The Struggle for Hegemony and the Articulation of Plurinationality: Contrasting Visions of Social Change and State Transformation in Bolivia’S Proceso De Cambio
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
University of California, Santa Cruz The Struggle for Hegemony and the Articulation of Plurinationality: Contrasting Visions of Social Change and State Transformation in Bolivia’s Proceso de Cambio A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in POLITICS with an emphasis in LATIN AMERICAN & LATINO STUDIES Aaron Augsburger June 2018 The dissertation of Aaron Augsburger is approved: ____________________________________ Guillermo Delgado-P., Chair ____________________________________ Benjamin L. Read ____________________________________ Megan Thomas ____________________________________ Fernando I. Leiva _____________________________________ Tyrus Miller Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Conceptualizing Hegemony and Plurinationality in Bolivia’s Proceso de Cambio 11 3. Infrastructure, Extraction, and Indigeneity: TIPNIS and the Production of National Development 98 4. Plurality and Populism: CONAMAQ and Struggles of Indigenous Representation 155 5. Transforming the State? The Possibilities and Ambiguities of Indigenous Autonomy in El Estado Plurinacional 191 6. Conclusion 241 Bibliography 245 iii Abstract The Struggle for Hegemony and the Demand for Plurinationality: Contrasting Visions of Social Change and State Transformation in Bolivia’s Proceso de Cambio Aaron Augsburger Evo Morales and the MAS came to power in 2006 promising fundamental social, cultural, economic and political change, what they called el proceso de cambio (the process of change). While Bolivia has witnessed a number of important social, political, and economic changes, while also experiencing the most prolonged period of political stability in its history, significant disputes over land, territory, resources, identity, democracy, and the state remain. These differences have provoked conflicts over the vision, future direction, and transformational potential of Bolivia’s process of change. In this dissertation I argue that the central axis along which many of these conflicts rest can be theorized as an antagonism between two differing visions of social change and state transformation, conceptualized on the one hand as a struggle for hegemony, and on the other hand as a demand for plurinationality. Based on 16 months of ethnographic fieldwork, I argue that Morales and the MAS have pursued a vision of state-centered hegemonic change. In contrast, many of the actors that brought Morales to power have challenged the very legitimacy of the nation-state form and its culturally homogenizing practices. As an alternative, they offer a vision of plurinationality that seeks to “refound” Bolivia and recognize the cultures, economies, systems of social and political organization, and overall world visions that co-exist and interact within the geographic boundaries of the country. iv Introduction Every so often there are certain events that transcend their specific time and place, although their true significance is only really knowable to us in the future. When these events that transcend a particular moment, what García Linera labels “condensations of an era,” occur, “they divide history, because they announce that from that point on, social processes will follow new norms, though we only come to realize it years or decades later.”1 What came to be known as the Water War was one such event in Cochabamba in April 2000 where massive mobilizations of indigenous and popular forces came together to protest a water privatization scheme that had put the community’s water supply under the control of Aguas de Tunari, an affiliate of the transnational corporation Bechtel, that had sharply raised users’ rates.2 These protests eventually led to the cancelation of the privatization plan and the return of the Cochabamba’s water company to public hands. This uprising would come to be seen as the opening salvo of Bolivia’s 2000-2005 revolutionary situation that unified disparate social forces in a struggle against the country’s ruling elite and their model of development. This five-year period, which overthrew two sitting governments, ultimately brought Evo Morales, Bolivia’s first indigenous president, and the 1 Alvaro García Linera, “The Death of the Twentieth-Century Working-Class Condition,” in Plebeian Power: Collective Action and Indigenous, Working-Class, and Popular Identities in Bolivia, (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014), p. 117. 2 On the Water War, see, for instance, Oscar Olivera and Tom Lewis, Cochabamba!: Water War in Bolivia, (Cambridge: South End Press, 2004); Willem Assies, “David versus Goliath in Cochabamba: Water Rights, Neoliberalism, and the Revival of Social Protest in Bolivia,” Latin American Perspectives, 30 (3), 2003, pp. 14-36; and William Finnegan, “Leasing the Rain,” The New Yorker, April 8, 2002. 1 Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement toward Socialism, MAS) to state power in 2006.3 Morales and the MAS came to power promising fundamental social, cultural, economic and political change, what they called el proceso de cambio (the process of change). Despite all the lofty goals and expectations that accompanied their rise to power, perhaps not surprisingly Morales and the MAS have not been able to deliver wholesale transformation. While Bolivia has witnessed a number of important social, political, and economic changes, while also experiencing the most prolonged period of political stability in its history, significant disputes over land, territory, resources, identity, democracy, and the state remain.4 These differences have provoked considerable tensions and conflicts between civil society actors and the MAS government. In essence, the struggle is over the vision, future direction, and transformational potential of the process of change and is often framed as a profound difference over governance and the development model. In this dissertation I argue that the central axis along which many of the fundamentally divisive conflicts rest can be usefully theorized as an antagonism between two differing visions of social change and state transformation, conceptualized on the one hand as a struggle for hegemony, and on the other hand as a demand for plurinationality. Since the early days of the MAS administration, but 3 On revolutionary situations, see Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1978); Jeffrey Webber, From Rebellion to Reform in Bolivia: Class Struggle, Indigenous Liberation, and the Politics of Evo Morales, (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011). 4 For the most comprehensive overview of the Morales era, see Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl, Evo’s Bolivia: Continuity and Change, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015). 2 especially since 2009, Morales and his party have pursued a vision of state-centered hegemonic change. In this process, they play the role of a vanguard that relies on natural resource extraction, agro-industrial expansion, and ideas of resource nationalism and development while, at the same time, maintaining the institutional structure of the pre-existing liberal nation-state. In contrast, many of the actors that formed the backbone of the 2000-2005 insurrectionary mobilizations that brought Morales to power have challenged not only neoliberalism and its model of development and political representation, but also the very legitimacy of the nation- state form and its culturally homogenizing practices. As an alternative, they offer a vision of plurinationality that seeks to “refound” Bolivia through the recognition of the diversity – both indigenous and non-indigenous – of cultures, economies, systems of social and political organization, and overall world visions that co-exist and interact within the geographic boundaries of the country. Contrasting Hegemony and Plurinationality Much of the literature focusing on the revolutionary period of 2000-2005 and the current process of change in Bolivia maintains the fundamental causes were related to the failures of neoliberalism and the political party system. These arguments are certainly true, but they only highlight the proximate causes of the insurrections. The “revolutionary epoch” of 2000-2005 was a period of crisis with various short-, medium-, and long-term causes.5 Some of the specific short-term 5 Raúl Prada, Horizontes de la Asamblea Constituyente, (La Paz: Ediciones Yachaywasi, 2006), p. 7. 3 motivations for the uprisings where the water privatization schemes in Cochabamba and El Alto and the plan to export natural gas to the United States through ports in Chile. These short-term motivations were linked to larger medium-term crises in the model of neoliberalism that had been applied in Bolivia since the mid 1980s, in addition to a crisis of political representation. From a much longer historical perspective, a system of colonialism installed during the conquest had remained through the independence period, the republican period, and even after the country’s social revolution of 1952. Thus, the revolutionary period at the turn of the 21st century should also be understood as a decolonial insurrection against an historical system of indigenous oppression and exploitation. It is important to understand these how these short-, medium-, and long-term causes and histories played out and came together in order to more fully comprehend contemporary Bolivia under Evo Morales and the MAS and the various tensions and contradictions of this current period. Bolivia entered into an era of hegemonic politics during the period between the