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Assessment Report of Idps Movement in Northwest Syria

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Assessment Report of Idps Movement in Northwest Syria ASSESSMENT REPORT OF IDPS MOVEMENT IN NORTHWEST SYRIA Between 14 MARCH & 31 MAY 2018 [email protected] [email protected] opc.center www.opc.center GENERAL OVERVIEW Key Findings: A total of 118,862 people arrived to northwest Syria into Idleb and Aleppo governorates in the period between 14 March to 31 May 2018 1,351 IDPs from Al Qadam, 66,377 IDPs from Eastern Ghouta, 6,236 IDPs from Eastern Qalamoun, 9,250 from South Damascus and 35,648 from northern Homs countryside 84,290 IDPs arrived through Madiq Castle and 34,959 arrived through Abu Zendin crossing point near Al-Bab town The following map shows numbers and distribution of IDPs in northwest of Syria 2 Displacements to North West Syria from 14 March 2018 to 31 May 2018 TURKEY BULBUL JARABLUS RAJU 83 370 250 SHARAN 292 SURAN A'ZAZ 480 MA'BTALI 550 350 AGHTRIN 303 AFRIN MARE' 5549 45 JANDAIRIS AL BAB TURKEY 250 2786 HARITAN 652 DANA 4633 DARET AZZA 60 ALEPPO HARIM QOUR- 263 QEENA SALQIN 80 326 KAFR ATAREB TAKHARIM 1469 235 MAARET TURKEY ARMANAZ TAMSRIN 324 1020 TEFTANAZ 242 DARKOSH BENNSH ALBAB 232 137 JANUDIYEH IDLEB SARMIN 40 ALEPPO 2057 122 IDLEB JISR SARAQAB Administrative ASH-SHUGUR MHAMBAL ARIHA 750 262 215 1270 ABUL boundaries THOHUR 20 HAMA EHSEM 544 MA'ARRAT NOURTH HOMS International ZIYARA HOMS 74 ANNU'MAN 2371 Governorate KAFR NOBOL 763 HEISH 271 EAST QALAMUN District MADIQ LEBANON CASTLE EAST GHOTA 673 SOUTH DAMASCUS DAMASCUS KHAN SHAYKUN AL QADAM 126 Sub-District 3 AL QADAM 1351 EAST GHOTA: 66365 EAST QALAMUN: 6235 SOUTH DAMASCUS: 9650 NOURTH HOMS: 35648 MAP PRODUCTION DATE: 3/JUNE/2018 ABOUT THIS REPORT During the 2nd quarter of 2018, the Response Coordinators Team has followed the movement of the IDPs from the moment of their arrival to the reception centers in Qalaat Al Madiq (Hama) until they reached their final destinations. All the while assessing their basic needs and participating in coordinating humanitarian responses through sharing information with local and international actors operating on the ground. This report is the first of a series of reports that will be issued by “Orient Policy Center” and “Response Coordinators Team” and that will follow the movement of IDPs, assess their needs, analyze the dynamics of their relations with host communities, and offer the necessary information and recommandations to coordinate and improve humanitarian and developmental responses. This series of reports addresses governments and local and international non-governmental organizations, aiming at offering the necessary information to improve the level of responses, and to highlight the ensuing opportunities and challenges, starting from the smallest unit, the community. 1% OVERVIEW 5% • The military campaigns waged by the Syrian regime and its allies on Southern Damascus, Eastern 8% Ghouta, Eastern Qalamoun and Northern Homs countryside have displaced around 120,000 people towards the Northern Syria during the the 2nd quarter of 2018. 86% of them came from the areas that were considered as “de-escalation zones” in Eastern Ghouta and Northern Homs countryside. • Two thirds of the total number of IDPs displaced in 2018 are currently residing in Idlib Province, mainly in Harem District, while Afrin city in Aleppo countryside is the number one subdistrict in terms of number of IDPs. 30% 56% • The nature and level of challenges facing IDPs vary from one area to another. The main challenges are now related to shelter, health and emerging tensions between local communities and IDPs in some areas. • Humanitarian response to such a massive number of IDPs requires a high level of coordination and collaboration between governmental and nongovernmental organizations and agencies, both local and international, as they all have faced major challenges in dealing with the situation. More coordination ALQADAM EASTERN QALMUN SOUTH DAMASCUS is required between local, regional and international actors, authorities, governments, and NGOs to find solutions on the medium and long terms to the challenges IDPs are facing in North Syria. IDPs NORTH HOMS EASTERN GHUTA currently constitute more than 50% of the total population in the area. 4 MAIN DEVELOPMENTS • Since March 2018, the Syrian regime and its allies started several successive military campaigns targeting besieged areas near Damascus including “de-escalation zones” in Eastern Ghouta, and northern Homs countryside enclave, and also besieged Southern Damascus neighborhoods (al-Qadam and Yarmouk Camp), and al-Dameir in Eastern Qalamoun. The regime and its allies have also threatened Yalda, Babila, Beit Sahem in South Damascus and Jairoud, al-Rhaybeh, al-Nasyrieh and Atneh in Eastern Qalamoun with similar campaigns. • All of the above mentioned campaigns ended up with Russian- sponsored agreements between the local communities and local 460 opposition factions on the one hand, and the Syrian regime on the other. In addition, the regime reached an agreement with Islamic State fighters in Yarmouk Camp. All of those agreements allowed 2461 307 128 civilians and fighters who did not want to be part of the reconciliation 1377 with the Syrian regime to be transferred towards the North of Syria, 721 or the East in the case of IS fighters, with guarantees from Russia. The agreements included other stipulations regarding the handing over of heavy weaponry, allowing the regime institutions to enter and 6314 3400 2759 2682 2786 operate from the areas, and in certain cases handing over security to the Russian military police. • Between March 14 and May 17 2018, 118,862 IDPs have left towards AFRIN HAREM IDLIB MAARAT AL-NUMAN AL-BAB northern Syrian . The convoys were directed to the agreed areas, EASTERN GHUTA SOUTH DAMASCUS NORTH HOMS mostly Idlib region, Al Bab in Aleppo countryside, and Afrin districts, while a few dozens arrived to Turkey. • The chart shows the percentage of IDPs in the 5 key areas in the northwest of Syria. IDPs have been classified into three general groups based on areas of origin: 1- Eastern Ghouta (Harasta, Irbin and Douma), 2- South Damascus (al-Qadam, Babila, Yalda, Beit Sahem, Yarmouk Camp & al-Qalamoun) 3- Northern Homs Countryside 5 THE JOURNEY TO THE NORTH • The Convoys: IDPs were transported from Damascus, Damascus countryside and Northern Homs to the north of Syria by buses in several waves under Russian guarantees and supervision. Convoys mostly were directed to Zero Point (Qalaat Al Madiq in Hama) or Abu Zendin crossing point south of al-Bab. • Zero Point: Many local organizations prepared a point to receive the IDPs’ convoys in Qalaat Al Madiq, a town in Hama. Zero Point was equipped with medical units and teams, recovery and resting areas and sanitary services. Quick meals and water were also prepared on the IDPs’ arrivals and ambulances were ready to transport the wounded and injured to hospitals. Volunteers helped the IDPs and organized reception centers and coordinated the movement of buses. • Temporary reception centers: After Zero Point some of the IDPs were transported to temporary reception centers according to space availability and capacity of those reception centers. • Camps and the hosting communities: The biggest number of IDPs were hosted by local communities and shelter locations prepared whether by local councils or local NGOs. The majority of those who arrived to the temporary reception centers later moved either to camps or host communities. • Aleppo northern countryside: Convoys arrived into northern Aleppo countryside at Abu Zendin crossing point, near al-Bab city, faced challenges accessing the area and waited sometimes for several days before being directed to temporary reception centers or camps present in the area. The following table shows IDPs numbers and information about the displacement process: IDPs Home Area The Start of the displacement process Number of IDPs South Damascus – Al Qadam Neighborhood March 14 : 3 convoys 1351 Eastern Ghouta: Total: 66377 Harasta March 23 : 2 convoys 5204 Central Sector (Zamlka, Irbin & Joubar) March 25-April 1 : 11 convoys 40895 Douma City April 2 : 9 convoys 20278 Eastern Qalamoun April 21 : 5 convoys 6235 South Damascus (Yalda, Babila, Beit Sahem) May 3 : 7 convoys 9250 Northern Homs Countryside May 7- May17: 9 convoys 35648 6 GEOPOLITICS OF THE HOST COMMUNITIES • The majority of the IDPs (about 63%) settled in Idlib governorate and west Aleppo countryside while only 14% settled in northern Aleppo countryside districts (Azaz, al-Bab and Jarablus), and 23% settled in Afrin district. • IDPs did not have the freedom to choose their destination, most of the IDPs convoys arrived in their final destination according to previous political, logistical, and humanitarian arrangements. Although the three regions are geographically connected, neither the IDPs nor the inhabitants had the choice to move freely between them. The figure shows percentage of IDPs in each of the three areas. 14% • The great majority of IDPs (84%) opted to live within local host communities, while only 16% are staying in camps, mud villages, and in some cases in informal settlements. 23% 63% IDLIB EUPHRATES SHEILD AFRIN 84% 16% 99.1% 0.5% 0.4% WITHIN LOCAL COMMUNITIES MANAGED CAMPS MUD VILLAGES INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS 7 • Challenges in the three areas differ in nature. Despite of the relative stability in Idlib region after the establishing of joint Turkish-Russian-Iranian observation points in the de-escalation area, possibilities of military confrontations are still present. Area/IDPs percentage Idlib Region 63% Euphrates Shield areas 14% Olive Branch areas 23% Geographical area Idlib Province, parts of northern Hama Parts of Aleppo’s northern and Afrin and its countryside countryside, western Aleppo country eastern countryside including al- side and eastern Lattakia countryside. Bab, Jarablus and Aazaz Military Forces in Control HTS and “Jabhat Thuwar Syria” and the Arab and Turkmen factions sup- Arab and Turkmen factions supported by Tur- National Front for Liberation ported by Turkey, working to unite key and working to unite under a national army.
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