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Thinking About Deterrence Thinking about Deterrence Enduring Questions in a Time of Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism Edited by Adam Lowther Air University Press Air Force Research Institute Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama Project Editor Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data James S. Howard Thinking about deterrence : enduring questions in a Cover Art, Book Design, and Illustrations time of rising powers, rogue regimes, and terrorism / Daniel Armstrong edited by Adam Lowther. Composition and Prepress Production pages cm Nedra Looney Includes bibliographical references and index. Print Preparation and Distribution ISBN 978-1-58566-227-2 (pbk : alk. paper) Diane Clark 1. Deterrence (Strategy) 2. United States—Military policy. I. Lowther, Adam, editor of compilation. U162.6.D487 2013 355’.033573—dc23 AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE 2013035133 AIR UNIVERSITY PRESS Director and Publisher Allen G. Peck Published by Air University Press in December 2013 Editor in Chief Oreste M. Johnson Managing Editor Demorah Hayes Design and Production Manager Cheryl King Air University Press 155 N. Twining St., Bldg. 693 Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6026 afri.aupress@us.af.mil http://aupress.au.af.mil http://afri.au.af.mil/ Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other AFRI US government agency. Cleared for public Air Force Research Institute release: distribution unlimited. ii Contents List of Illustrations v About the Authors vii Foreword xi SECTION 1 THE Prospects for Deterrence IN CYBerspace 1 Introduction: The Evolution of Deterrence 3 Adam Lowther 2 Operationally Responsive Cyberspace: A Critical Piece in the Strategic Deterrence Equation 17 Kevin R. Beeker, Robert F. Mills, Michael R. Grimaila, and Michael W. Haas 3 Deterrence in Cyberspace 37 Kamal T. Jabbour and E. Paul Ratazzi SECTION 2 THE RELEVance of NUCLEAR Deterrence IN THE TWENTY-First CENTURY 4 Why Nuclear Deterrence Is Still Relevant 51 Elbridge A. Colby 5 How Much Is Enough? A Goal-Driven Approach to Defining Key Principles for Measuring the Adequacy of US Strategic Forces 75 Keith B. Payne 6 Tailored Deterrence, Smart Power, and the Long-Term Challenge of Nuclear Proliferation 95 Jonathan Trexel 7 Is a New Focus on Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Necessary? 119 Anne Fitzpatrick iii CONTENTS 8 Mathematical Foundations of Strategic Deterrence 137 Edward H. Robbins, Hunter Hustus, and James A. Blackwell Section 3 NEW ApproacHES TO ConVentional Deterrence 9 Deterring Rogues: Modeling the Intent of Revolutionary State Actors 169 Gary Schaub Jr 10 Deterring Nonstate Actors 195 Adam Lowther 11 Space Strategic Deterrence: Achieving Space Superiority 217 Dale Hayden 12 Unmanned Air Systems and Deterrence 249 James D. Perry Abbreviations 271 Bibliography 273 Index 309 iv CONTENTS Illustrations Figure 1.1 Conflict pyramid 7 2.1 DOJOC model of deterrence 19 2.2 ORS concept 22 2.3 Implementation of the ORS concept 23 2.4 ORC contributes to benefit denial 24 5.1 Requirements for strategic forces 92 6.1 Strategic deterrence model 96 6.2 Long-term deterrence strategies 100 6.3 Strategy options 101 6.4 Campaigning and bargaining 107 6.5 Bargaining early 108 8.1 Depiction of optimization of the linear function for first strike 150 10.1 Deterrence model 199 10.2 National interests 203 10.3 Conflict pyramid 204 10.4 Nonstate actor deterrence model 207 Table 2.1 Comparison of ORS to ORC 25 3.1 USAF strategic imperatives are enabled by nine primary technical capabilities 38 3.2 Cyberspace differs fundamentally from other domains 42 6.1 Long-term deterrence strategy overview 103 v CONTENTS 8.1 Ellsberg’s nuclear warfare incomplete game payoff matrix 139 8.2 Altered model (payoff matrix) of two-player nuclear war 142 8.3 Ellsberg’s incomplete game restated in our context and notation 143 8.4 Tacit formulation of Ellsberg’s game in our context/notation 144 12.1 Manned and unmanned endurance 256 12.2 Hours on station per sortie for manned and unmanned aircraft at a given range 256 12.3 Number of persistent orbits a force of 100 aircraft generates at a given range 257 vi About the Authors Kevin R. Beeker is a US Air Force senior combat pilot in the A/OA-10 and has also completed a joint tour flying F/A-18s with the US Navy. He currently works in the Combat Targeting Division at US Cyber Command, Fort Meade, Maryland. He received his MS degree in cyber warfare from the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright- Patterson AFB, Ohio. James A. Blackwell is special advisor to the assistant chief of staff, strategic deterrence and nuclear integration, at Headquarters US Air Force. He received his PhD and MALD from the Fletcher School of International Law and Diplomacy and BS from the US Military Academy. He previously served as executive director of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management. He co-edited Making Defense Reform Work with Barry Blechman (Brassey’s, 1990) and has authored numerous books and articles. Elbridge A. Colby is a principal analyst at the Center for Naval Anal- ysis, where he advises a number of US government entities on deter- rence and nuclear weapons issues. He previously served in a number of government positions, including the New START negotiations and ratification team for the Department of Defense and as an advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission. He is a graduate of Harvard College and Yale Law School. Anne Fitzpatrick earned her PhD in science and technology studies from Virginia Tech in 1998. Her research includes high-performance computing and strategic science and technology analyses. She has lived and worked in the former Soviet Union and is fluent in Russian. Michael R. Grimaila is an associate professor of systems engineering at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. He received his PhD in electrical engineering from Texas A&M University. His research interests include mission assurance, network manage- ment and security, quantum cryptography, and systems engineering. Michael W. Haas is a principal electronics engineer at the 711th Human Performance Wing, Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright- Patterson AFB, Ohio. He received his PhD in engineering and ap- plied science from the University of Southampton, United Kingdom. His research interests include cyberspace operations, information operations, and human interface technology. Dale Hayden is the deputy director of the Air Force Research In- stitute (AFRI). He has authored a number of articles on Air Force vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS topics, with a focus on space issues. Colonel Hayden completed a dis- tinguished Air Force career in 2008 after more than 25 years of ser- vice as a space and missile officer. He holds a PhD in administration of higher education from the University of Alabama. Hunter Hustus is technical advisor to the assistant chief of staff, strategic deterrence and nuclear integration at Headquarters US Air Force. He received his MA in political science from the University of South Dakota. He previously served as foreign policy and congres- sional affairs advisor to US Air Forces in Europe and served as a B-52 electronic warfare officer and NATO staff officer before retiring from active duty. Kamal T. Jabbour is senior scientist for information assurance in the Information Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome, New York. He taught and conducted research for two decades on the computer engineering faculty at Syracuse University, including a three-year term as department chair. Dr. Jabbour has received one US patent, published more than 60 papers in refereed journals and con- ference proceedings, and penned 317 articles on running. Adam B. Lowther is a research professor at the AFRI. He is the author of numerous books, chapters, journal articles, and editorials on contemporary defense issues. Before joining AFRI, Dr. Lowther taught international relations and security studies at two universities. He also served in the US Navy at several shipboard and shore com- mands. He holds a PhD in international relations from the University of Alabama. Robert F. Mills is an associate professor of electrical engineering at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. He received his PhD in electrical engineering from the University of Kansas. His research interests include network management and security, electronic warfare, and systems engineering. James D. Perry holds an MA degree in security policy studies and a PhD in history from George Washington University and was a visit- ing fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1996–97. He is currently a senior analyst for Northrop Grumman Corporation, where he conducts defense policy, operational, and budgetary analyses to support company programs. His particular areas of expertise include long-range strike, unmanned systems, and emerging antiaccess threats to power projection. E. Paul Ratazzi is a principal engineer in the Cyber Assurance Branch of the Air Force Research Laboratory in Rome, New York. His viii ABOUT THE AUTHORS research interests include access control and security for mobile devices and assured cloud computing. He holds BSEE and MS degrees in management from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and an MSEE from Syracuse University and is currently a PhD candidate (ABD) in electrical and computer engineering at Syracuse University. Keith B. Payne is the president of the National Institute for Public Policy, a professor and the head of the Graduate Department of De- fense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Washington Campus), the chairman of the US Strategic Command’s Strategy and Policy Panel, the editor-in-chief of Comparative Strategy: An Inter- national Journal, and a co-chair of the US Nuclear Strategy Forum. He has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy.
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