyushu Electric Power (Fukuoka Prefecture) carrying LNG. In 2013 Asahi Kasei Chemicals, Mitsubishi Chemical organized a journey from Rotterdam (Netherlands) to Mizushima Port Terminal (Okayama Prefecture) carrying Naphtha. The same year, another shipment from Murmansk (Russia) to Iwa Nagoya Port/Keihin Port was organized transporting petroleum

103 According to Tonami (2018, 9), financial assistance for maritime shipping activities, welfare projects, and international development is provided.

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products, and from Hammerfest to Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) transporting LNG (Ministry of Land 2014).

If sea ice in the Arctic Ocean continues to decrease and the Arctic Sea Route is to be established along the coasts of Russia and neighboring states, then a voyage between Asia and Europe will become about 40% shorter than a voyage via the Suez Canal. Hence the interest is mounting from the international community in the feasibility of the Arctic Sea Route. […] As shipping opportunities expand, increasingly active discussions are underway regarding the effect of shipping on the marine environment and on securing the safety of navigation. Japan should participate actively in the international debates regarding the drafting of new rules. It is also important for Japan to put its expertise in science and technology to use in developing effective new technologies to secure the safety of navigation in the Arctic Ocean (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 5).

As underlined in Chapter 1 and by several researchers, maritime-sector bureaucracies responsible for industries with Arctic experience, such as the OPRF with in particular the involvement of M. Sunami, have been closely involved in the elaboration of Japan's Arctic Policy (Moe and Stokke 2019; Tonami 2016a; Tonami and Watters 2012). Despite the announcements on the supposed advantages of the NSR, Japanese shipowners remain very cautious about its use and its profitability (Mitsui Osk Line (MOL) 2017). This is reflected in the Arctic policy of 2015, where the perspectives concerning the NSR development are fairly neutral (Moe and Stokke 2019). The official Arctic Policy notes that “currently, given factors such as the sea ice conditions, the use of ports and other infrastructure along the route, and the status of services and regulations of coastal states, the Arctic Sea Route is not ready yet for safe and reliable use”. […]. Moreover “the private sector and the government should work together to give the future potential of this route serious consideration” (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015). Hence, despite the enthusiasm for the developing of a maritime “highway” in the Arctic, Japan’s policy highlights the remaining limitations and the need for more in-depth feasibility studies before national companies feel confident to invest in related projects (Moe and Stokke 2019). To overcome the various problems, Japan’s Arctic policy underlined initiatives to identify the various challenges of the Arctic Sea Route and promote a favorable environment for its utilization by Japanese shipping companies by constructing systems to support maritime navigation (e.g., a system to predict sea ice distribution and one to forecast weather) (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 8).

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The 2015 Arctic policy emphasizes the need to “identify the natural, technical, systemic, and economic challenges of the Arctic Sea Route, and promote the preparation of an environment for its utilization by Japanese shipping companies and others, by constructing systems to support maritime navigation such as a system to predict sea ice distribution and one to forecast weather” in NSR (often called the Arctic Sea Route in Japanese documents). To meet these objectives, part of the resources of the ArCS has been allocated to this goal with, for example, research theme one focusing on forecasting the weather and sea ice conditions in the Arctic Ocean and the integration of information on the Arctic Ocean route assistance. The collected and analyzed data can be delivered to ships and used for some of the commercial vessels that sail in the Arctic Ocean for safety and risk mitigation (北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] 2020). The NIPR has been developing a vessel navigation unit support system (VENUS) to receive and automatically process forecast data on the ships (installed on the Japanese RV MIRAI). It provides an overview of destination-specific information on sea ice and weather conditions close to the real-time manner, covering a 1,000 kilometers radius from any ship that may have access to the Venus system (High North News 2018).

Although their presence has remained discreet, Japan sent representatives since 2009 to participated in the Correspondence Group104 that worked on draft texts on navigation in polar waters (Moe and Stokke 2019). A report from the MLIT underlined in 2014 that the safety and environmental requirements for ships navigating in the Arctic Ocean had been the same as those in general ocean areas. Hence, to better protect this vulnerable environment and ensure the ships’ and crews' safety, the establishment of a Polar Code that defines additional requirements for maritime life safety treaties (SOLAS), marine pollution prevention treaties (MARPOL), was in need. The same year, an official draft for an International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) was submitted to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). Following its objective of participating in establishming of new international regulations, Japan participated in elaborating the Polar Code. Although the Polar Code only

104 Publication in 2009 of the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (ASMA) in the Arctic Council Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group.

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entered into application on the 1rst January 2017, the 2015 Arctic Policy already mentioned Japan’s commitment to ensure safe shipping in polar water (Babin, Lasserre, and Pic 2020).

The MLIT notes that the Arctic Ocean route's utilization has been slowly increasing for the past years, and the interest in other countries, including China and South Korea, is also rising. Despite its high potential as a future resource supply base on the Yamal Peninsula, the Arctic Ocean route's utilization is currently limited to the summer season with additional specific costs such as an icebreaker support fee and insurance fee. The current transportation trends focus on the transportation of energy and mineral resources such as oil, LNG, and iron ore and should continue in this direction for years to come (Ministry of Land 2014).

Secure stable and various supply of energy resources

In Japan, hydrocarbons' natural resources (oil and gas) are very scarce. Japan is only self- sufficient in 16% of its energy supply. Consequently, Japan must import most of its energy resources from outside. As a result of this, supplier diversification is crucial for Japan as it must consider its future policy as a maritime state to survive through trade (Hammond 2017). Japan is the biggest importer of liquefied natural gas, the second biggest importer of coal, and the third- biggest oil importer105. Japan’s LNG imports have increased significantly after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, which caused the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power station leading to a drastic shift from nuclear energy to other energy resources, including LNG (Shibasaki et al. 2018). In December 2011, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) issued a set of measures to ensure stable supplies of fuels and natural resources, which should be treated

105 Iran is the main petroleum supplier for Japan.

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with priority following the earthquake in Japan. Japan's interest in the Arctic stems, among other things, from its scarce natural resources and its reliance on imports its energy needs (Grzela et al. 2017). During interviews with JOGMEC and JGC members, they highlighted the vulnerability of the Middle East's energy supply as it cannot be guaranteed in the long term due to the region's unstable politics and economies. However, according to Drifte (1996, 87), this dependence still gives Japan an important status and influence in the economic sphere.

Tokyo sees the Arctic Ocean's hydrocarbon resources as an alternative energy supply (JOGMEC 2019). In this perspective, the Arctic Sea Route is a possible way to support LNG suppliers' diversification for Asian countries, including Japan. Since 2011 and with the consequences of the Great Earthquake and the shutdown of nuclear reactors, the Japanese Diplomatic Bluebooks have emphasized the need for Japan to secure a long-term and stable supply of energy resources. Arctic hydrocarbon resources can be such a supply, and Russian ones will probably become the main supply in the future. In the 2015 Arctic policy, the document underlines in a footnote the numbers put forward in 2008 by the US Geological Survey concerning the estimation of potential resources until undiscovered, including 90 billion barrels of petroleum (13% of world total) and 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (30% of world total) (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 5).

Although it is surmised that the Arctic Ocean area has a certain potential for undiscovered resources, development in area of extreme cold and sea ice is with difficulties, requiring advanced development technology. Under these circumstances, resources should be addressed steadily over the mid and long term from the viewpoint of continued diversification of resources supplies, considering progress in resources development technology in sea ice regions, cooperative relationships with coastal states, and factors such as needs of private sector (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 5).

The official arctic policy also stresses the need to “continue financial support for Greenland Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. which is participating in an exploration project in an ocean area northeast of Greenland, via the Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC)” as a specific initiative (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 8). If the Japanese government highlights the potential of arctic resources as an alternative source for Japan to diversify its importation, experts stress the lack of infrastructure along the Russian Arctic coast to ensure

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safe transit for ships on this route. During interviews with Japanese companies, respondents brought the many operational additional cost linked to polar navigation such as insurance, icebreaker escort, etc., hindering their decision to invest in arctic navigation or business opportunities located in the arctic. According to these respondents, the Government should support business companies by necessary and concrete measures to increase Japan’s presence in resource development in the Arctic in parallel with Arctic commercial shipping through appropriate ways, including strengthening Japan’s relationship with Russia (The Arctic Conference Japan 2012).

Moe and Stokke (2019, 34) note that MOL and the Chinese Shipping COSCO have established to own and operate a subset of the carriers under construction for the Yamal LNG project. They also mention that another Japanese company, NYK Line, has reportedly sought cooperation with Russia’s Sovcomflot to manage five carriers, but the deal fell through when Sovcomflot reneged on four of the five carriers it had initially intended to order.

Overview of Japan’s Arctic relations with Northern American and Europe, the extension of its traditional diplomatic relations?

Expansion of international and bilateral cooperation with Arctic and other countries: In addition to furthering additional exchanges of opinions with Arctic states, consider initiating bilateral conferences with regard to the Arctic. Promote scientific and technical cooperation on the basis of bilateral scientific and technical cooperation agreements with interested states, including the Arctic states, in polar research and related fields. Strengthen joint international Arctic research via the establishment of research and observation stations in the Arctic states and the dispatch of researchers. Enhance Japan's presence by actively participating in the Arctic Circle, Arctic Frontiers, and other international forums related to the Arctic, to communicate Japan's viewpoint and observation and research results (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015).

Whether in documents concerning its Arctic policy, in speeches by government representatives in international forums and conferences, Japan highlights its good relations with the Arctic States. Are these relationships maintained and praised with the Arctic states specific to the Arctic region? What do they have in the Arctic? Or are we again observing the impact of the rebranding of relations already long-established with States, certainly arctic, to support Japan’d geoeconomic strategy in the Arctic?

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North America

US-Japan’s relations in the Arctic

Japan’s postwar foreign strategy heavily focused on its support to the US while quickly develop and support its economic growth (Sakakibara 2003). This led to the establishment of solid ties between Japan and the US. Japan continues to cooperate with Washington on security issues actively. Japan considers the US a military-political ally and relies on the US government's support to obtain additional powers in the Arctic organizations and support the exploitation of resources.

Concerning arctic-related project, in 2012, Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC)106 collaborated with ConocoPhillips and the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) on finding ways to recover methane hydrate energy resources safely in the Arctic in order to make available new supplies of clean-burning natural gas. JOGMEC participated in a technological test associated with exploring natural gas from methane hydrates. The test took place on North Slope in Alaska and aimed to diversify sources and suppliers. This project was conducted by an American Company, ConocoPhillips, and was financed by the US Department of Energy (U.S. Department of Energy’s National Energy Technology Laboratory 2014, U.S. Geological Survey 2014). In November 2014, the Governments of Japan and the United States signed a memorandum of joint research on experimental extraction of methane hydrate in Alaska. The document was signed by the Minister of Economy of Japan Mr. Miyazawa Yoichi, and U.S Ambassador in Japan Mrs. Caroline Kennedy, in Tokyo at the International Conference "Producers and consumers of liquefied natural gas in 2014". The project will be arranged by JOGMEC and the State Laboratory of Energy and Technology of the U.S Ministry of Energy (Zhuravel 2016). In 2017, the DOE and JOGMEC jointly conducted another round of testing on methane hydrates on the North Slope in Alaska.

106 Formerly known as Japan National Oil Corporation, JOGMEC is a Japanese incorporated administrative agency (IAA) (独立行政法人 ). IIA are organizations of the Japanese government who are given considerable autonomy in their own operations, based on the idea that ‘the planning sectors and the implementing sector should be separated’ to provide effective public services. Administrative Evaluation Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (Japan), Evaluation of Incorporated Administrative Agencies [online presentation, tentative translation], 2007 (Rafnsdóttir 2019, 31).

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In 2015, the Japanese Ambassador in charge of Arctic Affairs, Kazuko Shiraishi, attended and delivered a speech at the Conference on Global Leadership in the Arctic: Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement, and Resilience (GLACIER), hosted by U.S Secretary of State John Kerry in Anchorage, Alaska. In 2016, the former Minister of Justice, Ms. Kamikawa Yoko, attended the 12th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (CPAR) in Canada. She expressed Japan's will to strengthen and further expand scientific cooperation in Alaska's International Arctic Research Center.

Japan and the U.S. already have a strong partnership in Arctic research, stemming from Japanese investment in the International Arctic Research Center at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. Japan’s new Arctic policy, announced by Arctic Ambassador Kazuko Shiraishi late last year, details several approaches to expanding research in the North. Japan’s Parliamentary League of Arctic Frontier Study, which includes 11 influential members of Japan’s upper and lower houses of the Diet, has encouraged this policy and the budget allocations necessary to carry it out (Green and Treadwell 2016).

Canada

In November 2010, Canadian and Japanese scientists successfully experimented on gas production from methane hydrate, which they drilled on the Beaufort Seashore. They managed to maintain gas production for six days, which experts estimated as an excellent result. Although the industrial level of gas production from hydrate in the Arctic, according to experts, can be achieved no earlier than in 10-15 years, the experiment once again showed how inexhaustible energy potential the region has. According to some estimates, there are reserves of methane hydrate in the Arctic region of Canada, able to provide the needs of this country in gas for a few hundred years (Zhuravel 2016). In 2012, Japan launched EPA negotiations with Canada, with which Japan shares fundamental values and has a complementary economic relationship. Seven rounds of negotiation meetings had been held by November 2014, to achieve an EPA that can contribute to the stable supply of energy, minerals, and foodstuffs to Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019b, 264). In 2013, during a visit of Prime Minister Abe in Canada, he held a meeting with the Canadian Prime Minister, where they confirmed their intention to reinforce collaboration on the

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Arctic issues and promote discussions toward Japan's import of low-priced and stable supplies of LNG from Canada.

The National Institute of Polar Research and Polar Knowledge Canada concluded the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on scientific cooperation in 2016. Its objective was to advance joint research activities at Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS). And on June 6th, 2016, the Polar Knowledge Canada (POLAR) and the National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR) signed a Letter of Understanding (LoU) concerning Cooperation in Polar Research between took place at Global Affairs Canada107. Under the LoU, Canada and Japan committed to conduct joint research at the Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) in Cambridge Bay108. All parties involved expressed their hope and expectation for future research cooperation (Embassy of Japan in Canada 2016). Also, in 2016, the former Minister of Justice, Ms. Kamikawa Yoko, the 12th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (CPAR) in Canada. In her speech, she unlined the environmental changes in the Arctic and their global repercussions. She expressed Japan's will to strengthen and further expand scientific cooperation in the Canadian High Arctic Research Station in Nunavut. Ms. Kamikawa Yoko also argued that the financial sector should take more significant environmental responsibility regarding investments in the Arctic (Parliament of Canada 2016). After the conference, the Canadian delegation met with its Japanese counterparts, where Ms. Kamikawa provided a summary of Japan’s Arctic Policy based on science and technology cooperation. She promoted joint research stations in the Arctic and Japan’s Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Project, aiming to strengthen international cooperation in Arctic science through young researchers’ exchanges. Her speech was welcomed by the Canadian delegation, which praised the contribution of Japan in Arctic research and indicated the upcoming opening of the Canadian High Arctic Research Station in 2017 as an excellent opportunity to enhance Canadian Japanese Arctic science cooperation. The Canadian delegation also used this opportunity to underline the importance of science and the participation of indigenous peoples in contributing to the Arctic decision-making

107 Co-signed by the President and CEO of POLAR, Dr. David J. Scott, the Director General of the NIPR, Dr. Kazuyuki Shiraishi, and the Ambassador Karube. 108 opened in 2017.

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processes, which can echo the community of northern Japan, the Ainu, today recognized by Japan as an indigenous people of the province of Hokkaido.

Cooperation with Nordic States

Japan maintains cordial relations with the Nordic states (defined as Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland). Meetings between Prime Ministers or Ministers of Foreign Affairs occurs almost every year in Japan or these Nordic states. The Japanese MoFA notes that in light of the Nordic and Baltic region's geopolitical importance, including the Arctic, Japan is working to strengthen its relations with the Nordic and Baltic states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015b).

Japan’s relations with Denmark, Greenland and Iceland

Japan’s involvement in the development of natural resources in the Arctic is still limited. Japan has invested capital in a company involved in offshore exploration in Greenland (Hammond 2017).

Since 1989, Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC)109, has participated in the

KANUMAS oil exploration project in Greenland (Tonami and Watters 2012; Tonami 2016a, 59; Rafnsdóttir 2019). The project, placed under the auspices of the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, was a joint geological and geophysical survey with a regional seismic program that includes new data acquisition and preliminary studies for hydrocarbon potential in the north-west and northeast offshore Greenland. The project was sponsored by the KANUMAS Group, a consortium composed of several oil companies Statoil, BP, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Shell, JOGMEC, and NUNAOIL A/S (National Oil Company of Greenland). Moreover, a subsidiary of one of Japan’s largest energy corporations (Idemitsu Petroleum Norge - IPN), has operated on the Norwegian Continental Shelf since 1989. IPN has been involved in several projects in four oil extraction sites

109 JOGMEC is a Japanese incorporated administrative agency (IAA) (独立行政法人) formerly known as Japan National Oil Corporation (“JNOC”). IAA are organizations of the Japanese government who are given considerable autonomy in their own operations, based on the idea that ‘the planning sectors and the implementing sector should be separated’ to provide effective public services. Administrative Evaluation Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (Japan), Evaluation of Incorporated Administrative Agencies [online presentation, tentative translation], 2007, http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/hyouka/dokuritu_n/english.pdf

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in the region and plans to extract from Knarr, having obtained a Norwegian government license and oil production started in 2014 (Tonami and Watters 2012).

In December 2011, the Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum (BMP) of the Government of Greenland announced the opening of the licensing rounds in the Greenland Sea, offshore Northeast Greenland, consisting of two successive rounds; a pre-round reserved for the KANUMAS Group members and an ordinary-round for others. Greenland Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (GreenPeX) was established dedicatedly for the possible participation in the pre-round, being entitled to the preferential position as an affiliate of JOGMEC expectedly, in the future exploration and development in the area. GreenPeX (established with a capital of JPY 1,157,288,000) is composed of investments from Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) (6.6%), JOGMEC (59.4%), INPEX Corporation (23.5%) JX Nippon Oil & Gas Exploration Corporation (9.0%) and Mitsui Oil Exploration Co., Ltd. In 2013, GreenPeX announced the licensing for two offshore explorations licenses, Block 9 and Block 14, in Kanumas Area in Greenland Sea Area (KANUMAS area) jointly with Chevron and Shell110. The contract was established between GreenPeX, and the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources of Greenland. As mentioned earlier, the Japan’s 2015 Arctic Policy underlines the need to “continue financial support for Greenland Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd., which is participating in an exploration project in an ocean area northeast of Greenland, via JOGMEC.

In parallel to the Kanuma Project, Japan and China launched in 2008 the North Greenland Eemian Ice Drilling (NEEM) project to conduct research on climatology111. Scientists recovered ice from the Eemian period112, approximately 130,000 to 115,000 years before the present date, rich with DNA on that period’s natural conditions (Rafnsdóttir 2019). In 2016, the former Minister of Justice, Ms. Kamikawa Yoko, attended the 12th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic

110 GreenPeX: 29.1667%, Chevron (Operator): 29.1667%, Shell: 29.1667%, Nunaoil: 12,5%. 111 North Greenland Eemian Ice Drilling, Partners, [website] https://neem.dk/partners/ British Antarctic Survey, Greenland Ice Core Team Reaches Bedrock, [press release], 2 August 2010, https://www.bas.ac.uk/media-post/greenland-ice-core-team-reaches-bedrock/ 112 The last interglacial period with warmer temperature and sea levels higher than the current level.

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Region (CPAR) in Canada. She expressed Japan's will to strengthen and further expand scientific cooperation in Greenland's Institute of Natural Resources in Nuuk.

During his visit with the Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen in 2017, Prime Minister Abe reaffirmed Japan and Denmark’s cooperation in free trade and resource development and research in the Arctic and Greenland. In October 2018, Minister for Foreign Affairs Kōno Tarō held a meeting with his Danish counterpart Anders Samuelsen during his visit to Denmark where the two ministers discussed a future Strategic Partnership that includes the Arctic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2018b)

Japan has been sending researchers and policymakers to attend the annual Arctic Circle forum in Iceland for several years in October. During one of these forums, the former Arctic affairs ambassador Shiraishi Kazuko had unveiled the official Japanese Arctic policy in 2015. The same year, and following the 60th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations between Japan and Iceland, the two foreign ministers agreed to promote cooperation in whale fishing, disaster prevention, the Arctic, climate change countermeasures, and other issues concerning the two countries. During his visit to Iceland in October 2018, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Kōno Tarō held a Foreign Ministers’ meeting with his Icelandic counterpart, Mr. Gudlaugur Thor Thordarson. During the meeting, they exchanged about enhancing cooperation in a wide range of areas including the Arctic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2018c). In December 2019, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzo held a meeting with the President of the Republic of Iceland, Guðni Thorlacius Jóhannesson. During the meeting, the Japanese PM highlighted Japan-Iceland cooperation's progress in a wide range of areas and stated his willingness to actively cooperate with Iceland as an observer at the Arctic Council, where Iceland currently holds the presidency (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019f). In 2019, Iceland´s Minister of Education, Science and Culture, Lilja Alfreðsdóttir, met with Shibayama Masahiko (Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology), Tsuchiya Shinako (Chairman of the Icelandic Parliamentary Friendship League at the Japanese Diet), and Kamikawa Yoko in Tokyo. Together, they also visited the OPRI at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and discussed the upcoming 3rd Arctic Science Ministerial meeting, co-hosted by Iceland and Japan, in Tokyo, in the fall of 2020 (Government of Iceland 2019). But also, future cooperation in the fields of science and research.

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Japanese-Scandinavian relations

In 2016, the Finish President Niinistö visited Japan, and the two leaders issued their first joint statement, which positions the relationship between Japan and Finland as a strategic partnership that serves as a gateway between Asia and Europe and affirms the promotion of strategic cooperation in a wide range of areas including politics and security, economy, and the Arctic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017a). During his visit with the Finnish President Sauli Niinisto in 2017, Prime Minister Abe expressed Japan’s desire to play a more significant role in the Arctic Council chaired by Finland.

The Finnish President Niinistö and Prime Minister Abe concluded a Joint Statement on a Strategic Partnership in March 2016. In the Statement, the two leaders confirmed their commitment to advance dialogue and cooperation in their shared interests in the Arctic, such as the Northern Sea Route. Following this statement, on May 18, the Embassy of Finland in Japan held Japan- Finland Arctic Expertise Seminar to boost up bilateral economic cooperation on the Arctic (2016 Shiraishi). In January 2019, the 14th Japan-Canada Joint Committee Meeting on Science and Technology Cooperation was held in Tokyo. During the meeting, both sides exchanged views on the recent developments of national science, technology, innovation policies, and the current situation of bilateral cooperation. The committee also discussed cooperation activities and prospects in specific areas, including arctic research (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019a).

Norway and Japan consider themselves sharing common interests, especially around ocean governance and marine industry: they support each other concerning whaling activities. The Japanese-Norwegian relations in the arctic have been mainly focused on scientific collaboration, promoting the mobility of scientists and the sharing of research infrastructure. Japan (NIPR) and Norway have been cooperating on several projects focusing on Arctic environmental change and solar-terrestrial physics, including EISCAT_3D and SIOS. But also, studies focusing on changes in the Arctic Ocean environment (JAMSTEC). However, already in 1993, institutes from Japan and Norway had collaborated (with Russia) in a study concerning navigation in the Northern Sea Route (see INSROP). And in August 2013, Norway used the NSR route and sent oil products (including gasoline) to Japan (Yep 2013).

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In 2015, the 5th Japan-Norway Joint Committee Meeting on Cooperation in Science and Technology held in Oslo held a session to promote the importance of collaboration of Arctic research. During the meeting, the representative of MEXT proposed a new initiative to advance international Arctic research by actively delivering science-based information for stakeholders in the decision-making process, reflecting Japan's role as an observer of the Arctic Council (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015a). Japan-Norway Arctic Science and Innovation Week was held in 2016. This seminar aims to strengthen bilateral cooperation presenting Arctic research by participants of both countries on various thematic113. The same year, despite the polemic on Japanese Antarctic whaling, Japan and Norway agreed to cooperate on whaling in the Arctic for research purposes. Ms. Kamikawa Yoko, former Minister of Justice, attended the 12th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (CPAR) in Canada. She expressed Japan's will to strengthen and further expand scientific cooperation in Norway's Ny-Ålesund Station and the University Center in Svalbard.

In 2017, In July, Prime Minister Abe had a Summit Meeting with the Norwegian Prime Minister Solberg during the G20 Hamburg Summit. The two countries confirmed developing cooperative relations in a broad range of areas, including implementing the rule of law in maritime affairs and the Arctic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2018a). In 2018, Prime Minister Solberg visited Japan and held a Summit Meeting with Prime Minister Abe. They concurred on further strengthening future economic relations, as well as cooperating on promoting sustainable development goals. The same year the Norwegian Prime Minister also held a meeting with Foreign Minister Kōno, during which they concurred on promoting free trade and investment and advancing cooperation in areas such as whaling and the Arctic sector (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019b). In 2019 (December), Japan’s Foreign Minister, Motegi Toshimitsu, held a Japan-Norway Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (in Spain) where he stated that Japan “intends to promote cooperation with Norway in wide-ranging areas, including the Arctic, whaling, and sustainable development”. He also expressed his gratitude for Norway’s assistance in relocating the

113 (1) Arctic Maritime Operations and Societal Needs, (2) Marine Environment and Resource Management, (3) The Coupled Arctic Climate System and its Teleconnections with Midlatitudes, (4) Climate Processes and the Role of Antarctica in the Global Climate System, and (5) Energy and infrastructure for sustainability in the Arctic.

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observatory operated by Japan’s National Institute of Polar Research in Svalbard in Ny-Ålesund (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019d).

Relations between Japan and the American and European Arctic States (excluding Russia), therefore, appear to be an extension of the international relations already established with these States. Arctic cooperation seems more of a political nature to underline the "good" bilateral and multilateral relations with these states and to support scientific cooperation.

Japan and Russia relation in the North, from territorial dispute, interregional cooperation, to economic cooperation

Japan and Russia have a long and complicated relationship described as a “love-hate” relation or geographically close but politically distant (Rafnsdóttir 2019). Although a peace treaty between Japan and Russia has still not been signed since the end of World War II, the diplomatic ties between the two States were restored by the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956. Despite the tensions between these states around the Northern Territories dispute (known in Russia as the Southern Kurils), the geographical proximity between the Japanese province of Hokkaidō and the Russian province of Sakhalin, only separated by the Soya Strait, has helped establish channels of cooperation between those two regions once direct governmental objections were lifted (Williams 2007, 54; 2006, 264). Since the start of his mandates, Japanese Prime Minister Abe has tried to promote a rapprochement with President Putin in order to put an end to the territorial dispute, strengthen the economic ties between Japan and Russia and especially in the sector energy, and establish itself vis-à-vis China as a responsible partner.

The lost North

As the Japanese Empire began to expand, Hokkaido colonized in 1869, the location of its northern border was re-negotiated several times (Steinberg 2006; Seaton 2017, 2015). In the Treaty of Shimoda of 1855, Japan and Russia agreed that Sakhalin would be shared without establishing a border, but the demarcation line would be drawn in the middle of the Kurile Island chain between Etorofu and Uruppu. This situation changed due to the Treaty of Saint Petersburg in 1875. According to this treaty, Sakhalin belonged to Russia, and the Kurile Islands to the Kamchatka belonged to Japan. While the Treaty of Portsmouth signed at the end of the Russo-Japanese War

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(1904–1905) added the southern Sakhalin into the Japanese Empire, the Japanese army also temporarily occupied the northern part of the island between 1920 and 1925 (Bukh 2010; Irish 2009). Karafuto, the Japanese name used to refer to southern Sakhalin, developed rapidly as a settler colony where the Japanese formed a clear majority. The region's official status changed in 1943 when the Karafuto Prefecture became an integral part of the Japanese Empire. Thus, Hokkaido lost its status as the northernmost part of the Japanese state formation, and the cultural sphere and its particular position was also affected by the intensification overseas colonization project, for example, in Manchuria.

The defeat in World War 2 and the emergence of the Cold War soon after forced the redefinition of the territorial shape of Japan’s north and challenged the Japanese to reconsider their relationship with the areas north from Hokkaidō (Williams 2007). Despite the Japanese forces occupied two of the Aleutian Islands and a few direct attacks on Hokkaidō were made in 1945, northern Japan was not a major frontier during World War 2. Contrary to Germany, Japan was not divided into occupation zones. Therefore, despite the Soviet Union’s wish to occupy Hokkaido, the northernmost island remained an inseparable part of the territorial entity under the predominantly American occupation. However, this did not solve the question concerning the Hokkaido's territory and the exact location of the northeastern border. The loss of Karafuto and Kuril Islands that had for decades served as the northern edge of the Japanese Empire, meant that Hokkaidō returned to the role it had from 1868 to the imperial conquests at the end of the 19th. The border issue became a highly politicized conflict between different government levels when the prefectural government led by a socialist governor challenged the politics carried out by the conservative central government. The early postwar Japanese discussion concerning the north concentrated on territorial issues and the disputed national border.

The dispute had its roots in the Yalta Conference where the Kurile Islands and Southern Sakhalin were promised to the Soviet Union and in the Potsdam Declaration that was somewhat vague when defining the area where Japanese sovereignty was to be limited (Williams 2007; Kossa, Lomaeva, and Saunavaara 2020; Saunavaara 2014). The exact definitions of Japan's territory, excluding the Kurile Islands, were received only on 29 January 1946 when the occupation authorities defined the area over which the Japanese Government held governmental or

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administrative authority. However, neither this decision nor the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in 1951, where Japan renounced its rights to Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, solved the question of Japan's northern border. While the Soviet Union abstained from signing the 1951 Treaty, Japan still demanded the return of the four islands it did not consider as a part of the Kuril Island chain (Bukh 2010, 56-59; 2012, 488,490,493-495). The border issue became a highly politicized conflict between Hokkaidō and Central Government when the prefectural government led by a socialist Governor challenged the politics carried out by the conservative central government. Eventually, both the turbulence within Hokkaidō and problems in the Hokkaidō - Tokyo relations settled down at the end of the 1950s after the Soviet-Japanese talks in 1955 had failed and a new Governor of Hokkaidō representing the governing conservative party was elected in 1959. The so-called Northern Territories 114 (hoppō ryōdo) 115 problem disappeared neither as a domestic question nor as an international conflict, but it gradually lost its importance in daily political agenda - only to temporarily surface in various occasions during the following decades (Bukh 2010, 57-59; 2012, 483-509). This kind of debate showed a great variety of opinions and conflicting views and interests between Hokkaidō and Tokyo and within Hokkaidō (Williams 2007; Kossa, Lomaeva, and Saunavaara 2020).

114 Also known as the Southern Kurils in Russia. 115 Since a ministerial decree of June 1964, the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai are called the "Northern Territories" and no longer "Minami-Chishima" (Literal translation: South Kurils) (Lasserre 1999, 2).

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FIGURE 9: MAP ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORY DISPUTES FROM THE JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE (NADEAU 2016).

Diesen (2018, 589) argues that after the war, Japan’s argument concerning the dispute for the Northern Territories was focused on establishing a distinction between geographical and administrative borders with Hokkaido's argument had administered Habomai and Shikotan island before the war. The debate concerning the border and ways to clarify the relations with the Soviet Union showed how differently various stakeholders saw the meaning and importance of the lost north to Hokkaidō and Japan. The question was not only about the borders of territory that was demanded to be returned, i.e., whether the Soviet should return all the Kuril Island, the four islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu (Iturup), Habomai archipelago, and Shikotan or only the latter two mentioned. Instead, the debate and movements that emerged, especially in the Nemuro region where most of the former residents of the islands now under Soviet rule were relocated, revealed the differences between those who were longing for their old homeland and others emphasizing the economic importance of the Northern Territories and especially the fishing areas around them (Williams 2007, 26-30; 2006, 273).

Although the loss of the “old north” also affected Hokkaidō-based businesses and Hokkaidō s role in the Japanese economy, the semi-colonial role of Hokkaidō did not change. For example, in the policies of the Allied occupiers, Hokkaidō continued to be considered as a food, raw materials, and energy (coal) supply center that exported primary sector products to the heartlands of Japan and imported manufactured goods and processed products (Saunavaara 2018a, 66-67; 2018b). However, the loss of coal and timber from Karafuto and the north's fishing grounds meant that the relative importance of Hokkaidō increased in many of the fields.

Article 9 of the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration expressed the USSR's will to cede the Habomai and Shikotan Islands' control after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan. However, the peace treaty was never signed, and relations between the USSR-Russia and Japan have remained strained over the years with the Northern Territories dispute the main obstacle to the normalization of the bilateral relations. However, this did not prevent regional cooperation from taking hold between Japanese subnational governments in Hokkaido's northern province, with their counterpart in Eastern Russia.

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Interregional cooperation between subnational governments in Hokkaidō and in Eastern Russia

Despite sometimes tense relations between Moscow and Tokyo since the end of the Second world war, and still no peace treaty116 because of the territorial dispute, the relations between Hokkaidō and the Soviet/Russian subnational governments made it possible to serve as a bridge of communication and exchanges between the two states (Stephan 1974). Those activities, despite having occasionally been criticized or vetoed by the central government, still led to cooperation between regions and cities in Japan and Russia (Arase 2002, 186; Akaha 2003, 105- 106; P. Jain 2005, 61, 67, 79-80, 103-106). Despite the evolutions of Tokyo politics and its attitude toward Moscow, various Governors of Hokkaidō have tried to promote a rapprochement with Russia and Sakhalin to promote stability and economic development. As Lecours (2002, 96) notes, the regions do not seek, unlike states, an international presence to demonstrate their power and influence. On the contrary, these regions' paradiplomatic relationships are often the continuation of specific national situations or conflicts. Despite tense relations between Tokyo and Moscow, the Association of Mayors of Coastal Cities of Japan117 and the Soviet Union (now the Association of Mayors of Coastal Cities of Japan and Russia) had in 1970 established the Conference of Coastal Cities of Japan and the Soviet Union to promote trade between these regions. According to P. Jain (2005), this partnership illustrates that regional governments can maintain productive links, even when official contacts at the national level are broken (P. Jain 2005, 7,95; Tavares 2016, 53,117; Kamiński 2018, 177). This agreement came just before the first round of negotiations for a peace treaty between the Foreign Ministers of Japan and the Soviet Union in October 1972 and included a clause to "promote the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union" (P. Jain 2005, 79). These meetings also provide communication channels and trade between Japan and the Soviet Union, which could not be conducted at the national level for diplomatic reasons.

116 Moscow refused to sign the San Francisco treaty in 1951 which, according to Williams (2006, 269) lead Tokyo’s to see it as one of the legal factors invalidating the Soviet’s claim to sovereignty over the disputed islands. 117 Initiative of the city of Niigata.

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Moreover, four agreements of sister cities were concluded between the 1960s and 1970s: Asahikawa and Yuznho-Sakhalinsk (1967), Kitami and Poronaisk (1972), Wakkanai and Nevelsk (1972), and Kushiro and Kholmsk (1975). According to Williams, if these exchanges were then mainly between members of the regional elites and lacked substance (kanpai gaiko or “three cheer diplomacy"118), they nevertheless made it possible on various occasions to support political goals (Williams 2007, 86-87; P. Jain 2005, 67). Williams also notes that both Hokkaidō and “Sakhalin’s attempts to intervene in Russo-Japanese territorial negotiations served to highlight the growing salience of subnational actors in the international relations of Northeast Asia” (Williams 2006, 265). The idea that Hokkaidō could play a special role in economic activities related to the Northern Road was first discussed in the 1984 Hokkaidō Development Agency (Saunavaara 2017).

In 1990, Hokkaidō Governor Takahiro Yokomichi signed a partnership agreement between Hokkaidō Prefecture, and the Soviet Union. This partnership is seen as an "extraordinary" decision by a head of a Japanese provincial government with the President of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and Hokkaidō’s Governor Takahiro Yokomichi signed a partnership agreement in 1990 119 in the fields of economics, science, technology and culture between Hokkaidō Prefecture and the Soviet Union (P. Jain 2005, 70; Williams 2007, 92). The creation of a council followed the agreement to promote economic exchange with the Russian Republic and, in 1992 by a three-day cultural event (Dialogue 92 held in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk) and the establishment of a Joint Standing Committee for Economic Cooperation between Hokkaidō and the Russian Republic (Williams 2006, 269). With and following the collapse of the Soviet Union, five agreements were implemented: Sarufutsu and Ozersky (1990), Mombetsu and Korsakov (1991), Nayoro and Dolinsk (1991), Wakkanai and Kosakov (1991), and Teshio and Tomaro (1992) to help promote exchanges (education, youth exchanges, business, medicine, sports, music, culture, media but also infrastructures such as “northern houses” with a high degree of airtightness) between subnational government and privates groups in Hokkaidō and Sakhalin (Williams 2007, 87; 2006, 265). Regular air service was established in 1994 linking Hakodate and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, making it possible to travel at low cost, and in 1995, a regular ferry service between Korsakov and Otaru and

118 Like visits and handshakes by high-ranking officials and politicians, public photo, and newspaper articles. 119 Agreement for a Friendly Partnership between Hokkaido and the Russian Republic.

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Wakkanai to transports goods (food, fishery, forestry) and people (Williams 2007, 55, 87, 89; Rozman 1999, 25).

During the 1950s/1960s, there was a will from the Japanese government to keep a formal separation between politics and economics (seikei bunri). As Japan tried to multiply and diversify its importation of fuel resources, this situation continues with Siberia's development from the 1970s. However, Gorbachev’s reforms policy to strengthened economic relations with the outside from the mid-1980s leads Japan to develop a more robust line in its Foreign policy by supporting the inseparability of politics and economics (seikei fukabun). Through a tougher political line, the government wished to pressure on the dispute over the Northern Territories120 (Williams 2007, 31-32). This policy did not obtain the expected results and contributed to increased tensions between Moscow and Tokyo. According to Williams (2007, 32), the Governor of Hokkaidō at the time (1983–95), Takahiro Yokomichi, who had visited the USSR several times, opposed this policy, considering that cooperation between Japan and the USSR was essential for the stability of the province of Hokkaidō (Williams 2006, 269). In the late 1980s, the Japanese government announced a new policy of “enlarged balance” or “expended equilibrium” (kakudai kinkō), which aimed to improve political and economic cooperation between Japan and the soviets without going back on demand to return from the Northern Territories. From the mid-1990s, the MoFA has been promoting the “multilayered approach” (jū sōteki) with seven areas of cooperation in order to develop a peace treaty negotiations (focusing on the Northern Territories dispute), political dialogue, economic cooperation, security talks, a program of unrestricted visits (jiyū hōmon) to the disputed island, etc. (Williams 2007, 34, 78-81). Even today, the Japanese and Russian governments retain national pride and a desire to control this strategic area between northern Hokkaidō and southern Sakhalin: a permanent exhibition on Tokyo claims on the islands is being held in the former Hokkaidō government offices (P. Jain 2005, 159; Bukh 2012, 497-498).

While MoFA has supported Hokkaidō’s activities to cooperate with other northern regions, this has sometimes led to sparks between the local authorities and the central government,

120 Since a ministerial decree of June 1964, the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai are called the "Northern Territories" and no longer "Minami-Chishima" (South Kurils) (Lasserre 1999, 2).

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particularly concerning relations with the USSR/Russia (Hoppōken jidai Kankōkai 1980, 275; HIECC 2019; Sapporo City Hall 2019). In September 1997, the Governor Hokkaidō, M. Hori Tatsuya, and his Sakhalin counterpart, Igor Farkhutdinov, decided to explore the possibility of joint economic development of the four disputed islands. However, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered this initiative a challenge to his authority and immediately sent a leader to Hokkaidō to reprimand Governor Hori. Indeed, the central states are generally reluctant to give their regions full space to project themselves onto the international scene (Lecours 2002, 95). As noted by Jain, "this incident has highlighted the problem for the two regional governments to strike a balance between the desire for closer economic exchange and the problem of the Northern Territories, within the restrictive framework of the diplomacy at the state level" (P. Jain 2005, 125). P. Jain (2005, 125) notes that the Hokkaidō Prefectural Government and its Sakhalin counterpart recognize that their mutual economic ties have potential value far beyond the economic benefits: these links can help to resolve bilateral political tensions at the national level121. It resulted on the Hokkaidō - Sakhalin Friendship and Economic Cooperation Agreement, established in 1998 and considered as a regional level peace treaty, and a cooperation agreement in 2000 (Williams 2007, 87-88, 94-95). In 2013 was organized the 19th Far East- Hokkaidō joint plenary meeting; 14th Consultative Board on The Sakhalin Oblast122 and Hokkaidō Prefecture Friendship Economic Cooperation Agreement which provides a five-year plan of cooperation; dialogue concerning a visa-free regime between the Kuril Islands and Japanese inhabitants; and meetings between Sakhalin and Hokkaidō Prefecture citizens (Kamiński 2018, 177).

Economic ties between Tokyo and Moscow in the Arctic

Okano-Heijmans and Asano (2018) state that “Japanese economic diplomacy vis-à-vis Russia is widely understood as offering political and economic incentives to President Putin to build mutual trust toward the signing of a peace treaty and resolving the decades-long territorial disputes”. This also includes today the development of economic ties to develop and secure Japanese resources supplies (mineral, living and energy). Several articles argue that Moscow strongly

121 Signing of the Agreement of Friendship and Economic Cooperation, considered a mini peace treaty in 1998 (P. Jain 2005, 126). 122 Region in Russian.

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supported Japan’s candidacy for observer status at the Arctic Council while it did not support the Chinese candidacy. The previous Japanese Ambassador in charge of Arctic affairs, Mrs. Shiraishi Kazuko, developed the three main areas of Russo-Japanese cooperation in the Arctic at a press conference in Moscow 2016. These three areas include research activities, the Northern Sea Route (Arctic Sea Route), and the Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG) project.

Cooperation for the development of Arctic liquefied natural gas (LNG) project through the Northern Sea Route (Arctic Sea Route)

Similarly to China and South Korea, Japan’s Arctic Economic strategy has focused on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) zone, often called in Japanese the Arctic Sea Route. Compared to the North-West Passage (NWP) in the Canadian Arctic, the NSR is also more attractive to shipowners due to the available infrastructure than the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Moreover, the depth limitations for navigation and permanent or moving ice, are also reasons for concern for shipowners in using of the NWP (Moe and Stokke 2019). Despite the presented attractiveness of commercial shipping via the NSR to connect Asia to Europe, only northern to northern destinations would be attractive (in terms of pure distance) in the Arctic routes such as Yokohama to Rotterdam (Lasserre and Pelletier 2011). Despite announcements concerning shortened navigation distances between Asia and Europe via the NSR, several studies have shown that, on the one hand, these distances in terms of kilometers are only efficient for specific North to North destinations (Lasserre 2014; Lasserre and Pelletier 2011). Also, shorter distances do not necessarily mean shorter navigation (polar condition very different from translational routes), less expensive (fuel versus equipment, insurance, navigation license, crew trained in polar navigation, etc.), and more profitable. Indeed, container ships using traditional routes will make several stops during their navigation (loading, unloading) while complying with the just-in-time rule. Rather than trans-Arctic shipping from Asia to Europe, shipowners consider destination shipping 123 with seasonal use of the NSR for resource extraction transportation from the Russian Arctic (Moe and Stokke 2019; Beveridge et al. 2016). The navigation envisaged, and today in development,

123 “Transit shipping is that which utilizes an Arctic route to connect the trading hubs of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, whereas destination shipping is the movement of bulk resources (such as oil, gas, LNG, or minerals) from the point of extraction to markets outside of the Arctic region” in Gosnell (2019).

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navigation from the resource extraction site to Asia in the summer and Europe in the winter (or all seasons).

Figure 10: Winter and Summer Routes from Yamal LNG plans to Asian and European markets. Source: Eco R. Geo (2017).

In 2009, the Japan-Russia Transportation Working Group established a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) in transportation signed between the Ministers in charge of Japan-Russia concerning information sharing between the two governments to promote the use and the safety of the Arctic Ocean route (Ministry of Land 2014). According to a presentation of the MLIT in 2014, Japan observed a decreased motivation from shipowners to use Arctic Ocean routes linked to a decrease in demand for iron ore in China (Ministry of Land 2014). The economic sanctions against Russia with the Ukrainian situation, and retaliatory measures by Russia, may have been a factor, if not directly, to avoid using the Arctic Ocean route. Due to those political factors, they observed decreased market prices in marine fuel prices and crude oil prices that reduced the Arctic Ocean route's advantages. According to the MLIT, Japanese stakeholders are concerned

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with utilizing the Japan-Russia Transport Working Group framework, carried out by the Russian and Japanese transport authorities. Regarding tariffs (charges) for arranging icebreakers and pilots when traveling through the Arctic Ocean route, only the maximum price is specified, and the actual price remains unclear. They also underline the need to develop an evacuation port and a rescue system that can respond to changes in weather and sea conditions, marine accidents, and crew emergencies. The Arctic Ocean routes' charts are old and need to be updated, and it is essential to improve the prediction accuracy of weather and sea conditions provided by Russia (Presentation MLIT 2014).

The Yamal LNG project, which began operating in December 2017, is a large-scale LNG production and export project jointly owned by Novatek (Russia), Total (France), and China-based China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). The project enabled year-round LNG transport by utilizing the world’s first Arc7124 class ice-breaking LNG carriers from Russia’s Yamal Peninsula to European markets and in the Asian market the NSR. To participate in this project, Mitsui OSK Line (MOL), in cooperation with COSCO Shipping (China), signed in July 2014 a long-term125 charter contract for three Arc7 class ice-breaking LNG carriers, completed in June 2017 by an addition long-term for four conventional-type LNG carriers. The NSR open from May to November, with around 15 Arc7 ice-class specialist tankers and 11 conventional-type LNG carriers, including four co-owned by MOL and COSCO, operating back and forth from Yamal LNG plant. MOL’s first icebreaking LNG carrier, Vladimir Rusanov, began its activities in March 2018. Interviews carried out with MOL managers in spring 2017 underline that this MOL initiative was considered both innovative and risky at the time of the partnership. The Yamal LNG delivery was the first major international cooperation project with Russia, Chinese companies, etc. They also pointed out that at that time, the MOL was not receiving government assistance (METI or MLIT)

124 Japanese shipbuilders lost the bids to build the carriers for the Yamal LNG project in West Siberia to the Korean Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co., Ltd. (DSME) (Moe and Stokke 2019). Built in the shipyard of DSME, the Arc7 ships are equipped with a Double-Acting Ice-Breaking System to ensure safe and unfailing navigation, even though the thick ice covering the waters of the Arctic Ocean. The ship will navigate ahead on open water and thin ice (up to 1.5 meters) and turn 180° to proceed backward and use a double-acting icebreaking system. When facing thick ice (up to 2.1 meters), as the stern is heavier and its designed for ice breaking. The ships are also designed to withstand temperatures extreme temperatures (-52 ° C). However, with the changes to the Russian Merchant Shipping Code the next the Arc7s required for Arctic LNG 2 will probably have to be partially built at the Zvezda shipyard. During an exchange with a member of the Korean Maritime Institute (KMI), he pointed out that probably 90% of the ships will be built in the Korean shipyard DSME and the remaining 10% in the Russian shipyard. 125 Contract until 2045 (Mitsui Osk Line (MOL) 2017).

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for obtaining these contracts. According to them, the Japanese government's increased involvement in supporting the development of the NSR could allow other Japanese companies to invest in the region (Mitsui Osk Line (MOL) 2017).

While Japan’s involvement in developing natural resources in the Arctic is still limited, Japanese companies have invested capital in the Russian Arctic Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) projects. Japan imports around 90% of its energy resources from the Middle East, pushing Tokyo to seek new partners to diversify its supply sources and thus ensure its energy security. After the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Fukushima’s nuclear accident, most Japanese nuclear reactors were shut down as a precautionary measure, thus causing stress on the production of electricity necessary for the archipelago (Nakano 2019). Consequently, Japan had to buy massive quantities of LNG in a short period of time from abroad to support national demand (Tonami 2016a). Japan has long relied on the development of LNG with its first shipment in 1969 from Alaska. Since then, Japan has invested in LNG projects as in the US, Middle-East (Qatar), Canada (British Columbia in 2017), Asia (Australia, Malaysia), but above all in Russia (Kosuke 2019). Tonami (2016a) argues that Japan has been the largest importer of Russian LNG for years. Indeed, since 2009, Russia has been supplying natural gas to Japan from its Sakhalin 2 project, and in 2012 Gazprom126 sent the first order of LNG through the North Route from Norway (Hammerfest) to Japan (Tokota). In 2012, the head of Rosneft, Russia’s state-controlled oil giant, visited Japan to discuss oil and gas production development in the Sakhalin Project (Tonami 2016a). In May 2013 Japan energy company Inpex Corporation reached a deal with Russian oil giant Rosneft to jointly explore two Russian oil fields (Tonami 2016a). The same year, Marubeni Corporation, the fifth-largest trading company (sōgō shōsha) in Japan, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Rosneft for a Strategic Partnership concerning the implementation of an LNG project in the Russian Far East with joint oil and gas field exploration and development (Tonami 2016a; Marubeni 2013). In 2016, Marubeni signed a MoU with Novatek to develop upstream and midstream areas for the Arctic LNG 2.

126 One of Russia’s biggest company exporting natural gas,

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Following this resumption of dialogue and enhanced cooperation between Russia and Japan, it can be noted that in 2013, Russia supported Japan's candidacy to host the 2020 Olympic Games (postponed due to COVID-2019) (Pourzitakis 2014). Despite the progress of Russo-Japanese cooperation, Diesen (2018) argues that if in 2013 Japan was deemed to be an ideal partner to finance the expansion of Sakhalin projects and develop a second LNG plant in Vladivostok for Japanese orientated exportation, the project was postponed in 2015 as Russia decided to prioritize delivering gas to China via pipelines. Moreover, while a pipeline to import gas from Sakhalin to Hokkaido has also been considered, this project was abandoned due to geological challenges and political tensions (Diesen 2018, 596). Discussions on the construction of a pipeline between Sakhalin and Japan resumed in 2015 as the Tokyo Gas president suggested at the Japan– Russia Forum argued that a pipeline would secure lower Japan’s dependency LNG imported by ships (Tonami 2016a).

Current developments: LNG development bringing together Japan and Russia

The administration of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has been actively encouraging Japanese companies to participate in the Russian Arctic projects. The economic integration of other States like Japan in Arctic projects is also seen as a way for Russia and Japan to reduce their dependence on China's asymmetrical partnership. In 2013, for the first time since 2003, with the visit of former Prime Minister Junichiro for the Japan-Russia Action Plan127, Prime Minister Abe went on an official visit to Russia and met President Putin in Moscow128. According to the media, this visit increased business cooperation between Japan and Russia on energy development in the Far-East. Diesen (2018) and Brown (2016) argue that the US had discouraged this economic connectivity between Japan and Russia, especially with the Ukrainian Crisis context, and objected to a Japanese and Russian agreement to drill for oil southwestern offshore area of Sakhalin Island collectively.

127 Signed by Putin. Cooperation around Sakhalin II Project and the production of Crude Oil, feasibility studies on the establishment of a gas pipeline between Sakhalin and Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2003). 128 Previous visits were said to be unofficial.

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Nevertheless, in 2017, the Japanese government announced a 10 billion USD public-private aid to boost LNG use in Asia (Nikkei Asian Review 2017). Japan has been world’s biggest LNG importer for decades, and in 2019, Japan imported a total of 77.32 million tons of LNG, slightly less than in 2018129 (Offshore Energy 2020). The Japanese government recognizes that its ties with Russia are an important part of its energy strategy (Hammond 2017).

In his speech at the Arctic Circle 2018, Foreign Minister Kōno Tarō stated that Japan is “promoting a comprehensive energy development cooperation with Russia in its Arctic region, while fully taking account of the environment” (High North News 2018). The Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and the Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin met during the 22nd Japan-Russia Summit Meeting in 2018, where they discussed the advancement of cooperation under the “cooperation plan,” including projects in the Far East Region such as the modernization of Khabarovsk Novy Airport, Arctic LNG 2 and the LNG transshipment in the Kamchatka region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2018d). Abe and Putin signed an MoU to cooperate on Novatek’s projects in the Yamal and Gydan peninsulas, including the Arctic LNG 2 project, and cooperate in developing a regular transport link the Northern Sea Route for LNG deliveries to the Japanese and Asia-Pacific markets.

In 2019 June 29, and during the 26th Japan-Russia Summit Meeting on the occasion of the G20 Osaka Summit, the Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo held a meeting with the Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019e). During this meeting, the two heads of state welcomed the progress realizing of the Eight-point Cooperation Plan, including Japanese companies' participation in the Arctic LNG 2 project and the decision to invest in the establishment of the Center of Preventive Medicine and Diagnostics in Khabarovsk. Following this meeting, Novatek signed a basic agreement with Japan Arctic LNG consortium, Mitsui & Co and JOGMEC, to invest 3 billion USD in the Arctic 2 LNG Project, for a 10 percent stake130 and a supply of 2 million metric tons of LNG per year with 80 percent of its LNG output bound for Asian markets (Nakano 2019). The Arctic 2 LNG is expected to become efficient in

129 With a sudden drop in imports from May 2020 due to the Covid-2019 crisis. Japan’s importations may be exceeded between 2020 and 2022 by China due to massive importations 130 Mitsui will detain 25% and JOGMEC 75% of the share of the stake.

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2022-2023 with a capacity of 19.8 metric tons per year. This project is in collaboration with Total (France), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).

“We welcome the consortium of Mitsui and JOGMEC as partners in our Arctic LNG 2 project. [...] Japan has 50 years of experience with importing LNG and is one of the largest LNG consuming countries. Moreover, Japanese companies have extensive experience in implementing LNG projects as well as marketing LNG around the world. The entry of Japanese partners into Arctic LNG 2 will contribute to its successful implementation” commented the chairman of the Management Board at NOVATEK, Leonid Mikhelson (Offshore Energy 2019).

The Japanese and Russian heads of state met again during the 27th Japan-Russia Summit Meeting on 2019 September 5, where they welcomed the implementation of joint economic activities (tourism and garbage disposal) on the disputed Northern Territories. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019e). The two heads of state also discussed the specific outcomes relating to the Eight-point Cooperation Plan and welcomed the final investment decision on the Arctic 2 LNG project and the conclusion of Toyota's particular investment contract in St. Petersburg. The same month, Novatek also signed a cooperation agreement with Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. (MOL) and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) concerning the implementation of projects concerning the construction of marine LNG transshipment facilities in the Kamchatka and Murmansk region. Finally, in December 2019, a consortium composed of Japanese leading sōgō shōsha (trading house) Itochu and Marubeni, Japan Petroleum Exploration (JAPEX), and the METI agreed to the terms of a new Russia-based LNG project with Exxon Mobil, Rosneft, and Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development. Since October 2005, JAPEX has been implicated (30%) in Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development Co., Ltd. (SODECO) in the Sakhalin 1 Project (Chayvo, Odoptu, and Arkutun-Dagi). The new venture would broaden the existing Sakhalin-1 oil field to add 6.2 million tons of LNG production by 2027.

These various announcements to invest in the Arctic 2 LNG project seems to reflects the common interests of Japan and Russia to develop relations and partnerships in the energy, foreign policy, and geopolitical spheres, but also to try to find a solution concerning the dispute of the northern territories (Nakano 2019). While relations between Japan and Russia are regularly complicated, LNG development and cooperation seem to bring Japan and Russia closer. The

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Financial Times and Reuters reported that Japanese government agencies METI and JOGMEC are set to land the main investment for a Japanese consortium composed of Mitsubishi Corp, Mitsui & Co, Itochu Corp, JAPEX, and Marubeni Inpex Corp. The investment could reach about 15-20% of the total project - in Rosneft's oil operation in Vostok, which amounts to $ 157 billion in the arctic region.

In July 2020, Novatek announced its first shipment of cargo from Sabetta to the Higashi- Ohgishima LNG terminal with an Arc7 icebreaking LNG in a 25 days voyage. In July, Novatek announced that “this LNG cargo is the company's first successful experience of entering and unloading an Arc-7 ice-class LNG tanker in a Japanese port, which allows the company to increase the volume of LNG supplies to this country" (Stuart and Dmitrieva 2020). The trips between Arctic 2 LNG and Japan are supposed to increase over the years. However, although Japan's interest in hydrocarbon resources in the Russian Arctic has attracted the attention of several media and academic articles, it should be remembered that importation of Arctic LNG remains minimal compare to other imports of LNG. Japan receives around 100 to 120 LNG cargoes per month. However, MOL has indicated that it wants to take part in the terminal transshipment in Kamchatka, thanks to its ArC-7 ships, and thus participate in delivering the LNG to the rest of Asia (Katona 2020).

Economic cooperation to promote a peaceful resolution of the Northern Territories issue and the establishment of an Official Peace Treaty

Both Japanese and Russian parties hope that building a firm partnership could help solve the dispute over the northern territories, mainly through projects related to LNG exploitation in the Russian Arctic (Brown 2016). With the development of the Arctic Sea Route/NSR, the control over the Northern Territories has become strategically more critical as they are located at the end of the NSR. From the beginning of its first administration, Abe has been working on settling the territorial dispute as it remains a crucial obstacle for both states to establish an official peace between Japan and Russia. In official declarations, statements, and documents, Japan has so far never explicitly taken part in the territorial disagreements between, for example, Canada and Denmark for Hans Island or around the Bering Strait.

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Since the beginning of his second term in 2012, Abe has met with President Vladimir Putin several times to explore joint economic projects and attempt discussions about the Northern Territories and potential peace treaty negotiations. In 2015, the Japanese Prime Minister proposed “a new approach” to the bilateral relationship and bypass the territorial talks and focusing on expanded cooperation via economic engagement (Brown 2016). The Heads of State of Japan and Russia met in May 2016 at the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting, where they agreed on eight-point bilateral cooperation. The first point concerning the resolution of the conflict concerning the Northern Territories. The two heads of state had the opportunity during this meeting to conduct an in- depth exchange of opinions on the Northern Territories issue. They concluded that they should actively proceed with negotiations toward the formulation of solutions acceptable to both sides through a "new approach" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016b). As part of the eight-point bilateral cooperation plan, Russia and Japan launched a tourism program that left Hokkaido a six- day visit to the islands of Kunashir and Iturup. Following this cooperation plan, Japan’s New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO)131 concluded a memorandum of cooperation (MOC) in 2018 with the Government of the Sakha Republic and RusHydro on energy infrastructure and wind power. Supporting the cooperation in petroleum, gas and other energy development and enhancing production capacity, this MOC included wind technology resilient in the severe cold environment above the polar circle (Hammond 2017; NEDO 2018, 2020).

However, in a public statement in 2016 at the Russia-ASEAN summit, Putin rejected any linkage between economic cooperation and the disputed islands and stated that "We [Russia] do not connect one thing with the other" (Brown 2016). Despite renewed tensions between 2016 and 2018, the dialogue resumed in September 2018 when President Putin told Prime Minister Abe that they should conclude a peace treaty before the end of the year, without any preconditions (Rafnsdóttir 2019). Although the negotiations were not successful, in January 2019, the heads of state of Russia and Japan met again to discuss the territorial dispute over the Northern Territories, leading to small street protest by nationalists in Moscow. However, the situation

131 With the participation of Mitsui & Co., Ltd., Takaoka Toko Co., Ltd., and Komaihaltec Inc.

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remained at a standstill, and in a meeting between the Russian and Japanese foreign ministers, M. Lavrov allegedly told his counterpart that "sovereignty over the islands was non-negotiable

[…] this is Russia's territory". Few details about this meeting were made public. In March (2019), the Deputy Foreign Ministers of both states met to continue peace treaty talks (Rafnsdóttir 2019). For several years Japan used the expression "illegal occupation" on the part of Russia regarding the Northern Territories. This expression was dropped in 2019 to avoid raising tensions between Tokyo and Moscow over the territorial issue. The Japanese press agency Kyodo News reported in February 2020, that during the rally held on "Northern Territories Day", the Japanese Prime Minister declared that he would "step up joint work to find a solution that is acceptable to both sides and advance (peace treaty) negotiations steadily" (Kyodo News 2020).

Despite this economic rapprochement, and with the resurgence of nationalism in both Russia and Japan, this dispute's resolution seems understood to the extent that each party's public opinion would oppose any form of settlement unless it is “all or nothing”. After soon 80 years since the end of World War II, the status quo regarding the sovereignty of these islands seems to be well established between Russia and Japan, and if the populations of these two states claim possession of these islands, this territorial dispute seems to be of little interest to most of the citizens.

On the Japanese side, the government hopes that strengthening economic ties with Russia, and in particular, in projects located in the Russian Arctic, will reinforce its claims or encourage the resolution of the conflict for the Northern Territories. Therefore, economic cooperation with Russia, supported by Japan, appears to be politically oriented to bring about a peaceful resolution of the territorial dispute and finally conclude a peace treaty. The resolution of the land dispute between Japan and Russia will impact other disputes in the region, regardless of the result. For Japan, this will impact on its disagreement with South Korea over the possession of Takeshima Island, called Dokdo in Korean, which is administered by the latter. The dispute between Japan and China around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in Chinese) was claimed by the latter and administered by Japan. These long-term impacts are probably one reason why Japan is not ready to abandon its claims to the Northern Territories, and the status quo between Japan and Russia on this issue remains an acceptable solution.

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Conclusion

The effects of the use of the Arctic Ocean route are widespread, including the increase in fossil fuel consumption in the polar regions and the lives of coastal inhabitants and the arctic life. Some of them, whether positive or negative, may have implications that cannot currently be imagined. Hence, research is needed that can transmit full scientific knowledge and predictions about the vulnerability of the arctic's natural environment, ecosystems, and even people's lives to the societies (北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] 2020). In the context of a GlobalArctic, the Arctic is today a unique laboratory for scientific, political, and socio-economic cooperation. The warming of the region and the melting of the arctic ice makes it possible to envisage prospects for economic development, such as the opening of maritime routes, which would be alternatives to traditional routes. However, the development of the arctic can compromise environmental security and have harmful effects on indigenous populations. On the one hand, the Arctic states, sovereign on their territory, have committed to resolving all their border disputes before the Commission on the Continental Shelf Limits. And the Arctic Council excludes any military debate from its scope. On the other hand, scientific cooperation seems to inspire a common interest in both Arctic and non-Arctic states while being an essential element for this region (Bertelsen 2019; Finger and Heininen 2019).

As polar research in Japan has been established for decades, developing experience and expertise, science is ready to provide information to governmental bodies (decision-makers) and the industry (stakeholders). Nevertheless, we can observe different time scales between these three types of actors: research is long-term (few years to life work), policies are shorter as electoral mandates dictate them, and industry in Japan need shorts time benefits, which often leads to long silence and then quick movement to seize an opportunity. International scientific cooperation in the Arctic helps the Japanese government stimulate cooperation in other areas and particularly on the territorial dispute with Russia concerning the northern territories. The Russian Arctic's economic cooperation also seems to respond to a vocation for political objectives, including a rapprochement between Japan and Russia on the northern territories dispute.

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Japan’s Arctic policy strongly emphasizes the importance of scientific knowledge and advanced technology to further contribute to arctic institutions such as the Arctic Council (Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015). The Arctic Council Working Groups are an opportunity to develop tools that can be shared with the international research community and to innovate with commercial prospects, for example, in the fields of polar navigation. or resource extraction, but also to model, for the Arctic States and Japan, the consequences of climatic and socio-economic changes in the region. Additionally, Tokyo is aware it must strengthen its visibility and contributions by actively participating in other international forums such as the Arctic Circle and Arctic Frontiers and developing bilateral cooperative relationships with arctic and other states concerned alongside multilateral initiatives.

Japan uses its science diplomacy to foster cooperation with the Arctic States and forge good relations that can/will lead to economic opportunities for its business companies and, therefore, support its national wealth. This diplomacy is an extension of its geoeconomic/economic diplomacy: it aims to ensure its economic and diplomatic security (Tonami 2018). It also illustrates the interventionist role of the Japanese state and the private sector (energy, transport, fishing, etc.), which collaborate in Japan's economic development. Although it alone does not allow Japan to participate in various cooperation and collaboration forums such as the Arctic Council, it remains the approach favored by the Japanese government, but also Chinese and South Korean, to reassure the states of the Arctic region on their intentions (Bertelsen and Xing 2016). Arctic policies from non-arctic States seem to try to end the many concerns on their intentions and agenda in the Arctic by demonstrating their goodwill and their desire for cooperation, an active contribution to the polar scientific research, in particular in the working groups of the Arctic Council.

The Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy underlines the need for Japan to stimulate an "ocean economy" or "blue economy" that would exploit the economic opportunities created by arctic shipping routes and ensure the protection of a fragile and vulnerable ecosystem. In conclusion, the Plan emphasizes Japan's importance to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Arctic and non-Arctic states through its scientific and technological expertise (Cabinet Office of Japan 2018). Although Japan has not received as much attention as China, its geoeconomic

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engagement in the Arctic, especially on the Russian side, has grown since the mid-2010s and is expected to continue (Yamal, Arctic Sea Routes). This engagement resulted in various geopolitical interpretations in and out of the Arctic as an opportunity or a potential threat. Similarly, with Japanese territory and people not directly affected by polar issues, the Arctic does not prioritize Japanese economic and research policy to China and South Korea. Instead, it is a parallel and secondary research and development sector allowing the Japanese government and experts to demonstrate their skills in new sectors internationally. But also, to underline Japan's commitment to institutions and the main principles of international law. Japan has defined its interests in the Arctic as global environmental protection, resource development, and in the arctic sea route. Similarly to other non-arctic States involved in the region, Japan believes it needs to be involved in current and future international agreements and the rules-making process regarding arctic issues.

The Sino-Japanese and Korean-Japanese rivalries on the regional but also arctic scene have essentially political stakes: these States may offer a similar vision on their engagement in arctic institutions and investment in the region, but from the point of strategic view, it is essential to know who dominates and stands out in these exchanges and platforms. Rather similar to the Japanese strategy in Central Asia illustrated by Dadabaev (2018a), or in its general foreign policy, Japan favors the concept of open regionalism132. Japan's engagements in the Arctic region are mostly done through the Japanese government's ODA scheme, with limited corporate interest participation (Dadabaev 2018a, 4; Tonami 2018). Tonami (2018, 10), in her paper on Japan’s Economic Diplomacy, highlight the interventionist role of the government in the foreign policy system to achieve economic development and autonomy. Thus, Japan does not aim to build an exclusive regional forum to build and enrich its Arctic-Japan dialogue.

Following its overall foreign policy engagement, Japan does not claim exclusivity in terms of participants or opposes any party wanting to play a constructive role. Japan wishes to be included in international discussions but does not assert or demand a highly influential role in managing Arctic affairs. The government of Japan, like the business community, sees the Arctic as a land

132 Adopted in as a fundamental principle of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989.

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of opportunity, a place of the future more than the present, but worth watching closely due to the potential for regional developments to offer dramatic opportunities for the country” (Ken Coates and Holroyd 2015, 93-94). Its economic diplomacy in the region is a continuation of its global geoeconomic strategy to ensure its economic stability and prosperity (Tonami 2018, 10). In the context of its implication in the Arctic, the government of Japan has focused on cooperation with the Eurasian Arctic States and, in particular, with Russia with the development of LGN capacities. Dadabaev (2018b, 15) argues that the Japanese government and its affiliated agencies (e.g. JOGMEC) prefer to use Japanese expertise and reputation (made in Japan brand) to both cements its presence in this region and emphasizes the Japaneseness of the assistance schemes. He also notes that despite the government's will to invest, be it Central Asia or the Arctic, the Japanese private enterprises lack information on the markets and the confidence to act in “new waters”. In its declaration, Tokyo tends to overestimate the business industry's participation and interest in the Arctic. If some companies are already active or interested in investments in the Arctic region, we can note that these are mainly located on the shore of the Arctic Sea Route. That it is cooperation with other Russian and international companies in which Japanese companies still participate in a minority. And in most cases, China also invests in these same projects, and often with superior means.

Although the Japanese government wishes to encourage Japanese companies' investment in Arctic projects, it nevertheless recognizes that at present, these companies are cautious about investing in a region still considered at risk and requiring investment in the medium and long term (Hammond 2017). Currently, Japan has no existing projects focused on Arctic resources other than oil and gas in the Russian Arctic.

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Chapter 3: Hokkaidō: from the ‘Road to the Northern Sea’ to ‘Japan’s gateway to the Arctic’

With the potential for the development of Arctic maritime routes and the exploitation of its natural resources, many researchers, municipalities, and regions try to highlight their attractiveness to this development. It is the case of St-Pierre and Miquelon for France133, Maine for the Atlantic facade of the United States134, Scotland in Europe135, but also Hokkaidō for Japan (Gass 2016; Dotte 2014; Saunavaara 2018a; Tømmerbakke 2019; Lasserre 2015). The concept of a “gateway to the Arctic” has been put forward by different territories for several years to claim geographical and sometimes cultural proximity to the Arctic, thus supporting the establishment or strengthening of an economic link. Many non-Arctic observers (China, France, United Kingdom, South Korea, etc.)136 in the Arctic Council claim a geographical or cultural proximity to the Arctic region and its peoples to legitimize their interests in various Arctic resources and issues. This circumpolarity137 supported by non-Arctic states builds the idea of connecting the Asian continent to North America and Europe via the Arctic, to reach the Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic Oceans (Väätänen and Zimmerbauer 2019).

Hokkaidō is Japan’s northernmost and by far largest prefecture, has served as the country’s gate to the north since it officially became a part of Japan’s territory in the mid-19th century. Thus, Japanese delegates, have during international events (e.g., Arctic Circle), emphasizing its role as a maritime nation and the geographical proximity of Japan to the Arctic through its northern island of Hokkaidō, allowing it to strengthen the legitimacy of its interest in this region and its willingness to be included in the governance of the Arctic. Meanwhile, Hokkaidō has recently aspired to become a hub where the ships and subsea communications cables carrying cargo and information between East Asia, North America, and Europe through the Arctic will land

133 "The archipelago represents an advanced position (in the Arctic) which France must absolutely benefit from" (Dotte 2014). 134 “Maine is poised to become the hub, the eastern gateway to the Arctic, a region whose allure we have shared since Portland Maine explorer Robert Peary set foot on the North Pole in 1909” ("Governor Janet Mills addresses the Arctic Circle Assembly" 2019). 135 "A European gateway to the Arctic". Scotland 2019 Arctic Policy (Tømmerbakke 2019). 136 For China and Korea: "near-Arctic state", for the United Kingdom: "sub-Arctic nation". 137 Circumpolar is not specific to the Arctic. This term means what is close, surrounds and/or specific to the poles.

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in the future. Furthermore, Hokkaidō’s northern location and cold climate are no longer considered factors hindering development, as they used to be, but as features opening new business possibilities, as emphasized in the 8th Hokkaidō Comprehensive Development Plan in 2016. Hokkaidō is Japan’s northernmost and by far largest prefecture, has served as the country’s gate to the north since it officially became a part of the territory of Japan in the mid- 19th century. Thus, Japanese delegates, have during international events (e.g., Arctic Circle), emphasized its role as a maritime nation and the geographical proximity of Japan to the Arctic through its northern island of Hokkaidō allowing it to strengthen the legitimacy of its interest in this region and its willingness to be included in the governance of the Arctic. Meanwhile, Hokkaidō has recently aspired to become a hub where the ships and subsea communications cables carrying cargo and information between East Asia, North America, and Europe through the Arctic will land in the future. Furthermore, Hokkaidō’s northern location and cold climate are no longer considered only as factors hindering development, as they used to be, but as features opening new business possibilities, as emphasized in the 8th Hokkaidō Comprehensive Development Plan in 2016. In view of these developments, it is worth noticing that both Japan’s involvement in the processes concerning areas north of latitude 45 degrees north, as well as Hokkaidō’s special role in it, evolved over time.

It was in the late 1960s, and under the leadership of Governor Dōgakinai Naohiro (1971-1983), that the concept of a northern region or "Hoppōken Kōso"138 emerged to revitalize the economy of the prefecture and improve living conditions of its citizens. While he was Deputy Minister of Administration of the Hokkaidō Development Agency, Governor Dōgakinai had the idea of changing the classical North / South observation perspective, and instead analyze the island of Hokkaidō in terms of latitude (Hondo 2004, 93; Hoppōken-Sentā 1982, 4,37).

As Hamelin (1979), Bernier (2014), or Chartier (2008) notes, definitions of the North are multiple according to the chosen criteria and objectives and are not intrinsic to a territory or a direction139.

138 Literal translation : Hoppo 北方 : North and Ken 圏: sphere, circle, region. 139 "The representations of the North no longer appears as the mere description of a geographical space, but rather as a fascinating pluricultural discourse uniquely fed by different strata from ancient cultures, taken up by European cultures, fueled by the cultures of Northern Europe and involved by indigenous cultures”. In Chartier (2004, 10).

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The Governor of Hokkaidō observed many climatic, geographical and cultural differences between Hokkaidō located at the extreme north of the Japanese archipelago and Tokyo, centrally located on the main island Honshu. Thus, the Governor wished to insist on the need to obtain more autonomy vis-à-vis the capital to answer the various problems of developing the northern Japanese prefecture. He also wanted to promote partnerships with other northern provinces and municipalities to boost the local economy and improve the living conditions of the citizens of Hokkaidō.

This chapter is based on two hypotheses. Firstly, the northern role of Hokkaidō in Japan evolved to conform to the needs of the central authorities. From the role of the last frontier to the Northern regional environment (Sakhalin, Kuriles, Eastern Siberia) with the need to secure the Japanese territory again the Russian threat through the colonization of Hokkaidō, to its role in the Japanese-Soviet dispute concerning the Northern Territories. Then finally, in the recent year, the Northern role and position of Hokkaidō have helped the Japanese government promote the province as Asia’s gateway to the Arctic and hence to support Japan’s policy and interests in the Arctic.

Secondly, although Hokkaidō has had a peculiar yet continuously changing role in national policies, there have also been locally Hokkaidō-based initiatives and international activity outside or beyond the national foreign policy framework. These exchanges aimed to reduce its dependence on the central government by promoting exchanges with other Northern regions (the Northern Region Plan, Northern Forum, World Winter Cities Associations for Mayors etc.).

In order to test those hypotheses, this chapter asks:

1) How were the ‘Northerness’ or ‘Nordicity’ of Hokkaidō and Hokkaidō’s role as the north of Japan, understood and conceptualized at different times both within and outside the island?

2) What kind of interactions have taken place between Hokkaidō and other northern regions (from cooperation to exchanges)?

3) Finally, to what extent does the development of the ‘Northern region’ concept supported by the Hokkaidō prefecture and the various paradiplomatic initiatives implemented with other

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northern/arctic territories support the Japanese government asserts itself as the gateway from Asia to the Arctic?

Conceptual framework

Regionalism and Open Regionalism in international relations

Since the 1950s, the concept of "region" and “regionalism” has become the central research subject of regional science's academic discipline with multiple definitions, flexible in the discourses (Kuznetsov 2014, 21; Hettne and Söderbaum 1998, 2000). For Paasi (2010, 2297), a region exists in geographical research in three modalities: first as a spatial unit (statistical, administrative), as the end product of a research process (a construct), and finally, as social practices/discourses construction. For Kuznetsov, there are several levels of understanding of "region" depending on the context: (1) geographic meta-entities (Asia, Europe, etc.), (2) geographically, historically, economically, linguistically, or culturally united areas (the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) which includes territories of Finland, Russia, Sweden, and Norway), and finally (3) administrative- territorial units of a state (Kuznetsov 2014). Hettne and Söderbaum (2000, 462) argue that “the regional frontier may very well cut through a particular state’s territory, positioning some parts of the state within the emerging region and others outside”.

Although it necessarily includes a geographical dimension, there are many definitions, depending on and within the field of study (social sciences, international relations) or the approach (Keating 2017; Richard 2014; Girard 2004)140. The idea of objective regions as in the classical geographic school141 (Paul Vidal de la Blache, Emmanuel de Martonne, etc…) has evolved towards a new conception within the New Geography school 1980s. According to this school, regions can also reflect their populations' identity, according to a spontaneous social process but which can also be activated by actors like regional authorities (Lacoste and Lorot 2010; Claval 1976; Lacoste 1982; Hamelin 1967; Brunet 1972). Paasi defines this new regional geography defines as “a subfield

140 Like spatial entities of various scales (micro-region, a geopolitical entity of larger dimension), group of States or continental groups (Arctic, Southeast Asia, etc.), "regional" powers or of "regional" conflicts, but also, "natural" region, urban region, mountain region, etc. (Girard 2004). 141 Ecole Vidalienne in the early 20th century.

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of human geography focusing on the sociocultural construction of regions, their meanings for individual and social identities, and on the power-relations embedded in region-building processes. Those approaches aim to define the degree (regionness) to which a particular area constitutes a distinct identity (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998, p. 5; 2000; Knecht, 2013). For new regional geographers, the region is an entity based on social practice and discourse” (Paasi 2020, 3).

“A region may have a historic resonance or provide a focus for the identity of its inhabitants. It may represent a landscape, an architecture or a style of cooking. There is often a cultural element, perhaps represented by a distinct language or dialect. Beyond this, a region may sustain a distinct civil society, a range of social institutions. It can be an economic unit, based either on a single type of production or an integrated production system. It may be, and increasingly is, a unit of government and administration. Finally, all these meanings may or may not coincide, to a greater or lesser degree” (Keating 2004, xi)

The geographers are not unanimous on the administrative/political translation of the regions. If for some geographers, the region corresponds to a spatial unit used to describe the territory (Brunet 1972), for Kuznetsov (2014, 22) and Sodupe (1999, 59), a region is “a territorial unit immediately below the sovereign state, with a system of self-government, that have its own constitution, statute of autonomy or other law which forms part of the legislation of the state and which determines how the region is organized and what its powers are”. Following this definition, Paasi (2009, 131) also argues that “Region refers in most debates on new regionalism to administrative Units”. The Assembly of European Regions (AER) defines the term "region" as an existing territorial authority immediately after the central government and has its own political representation in the form of an elected regional assembly (Kuznetsov 2014, 22). According to Hettne and Söderbaum (2000, 35), a region is founded by “a territorial and united space through a certain set of cultural values and common links of social order forged by history". In this study, we will take Kuznetsov's definition, the “regions” refer to a group of subnational governmental entities within a geographical area and the geographic areas concerned.

However, "regions" can also refer to a more fluid concept if the term is associated with identity or a parameter that is a consensus for political reasons. Geographically, regions can extend beyond a subnational government or a national state according to the level of common identity and cohesion (European Union, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, Euro-Barents region, etc.). The concept of

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region then refers to construction that responds to objectives that vary from one case to another, but for which we must find legitimacy. As a result, regions may exist on a "more or less regional" scale and be composed of a group of government entities that have voluntarily engaged in a transregional arrangement (Tsui 2016). Söderbaum (2015, 4) notes that “in constructing and reconstructing regions, it is typically the region-builders, political actors and other powerful stakeholders that determine much of the criteria that constitute the region and orchestrate the process of region-building”. The concept of region as a space bringing together national territories transcends here political boundaries.

Region appears to be primarily a tool of science; it disappears when we engage in pure spatial theorizing, only to reappear as a concept to be tolerated in order to validate our doctrines (Isserman 1993; Kuznetsov 2014, 22).

Following the constructivist approach, the term region is in this chapter understood as a political and social construction, in perpetual evolution, grounded in social practices (Paasi 2009, 133; 1986; Hettne and Söderbaum 1998, 2000). There are several levels of understanding of "region" depending on the context: (1) geographic meta-entities (Asia, Europe, etc.), (2) geographically, historically, economically, linguistically or culturally united areas (the Barents Euro-Arctic Region ‘BEAR’ which includes territories of Finland, Russia, Sweden, and Norway), and finally (3) administrative-territorial units of a state. As Hettne and Söderbaum (1998, 9-10) argue, regional identity is also a contested concept in regional science. It refers to an imagined and subjective cognitive construction: the perception of belonging of a particular community that can be explained by internal (domestic and regional) and external factors.

Regional construction process

Richard (2014, 2) and Symonides (2018, 14) argue that geographical proximity remains one of the major determinants of human exchanges (social and economic), which is reflected at different scales by agglomeration effects or by the concentration of trade in large territorial units constituted neighboring states and is called in the Anglo-Saxon literature "regionalization". Regionalization is a process by which actors form, reform, or reinforce a regional bond (Knecht 2013; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000). To succeed, regionalization needs common criteria (culture, language, history, fundamental values) (Hettne and Söderbaum 1998, 9-10). Regionalism is the

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opposite process; it refers to the propensity to create regional institutions and agreements. It refers to an intentional political process, often led by governments with similar goals and values to pursue overall development in the region (Richard 2014; Symonides 2018; Paasi 2009; Hettne and Söderbaum 1998; Knecht 2013). For Kuznetsov, regionalism is a complex process highlighting subnational governments' growing role in most areas, including international relations (Kuznetsov 2014, 103). Kuznetsov defines regionalization as the “global trend that leads to the delegation of as many central government powers as possible to regional and local authorities in areas where non-central governments can effectively operate” (Kuznetsov 2014, 103). Paasi prefers to define it as “the process of dividing space into distinct regions, to the political governance of state space and to the decentralization of activities. In the global context, it may refer to the construction of regional blocks at a supranational scale” (Paasi 2020, 3).

According to Allen, Cochrane, and Massey (1998), regions are a relational assemblage: a “product of the networks, interactions, juxtapositions and articulations of the myriad of connections through which all social phenomena are lived out” (Allen, Cochrane, and Massey 1998, 50; cited in Paasi 2010, 2299). Knecht (2013) notes that a region requires increasing social, economic, or political transnational interdependencies between/with states in relative geographical proximity to be regarded as such. The Arctic is an excellent example of the multiple possible definitions of the concept of region (Knecht 2013; Keskitalo 2004; Stokke and Hønneland 2006; Griffiths 1988). There are astronomical (Arctic circle), forest (tree line), climatic (Koppen line), and political definitions (Arctic 5 vs. Arctic 8). Hence, this thesis also integrates the concept of region as a space grouping national territories and therefore transcending political boundaries: a social construction “produced and reproduced by daily actions as part of a wider social reproduction” (Paasi 2010, 2300).

Paradiplomacy and subnational governance

The implication of constituent units (regions) of national states in international affairs is called in the scientific literature, paradiplomacy. The terms "sub-national government" and "regional government" are, in the literature, used interchangeably to refer to the level of government below the central authority that has more expertise and administrative resources than a city but inferior to those of the central or federal government (Cornago 2010, 13). A subnational entity can be

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defined as “a coherent territorial entity situated between local and national levels with a capacity for authoritative decision making” (Happaerts, Van den Brande, and Bruyninckx 2010, 128). And “regional diplomacy, “paradiplomacy”142 force the international activities conducted by these subnational governments. Whereas on the one hand, the central government has the monopoly of the sovereign activities represented among others by the diplomatic and military security agenda, the sub-national government concentrates its competencies around environmental issues, investment promotion, cultural and educational exchange, etc. (Kamiński 2018).

In his book « Japan’s Subnational Governments in International Affairs » (2005, 15), Jain argues that the creation of multiple channels of contact between societies linked to globalization through transgovernmental and transnational organizations blurs the distinction between domestic and international politics. As national and international policies become inextricably linked, regional governments have recently become true international actors. They negotiate and sign international agreements, develop overseas representation, conduct trade missions, seek foreign investment, and build bilateral and multilateral relations with states (Williams 2007, 12; Duchacek 1990, 14-15). Their action is no longer limited to "the internal". In addition, as a subset of government, subnational governments are responsible for administering public services to their constituents most effectively and serving the interests of their constituents collectively (P. Jain 2005, 18; Sergunin and Joenniemi 2014).

Thus, we can note three main types of motivations that push regions to stimulate their activity across national borders: economic, cultural (education, environment, etc.), and political (Lecours 2008, 2; Ackrén 2019, 235; Williams 2006, 265). Economic motivations lie in the desire of regional authorities to make the most of the global liberal market environment by interacting with foreign players motivated and “by a desire to break out of economic stagnation by promoting trade and investment linkages based on the notion of perceived economic complementarity” (Williams 2006, 265). Subnational governments’ goal is not to generate profits for themselves but rather to cultivate an international presence leading to an economic climate conducive to profits in their constituency (P. Jain 2005, 18). Moreover, by allowing regional governments to conduct

142 Among many others.

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paradiplomacy, the government saves resources that can be allocated elsewhere. Kuznetsov (2014, 109) and P. Jain (2005, 24) notes that the choice of the economic partner is often based on functional and geographical proximity 143 . P. Jain (2005, 19) underlines the inability or incompetence of some national/central governments to protect local markets and budget cuts in subnational governments. This has forced the latter to take more responsibility concerning the economic well-being of their region, including seeking international business opportunities. Cultural or linguistic factors are vital incentives for paradiplomacy, especially for regions with their own language and cultural or religious particularities. Finally, the third main motivation for subnational governments' actions is their political goals, with a view to re-election (creating jobs), sometimes secessionist (the province of Quebec in Canada), or for greater autonomy or decentralization of the state.

Finding clear definitions for the concepts of "region" and "paradiplomacy" is an ongoing challenge for geographers, political and international relations scientists. As we have seen “Region” can be considered one of the most polysemantic terms of the modern social sciences. "Paradiplomacy" or parallel diplomacy is a relatively emerging concept in the social sciences but is now at the center of more and more studies (Tonami 2020)144. Rohan Butler, in his monograph Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography (1961; 1971), was the first to mention first paradiplomacy as "the highest level of personal and parallel diplomacy, complementing or competing with the usual foreign policy of the minister concerned, is thus a recurring temptation for the chief executive, whether prime minister or president, dictator or monarch" (Kuznetsov 2014, 26; R. Butler 1961). For Lecours (2002, 92), paradiplomacy concerns certain types of regions (second administrative rank) and defines the international activities of the regional governments supporting, complementing or correcting the central state diplomacy145. Paradiplomacy can reflect competition between, for example, the General Delegations of Quebec, de facto embassies,

143 Also in Richard (2014, 2). 144 There are many terms other than "paradiplomatie" to conceptualize the activities of the regions (with however different implications) such as "constituent diplomacy", "regional diplomacy", "sub-state diplomacy", "microdiplomacy", "multi-level diplomacy", "catalytic diplomacy", "protodiplomacy" (although according to Paquin (2020, 51), it refers to “international strategies designed to promote diplomatic recognitions as a way of preparing the establishment of a sovereign country”), "post- diplomacy", etc. (Duchacek 1986, 9; Putnam 1988; Kincaid 1990; Hocking 1993; Aguirre 1999; P. Jain 2005, 19; Kuznetsov 2014, 25; Tavares 2016; Jackson 2018, 3; Kamiński 2018, 15). 145 "They [regional governments] negotiate and sign international agreements, develop international representation, conduct trade missions, seek foreign investment, and enter into bilateral and multilateral relations with states" in Lecours (2002, 92).

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tolerated by Ottawa (central government) but intended to complement / compete with the network of Canadian embassies abroad. Like Duchacek before him, Lecours notes that the movement of comparative politics and international relations sees paradiplomacy as the result of the conjuncture of internal state dynamics and external turbulence, which reflects both the notions of parallelism and subsidiarity (Lecours 2002, 93; Duchacek 1984; Kamiński 2018; Williams 2007, 10; Duchacek 1990, 25; Paquin 2020)146. The study of paradiplomacy is relatively recent (the 1980s and developed in the 1990s) and limited with recent development of conceptual and theoretical fields147 (Paquin 2020). And after a multitude of debates around terminology, the term "paradiplomacy"148 has become the main term for marking the new phenomenon of subnational implications in international relations (Kuznetsov 2014, 28; Ackrén 2019, 235; Jackson 2018; Tonami 2020).

The academic literature broadly defines paradiplomacy as the involvement of constituent units (regions) of national states in international affairs. Thus, regional governments intervene in different ways in international affairs: they open trade and cultural missions abroad, sign treaties and agreements with state and non-state actors. They can also participate in international networks of regional cooperation and sometimes question their central governments' official foreign policy through their statements or actions (Lecours 2002, 93). As summarized by Kamiński (2018, 13), paradiplomacy represents the projection abroad of subnational governments' domestic competencies, which are predominantly concentrated on environmental issues, investment promotion, and cultural and educational exchange.

Non-state actors are involved in foreign affairs through paradiplomacy and build multilateral, international and global policies and networks. Decision-making must be at a level closer to the markets and communities affected. The scope of paradiplomacy is broad and can encompass ordinary diplomatic activities such as establishing of delegations and participation in interregional and bilateral consultations (Tonami 2020, 8). But also, more simply creating twinning between cities or provinces (Kamiński 2018, 17). Subnational entities are state-owned, unlike NGOs or

146 Alongside and assisting. Also in Jackson (2018); Tavares (2016, 7-8). 147 These concepts and theories have mainly developed in federal states such as Canada, or in Europe. 148 A form of diplomacy in parallel with that undertaken by the State.

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multinationals. Indeed, subnational governments are "coherent territorial entities located between the local and national levels and with an authoritative decision-making capacity" (Happaerts, Van den Brande, and Bruyninckx 2010, 128). As their decisions may affect millions of citizens, they may have an impact, albeit modest, on a state's foreign and domestic policies (Kuznetsov 2014, 3; Williams 2007, 11). Echoing the idea put forward by Shuman in 1986, Williams argues that subnational public authorities can influence the central government's decision-making process ("consciousness-raising measures") (Shuman 1986, 159 cited in ; Williams 2007, 11). And this particularly in the fields of education, research and lobbying.

Sub-national governments may seek to develop a set of international relationships to affirm or reaffirm their political autonomy through their culture's distinctive character, the national character of the community they represent (Lecours 2008, 3). Paradiplomatic initiatives by subnational governments are not always viewed favorably by the state, which has exclusive powers over foreign affairs. According to Lecours (2008, 6), one concern is that paradiplomacy may be detrimental to the international coherence of state discourse. The objectives of subnational governments and those of the central government are not always in harmony, which may have given rise to intergovernmental tensions in the past (for example, Quebec or Catalonia's demands for autonomy). These relations tend to be more confrontational in multinational or multiethnic states or the cultural specified is not always reflected in the state's international policies (Lecours 2008, 9). The supreme powers of foreign policy vary from state to state, but in general, only the central state can ratify treaties.

The "Theory and Practice of Paradiplomacy" of Kuznetsov (2014) establishes an analytical framework for which critical analysis is possible of how subnational entities engage abroad and how and why subnational entities commit to foreign. Kuznetsov (2014, 103) framework includes six questions that could be applied to all regions and governments concerned and suggests possible answers for each.

- The first question relates to the different reasons why a region is involved in para-diplomatic relations. He thus notes (116), 11 possible different reasons: globalization, regionalization, democratization, the appropriation of foreign policy and internalization of domestic politics,

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federalization and decentralization, problems related to the process of building the nation, insufficient central government effectiveness in external relations, asymmetry of constituent units, external incentive, regional leader / political party, and borders.

- The second question revolves around the legal foundations of the constituent diplomacy in the country of a sub-national case examined149.

- Then he asks, what is the predominant reason for the government of the region examined to get involved in international affairs?

- How has paradiplomacy been institutionalized in the region under review?150 - What is the central government's attitude towards the paradiplomacy of its constituent entities?151

- Finally, what are the consequences of paradiplomacy on the development of the whole nation? 152

Kuznetsov (2014, 50) notes eleven dimensions to understand the external activities of regional governments in the framework of paradiplomacy: a constitutional dimension of paradiplomatic discourse, federalist/intergovernmental relations, nationalist, international relations (IR), border studies, globalization, security/geopolitics, the global economy dimension, an environmental and diplomatic dimension and finally a separatist dimension. According to Kuznetsov (2014, 109), there are three main types of motivations that drive regions to stimulate their activity beyond the national borders found in the development policy of the Japanese prefecture of Hokkaidō: cultural, political and economic.

149 What is the level of legal permission to conclude treaties with foreign actors granted by national constitutions / legal acts to regional authorities? What are the constitutional requirements for consultations with sub-national governments on foreign affairs issues? 150 Regional Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Permanent Offices Abroad, Official Visits, Exhibitions / Forums, Global and Cross- Border Multilateral Regional Networks, Work in Central Government Delegations. 151 Dimension of perception: paradiplomacy as a challenge for an entire nation, paradiplomacy as an opportunity for the whole nation, practical dimension, model of coordinated cooperation, model of cooperative cooperation, model of parallel harmony, model of parallel disharmony, passive tolerance and indifference (Kuznetsov 2015). 152 Rationalization of the national framework of paradiplomacy, democratization of the decision-making process in the national framework of paradiplomacy, disintegration of the State, marginal impact on the State (Kuznetsov 2015).

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Japanese subnational governments and their international capabilities

As more and more sub-national governments engage in economic and cultural exchanges with their counterparts to support the development of their territory, the Japanese government officially supports the regional participation of “with local governments making decisions, through the private sector, primarily with trade, letting economic cooperation emerge naturally” in these regions (Christoffersen 1994, 517; Bennett 2014, 517). However, as noted by several researchers, these local governments' interests are not necessarily shared with the national government (O.R. Young 2005; P. Jain 2005, 67; Lecours 2008, 10)153.

The Northern Region Plan (Hoppōken kōsō) developed by the Hokkaidō prefecture since the 1970s is an illustration of the internationalization of subnational governments in order to support its economic growth by promoting exchanges with other northern regions. Therefore, it is important to review the role and capabilities of subnational governments in Japan and its foreign policy.

Organization of subnational governance in Japan

Although Chapter VIII is devoted to the local governance in the Japanese constitution, the terms chosen in the Japanese version and its official English translation refers to "local public entities" (P. Jain 2005, 40). The term seifu (government) does not appear in this chapter, which prefers to use the term jiichitai local public entities). However, according to article 73 of the constitution, the Cabinet has authorities on diplomatic affairs (Williams 2007, 65). After several decades of debate, prefectural administrations tend to describe themselves as local governments, at least in their official English-language website. And while subnational governments do not have the formal authority to intervene in defense, diplomacy, or law, there is no denying their influence in policies in these areas (P. Jain 2005, 41). Neither the Constitution nor the Local Autonomy Law enshrined in 1947 (Chihō-jichi-hō) prohibits Japanese prefectures from acting internationally (Williams 2007, 65). Sub-national governments' roles and responsibilities are enshrined in the Local Autonomy

153 During the Cold War and despite ideological differences, the Association of Mayors of Coastal Cities of Japan and the Soviet Union (now the Association of Mayors of Coastal Cities of Japan and Russia) was established in 1970 and organized a Conference of Coastal Cities in 1972 to promote trade between these regions. This, according to Jain, illustrates that regional governments can maintain productive links, even when official contacts at the national level are broken. In P. Jain (2005, 7).

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Law, but this law does not mention their international functions (P. Jain 2005, 10, 24, 41, 53–54). Williams (2007) argues that those limitations led to the creation of loopholes permitting subnational government diplomacy through multilayering (Williams 2007, 65). Later he notes that according to an expert on Japanese subnational government diplomacy, Matsushita Keiichi, “subnational government diplomacy is not unconstitutional as long as the localities do not seek a leadership or coordinating role in foreign policy, […] subnational governments are allowed to do what is not banned by national law” (Williams 2007, 65).

For a long time, Japanese subnational governments have been firmly restricted by the central government, especially by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) (P. Jain 2005, 32,39). In an amendment to the Local Autonomy Law in 1990, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA)154 tried to include international cooperation as a subnational government affair. However, as is often the case in Japanese politics, each ministry tries to keep maximum influence and protect its primary interests and the MoFA pressure the MoHA to back down this amendment (Williams 2007, 66). There is very little horizontal cooperation in the Japanese administrative system, and this is also the case concerning possible support for subnational governments and their implications abroad (P. Jain 2005, 42, 46; Williams 2007, 17). The MoFA has long sought to assert its responsibility for the domestic foreign policy and, in so doing, to regulate the "local" foreign policy of subnational governments. Williams (2007:10) argues that the MoFA saw the international role of subnational government in cultural exchanges or domestic public relations activities (educational, cultural, sports partnerships or exchanges, etc.). Williams, however, notes that with the effect of globalization, the distinction between domestic politics and foreign policy tends to become quite blurry (Williams 2007, 10).

The central government and the MoFA have been forced since the mid-2000s to recognize the potential benefits of the scope of sub-national governments (SNG) (greater proximity, the economy of resources) beyond national borders and their complementarity (P. Jain 2005, 39). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has begun to decentralize some aspects of foreign policy by giving

154 Replaced by the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunication (MPHPT) in 2001 and renamed Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in 2004.

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subnational governments some responsibility for practical functions while maintaining its general authority over foreign policy (P. Jain 2005, 39). Japan's national government decentralizes some practical work and responsibilities through partnerships and other cooperation agreements with subnational governments (P. Jain 2005, 38).

“Kōryū kara kyōryoku e” - From exchanges to cooperation

This slogan Developed by the MoHA in the 1990s followed MoFA’ order to diversify Japan's international contribution (kokusai koken) (P. Jain 2005, 10,87,90). For the MOHA and MoFA the international involvement of SNG helped support their international action, and for the subnational governments (SNG), it was a way to support or develop the local economy.

In Japan, the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR), established in 1988, is a governmental agency representing the interests of subnational governments abroad to promote local development, like the Japan Exchange and Teaching Program (JET), and socio- economic revitalization. Subnational governments developed it to support their international activities (P. Jain 2005, 33–39, 42–44, 49–51). notes that CLAIR supports subnational governments' efforts through programs by sending officials from these administrations abroad and hosting their counterparts to work as experts or trainers in various fields Jain (P. Jain 2005, 49).

The Ministry responsible for subnational governments is the Ministry of Public Management, Home

Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications (Sōmu shō Home Affairs and Communications - SHA)155. It collaborates with the Ministry of Trade and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), and the Japanese Bank for International Corporation (JBIC) for supporting the actions of regional governments abroad. P. Jain (2005, 43) notes that the SHA exercises immense regulatory and financial control over subnational governments. It manages a large portion of subnational government funding, including the local allocation tax, and controls these governments' ability to

155 Replaced the MoHA, and the MPHPT.

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issue local bonds156. In addition, many CLAIR members are from or have been trained by SHA, which provides policy guidance to senior officials in national and international offices.

Hokkaidō governmental organization

The prefectures of Okinawa and Hokkaidō, unlike other Japanese provinces, are under the jurisdiction of special central government agencies in charge of their development (Williams 2007, 59). After Hokkaidō’s assimilation into the Japanese Empire, the central government established the Hokkaidō Development Commission (Kaitakushi) in 1869 to carry out the Hokkaidō development projects with the support of western experts. And in 1886, the Hokkaidō

Development Agency (Hokkaidō Kaihatsuchō) was established as a state department agency to improve the social infrastructures157. It dealt with infrastructure modernization projects like the construction of roads, ports and railways, or the opening of the Seikan sea route between Honshu island through Aomori, and Hokkaidō by Hakodate (Ministry of Land 2008b).

After World War II, the Ministry of Home Affairs was abolished under the new constitution of 1947, and the Hokkaidō Agency became a local government. Under the Hokkaidō Development Act (1950), the Hokkaidō Comprehensive Development Plan (HCDP) has been drawn up periodically since 1952, every 10 years to emphasize the key area for Hokkaidō development, and provide the groundwork for systematic development (Wada 2010). It resulted in the formulation of development plans that address current challenges and utilize resources from the region, including revitalizing the economy and increasing food production, and the appropriate distribution of the population and industry location 158 . But also to take a wide range of measures to develop infrastructure to establish a comfortable living environment in a cold and snowy climate (roads, ports, railways, airports, industrial parks, etc.) by taking advantage of Hokkaidō’s resources

156 Local taxes account for about 35% of total revenue of subnational governments, and the local allocation tax, which is automatically transferred from national governments to subnational governments, accounts for 22% of subnational government revenue. Only 30% of the funding from these administrations comes from sources independent of the national government. In P. Jain (2005, 45; 2011, 172). 157 Government title worn by all cabinet members, the Japanese government. It was dissolved in 2001. 158 Third Development Plan, History of Hokkaidō Development, 208: 4 “Third Hokkaidō Comprehensive Development Plan”.

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(development of mines, construction of paper mills, iron and steel works) (Ministry of Land 2008d; Wada 2010).

The Hokkaidō Regional Development Bureau (Hokkaidō Kaihatsukyoku/HRDB), established in 1951 and under the authority of the Hokkaidō Development Agency (Kokudo Kōtsūshō) then of the Ministry of Land, Industry, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), is responsible for the implementation of research and public works as established by HCDP. The various competent ministries manage the budget for those plans: The Ministries such as Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Transportation and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery under the Hokkaidō - Tohoku Development Fund financing private sectors under preferential conditions (low-interest rate)159. According to Williams (2007), by the end of the 1990s, about 60 trillion yen were invested into those plans for Hokkaidō’s development through agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and coal industry projects (Williams 2007, 59). In the Fifth Plan, sub-national authorities emphasized the need for Hokkaidō to compete successfully with regions elsewhere in Japan and the world to develop its territory and resources, and thus, the need to develop capacities for exchange and international cooperation. Subsequently, all Hokkaidō development plans noted this need to cooperate and collaborate with other world regions(Ministry of Land 2008b, 2008a, 1998).

The Hokkaidō Development Agency is now part of the Ministry of Lands, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)160, and it is the national government of Japan that, under the leadership of the prefectural government, is developing the plan of Hokkaidō development. The central-local government system in Hokkaidō is composed of a national government, a prefecture government (Hokkaidō government), and local governments (212 municipalities). Hokkaidō is a special prefecture161 with its chief city, Sapporo, and is also composed of sub-prefectures 162 which considers the size of this region, does the work usually done by the prefectural offices in the rest of Japan. The island's governance system included a Ministry of National Development, the

159 The Hokkaidō Development Finance Public Corporation was established in 1956 and reorganized as the Hokkaidō -Tohoku Development Finance Public Corporation in 1957 (Ministry of Land 2008c). The 1st HCDP was introduced in 1910-1926, followed by the 2nd HCDP in 1927-1946, the 3rd for 1971 – 1977, the 4th for 1978 – 1987, the 5th for 1988 – 1997, the 6th for 1998 – 2007, the 7th for 2008 - 2015 and the 8th HCDP for 2016 to 2025 (Anazawa 2014). 160 Reorganized in 2001. 161 Under the jurisdiction of special central government agency in charge of its development. 162 Sōya, Tokachi, Iburi (Hidaka), Oshima (Hiyama), Shiribeshi, Sorachi (Ishikari), Okhotsk, Kamigawa (Rumoi), and Kushiro (Nemuro with the Northern Territories).

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Hokkaidō Development Bureau, and a public financial institution: the Hokkaidō -Tohoku Development Finance Corporation (Yamazaki 2001; Ministry of Land 2008a). Hokkaido Prefectural Assembly is composed of 101 members representing 47 electoral districts.

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FIGURE 11 MINISTRY OF LAND, INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT AND TOURISM (SOURCE: MINISTRY OF LAND 2008A).

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In 1998, the SHA granted the status of "Recognized Local International Exchange Associations" to the Northern Region Center, which became in 2011 the Hokkaidō International Exchange and Cooperation Center (HIECC) (Hokkaido International Exchange and Cooperation Center (HIECC) 2015, 3)163. The center aimed to assume a comprehensive and important role in international exchange/cooperation in Hokkaidō and expand the target areas of its programs from northern regions to the entire world. HIECC is a public interest incorporated association composed of corporate and individual members.

Apr 1971 Northern Regions Research Council established

Jan 1972 Approved as an incorporated body by the Prime Minister

Apr 1978 Reorganized into the Northern Regions Center

Apr 1996 Entrusted with the management and operation of Hokkaidō International Centers

Mar 1998 Recognized as a Local International Exchange Association by the Minister of Home Affairs

Jul 2004 Incorporates the Northern Regions Exchange Foundation

Jul 2006 Incorporates the Hokkaidō Overseas Association

Apr 2010 Takes over the operations of the North Pacific Region Advanced Research Center

Aug 2011 Transitions into a public interest incorporated association and changes its name to the Hokkaidō International Exchange and Cooperation Center

TABLE 13: SOURCE: HIECC, 2015: 3.

Conceptualizing North/ Northern/ Nordicity/ Northerness and Arcticness/Arcticity

As the question of the ‘Northerness’ or ‘Nordicity’ of Hokkaidō and Hokkaidō’s role as the north of Japan is central to this chapter, the conceptual approach is essentially based on the existing western literature of Nordic / Northerness / Nordicity and Arcticness/Arcticity. Indeed,

163 It also incorporated the Hokkaidō International Exchange Center for Youth and Women in April 1998, the Hokkaidō Overseas Association in 2006 and the North Pacific Region Advanced Research Center (NORPAC) in 2010.

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the literature on this subject is almost exclusively of Western origin, and it has largely focused on America and Northern Europe. However, the “temporary winterness” of Hokkaido has been recognized by some researchers (Chartier, 2004; L.-E. Hamelin, 2000; Parsis-Barubé, 2017) and is the base of the development of the Northern Region Plan drawn up in the 1970s in Hokkaido.

Evolution of the concept and terms

As I. Medby (2017, v) explains, claiming a northern and later an Arctic identity “may serve an instrumental purpose – for example adding to political actors’ or private stakeholders’ credibility”. The northern Japanese prefecture Hokkaidō developed in the late 1960s its concept of a Nordic region. However, this conceptualization seems to take the characteristics used in the western literature (Bernier 2014, 32).

While the magnetic north indicates a fixed point (which certainly moves over the years), definitions of the geographic North continue to evolve over the years. Hamelin, in his glossary on North and Nordicity, defines the North as the “northern zone comprising parts of Canada, Norden (Finno- Scandia, Island, Greenland, Svalbard), the former USSR and the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, as well as the entire Arctic Ocean, Greenland, Iceland and Alaska” (Hamelin et al. 2002). For his part, Chartier (2007, 38) notes that, initially, the geographic Nordicity is understood as the area including Finland, Scandinavia, Russia, Canada, Alaska, Greenland and regions subject to so-called winter conditions. The conception of the North and Nordicity has been evolving through time and we can observe the development of significant literature on this subject Canada and in Northern Europe.

The definitions concerning the North, Nordicity and Northerness are multiples. Chartier (2018), for this part, describe the North as

“A space imagined and represented for centuries by the artists and writers of the Western world, which led, over time and the successive accumulation of layers of speech, to the creation of an ‘imaginary of the North’ - whether this North is that of Scandinavia, Greenland, Russia or the North, or the poles. But Westerners reached the North Pole only a century ago, which makes the “North” the product of a double look, from the outside - representations, especially Western - and from within - Nordic cultures (Inuit, Scandinavian, Cree, etc.)” (Chartier 2018, 9)

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The North is the object of infinite reinterpretations in the imaginary since it puts the individual in relation with himself and his environment (Van Baak 1995; Chartier 2018). As a geographical notion, the North escapes to all delimitation and disciplines (geography, history, linguistics, sociology, art, etc.). The works of both Daniel Chartier and Louis-Edmond Hamelin demonstrate that the North is a social construction, a cultural discourse, applied to a territory (Hamelin 1979, 2000b; Chartier 2004, 2008, 2018). In another paper, Chartier adds that “the representations of the North no longer appear as the mere description of geographical space, but rather as a fascinating pluricultural discourse uniquely fed by different strata from ancient cultures, taken up by European cultures, fueled by the cultures of Europe. [...] Determined as a discursive system and no longer as a description, the North unfolds in its historical depth and, when analyzed in literary works, in its narrative functions” (Chartier 2010: 10, cited in Bernier 2014, 33).

Hamelin is one of the first researchers to conceptualize Nordicity164 in the 1970s. According to him, Nordicity exploits the lexical dimensions of north and northern roots, as it reflects both the natural and cultural diversity of the high latitudes of the northern hemisphere (Hamelin 1976, 1979). Hence, according to him, nordicity "expresses the state and the polar level in the northern hemisphere, in fact, the North's elementsthat are ideas, borders, vocabulary, inhabitants, things and backgrounds "(Hamelin 1980, 11). He adds later that “the global concept of nordicity, created from 1960, refers to the perceived, real, lived and even invented state of the cold zone within the northern hemisphere” (Hamelin 2017b). Hamelin defines Nordicity as all the ideas and characteristics resulting from all the North's thematic: “the state, degree, awareness and representation of cold territoriality in the northern hemisphere”(Hamelin et al. 2002). Nordicity helps define societies that live in similar conditions in the North and need to adapt to these characteristics (Symonides 2018). According to Hamelin, the word Nordicity serves as a trunk for a corpus of about 160 providential entities, including mental Nordicity 165 . The geographical Nordicity is then calculated in vapos (polar value, a unit used by Hamelin representing the Nordic index calculation166). This index of Nordicity makes it possible, among other things, to define the

164 From the French Nordicité. 165 E.g. “Seasonal nordicity”, “cultural nordicity”, “nordicitude”, “winterness”, “winterity”, “winterland”, “altitudinality”, “slidicity” etc. (Hamelin et al. 2002). 166 Chill summers, cold winters, different types of ice, snow, rain, vegetation, land access, air access, population economy.

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subdivision of the polar world into an area: the Middle North, the High North, and the Far North (Hamelin 1980, 85-89).

Chartier prefers to use the concept of "northern imaginary", also based on the ideas of Nordicity and winter, but which takes into account representations from the outside and from the cultures of the interior (Chartier 2018). Parsis-Barubé (2017, 170) noted the terms Nordic and Northerness are derived from the Nordicity and appeared in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It mainly refers to Scandinavia, while Nordicity is more common in Canada (Browning 2007; Hamelin 1979, 2000a). Hamelin also noted that the concept of Nordicity was used to name and measure “the state of the North” and to fill the conceptual void inherent in the impossibility of objectively fixing the southern border of the northern zone (Reeve and McTominey 2017, 65). For Symonides (2018, 13), Nordic refers to something specific to this geographical group, its inhabitants, which has certain characteristics. Therefore, Nordic and Northerness encompasses all areas with characteristics similar to those in the Arctic and comparable living conditions encountered without being limited geographically to this region (Symonides 2018, 13). This term also qualifies the Scandinavian states (Norden) or part of northern Europe.

If the term north or northern has remained negative with climatic and landscape stereotypes167 that have sedimented since ancient geographies, Nordic, nordicity168 and Northernness169 appear to be a more poetic, more attractive and acceptable alternative that slowly emerged since 1950/1960s170. Nordicity or Northernness binds the individual and its community to "the North". From the end of the twentieth century, and with the return to the political and media scene of the Arctic, this Northern and Nordic conception tends to be divided on the one hand by a "gray and foggy north" and on the other hand, a "White North" made of circumpolar spaces and arctic studies. On both the western and eastern sides, the attributes granted to the North171 and the

167 Negative images related to the cold, the absence of light, the harshness of living conditions. 168 “The global concept of "nordicity", created from 1960, refers to the perceived, real, lived and even invented state of the cold zone within the northern hemisphere” in Hamelin (2017a). 169 “Pure “Northernness” engulfed me: a vision of huge, clear spaces hanging above the Atlantic in the endless twilight of Northern summer, remoteness, severity…” p73 … “Huge regions of the Northern sky” p17 In C.S. Lewis, Surprised by Joy (1995). "The concept of" Northernness "does not seek to account for a degree in the state of North, but a relative situation in space" in Parsis-Barubé (2017, 169). 170 In contrast to a culture centered around a more sportive, touristy and more exhilarating culture and image (Hamelin et al. 2002). 171 Winter, darkness, isolation, wilderness, cold, ice, blue and white, polar bear etc. These are generally the same criteria that

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South172 go beyond the geographical dimension, and over time, they have become stakeholders in the discourses defining the places and their inhabitants, although this dichotomy is a matter of historical and political perception.

Although Hamelin and other researcher have been working on the conceptualization of northern/nordic/nordicity for the past decades, as we observe that with the “arctic branding”, the terminology of those terms have slowly been deriving, first to polar and polarity, and lately to arcticness and arcticity. Hamelin (2002: 12) notes that "the nested words North, Nordic and Nordicity come as generics and equivalents of the combined terms of ‘Arctic’ (tundra), ‘boreal’ (forest), ‘polar’ (beyond the Circle) and ‘northern’". Hamelin notes more than twenty criteria for delimiting cold regions and to calculate a Nordic index such as latitude, summer heat, annual cold, ice types, vegetation cover, rainfall, etc. As Rowe argues, « The idea of ‘what’ or ‘where’ the Arctic is has been fascinatingly fluid and contested, depending on the political context and constellation of actors at hand » (Rowe 2018, 6). The Arctic is many different things at once: an ocean, a frontier, a homeland, that has attracted a much attention for centuries and will keep doing so in the future.

“A northern identity may now be an Arctic identity - just like our tap water is now Arctic water” (I. Medby 2017, vi). This new terminology unifies living peoples in the so-called arctic zone within a new identity. It allows us to exclude non-Arctic states and regions from this new identity. The research community defines Arcticness or Arcticity as a quality of being Arctic or a description of something perceived as ‘arctic’, which is a cultural object constructed in a relational context (Kelman 2017, 127; I. Medby 2017; Müller 2014; Duc 2018). Spruds argues that “Arcticness is a dynamic concept which conveys the message that-Arctic actors are becoming Arctic stakeholders with real rather than imagined stakes” (Sprūds et al. 2014, 227).

“As the world is increasingly looking northwards to a region undergoing rapid change, identifying what, who or where has the ‘quality of being Arctic’ is high on the agenda;

are associated with the Arctic. 172 Summer, light, life, luxuriance, warmth, multiple colors, exoticism etc.

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for actors from both near and far, their ‘Arcticness’ becomes a potential asset as they position themselves for Arctic futures” (I. Medby 2017, v).

Medby also notes that this distinction certainly has political objectives. However, it also makes it possible to add additional economic and exotic value to Arctic resources, inhabitants, and territories (northern lights, sports activities like ice-fishing, cruises, food, and drinks, etc.). Arcticness/arcticity are terms similar to nordicity to describe the Arctic degrees of certain things, places, phenomena, social features, and people (Müller 2014, 127). Tsui (2016) and I. Medby (2017) notes that the terms Arctic and Northern are often used interchangeably, and the distinction between them is today more blurry than ever. However, from academic perspectives, the contemporary Arctic is both global and exceptional due to the increasing international cooperation and a persisting romantic image (exotic and unique properties of the environment) (Käpylä and Mikkola 2019, 2015). On the other hand, although having many similarities, these terms impose a geographical limit on the arcticness / arcticity criteria, which is based on the definition of the Arctic region chosen by the researcher, thereby excluding non-Arctic regions.

If the northern regions have given rise to many imaginary stories and fantasies for centuries, the discourse has slowly evolved. What was previously known as the northern regions are now generally understood as Arctic regions. As noted in this dissertation introduction, the Arctic and arctic regions are subject to a multitude of more or less inclusive definitions173 depending on the objectives pursued. It also covers a wide variety of terms and images, taking into account indigenous and non-native perspectives. Chartier (2018, 21) notes that “most thinkers in the Arctic world insist for the region to be considered as a ‘circumpolar’ whole, as the sum of its different states, nations, cultures, histories, and relationships. The Arctic must be able to define itself as an idea, whereas historically it has been rather thought, defined and governed, for a century especially, by the parallel influences of the powers of the South”.

173 Among the many definitions of the Arctic, let us mention the following: Geographical Definition: The Arctic Circle (latitude 66 ° 33'N) = Astronomical definition: zone where during the solstices it is day or night for twenty-four hours. Environmental definition: the tree line. Climatic: "Köppen" line or July 10° C isotherm, the zone in which the temperature in July does not exceed 10 ° C (on average); or the permafrost line. Arctic Council: the eight member states.

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Chartier (2007) and Hamelin (1979) noted in the case of the Arctic regions, northern regions must be considered as circumpolar entities with varying boundaries and whose territory must be understood as the sum of its physical, cultural and social components. The evolution of terminology from Nordic to the Arctic also responds to the notion of branding174 (Browning 2007; I. Medby 2017; I.A. Medby 2018). The contemporary Arctic is both global and exceptional due to increasing international cooperation and the persisting romantic image of the environment's exotic and unique properties (Käpylä and Mikkola 2015, 2019). However, as underlined by Keskitalo (2019, 3), “Understanding ‘the Arctic’, but also the North, ‘is not as much about understanding a set of geophysical, climatological, or environmental conditions, but rather about understanding social and institutional structures”.

North and nordicity in Asia

In the Western collective imagination, North-Asian territories (excluding Russia) are rarely associated with the concept of Nordicity despite having regions with winter climatic conditions similar to Scandinavia: long, cold and snowy winters. However, perhaps because of its involvement in the Northern Forum or the World Winter Cities Association for Mayors, the Japanese island of Hokkaidō has been associated with this idea of temporary nordicity (also called winter nordicity, multi-monthly nordicity, or seasonal nordicity)175. Hamelin, in his toponymy of the North, proposed the concept of seasonal nordicity or wintertime which season is a “cold, snow- and ice-producing phenomenon of the water-land-atmosphere interface, which varies with the weather, place, day and year, and is influenced by the world of the imagination, the health of individuals, seasonal technology, sports, public services, and social pressure” (Hamelin 2002). It applies to wintertime, a seasonal phenomenon, and Winterland, a space (Chartier, 2018, p. 17; L.-E. Hamelin, 2000, p. 25; L.-E. Hamelin et al., 2002, pp. 41-42). Hamelin later supports the definition proposed by the Association of Winter Cities underlining that a "Winter City" indicates a city facing development problems due to severe winter conditions, heavy snowfalls and cold temperatures176 (Hamelin

174 “Brand is usually understood as a particular version of a particular thing […] brand becomes something people recognize, admire and even aspire to have or associate with” in Browning (2007, 6). 175 “A cold, snow and ice producing phenomenon of the water-land-atmosphere interface, which varies with the weather; place; day and year and is influenced by the world of the imagination, the heath of individuals, seasonal technology, sports, public service and social pressure” in Hamelin et al. (2002, 43). 176 With accumulations of at least 20 cm of snow per year, and at least one month per year with an average temperature below

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2000b; Chartier 2004; Parsis-Barubé 2017). This seasonal nordicity, according to Hamelin, extends in Asia over the northern parts of China and Japan (Hokkaidō), includes Korea, Nepal, and Tibet, to the North Pacific. From February to March, the state of the ice (drifting ice for example in the Okhotsk Sea) and snow cover provides one of the fronts of this intermediate-level winter defined by Hamelin in his work.

Despite this absence of discourse on Nordicity/Northerness in Asia, Hokkaidō prefecture decided to define itself as such through the Northern Region Plan at the instigation of Governor

0°C.

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Dōgakinai177. The Japanese prefecture of Hokkaidō defined in a report the northern regions as being located at a latitude similar or above to that of Hokkaidō, where it snows every year and which experience long and rigorous winters (Hoppōken-Sentā, 1982, p. 38). These regions include Hokkaidō, Canada, Alaska, Siberia and northern Russia and northern European states, but exclude France, the United Kingdom, or Germany, which are at latitudes higher than those of Hokkaidō but do not experience “long and rigorous winters”. The Northern Region Center of Hokkaidō also describes the island as located in the sub-frigid zone, and Northern region is territories where the average temperature in January is below -5°C and, “where the snowfall lasts more than four months in a year and yearly rainfall is less than 1,000m.m. With regards to flora and fauna, the region's symbolic northern characteristics are represented by coniferous forests, wild roses, cranberries great swans, and brown bears". It includes Hokkaidō, northern states of the USA, Norway, Sweden, the north part of Russia and a part of Mongolia (Hoppōken-Sentā 1982, 38).

The study of the case of Hokkaidō and the development of its activities paradiplomatic with other northern regions is relatively recent, as is its own identification as a northern region. While the colonization of Hokkaidō intervenes late in Japan's history (19th century), this territory has always had in the Japanese imagination certain connotations echoing the Nordicity/Northerness concepts used in Europe or North America178. Hokkaidō179, whose literal translation "Northern Sea Road" is in Japanese and has almost always been described as Japan’ northern island and today echoes the Japanese Arctic policy. The island has always been considered a territory located in the extreme north of the archipelago, with a harsh climate and rigorous living conditions. The conceptualization of Hokkaidō as a northern region or “Hoppōken" is even more recent. Indeed, this concept emerged in the late 1960s to promote exchanges with other cities and northern regions to revitalize the island's economy. Like the local authorities of the Scandinavian states, the Governor of Hokkaidō proposes in the 1960s to develop the prefecture image through the prism of the Nordicity (natural parks, seasonal tourism, Sapporo snow festival, etc) to improve its

177 Implemented in the late 1960. 178 "The image of a Northern country like Hokkaidō is symbolized by snow and coldness" (Executive Committee of the Northern Regions Journalists Meeting 1979). 179 The Japanese character of Hokkaido are 北海: Northern sea & 道 : Road. It refers to the Heian-period concept that highways lead to the imperial capital (Seaton 2017, 2).

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attractiveness in Japan but also with international tourists. It is from this period that the terms "northern region", "northern living", "northern people", "northern cities" begin to appear in official documents of Hokkaidō authorities (Hokkaido Government 1974; Hoppōken-Sentā 1982; Ministry of Land 2008d).

Hokkaidō’s role in Japan’s northern history: the ‘Road to the Northern Sea’

The Island of Hokkaidō is the latest addition to Japan's definitive form as we know it today. In order to better understand the development of Hokkaidō by the North, it seems important to reconsider Hokkaidō 's position in Japan's history. Despite its relatively recent role, Hokkaidō has served as a northern border since its colonization in the nineteenth century, first against a potential invasion of the Russian empire, and then as a gateway to the North and the Arctic.

The Name of a territory is one of its strongest and most visible symbols and the naming process is a part of the formation of the conceptual or symbolic shape of a region. Paasi argues that’s by definition “a territory differs from a region in that its boundaries and the resources therein are under the people's control. Territoriality is not a constant but a political, spatially selective strategy that can be exercised or not” (2009, 124). Later he adds that a “territory is social because people inhabit it collectively, it is political because groups fight to preserve or enlarge their space, it is cultural because it contains collective memories and it is cognitive, and hence its capacity to subjectify cultural, political and social boundaries makes territory the core of both public and private identity projects”. While the meanings associated with the name will always be constructed individually, these kinds of symbols strengthen the idea of the existence of a specific region and regional identity and distinguish the region from all others (Paasi 1986, 114.125-130; 2009, 135).

Since the Yamato period (250-710), the Japanese empire has mainly developed on the largest island of the current archipelago, Honshu. Ezo, Ezochi or Ezogashima (Barbarian land) 180,

180 According to Clercq, in the 7th century Hokkaidō was called Watarishima in the description of expeditions (Clercq 2017, 104). However, in his book, Harrison mentions that, before the Nara period, this area was called Koshi which evolved to Kui

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now called Hokkaidō (the road to the northern seas), was inhabited by the Ainu people, an indigenous community181 which also occupied the Sakhalin and the Kurile islands long before the arrival of Russian and Japanese people (Seaton 2017, 2). Despite exchanges with Ezo since the 14th century and the occupation by the Matsumae clan in the 17th, it is only towards the end of the 19th century, and after the Meiji restauration182, that this northern territory was officially added to the empire.

Ezo was officially integrated into the Japanese Empire in 1869. The name of Hokkaidō was proposed propose to the Meiji government to replace Ezo by Matsuura Takeshirō, a geographer who had made several expeditions to the northern island at the end of the Tokugawa period. It literally means the “Road/way to the Northern Sea” or “Northern Sea Circuit”. Originally Matsuura Takeshirō submitted six proposals, including names Kitakaidō (The North, where the Ainu live), or Kaihokudō to the authorities. In the first proposition, he used a combination of four characters, including two characters in the middle referring to an Ainu word that meant people born in this land. However, the naming process and selection of a three-character combination were carried out by the leaders who had seized power after the Meiji Restoration. The two characters referring to the Ainu were eventually replaced by a single character referring to the sea. They decided to use the name Hokkaidō using the ideogram hoku/kita 北 (north), kai 海 (sea) and dō 道 (way). The latter followed the ancient tradition of spatial conception, which originated from the Heian period (794-1185) and emphasized the importance of the imperial capital that all regions were connected with (like Tōkaidō 東海道) with (Mason 2012, 24,26; Seki 2006, 34). It also removed the idea of an Ainu territory and integrated legally and symbolically Hokkaidō as a Japanese region (Johnston 2018; Mountains 2013). The Ainu were supposed to become Japanese and merged with the flow of new immigration. Clercq (2017) argues that through this name change,

and Kai. The lasted was originated from the Chinese character for "easter barbarian people" that Japanese people read as Ezo or Yezo. The southern part of Hokkaidō, or Ezo, was partially controlled by Japanese clans from the eleventh century (Abe clan, Ando family who was appointed Ezo Kanrei, guardian of Yezo from 1222 to 1333, then the Matsumae clan) (Harrison 1953, x,4-8; Clercq 2017, 136-141). Ezo ga Chishima ("myriad islands north of Japan") appears in a 1356 scroll. This document then described the Ainu, the indigenous inhabitants of Hokkaidō as Oni, “devil”. The Ainu people were first called Ebisu or Emishi then Ezo people 毛人 (barbarians). The concept of barbarian peoples was introduced in Japan during the massive importation of the Chinese culture between the 6th and the 8th centuries (Clercq 2017, 104). The Ainu domain was then called Ainu Mosir, “the land/ earth/world of human beings”. By contrast, the Japanese people were called wajin 和人, the people of Yamato (a dominant ethnic group in Japan). In Stephan (1974) and Okada (2012). 181 An ethnic group native to a particular place. 182 The dethronement of the old Tokugawa regime by a new ruling elite acting in the name of the Emperor.

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the Japanese Empire was wanted to define its northerner border in order to prevent any further Russian expansion, which already had become a real threat as the Russians had appropriated the south of Sakhalin and were dangerously close to the Hokkaidō coast Clercq (2017, 98, 216).

The political, economic and societal circumstances around and within the island had seen changes already before the renaming process took place. The southernmost part of the area inhabited by the Ainu gradually became incorporated into the Japanese cultural sphere during the previous centuries mainly through the activities of the Matsumae clan that enjoyed exclusive rights to trade (e.g., animal skins and furs, feathers, silks, kombu, herring, and salmon) with the Ainu until the end of the 18th century. At the same time, the activity of Western Powers increased in areas with close proximity to Hokkaidō. (Irish 2009, 52-54).

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FIGURE 12: 1802 MAP OF HOKKAIDŌ, SAKHALIN AND KURIL ISLANDS ASSEMBLED BY KONDO MORISHIGE (COURTESY HOKKAIDŌ UNIVERSITY LIBRARY). IN Irish (2009, 70).

The establishment of the Bureau of Colonial Affairs, Kaitakushi (1869-1882), in 1869 marked the Figure 13: 1802 map of Hokkaidō, Sakhalin and Kuril Islands assembled by Kondo Morishige (courtesy Hokkaidō beginning of a new era in HokkaidōUniversity as "the Library). Northern In Irish Gate(2009, of70) the. Empire" (Hoppōken-Sentā 1982, 17; Harrison 1953, 63; Irish 2009). However, the attempts to bind Hokkaidō - featured by remoteness and natural and climatic conditions that differed greatly from those of Honshu - to the rest of Japan and the utilization of its abundant natural resources turned out to be challenging. Eventually, the greater stability in the administrative structure of Hokkaidō was achieved only in

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1886, when the Hokkaidō Agency was established, and it replaced the three short-lived prefectures into which the island had been divided following the partial failure of the Bureau of Colonial Affairs (Irish 2009, 217, 223; Saunavaara 2014, 2018a; Hoppōken-Sentā 1982, 17) (OR Onuma 2004, 13-15). In 1888, the development of Hokkaidō was mainly handed to the private sector (Mitsui, Mitsubishi invested in coal mining (Wada 2010; Harrison 1953, 90-96). As Clercq (2002) notes, the port of Hakodate and its region became the new center of experimentation for everything that came from western industrialized states. Western experts were brought in like H. Capron (an agronomist), S. Clarks (Hokkaidō University) and introduced a new agriculture system. Although the intensification of economic activity in Hokkaidō, for example, through investments in industry and mining and the agriculture growth, took place at the beginning of the 20th century, Hokkaidō did not lose its uniqueness. Instead, Hokkaidō’s governing structures and the rights and duties of people living on the island differed from those in other parts of the state.

While the structures guiding the development of Japan’s northern periphery took shape, various immigration promotion activities were also carried out in order to increase the population of Hokkaidō and to solve the problem of the samurais, thousands of warriors, which in the new Meiji Era, found themselves unemployed: the shizoku (Clercq 2017, 219-220). By sending these former soldiers to Hokkaidō and converting them into (forcibly) peasants, the Japanese government was killing two birds with one stone: these shizoku occupied and worked the land while being able to defend that territory in case of a Russian invasion183 and this at a lower cost for the state184. Already in the 1950’, Harrison (1953, ix,11,140-141) highlighted in his book the role of Hokkaidō as Japan's northern border against the Russian empire. This common and potentially vulnerable frontier led to the development of the Japanese military spirit and caste in the late nineteenth century, without which, according to him, Japan would probably not have developed colonial ambitions. He further notes that it is the northwestern Russian Pacific to advance its threatening presence on the northern border of the empire that motivated the colonization of Hokkaidō. "It was the expansion of the Russian Empire, and the exploration of the North Pacific, that put it on

183 And the case of an Ainu insurrection. 184 Creation of a militia of military farmers tondenhei 屯田兵 who later became ennobled kempei 憲兵, then shizoku 士族 with lifetime service and hereditary status for their children (Clercq 2017, 220).

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in particular and that created a political frontier on the north for Japan" (Harrison 1953, 11)185. Russian exploration of the Kuril Islands to the Japanese province of Mutsu186 gave rise to military reinforcement of the Japanese coast against the fear of an invasion. Ezo was recognized as "the key to the Northern Gate [of the empire]" (Harrison 1953, 13). The Russians organized the raids along the northern coast of Japan to force North Japan to open up to trade with the Russian Empire, strengthening the rise of a strong anti-foreign sentiment of mistrust.

The need to define the meaning and boundaries of the north within the framework of expanding the Japanese empire was not only limited to terrestrial regions but involved sea areas as well (Steinberg 2006). The discussion on the meaning of the Northern Sea (Hokuyō) concept that emerged in the 1920s took place in the context of the Japanese Northern Sea fisheries (Hokuyō- gyogyō). The Japanese offshore fishing industry began to develop in the late 19th century in close cooperation with the state authorities and the Imperial Navy. While the Japanese fishermen also operated in the southwest Pacific, with whaling being conducted in waters near the Antarctic, the Japanese factory ships started their operations on the Siberian coast in the early 1920s, and some Japanese companies became involved even in the fishery in the international waters of the Bering Strait (Tsutsui 2017; Onodera and Hiroyoshi 1996). As Kaminaga (2017) pointed out, the Northern Sea's definition and geographical scope evolved during the prewar decades. Although fishing activities that took place in southern Sakhalin during the late 19th century have later been described as an integral part of the Northern Sea fishery history, articles published in Japanese fishery journals in the late 1920s and the early 1930s did not include southern Sakhalin into the sphere of the Northern Sea fisheries. Namely, the understanding of the contemporary area of the Northern Sea had moved northward to the point that it even included waters around Alaska, where Japanese salmon fishing activities triggered the so-called Conflict of Bristol Bay in 1936–37 (Kaminaga 2017; Onodera and Hiroyoshi 1996) (Babin & Saunavaara 2021).

During the Meiji Restoration period to the outbreak of the Second World War, Hokkaidō was established as the northern frontier of Japan and went through a modernization process that did

185 Also in Irish (2009, 1,57) 186 North-Est part of Japan’s main island Honshu.

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not abolish its peculiar role vis-à-vis the central regions of Japan. However, the northward expansion of the Empire shifted the national borders and borders of Japanese influence and presence far away from the shores of Hokkaidō. Both the establishment of Hokkaidō - incorporation of a northern territory that had previously been only loosely connected with the rest of Japan - as well as the extension of the border even further north were dominated by the central government and based on national policies rather than on local initiatives. While the actors involved had various motives to act, the economic benefits and issues related to the security politics seem to have been the main drivers of developments taking place.

According to Nagai and Okaji (1962, 11-16)187, the image of Hokkaidō in the Japanese collective mind remained relatively unchanged during the immediate postwar years. According to the authors, people in Japan's main island saw Hokkaidō as Japan’s first, last, and the only remaining frontier now when Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Karafuto, and southern areas were all lost. While arguing that the postwar image of Hokkaidō that was still more or less the same as the image of Hokkaidō created during the Meiji period did not correspond with the existing reality, the authors did not deny the differences between the northernmost island and the rest of Japan (Kossa, Lomaeva, and Saunavaara 2020; Irish 2009; Bukh 2012). When referring to Hokkaidō and people living on the island, the authors often used the terms of Kita no Kuni (literally meaning the Land of the North) and dosanko (a word that was originally used when referring to a breed of horse from Hokkaidō) (Williams 2007, 69). The latter expression is still in use and the former is nowadays strongly associated with the extremely popular television drama called “From the North Country” (Kita no kuni kara), which was set in the town of Furano in Hokkaidō and broadcasted in the early 1980s with various succeeding special episodes.

The development of the Northern Region Plan/Hoppōken kōso

The gradual maturation of Hokkaidō as a part of the circumpolar or international through the emergence and institutionalization of the Northern Regions plan (Hoppōken Kōso in Japanese) began in the late 1960s. Indeed, this concept emerged to promote exchanges with other cities

187 Cited in Saunavaara (2018b, 37-39)

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and northern territories to revitalize the island's economy. Like the local authorities of the Scandinavian states with the North Calotte Committee188, the Governor of Hokkaidō proposed in the 1960s to develop the image of the prefecture through international exchanges using the prism of the Nordicity (nature, seasonal tourism, snow festival, etc) to improve its attractiveness not only within Japan, but also abroad.

The conceptualization of Hokkaidō as a northern region, Hoppōken kōso

In the 1970s, while economic development was mainly centered around the Japanese megalopolis, there was a willingness from the Governor of Hokkaidō Prefecture Dōgakinai Naohiro (1971-1983) to organize a partnership with other northern municipalities. The shift was clearly originated from Hokkaidō, not from Tokyo or national government, and took form in new institutions and in new types of cooperation and reflected a new way to understand Hokkaidō's international position.

The policy's roots can be traced back to Dōgakinai’s personal history and positive experiences of cooperation with North American and European partners (Dōgakinai 1974, 237-238; 2001, 47). When he was still an administrative vice minister of the Hokkaidō Development Agency, Dōgakinai observed similarities between northern societies worldwide on which to capitalize to develop Hokkaidō (Hondo 2004, 92-93). He observed that, as in many other northern states (Europe, North America), the population generally preferred to settle in regions with a milder climate in the South. This has prompted national governments to focus their public policies around these regions, sometimes creating gaps for northern regions whose needs are different. The inhabitants of Hokkaidō have adopted the lifestyle of the main island of Honshu, whether in housing construction or clothing customs (Hoppōken-Sentā 1982, 23). This alignment of both the lifestyle of citizens and local public policies towards Tokyo has contributed to increase Hokkaidō's dependence on Honshu on which the newly appointed Governor Dōgakinai wished to return.

Through the Nordic concept, the governor aimed to foster cultural, economic, and social proximity with the other regions and cities of the North due to geographical similarities and to revitalize the

188 A Nordic cross-border cooperation established in 1967 (Aalbu 1998).

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island's economy (Williams 2007, 69). Following the example of the Scandinavian states' local authorities, the governor of Hokkaidō proposed developing the prefecture image through its nordic features (nature, seasonal tourism, festivals, etc). In addition, this context coincided with the organization of the 1972 Olympic Winter Games, for which the city of Sapporo wished to present itself as a global and northern city representing an ideal model for the development of regions with cold and snowy climates (Sapporo International Strategic Plan 2014)189. The governor also thought that coordinating the activities of regional governments could "contribute to the success of future conferences organized by the United Nations" 190.

[…] There still remains a big problem for the people of Hokkaidō of how to conquer the severe climatic conditions characterized by snow and cold temperature, and secure and affluent and comfortable life. Consequently, when I took office in 1971, I proposed to the people of Hokkaidō a Northern Region concept which aims at promoting exchange with other northern areas that have a riche experience and an excellent tradition of coping with life in a severe winter climate. This concept is to enable us to benefit from one another in the course of the development of our respective areas. Such exchanges, I believe, will facilitate Hokkaidō to function as a far more important area in the development of Japan as a whole (Dōgakinai Naohiro. In Hoppôken Sentâ, 1982 p.vii).

Hokkaidō prefecture defined in a report the northern regions as being located at a latitude almost similar to that of Hokkaidō, with annual snowfall, experiencing long and rigorous winters 191 (Hoppōken-Sentā 1982, 38). Hence, according to the prefecture, these regions include Hokkaidō alongside Canada, Alaska, Siberia, and northern Russia and northern European states.

189 Inauguration of the subway system. 190 Official Report of the International Conference on Human Environment in Northern Regions,” Hokkaidō Government (Sapporo: December 1974) :1. 191 A Research on the Thought Patterns of the Northern Region and the creation of a New Hokkaidō.

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FIGURE 14 : SOURCE: HOPPŌKEN-SENTĀ, 1982, P. 61

“The Northern Region concept can be said to be a long-term vision which aims at making great progress in our northern countries by fully utilizing the vast land space and abundant resources that we possess” (Dogakinai Naohiro. In Hoppōken Sentâ, 1982 p.viii).

The concept of a northern region or Hoppōken Koso formed the core of the new policy emphasizing the importance of cooperation between northern regions sharing similar kinds of challenges and possibilities due to their climate and peculiar environmental conditions (Dōgakinai 1974, 258-259; Hondo 2004, 93; Hoppōken-Sentā 1982, 4). According to the governor, but also Sapporo’ Mayor Itagaki Takeshi, Hokkaidō occupies an ideal and important geographical position in the northern hemisphere and plays an important role for Japan as a base of trade with countries located in the northern hemisphere, thus facilitating prosperity and development (Executive Committee of the Northern Regions Journalists Meeting 1979).

At the beginning of Japan's settlement of Hokkaidō, the authorities turned to engineers from America and Europe to build infrastructures. If some of them had proposed a housing and heating system modeled on the one used in northern regions, this system was not adopted by most homes. Mr. Caperon proposed in the early 1870s to replace the building materials of classic paper and wall houses for more solid materials such as hardwood or stone. Later, Hokkaido’ Governor Kuroda Kiyotaka (1874-1882) tried to take advantage of Sakhalin residents' experience to build houses more suitable for a cold and snowy climate, with a better heating system. However, by

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the mid-1950s, less than 7 percent of the population of Hokkaidō had thermally insulated dwellings (Executive Committee of the Northern Regions Journalists Meeting 1979, 23-25). While the new homes located in cold regions in Europe and North America were equipped with a heating system in every room, in Hokkaidō, only one room was generally heated. The 1978-1987 Hokkaidō Comprehensive Development Plan aimed, among other things, at correcting this recurrent problem. Finally, the development of the northern region's concept by the prefectural authorities of Hokkaidō aimed at the development of the island by its inhabitants and creating new employment areas to encourage the younger generations to stay or settle in Hokkaidō and appreciate the particular environment of the region.

Paasi (2010, 2300) argues that when a region becomes an established part of a wider regional system, this transformation and the dynamic constellation of networks. Although the foreign policy was part of the quasi-exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Governor of Hokkaidō wanted to contact other northern regional governments to collaborate on developing environmental protection strategies. Hence, M.M (1983) notes that the general idea behind the conceptualization of Hokkaidō as a northern region “was to improve the quality of life by fostering economic and cultural cooperation among the peoples of those northern countries which have cold climates, notably the Scandinavian countries, Canada, Alaska, the northern United States, northerly parts of the Soviet Union, and Hokkaidō itself”.

According to sources in HIECC, the Northern Region Plan was not considered diplomacy (gaiko), but as regional level cooperation (HIECC 2019). They also added that regional level cooperation was not a problem for the MoFA, as it is not national interest. On the contrary, the subnational authorities at that time received more like encouragement from MOFA’s side. From the second half of the 1970s to the mid-1980s, the Northern Region Center (Hoppōken Sentā) received a request from the MoFA, which ordered investigations concerning the Siberian gas pipeline, Canadian indigenous people, northern housing, etc.). They also provided funding for the Center to develop those studies. It led the Northern Region Center to bring together people from Hokkaido Prefecture, researchers from Hokkaido University, etc. Hokkaido Bureau of Economy, Trade, and Industry (Hokkaido Keizai Sangyo Kyoku, a regional branch of the METI). They were asked to conduct investigations concerning the possibilities in the IT sector in Siberia. The Northern Region

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Center, now HIECC functions as a think tank. In Japan, the cooperation between prefectures and the MoFA is traditionally weak. Prefectures’ relations with the central government usually go through the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (Sōmu shō). Therefore, Hokkaido prefecture (Hoppōken sentā/HIECC) cooperation with the MoFA was slightly unusual and was made possible because of the support of the MoFA to the Northern Region Plan.

“The concept, which is called the ‘Northern Region’, focuses on the development of economy and culture that is most appropriate to the northern living by means of exchanging and sharing of our experiences with those of other northern regional countries” (Takei Tojo, Hoppôken Sentâ, 1982 p.ix).

It was introduced in the third term of the 1971 Hokkaidō Integrated Development Plan192 when the Northern Regions Study Council (Hoppōken chōsakai) was established as a private organization 193 and the Northern Regions Study Office (Hoppōken chōsashitsu) within the Hokkaidō Government. The latter was then reorganized as the Center of Northern Regions (Hoppōken Sentā) in 1978. It developed Northern-based exchange activities as a unified international organization with focus groups, including research projects related to the Soviet Union, data banks, and exchanges. These activities served as a node of contacts and future cooperation with the counterparts of the central government of Hokkaidō in the northern countries (P. Jain 2005, 124). A Northern Regions Exchange Foundation was also established to provide financial support for private exchange programs with northern regions (Hokkaido International Exchange and Cooperation Center (HIECC) 2012, 3). The Northern Regions Plan's organizational development also included establishing and developing friendly associations between Hokkaidō various northern regions (Koiso and Yamazaki 2007, 138-139).

In parallel with the Nordic concept's prefectural initiative, the northern region journalist meeting took place in 1979. For a few days, Hokkaidō and national media had hosted in Sapporo a meeting with their counterparts from the Nordic regions and France, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. This meeting's objective was "to deepen mutual

192 It is a long-term road map for the development of Hokkaidō. He was replaced in 1978 by the Northern Region Center. Its activities are detailed in its annual report published by the Northern Regions Center (P. Jain 2005, 124). 193 Approved as an incorporated body by the Prime Minister office in January 1972.

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understanding and exchange ideas and information on how to improve" life in northern regions (Executive Committee of the Northern Regions Journalists Meeting 1979). Governor Dōgakinai and Sapporo Mayor Itagaki Takeshi were then part of the opening committee of the meeting and a representative of the Embassies from Canada and Norway.

The North in Hokkaidō Development Plans:

In 1869, the Japanese government established the Hokkaidō Development Agency (Kaitakusi). It recognized then that the natural conditions in Hokkaidō were very different from those of Honshu and that especially the living conditions and the industrial activities were challenging. This notion of isolation, of severe climatic conditions, remained in many Japanese's minds in the South in their vision of Hokkaidō Island (Hoppōken-Sentā 1982, 17). Before the Second World War, Hokkaidō was managed by the central government body which developed, with the zaibatsu194, basic farming and industrial infrastructures. The central government was also in charge of the draft of the Development and its implementation. However, after the war, a local self-government system was introduced in Hokkaidō with Hokkaidō Regional Government's establishment (Wada 2010, 29). Wada (2010, 30) notes that, after the end of the war, Hokkaidō was expected to become a base for food supplies production and host the returning population from former overseas territories. As mentioned earlier, due to its territory's size, the island of Hokkaidō was also divided into seven sub-prefectures to carry out the work usually performed by prefecture offices in the rest of Japan. The Hokkaidō government system is fundamentally similar to other prefectures: the national government, a prefectural government (the Hokkaidō government), and local governments (212 municipalities). The governance system of the island included a Ministry of National Development (the Hokkaidō Development Agency, which deals with major projects, dissolved in 2001), which was a state department195, the Hokkaidō Development Bureau, a financial institution public (Hokkaidō -Tohoku Development Finance Corporation). Since the Hokkaidō's Development Law promulgated in 1950, local development policy has helped meet the region's challenges. It results in the formulation of development plans (HCDP) that address current

194 The largest Japanese financial and industrial conglomerates. 195 Government title worn by all cabinet members, the Japanese government.

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challenges and utilize resources from the region, including revitalizing the economy and increasing food production, and the appropriate distribution of the population and industry location196. It also took a wide range of measures to develop infrastructure to establish a comfortable living environment in a cold and snowy climate (roads, ports, railways, airports, industrial parks, etc.) (Wada 2010). The Hokkaidō Development Agency is now part of the Ministry of Lands, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT), and it is the national government of Japan that, under the leadership of the prefectural government, is developing the plan of Hokkaidō development. Under the Hokkaidō Development Act, the Development Plans have been drawn up every ten years to emphasize the key area for Hokkaidō development (Wada 2010). The Ministries such as the Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Transportation and Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Forestry and Fishery (under the Hokkaidō -Tohoku Development Fund financing private sectors under preferential conditions: low-interest rate) manages the budget allocated to Hokkaido's development.

During the postwar era, the long-term development of Hokkaidō has been guided through the consecutive Hokkaidō Comprehensive Development Plans aims to take advantage of Hokkaidō’s resources and characteristics to resolve issues of Japan (Ministry of Land 2008d). The 1st Development Plan was introduced in 1910-1926, followed by the 2nd Development Plan in 1927- 1946, respectively (Anazawa 2014; Williams 2007, 59). The Northern Region Plan, Hoppōken kōsō, first appeared at the government level in the third global development plan (1971-1977) (HIECC, 2015 :3).

The Northern Regions Plan emerged when Hokkaidō was facing severe economic difficulties, for example, due to the significant shift from domestic coal production to the import of oil. The new policy initiative was strongly connected to the idea of developing Hokkaidō’s economy and industry in cooperation with resource-rich northern regions, especially in Alaska, Canada, and Russia. However, the new policy's objectives also included issues such as the improvement of people's everyday living conditions and cultural exchange197. One of the policy's starting points

196 Third Development Plan, History of Hokkaidō Development, 208: 4 “Third Hokkaidō Comprehensive Development Plan”. 197 E.g., Sports instructors came from Canada, it led to the creation of an Olympic Japanese curling team (first team in Nagano).

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was the notion that although the circumstances in Hokkaidō differed significantly from the rest of Japan, the Japanese way of living had been imported to the North, where it often fit poorly. Therefore, there was a need to learn from other regions adapted to Hokkaidō-like environments (HIECC 2019).

“This concept [Nordic Region] aimed to improve the industrial economy of Hokkaidō, the lives of its people and its culture, and to promote appropriate local development in the north of the country through exchanges with the United States, Canada and other countries. of Northern Europe with highly developed cultures and the same cold, snowy climate as Hokkaidō”.198

Hokkaidō northern development plan is based on climate-related similarities with other northern regions. Indeed, a similar climate means that some products developed in Hokkaidō can be very attractive to people in other countries with severe winters, especially Russia. This geographical proximity creates a distinct economic dynamic and gives companies in certain sectors of activity in Hokkaidō an advantage over their counterparts in other parts of Japan. The companies that manufacture furniture and heating systems in Hokkaidō have special expertise that allows them to live in extremely cold conditions (P. Jain 2005, 124). Housing companies in Hokkaidō are well equipped to meet the demand for housing in Sakhalin. Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries also provide economic opportunities for Hokkaidō businesses with local experience, knowledge, and capacity (P. Jain 2005, 124).

With this plan, the prefecture aimed to enable subnational governments and local groups to develop new knowledge through exchanging information with other administrations abroad (P. Jain 2005, 98). Therefore, these development plans can be utilized when analyzing a policy instrument's institutionalization and evolution like the Northern Regions Plan. The Northern Region Plan was formally introduced in the 3rd HCDP as the basic direction of international exchange in Hokkaidō. However, as Table 1 shows, while the ‘Northern Region Plan’ particularly supported in the 3rd plan, the plan was not formally used in the latter plans. There are several initiatives in every plan to develop Hokkaidō around a northern prism but, from the 1990’ as this initiative is firmly established, subnational authorities then focus on establishing similar cooperation with other

198 (Hokkaido International Exchange and Cooperation Center (HIECC) 2015, 3).

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regions in Asia. At first, the Northern Region Plan was supposed to be called the “zone economy concept”, but as it mainly focusses on non-economic cooperation in academic, cultural, sports and environmental issues, the plan changed.

Plan Relation to the North

- First appearance of the “Northern region” concept. - Promote cooperation with other northern regions connected with the 3rd development of Hokkaidō industry, transport infrastructure (for example: port (1971 - 1977) development in Ishikari area and international airport), cultural exchange and pleasant daily life (for example: housing, water, and sewer services, areal heating, parks).

- The local environment, society, and culture should adapt to and be in harmony with the northern environment. - Develop industry taking into account the characteristics of the northern environment, the possibility to import natural gas from northern regions. 4th - Develop ports and airports infrastructures for northern regions’ international (1978 - 1987) exchange. - Promote tighter cooperation with northern countries and regions. - Promote cultural exchange and winter sports cooperation between northern regions.

- Promote northern type to support good living conditions with cold weather. 5th - Promote winter sports cooperation with various northern countries. (1988 - 1997) - Link Hokkaidō tourism with northern natural features.

- Plays an important role in the exchange between northern regions. - Serves as “Japan’s entranceway to North”. - To vitalize the northern cooperation, support Hokkaidō’s role in Sakhalin energy project and improve the international airport infrastructure. 6th - Support the activities of the Northern Forum and other international exchange (1998 - 2007) organizations, sports-related exchange, promote cultural cooperation with Russia, and international cooperation in the fields of cold region agriculture and fishery technology, civil engineering, and biotechnology. - Diversify international exchange and increase cooperation with Asia and (Far East) Russia.

- The concept of “northern region” is not mentioned but, - References to Hokkaidō’s Northerness. 7th - Northern type of housing connected with pleasant daily living in a cold (2008 - 2015) environment. - Cooperation with (East) Asia.

- Emphasizing the advantages of Hokkaidō’s northern location. 8th - The future of the NSR and the possibility to emerge as the East Asian hub of (2016 - 2025) the new route. - Northern Territories issues.

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TABLE 14: SUCCESSIVE PLANS IN BABIN & SAUNAVAARA 2021.

Although the drafting of the 3rd HCDP was greatly influenced by the making of the New Comprehensive National Development Plan199, approved by the Cabinet in 1969 (Yamazaki 2006, Koiso & Yamazaki 2007, Saunavaara 2017), the Hokkaidō -based actors managed to include the Hoppōken Kōso as a new and original policy instrument that was not connected with the policies promoted by the national development plan. The Northern region concept was also still visible in 4th HCDP that was transferring the focus from promoting of large-scale industrial projects and attempts to attract heavy chemical industry from overpopulated industrial areas to Hokkaidō to natural environment, human welfare and local participation. While the succeeding plans continued to emphasize Hokkaidō’s northern characteristics and introduced concrete avenues to develop exchanges with other northern regions, the desired scope of Hokkaidō’s desired international activity gradually widened. Rather than paying attention to Hokkaidō as part of the North, the questions concerning Hokkaidō’s role as a part of Asia and the global world gained greater importance.

The 4th Hokkaidō Comprehensive Development Plan (1978–1987) introduced new approaches and emphasized the natural environment, human welfare, and local participation. This kind of change in Hokkaidō was again bound to draft the new National Comprehensive Development Plan (Zenkoku-sougou-kaihatsu-keikaku) (Williams 2007; Koiso and Yamazaki 2007; Yamazaki 2001). The deep post-bubble recession of the 1990s left its marks on Hokkaidō development policy as well. At the time when there was a great worry about the future funding of development projects and many household names in Hokkaidō’s enterprise world faced serious problems or bankruptcy (for example, the Hokkaidō Takushoku Ginko, the largest bank in Hokkaidō collapsed in the autumn of 1997), ‘industrial cluster’ emerged as a new catchphrase.

The succeeding plans continued to emphasize Hokkaidō’s northern characteristics, introduced concrete avenues to develop exchanges with other northern regions and were endorsed, for example, by the 5th Comprehensive National Development Plan describing Hokkaidō as Japan’s

199 "In the future, Hokkaidō will develop into a unique region as a "Frontier to create a new northern culture" based on its pioneering spirit and frankness, as well as its natural and geographic features and cultural riches". In the 5th http://www.mlit.go.jp/kokudokeikaku/zs5-e/part3.html

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northern international gateway. As the "base to connect the Northern region with the Asia- Pacific region[...] and to promote exchange with the Northern regions overseas" (Ministry of Land 1998). It also supported creating an international sphere of interaction on a large scale to communicate with the northern region. And in July 1997, the law on the promotion of Ainu culture and the dissemination of information on the Ainu traditions was promulgated to promote a policy aiming at establishing a company respecting Ainu. Based on this law, the Ainu Culture Promotion Foundation (Ainu Culture Promotion Foundation) has been designated as a designated company to undertake various projects as a global national project.

With the 7th plan, the authorities recognized the challenges posed by globalization, environmental problems and their impacts on humans, the problems posed by the shrinking of the population in Japan, the aging of the population and the drop-in birth rates. To meet these challenges, the 7th development plan of Hokkaidō wishes to highlight its Northerness with its various resources (water, wood, fish resources, wind energy, and biomass, natural gas) and its characteristics (open spaces, fresh summer, and cold and snowy winter). The strategic goals put forward in this plan are diverse, including establishing itself as the ultimate Nordic base in Asia, allowing it, among other things, to have a competitive advantage with the rest of Asia in terms of the tourism industry, and to strengthen it (2008: 5 ; Sapporo International Strategic Plan, 2014 :7). This plan also aims to promote the creation and improvement of exchange infrastructure, such as transport networks, and to strengthen exchanges with various regions in Japan (Tōhoku region) and abroad (Sakhalin). Here we find several points mentioned above in the development of the paradiplomatic activities of a subnational authority.

One of the key objectives of the 8th Hokkaidō Global Development Plan (2016 -2025) is the development of the border region of the northern region promoting comprehensive measures to revitalize the local economy of the region. The recognition of the Ainu people as indigenous people of Hokkaidō and the protection of lifestyles are also included in the plan. Measures to promote Ainu culture, to raise public awareness of Ainu history and culture, and to improve the living conditions of the Ainu people are being implemented with, inter alia, the development of "the symbolic space of the Ainu". Ethnic Harmony "at the Ainu National Revitalization Center in Shiraoi, Hokkaidō Island. The plan includes a paragraph emphasizing the advantages of Hokkaidō’s

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northern location, the future of the NSR and the possibility to emerge as the East Asian hub of the new route. Cooperation with Tomakomai port to study the possibilities offered by the new transportation route. This plan highlights the importance of Hokkaidō in the Japanese economy with the massive export of agricultural produce for the rest of the island, the explosion of the tourism sector. But also, the fastest aging of the island of the population. This report takes into account that data centers are well adapted to the relatively cold Hokkaidō climate.

However, from the 1990s, the scope of Hokkaidō’s desired international activity gradually widened. Rather than paying attention to Hokkaidō as part of the North, the questions concerning Hokkaidō’s role as a part of Asia and the global world gradually gained greater importance within the long-term development plans. The heyday of the plan was in the 1980s and 1990s, but the Northern Regions Center was eventually, after organizational changes in the 1990s and early 2000s, integrated into the Hokkaidō International Exchange and Cooperation Center (HIECC), established in 2011. HIECC is not concentrating solely on cooperation with the northern regions but acts as a coordinator of all international exchange and cooperation in Hokkaidō prefecture (HIECC and Hokkaidō Government, personal communication, November 26, 2019; HIECC 2019).

When launched, the Northern Regions Plan, was an exceptional initiative within Japan’s international relations framework. At first sight, this initiative can be seen as a challenge to the conception according to which foreign policy was an exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs (P. Jain 2005). However, the plan evolved into a kind of example case of subnational governments’ international engagement. Although MOFA supported Hokkaidō’s activities and involvement in cooperation between northern regions in many ways (Hoppōken jidai Kankōkai 1980, 275; HIECC 2019; Hokkaidō Government 2019), there was one issue area where it did not hesitate to intervene if it thought that Hokkaidō had gone “too far”. In other words, MOFA did its best to ensure that Hokkaidō’s cooperation with Sakhalin Oblast (the regional entity consisting of the disputed islands) did not compromise Japan’s claims concerning the disputed islands in any way. This point was one of the pillars of Japanese cooperation with Moscow: to get closer to the USSR, assert the interests of this cooperation in the eyes of the Soviets to soothe Moscow, without giving up the claim on the Kurils of the south. The establishment of the position of the

Hokkaidō ambassador (Hokkaidō tantō taishi) that existed within MOFA between 1980 and 1998

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is one example of the peculiar relationship between the region and the ministry (Akaha 2003, 105- 106; P. Jain 2005, 61, 67, 79-80, 103-106, 123-126; Dōgakinai 1987, 91-92; HIECC 2019; Hokkaidō Government 2019).

The shared Northerness, Hoppoken Kōso in Hokkaidō paradiplomatic activities in the North

In the late 1980s and 1990s, the international activities of Japanese SNGs intensified further and evolved from the exchange (kōryū) to cooperation (kyōryoku). Their objective and purpose also shifted from symbolic goodwill to mutual – often economic – benefits). Their objective and purpose also shifted from symbolic goodwill to mutual – often economic – benefits.

Hokkaidō in the Northern Forum, from founding member to business partner

Although the northern interregional cooperation movement had a long history of its own, the NF establishment can also be considered a part of the much broader transition that was taking place in the circumpolar North. Following Mikhail Gorbachev’s famous speech in Murmansk in October 1987, Finland had proposed a meeting concentrating on the Arctic Countries Environmental Cooperation to seven other Arctic countries in 1989. This was not a completely new idea as Canada had already proposed establishing some kind of Arctic Council at the end of the 1980s. Eventually, the Arctic Ministers' of Environment's meetings and the approval of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy took place in 1991. The cooperation in science had also progressed and took form in the founding of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) in 1990. While the geographical scope covering the entire circumpolar North made NF a unique initiative, there were also contemporary attempts to create interregional cooperation covering only a more limited area. The Pacific Northwest Economic Region created in 1991 by the northern states of the United States and various Canadian provinces did not necessarily reflect the world order's changes. The Barents Regional Council that was established at the same time as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in 1993, paralleled NF and brought together regions that had been separated by the Cold War frontiers and then later the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996.

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As with the Northern Region Plan supported by Governor Dōgakinai, the concept of a northern economic region emerged in the 1970s to revitalize Hokkaidō 's economy (Hondo 2004, 3). It led to the organization of the International Conference on the Human Environment in the Northern Regions organized in Sapporo in 1974. Its purpose is to promote cooperation and exchange and to increase the visibility of the various issues faced by Northern governments in public opinion. (Hokkaido Government 1974, 2). The Hokkaidō Government invites representatives from the Canadian provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and the Northwest Territories, representatives of Alaska, Idaho, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin on the US side, the Siberian governments, and the capitals of Finland, Norway, and Sweden. About 20 delegations from six different countries responded favorably to the invitation.

This conference tackled several themes: the environment and the climatic similarities between the North's cities and the economic and social similarities facing the inhabitants of the northern regions (NF official website). Promotion of exchanges around science, technology, and culture (sports, artistic events), town twinning. The International Conference on the Human Environment in the Northern Regions of 1974 was followed by another meeting in Edmonton (Canada) in 1979 and 1990 in Anchorage (Alaska, Third Northern Regions Conference). Following those conferences, the NF was established to improve the transboundary cooperation between northern regional governments in 1991. These conferences are held in a particular geopolitical context with the opening and the fall of the Soviet bloc. This rapprochement between East and West has enabled the Arctic peoples to restore family or cultural ties on both sides of the "ice curtain" and create new economic and cultural links (Hills 1993, 26).

The Northern Forum is an international non-profit organization and initially, was based in Alaska and Russia (Yakutsk). Its mission was to develop horizontal links between the Northern subnational actors to:

“Improve the quality of life of Northerners and to promote sustainable development by providing Northern regional leaders a means to share their knowledge and experience in addressing common challenges; and

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To support sustainable development and the implementation of cooperative socioeconomic initiatives among Northern regions and through international fora” (B.o.D. Northern Forum 1999, 1; Tsui 2016, 6).

Businesses and other civil society groups are invited to participate as Observers, and the NF itself is an Observer on the Arctic Council. The Northern Forum has included up to 18 nations, including Japan (Hokkaidō, Masaki Suzuki), China (Heilongjiang), and Korea (Gangwon)200. It was developed to share local knowledge in order to develop best practices for Arctic policy-making in federal and regional governments (Tsui 2016, 6). The criteria for northern regions then invited to join was simply to share "similar climatic conditions" (Tsui 2016, 42). Trade and educational exchanges are one of the main topics of discussion among NF members. Subnational participants involved often have common interests that are not necessarily shared with their national governments. The geographical proximity between the cities that make up the NF allows them to consider coordination in areas such as shipping logistics or the environment. Each city or region chooses to specialize in a subject that is of particular interest to them: for Hokkaidō it is about air pollution and the sea (Hondo 2004). This gives rise to big financial investment from Hokkaidō in the NF and Northern Forum Center.

Within the NF, Hokkaidō played an important role as one of the biggest funders of the organization. Furthermore, Hokkaidō Government used to dispatch its representatives to NF office in Alaska201. Hokkaidō participated, for example, in environmental projects such as the Brown Bear Population Study Group, in the Youth Eco-forum, and in a project on Northern Tourism. Hokkaidō also hosted

200 NF consists today of: Nenetskiy Autonomous Okrug (Russia) - Chairman, Sakha Republic (Russia) - Deputy Chairman from Northeastern Russia, Khanty-Mansiysk AO – Ugra (Russia) - Deputy Chairman from Northwestern of Russia, State of Alaska (USA) - Deputy Chairman from North America, Akureyri (Iceland) - Deputy Chairman from Northern Europe, Gangwon Province (Republic of Korea) - Deputy chairman from northeast Asia, Chukotka Autonomous okrug (Russia), Kamchatka krai (Russia), Khabarovsk krai (Russia), Krasnoyarskiy krai (Russia), Lapland (Finland), Magadan oblast (Russia), Primorsky kray (Russia), and, Yamal - Nenets Autonomous okrug (Russia). The NF Business Partners are: Academy of the Northern Forum (Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Russia), the Arctic Portal (Akureyri, Iceland), Orsa Grönklitt Predator Center (Dalarna, Sweden), Institute of the North (Alaska, USA), Arctic Business Relations LLC of Ukpeaġvik Iñupiat Corporation »(UIC) (Alaska, USA), CMYK Master Polygraphy LLC (Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Russia), SuluS LLC (St. Petersburg, Russia), Pure Water LLC (Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Russia), Energy Saving Technologies LLC (Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Russia), Lapland Chamber of Commerce (Finland), the Cluster Polaire Français (France), High North Center for Business and Governance of the Business School at Nord University (Norway), Hokkaido International Exchange and Cooperation Center (Japan), and, Alaska Native Heritage Center (Alaska, USA) (Northern Forum 2020). 201 According to NF unofficial sources, Hokkaido made an annual contribution on time, in addition to it grant funds in the amount of US $ 531,500 from 1995 to 2008. Hokkaido also maintained its representative at the Northern Forum secretariat in Anchorage until March 2000, paying rent, transportation expenses and insurance for all members of the representative's family. And according to HIECC source, Hokkaido’s annual fee were approximately around 25.000 USD (HIECC 2019).

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the 2nd General Assembly of the Northern Forum in Sapporo in 1995 and the Youth Eco-forum in 2004.

According to personal communication with members of the HIEEC, with the retirement of Dōgakinai, who was particularly committed to Northern cooperation, Hokkaidō gradually withdraws from this institution. Between 2001 and 2003, 25 sub-national governments from 10 different States were members of the Northern Forum. However, these numbers started to decline from 2004, and Hokkaido left the organization in 2013, following Alaska and Finnish Lapland's example that had terminated their membership already a few years earlier202. “A unique kind of international communication has been fostered for many years since then. However, Hokkaidō's international interaction faces a turning point these days. It appears to have grown weary during a period of lassitude” (Hondo 2004). The NF secretariat moved in 2013 from Anchorage (Alaska, U.S) to Yakutsk (Yakutia, Russia), and new regions have joined NF again. Some other mentions the Russian’s growing presence in the Northern Forum that seems to change the balance of the NF (Hondo 2004). The secretariat of the NF moved in 2013 from Anchorage Alaska to Yakutsk in Yakutia (Russia) and new regions have joined NF again. Some other mentions the Russian’s growing presence in the Northern Forum that seems to be change the balance of the NF (Hondo 2004; Tsui 2016). While Hokkaidō based actors first followed the development of the organization and the implementation of the new strategy, they also started to wonder what the added value of multilateral cooperation was: what could Hokkaidō achieve through the NF that it could not accomplish through active bilateral ties with many of the membership regions (Babin & Saunavaara 2021). Hokkaido’s international activities' focus switched to South-East Asia (Hondo 2004, 95; HIECC 2019). The increase in economic and tourist exchanges with these regions has led to a shift in focus with the northern regions towards South-East Asia. While Hokkaidō has also been invited to renew its membership, it has declined the offer. Nevertheless, in 2014, HIECC became a business partner203 in the Northern Forum and Hokkaidō is still participating in the youth Eco- forum activities and participated in 2018 in the organization of one of the events in Sapporo.

202 Quebec was a member of the NF between 2010 and 2013. 203 According to Northern Forum unofficial sources, the regional membership fee is around $ 25,000 per year, and the partner’s business is $ 1,000 per year.

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Today MoFA wants to rejoin the NF, but Hokkaidō prefecture seems little motivated to invest in a forum where it does not see economic benefits.

The NF, however, is not the only northern platform for exchanges used by Japanese local authorities. The city of Sapporo has developed exchange activities with Russia, which is close to the city, through exchanges based on affiliations between sisters and friendly cities and interactions through the global association of mayor cities to winter (17 cities twinned with Russia in 2003) (Sapporo International Strategic Plan 2014, 23).

« Winter is a Resource and an Asset », the International Association of Winter Cities for Mayors, Sapporo city’ diplomacy

City diplomacy

As Acuto, Morissette, and Tsouros (2017) note, cities are currently housing more than half the world’s population and standing on the frontline of many key challenges (industrial pollution, the spread of infectious diseases, economic and social inequalities and migration). This shows why the participation of city leaders in discussing current societal challenges is vital. While the cities' international activities attract more attention from the academic community, the concept of city diplomacy was put forward (Amiri 2020). Kamiński (2018, 16) argues that nowadays more than 4 billion people (about 55% of the world population) live in cities enabling these cities to become powerful political and economic entities. Already in 2007, Dutch researchers proposed during a symposium a definition for the diplomacy of cities, which, according to them, "lies in the institutions and processes by which cities engage in reciprocal relations with other actors on the international political scene with the aim of being represented, as well as their interests” (Van der Pluijm and Melissen 2007; Viltard 2008). Viltard (2008), notes that this definition encompasses the relations of sub-state units with all international actors. Later, he defines city diplomacy as “ the tool of local governments and their associations to promote social cohesion, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, with the aim of creating a stable environment in which citizens can live together in peace, democracy and prosperity” (Viltard 2010, 594). Van der Pluijm and Melissen (2007, 11) defines it as "the institutions and processes by which cities engage with actors on the international scene, with the intention of representing

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themselves and their interests, and vice versa […] a form of decentralization of international relations’ management, choosing the cities as the key actors”.

Van der Pluijm and Melissen notes three main reasons for cities' involvement in diplomacy. First, to serve their own interests and those of their community. Secondly, cities engage in diplomacy under the pressure of their citizens (citizen activism). Finally, cities act out of solidarity with other cities. Hence, city diplomacy has multiple dimensions covering all actions carried out on the international scene by cities, not just international security issues. According to Van der Pluijm and Melissen (2007, 19), there are six mains dimensions in which cities might involve themselves in an international level: development, economic, cultural, cooperative or network, representative and security. Viltard (2010, 599) and Van der Pluijm and Melissen (2007, 25) notes that self- interest is often the main motive for cities to involve themselves internationally: the municipal teams hope to obtain substantial profits by "attracting tourists, foreign companies, international organizations", and by competing with other major cities to be given the responsibility of organizing international events (Olympic, World Exhibition, World Cups, etc.). Cities also find it interesting to establish privileged partnerships with each other and create networks of cities with characteristics close to their own. Van der Pluijm and Melissen (2007, 17) also point out that, as with paradiplomacy, cities' geographical location is a determining factor in their international activities. Cities along borders or the seas are more likely to engage in international activities. Although not a port city, Sapporo is one of the largest Japanese cities, located in the extreme north of the territory and not far from the Pacific Ocean, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Japanese sea. We can, therefore, consider that the involvement of the city of Sapporo in the World Winter Cities Association for Mayors is involved in the economic, cultural, and cooperation dimensions.

World Winter Cities Association for Mayors (WWCAM)

In parallel with the prefecture's investment with other northern regions, the municipal authorities of Sapporo's city proposed to establish the same type of relations with cities in other regions (Hondo, 2004 p.95). In addition to the Edmonton Conference of 1979, the city of Sapporo had announced that it would organize and host the first Conference of Northern Cities in Sapporo in February 1982, whose goal is to forge cooperation among member cities to solve common problems related to the cold of their regions and offer better living conditions to their inhabitants

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(P. Jain 2005, 81,97). These problems or difficulties include urban planning, housing, winter transportation, winter tourism, snow removal, pollution, and the prevention of natural disasters (P. Jain 2005, 97).

Formerly called the International Association of Mayors of Northern Cities (IAMNC), the WWCAM was initiated in 1981 from a network created in 1981 by Sapporo's Mayor, Itagaki Takeshi. According to officials in Sapporo, research through out-of-country contacts of solutions to local problems should help increase Sapporo's local autonomy by reducing its dependence on the national government in solving problems concerning the colder part located north of the country (Hondo 2004). These officials felt that elsewhere in Japan, subnational coalitions shared similar concerns and allowed these territories to rely less on the national government and to tackle local issues more effectively (P. Jain 2005, 81). One of the arguments put forward by the officials of the city of Sapporo is that the central government had not in the past been able to manage the housing and energy problems in Hokkaidō because these plans were based on false assumptions about the climate.

The first 1982 conference in Sapporo brought together nine municipalities from the United States, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Russia, and China. Participants were invited to share their experiences and expertise in four areas: urban planning for northern cities, winter circulation systems, comfortable habitats and culture, arts, sports and recreation in the north. Conferences are held every two years to give mayors and businesses in northern cities an opportunity to meet, face- to-face, and share knowledge about urban planning and other common issues that often face cities with snowfall and cold temperatures.

WWCAM Goals:

To “contribute to development of livable winter cities by gathering representatives of cities with similar climates to facilitate exchange of knowledge and information concerning winter- related issues; promote the Winter Cities Movement; strengthen cooperation and solidarity

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among winter cities while contributing to peace and development of an international society; tackle global warming issues through educational and action campaigns”.

(Sources: official WWCAM website, Historical Background: https://www.city.sapporo.jp/somu/kokusai/wwcam/history.html).

The officials' working meetings occur every two years in Sapporo (Sapporo in 2002, 2007, 2011, 2013, 2015). And finally, sub-committee meetings to conduct technical research and exchange information and technological tools between administrators and technocrats of cities (Sapporo in 1993, 2004, 2010 et 2016).

The Mayor of Sapporo as chaired the World Winter Cities Association of Mayors since its establishment with its secretariat located in Sapporo (P. Jain 2005, 81). The association now hosts more than 21 member cities from 10 different states204. In July 2016, Sapporo hosted a conference and exhibition whose main theme was the urban development of winter towns: their uniqueness and their attractions. The expenses necessary for implementing of the Association's projects are covered by the Association's revenues, such as contributions, contributions, balances carried forward from the previous year and other sources. Part of the Mayors' Conference's operating costs like the Senior Officials Meeting, the Subcommittees, the Revitalization Projects, or the Secretariat are covered by the Association's revenues we the fees based on GDP and population.

204 Canada, China, Denmark, Estonia, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Norway, Sweden and the United States. Available at :http://www.city.sapporo.jp/somu/kokusai/wwcam/introduction_e.html

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FIGURE 15 SOURCE : WWCAM MEMBERSHIP PROCEDURE (WORLD WINTER CITIES ASSOCIATION FOR MAYORS (WWCAM) 2019).

These exchanges had allowed Sapporo's city to change the landscape plan of the city by favoring the planting of evergreen trees planted in public spaces to prevent snowstorms in the region. It also changed the regulation of winter tires, prohibiting the use of studded tires from the 1990s in the city. Technological exchanges around hydroelectricity, sodium lamps to increase road visibility during storms. Promotion of winter sports like hockey, ski-cross, etc. (World Winter Cities Association for Mayors (WWCAM) 2019). This cooperation illustrates the productive involvement of a subnational government like Hokkaidō and Sapporo in international cooperation programs for problem-solving and mutual benefit through the sharing of information and experiences and reduce their dependence from the Japanese central government and stop economic decline (P. Jain 2005, 98; Williams 2007, 60-61).

Major Outcomes of WWCAM for Sapporo (World Winter Cities Association for Mayors (WWCAM) 2019):

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- Planting of evergreen trees - Regulations for studded tires (total ban in 1990) - Introduction of hydroelectric power - Introduction of sodium lamp - Promotion of snow hockey - Promotion of cross-country ski courses - Opening parks in winter and introducing wooden play equipment - Role sharing between the city and citizen (e.g., cleaning and weeding of children’s park) - Cityscape development

The 2014 Sapporo International Strategic Plan highlights the need to regularly send senior officials to meetings of the Association of Mayors of Northern Cities to support the city's visibility and support activities of the Association with the United Nations (Sapporo International Strategic Plan 2014). The plan wishes to capitalize on the four seasons' city character with other northern municipalities to enhance its tourist appeal to them.

Through these exchanges with other regions and municipalities of the North, the city of Sapporo and the authorities of the prefecture of Hokkaidō wish that the relations of cooperation also have potential in terms of economic cooperation and answers to the environmental problems exploiting the geographical features of Sapporo. They also wish to develop policies for the city's urban development and the region using the knowledge acquired during the collaboration of these cities and the Northern territories (Sapporo International Strategic Plan 2014). In 2015 was established the Arctic Design Subcommittee with Rovaniemi, Finland, as its secretariat. Through cooperation between local municipalities, universities, research facilities and private sector, this subcommittee published a report in 2017 on a new economic model, “Circular Economy” focusing on reusing resources and delivering added values toward products from Rovaniemi.

“From ‘northern region’ to ‘word winter cities’”

In 2004, the association's name was changed from the International Association of Mayors of Northern cities (IAMNC) to the World Winter Cities Association for Mayor (WWCAM). Studying the various topics discussed at the IAMNC / WWCAM conferences noted that language elements are evolving from the third Edmonton Conference in 1988 from the "northern region" to "winter cities". It started from a desire to revitalize the association and its attractiveness to new cities.

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This name change demonstrates the association's desire to promote and strengthen cooperation and exchanges, not only with the Northern regions but also with other cities subject to so-called winter conditions around the world (World Winter Cities Association for Mayors (WWCAM) 2019). A “winter City” is defined by the association as a city “that faces challenges related to development due to harsh winter climatic conditions with heavy snowfall and cold temperature” with at least 20cm of snow accumulation per year and at least a month per year with an approximate average temperature below 0°C (article 4 of the WWCAM charter).

It is possible to consider Sapporo's initiative as a part of a broader internationalization process of Japanese cities. As P. Jain (2005, 95) has pointed out, some Japanese cities hosted international conferences to facilitate the exchange of ideas and policy approaches in specific fields. For example, Tokyo hosted the World Big City Convention in 1972 and the World Major City summit in 1985. Kyoto hosted the World Historical City Summit in 1987 and the Japan-Russia Association of Mayors of Japan Sea Coastal Cities was established already in 1970 at the initiative of Niigata City. Moreover, the Hokkaido Canada Society was established in 1979 to deepen understanding and promote exchanges between Hokkaido and Canada (Society 2020)205.

Through exchanges, Hokkaidō wants to reduce part of its dependence vis-à-vis the central government, boost its local economy, attract a part of the young Japanese population through a privileged lifestyle, and fight against its population's aging. According to the local authorities, Hokkaidō Northern cooperation reflects in various ways in local people’s life. They argue that people’s consciousness and behavior about winter and snow have changed to a more positive image than before. This image remains strongly linked to winter or northern characteristics: winter sports (skiing, curling), winter events (Sapporo snow festival, Lake Shikotsu Ice Festival, drift ice visit), etc. This cooperation also led to an improvement in housing construction methods using, according to them, the northern-type method with high airtightness and high thermal insulation.

205 The society aims to promote exchange students’ programs, organize conferences and provide information.

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Hokkaidō: Japan’s gateway to the north and to the Arctic

While the interest in cooperation with the northern and eastern parts of Russia has upheld Hokkaido’s interest in the North (see chapter 2), a discussion concerning cooperation and relations with the Arctic has emerged in Hokkaido. Hokkaido’s interest in this territorially huge and culturally and socially diverse region has gone hand in hand with the evolution of Japan’s national policies. Activities involving Hokkaido have been part of the global pivot to the Arctic region, emphasizing its vulnerability to the changing climate, its growing geopolitical importance, and its economic potential (Babin & Saunavaara 2020).

Despite the switch of focus in Hokkaido Subnational cooperation from northern regions toward South-East Asia since the late 1990s, a series of studies and meetings between local municipalities, universities, research facilities, and the private sector were initiated to analyze the island's economic development prospects linked to the development of the Arctic. These initiatives originated from the academic community and took form in cooperation between researchers and the private sector to reflected in new ways to capitalize on Hokkaidō's northern position to develop specific industry and infrastructure linked to the NSR development.

Hokkaidō University and the Arctic Research Center

Hokkaidō University plays a leading role in Japanese polar research that is recognized in Japanese Arctic politics. Although like in many other regions, Hokkaidō University’s polar research program has mainly been oriented around the Antarctic, it started Arctic research in the 1950’ with a project on the glaciological ice cap in Greenland lead by Nakaya Ukichiro. Nowadays, Hokkaidō University hosts several centers dedicated to Nordic and Arctic research.

The Cold Region Port and Harbor Engineering Research Center (CPC) was established in 1987 as an incorporated association in Sapporo. The CPC's objectives are to develop ports and regional communities characterized by a cold climate, snow, ice, and icy sea. Its research activities include maritime transport, planning and structural designing of port infrastructures, disaster prevention in port, and regional development. Coinciding with the launch of the ArCS in 2015, Japan’s pilot program on arctic research, the Arctic Research Center (ARC), was established in Hokkaidō

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University, located in Sapporo. It serves “as a national center for Arctic Research, and contribute to policy-making about the Arctic at national and international forums” with the Japan Arctic Research Network Center (together with the National Institute of Polar Research and Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology) (ARC 2015).

“Hokkaidō University is the northernmost university in Japan, therefore it is natural for us to “head for the north”. As a flagship center for the Arctic studies at Hokkaidō University, we will push forward with determination to advance Arctic research and develop this center” (ARC 2015)

The ARC cooperates closely with both the regional and the central governments, and Hokkaidō University is also the only Japanese member university in the University of the Arctic (UArctic). It regularly sends experts in the Japanese delegation at the Arctic Council Working Groups (PAME, SDWG, CAFF) (see chapter 2).

Hokkaidō University and ARC both have a central role in the Arctic Challenge for Sustainability (ArCS) with NIPR and JAMSTEC. Together, it conducts research, host public events, an exchange program with universities in Arctic States like Finland or Russia. The ARC staff regularly gives lectures to undergraduates and graduates students in English and Japanese on arctic issues both in the natural and social science field “with the purpose of producing transdisciplinary cutting- edge and interdisciplinary research activities and exploratory studies” (ARC 2015). These three goals are to:

1. Promote advanced field research and expand international cooperation and network 2. Establish new Arctic science through trans-disciplinary approach 3. Promote cooperation and collaboration among Industry, Government and Academia.

Figure 16: source: https://www.arc.hokudai.ac.jp/en/international-collaboration/

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FIGURE 17: SOURCE ARCTIC RESEARCH CENTER (2019).

ARC also collaborates with the Belmont Forum, an international partnership of funding organizations, international science councils, and regional consortia committed to advancing interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary science206. The ARC participates in the Ecosystem Study of Sub-Arctic and Arctic Seas (ESSAS), which will have its 2020 annual science meeting in Sapporo and have concluded MoU with the international Institutes for Arctic Research207. ARC and the Cold Region Port and Harbor Engineering Research Center (CPC) from Hokkaidō University also participates in annual meetings with institutes from China and Korea208: The North Pacific Arctic Research Community (NPARC). At the seminar, each institute institution

206 Participates in RACArctic, Resilience and Adaptive Capacity of ARCTIC marine systems under a changing climate and COPERA (NPARC 2016). 207 MOU with the International Arctic Research Center of University of Alaska Fairbanks (2016), a Japan-Russia joint research agreement between the North Eastern Federal University, the Russia National Academy of Science (2016), winter school in 2017 and again in 2018 as part of an upbringing program of human resources of J-ARC Net. 208 In 2019 participated the Korea Maritime Institute (KMI), Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), Ocean Policy Research Institute (OPRI), the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center (SRC). Established in 2014 by an initiative from Korea, the NPARC have includes members from Korea Institute of Polar Research (KOPRI), Seoul National University (SNU), Korea Marine and Marine Technology Research (KRISO), Inka Institute of Technology (ITC), Korea University of Foreign Studies (HUFS), China Polar Research Center (PRIC), China Institute of Water Transportation Science (WTI), International Coastal Development Research Center (OCDI), and the Hokkaido International Exchange and Cooperation Center (HIECC) also participated in the meetings (NPARC 2016).

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introduced its work and efforts related to the Arctic region and actively discussed the relationship between the Arctic and Asian countries. The meeting rotates every year and was held in 2019 at Hokkaidō University. This arctic NPARC annual meeting was commended by the three Japanese, Korean and Chinese Heads of Delegations during the 2018 declaration of the trilateral High-Level Dialogue on the Arctic (Korea 2018).

Researchers from ARC have been collaborating with JAMSTEC, NIPR to create a Board Game called “The Arctic” as a learning tool to promote and develop interdisciplinary cooperation between young researchers in Japan (ArCS 2019). The game was presented during a session at the Arctic Circle in October 2019. As the game's designers note pertinently, it is not easy for individual researchers involved in Arctic research to position their own research within Arctic changes' overall picture. Hence, in order to tackle Arctic issues, researchers need to collaborate across their specialized fields. As one of the results of this collaborative research, researchers specializing in the Arctic marine environment/ecosystem, culture, international law, etc. will explore each research's contact points and combine the events occurring in the Arctic region with the research content. The game was introduced in workshops at the National Museum of Emerging Science and at events at Hokkaido University to elementary school students to high school students and their parents who experienced it. Originally, this activity started as an educational tool on site, but it benefited from a great deal of publicity and was effective as a publicity project. Although this game has only been developed in Japanese for the moment, the various researchers involved in its development (as well as the Icelandic Minister of Science) are hoping for an English translation in the future to encourage cooperation between young Japanese and international researchers ( 北極域研究推進プロジェクト [Arctic Challenge for Sustainability] 2020, 153-154; ARC 2019).

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FIGURE 18: THE ARCTIC BOARD GAME, PHOTOS: ARCS (2019).

Hokkaidō University and ARC are also members of the Japan Arctic Research Network Center (JARC-Net), established in 2016 with JAMSTEC and NIPR. It organizes open seminars that promote industry-academia-government collaboration. Finally, researchers from Hokkaido Universities have been particularly active within the International Symposium on the Okhotsk Sea & Polar Oceans in Mombetsu, a seminar held annually for over 30 years. While this symposium was first focused on the Okhotsk Sea, it now also integrates plurisdiplinary work on oceanography and Arctic Research.

How does the government perceive these paradiplomatic Hokkaidō initiatives with other northern regions?

As Japan is not an Arctic State, the Japanese government tend to use not only the long tradition of Japanese polar research, but also the northern geographical location of Hokkaidō, and its history of exchanges with other northern regions to highlight the Japanese polar identity and its legitimacy to be involved in this region. As Busson reminds us, one of the important postulates of

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the Constructivists is that international norms (mainly those disseminated by international institutions), once "internalized" by the state, tend to become an integral part of the identity definition of a state that believes in the legitimacy of these principles (Busson 2008, 27-28; Checkel 1998).

Already in the 1998 5th Comprehensive National Development Plan209, the role of Hokkaidō as a Japan's northern international gateway to the Asia-Pacific, but also to other northern regions region is underlined.

" Hokkaidō covers a large area and has a rich natural environment, good resources and cool weather. It is positioned as a base to connect the northern region with the Asia-Pacific region and has developed its own northern culture and lifestyles including the Ainu culture. In the future, Hokkaidō will develop into a unique region as a ‘Frontier to create a new northern culture’ based on its pioneering spirit and frankness, as well as its natural and geographic features and cultural riches. Along with it, lifestyles will change in the 21st century in the Asian region including Japan.

It is necessary to create nature-rich residential areas that also serve as bases for the supply of food and lumber to other areas throughout Japan. At the same time, develop unique industries based on the characteristics of each area of Hokkaidō. Also, create independent and unique areas by promoting diverse cooperation among areas and strengthen cooperation between the central cities in Hokkaidō and the residential areas. In addition, utilize information and communications to strengthen cooperation between areas. Furthermore, for creating an international sphere of interaction on a large scale to communicate with the northern region and Asia- Pacific region, promote international exchanges in economics and technology. Hokkaidō will serve as a sightseeing and recreational base, especially for Asian people, based on its unique, attractive natural environment including magnificent views and snow. By implementing these measures, develop Hokkaidō into a more attractive region that has more versatility, taking a long-term view towards the formation of the North-Eastern National Axial Zone and the Japan Sea Coastal National Axial Zone” …

… “Thus, make northern Japan an international gateway, and improve the transportation infrastructure” …

… “In the North-Eastern National Axial Zone, two layers of networks will be established; a network of cities and towns on a scale suited to coexistence with

209 The National and regional plans are long-term, comprehensive and spatial plans to show the ideal state of territory that is comprised of land, water, nature, social infrastructures, industry accumulation, culture, human resources and others.

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nature in the 21st century, and a network of rich green mountains, wide river valleys and basins. The zone will make further exchanges with the Asian Pacific region and northern regions overseas. Especially in Hokkaidō, which covers a vast area, an international exchange base will be established to promote exchange with the northern regions overseas” (Ministry of Land 1998).

As the actions taken by Hokkaido-based actors vis-à-vis the Arctic are in line with the objectives of the national government, the attitude of Japan’s central government toward Hokkaidō’s Arctic initiatives has been positive, and Hokkaidō has actively approached decision-makers in Tokyo. In 2014, Sapporo hosted, with the support of the METI, the 7th Japan-Russia Meeting Concerning Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) to develop cooperative projects between Hokkaido and Russia. During a visit from the minister of the MLIT in Sapporo the same year, the local industry and commerce representatives expressed their wish for governmental support of Hokkaidō’s efforts toward the NSR (Kawai and Ishii 2014). In response, the Japanese government has highlighted this province's northern character and its privileged geographical position as the gate of Japan and Asia towards the Arctic in various official communications (Tonami 2020; Kossa, Lomaeva, and Saunavaara 2020). Similarly, actors from Hokkaidō have continuously exchanged ideas with the representatives of MOFA. Although there are limitations in these cooperative efforts: the MLIT cannot support one Japanese port over the others on NSR-related issues (MOL personal communication 2017).

Hokkaidō’s contribution to Japan’s Arctic policy has been recognized at the leading international forums. During the speech of M. Kōno Tarō about Japan’s Arctic involvement at the Arctic Circle annual meeting in October 2018, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs mentioned Hokkaidō as the gateway from Asia to the Northern Sea Route. This declaration was analyzed as significant support for Hokkaidō to increase a sense of presence in Arctic affairs. During the meeting, Yoshinao Okabe, a Hokkaidō government member, noticed the similarity between Hokkaidō and Arctic that could revitalize the local economy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2018e; Okabe 2018). He also argues that the Hokkaidō Government is also promoting the establishment of a data center, as Japan's northern island has a cool climate which could be an advantage to reduce the power consumption of air conditioning. And in 2019, the new Japanese Ambassador of Arctic Affairs, Ms. Miyoshi Mari, supported Hokkaidō University's role in Japan's Arctic research activities.

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Although the central government has taken a positive attitude toward the initiatives that originate from Hokkaido and utilizes local expertise and international connections, its possibilities to support these activities are limited. The central government cannot, for example, make market interventions and influence the decisions made by private enterprises in order to back the development of Hokkaido-based harbors against the other Japanese ports in case the traffic through the NSR develops. Similarly, the Arctic submarine cable's potential landing to Hokkaido is first and foremost a matter involving private sector actors and, to some extent, regional and local authorities (Babin & Saunavaara 2021).

The development of port infrastructures oriented towards the Northern Sea Route

The Northern Sea Route has recently attracted Western media and researchers' attention as it could significantly reduce the navigational distance between Europe and East Asia. Cooperation relations with northern regions also have the potential for economic cooperation and responses to environmental problems that take advantage of Sapporo's geographical features. The development of the NSR is a lever to relaunch an old development tropism with, for Japan, Hokkaido as a northern window. Other regions use the same speech - a "crossroads to the Arctic", Iceland, St Pierre and Miquelon, Halifax, Maine, Scotland, etc. (Gass 2016; Dotte 2014; Saunavaara 2018a; Tømmerbakke 2019; Lasserre 2015). The 2014 Sapporo Strategic Plan noted that while the northern route is shorter than the conventional routes between Hokkaidō and northern Europe, many difficulties remain (e.g., drifting ice, a short period of use, operational cost, etc.). Kitagawa and Otsuka's article highlights the benefits and challenges of commercial shipping in the Arctic: a shorter sailing distance but expensive ice-strengthened commercial vessels, lack of knowledge and experience for crews, high operational and insurance costs (Kitagawa and Otsuka 2014). They, however, also underline Hokkaido's advantageous geographical position for Europe-Asia Arctic maritime traffic and within Japan (less risk of natural disasters compared to other Japanese port’s locations: tsunamis, earthquakes, typhoons, volcanic eruptions; and bigger spaces for port development).

Hokkaidō Development Plan Bureau, Harbor Airport Section, Harbor Planning Department, and the city of Tomakomai, which hosts one of Hokkaidō’s major ports, conducted a study in 2012 on the region's development potential with the NSR. This report was based on a comparison of

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Hokkaidō and Niigata (prefecture located northwest of the main island Honshu) and suggested several scenarios for using and promoting the geographical location of Hokkaidō as the entry point of NSR in Asia. After considering Hokkaido's various ports (Otaru, Wakkanai, Abashiri and Kushiro), the report argued that Tomakomai Harbor had the greatest location for arctic shipping. Indeed, Tomakomai Harbor is located at a short distance from Sapporo, Hokkaido’s biggest city; New- Chitose International Airport, the main airport of the province, with railway and highway connections (Bullet train, Shinkansen, scheduled to open by 2030).

However, the report came to the conclusion that, although the use of the Northern Route has several advantages (distance, consumption fuel), there were still many operational difficulties and uncertainties favoring the use of the via the Suez channel (Saunavaara 2017). Although Hokkaidō tends to present itself as the Future Hub for Asia-Europe shipping via the NSR, the cities of Shanghai and Busan present themselves as serious rivals, including the opening of the New Busan Port that can accommodate a capacity of vessels and upper containers at the port of Yokohama or Nagoya. The majority of shipping from China to Europe, what would be the reasons to go through Hokkaidō, knowing that companies are not interested in the transshipment option presented by Hokkaidō so that ice-type ships remain in the regions where they are most efficient, and that other ships are taking over from Hokkaidō to bring goods and fuel to the Asian markets. The report also noted that the route was not necessarily interesting for cargo ships but, on the other hand, could be interesting for perishable or urgent goods such as seafood, parts of machinery mostly transported by air.

The port of Tomakomai is still highlighted as a potential HUB for Asia-Europe maritime transport via the Northern route because it can accommodate many ships, can easily expand, connect to other maritime routes. The delivered goods (hydrocarbon, mineral, and living resources) could be transshipped here and then transported from this port to the South (Moe and Stokke 2019, 34). According to MOL officials210, this would allow to keep the ships with polar conditions in waters where their capacities are efficient and to use conventional ships (more efficient in ice-free water) to serve the Asian markets. Partners in Hokkaidō are engaged in discussions concerning

210 Personal communication, 2017 & 2018.

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the import of European food such as wine and delicatessen on the Europe-Asia side and seafood, machine parts exports from Asia to Europe side (personal communication Otuska Natsuhiko 20/02/2019 & Saunavaara ; 2017 p.277, also conditioned to be able to manage the temperature of the containers to preserve the quality of the products, and lower taxes on the importation of wine in 2019 with the agreement Japan - UE).

The Tomakomai-East Development Project was introduced during the third Hokkaidō Development Plan in the late 1960s to establish a large-scale sea coast industrial park (Wada 2010, 35; Kitagawa and Otsuka 2014). It is one of the largest Japanese ports for all domestic shipping. The port is equipped with offshore berths with a maximum depth of up to 24 m, capable of accepting large tanker vessels carrying up to 280 thousand tons. The main import items are coal, wood and wood products, oil and oil products, automotive and industrial equipment export. The total turnover of sea transportations for one year in Tomakomai Harbor is around 43 million tons of cargoes and the port maintains modern equipment for loading and unloading, with large storage spaces and storage facilities for oil (Zhuravel 2016).

This port currently processes about one-third of the total cargo volume in the city. It has vast space for handling containers but also for future expansion, cool climate, and little snow compared to other areas in Hokkaido, potable water supply, shipbuilding yard, and an oil refinery plant close by) (Kitagawa and Otsuka 2014). As the largest international trading port in northern Japan, the Hokkaidō government regards Tomakomai as a crucial element in Hokkaidō's economy. They hope to use it as a human and logistical assistance terminal in Northeast Asia, serving as a supply service for South Korean, Chinese and Russian vessels (Tonami, 2014).

A container ship from Cosco (China) stopped in October 2019 in Tomakomai Port after sailing from Helsinki for three-week through the NSR to Asia. According to the Mayor of Tomakomai Hirofumi Iwakura (Mukano 2019), "There are business advantages to passage through the Arctic Ocean". After a ceremony to welcome its arrival, the ship unloaded 20, 40-foot containers of lumber in Hokkaidō and then set sail on to China carrying wood, pulp, and other freight. The construction of LNG tank at Tomakomai is also under consideration. Moreover, following Japan’s energy strategy to diversify its energy importation sources, by the end of 2020, the first Japanese LNG bunkering ships LNG should be launched. The ships should operate from 2021 in Ise and

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Mikawa bays, supplying gas to two car-carriers ordered by Toyota Motor Corp. to transport automobiles to the United States.

However, despite these initiatives, the resources committed to promoting the port of Tomakomai as a potential HUB remain very limited, especially given the attractiveness of ports in South Korea (Busan) or in China, which receives State support (Bergesen, Moe, and Østreng 1987). Other researchers, Saunavaara (2017), highlight the potential of marine communications cables passing through the Arctic that create data centers and cloud networks that can boost the island's economy.

Conclusion

The construction of northern identity by Hokkaidō and the Japanese government served to support various political and economic objectives (Saunavaara 2017; Tonami 2016a; Ohnishi 2016). At first the attempts aiming at the physical expansion of national borders or to the seizing and utilization of natural resources were the main drivers for activities taking place in areas reaching from the continental Russian (Soviet Union), Far East, Sakhalin (Karafuto), and the Kuril (Chishima) Islands to the shores of Kamchatka Peninsula and even to Alaska (Kaminaga 2017). While the dispute over the Northern Territories continued, it did not prevent the institutionalization of international exchange relationships between Hokkaidō and other northern subnational authorities (Bukh 2010; Williams 2007). In the case of Hokkaidō, these activities were based on the conceptualization of Hokkaidō as Northern Region and with the Northern Regions Plan, which eventually developed into institutionalized international cooperation between various regions within the auspices of the Northern Forum. Since the end of the 2000s, the Japanese government's interest in the Arctic region has increased. Activities involving Hokkaidō have been part of the global pivot to the Arctic region, emphasizing its vulnerability to the changing climate, its growing geopolitical importance, and its economic potential (Kossa, Lomaeva, and Saunavaara 2020; Saunavaara 2017).

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Hokkaidō Northern cooperation has been reflected in various ways in local people’s life. They argue that people’s consciousness and behavior about winter and snow have changed to a more positive image compared as the one before. This image remains strongly linked to winter or northern characteristics: winter sports (skiing, curling), winter events (Sapporo snow festival, Lake

Shikotsu Ice Festival, drift ice visit), etc. This cooperation also led to an improvement in housing construction methods using, according to them, the northern-type method with high airtightness and high thermal insulation.

Governor Dōgakinai wanted to promote the economic and cultural cooperation of Hokkaidō with the other communities of the "North" of which he observed many similarities due to their geographical position in the North211. Half a century later, this development towards the North continues with the study of the potential of the northern maritime route for the island and its port infrastructure (Tomakomai port), studies on the development of communications cables under -marines traveling through the Arctic and may lead to the creation of data centers. While for several decades there has been a concentration of economic and political activity in the region of Kanto (Tokyo), the Hokkaidō prefecture wishes to highlight the advantages of its geographical position in the North to promote the development of the island, enter into commercial and cultural agreements with northern municipalities, and attract foreign investment.

The emergence of the Northern Region Plan in the late 1960s onwards—emphasizing the economy and the people, exchange, and the environment marked a great change in Hokkaido’s relationship with overseas northern areas and with the central government. This policy was initiated in Hokkaido, carried out by Hokkaido-based actors, and was based on internationalism, multilateralism, and mutual respect. Although the policy instrument has already ceased to exist, its legacy can still be seen, for example, in Hokkaido’s active participation in international cooperation under the banner of the Arctic as well as in the promotion of winter tourism and cultural activities associated with Nordicity in North America and northern Europe. Hokkaido prefecture has neither drafted a comprehensive Arctic policy nor established positions or

211 Similar climatic conditions, long distances to the national capital etc.

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organizations focusing on Arctic related matters. Rather, Hokkaido’s engagement with the Arctic has been based on cooperation involving regional and local governments, local businesses, and universities. Hokkaido’s focus with respect to Arctic issues has been on cooperation and exchange with Eurasia, and in particular, Russia. With for example the potential of commercial shipping through the NSR, Hokkaido’s possibilities to develop as a future transport hub (Tomakomai Port), and the plans to connect East Asia, North America, and northern Europe with a submarine fiber-optic cable via the Arctic Ocean (Babin & Saunavaara 2021).

We can observe that while Northerness or Winterness were meant to be inclusive (who can participate) and flexible concepts criteria’s to encourage cultural, economic cooperation and exchanges among the people and institutions, the arcticness criterion is designed around a concept of exceptionalism and exclusivity (Käpylä and Mikkola 2019, 2015). And although the concept of a Nordic region developed in the 1960s in North America, Scandinavia and in Japan was a driving force for collaboration, it is now slowly neglected for the Arctic. Development in Hokkaidō has followed this international pattern. Hokkaidō was active, even played a leading role in interregional international cooperation when it was built around the concept of "North". When it comes to the Arctic, Hokkaidō does not consider itself an Arctic region, but it has been interested in cooperation with Arctic/northern actors. Northern and Arctic cooperation can overlap each other’s with for example exchanges with Sakhalin that started long before the Arctic became a popular trend. The geographical scope has been slowly changing. While at first Northern cooperation included the North American side with several conferences and partnership leading to the establishment of the Northern Forum, Hokkaidō’s Arctic/northern cooperation has become dominated by Eurasia.

Despite not guided by national policies, Hokkaido’s relationship with the Arctic has evolved during the past decade hand-in-hand with the development of Japan’s Arctic approach. As the key actors, the patterns of cooperation and issue areas have become established during the recent years, the intensity of the future exchange and connection between Hokkaido and the Arctic will most likely depend on the materialization of the recognized economic possibilities and the effects the changing Arctic environment has on life in northern Japan (Babin & Saunavaara 2021).

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Concluding remarks

During recent years, international discussions concerning the Arctic has resulted in the emergence of the concept of GlobalArctic, a comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach conceptualizing the Arctic as “a multifaceted region within a changing global context, which is both affected by it and affecting it” (Finger and Heininen 2019, 2). While the completed and ongoing industrial projects have shown that the development, which has significant impacts on the Arctic natural environment and its communities, is tightly connected to decisions made by the non-Arctic actors, an increasing academic interest has been devoted to questions concerning the interconnections between the Arctic in East Asia. Although Japan has nothing parallel to the concept of a near-Arctic state as initiated by China, it can be debated whether Japan’s plays a role in stretching the region's boundaries (Väätänen and Zimmerbauer 2019) (Babin & Saunavaara 2021). This dissertation aimed to emphasize further that once again, as the saying goes, what happens in the arctic does not stay in the arctic, and Japan's arctic policy serves broader goals than just for the arctic.

In its introduction, this dissertation proposed three hypotheses to answer the following research question: What are the foundations and actors involved in developing and promoting Japan’s Arctic policy? To what extent does this policy respond to economic and political objectives that go beyond the Arctic?

The first hypothesis postulated that the Japanese government's interest in the Arctic is linked to the growing importance of this maritime domain in international geostrategy, the geo-strategic dynamics in Japan maritime proximity (Arctic Sea Routes, Northern Territories, the Rise of China). The Japanese Arctic policy is based on principles established within its Ocean policy and integrated into the second and third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. It leans on promoting and establishing fundamental values (freedom of navigation, Rule of Law, etc.), the pursuit of economic prosperity, and the commitment to peace and stability found in its Indo-Pacific strategy (Free and Open Indo-Pacific).

While governance, research, and economic cooperation in the Arctic region are mainly ocean- based, Japanese arctic policy follows this trend. The Arctic is included in Japan's oceanic policy

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since the second Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (2013), confirmed in the official policy of 2015 and the Basic Plan of 2018. The principles established in 2015 in Japan's official Arctic policy, such as the promotion and support of international law, law of the sea, peaceful international cooperation in this region, also echo the principles supported by Japan in its Free and Open Indo- Pacific strategy, but also its digital strategy and for its space policy (MoFA 2019, 2017). This overall strategy is based on Japan’s official Arctic Policy (2015) and the Basic Plans on Ocean Policy (2013&2018).

As Moe and Stokke (2019) points out, the language used in the official Arctic policy remains very cautious and regularly refers to the Arctic states' sovereignty, including their rights concerning the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelves. Several footnotes specific elements of the legal framework in force in the Arctic. In the second footnote, the document states that “it needs to be remembered that land areas in the Arctic are under the states' sovereign authority in the region. A large part of the Arctic Ocean consists of the territorial waters of the coastal states, and these have sovereignty or sovereign rights to exclusive economic zones and continental shelves”(Headquarters for Ocean Policy 2015, 1). The policy underlines the importance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and its application in the Arctic Ocean's legal framework.

To strengthen Japan’s arctic strategy, the Third Basic plan underlined the need to "prioritize measures related to research and development, international cooperation and sustainable use, to take into account the private sector initiatives to use the Northern Sea Route" to participate and stimulate an "ocean economy", to use its scientific and technological expertise to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Arctic and non-Arctic states. It also makes notes to establish relations with other states (arctic and non-arctic), to create partnerships supporting sustainable development, economic growth, and national wealth. The purpose of Japan’s Arctic Policy is to set Japan as an essential player contributing to the international community through its action to Arctic and global issues, including a proactive contribution to peace. It also aimed to promote its role as an important player contributing to the international community through

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“Panoramic diplomacy”212 with strategic cooperation with arctic and non-arctic partners, ensuring the international legal framework and promote cooperation to respond to global issues regarding the Arctic. From a security perspective, the policy aimed, through this proactive contribution to peace, to prevent moves to strengthen military presence in the region from leading to tension and confrontations and to pay close attention to moves by the states concerned.

The second hypothesis, which was verified in the second and third chapters, postulated that the official Arctic policy's development corresponds to a general trend where non-Arctic states are taking a stand for this region. Indeed, even though Japan was the first Asian State to start polar exploration, external factors such as the growing Chinese and South Korean interests for this region are significant factors influencing Tokyo's interest. The Japanese government's involvement in Arctic-related issues is a way for it to develop its image as a scientific and technological leader and mediator in the area of peaceful conflict resolution. This involvement also allows it to develop or strengthen its bilateral relations with the Arctic States and promote its national interests (economic, diplomatic, etc.). It relies on its long history of polar research activities, renewed scientific cooperation with the development of specific programs such as GRENE, ArCS, and ArCS-II, and its contribution to international forums such as the Arctic Council or the Arctic Circle.

To promote its national interests in the international geopolitical scene, in this case, in the Arctic, Japan mobilizes several tools, including international economic cooperation and science diplomacy, to build bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The "arctic" particularity of Japanese arctic policy is essentially focused on the aspect of research and scientific cooperation. It underlines several current issues such as climate change, economic opportunities, and the consequences of these issues in the Arctic and Japan. It also presents a series of initiatives and specific measures to try to respond to these issues. While Japanese policy is relatively recent, Japanese scientific research institutes have been very present and active for several decades in the polar regions. This tradition of polar/arctic research, often claimed by the government, has enabled Japanese researchers and experts to develop and promote their skills and networks in

212 Taking into account the World Map and based on the principle of international cooperation.

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and with arctic states since the 1990s. The inscription of the Arctic in Japanese policies today strengthens its organization and structure by offering it more means (increase in the budget and resources) and visibility on the international level. In this sense, the GRENE, ArCS, and now ArCS-II programs can be considered as successful. Science diplomacy in the Arctic is achieved through Research networks, international exchanges, and events, in the Research Station, with Data-sharing and management.

“The majority of Japan’s diplomatic efforts towards the Arctic are made by the members of the epistemic community using their scientific knowledge gained from nationally funded research projects […] This narrative of legitimizing the state’s involvement in science and technology in order to achieve economic growth is identical to what we have seen in Japan’s industrial policies as well as foreign development assistance after WWII” Tonami 2018.

Japan's Arctic science diplomacy is based primarily on its Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Projects (ArCS 2015-2020) and ArCS-II (2020-2025) projects. The objective is to convey robust information to national and international stakeholders from the Science perspective to enable appropriate decision-making and problem-solving involving the Arctic via strengthened research programs. These programs organize and provide Japanese researchers facilities to carry out their research projects and organize and participate in international events. On the one hand, the lack of resources allocated for constructing a new research icebreaker, like China and South Korea, could carry out research in the Arctic during summer and the Antarctic in the winter. The number of researchers and students also limits this diplomacy, admittedly increasing, working on the Arctic issues and which remains limited. The scientific community requires more in-depth support of policy-makers to increase Japanese polar research visibility at the national level (NIPR 2020c, 2017; ARC 2019).

Following on hypotheses 1 and 2, hypothesis 3 postulated that Japan's strategy in the Arctic has focused on the Russian Arctic overlapping with other interests, including, for example, cooperation and exchange with Russia. Chapters 2 and 3 made it possible to underline a synergy between Japanese Arctic policy, its global Ocean Policy, and its foreign relations with Russia.

With the study of bilateral relations between Japan and the Arctic states, we observed that the Japanese Arctic strategy is mainly focused on the Russian Arctic. This is not surprising

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considering that it is in this region that most hydrocarbon deposits were found. Several of those deposits are located close to Northern Route, making it easier for shipping to European and Asian markets. Finally, Japan, and its northern province Hokkaido, are located in the middle of shipping from East Asia to the Northern Sea Route, offering Japan several possibilities to develop Arctic shipping infrastructures (ports, submarine cable terminal, etc.).

While relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, then Russia, experienced many tensions mainly linked to World War II, Japan uses Arctic scientific and economic cooperation to promote a rapprochement with Russia. Since the end of the wars, the collaboration of Japanese and Russian sub-governmental entities (such as within the Northern Forum or World Winter Cities Association for Mayors) had also made it possible to forge cultural and economic cooperation events when the two national governments relations were strained.

The arctic cooperation between Japan and Russia builds on socio-political objectives, including an economic partnership to ensure Japan's energy security through new LNG importation sources and reduce China's influence in the region. This politically oriented cooperation allows it to establish and strengthen its diplomatic relations with Russia and advance sensitive issues such as the territorial dispute over the Northern territories (one of Abe's Foreign Policy administration objectives). Scientific and economic cooperation makes it possible to highlight Japanese researchers and companies' expertise in many sectors and build bridges between the two States. These collaborations require the support of the Japanese government, just as much as it strengthens Tokyo's partnerships with Russia.

Finally, by developing economic partnerships and investments with Russian companies in the Arctic, Japan wishes to underline the legitimacy of its interest in this region. Tokyo underlines its responsibility to be included in the governance debates of this Arctic to support and protect Japanese companies' investments in the region. This desire to be involved also fulfills the commitment of the government to ensure peace and global prosperity.

To conclude this dissertation, it can be argued that the Japanese government's interest in Arctic issues meets several objectives: to be included and participate (within the prescribed limits) in the present and future governance debates in which several major world powers are involved (US,

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Russia, members of the EU, etc.). This involvement also responds to a need for Japan to counteract or limit China's influence with and in Arctic institutions, especially regarding Russia. Using the reputation of excellence of Japanese researchers and companies, Tokyo wishes to strengthen its relations and build new partnerships with the Arctic States, local communities, and also non-Arctic States involved in the region. It is a method that Japan has used for several decades, and particularly in Southeast Asia, to promote partnerships based on Japanese expertise and quality. In addition, these partnerships aim to promote Japanese companies abroad, strengthen Japan's energy strategy and security, and ensure a stable environment favorable to peace and economic prosperity.

The involvement and participation of the Japanese government in Arctic affairs are also a matter of prestige and power display. Japan does not want to be sidelined or remain behind in a developing political scene, where the world's major powers are present (US, Russia, Members of the EU, and now China). To strengthen its international stature and on the Arctic scene, Japan aims to strengthen its reputation as an expert in research and innovation, a mediator in peaceful conflict resolution, and its commitment to fight against global warming (Kyoto agreement).

However, despite government declarations, the Arctic does not seem to be a priority for Japanese research policy. Indeed, as the Japanese territory and the population are not directly concerned by polar issues, we observe a moderate interest in the polar regions on the part of the political class and the citizens. This phenomenon is present in most of the non-arctic states active in these regions. The lack of continuity in the Ambassador's function for Arctic Affairs is also a sign of the Japanese government's interest in this region. Instead, Arctic policy is a parallel and secondary foreign policy angle that allows Japanese business companies and researchers to showcase their expertise and innovative skills. It is an opportunity to develop tools that can be shared with the international research community (Arctic Council working groups), innovations with commercial opportunities (in polar navigation or resource extraction), but also to model the consequences of climate and socio-economic changes in the Arctic for the Arctic States and Japan.

Japan's Arctic science diplomacy is based primarily on its ArCS (2015-2020) and ArCS-II (2020- 2025) projects, which organize and provide Japanese researchers facilities to carry out their

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research projects, organize and participate in international events. Although the budget allocated to this project is increasing over the years, it remains limited. On the one hand, the lack of resources allocated for constructing a new research icebreaker, like China and South Korea, could carry out research in the Arctic during summer and the Antarctic in the winter. The number of researchers and students also limits this diplomacy, admittedly increasing, working on the Arctic issues and which remains limited. The scientific community requires more in-depth support of policymakers to increase Japanese polar research visibility at the national level.

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Annex A: Dispatch of Experts to Arctic-related Meetings (Data provided by NIPR 2020/08/18).

For the 2015 Fiscal Year (FY)

MEETING PARTICIPANTS HOME DATE VENUE INSTITUTION AMAP 29TH MEETING Takashi Kikuchi, JAMSTEC 13-15 September 2015 Tromsø (Norway) Hiroyuki Enomoto, NIPR Sei-Ichi Saitoh HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY CAFF BOARD MEETING Masaki Uchida NIPR 15-17 September 2015 Tromsø (Norway) ARCTIC CIRCLE Masao Fukasawa NIPR/JAMSTEC 16-18 October 2015 Reykjavík (Iceland) GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2015 EGBCM 1ST MEETING Yutaka Kondo NIPR 27-28 January 2016 Reykjavík (Iceland) SCTF 8TH MEETING Akiho Shibata KOBE 3-4 March 2016 Arlington (Usa) UNIVERSITY ASSW2016, AOS Masao Fukasawa NIPR/JAMSTEC 12-18 March 2016 Fairbanks (Usa)

FY2016

MEETING PARTICIPANTS HOME DATE VENUE INSTITUTION EGBCM 2ND Yutaka Kondo NIPR 8-9 June 2016 Helsinki (Finland) MEETING SCTF 9TH MEETING Akiho Shibata KOBE 6-8 July 2016 Ottawa (Canada) UNIVERSITY CAFF BOARD Masaki Uchida NIPR 7-8 September Longyearbyen (Norway) MEETING 2016 PAME II-2016 Natsuhiko Otsuka HOKKAIDO 18-21 September Portland (Usa) UNIVERSITY 2016 ARCTIC CIRCLE Masao Fukasawa, NIPR/JAMSTEC 7-9 October 2016 Reykjavík (Iceland) GENERAL Shin Sugiyama, HOKKAIDO ASSEMBLY 2016 Masanori Goto, UNIVERSITY Natsuhiko Otsuka EGBCM 3RD Yutaka Kondo NIPR 25-26 October Washington Dc (Usa) MEETING 2016 AMAP 30TH Takashi Kikuchi JAMSTEC 28 Nobemver - 1 Helsinki (Finland) MEETING December 2016 ARCTIC Masao Fukasawa NIPR/JAMSTEC 22-26 January Tromsø (Norway) FRONTIERS 2017 2017 CAFF BOARD Masaki Uchida NIPR 1-2 February 2017 Kautokeino (Norway) MEETING SDWG REGULAR Fujio Ohnishi HOKKAIDO 7-8 February 2017 Kotzebue (Usa) MEETING UNIVERSITY CBIRD REGULAR Akinori Takahashi NIPR 7-9 March 2017 Faroe Islands (Danmark) MEETING ASSW2017 Masao Fukasawa, NIPR/JAMSTEC 31 March - 7 April Prague (Czech Republic) Hiroyuki Enomoto NIPR 2017

293

FY2017

MEETING PARTICIPANTS HOME DATE VENUE INSTITUTION ASSW2017 Masao Fukasawa, NIPR/JAMSTEC 31 March - 7 April Prague (Czech Hiroyuki Enomoto 2017 Republic) AMAP CONFERENCE Fujio Ohnishi HOKKAIDO 24-27 April 2017 Reston (Usa) UNIVERSITY AMAP SLCF EG 1ST Yutaka Kondo NIPR 27-30 June 2017 Victoria (Canada) MEETING AMAP 31TH MEETING Takashi Kikuchi JAMSTEC 12-24 September Reykjavík (Iceland) 2017 PAME II-2017 Natsuhiko Otsuka HOKKAIDO 18-20 September Helsinki (Finland) UNIVERSITY 2017 SDWG REGULAR Fujio Ohnishi HOKKAIDO 21-22 September Inari (Finland) MEETING UNIVERSITY 2017 CAFF BOARD MEETING Masaki Uchida NIPR 6-7 September 2017 Bethel (Usa) EGBCM 4TH MEETING Yutaka Kondo NIPR 3-4 October 2017 Helsinki (Finland) ARCTIC CIRCLE Masao Fukasawa, HOKKAIDO 13-15 October 2017 Reykjavík (Iceland) GENERAL ASSEMBLY Hiroki Takakura, UNIVERSITY 2017 Natsuhiko Otsuka TOHOKU UNIVERSITY/NIP R GEO WEEK 2017 Masao Fukasawa JAMSTEC 24-26 October 2017 Washington Dc (Usa) 6TH EA WORKSHOP Orio Yamamura HOKKAIDO 9-11 January 2018 Seattle (Usa) UNIVERSITY ARCTIC FRONTIERS Masao Fukasawa JAMSTEC 21-26 January 2018 Tromsø (Norway) 2018 AMAP SLCF EG 2ND Yutaka Kondo NIPR 29-31 January 2018 Helsinki (Finland) MEETING CAFF BOARD MEETING Masaki Uchida NIPR 6-8 February 2018 Fairbanks (Usa) PAME I-2018 Natsuhiko Otsuka HOKKAIDO 12-14 February 2018 Quebec City (Canada) UNIVERSITY CBIRD REGULAR Alexis Will NIPR 12-15 March 2018 Cambridge (Usa) MEETING SDWG REGULAR Fujio Ohnishi HOKKAIDO 19-20 March 2018 Kittilä (Finland) MEETING UNIVERSITY SAO PLENARY MEETING Fujio Ohnishi HOKKAIDO 22-23 March 2018 Kittilä (Finland) UNIVERSITY

294

FY2018

MEETING PARTICIPANTS HOME DATE VENUE INSTITUTIO N POLAR2018 (ASSW2018, Masao Fukasawa, NIPR/JAMST 15-27 June 2018 Davos (Switzerland) AOS) Hiroyuki Enomoto, EC Jun Inoue CAFF BOARD MEETING Alexis Will NIPR 4-5 September 2018 Dutch Harbor (Usa) EGBCM 5TH MEETING Yutaka Kondo NIPR 20-21 September 2018 Helsinki (Finland) AMAP 32ND MEETING Takashi Kikuchi JAMSTEC 25-27 September 2018 Kiruna (Sweden) PAME II-2018 Natsuhiko Otsuka HOKKAIDO 1-4 October 2018 Vladivostok (Russia) UNIVERSITY AMBI PHASE 2 Shirow Tatsuzawa HOKKAIDO 7-8 October 2018 Rovaniemi (Finland) PLANNING MEETING UNIVERSITY ABC 2ND CONGRESS Shirow Tatsuzawa HOKKAIDO 9-11 October 2018 Rovaniemi (Finland) UNIVERSITY ARCTIC CIRCLE Masao Fukasawa, JAMSTEC 19-21 October 2018 Reykjavík (Iceland) GENERAL ASSEMBLY Natsuhiko Otsuka, HOKKAIDO 2018 Yuichiro Fujioka UNIVERSITY ARCTIC SCIENCE Hiroyuki Enomoto, NIPR 24-26 October 2018 Berlin (Germany) MINISTERIAL 2 Kumiko Goto-Azuma, Natsuhiko Otsuka HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY SDWG REGULAR Fujio Ohnishi HOKKAIDO 29-30 October 2018 Rovaniemi (Finland) MEETING UNIVERSITY GEO WEEK 2018 Masao Fukasawa, NIPR/JAMST 31 October -1 November Kyoto (Japan) Hiroyuki Enomoto EC 2018 ARCTIC Jinro Ukita NIIGATA 6-8 November 2018 Copenhagen METEOROLOGICAL AND UNIVERSITY (Denmark) CLIMATE WORKSHOP 2ND CONGRESS AMAP SLCF EG 3RD Yutaka Kondo NIPR 13-15 November 2018 Bologna (Italy) MEETING EGBCM 6TH MEETING Yutaka Kondo NIPR 16-17 January 2019 Helsinki (Finland) ARCTIC FRONTIERS Masao Fukasawa JAMSTEC 20-24 January 2019 Tromsø (Norway) 2019 CAFF BOARD MEETING Masaki Uchida NIPR 4-6 Feburary 2019 Anchorage (Usa) PAME I-2019 Natsuhiko Otsuka HOKKAIDO 4-7 Feburary 2019 Malmö (Sweden) UNIVERSITY CBIRD REGULAR Alexis Will 26-28 May 2019 Akureyri (Iceland) MEETING

295

FY2019

MEETING PARTICIPANTS HOME DATE VENUE INSTITUTION ASSW2019 Masao JAMSTEC 22-30 May 2019 Arkhangelsk (Russia) Fukasawa, NIPR Hiroyuki Enomoto, Yuji Kodama CAFF BOARD MEETING Masaki Uchida NIPR 5-6 September 2019 Stockholm (Sweden) PAME II-2019 Natsuhiko Otsuka HOKKAIDO 9-12 September 2019 Reykjavík (Iceland) UNIVERSITY SDWG REGULAR MEETING Fujio Ohnishi HOKKAIDO 11-12 September 2019 Ísafjörður (Iceland) UNIVERSITY ARCTIC CIRCLE GENERAL Masao JAMSTEC 10-13 October 2019 Reykjavík (Iceland) ASSEMBLY 2019 Fukasawa, HOKKAIDO Natsuhiko UNIVERSITY Otsuka, Yuichiro Fujioka, Shirow Tatsuzawa AMAP 33RD MEETING Hajime Kimura JAMSTEC 28-30 October 2019 Tromsø (Norway) GEO WEEK 2019 Masao Fukasawa JAMSTEC 4-9 November 2019 Camberra (Australia) AMAP SLCF EG 4TH MEETING Yutaka Kondo NIPR 5-7 November 2019 Ann Arbor (Usa) CAFF BOARD MEETING Masaki Uchida NIPR 3-5 February 2020 Gällivare (Sweden) PAME I-2020 Natsuhiko Otsuka HOKKAIDO 3-7 February 2020 Oslo (Norway) UNIVERSITY

296

Annex B: Brief overview of international activities between FY2015-2019 per institute.

Institution FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 AMAP JAMSTEC, JAMSTEC NIPR, JAMSTEC, JAMSTEC, NIPR JAMSTEC, NIPR, HOKKAIDO HOKKAIDO NIPR UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY CAFF NIPR NIPR NIPR NIPR NIPR

SDWG HOKKAIDO HOKKAIDO HOKKAIDO HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY PAME HOKKAIDO HOKKAIDO HOKKAIDO HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY Cbird NIPR NIPR NIPR

EGBCM NIPR NIPR NIPR NIPR

SCTF KOBE KOBE UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY SAO HOKKAIDO Plenary UNIVERSITY ASM NIPR, HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY Arctic NIPR/JAMSTEC NIPR, HOKKAIDO JAMSTEC, JAMSTEC, Circle JAMSTEC, UNIVERSITY, HOKKAIDO HOKKAIDO HOKKAIDO TOHOKU UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY Arctic NIPR, JAMSTEC JAMSTEC Frontiers JAMSTEC Geo Week JAMSTEC NIPR, JAMSTEC JAMSTEC ASSW NIPR/JAMSTEC NIPR, NIPR, JAMSTEC NIPR, JAMSTEC NIPR, JAMSTEC JAMSTEC

297