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CURRICULUM VITAE Hare, John E. Degrees: Princeton University Program in Classical Philosophy, Ph.D. 1975; Watkins Fellowship Balliol College, Oxford Honours Literae Humaniores, B.A. 1971 (First) Appointments: Yale University, Yale Divinity School Noah Porter Professor of Philosophical Theology, 2003 Calvin College Professor, 1989-2003 Lehigh University Instructor, 1974 Assistant Professor, 1975-1981 Associate Professor, 1981-1987 Professor, 1987 University of Michigan Visiting Assistant Professor, 1975 Medical College of Pennsylvania Visiting Fellow in the Humanities, 1978-1981 American Philosophical Association Congressional Fellow, 1981-1982 Staff Associate, House Foreign Affairs Committee Washington, DC, 1982-1983 Teacher, Tyndale-Biscoe Memorial High School, Kashmir (India) 1966-7 Lectureships, Fellowships and Prizes: Senior Fellowship, Center for Philosophy of Religion, Notre Dame, 2008- 09, and Plantinga Lecture 2008. Gifford Lecturer, 2005 Calvin Lecturer, 1999-2000 Stob Lecturer, Calvin College, October 1999 Senior Fellowship, Center for Philosophy of Religion and Erasmus Institute, Notre Dame 1998-99 Institute for Advanced Christian Studies (IFACS) Book Prize, 1997 Pew Evangelical Fellowship, 1991-92 Lindback Award for Distinguished Teaching, (Lehigh University) 1981 Elected Honorary Member Phi Beta Kappa, 1979 1. Evidence of Professional Achievement a. Publications (1) Books God and Morality: A Philosophical History, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007) Por Que Ser Bom?, (Editoria Vida, 2002, translation of Why Bother Being Good?) Why Bother Being Good?, (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, April 2002) God’s Call, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2001. Paperback 2001) The Moral Gap, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Paperback 1997) Ethics and International Affairs, (London: MacMillan, 1982), with Carey B. Joynt. Plato's Euthyphro, (Bryn Mawr, 1981; 2nd edition with revisions 1985). (2) Articles 62) ‘Moral Motivation,’ in Games, Groups, and the Global Good, ed. Simon Levin, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2009, 181-93. 61) ‘The Supervenience of Goodness on Being,’ in Metaphysics and God, ed. Kevin Timpe, New York: Routledge, 2009, 143-56. 60) ‘Interview with Professor John Hare,’ David Leimbach, Aporia vol. 27 no.1, 2009, 16-20. 59) ‘Is Moral Goodness without Belief in God Rationally Stable?’, in Is Goodness without God Good Enough?, ed. Robert Garcia and Nathan King, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, 2009, 85-99. 58) ‘Prescriptive Realism’, Realism and Religion, ed. Andrew Moore and Michael Scott, Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007, 83-101. 57) ‘Thorns’ in Prospect, vol 2, spring 2007. 56) ‘Kant and Depravity’, Philosophia Christi vol. 9, no. 1, 2007, 21-27. 55) ‘Religion and Morality’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 18,000 words, Sept. 2006. 54) ‘God’s Commands and Moral Realism’, in The Doctrine of God and Theological Ethics, ed. Alan J. Torrance and Michael Banner, London: T & T Clark, 2006, 55-70. 53) Reprint of 52, in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Melville Stewart and Xing Taotao, Peking: Peking University Press, 2005, 513-29. 52) ‘On Recognizing our Duties as God’s Commands’, Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2006, 275-85. 51) ‘Prescriptive Realism’, Philosophia Reformata, 71 (2006), 14- 30. 50) ‘Kant on the Rational Instability of Atheism’, in Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion, ed. Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006, 62-78. 49) ‘Kant on the Rational Instability of Atheism’, in God and the Ethics of Belief, ed. Andrew Dole and Andrew Chignell, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 202-18. 48) ‘Evolutionary Naturalism and Reducing the Demand of Justice’, in Religion and the Liberal Polity, ed. Terence Cuneo, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005, 74- 94. 47) ‘Is Er Een Evolutionaire Basis Voor Moral?’, Beweging 69: 1, 2005, 28-33. (translation of 45) 46) ‘Politics and Salt’, in Reflections, Yale Divinity School, Fall 2004, 21-23. 45) ‘Is There an Evolutionary Foundation for Human Morality?’ in Evolution and Ethics: Human Morality in Biological and Religious Perspective, ed. Philip Clayton and Jeffrey Schloss, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2004, 187-203. 44) ‘Immanuel Kant’ in Key Thinkers in Christianity, ed. Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason and Hugh Pyper, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 92-97. (reprint of 35) 43) ‘Christian Scholarship and Human Responsibility’, in Christian Scholarship...for What?, ed. Susan Felch, Calvin College, 2003, pp 51-69. 42) ‘Kantian Moral Education and Service-Learning’ in Commitment and Connection: Service-Learning and Christian Higher Education, ed. Gail Heffner and Claudia Beversluis, Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2002, 73-95. 41) ‘R. M. Hare: a Memorial Address’, in Utilitas, vol 14 no 3, 2002, 306-8. 40) ‘Being Good’, Mars Hill Audio Journal vol. 57, July/August 2002. 39) ‘The Virtue of Hope’, Christian Reflection, vol. 3, 2002, p. 18- 23. 38) ‘Morality and God’, vol. 13 no. 2, papers published by the Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, West Michigan University, March 2001. 37) ‘Duns Scotus on Morality and Nature’, Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 9: 1, 2001, 1-39. 36) ‘Kant’, Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, 5000 words, Oxford: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 365-366. 35) ‘Naturalism and Morality’ in Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal, ed. William L. Craig and J. P. Moreland, London: Routledge, 2000, 189-211. 34) ‘Kant on Recognizing our Duties as God’s Commands’, Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 17 No. 4, October 2000, 487-505. 33) Essay Review of Christine Korsgaard’s Creating the Kingdom of Ends and The Sources of Normativity, in Faith and Philosophy, vol. 17 No. 3, July 2000, 371-83. 32) ‘Kant’s Divine Command Theory and its Reception within Analytic Philosophy’, in D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin, ed., Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, London: Macmillan, 2000, 263-77. 31) ‘Moral Misdeeds: What’s Private? What’s Public?’, The Banner, 13 Sept. 1999, 14-16. 30) ‘Augustine, Kant, and the Moral Gap’, in The Augustinian Tradition, ed. Gareth B. Matthews, University of California Press, 1999, pp 251-62. 29) Autonomie de l'Ethique" (3000 words) in Dictionnaire de Theologie, ed. Jean-Yves Lacoste, Presses Universitaires de France 1998. 28) ‘Why Bertrand Russell Was Not a Christian’ (Essay Review of Ray Monk’s Bertrand Russell), Books and Culture, May/June 1997, 26-28. 27) ‘Atonement, Justification, and Sanctification’ (3000 words) in A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion , ed. Philip Quinn and Charles Taliaferro, Blackwell, 1997, pp. 549-555. 26) ‘Kantian Ethics, International Politics and the Enlargement of the Foedus Pacificum’, in Sovereignty at the Crossroads, Rowman & Littlefield 1996, pp. 71-92. 25) ‘The Unhappiest Man’ in Kierkegaard's Either/Or, International Kierkegaard Commentary, Mercer Press, 1995, pp. 91-108. 24) ‘The History of Christian Ethics’ (4000 words) in New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology, ed. David Kingon, InterVarsity Press, 1995, pp. 33-42. 23) ‘The Atonement’, Perspectives, May 1995, pp. 16-18. 22) ‘The Invitation’, poem. Dialogue March/April 1995, p. 8. 21) ‘Commercial Contracts and the Moral Contract’ in Christian Scholar's Review 1994, Vol. XXIII no.3, 259-266. 20) ‘Puffing up the Capacity’, in Journal of Philosophical Research, 1994 Vol. XIX, 75-88. 19) ‘Government, Ethics in’, in Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence C. Becker, 1992, pp. 412-416. Revised 1997. 18) ‘The Atonement; How does Christ Bridge the Gap?’ in The Banner, April 13, 1992, 4-6. 17) ‘Jackie Kennedy and the Seven Dwarfs’ in Dialogue, April/May 1991,Vol. 23 no. 6, 20-31. 16) ‘The Problem of Evil’ and 15) ‘The Argument from Religious Experience’ in Evidence for Faith, ed. Louis D. Whitworth and J. Warwick Montgomery. Dallas: Probe, 1990, 231-252 and 253-273. 14) ‘Eleutheriotes in Aristotle's Ethics’ in Ancient Philosophy, Spring 1988, pp. 19-32. 13) ‘Il Movimento Hospice e L'accettazione della Morte,’ Progressi Clinici: Medicina Vol. 3, No. 3, 1988, 137-140. (translation of 5) 12) ‘Commentary on Timothy J. Brennan,’ “Academic Disciplines and Representative Advocacy," Business and Professional Ethics Journal Vol. 6 No.1, 1988, 56-62. 11) ‘Aristotelian Justice and the Pull to Consensus,’ in International Journal of Applied Ethics. Vol. 3 Spring 1989. No. 3, 37-49. 10) ‘Nuclear Deterrence as Bluff,’ with J. Ralph Lindgren, in Political Realism and International Morality: Ethics in the Nuclear Age, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 144-152. 9) ‘Credibility and Bluff,’ in Avner Cohen and Steven Lee, ed. Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity, (Totowa; Rowman and Allanheld, 1986), pp. 191-199. 8) ‘Philosophy in the Legislative Process,’ International Journal of Applied Ethics, Vol. 2, No. 2, (Fall, 1984), pp. 81-88. 7) ‘Threats and Intentions,’ Evangelical Perspectives on the Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter, ed. Dean Curry, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), pp. 139-157. 6) ‘The Unfinished Business of the Peace Process in the Middle East,’ Report of Congressional Study Mission to Europe and the Middle East, November 1982, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 97th Congress, 2nd session. 5) ‘The Hospice Movement and the Acceptance of Death,’ Hospice U.S.A., ed. by Austin H. Kutscher, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 9-17. 4) ‘The Apology as an Inverted Parody of Rhetoric,’ with Douglas Feaver, Arethusa, 14.2. (Fall, 1981), pp. 205-216. 3) ‘The Limits of Paternalism in Emergency
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