Somalia National Health Cluster Meeting 17 Dec 2020, 10:00 Am to 12:00 ‘Noon

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Somalia National Health Cluster Meeting 17 Dec 2020, 10:00 Am to 12:00 ‘Noon Somalia National Health Cluster Meeting 17 Dec 2020, 10:00 am to 12:00 ‘noon Agenda Discussions Action points 1. Polio Update-WHO 4. Summary Presentation on the Perception Survey of Aid 2. Discussion on Radio Ergo Listener's Feedback -Radio Ergo Recipients in Somalia - Health Cluster 3. Cyclone Gati Update 5. AoB Introduction The meeting was opened by the Health Cluster Coordinator who welcomed all the participants connecting online. Participants were and opening encouraged to write in their name and organization name in the comments box and to type in questions in the comments box as the meeting remarks is ongoing; in order to respond as is possible and limit interruptions to the presentations. Polio WHO provided an update on the vaccine-derived Polio outbreak and planned vaccination campaign. As of the epidemiological week 45, a Partners to total of 348 AFP cases have been reported in 2020. Out of which 162 of the cases were female while the rest were male. 14 cVDPV cases communicate with have been reported in Somalia in 2020. The most recent cVDPV2 case reported on 25th October, 2020. 26 cVDPV2 (vaccine derived polio State-level mellitus) positive environmental samples have been reported in 2020, from six environmental sites in Banadir, Baidoa and Kismayo. The most Surveilance Officers recent cVDPV2 [ES] case reported was on 24th October, 2020. In 2020, 40 healthy children were sampled and 5 turned out to be positive for for alerts and cVDPV2. Date of collection of samples was 21st September 2020. All positive cases were from Borama District & Awdal region, in Somaliland. infomation This ongoing isolation of poliovirus from both the cases & environment suggests continuing transmission of cVDPV2 among the population. WHO is planning a nationwide polio campaign from the 20th-23rd of December 2020. Partners can support efforts to eradicate polio by ensuring that the health facilities they support offer RI including IPV, at all times with Penta 3. During the campaign, partners can coordinate with district or regional health authorities to ensure that stocks of polio vaccines finger marker and tally sheet for vaccinating children are available, especially if the health facility is busy. Monitor all under 5 children coming to the health facility during the campaign, if they have received polio vaccine by checking they have a finger mark on their finger or toe. If a child does not have the mark, offer the polio drops or refer them to the nearest vaccination team. Q: what states will be covered during NID? Country wide? A: This is a countrywide campaign targeting all accessible areas A: are there going to be any other vaccination campaign till Dec end other than NID? Q: Are the 348 cases all polio cases? A: These are acute flaccid paralysis cases whose samples have been collected to test for polio State-level Surveilance Officers contacts below for questions on AFP/Polio surveillance, and upcoiming NIDs: 1/3 State-level Surveillance Officers for AFP/Polio Jubaland Abdulahi Mohamed [email protected] South West Hussein Ali [email protected] Banadir Dr Farthun Hussein [email protected] Galmadug Mohamed Aden [email protected] Hirshabelle State Mohamed Abdule Osman (mohamedabdulle114@g Somaliland Dr. Hussein Mohamed Abdi [email protected] Puntland Abdi Nasir Elmi [email protected] Somaliland Abdi Dahir Elmi [email protected] Polio update Presentation: [click here] COVID-19 Real time updates on COVID-19 can be accessed through the below link: Update COVID-19 DASHBOARD, Somalia Discussion on Radio Ergo is a dedicated humanitarian radio for Somalia that is issue-based, and provides a platform for information sharing to save lives & Radio Ergo livelihoods. It is donor-funded and run by an NGO. Radio Ergo provides daily one hour broadcasts on shortwave and FM. The station also Listener's collects listener’s feedback and shares with stakeholders for action. Radio Ergo works around three approaches to include local reporting, that Feedback involves network of local Ergo correspondents across the regions reporting on stories from the ground; lifesaving and life enhancing information which includes information and discussion with experts, and the approach of audience feedback where audience have an independent call-in platform open across the country. Radio Ergo www.Radioergo.org/ Contacts: Louise Tunbridge (Coordinator) [email protected] Mohamed Shariff (Radio Ergo Editor) [email protected] Radio Ergo Presentation: [click here] Cyclone Gati The cluster has requested for information from partners on response to the cyclone. Information has so far been received from the cluster Partners requested Regional Focal Points, WHO Public Health Emergency Officers as well as three other NGOs. From the information received, the no of people to fill 4W response reached are 7608. There is a suspected cholera outbreak with 78 cases reported from 5th Dec in Afweyn town are being managed at Afweyn survey Health Centre. A sitrep has been shared and the partner has been lined with WHO for further support. Partners are requested to share any information on response through the 4W matrix shared by the cluster. Cyclone Gati update presentation: [click here] Gati 4W Response Survey: [click here] Summary A summary of the Ground Truth Solution’s Perception Survey of Aid Recipients in Somalia. Some of the key findings on health include: Presentation on • They need more information on available aid and how to access it. the Perception 2/3 Survey of Aid • Aid recipients also identified understanding how to access healthcare as an information gap, along with information on symptoms, testing, Recipients in and treatment for COVID-19 Somalia - • The majority of respondents say they are unable to meet their most important needs with the aid they receive. They identified better Health Cluster access to CVA, food, and healthcare as solutions. • Aid recipients do not understand how aid agencies decide who receives aid. • Healthcare featured as one of the top 5 unmet needs • Medicine featured as one of the top 3 items bought • Aid recipients also expressed a need for more information on accessing healthcare (63 percent) as well as on symptoms, testing, and treatment for COVID-19 For further information please see the survey report: [click here] Partner -PAC has continued to provide emergency outreach services supported by UNICEF-MOH in Wadjir, DayNile, Kaxda and Banadir. One notable Updates observation from the outreach is that the communities are still in fear and hesitant to be referred for COVID19 investigation. PAC has also received supplies of COVID 19 to support the community during the outreach. -STS: the ongoing COVID-19 IPC activities are running smoothly in its sites of lower Shabelle region, marka, janaale, Afgoye, but there is limited availability of PPE -Somali Aid, partnering with Medair are currently implementing integrated health,Nutrition,WASH and Covid-19 response activities in Lower Juba especially Kismayo and Badhadhe district. Kismayo health facilities include Suqaxolaha MCH, Sinai MCH and Abdalla Birolle MCH which is 50 KM away from kismayo town and Badhadhe Health facilities are Ras kamboni MCH, Kudha MCH and Burgabo MCH and all are in coastal town. Other activities that we are doing include crowd control, community awareness on covid-19 at the health facilities and community level. For the past few month we have mounted bill board with covid-19 messages in all public places and health facilities in all operation areas. Installed handwashing facilities in public places and health facilities. Meeting Recording Link https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UiSWGXy4O3pwgj_ml2FnoMY3FVILz6VB/view?usp=sharing Attendance: 32 Participants from the following organizations: Aamin Organization GRT Mercy USA UNICEF Aid Vision HIJRA PAC WARDI Alight (Formerly ARC) IMC SHO WARO CARE IOM Somali Aid Weyn Development Organization Cesvi IRC SOS WHO CWW Juba Foundation STS Health Cluster Team 3/3 .
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