INTRODUCTION
BRONNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX R SECTION III.G EVALUATION
The modifications made during the recoverv from the March 22, 1975, fire were intended to provide protection azainst the loss of more than one division of safetv equipment in the event of a fire. The modifications included nhysical moving of certain electrical conduits, the application of a fire resistant cable coating, and the addition of extensive fire protection systems. These changes and the plant's original separation criteria for Class 1E circuits as outlined in our FSAR are consistent with the philosophy outlined in section IXI.G.1. However, to be able to respond fully to section III.G and Fire Protection Rule Generic Letter 81-12, TVA performed a detailed analysis to compare the Browns Ferry safe shutdown systems and their associated .circuits for compliance with section III.G. TVA contends that Browns Ferry', upon completion of identifed modifications, will satisfy the intent of the requirements of section III.G. The safe shutdown analvsis and the manner in which it was performed is discussed in Attachment 1. The required shutdown equipment and time frames in which it is required is identified in Attachment 2. An analysis of circuits which can become associated with safe shutdown circuits is presented in Attachment '3. Attachments 0 and 5 discuss the electrical modifications, administrative controls, and fire protection modifications required to bring Browns Ferry into compliance with section III.G. A discussion of the impact on safety due to proposed modifications is presented in Attachment 6. Attachment 7 identifies the exceptions to the requirements of section XII.G and'rovides justification for each exemption requested. The request for additional information made by the NRC in Enclosures 1 and 2 of,'eneric'Letter 81-12 is presented in Attachment 8. l . Attachment 9 is the implementation schedule for modifications described in Attachments 0 and 5.
E52165.01
ATTACHMENT 1
SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS
l-l E5216 5.01 1.0 SCOPE
The following document summarizes the definitions, limiting safety conditions, separation criteria, requirements and assumptions, and procedure used to perform the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant safe shutdown analysis considering a fire as the initiating event.
2 .0 DEFINITIONS
2 1 Associated Circuits — Those safety-related and non-saf ety- related circuits that are not directly required to perform a safe shutdown function but have either:
1. A common power source with a shutdown circuit where the power source is not electrically protected from the shutdown circuit by coordinated circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or
2. A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation will adversely affect the shutdown capability, or
3 . A common enclosure, cable tray, conduit, panel, or junction box with a shutdown circuit and: a. Are not electrically protected from the shutdown circuit by circuit breakers, fuses, or similar devices, or b. Will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure.
2.2 Postulated fire —A fire that is assumed to occur in a specific area of the plant. The origin of the fire and the combustible materials involved are not defined.
2.3 Safe shutdown — The process of bringing all three reactors from . power operation to hot shutdown and then cold shutdown. 2.4 Hot shutdown — A stable plant condition where all three reactors are subcritical and have average coolant temperatures above 212'F.
2.5 Cold shutdown —A stable plant condition where all three reactors are subcritical and have average coolant temperatures below 212'F.
2.6 Fire area —An area completely enclosed by fire-rated barriers.
2.7 Fire zone —A subdivision of a fire area.
1-2 E52165.01 3.0 LIMITING SAFETY CONDITIONS
The .safe shutdown analysis determines the plant modifications required to ensure the following damage limits are not exceeded as a result of a single postulated fire: 3.1 Electrical cables and associated circuits of a minimum set of equipment necessary to achieve hot shutdown must be maintained free of fire damage. 3.2 Electrical cables and associated circuits of equipment necessary to achieve cold shutdown may be damaged. However, the damage must be limited so that a minimum set of equipment can be repaired or made operable within 72 hours using onsite capability. 3.3 Electrical circuits of equipment necessary for mitigation of design basis events may be damaged.
4.0 SEPARATION CRITERIA
The following means of protecting the safe shutdown capability from postulated fires are acceptable: 4.1 Separation of cables and associated circuits of redundant safe shutdown equipment by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating, or 4.2 Separation of cables and associated circuits of redundant safe shutdown equipment by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet if there are no intervening combustibles and if fixe detectors and an automatic fire suppression system are installed in the area, or 4.3 Separation of cables and associated circuits of redundant safe shutdown equipment by a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating if ~ fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system are installed in the area around the barrier.
5.0 REQUIREMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
5.1 The only unacceptable consequence of a fire is the inability to safely achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions ~ 5.2 All three units are operating at 100 percent power when a fire is postulated.
5.3 A postulated fire is not considered inside Primary Containment since it is inerted with nitrogen during power operations.
5.4 A postulated fire is assumed to occur in any other area containing electrical circuits necessary for safe shutdown, whether or not the area contains permanent combustible materials.
1-3 E52165.01 5.5 The zone of influence of a postulated fire is bounded by the largest area defined by the separation criteria of section 4.0.
5.6 Safe shutdown circuits and associated circuits are assumed to be damaged if.-they are in the zone of influence of a postulated fire.
5.7 No failures other than those directly attributable to a postulated fire will be considered.
5.8 No design basis events are considered concurrent with a postulated fire., 5.9 Equipment required for safe shutdown during a postulated fire must be capable of being powered by onsite emergency power systems.
5.10 Equipment required for safe shutdown during a postulated fire need not be designed to meet seismic Category I criteria, single failure criteria, or other design basis event criteria.
5.11 Cables whose exposed surfaces are coated with flamemastic or are enclosed in conduits are not considered an intervening combustible for the purposed of meeting the separation criteria , of section III.G.2.
5.12 For the first hour of a postulated fire, manual actions by operations personnel are limited to manipulation of controls located in the Main Control Room or Backup Control Stations.
5.13 After the first hour of a postulated fire, manual actions by operations personnel may include manipulation of equipment located anywhere in the plant.
5.14 During a post fire shutdown, the fission product boundary integrity must be maintained (e.g., no fuel clad damage, no rupture of any primary coolant boundary, no r upture of the containment boundary).
6.0 PROCEDURE FOR PERFORMING ANALYSIS
6.1 Determine the functions required to achieve and maintain safe plant shutdown. 6.2 Produce shutdown logic diagrams that define minimum systems that can perform required safe shutdown functions and satisfy section 4.0.
1-4 , E52165.01 8' 6.3 Group specific rooms or buildings into fire areas where a postulated fire requires the availability of similar safe shutdown equipment. 6.4 For each fire area defined in 6.3, identify one ox more paths through the Shutdown Logic Diagrams that will satisfy each required shutdown function. Identify one path if the required systems are located outside the fire area under consideration. If a function could not be satisfied with equipment located outside the fire area, identify redundant paths consisting of widely separated equipment inside the fire area. 6.5 Develop functional criteria that define the required equipment for the shutdown paths identified in 6.4. 6.6 Identify power and control cables for:
1. The equipment identified in 6.5 that is directly involved in performing required safe shutdown functions, or 2. Associated cables that are not adequately isolated from the safe'shutdown cable.
6.7 Mark the routing of the cables defined in 6.6 on cable tray or conduit drawings in such a manner that one can distinguish between redundant circuits. 6.8 Identify all interactions of redundant shutdown equipment whose circuits did not meet the separation criteria of section 4.0.
1 6.9 Determine whether the redundant shutdown circuit interactions are to be:
1. Corrected by cable rerouting, or 2 . Corrected by separation of redundant circuits by fire rated barriers, or 3. Corrected by addition of protective devices, or 4. Corrected by relocation or addition of equipment, or 5. Justified by analysis, or 6. Any combination of the above. 6.10 Determine if additional fire suppression and detection systems were needed in the redundant shutdown circuit interaction areas.
1-5 E52165. Ol ATTACHMENT 2
FUNCTIONAL CRXTERIA
2-1 E52165.01 I. SCOPE The functions required for safe shutdown of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant are identified in shutdown logic diagrams, figures I.a, I.b, and I.c. The methods of accomplishing these functions and the timing of the required operations are addressed in this criteria. For the purpose of the safe shutdown analysis, the plant is divided into the following fire areas: Reactor building/diesel generator building (RB/DGB)—Includes all areas of the diesel generator buildings and reactor buildings with the exception of the shutdown board rooms.
Shutdown board rooms (SBRs) —Each SBR is considered separately, figures 1.d through l.k. Control building (CB)—Includes all areas of the control building with the exception of the battery board rooms.
Battery board rooms (BBR)—Includes the battery and battery board rooms 1, 2, and 3, figures 1.1 through l.n. Turbine building/intake pumping station (TB/IPB)—Includes all areas of the turbine building and the intake pumping station. Existing compartmentation was utilized in the selection of these fire areas. Each area, with the exception of the BBRs, is enclosed by an equivalent 3-hour rated fire barrier. The BBRs are enclosed by 1-1/2- hour rated fire barriers.
The fire area boundaries were selected so that comparable actions are needed to safely shut the plant down for a fire anywhere in the area. II. CRITERIA All times identified in the following discussions are measured from the initiation of fire shutdown procedures and not from the start of the fire. Operating personnel are expected to use normal procedures to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition when a fire is detected. The equipment outlined in this document will be available for use following emergency procedures if operating personnel determine that the normal procedures cannot be completed due to fire induced equipment failures.
2-2 E52165.01 A. ,Time Less Than One Hour (Figure I.a)
1 . Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Integrity
a. RB/DGB, SBR, BBR, or TB/IPS Fixe
Control of a minimum set of valves is required to maintain RCS integrity during a fire. Table II.A.l lists the individual valves, their mode of operation and their required position. By ensuring the RCS will be isolated, other system requirements can be minimized.
b. CB Fire A minimum of one valve per process line (i.e., inboard or outboard) as listed in Table II.A.l must be controlled at the backup control stations 'with a fire in the CB.
2. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Rater Inventory Control
a. RPV Depressurization System Figure I.A indicates that an air supply is requixed for (S/R) valves during the first hour. This airthe'afety/relief supply will consist'of the ADS accumulators or the Dxywell Control Aix receivers. This is a passive system, therefore, no other consideration is required.
(1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, or BBR Fire
A minimum of four S/R valves per unit must be capable of being operated from the main control room (HCR) and no S/R valves may spuriously operate except at their pressure setpoints. See table II.A.2.a for a listing of the valves xequired and their respective mode of operation.
(2) CB Fire
Back-up contxol must be provided for a minimum of four S/R valves per unit with the remaining valves being adequately isolated from the CB to prevent spurious actuation. Refer to table II.A.2.a for the specific valves required.
(3) SBR Fire
Each SBR is considered as a separate fire area as shown in figures I.d-I.k. Board rooms A, C, and E are divided into two separate fire zones as follows: One zone will encompass the panel 25-32 and the closest distribution board (labled Al, Cl,
2-3 E52165.01 and El respectfully in the SBR analysis) while the other zone will include the whole room excluding panel 25-32 (labled A2, C2, and E2 respectfully in the SBR analysis). Refer to figure I.d, I.f, and I.h for the above descriptions.
The requirements for the S/R valves for all board rooms except Al, Cl, and El are the same as those discussed in section II.A.2 .a.(1) . For board rooms Al, Cl, and El, it is possible that some S/R valves can spuriously operate. By having a maximum of seven S/R manual control circuits in one fire area, the assumption is made that no more than four of the S/R valves will operate simultaneously. Figure II.A.2.a.(3) illustrates RPV water level as a function of time with four S/R valves operating to depressurize the vessel and one Core Spray System and one RHR system automatically making up vessel inventory. It is evident that more than adequate inventory makeup is available to reflood the core and then keep the core covered. Therefore, a maximum of seven S/R valve manual control circuits may be grouped together provided a minimum of one, Core Spray System and one RHR System (2 pumps) will function automatically at their respective setpoints for the affected unit. See table II.A.2.a for specific valves required. b. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System
RB/DGB Fire
One RHR pump and its associated valves must be available at the backup control stations for the fire affected unit. The minimum amount of equipment is justified by ensuring RCS integrity (sections II.A.l.a and II.A.2.a.(1)). The pumps to be used will be pumps 1B and 2D for a unit 1 fire; pumps 1A and 2C for a unit 2 fire; and pump 3C for a unit 3 fire. Table IX.A.2.b.(1) lists the requirements for each unit. The use of one RHR pump in conjunction with manual actuation of four S/R valves to depressurize the vessel as an inventory makeup method is equivalent of one RHR pump operating with the Automatic Depressurization System.
(2) TB/IPS or BBR Fire Since'CS Integrity will be ensured for fires in these areas (see sections II.A.l.a and II.A.2.a.(1)), manual operation and minimal system requirements are justified. Table II.A.2.b.(2) lists the equipment required and their respective mode of operation with control from the MCR.
2-4 E52165.01 (3) CB Fire
The equipment listed in table II.A.2.b.(l) must be operable for a fire in the CB. This will provide a minimum of one RHR system (one pump) per unit to meet RPV inventory requirements.
(4) SBR Fire
For all SBRs except Al, Cl, and El, the requirements are identical to those given in section II.A.2.b.(2).
For board rooms Al, Cl, and El, an RHR System (2 pumps) is required to operate automatically in the unit affected by the spurious S/R valve operation. For those units unaffected by the S/R valves, the requirements are the same as those given in section IX.A.2.b.(2). Refer to table II.A.2.b.(3) for automatic RHR system requirements . c. Core Spray (CS) System
(1) RB/DGB, BBR, TB/IPS or CB Fire
There are no requirements for the CS system for a fire in these areas.
(2) SBRs Fire Areas
For a fire in board room Al, Cl, or El, one CS system is required to operate automatically as shown in table II.A.2.c.(2) for the unit affected by the spurious S/R valves (i.e., Al-unit 1, Cl-unit 2, El-unit 3) ~ For other SBR fire areas see the requirements for CS system in section II.A.2.c.(1). d. High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) System
(1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, BBR, or SBR Fire
There are no requirements for the HPCI System for a fire in these areas. e. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System
(1) RB/DGS, TB/IPS, CB, BBR, or SBR Fire
There are no requirements for the RCIC System for these fire areas.
2-5 E52165.01 f. Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) System
RB/DGS, TB/IPS, or SBR Fire
A minimum of two RHRSW pumps, which service the EECW system in the same header (i.e., north or south) are required to start automatically and no more than one valve to close in the respective header being relied upon. The requirements for the system are listed in table II.A.2.f.
(2) CB Fire
A minimum of two pumps and three of its associated valves are required to have back-up control isolation. See table II.A.2.f for equipment required. 3. Reactivity Control
a. Reactor Protection System (RPS)
RB/DGB or TB/IPS An automatic scram signal is required if one of the following transients occur and off-site power is available: (a) RPV Low Mater Level or, (b) High RPV Pressure. A manual scram signal is also required for the above fire areas. Once a scram signal is generated, the signal must also reach the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic (CRDH) system to ensure a successful sc ram ~
SBR or BBR Fire
A fire in any of these areas would not defeat the ability of the RPs to generate a scram signal. A loss of power to the logic would be the only effect a fire would have on the RPs for the areas given, and such a loss would generate a scram signal. Therefore, the RPs meets the criteria for these areas with no further analysis.
(3) CB Fire Area
A reactor scram will be obtained by opening the power disconnect to the RPs at the Battery Board. The RPs will generate a scram signal upon loss of power. The RPs Panels are grounded and all connections to power are fused. Therefore, no hot shorts to maintain power are credible and a scram signal can be generated.
2-6 E52165.01 b. Control Rod Drive Hydraulic (CRDH) System
(1) RB/DGB Fire
A signal to the CRDH system to scram will be assured's discussed in the RPs description for the same fire area. The CRDH system will lose power which will cause the control rods to insert. This will limit our concern to hot shorts. No power for the control rod drive solenoid valves will be available except for hot shorts from other systems located in the same area. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that any more than a few will fail to insert due to a fire. These few will then be assured to insert by requiring one set of the back-up scram solenoids to operate, and venting any control air and allowing the remaining rods to insert due to loss of control air. See table II.A.3.b for the CRDH system requirements.
(2) TB/IPS, CB, SBR, or BBR Fire
The RPs description (section II.A.3.a) assures a scram signal will be received at the CRDH system panels. These panels are located solely in the RB area and will be unaffected by a fire in any of these areas. " 4. Process Instrumentation
a. RB/DGB, TB/XPS, CB, SBR, or BBR Fire
The instrumentation required fox all fire areas is (a) RPV Water Level (-155" to +55"), and (b) RPV Pressure (0 to 1500 lb/in g). These variables will provide sufficient information to allow the operator to take all manual actions required. RPV water level and pressure will allow the operator to maintain adequate inventory (see figure I.A). Reactivity contxol and RCS integrity are being assured (sections II.A.l and II.A.3). Therefore, these variables will be adequate to ensure a hot shutdown condition in the first hour of the event.
The minimum instrumentation loops needed to monitor the variables for each fire area are listed in table IX.a.4. For a CB fire the indicators for these variables are required on the backup control panels. Indicators for a fire in any other area are required in the MCR.
2-7 E52165.01 5. Auxiliary Power
a. RB/DGB Pire
Power must be available to the minimum equipment required for a fire in this area. The power requirements are * d xvid e d ino,into three, sections. Sections (1), (2), and ( ) list the minimum distribution boards required for a unit 1 unit 2, and unit 3 fire respectfully.
(1) Unit 1 Fixe
The following distribution boards are required to have power available to accommodate the RHR system circuits associated with the boards:
Unit 1 Untt 2 Unit 3
4-kV Shutdown Bd C 4-kV Shutdown Bd 9 4-kV Shutdown Bd 3EB 480-V Shutdown Bd 1B 480-V Shutdown Bd 2B 480-V Shutdown Bd 3A 480-V RMOV Bd 1B 480-V RMOV Bd 2B 480-V RMOV Bd 3A 480-V RMOV Bd 1E 480-V RMOV Bd 2E 480-V RMOV Bd 3D
The above requirements also hold true for a fare an the units 1 and 2 diesel generator building (DGB). Other distribution boards must be available for the equipment being relied upon.
(2) Unit 2 Pire
The fo llowing distribution boards are required to have power avax'1 abl e to accommodate the RHR system circuits associated with the boards:
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3
4-kV Shutdown Bd A 4-kY Shutdown Bd B 4-kV Shutdown Bd 3EC 480-V Shutdown Bd 1A 480-V Shutdown Bd 2A 480-V Shutdown Bd 3B 480-V RMOV Bd 1A 480-V RMOV Bd 2A 480-V RMOV Bd 3B 480-V RMOV Bd 1D 480-V RMOV Bd 29 480-V RMOV Bd 3E
Other distribution boards must be available for the equipment being relied upon.
K (3) Unit 3 Pire
The following distribution boards axe required to have power available to accommodate the RHR system circuits associated with the boards:
2-8 E52165.01 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3
4-kV Shutdown Bd A 4-kV Shutdown Bd D 4 kV Shutdown Bd 3EB 480-V Shutdown Bd lA 480-7 Shutdown Bd 2B 480-V Shutdown Bd 3A 480-V RHOV Bd 1A 480-V RMOV Bd 2B 480-V RMOV Bd 3A 480-V RMOV Bd 1D 480-V RMOV Bd 2E 480-V RMOV Bd 3D
Other distribution boards must be available for the e uipment being relied upon. In the unit 3 DGB, any combination may be used provided the minimum equipment has the power required.
b. CB, TB/IPS, BBR, or SBR Fire
Adequate powex must be available to supply the equipment being relied upon for the above fire areas.
3.2 Time Greater Than One Hour (Figure X.B)
1. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Xntegrity,
a. RB/DGB, SBR, BBR, or TB/IPS Fire
The requirements for equipment are the same as those identified in section XI.A.l.a.
b. CB Fire
The requirements fox equipment are the same as those identified in section II.A.I.a.
2. Reactor Pressuxe Vessel (RPV) Mater Inventory Control
a. RPV Depressurization System
The control air for the S/R valves is still required after one hour. The air supply is required to be capable of manual manipulation.
(1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, or BBR Fire
The requirements for equipment are the same as those identified in section IX.A.2 .a.(I) with the exception that only one S/R valve is required to be operable.
(2) CB Fire
The requirements for equipment are the same as those identified in section II.A.2.a.(2) with the exception that only one S/R valve is required to be operable.
2-9 E5216 5.01 (3) SBR Fire
The requirements for equipment are the same as those identified in section II.A.2.a.(3) with the exception that only one S/R valve is required to be operable. b. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System
See section II.B.5 for additional RHR requirements.
(1) RB/DGB Fire
The requirements for equipment are the same as those identified in section II.A.2.b.(l) with the exception being that FCV-74-52 or FCV-74-66 must be capable of being throttled. h
(2) TB/IPS or BBR Fire
The requirements for equipment are the same as those identified in section II.A.2.b.(2) with the exception that FCV-74-52 or FCV-74-66 must be capable of being throttled.
(3) CB Fire
The requirements for equipment are the same as those identified in section II.A.2.b.(3) with the exception that FCV-74-52 or FCV-74-66 must be capable of being throttled.
(4) SBR Fire
The requirements are the same as those listed in section II.B.2.b.(2). c. Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) System
(1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, BBR, CB, or SBR Fire
A minimum of two RHRSW pumps in the same EECW header are required to remain operable and three of its associated valves remain open for all of these areas. See table II.A'.2.f for the equipment required. d. Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System
See section II.B.5.b for RHRSW requirements .
E52165.01 0 3. Reactivity Control
a. RB/DGB Fire
The method for assuring the control rods remain fullful y inserted will be to isolate the contxol air supply to the control rod flow solenoid valves.
b. BBR, CB, TB/XPS or SBR Fire Th fl olenoid valves will remain deenergxzed (safe state) for the above fire areas to preclude wx.thdx w the control rods. 4. Process Instrumentation
a. RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, SBR, or BBR Fire
The requirements for equz.pment are sti'll the same as those identified in section II.A.4.a.
5. Decay Heat Removal
a. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System
(1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, BBR, or SBR Fire
One RHR pump and its associated valves axe required to be operable in the torus cooling mode. This pump ma be the same pump being used for RPV Water Inventory Control. Figure II.B.5.a il1us traatese the pool heat-up as a function of time with pool cooling begxnnxngb a t 1 hour. The following considerations have been analyzed to ensure one pump is sufficienient ox torusorus cooling:~ (a) RHR Net Positive Suction ead {NPSH), {b) Thermal Stresses on Torus andnd AttachAttached Piping, and (c) Adequate Suppression of Steam. See table II.B.5.a for valve position requirement.
b. RHR Service Mater (RHRSM) System
(1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, BBR, or SBR Fixe
A one RHRSM. pump per corresponding RHR pump must'fbe operable after one hour. The valves associated with the RHRSM pump must be in their required position to accommodate the flow path or the RHRSW system. See table II.B.5.b for system requirements.
2-11 E5216 5.01 c. Essential Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) System
(1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, SBR, or BBR Fire
See section XI.B.2.c for EECW requirements. 6. Shutdown Contxol Area Environmental Control
a. Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System
(1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, SBR, or BBR Fire
For a fire in these areas the HCR HVAC must be capable of operation via local or remote control after 1 hour. The equipment required is listed in table II.B.6.a.(1).
(2) CB Fire
The equipment listed in table IX.B.6 .a.(2) is xequired to have adequate isolation from the CB fire area.
7. Auxiliary Power
a. RB Fire
The requirements are the same as those specified in section IX.A.5.a for the respective units fire areas with one addition being that either 4-kV Shutdown Board A or C be energized.
b. CB,TB/XPS, SBR, or BBR Fire
See section XI.A.5 .b for the requirement in the above fire areas. c. Time Before Seventy Two Hours (Figure I.c)
1. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Integrity
a. RB/DGB, CB, SBR, TB/IPS, or BBR Fire
The requirements are the same as those given in section II.A.l.a with exception to the RPV head vent valves and shutdown cooling suction valves. These valves are not required once RPV pressure and RPV temperature are below the setpoints given on figure I.c.
2-12 E52165.01
0 2. Heat Removal and Xnventory Control
a. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System
(1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, SBR, or BBR Fire
Once RPV pressure is below 75 lb/in2g, the RHR system being used can be placed in the shutdown cooling mode of operation. This is done by repositioning of some RHR valves . See table XI.C.2 .a fox the RHR system requirements.
b. RHR Service Rater (RHRSM) System
(1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, BBR, or SBR Fixe See section II.B.5.b for system requirements for the above fire areas. c. Essential Equipment Cooling Rater (EEL) System
(1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, SBR, or BBR Fire
See section II.B.2.c for EECW requirements. 3. Reactivity Control
a. RB Fire
See section II.B.3 .a for reactivity control requirements.
b. BBR, CB, TB/IPS, or SBR Fixe
See section IX.B.3.b for reactivity control requirements. 4. Process Instrumentation
a. RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, SBR, ox BBR Fire
See section IX.B.4.a for instrumentation requirements.
. 5. Shutdown Control Area Environmental Control
a. Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System
(1) RB/DGB, TB/IPS, SBR, ox BBR Fixe
See section II.B.6 .a.(l) for system requirements .
(2) CB Fire
See section II.B.6.b.(1) for system requirements.
2-13 E52165.01 6. Auxiliary Power
a. RB/DGB, TB/IPS, CB, BBR, or SBR Fire A minimum amount of distribution boards are required to supply power to the necessary equipment.
III. CONCLVSION
By ensuring the minimum equipment in section II will be available for the respective fire areas, a stable hot and cold shutdown can be accomplished regardless of a fire in any area of the plant.
2-14 E5216 5.01 II 1 Pl srh Oper«leon
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on Rase\or r------a~Sac naia h C»lael Solar 401CSr Ioas Pressers RPV Iolg"lsI I I l. h)cqoaic p««~e ae«al lse. aces/able f R RPV afolcr 1«rerslorq I I tet«ape«o«1 iaa I'4 arplitowa rsl aallooan co'Lls CloLr-op Ca»i.ol ( 'ss 2, I t taatll too'l«ES aenavselagca 4a ~ ~ ~ aaa' 1. toison also«ll '41ln «sallaiea 2O «a'.earl«a. .I Ih~osl i«el;ol»n ~ 'l a coca«a ra1aa\ ac o)el«ala ~ ~ a«11 >o«oollec cnl bee«E is art'ala!'Ie 4 ~color oel:~. APPENDIX R asgO h. 011aar «solar 'Iaaranloral a»oA olo sane',1 ~ rl aat llHIXG..L:D...... g.rc«er Coo lcncq Orceoi~ Irate«EDaaa hl . A~ S11IIIDQWN of lira« cll lo e«oll 1ea aaCDc ~ > I ~ LOGIC c air.l 14 inoc«l«S .I sLa trV. 11.1 SS 1la asaooaal R'CV Tee r otlt BAOMII5 I'callr tria I ac rlalU REII < 1." c Oa c.. Carr 0lfftk4 SIH APR.SlD 1 I igure I.a r Rsrlcsul f~~ Al RPV Y~c RIR't k,(t ~i firer ~ 1 («ev
5ee eel ~ C Arel t(<4 Co ital Beh.up RVCu V.4S l RIIOI Zeal Dr5<<% Rev«a'«r« feu Reev« Cer«I«el He» {'A Ra(Cll Velec4 It< Re~Vie«(y 5LI I» C lr OII Octal 'Cecal Cea(rol Area E~r:r (( I(e»( am RPV Pre< RPV P {All'R RI(R I R«R h a 5t« t I IevRP (Ier f ty« LPCI P44 t QPV ««(<4< T«rce4 g HRlV< Cl TLv CLAW OR t(OVf5< 1 Vhc Rl(R prie( tgu:tck tet leeua ec<«( r«<( RC5 (ee Il«c Sa«e«c purep l«<«g ucch ter t(PY Irllc ft' IIt ~rt3 cr ge«ec~b<«r«l Cenlral. Tl«la u«'Al 4. 4 vc Are()L:g ~ (prep<:ale valves (e t a a : I a I >a«I> Q lke „.. RPl>»qrt>l'r Katf Pate««1 RPC Rre Cowl 8««L Ca«l al l>J rl g er ( Ari«Me Pr« ~ a>tc Pa \ 1 1 4 15>t 4 lr«l P~a.g P«Q > 4$ >s ~I ~ alt >>sent «C44 D» Rst Creel j r al~J Resell«i>~ ll«g'alar«~ ss> ~ ~l>al oR Swig Cwlt lie«4 la 4«a i«<+ k ILL K «. Pan C««l,al lr«l 1 QR {g el >CLl RCD Ts le«r'tQ eggs 1 RPt Ta»g +At'f Ti»~ «'Zl«a hi«Pl tll)1X 8, UNLIT,.i=A :RlU lOO>>IN ) LOGiC %0MtlS ffRR'f NUCLLAR PLAHT Date« P».A4ral,M Dr>lltR ssD S Figure I.c I»s>>t>MK Cl»>lkltt> 'Z Z ' ~ ' + ~ pi. ~ gl /pl I I FAtRT I 1 I 7'-0" I I ~ ~ 4 lI' 2'-3" I 0 /9" l I I p9 I /2" BOARD ZOON A EC GZ/Z5 F/GOjvE 1.cf 2-2 pygmy v'TDA'D O 8 A ~ (~ l~ S O Ir) Z-6 VAR'/ES VARIES~ z BOAS 'ROANB EZ 593.0 ~R/4 b ~ q' ' ~ '- L h "4 6 BOARD h'OON C El 6Z/.ZS FSSuiZ2:5 2-Z 0 ~ ~ I C -'2 a <0 a O ~o g4 ~, e Ct) 6~2 2'-6" 3'-6'" ~ A ~ ~ 4C sr /8"' zs'~ z BOARD ZOON D EL 893.0 F/Elf'y l l "t I l sv. j b 0 p4VEL Z5-9Z-8 VAR/ES l I I 2- g g» I I 1 I I 20" 'b d. ROON BOARD E'L 681.25 F%URE I. A 2-2 2. '20 RZ/ 25'-0" ' P ~ I ~, ~ .'b l. L'' NEIGES I 5'-6 ~rl ~ ~ l ' b ~ . b 'b '. BOARO ROON F EL 599.0 FlGLIRE 2 i 223 ~~REAcfoR BLDG- Uiv/T3 BL 593'-0" ~ ~ ~ ~, /6'-0' COiYS7 dP&VIA5S(Sarah'OTE3) Hi l i i 4/AYSflfDA'DSEA 4(60 Y SIITOiV8jP SEC ~i ii70iVT l 8' '!3PII.Sa 82 -Z8'-2" . -8 ~4'~IZPh'E-S 8 2-'Z.Z8'-Z'e t l orsero WIDOW s/77K'ORN SEA 80848E SLIDING IIRE'OoR LADDER TO &HE'RGB'CY EXIT W ROOF COVZREO NnPI/0/.E IN FI.OOR Herc/ LERNER Oa~ie ro EL Sar.5 0tl SZI4Yb5 Fl)Pf PRIV .C >' 'F C r / IO II 9 IO l2 8 FRONT 250Y BTRY BD I ~250V BTRY CHGR FRONT 250V BTRY 2 8 l2 250V BTRY CHGRS 9 ll IO I p I 0 SATTERY aoAED zoon z EL 593.0 F/BOA'E Z m RIB / 1// " ~/ 7// 2 5 4 250V BTRY BD 5 FRONT ll 9 CQ (g 12 8. 250V,BTRY CHGR ' k~, ''F ~ ~ e 5 ~ ~ p ~ gATPggy 80AFi'J ROOPP 3. Zl 563.0 FIGURE 2: n BFH RPP R STUDY 4 "GRV V I- g) >o Q, CV Ol a tQ I lJ CL lD $7% F Q7 LD C V) I - )gV. 5 ao aa JZO . 160 200 240 280 320 T I HE t SEC ) BFN APP R STUDY '4 SRV TORU$ ~O ll N cb lu Q ~G ~ tL ~ W~ G3 v'. CA > Q cK U7 }—n ~o Q Ol 6000 12000 18000 24000 30000 36000 42000 48000 Ttt1E l SEC) TABLE II.A.I Reactor Coolant System Integrity E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration Position PCV-69-16 1,2,3 Manual Closed FCV-69-17. Manual Closed Fcv-69-1 Manual Closed PCV-69-2 Manual Closed FCV-74-47 1,2,3 Stay as is Closed PCV-74-48 1,2,3 Stay as is Closed FCV-1-55 1,2,3 Stay as is Closed PCV-1-56 Stay as is Closed FCV-1-14 1,2,3 Manual/Automaticl Closed PCV-1-15 Manual/Automaticl Closed PCV-,1-26 1,2,3 Manual/Automaticl Closed Fcv-1-27 1,2,3 Manual/Automaticl Closed J Fcv-1-37 152>3 Manual/Automatic Closed PCV-1-38 Manual/Automaticl Closed FCV-1-51 1,2,3 Manual/Automaticl Closed PCV-1-52 Manual/Automaticl Closed Fcv-3-98 1,2,3 Manual, Closed Pcv-3-99 Manual Closed Pcv-43-13 1,2,3 Manual Closed FCV-43-14 Manual Closed Notes: RB and TB 1 ~ Valve must close automatically upon RPV low water for the fire areas. 2-31 E52165.01 TABLE II.A.2.a Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control S/R Valve Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration Position PCV-1-4 1,2,3 Manual Non-ADS Operable PCV-1-18 1,2 Manual Non-ADS Operable PCV-1-23 1,2,3 Manual Non-ADS Operable PCV-1-41 1,2 Manual Non-ADS Operable PCV-1-42 1$ 2$ 3 Manual Non-ADS Operable PCV-1-179 Manual Non-ADS Operable ...'CV-1-180 Manual Non-ADS Operable .'.PCV-1-30',' '' 3 Manual Non-ADS Operable PCV-1-31 3 Manual Non-ADS Operable PCV-1-5 1,2,3 Manual ADS Operable PCV-1-19 Manual ADS Operable PCV-1-22 Manual ADS Operable PCV-1-30 1,2 Manual ADS Operable PCV-1-31 1,2 Manual ADS Operable PCV-1-34 1,2,3 Manual ADS Operable PCV-1-18 3 Manual ADS Operable PCV-1-41 3 Manual ADS Operable 2-32 E52165.01 TABLE II.A.2.b.(1) Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control RHR Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration S s. Position II RHR Pump A or C 2 j3 Manual I Running RHR Pump Cooler A or C1 2 j3 Automatic I Running FCV-74-1 or 121 2j3 Manual I Open PCV-74-96 or 971 2 j3 Manual Closed PCV-74-.7 2 j3 Manual I Open/Close PCV-74-100 2 j3 Manual- I Closed PCV-74-60 or 61 2 j3 Manual ,I Closed PCV-74-77 or 78 2 j3 Manual I Closed PCV-78-61 or 62 2j3 Manual I Closed PCV-74-58 2 j3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-59 2 j3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-52 2 j3 Manual I Open PCV-74-53 2 j3 Manual I Open PCV-68-79 2 j3 Manual I Closed RHR Pump B or D 1 Manual II Running RHR Room Cooler B or Dl 1 Automatic II Running FCV-74-24 or 351 1 Manual II Open PCV 74 98 or 991,2 1 Manual II Closed PCV-74-30 1 Manual II Open/Close PCV-74-101 1 Manual II Closed PCV-74-74 or 75 1 Manual II Closed PCV-74-77 or 78 1 Manual II Closed FCV-78-61 or 62 1 Manual II Closed PCV-74"73 1 Manual II Closed FCV-74-66 1 Manual II Open PCV-74-'67 1 Manual II Open FCV"68"3 1 Manual II Closed PCV-74-72 1 Manual II Closed Notes: 1. The only piece of equipment required is the one associated with the operating pump. The equipment is listed respectfully (i.e. FCV-74-1 is A FCV-74-12 is required for pump required for pump while C).'. Backup control is not required provided unit 2 has backup control for valves 96 and 97. 2-33 TABLE II.A.2.b.(2) Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control RHR Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration S s. Position RHR Pump A or C 1~2s3 Manual I Running RHR Pump Cooler A or Cl Automatic I Running FCV-74-1 or 121 Manual I Open Closed FCV-74-96 or 971 2 $ 3 Manual I FCV-74-7 1,2,3 Automatic I Open/Close FCV-74-100 2 j3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-60 1,2,3 Manual I Closed ~ FCV-74-77 or 78 2 $ 3 Manual I Closed 'CV-78-61 or 62 2 $ 3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-58 1,2,3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-59 Manual I Closed FCV-74-52 Manual I Open FCV-74-53 Manual I Open FCV-68-79 Manual I Closed RHR Pump B or D 1,2,3 Manual II Running RHR Pump Cooler B or Dl Automatic II Running ;'CV-74-24,or-351 Manual II Open FCV-74-98 or 991 1,2 Manual II Closed FCV-74-30 1,2,3 Automatic II Open/Close FCV-74-101 1,2 Manual II Closed FCV-74-74 1,2,3 Manual II Closed FCV-74"77 or 78 1 Manual II Closed FCV-78-61 or 62 1 Manual II Closed FCV-74-72 1,2,3 Manual II Closed FCV«74-73 Manual II Closed FCV-74-66 Manual II Open FCV-74"67 Manual II Open FCV-68"3 Manual II Closed Notes: 1 ~ The only piece of equipment required is the one associated with the operating pump. The equipment is listed respectfully (i.e. FCV-74-1 is required for pump A while FCV-74-12 is required for pump C).'-34 E52165.01 TABLE II.A.2.b.(3) Reactor pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control RHR Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration S s. Position RHR Pump A and C 1,2,3 Automat ic I Running RHR Pump Cooler A and C Automatic I Running PCV-74«1'nd 12 Stay as is I Open PCV-74-96 3 as is I Closed , and 97 2$ Stay 'FCV-74-7 1$ 2$ 3 Automatic I Open/Close FCV-74-100 2 $ 3 Stay as is I Closed PCV-74-60 or 61 1,2,3 Stay as is I Closed PCV-74-77 or 78 2 $ 3 Stay as is I Closed PCV-78-61 or 62 2 $ 3 Stay as is I Closed FCV-74-58 1,2,3 Stay is is I Closed FCV-74-59 Stay as is I Closed PCV-74-52 Stay as is I Open PCV-74-53 Automatic I Open PCV-68-79 Automatic I Closed RHR Pump B and D 1,2,3 Automatic II Running RHR Pump Cooler B and D Automatic II Running FCV-74-24 and 35 Stay as is II Open PCV-74"98 and 99 1,2 Stay as is II Closed FCV-74-30 1,2,3 Automatic II Open/Close PCV-74-101 1,2 Stay as is II Closed PCV-74-74 or 75 1,2,3 Stay as is II Closed PCV-74-77 or 78 1 Stay as is II Closed PCV-78-61 or 62 1 Stay as is II Closed FCV-74"72 1,2,3 Stay as is II Closed .PCV-74-73 Stay as is II Closed 'FCV-74"66 Stay as is II Open PCV-74-67 Automatic II Open PCV"68-3 Automatic II Closed 2-35 E52165.01 TABLE II.A.2.c.(2) Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control CS Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration S s. Position CS Pump A and C 152>3 Automatic I Running CS Room Cooler (A 6 C) Automatic I Running FCV-75-2 Stay as is I Open FCV-75-11 Stay as is I Open FCV-75-9 Automatic I Open/Close FCV-75-23 Stay as is I Open FCV-75-25 Automatic I Open FCV-75-22 1,2,3 Stay as is I Closed CS Pump B and D 1,2,3 Automatic II Running " CS Room Cooler (B & D) Automatic II Running PCV-75-30 Stay as is II Open FCV-75-39 Stay as is II Open FCV-75-37 Automatic II Open/Close FCV-75-51 1~2,3 Stay as is II Open PCV-75-53 1,2,3 Automatic II Open PCV-75-50 1,2,3 Stay as is II Closed . 2-36 TABLE II.A.2.f Reactor Pressure Vessel Mater Inventory Contxol EECW Requirements 'E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 erationl Hdx. Position RHRSW Pump A3 and C3 0 Automatic North Running FCV-67-13 0 Stay as is North Open FCV-67-17 1 Stay as is North Open FCV-67-21 2 Stay as is North Open FCV-67-25 3 Stay as is North Open RHRSM Pump B3 and D3, 0 Automatic South Running FCV-67-14 0 Stay as's South Open FCV-67-18 1 Stay as is South Open FCV-67-22 Stay as is South Open FCV-67-26 3 Stay as is South Open Notes: I. For a CB fire, the mode of operation is manual for backup control. 2-37 E52165.01 TABLE EZ.A.3.b Reactivity Control CRDH Requirements ,E ui ment. Uni.t Mode of 0 eration Position PSV-85-35A 1,2,3 Automatic Energized PSV-85-70A 1,2,3 Automatic Energized PSV-85-35B 1,2,3 Automatic Energized PSV-85-70B Automatic Energized 2-38 E52165.01 TABLE II.A.4 Vital Instrument Loops 1 ~ General Area Fire Reactor Vessel Level LITS-3-46A and LI-3-46A or LITS-3-46B and LI-3-,46B Reactor Vessel Pressure PT-3-207, PI-3-207, PX-3-207, and LM-3-206 or PT-3-61, PX-3-61, PI-3-61, LM-3-60, and XS-3-53 2 ~ Control Ba Fire Reactor Vessel Level LITS-3-58B and LI-3-58A Reactor Vessel Pressure PT«3-79, PX-3-79, and PI«3-79 2-39 E52165.01 TABLE II.B.5.a Decay Heat Removal'HR Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration S s. Position RHR Pump A or C 1$ 2$ 3 Manual I Running RHR Pump Cooler A or Cl Manual I Running PCV-74-1 or 121 Manual I Open FCV-74"96 or 971 2 $ 3 Manual I Closed Pcv-74-7 1,2,3 Manual I , Open/Close PCV-74-100 2 $ 3 Manual I Closed ,', ....Fcv-74-60 1,2,3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-77 or 78 2 $ 3 Manual I Closed FCV-78-61 or 62 2 $ 3 Manual I Closed Pcv-74-58 1,2,3 Manual I Closed Pcv-74-59 Manual- I Open PCV-74-52 or 53 Manual I Closed Fcv-74-57 Manual I Open RHR Pump B or D 1,2,3 Manual II Running RHR Pump Cooler B or Dl Manual II Running Manual Open , FCV-74-24 or 351 II 'I PCV-74-98 or 991 1$ Manual Closed Pcv-74-30 2',2,3 Manual II Open/Close Fcv-74-101 f 1,2 Manual II Closed Pcv-74-74 1,2,3 Manual II Closed PCV-74-77 or- 78; 1 Manual II Closed FCV-78-61 or 62 1 Manual II Closed FCV-74-73 1,2,3 Manual II Open PCV-74-66 or 67 Manual II Closed Pcv-74-71 Manual II Open Pcv-74-72 Manual II Closed Notes: 1 ~ .The only piece of equipment required is the one associated with the operating pump. The equipment is listed respectfully (i.e. FCV-74-1 is required for pump A while FCV-74-12 is required for pump C).'-40 E52165.01 1 ~ TABLE II.B.5.b Decay Heat Removal RHRSW Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration Position RHRSW Pump A2 0 Manual Running RHRSW Pump Al 0 Manual Running FCV-23-34 1,2,3 Manual Open RHRSW.Pump C2 0 Manual Running RHRSW Pump Cl 0 Manual Running FCV-67-49 "0 Manual Closed FCV-23-40 1,2,3 Manual Open RHRSW Pump B2- 0 ~ Manual .Running RHRSW Pump Bl 0 Manual Running FCV-23-46 1,2,3 Manual Open FCV-23-57 2 Manual Closed RHRSW Pump D2 0 Manual Running RHRSW Pump Dl 0 Manual Running FCV-67-48 0 Manual, . Closed FCV-23-52 1,2,3 Manual Open FCV-23-57 1 Manual Closed 2-41 E52165.01 TABLE II.'B~ 6.a. (1) Shutdown Control Area Environmental Control HVAC Requirements E ui ment Unitl Mode of 0 eration Position MCR AHU A 1,2,3 Manual Running FCO-31-81 1,2 Manual Open PCO-31-104 3 Manual Open Chilled H20 Circ Pump A lr2r3 Manual Running Mater Chiller A Manual Running MCR AHU B 1,2,3 Manual Running FCO-31-82 1,2 Manual Open PC0-31-105 3 Manual Open Chilled H20 Circ Pump B 1,2,3 Manual Running Mater Chiller B Manual Running FCO-31-150B 1,2 Manual Closed PCO-31-150D 3 Manual Closed Emerg. Press. Pan A Manual Running 'oard Room Sply Fan lA Manual Running FCO-31-77B Manual Open PCO-31-151 Manual Open Emerg. Press. Fan B Manual Running Board Room Sply Pan 3A Manual Running PCO-31-77F Manual Open PCO-31-152 Manual Open NOTES 1. Units 1 and 2 have common equipment (i.e. one piece of equipment is sufficient for both units). 2-42 E52165.01 TABLE II.B.6.a.(2) Shutdown Control Area Environmental Control HVAC Requirements E ui ment Mode of 0 eration eratin Pos. Shtdn Bd A Emerg Cooling Unit Manual Running Shtdn Bd B Emerg Cooling Unit Manual Running Shtdn Bd C Emerg Cooling Unit Manual Running Shtdn Bd D Emerg Cooling Unit Manual Running Shtdn Bd E Emerg Cooling Unit %manual Running Shtdn Bd P Emerg Cooling Unit Manual Running AHU 3A-1 Manual Running AHU 3A-2 Manual Running Chilled Water Circ. Pump 3A-1 Manual Running Chilled-Water Circ. Pump 3A-2 Manual Running. Bd Rm Water Chiller 3A-1 Manual Running Bd Rm Water Chiller 3A-2 Manual Running FCO-31-110A Automatic Closed FCO-31-110B A Automatic Open PCO-31-110C Automatic Closed FCO-31-112A Automatic Closed PCO-31-112B B Automatic Open PCO-31-112C Automatic Closed FCO-31-116A Automatic Closed PCO-31-116B C Automatic Open PC0-31-116C Automatic Closed PCO-31-118A Automatic Closed PCO-31-118B D Automatic Open PC0-31-118C Automatic Closed PCO-31-121A Automatic Closed FCO-31-121B E Automatic Open FCO-31-121C Automatic Closed PCO-31-123A Automatic Closed PCO-31-123B F Automatic Open PCO-31-123C Automatic Closed NOTE: 1 ~ Dampers operate automatically due to operation of respective cooling unit. 2-43 E5216 5. 01 TABLE II.C.2.a Heat Removal and Inventory Control Requirements E ui ment Unit Mode of 0 eration S s. Position RHR Pump A or C 1,2,3 Manual I Running RHR Pump Cooler A or Cl Manual I Running FCV-74-2 or 131 1,2,3 Manual I Open FCV-74-96 or 971 293 Manual I Closed FCV-74-1 1,2,3 Manual I Closed PCV-74-12 Manual I Closed FCV-74-47 1,2,3 Manual I Open PCV-74-48 1,2,3 Manual I Open PCV-74-7 Manual I Open/Close PCV-74-100 2 s3 Manual I Closed PCV-74-60 or 61 1,2,3 Manual I Closed Closed PCV-78-61 or 62 2 $ 3 Manual I PCV-74-58 1,2,3 Manual I Closed FCV-74-59 Manual I Closed PCV-74-52 Manual I Open FCV-74-53 Manual I Open FCV-68-79 Manual I Closed FCV-74-77 or 78 2 f3 Manual I Closed RHR Pump B or D 1,2,3 Manual II Running RHR Pump Cooler B or Dl 1,2,3 Manual II Running FCV-74-25 or 361 Manual II Open FCV-74-98 or 991 1,2 Manual II Closed FCV-74-24 1,2,3 Manual II Closed PCV-74-35 1,2,3 Manual II Closed PCV-74-47 1,2,3 Manual II Open PCV-74-48 Manual II Open FCV-74-30 Manual II Open/Close PCV-74-101 1,2 Manual II Closed FCV-74-74 or 75 1,2,3 Manual II Closed FCV-78-61 or 62 1 Manual II Closed PCV-74"77 or 78 1 Manual II Closed FCV-74-72 1,2,3 Manual II Closed FCV-74-73 Manual II Closed FCV-74-66 Manual II Open PCV-74-67 Manual II Open FCV-68-3 Manual II Closed NOTES: 1. The only piece of equipment required is the one associated with the operating pump. The equipment is listed'respectfully (i.e. FCV-74-1 is 'required for pump A while FCV-74-12 is required for pump C).'52165.01 ATTACHMENT 3 ANALYSIS OF ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS OF CONCERN 3-1 E52165.02 1.0 SCOPE The Attachment 2 functional criteria addresses the minimum system requirements of those functions necessary for achieving and maintaining a shutdown condition in event of a postulated fire. To determine if modifications axe needed to comply with section III.G.2 of Appendix R, a reassessment was made of associated circuits of concern, whose fire-induced failures could affect the capability to shutdown. This reassessment was made to identify cables that are associated because they are not adequately isolated, and: 1. Have a common power source with 'required shutdown equipment, or 2. Could cause spurious operation of required shutdown equipment, or 3 ~ Share a common enclosure with required shutdown cables. The method used to perform the associated circuit analysis varies from the method=given by NRC in the Generic Letter 81-12 . However, the systematic approach described in this attachment demonstrates that the„ intent of Generic Letter 81-12 has been met. 2.0 DISCUSSION Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant has five different voltage level groupings of raceway (conduit and cable tray) systems, namely: 4160 V, 480'V, control, medium-level signal, and low-level signal cables. The':". 4160 V, 480 V, and control groupings are divided into divisional and nondivisional raceway systems. The 4160-V raceways contain only '-" 4160-V cables and axe located at the top position of verti'cally "->: "„' stacked trays. The 480-V raceways have 480-V power cables, lightiag . cabinet feeders, and instrumentation and control power cables carrying,. 30 A or more. Control level raceways contain alternating current and/or direct- current control cables of 250 V or less that carry less than 30 A and communication cables, such as for telephone circuits. Medium-level signal and low-level signal trays contain only nondivisional cables and are located at or near the lowest level of stacked trays. Divisional medium-level signal cables are routed in conduit. Medium-level signal trays carry the following type cables: signal cables of digital input to and outputs from the computer other than thexmocouples; instrument transmitters, recorders, and indicators; eccentricity and rotor detectors; RTD's, tachometers, and shielded annunciator cables used with solid-state equipment. Signal cables for thermocouples, strain gauges, vibration detectors, and thermal converters are nondivisional and are run in low-level signal raceways. These type cables are for very low power circuits- used to convey information. Instrument control loop and related instrument signal cables operate in a range of 10 to 50 mA with power supply voltages up to 85 V dc. The annunciator circuits operate at approximately 1 mA, 140-V dc intermittent duty. The computer cables 3-2 E52165.02 ~ operate at 160 mV into a high impedance. Thermocouples, strain gauges, accelerometers, and resistance-type temperature detectors are low excitation voltage devices; cables from these devices operate at 15 V or less and carry negligible current. Thus, energy produced by electrical faults in the cables routed in medium-level signal and low-level signal trays is considered insignificant and is considered no challenge to shutdown capability. A non-safety-related cable may be routed in a tray with safety-related cables, but once routed with one division of safety-related cables, it cannot cross over and be mixed with safety-related cables of the redundant division. The non-safety-related cables are the same type and have the same circuit protection,and short circuit rating as the safety-related cables . With respect to identifying associated circuits of concern, TVA has reviewed protection for power and control cables, and has determined that if a cable fault occurs, existing or proposed overcurrent protective devices will interrupt the fault before cable damage occurs. The fault will be cleared before autoignition temperature of the cable insulation is reached. One case was identified per unit where the load/feeder overcurrent protective devices are not adequately coordinated (see Analysis of Cables That Share a Common Power Source). Several cases were identified where existing cables that can share a common enclosure do not have adequate overcurrent protection; these cables require circuit modifications (see Analysis of Cables That Share a Common Enclosure). Cables used for 4160-7 circuits are shielded, 5-kV cables. The minimum size cable used for these circuits is 2/0 AWG. The 4160-V circuits are protected by both phase-to-phase overcuirent and ground fault protective devices. The phase-to-phase fault protection is instantaneous (no intentional delay). The ground fault devices are instantaneous in operation and are set,to operate for 'ground fault currents from 5 to 20 A. The 480-V cables are part of the 480-V ungrounded delta distribution system. Overcurrent protection is provided by molded case circuit breakers with an interrupting time of less than two cycles.and power circuit breakers with interrupting times of lessby'ow-voltage than four cycles if equipped with instantaneous trip devices, or up to 35 cycles if equipped with short time delay devices. In all cases, after circuit modifications are made to selected cables that share a common enclosure the protective device will clear a fault before the cable insulation reaches its auto-ignition temperature. Control level cables are used to provide instrumentat'ion and control power (below 30 A}, to convey information, or to intermittently operate devices controlling power switching or conversion equipment. The 250-V dc control power circuit was determined to have the highest 3-3 E52165.02 available fault energy. Each polarity of this ungrounded 250-V dc circuit is protected by a fuse or circuit breaker sized to protect the cable fxom damage. Thus, a fault will be cleared by a protective device before the cable insulation's,auto-ignition temperature-is reached. 3.0 ANAYLSIS OF-'CABLES THAT SHARE A COMMON POMER SOURCE Each safety-.related and non-safety-related circuit that shares a common power source with required shutdown equipment was analyzed to ensuxe that the power source is or will 'be adequately protected from electrical faults by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices. This analysis consisted of a,review of the overcurrent protective devices for the 480-V switchgear which shares a common power source, to verify proper coordination of the load and feeder breakers. Cooxdination. of protective devices for the 4160-V switchgear had been previously verified by formal xeview of protective relay setting instructions. In all cases, coordination exists between these breakers as designed. Each 4160 V and 480-V s'witchgear ha's' 250-V dc control bus. Since'ontrol level trays occupy a position below the power level trays, a postulated exposure fire could possibly cause a on the control cable for local, control or process interlock. 'ault This fault could trip the control circuit's protective device for a given pump befor'e its power feed cable becomes involved in the fire. Verification was made that each control circuit as designed was properly fused for this switchgear which shaxes a common power source with shutdown equipment. The existing des'ign of the 480-V motor control centers that share a common power source with required shutdown equipment, was determined to have proper coordination between the combination motor starter or circuit breaker for each load.and the feeder bxeaker. Also, the control circuit for each load has its own control transformer and is adequately fused as designed. Each circuit of the instrumentation and contxol power system that shares a common power source with requixed shutdown equipment was analyzed. For this analysis, it was assumed that a fault occurs at the point closest to the distribution panel where nonessential cables could be involved in a postulated fire, without also involving the required cables or the distribution panel itself. Except for one case per unit, the results of the analysis confirmed that the load/feeder overcurrent protective devices are adequately coordinated to ensure that instxument and control power is available to a minimum set of shutdown equipment for any postulated fire. This exception involves a control power load circuit of the unitized 250-V dc RMOV boaxd IA, 2A, and 3A. 3-4 E5216 5.02 4.0 ANALYSIS OF CABLES THAT CAN CAUSE SPURIOUS OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT Spurious operation of equipment due to associated circuits will not 'eopardize the shutdown capability because all equipment whose spurious operation could affect safe shutdown are included in the list of required equipment and will be separated or protected in accordance with section IXI.G.2 of Appendix R. Therefore, if a component does operate spuriously, its redundant counterpart is outside the fire's zone of influence and will not be affected. 5.0 ANALYSIS OF CABLES THAT SHARE -.A COMMON =ENCLOSURE At Browns Ferry nonessential cables can share a common enclosure (e.g., raceway, panel, junction) with required shutdown cables. An analysis was made of all switchgear, distribution panels and cabinets that could affect shutdown capability to determine if the load cables are adequately protected from damage by circuit breakers, fuses, or similar devices'hus, only those cables that are not adequately protected become associated circuits of concern. From the analysis, several cases were identified for each unit where the protective device is inadequate to protect the load cable from possible damage during a faulted condition. Although these cables are not required for shutdown for a postulated fire, they can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability. These cables will be modified to provide adequate cable protection or separation. In addition, exposed surfaces of cables in horiziontal and vertical cable trays have been coated with fire-retardant Flamemastic 71A or Flamemastic 77 in all areas outside primary containment that contain required safe shutdown circuits. The cable coatings coupled with compliance with section III.G.2 requirements provide adequate assurance that a fire can, be detected and extinguished before it prxopagatespa betweeen redundant circuits over intervening cable trays. The open cable trays axe the only common enclosures through w ic i could possibly propagate between xedundant shutdown circuits. 6 0 CONCLUSION After the proposed circuit modifications described in Attachment 4 are made, there will be no associated circuits of concern. Thus, the cables necessary for achieving and maintaining shutdown conditions in the event of a postulated fire will comply with section III.G.2 of Appendix R. 3-5 E52165.02 ATTACHMENT 4 ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS AND REQUIRED ADMINISTRATIVEACTIONS 4-1 E52165.02 1.0 SCOPE The electrical modifications and administrative controls required to bring Browns Ferry into compliance with section III.G.2 are the subject of this attachment. 2.0 SAFE SHUTDOW ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR THE REACTOR BUILDING/DIESEL GENERATOR AND TURBINE BUILDING/INTAKEPUMPING STATION FIRE AREAS The following section outlines the results of the Reactor Buildings/Diesel Generators and the Turbine Buildings/Intake Pumping Station. The tables are arranged to indicate all interactions between redundant equipment required for each function defined on the shutdown Logic Diagrams in Attachment 2 (figures I.a, I.b, and I.c). Each table has a sheet 0 which lists interactions between redundant components and a sheet 1 which provides details of each interaction identified on sheet 0 . Sheet 1 also references a corrective action sheet for each identified interaction. Tables are not provided for the RHR, Auxiliary Power, HVAC, and Drywell Control Air Systems due to the complexity or simplicity of the identified interactions. However, corrective action descriptions are provided for all these systems. In addition, diagrams are provided for the Auxiliary Power System illustrating the required power arrangements necessary to meet the functional criteria. 4-2 E52165.02 ~ ~ I. r ~ ar cc>vi H I n a l Cl n~4 n n Ial fl VI n ll rl a n 4 n I ~a 'a T aI V ~ I al aa ~lI II V CP la. aa ~a IL la a,> G FCV.es 1 ~ r ~CV C 0- I4 3 Zy. ICV.I S- I1 fCV 3- ~rCI ar ~ r. // r Y /r/ . rr IC, ~cv. 1 ~ it fet ~ 1 . gI, res. I ~ sr VCV. t-SI I I frr. $ ~ SS lO I fCif-43. It 5YHIÃ)I5l 1aaicr~laoaa IIIIC~~l l4 f~lea~t.~ AIIINnlX II RCACTOR BUII.DING fICACTOR COOLANT 5Z51CM IIIIUilfITY INSIIIS ffRflT fIN(Ihg Plhttf ra«slN.Vl ital ~ %" ' ~ Ilfil1'i'RD RC5'L ~ ya RIII n.. I I'>~ S CAB'LE RCSPOIIS1BLC G ROVI TBG its SEE r. hall g hT 1OIl ~ sf AIC>oAIIE R lf Cnull fhr.NT 'fLIIQ5 Sllf:f.l Of COIIRfCT I E SIIECT PIV>PIQfA YQQf IIVUIILB. 9 BfVXR~Xf PCV 69 1~8'. SET '1 Cab'lc Tra OetofIEB .IkteoS >P ~ Irc3>>~i ercsosell fe >,Q p.c >clif t FCV. GO-P. ID+Sea >I ~ Shr.c) 3 >bit fraf LLOYD cad~ >PC343 ~ SPCssS ~ I t SET> l. ~ IIEB qpcoSIV l> IIOTES> lcv. oo-'i t ~ e C>Mc Tee ~ I ~ recto OC'I 2 >Vari TD s i>V 4 >>> I'. FCV- e9- le IT ' Sloccl ~ v, q ~cvl Rc 4 IKIIl~o~&f I. The corrcclovc ocl eon Io bc ~ ~ >POD>O-U "~ ~ SE'P FCY ~ E> 9 2 1 Cable Te st ~o NEO D' 0 ~ ~ . 'Co acct thi .:nrci ."..: ~ ritcrin for the RAGtl isolation vnlves, one pnth nut o! three'ust l)u oprrnble. For the inteructions described on sheet ~ l, nt nsi plus c'red;Il I t:hruu pnths come wit.hln 20 feet. Therefore, no modiHcatlon is required. r, F ~ APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE IICT ION B RLY1 BKDo Ihn-': t:r'< BFN-IT-RB-RCS-l-Jl I The 480V reactor NOV board canpartment SC breaker will be "racked out" to prevent the spurious operation of the residual heat removal shutdown cooling suction isolation ll 'kd'bk I 'll dbydhal kh y I» h '' ldgggyhdk 'kh 8 Ill I d I 8C breaker "racked out," the possibility of a fire causing a spurious operation of the b I'dhg 4 y I & ddbybdl dd»' b through of two power cables, one of which feeds the ~~~ valve motor, with the subsequent. touching of conductors in the proper phase sequence to open valve is too unlikely to occur to be considered. ~~~ APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED: REVIem: 062161 Ol 0 FN-IT-R -RCS- I-.MI To meet the requirements of Appendix R, the, cables for FCV~3-98 and 1CV-3-99 will be rerouted iA conduit. All cables for FCV-1-14, FCV-1-15, FCV-1-26, FCV-1-27, FCV-1-37, FCV-1-38 that: are presently-routed on elevation 593 in the reactor building will be rerouted in conduit. All cables for valves FCV-1-51, FCV-1-52,-FCV-1-55, FCV-1-56, FCV-43-13, and FCV-43-14 which are presently routed in the reactor building will.be rerouted in conduit. APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT I ON PREPPED: Petiem: BFN-IT-RB-RCS-I-M l 0 jI I ~ ~ cX N a Ct H n c) ~ ) EV r) VI h ~ n J ) n n '7P V V V V V V Ig )L. V V 4. h. )L 4. s,g 0 FCV-6e. f ' ~ gg SCV ~ t 9 IC rcv. (i.'). )l lcv $ - ~~5 rcv- vc-cl 1 ccv I II 1 crt f itcv. f -5I //g(jr'~„.g j,:~:.,'(~~jr~ II y~gxgy')." x',,'g, .'::Q'2 SYHDOI.5) 0 T~)efafen No) C~:k~f IIj l4 falcoMIM Al'I'I'HDIX R ia.r REACTOR Su? I.OING APACTOR COOI.ANT 575'Ll:I'I IHTKGHITT BRSN.") ffRRT tIKL(ARPt Rill <')" „.S O„,fQL. - e Or))41 RSRC52 Itasca 3 ~ CABLE, z RtsfoHsvBLE foal RQU 1 TTPK SEE,. *IIJI LiI>II 111'lllo 'F lt EQUlPHCNT CA BI.ES CORRECT1YL SHEET PR 5 PA FI E R llUQQL llTQ Y ~15QLVLO~ HVHGER. LHKRd V e zwsas 1 SET l. 0>se HEB pele<5/ F ~ ~ lI: — xiii'o 9 F N .'8 R B - R C S -. 2 - J 1 meet tbe success criteria for the RWCU isolation valves, one path nut of. three must be operable. Po'r the interactions described on sheet 1, at no place do «LL three paths come within 20 feet. 'I'.bcrefnre, nn n~~di f i«ation is required. ~ ~ 4 ~ I ~ APPENDIX R ConaEcTivE AcTtoN PHLf'ARED' Q i Pl:VIENED: OA1L: BFH-IT-RB-RCS-2-Jl The 480V reactor NN board canpartment 8C breaker will be "racked out" to prevent the spurious operation of the residual heat removal shutdown cooling suction isolation kd 'b k *'d tMhyd ll kh I IH yl h '' 'khkh I I I 8C breaker "racked out," the possibility of a fire causing a spurious operation of the I d b k I'~k2 I N bbbbbdy dkh through of two power cables, one of which feeds the gg~~8 valve motor, with the subsequent touching of conductors in the proper phase sequence to open valve is too unlikely to occur to be considered. ~g~ APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE ACTION PREPARED 'ATE 062161.01 FN-IT-RRCS-2-0 l To meet the requirements of Appendix R, t:he cables for FCV-3-98 and PCV-3-99 wilI be rerouted ih cond'uit. All cables for FCV-1-14, FCV-1-15, PCV-1-26, FCV-.1-27, FCV-1-. 37, FCV-1-38 that are presently routed on elevation 593 in the reactor building will be rerouted in conduit.. All cables for valves FCV-1-51, PCV-1-52, FCV-1-55, FCV-1-56, PCV-43-13, and FCV-43-14 which are presently routed in the reactor building will be rerouted:in conduit. ,APPENDIX R CORR ECT I VE ACT I,ON PREPARED 'ATE BFN-IT-RB-RCS-2-Ml ~ ~ ~ ~ n ~c co cII n cc cv v) vc n rl tc n J n : I rl '7 ' cc cc C ~ V CI V V c4 Ia IJ, ca l4 IL ~4 ca ry, Vr.c) %5. 1 1 r",3 2)3 n vrv.c.s- cc. yw ~ rcv c 0- I') frv 3 5 rrv- va-c) g..jf i/ rrv. 1- )1 I'rr'rr - 1.?c. rrv ~ ~ l 1 kf ) rcv 1 ~ 5) IO c rrt. 1-~~ 'reV. CS 11 QY)ll)01 .yc v. I~ier¹:1 scc Ho) (~J k). Ne li4o~. )v o Al'I'I:HDIX )I UHE '4P. 'aa c REACTOR 8ULLDIHG ACAC IO)7 C.r)O) A))'1 SYSIC)1 I))IEG)IIf Y P 8AON5 Ya Bast ~ APPf.HOIL> R tI>es I M RLACTOR GUtLOIIIG poao 1> ~ Is> teen REACTOR COOLAIIT Lest 3YSTC,H Or s Baste INTEGRITT p>sp' BROblllS FCRRY )/Ut:LCAR PLAIfl p>4465'+'er y 6 " ot Sttt Ifli5 IIC5-3 6 '':~ ~ ~ 9 ~ . A I I ~ ~ ra Yo meet the:;«c«a'..:: «riterla for the RtlCtt isolation valves, one path nut of three must he operable. For the interactions'escribed on sheet 1, at nn place do all three paths come within 20 feet'herefore, no. mndi.fication is required. ~ ~ nVtEVnIX R CORRECTIVE ACT ION PREPARED .'VIE~D: OWE: ~~< ~8'< BFH-IT-RB-RCS-3-Jl BFH-IT"RB"RCS-3~ The 480V reactor KV board canpartment 8C breaker will be "racked out" to prevent- the spurious operation of the residual heat removal shutdown cooling suction isolation k& "t k '6'&tyd t&1 th dH ~p t a thth4 t d g 8C breaker "racked out," the possibility of a fire causing a spurious operation of the feeds ~open valve and the insulation burn 250V dc breaker which power to ZQL~Z through of two power cables, one of which feeds the ZG~~ valve motor, with the subsequent touching of'onductors in the proper phase'equence to open valve g~~ is too unlikely to occur to be considered. APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE kCT I ON REPARED: thVIem: DATE l 062161.01 BPH-IT-RB-RCS-3~ -0 FN-IT-ARCS-3-Ml To peet;.the requirements of Appendix R, the cables for FCV-3-98 and FCV-3-99 will be reiouted in conduit; All cables for FCV-1-14, FCV-1-51; FCV-1-26, FCV-.1-27, FCV-1-37, FCV-1-38 that are presently routed on elevation 593 in the reactor building wil1 be rerouted in conduit. 'll cables for valves FCV-1-51, FCV-1-52, FCV-1-55, FCV-1-56, FCV-43-13, ~ and FCV-43-14.which are'resently. routed in the reactor building will be rerouted in conduit. APPENDIX R ConaEcvrvE Ac+IoN PnEpnnED; L ~r ~~br ~ ag 4 rO r Vl f 1 ~ ' A rt hl A vr ~ 0 n ~, e. ~r n rl $ ar 0 rJ V V ~I cl IL. Is 4, lL ~ ~ ~ 4. ~L lL wO ~ NI NI ~ r ~,. 1)r ~ NI . . ' r r ~, J ~ h ~ ~ gg SYHISI 5l Ielrrwl~ Hol Le ~ Rf . He fe lrrsc4n Al'PLNDl X R TURBINE BUILDING RCAC TnR COOL AllT ST51L'l't IN1EGAII 'f lÃCMH,"lFERRT llUClEAlfPthllf Csraot''v~ CJ rc ~ ~ * 0 t tO hO tll I v> ~ > n A n ~> n ag n ~t ~ h Tl 'P 'h> r t> t> t> t> h> t> c> c> r 4. Ch. cy D ~ l Vlf gt j ' ref.>/n- rl rff 3 - hhy Wy/g, m ~x (r ref-~e.il V'gh .:„Np rev-1- ll ref- f . pc, ftv ~ 1 . J1 >fcv 1 5l I rvv 1-55 Fth.h> hh ' rg/r.)/v >/ /' c ~ ~ c . c'>'fH]el '.>- . f~>r/vlhen hi~1 CwJnJ gf gt ftll/tktltttt AftPL WOI X R UllU TURBINE. BUILDING ACACTOR COOLANT SY!llf;8 INTA'RITY BRnnlS IIf'Rf NKEEAH PlAHf c' 8hc> O(t'1' OrN ll 'T8 RCS'l.~O ieijfg 0 c> ~ Vl %I vl ~V n vs J n fS, N A vs h hh n aP n r ti '7 s' aP hr ~r ~ V I N. \I cr „c ~a 4 lL I~ . i>d ' F(v 4e-1 tII Nl h rCV l 9 ~ Iran rCV-e «J- ll frv 3. yy. rCV- 14 . f1 ' ~ / X'h. rcv I li K p I - t4 h I rCV 1 51 NT err 1 5$ \ , ICS'3 H x'THIMli'sr N. T~lcro:iso Itnl Cr .Jar XI... lie la1ei~ l~e AI'I'INdt l Ii IS tIN~ S ',. TUIIBlNC, BUILDING ~ Pj, tti:ACTOlt COOI.AIIT 'T51L'tl ltlltGltlfY ' / HRCMN5 f[RRT IIVG)AR Plhlif cg 'c n 0 n vl n ct ft vt ~ t d.l tc T ct 4 T V ~t ct ~ ct ~t IL 0 0 11 0 0 4o 1 1 Par ~ 1 1 1 1 IXV- 1 -Zs 1 1 1 1 Pcv-l, -met 3 1 1 1 1 1 PCv- S- Sl 1 1 ~ 1 fcv- S ft 3 3 3 3 J 1 1 Pcr S t19 I'Cv $ ~ IQO 3 3 5 r 4t v c r1 0 vt 0 4t n 4 ~1 I g, ~I ~I V ~t ct L 0 D vt D 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 SVHBOI.~: 2 2 III .. tI~ ?4ICv eel ycvc 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 j 2 2 2 2 2 APPI: NDlX 8 REACTOR BUD.DlNG ~ I RPV '4fhlfR 1NVLIITGAT CAII 5/R VALVE CONROL BSOWIS r ERRT uu'.SCAR A.Au> ftctri>~'c''I ii<.~a.< ~v III IT RB mV.O .tc '=clSL . all ChGLE gcspDNsxsct 8 ROUT INg .(PE SEE c.kslg thy lO EOVIPFlENT CABLES SNEU OF COHlfCCTIYC S1IB BT, FN R PA 11 B N CV EYE~ RUliUCfLZQQMCLlO MJJQll HlMlQlBDJ)vtM. hll SlA Vela»S All A»actor >1/ g.( 10 PeAci Ocis TOP,D scesc»l Cor UNIT 1 QaM\s feeoleens flc, 6 Pe«l ' Bcaa~ Valses Broiler Bld) 'tSc hll BIN 5E,T lb Paocl 1 «TPP Deco5.18. NOI oeolvlo UHCT goMe ~ t e) ate A)fl g2 „,gg,n, O'Ceo l0 1 u I, flse cerracsovC a»lien I~ bc ~ ere AN Rassler AR pig SW) loll oa acloeess 't 5QT lb Passel " ~ fer »4 ietef vc '3 QeMe c evelelon) UslIT ~ Il .,':Joule"" gaea»relic»4 eia 14 folio«eec) SCo~al os a a osc e' Oooo polis h Ncroul Teevele»d Csblctsl B eo Dele 8- Prov'sdc F~c Bwricr reise Bise C. Circe'o't Had sf sca'l son Ocos Disso poses 0. Pier:Jc Fir» Seopprcssiees Bs Oe Jo Aesalysi ~, illsr o 0~ fcc cerrecliva s»ls ~ ~ »se 4 aoos Oe ec o 1Lc elov» scl oa ~ vr eeef flare goosl;~c ae 4eeee( o oo O'sos I'lis i~ ~ re'leronsv le lloc 1'e< ~ o dascrispl'em eaf llsc roieacloce »cloaca, Tioe 41 cel n velar cas Ov c. ~roll la ereardJ b) Sl if Aces cvrreclerc hob.c, oe 0 es «acl s ~ ed ls 5" el ~ clip B oeae Deice ~os»d. Oasis ~ esc alseol esvoelacr IVsr o ae ) L» ra(eros cad. Ci ~ . 0 ale I ~ cv »slice «l. ~ «eo'@co lA, «'.B Oees ~ Deere c u sc «g la «Q re M o ~ 4 s'll cveccl4e ~ a'l.on ~44 B decor:Lcd a 14l decO Coo beers decare pneo Tho 9sogn aoojcol ic over«clo Rcc fee 4 aeoedoot*lo o( 1l t >e»eo« Ocoe Ball »eqsoisac vs f' cveecb v». sveee ecl.a«. '»Be roe(~'.llc ~ ala=.is(e r g ~s 4« »sfceo Lie 4r lie Ocv bas ~ i cacL(seel'ev or joel (Nsl ov i'eee »1ov« Oo«o Csosee e U eoo bees pee eo Bc ev basso APPENDII R 11 see R»elf Rf.'AC,TOR ' BUILDING . 0«o s\n raise RPV WATER ItfVERTORT CONf Rim 5IR VALVE, COHTROL Oa e base ~ Aors 8ROlfNSfERRT WCLEAR FIAKf V beccsrVV &r.V~~< o BEN llft5 SsRV F)' 0 ~ i « ~ s oal 1 I. ~ s ' o s FN-IT- SRV-O-Ml To meet the requirements of Appendix R, all. cables required for'he 'safety/relief valves which are routed in the reactor building will.be rerouted in conduit and wrapped with a fire barrier to preclude any damage to the cables which could cause spurious actuation. .APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE ACT I ON PREWnED: Par>em: DATE 6 -/7- gZ BFN-IT-RB- SRV-0- Ml FN-IT-R -SRV-0- M2 To meet the requirements of Appendix R, all cables required for'he"safety/relief valves which are routed in the reactor building will be rerouted in conduit and wrapped with a fire barrier to preclude any damage to the cables which could cause spurious actuation.. APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACT ION PREV RED RarIE m; ATE: -' "/T-S Z BFN-IT-RB-SRV-0-M2 To meet the requirements of Appendix R, all cables required for. the'safety/relief valves which are routed 'in'he reactor building will be rerouted in conduit and wrapped with a fire barrier to preclude any damage to the cables which could cause spurious actuation. APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT ION PAEWnED: RV/IE m: ' DATE: -/7- gZ BFN-IT™RB-SRV-,O-M5 .0 c g Tn n «I 0 (0 n H iI ~) n I r( q4 ~ I ( ~ I rl j I Iy ~ ~ V V V V V V 4 4 n. do 0 4V I« 4o EI T. Ht Ar HZ I'CV ~ f 4 f4l Hr pev ~ I ~ n t4I Hf Ht Ht Hr Pcl 5 Ig Ht ur Hl I'cV- 5 -4.'s'l Nt HZ Pvv f PS El J Hr Ht llr Hr tcv-I .an Ht Elt Hr'4t Ht 'At Pci-5- el HT llt Ht PCi- 5-SL Hr Ht Ht Hg «Lt - H[ ~ NJ, PCV- 5 Ig Hr Hr I'Ci I lt Nt Nt Ht Pr.V 5 ITS NI Ht fit Hr Pcv- 5- ny fit Ht I4t HZ Nt I4Z ~ ~ Prv -5 ~ lhh lItNL Ht Pci I 4+0 Nt Nt Nt Nr f 'c nl 0 iij H n 4 ~0 ~ ( ~ ( H V V gl V V U>ILT 2 n 4 4 4 I'CV f ELt EEL. Elr. ! ~ It >Lt «Lt. ELr. Hl E4t 4Yt 5UOL~( pcv f <1 Ht Ht Ht Ht lll H« teleia(loon Lxv ~ V 47 HZ 54L At I'Or ~ 5 ~ Elf Ht Ht Xe'v- 4 -Ito Ht Ht HT. APPCNU1X R UB ~ TURBTELE OULLOt)LG RPV WAtLR 1llYERT(QT TXNT 5/R YALYE CON1ROL 8iue45 r ERAT LLLXLt'Nf'thill ~<'V' r,v(.~IIr'< ~ Oai(o IE ~ GTII IT 10 AV0 rrP( Ema ~0. The are to ensure the RllR system following modifications required will meet'he Functiona1 Criteria: I 1. Route all power cables in the Reactor Building (RB) required for the equipment given in table II.A.2.b. (1) in conduit and provide a one hour fire barrier for each conduit. 2. All cables located in the RB. involved in the back-up control circuitry for the above equipment are also required to be routed in conduit and provided with a one hour fire barrier. 3. All cables required for the redundant RHR System (System I for unit 1; ~ System II for units 2 and 3)'are to be re-routed where they will meet the separation requirements of Appendix R between the cables and the active equipment for the system required in step 1 above (see table below for active equipment). 4. The RllR pump back-up control switch will be revised as shown in the attached drawing to allow bypass of the position switch on the RHR drain valve. See attached schematic for exact change. By making the above corrective actions, one RflR system will be available for any RB fire. Active ~Rui ment 'Peble Unit l Unit 2 Unit 3 RliR Puicp U RllR Pump C. RHR Pump U I'CV-74-30 PCV-74-7 FCV-74-7 PCV-74-67 I:CV-74-53 FCV-74-53 APPENDIX R RllR Pump Room Cooler B RHR Pump Room Cooler C RHR Pump Room Cooler C CORA ECT I YE MG Set ll'.N MG Set 2DN eMG Set 3DN ACTION 480-V RMOV Bd 480-V RMOV Bd 2D 480-V RMOV Bd 3D 1L'-kV/480-V TS1B 4-kV/480-V xfmr xfmr TS2h 4;kV/480-V xfmr TS3E eEPAREU: C. REYIem: ~/4'FN-IT-RB-RHR-0-Nl ~ ~ N II I 4 I A 4 IK P X x II Il II ~ IL Cl IL IL lL IL HZ s)z Hz Nr HZ HZ NE Hz HZ hlI gz Hz Hz 3 Hz ~ I HZ Hz )4z 10 I I ) I lorn QYHt)ALSI g, I)o lealae L, A)~ ) L))0)X R REACTOR DOZLOING E55EN) IAL EOUIP COO) J)JG ECCW STSTEH naOW5 ireT RXlWR t'INn Iluls< III'~ Patt f Cl 'I erII'1()lb tfc< 0 .Cl 4" 'h'tc ir' CADK I Rtsfp>1$ 78LE t3 IIOVI iNO SKK ~LII af >ala ff EOIIIPHENT CAB!.'ES OIIEF.I Of CORRECTIVE BIIEET fiiiiiil\ if IIIIUIIEfL~IIV~V iXL IIIlllilfll EBhCIIQI HllfSQUl BfVIr'atf Ossa IIEQ paa ~ eS'If'5) RIIR5>bf Pv p AS O'C51581-I 5KT 12 Cd,4, Tts 'stfsls>!S>csisfe f Hf feet.oa.(.LJJ@ FCV-P$7- Sc.et IS C>blc > 26 II$LoofMnttf ~ 7 ~e1~ ta~iltat ~ RIIRSbf P„p C3 QEK!591 ~ I SKT 12 Cable 7„! ~ IIEO gosag.stet> NOTKSI ic ~ ts1$ 1F, scsieMv n sn Qa. GJnOQ.< FCV-67-26 $ SI et CS Cable Tn,f Jta tSt LII~ Ie 5 ts soiree I TI» cstrcclive sclien ti bc 't5'>$ ~ f'C'V ~ $ 7 poise 5-If' I 67 - 13 5ET 12 C>%4 Tw! ~, NC 0 lAin for CLe»lersctlenS stt tsstpc -E A,E n.lra Q.ff. EJ fJ4,< eiencrelac el ael Ibg, Me4ire) FCV-6 I- 14 7 Csb'4 Tts Shccl Iis>ass~at vnfnc ~neneatrl te FCV. 67 - 13 E$ 755 7 SET 12 Cable T rl Oaai t)EB paaeaf I>5 It)as>6 fss>.gfs GJnloc h. Ifcre>s>I into!ctd Cab)ala) ItSCPIS'te t Cable'.Te FCV. 67. 1 'JR>el II>etrcJ~ ~ lcsslp t ~ ltsf>>6 )oaa posaS.lf I . fCV.67 I I SET 12 Cable Tref !if8 O. Provide Fart Larrftr 'fasfe~ ....Qa.81 Of4, I'CV ~ CSSt5>G It Tta -67 14 Slice I 7 Cable Ota at C. Cltcoel Hoalif't.sl epn a>IO ICSC15 I ~ Ses I CV -G7- 17 5E.T IZ CA'lc Tea! neo> IIEB I«» S.lf tt f Ielcfg 7 Ianf neet ~ OO. Io! +et O. Prat'oo} c Fere aatatao tsnlnts FCY 6T- 18 ii,, i .. Sbael I.B Cab!c Tsrf I ES t?1 IL11 he>> ~a~"'i4~. Ic)al>5 I tcs ~ Is I 12 Orna lltll Pa>cag.tf I heaslypis FCV-67- 21 1!)SIL t st ts" tn'L .'jET Cable Ttrf 1~>> ~ f>JofJJ c>IS>e ~ ~ cscs'ls s Qti t fOIRSM Pa>mf> 83 Sla>CI 15 C>NG Tfeq if~a rLstet Cl~s>c IIac corrie'lore spline ~ csn bc CIS ~ >$ Case Iea ;\ ~ t 'feel nao> Ilt8 0 ataS If I I: FCY- 61- 2I ttbttl:.t>PCPK+43. SE.T 12 Cable csc(nt c conc ~ s Iss ~ sQQfcJ (U» t b'~bien If,erenC ~ ts BI>eel Ig Cable Test I RllRSbV Pu.np 03 EbtGPS=% bt>sd gtsc Is'lalts ~ ll'I>CI>e> S~'ll FCV-67- Zl EC)Ãtf>LigtsStft.t. GF.T 12 Csbfc 7>at nese gt8 If>a>f5 TI>.e i~ I refcrtntv se Ibac ~ ~ ~ Cist'>ll ~ Sate>l >IC>l>IS > I"it 0.0. CLQbt lescs ipI:rn nl liat .em>et!ate $ i\ II,I) C)MC T.pf FCV.61-22 CCSCS5P ACS~o Sc!atn. Tl.i eb r! nombcr '> ant~~ ~ S 5 ~ e a $ S ~ II 5 ~ J I e I II p> 5K,T 12 C>Mc Ttc ncaa pool ~ 5'-If ~ >fill bc paeceda H FCV-67-25 It)IJft.st cnsntc. IIt8 I b5 if .>I>Isis St)r I ~ >«tat fs,n Og.cJ lbf.. cearrccler c 8.C et 0 ae aaac) 10 5> If>16 t ~ FC Y - fc>7- 26 f.'> >n I gt>SSS >IS~~as Bctltcdt~lt~ snd bq l at acies» E ea Ossa Os«> vtcd. f)ea!S reae sbrcl tsenber I>est o sa II Iee referent".k. (Le. 11'bc i o ~ raealiie oa! on seo!ore belli pena ps ~ te t & t 4 s! «iI! ~bf be~A ra s t ~ ~J sll c«teel:tc ecl..n . II In afava dc>sr:fed oo llasl sbcrQ Ca 8>e« feet> 71> ~ kcoqn sar>col ie ecetna.sl ~ ka f Ibr soe04 a% A Ibo >>~Q, Soa best 4>ganesa>era F» Ibnf cer>ocb ice. ~ t ~ ~aliene 'T4 r ~ efeiL IS>e ~ tl>SS ~ oa po>ls peen b«le APPENDIX R Iles> tallJ IICACTOR BUILIIING Oeoi ps>re taste ESSENTIAL EQUIP CCA.IHG tcc> hEC'8 SYb'I Dace bS>ti EN testa f'ERRV Btnl BRObJNS NUCLEAR PLAIII po>sef If <' fks>DIr~te dr. KIIIllK!I KEC>ofo ~ I ~+~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I I ~ ~ a ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ g g I I ll ~ t4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ tl I gl I ~ II III~ I ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ I I I ~ ~ * ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ tt Ill To meet the success criteria for one EECW System, both pumps on that system must be operable and no more than one valve in the system may be closed. Therefore, the success criteria for both EECW systems would not be met if any one of the following situations occur Failure System I System II One Pump fail One Pump fail 2. 2 Valves closed One P)mp fail 3. One Pump fail 2 Valves closed 4. 2 Valves'closed 2 Valves closed Situation 1 does not occur as examining sheet 0 shows that there are no interactions between system I pumps (A3,C3) and system II pumps (83,D3). Situations 2 and 3 do not occur as'one system's pumps interact with only one of the other system's valves. Situation 4 dogs occur due to interactions 3-6 all being within the same area. Therefore, cable ES753-I will be relocated to assure the success cr5 teria is met. 'APPENDIX R -.CORRECTIVE ACTION REPARED:- ~IEWm: ~ +'ma: — 8 F 5 I T.- 8 8.- F E 6 H.- 0 - H 1 n " (II Q Id t N N IL I'I I 4 I n J If P II V 4. L IL L RIIRSV R NX gr biz Rl(AgV (I~~ (ted ttr NZ Ifv C'V If .Nr Nr ICV~ I 1- I( Ha Hr Fcv- cT tt ur oz rev. cl-as ttr Ar 5YffDOLSI Nt II+ gyltoP tkII A(I(It.t(01X R TURDTNC BUILDING C55EN1 tht. rnuIP Owl 1Q-. CCCW GYSTEtd OROVtlS l fRRY Nt CABLE, 2 ties PO)tsaSL'I 6 ai ROVIING O'E K ra hat ZhT ISING MLIIPNEHT . CABLES BIIEU CORII ECTIVE 5)I CRT Pit C Ph tt E il Y IYOULM—IffllfUEIL IUUBBBLR ~V Cart )csssso Jtslsac'c RIIRS'M P l ~ SET 12 C»cd«al asoT CB .Dasao giga aa ~ S ~ raL'LC C.oaa C~SZD S tt ~ ESZS74'B -- RttttS~ RLol I 6 Cable T O«o Daslo EECH STSTCTI feats 080M)f5 KRRY IIUC|.EAR 0 Afft c ~ tl vs e Data< a~Vs Sr roo rarBEErrr0 r C» 4a 1 BPH-IT-TB-EKN-OHQ. This modification involves wrapping the division I conduits (listed below} containing cables shown on BFH-IT-TB EECN-O, sheet 1, for RHBSiT pumps A3 and C3 with a one-hour fire-rated barrier in the intake pumping station, where 20-foot separation or a three-hour fire-rated barrier does not exist between redundant division II cable trays for RHRSà pumps B3 and D3. Conduits: 3ES1580-I 3ES1582-I 3ES1590-I 3ES1592-I ES86-I ES82-I ES81-I ES87-I APPENDIX R CORRECT t YE ACT I ON PRWARm: PeviF. m: DAm d /P ez O62166 02 BFH-IT TB-~P ~ Co II ~ ~ ~ / cr s \ LI r Cl 'x c «n O 'c> Z 4 2 oo (n ~I J V rl g rl or rr ll rr rt X Vo cr ~ v» I n ( ~r sr ]I ~ ss « y 'r N ~ Jr ~ « 5 ~ o oo r ls ll H oo r 55 rl lo oo c~ tr Co Cl 55 rl Sl S'l ~o. ~ ~ 5 Vo r ~ I u sl rc J IC cr o). ~ CL l. 0 or 15 c~ X oJ Cocr)IVII An ht C< 0 ((('V S~ hfrlcr ~ I Irr.( hl 1 j/' I (I.l"~~s F.l'V 'X ' to o N)lre Qx /,' ~ l ~ s;I 2(QQ . i I? I'V llsgls A 'V'/ I I'..c ore hl (r.z ~~zhb.. o ',g~ I I?I'V II~S. ~ I ~~ ". "oo'e A' LI. V Clc )w C o/ I s 'o (i ) l Ihi 5 5 rhino(V Clsso«e /yp,$ . ~ (r-- 1 ls'l 5 5 5 5 ' rN LLJIV also'wc / Iro- I - zc'S 5 5 oc Co II~ ( V CI 5~ e P fr..-h- t I) 5 5 / ~ I/o IC (V Clr)«c lr... 1 ~ «i Sor Ilhlf V CI o,.or '(r." I- I 'l I I ~ s.lr I V Ol.'o Ifrv- I ~ Sf I ~ SIS f T CI ~ s.oc I(rc ~ l -BA r F55. i;.g I lr S a 4 gygPPI, ne( t(IDIX R UUl ~ „, REACTOR 8?iTLDIHG RLACTIVITY CO((II(OL RPS ) CAD .".T'IEN 5 «- Uf(OMNJ ('IPR( sNQ EAI( P(ANT ' ~ Ihllr+ Wio~ ~ Cr'C I IVK ll I?Il IIC 1 ~ ere 1ulhv~>., I ":I:C I I e . Bg o 's ~ o ' 'or ~ ~ ' ~ t CABI.E t RTSPD>ISZBtt 6 IIOUIING ~ r SEE r,> a>l kl TOII If EOVIPMEIIT. CABLE5 BIIE'U OF I CORR'EC'f LYE OIICCT >>RCPARER Ill2LtKFL IIYIKY~I QLVEQ ILUTE BETE ER ELI - ~ I-? S 3 caO) A IRPZO TA ~ ET 13 CL lc'al Oa> ECB Dssa> Plpf t>e>e T~ IT>gs+~r i e R>tae'I IO > r 'IOTEO> t~() ~loses > l~p9 I! Clnelv.l e>naa Z~iu ~ . ~ ~ LIB- 3c20>B IRP281-ZB :>K.T l3 CsnLg EEB Dc>sffyfs nsess 1 +Pr P g ~'stet> IO C~k '.I Ts 4L~ ~hIL>JIIP E Fhc corrcctevc oct>on I~ Lc PIS-3. P-24 LRPZO rA BET 13 C.ehlssl o, Oe«s Dent >>eee L>a» roe p>e>e Pe(n Io esse APPEIIDIX TI It>re P>r REAC'TOR BUILVIIIG Ores p»re reen REACT lY IT Y CONTROL R>r> ITP3 CRLI Da e To>te ) SYSTEM h ~ teen BROMHS I'CRRY )OJCLCAR PLAIfl so Ie! Dae>>5 It 1> Ike ~ bAC t ea Ptlt 'll IIB RC B>e»aC ': f>ccLI ~ ~ h' I This equipment and .its associated cables are not required by the,final functional «r1teria. Therefolc', no ful (lu r consideratinn is required. ~ y ~ ~ APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE ACT I Ob BkL:I'hRL.D: - - ' 0 BF T-RB-'RC 1-.J2, sheet 1 of 2 '... ~,'... ~...', ~ '..~ In order to show compliahce with the Appendix.R criteria'for required, circuits'whose failure te operate could adversely. affect shutdown capability, justificaBon'is provided below for (A) not requiring separation-of the power supply "cables to Reactor Protection System (RPS)'. logic.an) (B). not.requiring separation qf the cables from the RPS logic panels to the Hydraulic Control Units (HCUS) of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) system: I For A and B above, the following design requirements. are=essential to the justification analysiq: 1. All wiring foz'the RPS outside of. the enclosures. in the control zoom is. run in rigid metallic conduits used for no other wiring. (refer to section 7.2;3.10 of the BFNP FSAR). The RPS and CRD HCUS are fail'afe (scram is initiated) on loss of power.. 3. The-CRD 'HCUS require control'ir to pull control. r'ods. Since the RPS s'ensozs are routed separately', 'the~gic..will.function for al1 but the.control bay. fires. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i 5 Scram time is less than seconds 3.5 for 90 percent insertion'of.control..rods,' : ..6. The. power supply cables from;the RPS logic panels to. the. HCUS.are pouted:.in'separate conduit from.the . power return..cables. 4 r For A above there are four failure modes for. the logic'power supply cables; they're! ~ ~ ~ 1 Ground short, "- " .. ": '" ': ".... ''ot 2. short',. ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. Open circuit, \ ~ 4. Line short ~' \ APPENDIX' I i ~ -'-.CORRECT ~ ,'. I VE ACT ION '' ~ ~ PaEmED: ~ ~ ~ I - ~ Palms: 4 ~ ~ BFN-IT-RB-RC-l-J2, sheet 1 of 2 BFN- -RB-RC-1-02, sheet 2 of 2 Both the ground short and line short will trfp the cables'ircuit breaker which will initiate a scram on loss :of power. The open circuit failure mode will also initiate a scram on loss of power. The hot short failure. mode can only impose another RPS power supply on the failed power supply cable; therefore, the logic circuit is still protected from damage by qualified trips of the power supply and will function to disconnect power to the CRD HCU's, thus inducing a scram. For B above the cables from the RPS logic panels to the HCUS provide power to the scram valves in the HCUS. This power is removed to cause the HCUS to insert the rods. If these subject cables are involved in a fire, they will degrade while the conduit is still intact. Because of this degradation, they will either open circuit or short to the conduit, either of which will remove power to the HCUS, causing insertion of the affected control rods. Refer to figure 1, attached, for a block diagram level representation of the power supply cable connections to the RPS logic and of the RPS logic cable connections to the HCUS. P APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION fhEFARED: PEVIWm: DATF.: 4 C>l < BFN-IT-RB-RC-1-J2, sheet 2 of 2 0 arm-IT-RB-RC-1-Nl This modification involves wrapping the division I conduits (listed below) containing cables for LIS-3-203A, LIS-3-203B, PIS-3-22A, and PIS-3-22B shown on BFH-IT-RB RC-l, sheet 1, with a one-hour fire-rated barrier in the unit 1 reactor building, where 20-foot separation or a three-hour fire-rated barrier does not exist between division II conduits containing cables for LIS-3-203C, LIS-3-203D, PIS-3-22C, and PIS-3-22D, respectively. Conduits: lRP52-IA 1RP53-IA 1RP54-IA lRP277-XB 1RP278-IB 1RP290-IB APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED l ~ cv t'A PATE 6'H 8'z. 062l66.05 This modification involves wrapping either the c'onduits (listed below) for FSV-85-35A and FSV-85-70A or for FSV-85-35B and FSV-85-70B shown on BFH-IT-RB-RC-l, sheet 1, in the unit 1 reactor building where 20-foot separation or a three-hour fire-rated barrier does not exist between the conduits to be wrapped and panel 25-25C or panel 25-25D. Conduits to be wrapped will be determined by field survey (e.g., ease of wrapping) . r Conduits for FSV-85-35A Conduits for FSV-85-35B and FSV-85-70A: and FSV-85-70B: lRP222-IIIA 1RP437-IIIB- 1RP215-IIIA 1RP429-IIIB 1RP207-IIIA lRP419-IIIB 1RP206-IIIA 1RP423-IIIB I APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED 7 D /@rnid fj REVIE ZP: BATE' Z Z 062166.10 :0 0 0 v n I .0 CI . jr. 'n O C 'al J o ev J 8 a a $ 3„ H Ih n 1 CI en vl V vl J 1 TI Vl 41 ~ CO ~ ~ h C ~ ee H 11 v v ~ e ~ v n n h etl n 'n CL ~ v el v r Ce e( n n Ji CC a ~ & h. X ls Nle CvMTI,I I(('V 1 v 1(~Ic r lre-.l hl e (I.I-- W III'T Le~ u.IC) 1 ee«1 . 111 2 A r', l.leM 2C«U lll'V lie)le r I'eve:.eee C h1 (I'L =- EC.Q.. Clvh 'ee' p, ~ I'.r.r.e,e r Yel > CI ~ (V ('.Ic Cevr. .~/7)Y ~ (C.S 1 ~ 14) < I ,p. 5 5 .5 tkry( V CI~ Le« c (err 1 ~ lS I Cl 5 5 5 / 'I I-15]V Cl.eve ee, IC T 1 ~ 24) kl 5 5 5 'C P N. I'I ClrC «C i''.~.'A'h'. r'y ~ ~ (C.- a ~ O'I) ':y. 5 5 g 5 J v CI(( V CleC vt / ~ ~ '' ( z ~ I 14) I'II 'Pl (V rl '(CS-I" I- CS) ~ 1:'I V ~ ~ 1 Tl IC ~ . I ~ 'll er «r r RI. I T e', g.. ~, ~ / r r l '(c-. - 1 . C~.) (rT.f "~.h 7 1 SVHBOLSc 5.. (vlcrhCIm Nil (.'~g4ig II V ~ >II Tnh .7 II( .. I(v 1alarocl eon h('('(WDIX LJND~ R REA('TOR B(jI(.DING I(l:A( TIVI T T COH1 l tahe ~ ~ Csas too te> ~ Ie roon Es baisi APPEHOIS R Ilare sr> e eo REACTOR BUILI}I}}C Ooe ~ s»to re<»'are REACTIVITY CONTROL IIPS CRD Oeas Os>go f SYSTE,N Casts ROM}}5FERRY HllCLEAR PEA}fi tt.CI 4 O„sa5 fts ~ fehtt.ut ' SfN ff25 RC«Z ~ ~ h' t ~ or«se .e )o" J e e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e I * o ~ i ~ ~ e :tl ll~ BFH-IyRB-RC-2-:J 1 This eq«lpmcnt and its. associated "cables are not required by the Sinai fllnctlonn 1 criteI ln ~ ThereCnrc, no fu~ ther consideration is required. ~ g APPENDIX R ConaEcvtvE Ac T l ON A REvlLwm: PyE: ~~< 8'< BFH- IT-RB-RC-2- Jl . ~ !. BF - -RB-RC-2-J2; sheet 1 of 2. ~ 'n order to.show compliance;with the Appendix R 'criteria for req'uired .ctrcuits whose, failure to operate could adversely affect shutdown capability, justificat'ion's.provided. below not " for (A) requiring separation. of the .power supply cables .to Reactor Protection System (RPS).'logic and (B) not requiring'separation of the cables from the RPS logic panels. to the Hydraulic. Control Units .(HCUS).'of the, Control Rod Drive-.(CRD) system. . For A and B above, the following design*requirements are essential to the Justification.analysis:. " .'"'". I. All w'iring for the RPS outside of the enclosures in the control room is run in rigid metallic conduits used for no other wir.ing (refer to section.7..2.3:10. of the BFNP FSAR). .. 2. The RPS and CRD HCUS are fail safe (scram is initiated). on loss'of. power. 3. The CRD HCUS require control.air to pull control rods. ~ ~ ~ —. 4.. Since the RPS sensors are routed separately, the logic will:fUnction.for al] but the'control bay fires.. .5. Scram time is less than.3.5 seconds for 90 percent insertion..of. control rods..'.'. ' ~ 6'. The power supp1y cables from the'RPS logic panels to the HCUS are rout'ed in. separate conduit from'the . power return cables, For A above there are four failure modes for. the lo'gic power 'supply cables.;. they.,are:, 1.. Ground short; . '. Hot short, * ~ ' 3~ Open circuit, 4.'ine short. I' APPCNDrX S t -.CORRECTIVE ACTION r "' ~ ~, "/'( ,. fhapma>: ~ ' Rerrem: D~: Yra Y~~ 1 BFN-IT-RB-RC-2-JZ, sheet 1 of 2 ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ' 'O. ~ . ~ " .' ~ ~ BFx-. IT-RB-RC-2-J2, sheet 2 .of 2. . ': ~ ..Both the ground shortand line. short will trip.the cab'les'ircuit breaker which wi11 initiate a.scram on loss of power. ~ * The open circuit failure mode will also initiate a scram on loss of power. The.hot short'failure mode 'can only impose another RPS power-.supply on the: failed power supply. cable; therefore, the logic circuit is still protected from damage by qualified trips of the power. supply and will function to disconnect power to the CRD HCU's, thus. inducing a scram'. For B above the cables .from .the RPS logic panels to the HCUS proyide.power. to the scram valves in the HCUS. ~ 'his power is removed to cause the HCUS ta.insert the rods. If these subject cables are involved in a fire, '-.they will degrade while the conduit is still.intacf. Because'of this degradation, they.'will either open circuit or short to the conduit, either of which will remove. power to the HCUS; causing insertion of the affected control rods. Refer to figpre. I,: attached, for a block diagram leve1 representation of the. power supply cable connections to. the RPS logic and of. the. RPS lhgic cable connec'tions to 'the HCUS. ~ ~ s ~ ~ Y ~ ~ ~ ~ J' 'L ' "~ ~0 r 4, ~ fl ~ L ~ ~ I ~ Y ~ ~ j \ ~ r APPENDIX R Y ~ ~ '. ':.CORRECT I VE ACT„ION ~ ~ REWRED ~ r . PerIem: ~ ~ E~ "Y BFN-IT-RB-RC-2-J2, sheet 2 of 2 This modification involves wrapping the division I conduits (listed below) containing cables for LIS-3-203A, LIS-3-203B, PIS-3-22A, and PIS-3-22B shown on BFN-IT-RB-RC-2, sheet lf with a one-hour fire-rated barrier in the unit 2 reactor building, where 20-foot separation or a three-hour fire-rated barrier does not exist between division II conduits containing cables for LIS-3-203C, LIS-3-203D, PIS-3-22C, and PIS-3-22D, respectively. Conduits: 2RP52-IA 2RP53-IA 2RP54-IA 2RP277-IB 2RP278-IB 2RP290-IB APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION RE| ARED. 7~ n ~ Wi" R&'IENEDl DATE: 062166.04 -BFH-IT-RB"RC-2-Ml BFH-IT-RB-RC-2-M2 This modification involves wrapping either the conduits (listed below) for FSV-85-35A and FSV-85-70A or FSV-85-35B and FSV-85-70B shown on BFN-IT-RB-RC-l, sheet 1, in the unit 2 reactor building where 20-foot separation or a three-hour fire-rated barrier does not exist between the conduits to be wrapped and panel 25-25C or panel 25-25D. Conduits to be wrapped will be determined by field survey (e.g., ease of wrapping) . Conduits for FSV-85-35A Conduits for FSV-85-35B and FPT-85-70A: and FSV-85-70B: 2RP206-IIIA 2RP419-IIIB 2RP222-IIIA 2RP437-IIIB 2RP215-IIIA 2RP429-IIIB 2RP207-IIIA 2RP423-IIIB APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT I ON PREWnED: -7 rent REVIem: DATE: ~ r8'~ 062166.11 BFH-IT-RB-RC-2-N2 4 ~ .C 'to I o V »I V tD 'X ~ fr rn na 1 J ot 0 S~ V o'ot tt ~ »1 »t n V oot tt tt do o N l tr g M )t 4 ~ » v ~o to H tt ' ~ r o v H ~ 'r , \ V eo f„ A rt tt 'I ~ v o. ~I rt ~ ~ ot I oe J tf. v CC ~ 0 X E~ I KPrr Cothttotlt Ao . h dg ad t P.IV tlqlo ' r I't e>o.oor C 11 / >. V ~ o r ~ MvtV Clttov» r g (r„- 1 ~ IA th.olV I:los~» Crr. d ~ tA 5 5 Ll3JV CI r» o ~ ta ~ I ~ ZS) r ~ X'i r i'r i . l> 5 5 = ~ o ~ I(,IV I I ooor (r rv I trr) I 6I ICI ~ I Cot ~ t ~ Cy., I Pt I I I l.l. 'I f C'I,»...r Itr... 1 ~ 1h) 1 Ir.V ~ f5.Svh ' i7 I ÃHUOL5t r:V IIS dnh III ... It [~I»re»lm o tlt'I'lttttlX tt oo o Uttl REACTOR BUtLOlttG ttCACtlVttY COtt(HI'L cps f canto s>51''N *,~'> r NouNS rlRRS o WOLhR PthN ~ g dgdt jIG.»o o toity, littt tt'Rl'IIC 3 ~ry Lh r ~ r ta.iLQ ~ t el as Ia) li I'. h ~ 'i I Chebf, t Rtsrollstol.t 8 es ROV'I IRG gr,Lul hT IOII r SEE \ If 'WVIPNENT CABINS . OIICEI CORRICf IYE. BIIEfT, I'RfPhII fA UVI5UKB ~maLYJP M)@YE.Q W VillKH..333IKRhCIlQH IIlhUKQ Kfuuull ~ a ~ c,fb a ~ L[5-3 ~ 203A 3RP2D. IA SET 13 C l«:I 0 ogl 1 '.I5 - ~ 3-203C 3RP94 KA 5 oi l2 "."+ZAN;-i l.l5 - 3. 2O3 B 3nP 25'- IB IIOTf5 I LT5- 3.2o3D 3RP319- shoal C..l;,I KB'l I. ytw cetrcelovc aelooea I~ bc - 5. 3 22.A 3RP2o- lA 5Kf 13 c 1-s «a Ifb Sos( ~ 3gtrtrde Iailcsa fer il ~ ullcr ~ eleonS atc n an I +. ry"*.v~ 3 r ' cpncroliced in ibc feIIoulohI PJS -3 22C 3f t'ats Qatao 11 b dgbs Iatan eirrcclorc hob.C, er D ss eccl Ssrsa ~ nd bl ) of cali ~ ts C os Ona o Oaree used ~ Otsls rnc alstv I nvrabcr Pere ee Ii bc referenced. (a.c. TI a4 fat cvecal'ooc asl en shtobca br'b Othe ee e C t l ehl e ~ ah»li eblbe ned re at ~ ~t3 all a«tealuc ~ alorsa oOI ba Sacs Jc ate:feed ee llosl abaci ) aao Bells * y lee ltoqh er ',eol s ~ ocoron.sir Rsr'a f» abe aeape~h A abe n~e ~ at beta ~ etqassag es oon f» Ibc aee e ael o ve atro eel.~. Tl» r«er~.'Ll ~ eel~lao ra@ay 4n ~ ore ~ blc I» Oi. Oau beers ea J:I ital » a jebel;I+a1.$ + reer dvtat or \ Oet, Dont sWot) 'eseal o "lettre eton lt r k ~ no basso APPEAOly A s iles( r ~ K Ml REACTOR BIIXLD1RG ~ I* Oioo Qe(n roon e REACTIVITY COHTROl r ftrs RP5 CRO STSTE'H Oa s fatso $ re<> ~ ORO'4HS PLAN1 ccs f CHAT HUClt:AR friy T'r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~,' -'..1 o ~' ~ ~ Ij () Il'll B F jl-,RH- RE-5- J 1 '0 This equlpmcnt nnd its associated cables nre not required by the final functional «riti via. Thercfovo, no fuvthnr consideration is required; I ~ l APPENDIX R COAREC'T l'YE ACT10H BiLi'NEED: I:.VtENL-O: ) V gATE: 4/Zlg BFH-IT-RB-RC-5- Jl BFN-IT-RB-RC-3-J2, sheet 1 of 2 In order to.'how compliance'-with the Appendix 'R criteria for required.'circuits whose failure to operate'ould adversely affect shutdown capability, justification is:provided.below for (A) not requiring separation of the power supply cables to Reactor Protection-System (RPS) logic.and (B) not requiring separation of the cables from the RPS logic panels to the Hydraulic. Control Units (HCUS) of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) system. For A and B above, the following design requirements are essential.to.the justification analysis: 1; All wiring for the RPS outside of the enclosures.ih the control room is run in rigid metallic conduits used for no "other wir'ing (refer to section 7.2.3.10 of the BFNP FSAR). I 2; The RPS and CRD HCUS are fail safe (scral is initiated) on loss'f power. 3.. The CRD HCUS require control air 'to pull control rods. 4. Since the RPS sensors are routed separately, the logic will function for all.but the control bay fires. .'. Scram time is less than 3.5 seconds for 90 .percent. insertion of control r'ods..'- -. 6. The power- supply cables from the RPS logic..panels.to the HCUS are routed in separate conduit from the power retorn cables. . ~ ~ For. A above thete're four failure modes for the logic power su'pply cables;. they".are: 1. Ground short, 2. Hot short, 3. Open circuit, . 4.. Line, short. APPENDIX R . '.CORRECTIVE ~ I': ACTION ..- REPARED: ./" PerIem: r ~ ~ . BFN-IT-RB-RC-3-J2, sheet 1 of 2 I ~ ~ ~ 4 ~ ' : B T-RB-'RC-.3-.J2, sheet 2 of 2 ": ~ L ~ ~ Both the ground.shortand line. short'will .tr)p.the cables'.circu$ t breaker which:will initiate a, scram on loss of power. The open circuit'ailure mode will also initiat'e a scram.on'loss of power. The.ttot shor't failure mode'can only impose another RPS.power. supply on the. failed power supply cable;.therefore..the logic circuit is still protected from:damage by qualified trips:of t3e power supply and will function to disconnect power to . the CRD HCU's, thus inducing" a scram.'or 8 above the cables from.the'RPS logic panels to the HCUS provide.power. to the scram valves, in.the HCUS. This power is removed to cause the-HCUS to insert the rods..If these subject. cables are involved in a fire they will degrade'while the conduit st'ill '. is intact. Because of this degradation they. will either open .. circuit or short to the conduit, either of which wi.ll remove power to the HCUS; causing insertion of the affected control rods. ~ ~ * - Refer to figure 1, attached, for a block diagram level representation of the power supply cable connections to the RPS'ogic and of. the RPS logic. cable connections to-the,HCUS. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ 'LL'~ L ~ L ' r n. ' oi. r ~ I ~ * ~ I L ~ : APPENDIX=- R ~ ~ :.CORREcTIVE At:T)ON ! L , PREi ARED: '. RVIem: ~ ~ DA~: dZrs g~ r BFN-IT-RB-RC-3-J2, sheet 2 of 2 ~ ~ asm-IT-RB-RC-3-ml This modification involves wrapping the division I'onduits (listed below) containing cables for LIS-3-203A, LIS 3 203Bg PIS 3 22'nd PIS 3 22B shown on BFH-IT-RB-RC-3, sheet l, with a one-hour fire-rated barrier in the unit 3 reactor building, where 20-foot separation or a three-hour fire-rated barrier does not exist between division II conduits containing cables for LIS-3-203C, LIS-3-203D, PIS-3-22C, and PIS-3-22D, respectively. Conduits: 3RP52-IA 3RP53-IA 3RP54-IA 3RP277-IB 3RP278-IB 3RP290-IB APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION .PREWaED: REV Iem: IlATE: lE 8'z 062166.03 BFH-IT-RB-RC-3~ BFB-IT-RB-RC-3-lQ This modification involves wrapping either the conduits (listed below) for FSV-85-35A and FSV-85-70A or FSV-85-35B and FSV-85-70B shown on BFN-IT-.RB-RC-l, sheet 1, in the unit 3 reactor building where 20-foot separation or a three-hour fire-rated barrier does not exist between the conduits to be wrapped and panel 25-2SC or panel 25-25D. Conduits to be wrapped will be determined. by field survey (e.g., ease of wrapping) . Conduits for FSV-85-35A Conduits for FSV-85-35B and FSV-85-70A: and FSV-85-70B: 3RP206-IIIA 3RP419-IIIB 3RP222-IIIA 3RP437-IIIB 3RP215-IIIA 3RP429-IIIB 3RP207-IIIA 3RP423-IIIB APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED: 7 E REVIEWED: ICE: 4 r'H dPz. 062166 12 BFN-IT-RB-RC-3~ Failure Modes Analysis for the RPS System f g ~g ~sons rf c~tr lay $888 Ps're use~ S<'re ~S RPS Pe~~fs 8 Bc ct(uP R B~k~p 5g ytcg~ Vss!VCj sc.~ vd& (sr si'c swot &ouhg ~pt~ R5'- 25 g,y- 8 v~(uo$ ) >~6~tu~) x5',', ~ ~ ls ~ ~ ~ s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ (es)'a~Sf'if fcoCtssr tfCl4$ PRST~f''essc4oe H Cn nero t ~ Tu>L>ne Gui>cking ~sr'rea a's ~ Fcv- 3b~l Figure 1 RPS Block Diagram Scram = (IA + IIA) (IB + IIB) 'a ~I et .C «r Le ce r t v ~ ~ i «n O )$ . Z C gn jn ~ t» n Jn gr ee ee ale et ve ve ~~v . ~ ep at ~ . v ~ V ~ e ve ve ? 7 ct Ct J« ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ f aa tt 4< V 'p ~ ~ ~ v 'fl Vh et h n 7 ~ 4n ~ \ ee ee n ~a. ~ ~ ~ v+ te n OC ~ e/ ec ea. Je n ~ c Jc J 0 g T ar 15 ea la eie'rr Ao. CVMtatfI ,. Itl III'V ) ~ )t,)cr Yig F aa I1 t e' (au~ Jll ear ttf'V le a vtelce I eer1 !SI Hj Jam.Zn I] . ttl'V t)ella I'a ~ .,aae C, ;ihip'~. ier 4'I - 0 fc.h]. . aae .e''a. g ea Ie)'V ~ II «tl a :,qy "... Pxx~, i'; ~II'1 >. ~ ZZth L).a]V C4 ca»c .(a,~y/g.+,"a a~ (tr 111 ea I H$ HZ l gt ' v e','aa ~ I tie«a] V Cta~r i « I(r I ~ e$3 tl! At HI r Ll.e]V I:laea«c X .y.i lr.- ~ 1 ~ ze) Ht Nl 'aa 'v' LI« 'l'I Cta ~ «C ;rga~, 'ra tr.. 1 t't) / p,'t HI Hl II] ll:]V C)et«r I - )4] Hl Hg Ht 'Ih: ) V Ct a»ar (r ~ I ~ e=,l t I HI Ht Ht Ht .I ~ eg ) V ea,e.t lr . s Ptl Hl Hl Ht Ht LI )f e 1 ~ ga ~ Ht ~ (r" ~ I 3 te) le I I«V- P.Se. 5rh SII]BOLSt ]»ttrtct~ Hrt ~'N4 r:V ter Vteh ttl . tt» tglcrcclun n]P « e ~a»»««a « aa e ~ e v .C ~ Le D 3r l gr c eft gn $ eI 0 VI ve VI V ~J gp vf ~ ~ pv II J v» I J, Iff vI CI g e J ~ '7 ct c N ~ e H~ ~ n n e H ~ e v V v'g IC I/n V ~\ p 7 VI n n r CL ~ n 4 ec el vl n t v( ec Jw h. cc 4.0 X 'C IIv fVQe c lv ..l -rf3 Hl HI 4 ~ e/ / I«lv rl I-l / r, q~; 'e~g';x e! H% HI l/Jc ~ r A hl HI HI JI '/4 Y .r e ~ al. I V Cle~~c lt;- I-H) X Hf. HZ III Iv) lV nl I ee' les I Pts 'HZ Hf HI I l/V F "5/h Ht Hl SxtIDOLSI fcl,/eel~ @el f.'~cjenf r:v w/ vugh gl . Il~ galrracleveI nl'Ie(II01X R Hl TURGINf BUILDIffG fll:ACflV1IY CfINf f ' 0 ~ ~ ~ f s ~ s v as r 'va 'Z v s 0 .C /j =O a r 4l ~ « 1 J sr » ~ g tn ar rl ! r vs $ vs ~ sn ar r >v. ~ s ar ar aI, al I 'X » h va 1 )s ~ aI ao r~ sj ~ > s ~ s ~ r aa ~ ss + a aa ~ ~ a ~ iv 'n n rs n n P 4 r j n h n aa 4 ~ ra rI Jw asc J ~ ~ 4 sj sJ > jJ g >I N'.. rrhs«SI gn I .b ~t2a 4t. . 4t ttt'T L~ @sacr /Y rP! hg 1+rgt hl r n). ReT ts«uiaa;s I ~ sr\ IR Ll'i.'b=20nvtt... R'I'T I\abls Iss ~ C sss g hl ssa V (I'.IG. 3M2h), IIIV alvlas ). l so j ssrr Rl ' If1 0 =2245 s- ~r''I / sa: I v Cls as4c . 'P, Ib„tv Clsa.ve ~" ~ s ~ 1 ~ a $3 NK„HI ~ .. I Ql ~ ssc 8 IT :, gx-.',: 4 ~ Ra) al Hl Al / v II-ss CI / p sj''g / r,'/ I ..a-q'a$ hl lit N tlat tlat ttL ttt, 1'I 'I V CI ~ ttL str ~ I ar) I NL ) ~ ISN'T a'a a ss IIt .1411 I ttl ttl ttt ttl II!.IT a'I.s»s. ~ l4t yX 1 aA sll AL tlat, ttI IrT.VJ 55h Elt SY ttBOLSa 5 .. Iaarrrrt'vrs ttrl t/ns*rnt III.. „.. It» fnlsrnatnvs ht'PLtlD[tt R 81~ tttl(IMPAR TURBltK BIILLDItlG ftCACIIVllf CQtt I t RPS $ CRO 5Y.aft'tttttMNJIftttRI t'thNt Ca O„lag Ir r a LilnW'14" ei»» m IIC.> ~ ss Ir - suscc 'I s ws ss gsj ir. ~ ~ I, I I ~" I~ lC..I .. ~ ~ A Cl ' \ ~ .* Cl ~ I It . '0 ~ 0 I ~ It tL3 Ol I I 1 a 0 n n In f0 JF ~ ~ I I - Yl I4 I H n l4I 0 O. I- I- LTTS-3- 44A HI N! ~ ~ a-3-4eh Nl 1 PX ~ 3 2o7 tl! tt? PT 3 201 H! NZ PT. 3 20'7 H! NL Ng LH 3-ZOCI tt! H! I ~ ~ Ta-c 4-ssg Nl H1 ttI ~ 114 64 555 N! tt! ttI WL TL ~ c4- SSA tt! HI xs-c 4-ssb HI W! SYNBDLSC Ã5 Cr4 ~ 35C N1. tlat HZ N!', C lntcrv.ten flItCenIl HI NO [nls n.liras I ~ ~ ~ 'cttDIX R ~ KAC'!OR BttIt.OItt(' ROCt:S5 VARTASLE, ~ ~ g lttSTttut4C tnA11OH \ 0 DROWNS FCRRT hXKLEAR PL%< Da>C I S. tt tg,+,a.'c w I I gn ZT m.tITg l ~ ~ ~ .. -.'rCLO p ~ ' I' I f I ~ ~ e jIjlI CAGK RcsfoRsIOLT, 6 ROUT IRS 'T'I, S'EK r L "Ij~'V'eis< l I 5 0 ce B. Prerodt fire Sorrier I ~ ~ te lb 0 to.. 0 Csee ~ ~ SF'- I RB-PVI-1:- Jl This equipment nnd i.ts associated cables nre not required by the fina1 functional criteria. Therefore, no further consideration is required. ~ ~ APPENDIX R (,ORRECT I VE ACTION Ftirw PFV I LHED I IhTE; R ~ APPENDIX CORRECTIVE ACT I ON PREpnnED; PerIWCO: DATE: BFN-IT-RB-PVI- I-Ml l ~ .> , ~ ~ ~ f 0 ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ V I ~ ~ I In 4 In )3 0 0 0 In I Itt I I (3 I I V tl n n IO "I In I )r I I ~ H ) l 3o UT5-Z- 14A ~' V ~" ~ ' ~ ~ f.z-s- Cc A PX- S. Zo't , the clI Pl 5- CCIW I Ht H1 VV ~ ~ ~ V I PZ 3 801 HI Ht At NI 1 I ~ ' I LQ ~ S-204 Nt TIT. I ,I - ~ ~ TE c4.55E HZ AI.. Hl AI, ) ~ TH - 64-555 Ht p TI ~ 44 55A NI, H1 ~ ~ XS-t W-558 HT Ht Nt ~ ~ YNBOLSf ffs Ce4 ~ 55C O Inleioclen IIol Con J HI C4o Inleraslton APPDlplà R REACTOR I3UIl.Dltl(j PROCKS5 VARIABLES INSTRufeCflTATION BROwll5f[RRT bKLfAR PLAIIT fNtitgnt II P ~ AA) t 'lft' sf% Il.lt5 Pfl 2 I ~ d) x' 1 ~ ~ ~ « 1! a I~ (r ~ 'I "i-j ~ ~ CABLE tiESPotloT8lf 9 ROUTING co t N LT 10 EQUIPMENT CASUS GREET CORRECT IV'E StlffT PttCPARf R QElV V N CIST 'IE2hCXIQN NIIMKR ~Vf.W PT ~ 3- 2C17 2R933 SET 15 CILlc ~ s> T+P, O.se>ScPta P„rg, r.'4~ PT-3-1" I . RRD37 . Pl cl lg CsMc Tray - 6>l All a in a'>le 'f )oo, llt8 ~ ss g 11 1 TE -55E col>le ET 15 Cs'go T~c tt 1.1)c '118. 8 ra,t, I)>O,tpSJ4H 2 Les'te Tee. TE- ()>1 55F Col 4 E rt» carrcctsvc oct>m to Lc Os>le tat>a/I 1st lfo salcrsctsotsc otc rser ~ qcncralscc4 in 14, folio»snT ataasc sts ~ esne e' Oooo t)t>~ I Psa h A. ttcrovt Irrolrcd Coblctol Oo1 ~ B. Provide 1'lrc Barrier >I> ~ te Sana C. Ci 11 '8 deaf ~.ol on Oass t)ass P>ers 0. Prov:Jc Fire S«pprccoion h>aa Or«I Anoly>is. s, Pe ~ l ~ TLc cartes'1>vc act>a«a can LC Otal Oe>c ~ ~>st of lLc cL>rc oclieoo or wof ra>ra coo>bit»1 ots tlsaeaofo Eav sas Oer le Tts.s ia s rc Tcrcnev 1 ~ 14 P>eet doscriopl >co ~ ol tlsc co trccloec I I Cclosn. Tt c al ecl no.nLcr ~ aI Os>it ~v>ll Lc orrerd oI Ly tt if P>ets corrcclsec A,b.c.ar D sa «scI 444 Q S ~ 1 oslo ~ es 8 Oea I 0>la ~ acl. O„l) e,c sls 1 Peer> » 11 Lc ref cree cch. (I.a. Tt sic I ~ rtc reste Tls ~ Ie>q>s pteacel s ~ scar».)olr («)L ~ eagayt>1 A aLc ea> Oe>h otqs ssal en f tL» aveacl'vc. ~ t ~ ~al's«T4 reap>«>.L4 ~ ay '1>l» @co tv)pro ~ .Llc Fer alc. 0ai ~ para> J:I: «:» o,,r0»sl rear t Oea O»)t ls ~ ~ ~ be ~ I~ t)eels re> n I 'it 'ba> ~ I APPENDIX R n ".'-"-. !!* ao~ . KACTOR BitILOING O>ao ., o>sle ro>n'eca PROCESS VARIABLE NBTRUPTENTATIOH Oaas ',Oa) t> t>an '. BROGANS I'EttHY HUCLCAR PIN>t Oaaa>$ 't are Ot> ~ fttt II4tt PVI 2 ~ I r t r ~ t)Lt ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ R B, lf L"." - 8 F H - I"i R B - P Y I 2:- J 1 This cquiiww nt:uul its ns: ucintc'd cnbles nre not required hy the final func tion:i 1 r r it c r in. Therefore, no fuvt.lu r consideration is required. APPENDIX R CORRECT I'E ACT ION Pni.WnLD: PJ'.V I LNED: BFH- I T- RB-PY I -2- Jl - BFN IT= -PVI-2-M I To meet the separations requirements of Appendix R for uni.t 2; "cable-2R937 will be rerouted in conduit. ~ ~ APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT I ON PREWnED: Pe IESm: DATE: - xr- Ez- BFN-IT-RB-PYI-2-Ml 0 „ i )li ~ ~ I N( < ~ :- r ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ I ~ ' \'I~ ~ CI 'll. Cl ~ ~ 4 . Vi ~ 'i 4 O ltl 'Ifl r It} 'I \ I I ~ ~ PI I I I I I + + n n fl 4 I w ~ n I I I I I Vl II n III II }- I t.tt5-Z- 4c A t.r-a- 44 A ~ r PX ~ 5 ZOl HI NI Pl. HI ~ ~ PT. 5- Coo HI H! HI Ha HI PZ- S. Z01 HI HI 'tIHI t}! }.M-3-Zotr t}I tl! )l! BI C4 55E K t}4-S4-SSS TT.- c4 55A tl? HI XS kt4 558 HL HL 5'fNBO}.SI X5 04 554 HE HZ HI ln}crcc};~ }try ~) HI Hc It }erne}IIIII !P}'Et(Dr}t R I REACTOR 8UIl.DI}ts \ I PROCESS Vht}TAB}.C ~ ~ INST}tVHD}TAT!OH I BROW}lS FERRT }%K}EAR PLART it ~ c ~ I ~ Qgtc I 5'71'I PIIrtlbit.~}I s ZTIl.gt.tm.P~g S ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ I rf ~ Ie ~ I ~' ~ CAGK 7 Rt>I (ae Ool ~ e I'sais Tla ~ 1raqn r»<<»i ~ < ecocr Oe»» Da» 5 pea» Ds»C ~ ret n » bello LPPE)IDIà R Cia n o»o CACTOR GUILOIHG peo» Deere assn 'ROCKS VARlABLK, Ra '4< I) I ~ ' I » ' ~ 1I l.,: — BF tl- I +8- P Y I -3: J 1 4: the final This e Therefnrv., no fnvtlu r cnns5deration is required. I ~ ~ ~ ~ APPENDIX R CORRECT1'VE IICT?ON B(El%l(LD: Rt:.viLe;n: ~1.'v. DwE: to~4 O'8 ~o BFN-IT-RB-PVI-3-Jl FN-IT-8 -HVAG-0-MI To meet the requirements of Appendix R, cables .ES3912-II, HS3795, ES3?96„- ES3913, ES3914, ES1400-I,. ES1293» ES1401, ES1294, and ES1402 will be rerouted in conduit as necessary to provide the required separation between the control bay and cabling to water chillers A and B. Cables E81240-1 and. ES3740-II will be rerouted in conduit as necessary to provide the required separation between the control bay and cabling to water chillers 3A and 38.'PPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT I ON .PREPARED: PeriEWCO: BATE: BFN-IT-RB- HVAC-0-Ml '1 ~ ~ ~ <+ iw ~ o.$ '}'» l. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ V. O ~f s) < LrTs-~- ca,a NT. Nl O-5- 4c A PX 3- 2oq Nr N$ N1 Nr ~ ~ ~ Pr- a- cc % ~ C PI- NL Nr NI 5-2'.M. ~ I< g ~ ~ 5 20c< Nr )t I NT }'lI Tt-44.55K t}I tlr TH-6<-~~a }tI l}I rl. c.l-55A HI }lr N$ . ~ ~ ~ ~ xa -Q4-55c< HI NI SYMBOLS< l<$ C»4 55C N. t'lr NI I~}r.eel<~ llcl Gs<,)<.el Pf He Inta cJ'n~ ~ ~ APPE}}01X 8 TVRGI}}C, ger t.gr }tr,. ' PROCESS yhl}TABLE, ~ ~ IHSTRUp}ENTATrp}t t}ROM}tSrfRRY ht ~ ~ ~ ~ ~, + ~ ~ r ~ ~ ~ ~ l~ ~ h ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~,lr' gV A lL 0 Vl In Vl VI )3 4 A Vl N ,'s 4 IL3 r t d , ~ ~ ~ r n n r0 V I ~r n )r I re H n rJ X' 0. O. I- x 30 ~ ~ I LfT5-a- 1c i LZ-S- CC A ~ ~ ~ PX- S- Row )J I t)I t)T hl Z ~ PT ~ S- Cow YZ- S- gog HI ttf t)E t)I ' L)1- S-Zoo llI t)I 'lI t)I tti TE- C 4-SSK 'T H 6( SSB ~ Tl C 4 ~ 5SA t)E XS tel -SSB XS Ci i 55C 5YNBOLS) Ie)er~tw Rrl C~„4 .i$ t)l t)e I )cree)lee APPC)IDIX 8 ~ ~ fURDIt)L BUS LOIN(i PROM'nR TAO).E JIISTRU)1C)IIAIIO)I 9ROQ)IS I'[RRI KKIfAR PLARI ~ ~ 4 ~ e S'ST Oasg r IlaroOr) ~ <~ ~ r gt'W S'vr !T TS PTT a. ra I, « ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r co II. h ct )3 c 0 lO c 4 8.3 Ipt c I I 4 c n cc .n 4 I n c I Ic I H cd T 0. C. I I- )C 3o $ 5-S- LI.5 PX ~ 5- 201 tlt tl! Ht pgf Pt 5-2O1 III HE H! Hf ~ r PZ 5 201 I !If Itf ~ ~ c r 5-2OI« HZ It! H! Nt . ~ ".p t 7'E C 4 55K Ht Itf ttf At ~ ~ lH 64-55B H! Itt Itf n- C e-55A gj nlI Hf H! ~ ~ ~ r5 ~ e a -55a V ui ntf XS G i 55C ntt « kYH80LSc tnlcrscl4~ Hot t:a~QeL Ht It« tpptcrncl ppprc hPrCHOtf n IIttRSIHE Otjift. In@ PROC'S VhRlbSLt: 1HSlRUHfItthtlOH ~ cc ~ GROWTHS FCART htKWAR PLNT c ~ ~ ~ bkeg ~ s I c'a,rpQ It »I ~ @ cc 11.th. Fv! .' v. pr I c'r r. ~ 0 r p ~ n «'««p« I p r 0' I( '"l'IPTE5« I I -"Qc I I I. C u.la Circ I rl-il~ 43~ I I«streets o«r Il 4 veetotlira E I I t 0 ooiieets reyoeol I~ rot«et 1 II I «I t (I 41414 ~ l 4 Zaeee it aes;Iolelc c Rc 44 etc tete 1 44c rrlclte I c I I «I 3-:II.4I . I 4 I I. .l I er ~ T I ee 7I seersl 43 4LA««44 14IAc ~c I- R I 0 14 Iotas's 4«st«os) ssl e«s is cs S....I. —. te I r- ccc I 8 (I rcgoierh lo s)cga 13«is I- 't . "r- I L I I C«41441«e«S (ee Ala 4SSaegh ) «0 Qlyo««color II 1-( I n 0%«olhoccscs f00te I cc cp I I «0 oe PI I- I I I a I I 0 cc O eec4 .I e I DPI I cele S Oil l 1 '. e 'Cl, ~ 1 «) rsel c ~ e pe ~c I I II I I SY!1IIOESI I I S I T C&atl r:Ile I'ro IIrear I I ( I c I il I I I Jr'll l LI I I I I I I"" J a rs e.(/ I I I I e 3 ( eEI e'e I I I ( -I I I I I I tl0 ) )I I I I I L-e-- —-I I- HII- -'I J ~ I ( Lrs I ~ ~ I t N.f' Ec ee I es a I r e r «X' I oa I t 43 I II. g r3 I - 1 r. II-' c J ~c 0 0 Il vd a ~ ~l ~s JIJ l v I I l as 0 9 ~ 4&0 '1IIsr sD -III- ~ II- .c lcol I~r41 4ILV 51~II~ 8J 5CA u ——~ E Ss.5 l R.IV 54I JPJ0 IIJ SEC I r~\ t L EI Q j I Wll- Sic«l J«eco BI ~ I N N Vetoer I ~ I V er'l.el«I«acc Bl 3 E 0 ec Soc nolcr R ~c hcI'PCIIOIX 8 1 0 4 Z Z tr or lll.ACTOR BulLOIHG n0 AVX1L'IARY POWCR ~r 5YSTCM I InE t 1 2 Ueerr 3 IIROMHS fERILY HUCL EAR PLAN ~ L petr« I'est. OQ IJ bIII TT RB sr' I t ~ ~ r.v. See cc BFH-IT-RB-APS-1-Ml Manual transfers in conjunction with wrapping of conduits shown symbolically on BFH-IT-RB-APS-1 and listed below to provide a one-hour fire-rated barrier within the unit 1 reactor building to ensure adequate power is available to supply electrical boards required for shutdown equignent in the event of a unit 1 reactor building fire. Conduits: 1ES3930-II. lES3 925-II PP629-II lPL451-II '*lB92-IB PP465-IB PP466-IB "This conduit number is subject to change dependent on rerouting from cable tray system. AP P END I K R CORRECT! YE ACTION REPARED; fhVIem: DATE: 062165. 04 N r,: Il ~ j c tta dhrr >t t(OTfea l. Ca«lv.la I l a4»a»rl'rarr(afa ara ELIa var ~ rem I I. orlrons rrguorad I~ cna«re I sdaIL«aE4 paarer Ia arallaMa .I Iar ~ fiora in r ail Eaao I 4 'building. 4 .I reaalor 5 I Tf nae»al all«lJo aa palla r I s K f. / I K is I sl, »an«sl acV.an is 4 4 "r S II ( rq,,rcd t al 5n tlla cannaaloan (K )ha aaa~cl J A'I I Jab~ (5. R sh«ldaJn taA. r ~ 4 Q la Zl ( S. C»joIL aaala la lla sara(fad a ~ l 4 f «nial to 4all Satal EL%% c (.» alE ..aEa. w((l):a ~a I aria' ' 1 (A«:)»'.LlrK4e«rw I I 4 I I I &I Cskin I I I I a) 1 .. ~r I al ra r ~ I I ~a e I I I c Kf I I p I I ~a 4 ( ~a 4 I I g I * I I T I I P»ayr'YH6ocSL a» L "l 5 ra I g p ~ I N I ~A L ——g)f-I~' -%It a a 1.F I 0 I A I EL SOS 0™ 5 ra s.o D cc Nas.ta ~ 4do khr (30 4 gV 55 I(.rn 8( 3ffi I l~ '1 3s. ID5 \ .e 'r I 4nt daatfi ~a Q >fC Z J O J aa ~ ~ Y I ~5 4 LV'Spalla«a Ll 3fd ~a I /J C»l rrL SLO ta 5 WaLL5( aK Slat(o«n lt 3CO dec n.lc a fl. «S.5 'an naEe tr APPEN>LX LL ra 4 c 5: Daltr PaL,Q(l. bfll LY-lt(L-A'PSE ~P rlr~ BFH-IT"BB-APS-2-Ml Manual transfers in conjunction with wrapping of conduits shown symbolically on BFN-IT-RB-APS-2 and listed below.to provide a one-hour fire-rated barrier within the unit 2 reactor building to ensuie adequate power is available to supply electrical boards required for shutdown equignent in the event of a unit 2 reactor building fire. Conduits: PP465-IB PP466-IB PP459-IA PP460-IA **38180-IE 2ES3l0-I *PP633-I 2ES320-I 2PL450-I *Ttus conduit number is subject to change dependent on rerouting fran cable tray system. ~*This conduit only has to be wrapped until it attains a 20-foot separation distance fran the alternate control power feeder to 4-kV shutdown board 3EA. APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE ACTION PREPARED;~< L . ~n Bl Vr. REYIEWED: 062l65.05 BFH-IT-RB"APS-2-Ml es 0 ai ~ si 'C* its tAil sC stat t:Ss ~ ~ eisa C t: t.'Ae SS ahra ~" 4 l a I e V. sea sic i«is ~e v ~ e 0 « r 4I ~ 1 ~ I r T r dl fstc I es Lsnel ~e Lts, I oe SYl1BoLSs ef I f T .'I l CsaL.t «etio FVC ))»tm I I I stI I I esMc I i$ ol I I I)j I os I I I ~s r I g t I e 544 ae)4 2 sv I te l ) ti ~i I I I I I I I I J l I I l I t- —t- —— I O I ~ i ' is C l s I I 4 e 4i I I l 0 ~s I I 1 its ass.es c 5 as ts' l CL st5s.o t t< 5tlta bt slA V ts N f1 5 S5 'P I t'sV 5LI 4 Bl Wa f' I S ~ tt ~ et c' I t LV 5V) blitt lait 5c 5.S ss tt t sv stot btgtts t t5.S sl APPC))D1X R ti 4\ fIF.ACTOR OU1I.DING re AUXILIARY POWER e $ SYSYFM Uott V UssLV 8 0 sstV lsROWIIS FERRY HUCI.CAR P).Lt) Dst Ce Fata, .C ~ Btl lt ))B.MSQ I te 9 2- 'V. tv~ ~ ~ I ~ s BFN-IT-RB"APS-3-1'il Manual transfers in conjunction with wrapping of conduits shown symbolxcaLly on BFB-IT-RB-APS-3 and listed below to provide a one-hour fire-rated barrier within the unit 3 reactor building to ensure adequate power is available to supply electricaL boards required for shutdown equignent in the event of a unit 3 reactor building fire. Conduits: *3B88-IE 3ES310-I 3ES320-I 3PL450-I PP465-IB PP466-IB PP643-IE PP644-IE 3PP733-I *Sos conduit number is subject to change dependent on rerouting fran cable tray system. APPENDIX R CoaaccTive AcTroN flaws: utee>: IhTF: 4 l8 8z 062165.06 BFH-IT-RB-APS-3-Ml C t n 2 g 2 IC rr.' rv.' p2 9 Ill AT At Ilf III Al HT IIT IIT AT AT Ag ~ T. 11t 11t 11 I gl tlf II! 1 rrc gT AK alt Hr II! IIl 8 'foal II! Irf IIT ll! 5 6YNViALS1 @.... ~ esolm III.I C~. @eh OI 7IIlirsrlioII Appr.lrolx R UBLL'3 ILL'hCI{)A BUILDI NG Dt:CAY IIEAI Rf:HOVAL I OROMIIS I'fRRY N1K1,CtN Pl@I oars ~ S P'0" 4IIe .II)I u arrl 'lr'11$ 'fIIIIR 11r-fl u AA. ~ I '.11II CABLE, t, ~ I >'esto(IOT81.'C? 15 ROIIIING s, SEE r,ha( kT 18 1T EQU? PHENT CABLES SIIED CORRECT1'VE SI I K ET tgapAIICII ~ ~ 'LYQ1XL IILIIfQQi. JllKEXXIQH 8~~ aWBf.K Esses-C - Oaa>(ICS 0.> ~ >coca RIIRsW Cbrit hl Esy5-I, SET Iy C.bi. T" . '„(If3.a.ddlL RHIIsrI I' Aa ESBB-I Essa-T goals 1,B Cble T ~ nc(bc~>1)a~~ RIIROW P~A1 K515 I 5E f I'I >IICC 044> a a 1( NOTES( E. ra .O.a~aO4~ .:- RRIIsw Is.~ Ci Esiao I ~ ESIct I :~,( 1,8 Coblc fiat," na(c~~~(> I Th coereclave act>on Io 'bc 9cce II~>4 4 i. I l 'ES'IS-I S< ll C,Ll~f„ ~>(ats Irl(. C 1 ~ ben for (Lo shieracrona a ~ a sate r la Rllllsai P«w A2 ES88-I SET I c 4 'I~s po(>C B. Provide Flic Barrier r.. ESI(1-I s~',8 @,g.M11.» ESIIS-Is CLQc Tro 8 ((acr C. C>rcv'at Hrdsf >col aon 'S RIIRSal Po~C1 Es lop I, E510t-I 5'ET 11 Csbir fca. Oeseeaea pee>C + A,E 0 a<. Q.O.L~ O. Pro a>le Fire Svpprcssion IVIQSW Pvost C2 ES ll)-I, EsII1-I 5(J>sa l>8 C,bl f 8(nac~e C.9') I HHRsvf Po~E 01 s< aaa~ sac n I'dvlat pro> ((CO p>iaa Analysis. Hi'>«oIS><(> Q,fi Q>0?wc sL i'~i: Section II.13.5.b. (1). of the Functional Criteria requires that one RllRSW pump bt opurnb1e Cor each RflR pomp.: In the RB, three separate R1fR pumps are bel»g relied upon {i.e. 18, 2D,:3C for u»Lt 1 fi,re; 1A, 2C, 38 for unit 2 fire; and 1A, 2D, 3C for unit 3 fire). ~ Sheet 0 indicates this criteria could only be defeated where h and C RHRSW pumps have interactions. Therefore, by rerouting cables for the RHRSW Pump C2 (ES113-I and ES117-I) to meet Appendix R separation requirements in the RB fire area, the cri- teria will be met. APPEND I X R CORRECT I'E ACT I OH REpmED: G. lhvtE m:~4' DATE; Nil"/$~8 BF H- I T- RB- RMRSM-0-Ml ~4 ~V ol P IV m Rc cs ~ o c c E Q c 4. 3 3 7 Pc cl 2 1 OC OC 2 flC g ~$ OlksvF Pa «F A'I I 1 I 1 RllBsrf 9, g AB 1 RQRsd P~ P Ct RNesd I4.F Cx j 1 Illgsvt l4»p Bl 1 1 IFNPsrF IFE I4 F IIINI.Pf P~»F 51 1 1 1 PARsvl 14soF bs GYH8OL5c @. lal«ccl.sa cLI Cee.'4«L ill fl I'+1 UI~all'PCIIDIX 8 «]uIIiIII Oul Q Let c 4'r'fc P~c ~ 0. Stm 11.as cwcA C ir Ea. &mLQ cc9 CABK rLRSPOLLsIGLC Cp ~ ~ r. Lssr A'1 OLE LEOLET IELG I ~ ~ SKK I SLEEK'f OF CORRECT PILL PAIL C R IT EQLE? PPLENT 'CABEK5 ' SLLCLT'PLLLLLikI V e LEtEIE ~QQLK EXQ EEEELIEEE l 5Er L7 Oaa ~ KKB .O so>C.O.ra REIRSM P «gELl E515-I 'Hi. C.4;E Q . tot> tfgi/gol~~ gfc~ow p, >I EBS Q- T. 5Errr + ELLLRSH PvscPCL ES LOO- T. SET 17 "B ~ KE 5 Dose c.%ra ELOTKSI R~>R>w p 2 Es>>I saeE + C.nh.'Il','alle 21u ~~+M~~+~ E. TL>o eorrcclive seL'eon lo Lsc 'kon ELLLEl5H Punp BE 3KD4080-E SEI 17 r ~ I r LL~ Lcr sel >ons otc Trs) generoLLCC4 in Lhc TPLL>4>any ~ I RELRbvC PuM 62 ES Z5SS- TL blusl + ~nsnncrt pea> se 1(LLLi.'SH Puo>E Dl DES +OBO. EI 5ET 17 Egg rs Cs le Trsg Pasta eI/ A. Rerou'1 Involved Cablclsl BELLES'un> DZ. E52t L3 - TI DLroE el >J Ooai 5. Provide f'rre Boirier r> ~ Ia LL>aac C. C:rco:1 Hodifico'Ison Osis r>n ~ I Paste , . ~ D, Prov>dc F;rc Sa>ppressl>on htaa Ol>os Os> u C. Analysis. rs sr ~ Krroc>r EL>e eorreclsv ~ scL>ons can lsc Dao I rlw>a> ~nL ot Llac \La>ac cela>ea ~ os'lif rsct i csoalsino1 an LlicrooC> a I Oooo Oae ~ s 2, TL>i~ aa ~ relerencv 1 ~ t Post ~ dose repl eon n'I Ilia eatrcclsvc e aclaovi. Trio olios 1 nvsnbcs Pa> ~ Oaes> so>El bc prost&. Iy sc if IL>an cos reel ~ re A ~ Q Cs or 0 ' asacl ~ nl Lal 3:I eel>en C as Os>a Oas ~ s wael. Oe>L> vnc shool ns>en\acr * P>ats is.i 'be rsTcrenccl. (i.~ . Tl >'4 Rata ~ «ec>LL c aalson anv>1 ts Loch oi> Deere A ail R as> M o> LL aoL>L bc ae>$ r>ae ~ aJ sll 4> tc>L'ete ~ sla>aa ~LL L s s Jose>:L>c) os 11>al ILICCL,) cu D>st> 'nL I ~ Itt * 'll>~ le4$ A plass>E e» ec I ~ s ( abt ~ >spica\ oI cE>e scar'esnLE> I~ I Pat I. wga~csr'.~ t: i& ~scc1ivc. as>I ~ 4 LC» scars ~ )Lc F» al~ 'L. Ocai PIS ~ I J:I; ~ o;.,r.( l: Ptas de>>4t >p 1 san. I 4 ra>ns Dans ctaste l«w t> I peer> P» ti oaa bail ~ APPENDIX R riots Rassler TUf ~ ~ — — B F N "~>-"T. - R B D C A 0 - 0 j. I 'l'he Drywell Control Air System wi11 be modified to provide a means of a longterm air supply to the S/R valves. This modification is in the design study stage due to previous safety concerns. APPENDIX R CORRECTIYE 'ACTlON PcvtEwco: ~ Dave; ~i~"C 8 ~ BF.H-IT-RB-DCA-O-M1 3.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS RESULTS'FOR THE SHUTDOWN BOARD ROOM, BATTERY BOARD ROOM, AND CONTROL BUILDING FIRE AREAS Each Shutdown Board Room (SBR), Battery Board Room (BBR), and the Control Building are considered as separate fire areas in the Functional Criteria (FC). Each of the areas has been analyzed to ensure a minimum amount of equipment will remain available for the fire areas defined in the FC. The results axe indicated in the attached tables with corrective actions identified where deficiencies were found. The following criteria was used in the analysis for the respective areas. 3.1 SBRs and BBRs Each piece of equipment was reviewed to determine the affects a fixe would have on the function of the equipment for that specific fire area. The following abbreviations were used to. indicate the effects on the equipment: EFD — Equipment Function Defeated —The required function of the equipment for that specific fire area cannot be accomplished. NPS — Normal Power Supply Lost — One of the normal power supplies (e.g. logic power, control power, equipment power) required for the equipment to perform its function for that specific fire area is affected. However, a manual transfer to an alternate power supply is available. Once all effects were identified, each piece of equipment was then reviewed to see if the FC was met with the following additional considerations for the RHR system: The RHR system requirements are satisfied. provided the flow path integrity for each RHR system in use (see table) is assured. SBRs RHR Pump Operation SBR Unit I Unit Unit 3 Al B>D C B,D A2 B,D C B,D B A B B,D C1 D A,C A>C C2 A,C D A,C D B A C,B>D El A,C B,D E2 A,C B,D B,D F A>C C A 3EA A>C B,D C>B>D 3EB A>C B,D 3EC A,C B,D 3ED A>C B,D 4-3 E52165.02 3.2 CB If adequate back-up control isolation (BCI) from the CB fire area is provided for the equipment required, the FC is met. 3.3 The type of corrective actions required to provide BCI or meet the functional criteria are coded as follows: a. Reroute involved cable(s). b. Provide fire barrier. c ~ Circuit modification. d ~ Provide fire suppression. e. Analyze. The corrective actions sheets correspond to identified inter- actions from the tables. 4-4 E52165.02 J j II ~ . 58R>, BBR~, anA,t 8 Analljs!~.....,.„.l... ~EHDBR=BBR Reac Coo)an I)sh e.(n .I.nhejrllg,. I*«««II«O)g. «III ply «7, p'Bz ~ ~ „.d,'«II«I II gii/i.i ~ R'4 ' ' IJ C 7W «« ~ ~ ~ ««l«li w «a z ~J«l I,~ I I «Al«7M L74 Il ~ ~ l« al'or 0Q1 Gt.I I It UllI1 2 4 S G 0t >L>z — 1 'tI 'L. II, 'LV'.c 2 ~ Cot .'k; ~ir~ 3 :Cm. ~C« l '(r:. 'k . FCV 2 ..'!e . (Ie1 .'Cc,s. lt(w fFQ .'ls~ Yc'(CS FCO i'- t.tt(1 .'.b.x 5 1.!V.». !>tA, 3 ~ l I!/(l Vc> ~ 2. »(n C ~ (« I 3 »/Lt l lQ, da ECY -l7 ? .t':. 'L . Jcs 3 t7 1-:5 ÃC'r .'km. ~ ~ 'l',», Y»s 'few. ') FCY 'tc*. Yre I(C.. ~IL~I '(»;. 3s' ~ l 11 « 'l.", I5'~. 'I I ~ « lfS. YC I. Ye~ 'A F t»D i .3I."-. .'C ~. ~ I 1 (.-.. - ~ I 1 C )'(.. '(»»I .'I'». JC'e. ~ ~ 3 Ia" . 'I'.:1., .'I'r .. . 3'I'< ~ I l. II."~ .He. QC1. I i' LE.t) ~ I I.C tie. de E $'tp 14. Yes.. ~ I I "« . the [<1. (~ I .6u. Des. 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' r)f! l lar l. r) I)) .I.!Ir! .,Ae a) I)lA u lb. I) ~ ))» I!f)1 )) Ir) ?)rt 5QRS > OQlisl l)) l 6 0, Analcgsi s ..... ~ ~ .Ever 5 i"it>n) TO) ) IX'~ t«rt«„. Qgd.....P(~~ u,<88(,. t«I~ ~ I~ Z~W «III y ~ ~ S '« ~ ' ~ /g ~ ' ~ ~ ~ « ~ ~ J ~ I' I \III -.PP( I II I ,I 'Itr«IT ~ IJIJ ~ Irk«I N. >ac 6Al 5 OC.X Xa5 ilt() Ud. Crt I LLIl 2 k4, QM C. ),).. ,. talk Pa- 5-1 .i!16 .i:le., .t)s tt ~ J l 'kr... ~.t pea- gp, cP CfD iit5, ' ~ r ~ ~ I i'i i:)I Ii)Illi)IIII!i~ t I' I ~ I II*~ f 4 APR '0 R-BBR-CB-0-Jl In Shutdown Boa rd Room F, the possibi Iity exists tha t va ives FCV-7~>- 1 00 , I'CV-7~~ - 1 0 1 , a nd va lve 1:CV-23-57 a ll cou ld spuriously open . This wnuld defeat t he flow path 8 » t e grity for system II {8 & D pumps) of RllR ~ n Unit 2 and the fiow path ineprity for system I {A' C pumps) of 101R in Unit 3. P The corrective actions are to rack out the breaker. for. valve I'CV-23-57 and to require that the RllR system II of Unit 2 remafn in standby con- dition to provide adequate flow path integrity for. Unit 3 RIIR system I. h schem;itic of the valve's power and control circuit is atLached. APPENDIX R CoaoEcv~vE AcTioH PhEtenEO: PEVI BIED.'~E: @ ~18'< A P R-.SB ff- BB R- CB-0- J 1 0 ii'f : ~ I nttnnt I fi' l 1 N ' ~ I I P C'~ I I tr I < f.-"'. he r 14 C„g ht V ~ 11 Neap cin ~ ~ \ \ \sr ~ 1 ~ ~ '1 ~ I ~ ~1 f ~ ~ 1 ~ Fl 3 tP I IPI < I Vf tare tl ~ f f'f' f is ~ t Cflff ~ f ~ l ~ C th ~ gi A ~NN treraaa I f I « Il. 1 te I 'lr ~«N J le( ~J,, ff at ltg fi pr~e ttn C. I V .'aJ ~ I t ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ INP 1 ~» L'IN'ap Sl, ~ PV iNkii~ ~ s Cl -- — I ~ I pr ~ ~ ee. N Nr ~ I ' 1 iJ CZlf ~ tt '1 I sn fjef I ' 'l'-..' f r a) f tliw!l1 1 \ ~ CA ~ ~ N I N N N ~ e h ~ nn1 h ~ CKC 1 «rp arr ~e P cir ~ II ~ I'ari.l I . p It1 ca I ~r. ~ 4 Phhhr Is ~ 1'. 1 t< Vhrf~ Syh AP R-'~ R-88 R- CB-0- J2 For n fire in Sliutdown Hoard Room Cl area, the D RIIR pump is required to operate in Unit l. The normal power supply to the RIIR pumll D cooler is 480-V Reactor MOV board lH which is.normally powered from 4-kV Shut- dnwn board C. Tliis pnwer may not be available due to the fire, there- -fore a manual transfer may be required to provide alternate power to 480-V Reactor HOV board 13. APPEPOIX R CORRECTIYE ACT)Op @EWnED: PevicstED: +("J. 4vA 0m E: &'~igz. APR-SBR-BBR-CB-0- J2 0 — — ~ I A P R-"-88 R CB-:0 J3 For a fire ln Shutdovn Board Room h, 8 and 3L'A and all Battery Board Rooms, the possibility exists that all required I 6 C pover may be lost. Therefore, a aianual transfer may be required at panel 9-9 cabinet 2 to provide adequate I & C purer. APPEtIDrX < CORRECTIYE ACTION REPARED,'erlem: ~l W. IIIPR-SBR-BBR-CB-0-J5 1 APE-,;-BHR-CB'-:0- J9 'l'lils cq~iiln|N.nt. and it" associated cables are not required by the, final l'»nctional cri(erin. 'fhercl'orc, no l'urtln r co»sideration is required ~ AI'PFNDIX R CORRECT I'E AcT I OH A~l'l nnED. RVlLM-:0: Obli:: ~l'~ AP R-SBR-BBR-CB-0- J0 -SBR-BBR-CB-0-Ml En order to meet the Appendix.R criteria for required circuits whose spurious operation. could adversely affect shutdown capability, and also to ensure the operability of the reactor pressure vessel isolation system, an additional backup control panel, located in a fire area separate from backup control panel 25-32 and from the control building fire area is required. In addition to the new panel above,.new manual controls, as marked on attached General Electric drawing 73QF929, sheets ], 3, 4, and 5 are required to ensure that the manual safety relief valves do not operate spuriously. These controls will be located on the new panel. ~ The Automatic Depressurization System (AOS) safety relief valves already have adequate control isolation. APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED l QtuoJ d PZVlem: DATE: > i 8'~ APR-SBR-BBR-CB-0-H1 0 APR-SBR-BBR-CB-0-M2 In order to meet the Appendix R cr'iteria for requiyed circuits whose failure to operate could. adversely affect shutdown capability, backup control with isolation from the Control Building Fire Area shall be provided..for the following valves.: FCV 74-7 Units 2 and 3 FCV 74-58 Units 2 and .3 FCV 74-30 Unit 1 FCV 74-72 Unit 1 FCV 68-3 . Unit 1 FCV 68-79 Units 2 and 3 FCV 78-61 Unit 1. FCV 78-62 Units 2 and 3 t ~ The location for these control and -isolation devices. is at each valve's motor control center at the 480-volt MOV boards. The control circuit changes described above are as marked on attached d~awings 45N779-6, 9, 11, and 21; 730E920-1, 5, 8.. APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED: ~ RerIwm: . HATE.'~ t~ ~~ APR-SBR-BBR-CB-0-M2 - ~ APR-SBR-BBR-CB-0-N3 In order to meet the Appendix R criteria for reguii'ed circuits whose fhilure to operate could adversely affect shutdown capability, the changes described below are required for the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) system injection valves to ensure that either valve can be opened manually even in case of a single fire affecting the train of logic contro-lling it: 1. They shall be enabled by a low pressure permissive signal from either train of .RHR logic. 2. That portion of logic.in each train of logic that develops the low pressure permissive signal shall be isolated by fuse from the remainder of the circuit. 3. The routing of the cables for the redundant power supplies to the above logic trains shall be in accordance with Appendix R separations criter ia. 4 4. The sensor which provides the low pressure permissive signals to each train of logic and their connections . to this logic shall be separated in accordance with Appendix .R criteria. The changes described above are marked on attached drawings 45N779-22; 730E930-2, -3, -4; 730E920-6, -9 : —.- and -11.. ~ ~ APPENDIX R COaRECT-IVE ACTION PREPARED; ~ ParIem: DA~: &/a Sz- APR-SBR-BBR-CB-0-H3 APR-SBf3BR-CB-0-M4 -0 To meet the requirements of Appendix R, cables 1H13, 2/3, 2M7, )M3, 3M7, and 1M12 will be rerouted .in.conduit such that they will not pass through the control building fire area., APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PnE WEED: fhVIE m: &TE 'P R-SBR-BBR-CB-0-M4 4.0 ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The associated circuit analysis discussed in Attachment 3 concluded that certain modifications"were required to ensure safe shutdown capabilities in the event of a postulated fire. The following section contains corrective actions sheets that identify the required modifications. Schematic drawings are also included when applicable. E52165.02 BFN-IT-BBR-AC-1-N2 Due to inadequately sized cable protective device, a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, the cable for this circuit and its protective device will be replaced as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacement Existing Replacement Cable Cable Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Aux'eferencePower Huahex, ~xe ~m Unius 1RM700 414, ANG 012,AWG 40A, Breaker .20A, Breaker 120V ac Unit 1 45H777-22R5 Preferred, Bkr. No. 1107 APPENDIX R CORREC-TIVE ACTION PaFvuam REV Iem: DATE: 062170.04 BFN-IT-BBR-AC-2-N2 Due to inadequately sized cable protective device,.a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, the cable for this circuit will be replaced as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacement Cable Cable Cable Power Reference Raker. Maze ~is~ ~~c Khmetia 2RN700 014, AWG 012 AWG 120V ac Unit 2 458777-22R5 Preferred, Bkr. Ho. 1178 APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACTION Paevam: REVIE m: DATE 4 - i'P'- 6'~ 062170.05 BFB"IT-BBR"AC-2-M2 BFH-IT-BBR-AC-3-M2 Due to inadequately sized cable protective device, a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown'capability. To alleviate this situation, the cable for this circuit will be replaced as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacenent Cable Cable Cable Power Reference Humhm Bmzm ~h~yjttg 3RN700 014i ANG 012 ANG 120V ac Unit 3 458777-22R5 Preferred, Bkr. No. 1108 APPENDIX R CORRECT t VE ACT ION FRe~~a>: > - J- l PZVtE m: DATE: 062170.06 BFH-IT-BBR-AC-3-M2 BFN-IT-CB-AC-0-Ml Some power circuit cables have enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto-ignition temperature before a fault could be cleared. Cables from motor control centers in the control building that are not protected and that can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed by MCC. Control Ba Vent Board A Control Ba Vent Board 8 Cab e ID Compt ab e ID ~Com t Cab e ID ~Com t Cab e ID ~Com t MS1 181 ES1310-I 5F PL1106 2D ES3810-II 6A PL1125 1C ES1288-I 6A ES3700-II 2E MS2 68 ES1300-I 2E ES1225-I 6D PL1183 3A ES3825-II 6C ES1350-I 2F ES1325-I 6F PL1196 38 PL1163 6E PL1100 3E PL1189. 781 ES3850 3C ES3725-I'I R2D PL1175 58 ES1316-I 7C PL 1138 3E PL1115 5C PL1150 7E ES3788-II 5D ES1200-I R1C Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuits with 'clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See the attached sketch. APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT I ON PREPARED: REVIEWED: DATE; C 2. I—8~ 062170.18 BFH-IT-CB-AC-O.-M1 BFN- IT-CB-A'C-0-Ml-1 HCC Bus Load BFN-IT-CB-AC-0-Hl-1 BFN- IT-CB-AC-0-Ml-2 HCC Bus Load BFN-IT-CB-AC-0-Hl-2 0 Due to inadequately sized cable protective device, a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, the protective device for the circuit of each cable will,be replaced as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacement Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse . Power Reference Humbez. Uhhiua ~@tlag &earn Babas~ FE700 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45W643-382 Breaker Breaker Cabinet 2, Bkr 231 ES563-I 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N779-18R7 Breaker Breaker Cabinet 2, Bkr 218 20 A. 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N771&R5 Breaker Breaker Cabinet 3, Bkr 318 PL916 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N769-3R7 Breaker Breaker Cabinet 5, Bkr 510 IV2329 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N614-9R18 Breaker Breaker Cabinet 5, Bkr 501 lPC560-II 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N614-9R18 1PC561-II Breaker Breaker Cabinet 3, Bkr 316 458777-21R4 1PC562-II 1PC479-II 1PC477-II APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED 'EVIEWED; Q c~~ ~c M~ DATE: 062170.11 'lhe cables listed below are not adecpately protected by the existing overcurrent protective devices. Therefore, a fire-induced fault on any of- these cables has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, additional protective devices will be added as indicated be1ow and as marked on the referenced drawings. Existing Additional Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference Humbler, Matiug ~hUaa Baud Bahm~ 1A1185r lA1240 20 A 10 A 48V DC on Panel 9-9 45N620-12R9 lA1233 Breaker Fuse Breaker 131 1Vl705, lV1554 20 A 15 A 120V AC I&C 45N614-2R10 1Vl581i 1V1700 Breaker Fuse Bus A, Bkr 219 1V1708 1V1706 i 1Vl707 20 A 15 A 120V AC I&C 45N614-3R11 1V1608i 1V1709 Breaker Fuse Bus B, Bkr 319 lV1634 1LT140 g 1LT143 20 A 15 A Panel 9-9 Cab 5 55N2701-1R9 1LT141, 1LT40 Breaker Fuse 120/240V AC 55N2701-2RS 1LT10 g 1LT20 Nonpreferred bus lLT274i 1LT297 APPENDIX R 1LTSg 1LT70 1LT18i LT75 CORRECT I YE ACTION PREPARED.'EViENED: 062170.14 BFH-I~AC-1-M2 Sheet 1 of 2 Existing Additional Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference Em~ R~t' ~pic'gg ~u~rc gche~ti c R223 20 A 15 A 120V AC Z&C Bus B 45N614-7R6 R224 Breaker Fuse PNL 9-9, Bkr 305 R149 20 A 15 A 120V AC DC Bus A 45N614-7R6 3A2913 Breaker Fuse PNL 9-9, Bkr 205 APPENDIX ACTIONR'ORRECTIVE 062l70.14 BFN-I~AC-1-M2 Sheet 2 of 2 BFN-I~AC-2-Ml Due to inadequately sized cable protective device, a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate-this situation, the protective device for the circuit of each cable will be replaced as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacement Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference pe@~ ~@~a &urm Sahmatia 2PC560-II 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N614-9R18 2PC561-II Breaker Breaker Cabinet 3, Bkr 316 458777-21R4 2PC562-II 2PC479-II 2PC477-II 2V2329 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N614-9R18 Breaker Breaker Cabinet 5, Bkr 501 APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE ACT ION REYIWm: DATE: 0 - ~9- 8'z. 062170.12 BFN-IT-CB-AC-2-Ml BFN-IT-CB-AC-2-N2 The cables listed below are not adequately protected by the existing overcurrent protective devices. Therefore, a fire-induced fault on any. of these cables has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, additional protective devices will be added as indicated below and as marked on the referenced drawings. Existing Additional Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference = Healer. URtiaa ~3atiaa Buuzm Bah@~ 2V1705i 2V1554 20 A 15 A. 120V AC I&C 45N614-2R10 2V1581 i .2V1700 Breaker Fuse Bus A, Bkr 219 2V1708 2V1706i 2V1707 20 A 15 A 120V AC I&C 45N614-3R11 2V1608i 2V1709 Breaker Fuse Bus B, Bkr 319 2V1634 2LT140 g 2LT40 20 A 15 A Panel 9-9 Cab 5 55N2701-1R9 2LT20g 2LT10 Breaker Fuse 120/240V AC 55N2701-2R8 2LT14li 2LT274 Nonpreferred bus 2LT297, 2LT8 2LT70g 2LT18 2LT134 APPENDIX R CORRECT1VE ACTI ON PREPPED: REV IENED,'8 DATE: 4 /8- 062170.15 BFN"IT-CB-AC-2-M2 BFN-~-AC-3-Ml Due to inadequately sized cable protective device< a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, the protective device for the circuit of each cable will be replaced as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacement Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference Huaca ~hhioa $QR~c Bshe@~ 3PC560-II 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N614-9R18 3PC561-II Breaker Breaker Cabinet 3, Bkr 316 4SN777-21R4 3PC562-II 3PC479-II 3PC477-II 3V2329 20 A 15 A 120V AC Panel 9-9 45N614-9R18 Breaker Breaker Cabinet 5, Bkr 501 APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED '~, ~ ~ REVIE m: DATE: - <~- tZ 062170.13 BFN-I~AC-3-Ml BFN-I~AC-3 The cables listed below are not adequately protected by the existing overcurrent protective devices. Therefore, a fire-induced fault on any of 'these cables has the potential to.impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, additional protective devices will be added as indicated below and as marked on the referenced drawings. Existing Additional Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference 9 Bauxm BahmaUa 3V1705g 3V1554 20 A 15 A 120V AC I&C 45N614-2R10 3V158lg 3V1700 Breaker Fuse Bus A, Bkr 219 3V1708 3V1706g 3Vl707 20 A 15 A 120V AC IGC 45N614-3Rll 3V1608~ 3V1709 Breaker Fuse Bus B, Bkr 319 3V1634 3LT140 g 3LT20 20 A 15 A Panel 9-9 Cab 5 55N2701-2R8 3LT10g 3LT274 Breaker Fuse 120/240V AC 55N2701-3R4 3LT297 g 3LT18 Nonpreferred bus 3LT8 APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACTION 062170.16 BE%-I~-AC-3-M2 BFH-IT-R9-AC-0-Nl The analysis of associated circuits has identified certain control gower circuits which are required, in the event of a reactor building fire, to ensure trip capability of 4160 and 480-volt switchgear throughout the plant. Modification of these circuits will ensure that we will have no associated circuits off these boards in common enclosures. This modification involves rerouting and/or wrapping the conduits containing these cables (listed below) with a one-hour fire-rated barrier to ensure circuit integrity in the event of a reactor building fire. Gahlz 1Bl9 250V Battery Board 3 250V DC Turbine Building Distribution Board 1 (Alternate Supply) 3B18 250V Battery Board 3 250V DC Turbine Building Distribution Board 3 (Normal Supply) 250V Battery Board 1 4160V-Bus Tie Board (Normal Supply) 250V Battery Board 2 4160V Bus Tie Board (Alternate Sugply) APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREpApEO ~ g~ rn w REVIem: PATE: 062169.04 BFH-IT-RB-AC-0-Nl BFN-IT-RB-AC-0-M2 Some power circuits from 480-volt motor control centers and 240-volt lighting.boards have enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto-ignitiion temperature before a fault could be cleared. Cables that are not protected and that can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed in Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-O-N2. Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuits with clearing. characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See attached. sketches. APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACTION REPARED: PerIem: DATE: 4 ~r e~ 052172.01 BFN-IT-RB-AC-0-M2 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-0-M2 480V Diesel Auxiliar Board A Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t PL2400 2A PL 2490 7C PL2455 2B PL2380 70 PL2300 2C PL 2415 7F PL2470 2D ES620-I BA PL1275 2F ES 731-I 8B ES600-I 3A PL4550 8D PL2363 3B PL4575 8F PL2325 3C PL2750 8F ES711-I 3D -ES6'30-I .9A ES640-I 3E ES741-I 9B PL2710 3F PL2775 9F ES 610-1 4A ES309-I '10A PL2367 4B ES350-I 10F1 PL2332 4C ES363-I 10F2 ES721-1 4D ES250-I llA ES647-1 4E PL2725- 4F PL 2551 5A PL2600 5C PL2650 5E APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT ION PREPARED DATE: » i 8' 052172.01 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-O-M2, sheet 1 of 3 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-0-M2 480V Diesel Auxiliar Board B Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t ES3130- II 3A PL2500 7C PL2375 3B PL2390 70 PL2350 3C FE699 7F1 ES3244-II 30 ES3110-II 8A ES3147-II 3E ES3222-II 8B PL2777 3F PL2727 8F PL2407 2A ES3100-II 9A PL 2314 2B ES3211-II 9B PL2307 2C PL 2712 9F PL2357 20 ES2809-II 10A ES3120-II 4A ES2850-II 10Fl PL2371 4B ES2863-II 10F2 PL2340 4C ES2750-II 11A ES3233- II 4D PL2425 12A ES3140-II 4E PL2694 12B PL2752 4F PL2576 5A PL2625 5C PL2675 5E APPENDIX R CORRECT.I VE ACT ION PREPARED REVIem: DATE: . gz 052172.01 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-O-M2, sheet 2 of 3 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-0-M2 240Y. L i ht in Board 1A 240 Li htin Board 2A 240Y Li htin Board 3A Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t 2D3 LD-4 P283 2D3 P291 3D3 3D2 P275 P288 2D4 P292 304 304 P276 P294 203 204 P278 P295 204 3D3 P280 AP P END I X R CORRECT I YE ACTION PREPARED'. en~: DATE: 052172.01 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-O-M2, sheet 3 of 3 BFN-IT-RB-AC-0-M2-1 f~CC Bus Load 8 FN- IT-RB-AC-0-"l2-1 . 8 FN- IT-RB-AC-0-t12-2 HCC Bus Load BFN- IT-RB-AC-O-HP-,2 BFN- IT-RB-AC-1-Nl Some power circuits from 480-volt motor control centers have'enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto ignition temperature before a fault could be cleared. Cables that are not protected and that can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed in table BFN-IT-RB-AC-1-Ml. Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuits with clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See attached sketches. APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACT ION BFN.l . BFN- IT-RB-AC-I-Nl Tab FN-IT-RB-AC-)-M) 480V Reactor HOV Bd 1C 480V Reactor Bld Vent Bd )B 480V Reactor Bld Vent Bd )A Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t .1PL2060 1C 1PL912 1D2 1PL1383 )A) ES) 52-I 3A 1PL900 2A 1PL)010 4B 1V2110 . 3B 1PL5175 2B 1PL1017 8B 1V2100 3C 1PL875 2C 1PL1375 BE 1V2122 3E 1PL935 2D2 1PL1390 1)A) 1PL585 4A 1PL5140 3A PLR2000 4B PLR1975 6A 1V2130 4E 1PL5118 6B )V2460 5B )PL5110 6C )V2308 5C 1PL1190 9A )PL2215 5E 1PL906 )OA 1V2465 6B 1PL5180 10B 1V2317 6C 1PL5200 10C )V2558, 6E 1PL953 10D2'1C PLR2012 7A 1PL5135 1Y2300 7B 1PL972 11D2 1V2160 7E PL)326 12A )V)950 8B PL1327 12A lV2150 8E 1V2500 9B 1V2516 9E )PL2225 11C 1ES300-I R6B 1ES462-I R6E 1ES2962-II RBA 1ES2925-II RBE APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACTION REPARED: fhVIE m: DATE: 4-~~- ~ BFN.2 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-)-N) BFN- IT-RB-AC-1-Ml-1 MCC Bus Load BFN- IT-RB-AC-1-Hl-1 BFN-IT-RB-AC-1-tel-2 MCC Bus Load BFN-IT-RB-AC-1-t Some power circuits from 480-volt motor control centers have enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto ignition temperature before a fault could be cleared. Cables that. are not protected and that can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed in table BFN-IT-RB-AC-2-M2. Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuits with clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See attached sketches. APPENDIX R HATERSCORRECTIVE ACTION REVIem; 4 BFN.3 BFN- IT-RB-AC-2-Ml Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-2-Nl 480V Reactor NOV Bd 2C 480V Reactor Bl d Vent Bd 2B 480V Reactor Bld Vent Bd 2A Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t 2PL2060 1C 2PL900 1A 2PL1383 1Al 2V2100 3C 2PL5175 1B 2PL1375 SE 2V2122 3E 2PL875 1C 2PL1390 llA1 2PL585 4A 2PL5140 2A PLR2025 4B PLR1981 5A 2V2130 4E 2PL5118 5B 2V2460 5B 2PL5110 5C 2V2308 5C 2PL906 9A 2PL2215 5E 2PL5180 9B 2Y2465 6B 2PL5135 9C 2V2317 6C PL482 10A1 2V2508 6E 2PL1118 10C2 PLR2037 7A 2PL1115 100 2V2300 7B 2PL1110 10E 2V2160 7E PL495 10F 2V1950 SB 2V2150 SE 2V2500 9B 2V2516 9E 2V2110 11C 2ES300-I R6A 2ES462-I R6E 2ES2962-II R8B 2ES2925-II RSE 2PL2225 R'1A APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED! r7: /g/ DATE: 6 BFN.4 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-2-Ml BFN- IT-RB-AC-2-Ml-1 MCC Bus Load BFN- IT-RB-AC-2-Ml-1 BFN-IT-RB-AC-2-f'11-2 HCC Bus Load BFN IT RB AC 2 t]l 2 BFN- IT-RB-AC-3-Ml Some power circuits from 480-volt motor control centers have enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto ignition temperature before a fault could be cleared. Cables that are not protected and that can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed in table BFN-IT-RB-AC-3-M1. Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuits with clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See attached sketches. APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED: paten: M DATE: BFN.5 BFN-IT-RB-AC-3-Ml Table FN- IT-RB-AC-3-Ml 480V Reactor NOV Bd 3C 480V Diesel Aux'iliar Bd 3EA 480V Diesel Auxiliar Bd 3EB Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t 3PL2060 1C 3PL1840 2A 3PL1850 ZA 3V2100 3C 3ES2200-I 281 3ES4700-II 28 3V2122 3E 3PL1975 282 3PL1976 2C1 3PL585 '4A'8 3ES2328- I 2C1 3PL1886 2E1 PLR2050 3PL1880 2E1 3PL1882 2E2 3V2130 4E 3PL1884 2EZ 3PL1810 3A 3V2460 58 3PL1800 3A 3PL1863 38 3V2308 5C 3PL861 38 3PL1862 3C 3PL2215 5E 3PL1860 3C 3PL1989 481 3V2465 68 ,3PL1970 4A 3PL19S6 482 3V2317 GC 3PL1980 481 3PL1977 4C1 3V2508 6E 3PL1983 482 3ES4705-II 581 PLR2062 7A 3ES2336-I 4C1 3ES2516-II 5C 3V2300 7.8 3PL1820 5A 3ES4650-II 5E 3V2160 7E 3ES2205-I 581 3ES4640-II 6A 3V1950 88 3ES2140- I 5E 3ES4670-II 6C 3V2150 SE 3ES2150-I 6A 3ES4660-II 6E 3V2500 98 3ES2160- I 6C 3ES4730-II 7A 3V2516 9E. 3ES2170- I 6E 3ES4740-II 78 3ES425-I R6A 3ES2220-I 7A 7C 3ES4750-II'ES4720-II 3ES462-I R6E 3ES2230- I 78 7D 3ES2962-II RBB 3ES2240-I 7C 3ES2925-II R8E 3ES2250-I 7D 3PL2225 R11A 3PL1888 7E1 3PL3780-IE R118 3PL1892 7E2 APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED l REVIem: DATE: C- Z.I'--'-~ BFN.6 Table BFN-IT-RB-AC-3-Nl BFN-IT-RB-AC-3-Hl-1 HCC Bus Load BFN- IT-RB-AC-3-Nl-1 BFN- IT-RB-AC-3-Hl-2 t1CC Bus Load B FN- IT-RB-AC-3-!<1-2 BPH-IT-SBR-AC-1-Nl 'lhe fire-induced failure of the 250-volt dc control power supply cables lES2819-II and lES2813-II on 250V dc reactor N3V board 1A, canpartment 7A, for the HPCI pump discharge valve FCV-73-44 could affect the unit safe shutdown capability due to the lack of coordination between the affected load and feeder breakers: Corrective Action: The magnetic trip setting of the affected load breaker will be adjusted to a lower setting to provide proper protective device coordination. (Refer to the attached marked copy of GK time-current curve 158B8127, sheet 2, typical for all three units.) APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACTION PREPARED: REViem: DATE: 062169.01 BFN-IT"SBR-AC-1-Ml BFN-IT-SBR-AC-1-M2 Due to inadequately sized cable protective device, a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, the protective device will be replaced in the circuit of each cable as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacement Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference /gal~ URtias QkiKcc lES4460-II 100 A 40 A 250V DC RMOV Bd lAg 4M763-8R3 Breaker Breaker Bkr lBl lES1960-I 100 A 40 A 250V DC RMOV Bd 1B, 458763-7R3 Breaker Breaker Bkr 8Bl lES1350-I 40 A 30 A 250V DC RMOV Bd 1Cg 45M714-5R7 Breaker Breaker Bkr 3D lES1339-I 40 A 30 A 250V DC RKV Bd 1Cg 45H714&RG Breaker Breaker Bkr 7B APPENDIX R CORR'ECT t VE ACT I ON PREPARED '. REViem DAve: (e-/0- g 2 062170.08 BFN-IT-SBR"AC-1-M2 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-1-M3 Some power circuit cables from 480-volt motor control centers in the shutdown board rooms have enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto-ignition temperature before a fault could be cleared. Cables that are not protected and that can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed by MCC: Reactor MOV Board lA Reactor MOV Board 18 Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t PL1210 1A 1RP1365A 13A 1PL2350 1A ES3333-II 15E 1PL 2014 1D 1PC700-I 13C PLR2018 18 ES3900-II . 17A 1PL2052 28 1PL 2051 168 ES3325-II 3F 8518 178-1 1PL2275 5A 8510 16Cl IV2475 5A 1PC504-II 17E 1V2235 6E 1ES1428-I 17E 1V2450 6A 1PL2300 18A 1ES1125-I 7E 1PL2425 R9A 1PL2040 6C-1 PLR2006 188 1PL2325 SB 1PL2450 R98 1PL2250 7A 1PL2210 18D 1PL442 981 1PL2430 R90-1 1ES4450-II SA 1PL2025 5 6 18E-2 1V2781- IE 982 1ES1450-I R90-2 1ES3680-II SC 1PL2460 R98 1V2788- IE 90 1V2831-IE 98 1V2800-IE 9E 1V2838-IE 90 1PL2200 llA lv2850-IE 9E ES825-I llc 1P C710-I I 11A ES833-I 11D 1V2244 12E 1ES2900-II 13A 1ES3700-II 13E 1RP1390-8 14C-1 Corrective action is to install fuses in the power ci'rcuits with clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See attached sketches. APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT ION PREPARED: REVIEWED: DATE: 052172.01 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-1-M3 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-1-M3-1 MCC Bus Load BFN-IT-SBR-AC-1-M3-1 Bl-N-IT-SBR-AC-1-M3-2 MCC Bus Load BFN-IT-SBR-AC-1-l13-2 BFH-IT"SBR-AC-2-Ml The fire-induced failure of the 250-volt dc control power supply cables 2ES2819-II and 2ES2813-II on 250V dc reactor bGV board 2A, ccepartment 7A, for the HPCI pump discharge valve FCV-73-44 could affect the unit safe shutdown capability due to the lack of coordination between the affected load and.feeder breakers: Corrective Action: The magnetic trip setting of the affected load breaker will be adjusted to a lower setting to provide proper protective device coordination. (Reference attached marked copy of GE time-current curve 158B8127, sheet 2, typical for all three units.) APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE ACTION PaEenED: PZYrem: DATE: 062169.02 BFH-IT-SBR-AC-2-Nl BFH-IT-SBR-AC-2-M2 Due to inadequately sized cable protective device, a fire-induced fault in'he following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, the protective device will be replaced in the circuit of each cable as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing Replacenent Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference Humbug 2a&og &uzi Babism 2ES4460-II 100 A 40 A 250V DC RKV Bd 2A, 45H763-10R3 Breaker Breaker Bkr 1Bl 2ES1 960-I 100 A 40 A 250V DC M3V Bd 2Bg 45H763-9R2 Breaker Breaker Bkr SBl * 2ES1350-I 40 A 30 A 250V DC RNCV Bd 2Cg 45N714-5R7 Breaker Breaker Bkr 3D 2ES1339-I 40 A 30 A 250V DC RMOV Bd 2Cg 45N714&R6 Breaker Breaker Bkr 7B 2ES1371-I 30 A 20 A 250V DC RN3V Bd 2Cg 45N714"5R7 Breaker Breaker Bkr 4B APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED m:'RIE DATE: 062170. 09 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-2-M2 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-2-M3 Some power circuit cables from 480-volt motor control centers in the shutdown board rooms have enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto-ignition temperature before a fault could be cleared. Cables that are not protected and that can share a co|mon enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed by MCC: Reactor MOV Board 2A Reactor MOV Board 2B Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t PL1225 1A 2ES428-I 17E 2PL 2350 1A 2PL 2210 11B 2PL2014,5,86 '0 2ES1450- I 19A PLR2043 l,B 2PL 2250 110 2PL2275 4E ES829-I . R9A 2ES2900-II 1C 2ES3700-II 12A B514 5A ES837-I R9B B522 4C 2ES4365-II 13A 2PL2325 5E 2PL2430 R9C1 2V2475 5A 2RP 1390-B 14C-1 2V2235 6E 2PL2425 R9C2 2V2450 6A ES3887-II 17A 2PC700-I 7B 2PL2450 R9E 2PL2040 6C-1 2P C504-I I 17B 2E S1125- I 7E 2PC1001-I R10F 2V2244 7A 2PL2300 18A 2PL 442 9B1 2ES3680-II 8C PLR2031 18B 2V 2781-IE 982 2V2831-IE 9B2 2ES4450-II 18D 2V2788- IE 9D 2V2838- IE 9D 2PL2025 5 6 18E 2 V2800- IE 9E 2V2850-IE 9E 2PL2435 R9A 2PL 2200 - llA ES3329-II 10C 2PL 2460 R98 ES3337-II 10D 2P C1003-I I R10F 2PC710-II 11A Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuits with clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See attached sketches. APPENDIX R CORRECT I YE ACTION PREPARED REVIENED 'ATE: 052172.01 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-2-M3 BFN- IT-SBR-AC-2-N3-1 MCC Bus Load BFN- IT-SBR-AC-2-t13-1 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-2-H3-2 HCC Bus Load BFN-IT-SBR-AC-2-M3-2 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-Ml 'The fire-induced failure of the 250-volt dc control power supply cables 3ES2819-II and 3ES2813-II on 250V dc reactor KV board 3A, canpartment 7A, for the HPCI pump discharge valve FQT-73-44 could affect the unit safe shutdown capability due to the lack of coordination between the affected load and feeder breakers: Corrective Action: 'Ihe magnetic trip setting of the affected load breaker will be adjusted to a lower setting to provide proper protective device cooidination. (Refer to the attached marked copy of GE time-current curve 158B8127, sheet 2, typical for all three units.) APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT ION PREPARED: DATE: 062169. 03 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-M2 Due to inadequately sized cable protective device, a fire-induced fault in the following cable has the potential to impair unit safe shutdown capability. To alleviate this situation, the protective device will be replaced in the circuit of each cable as indicated below, and as marked on the referenced schematic. Existing 'Replacement Cable Bkr/Fuse Bkr/Fuse Power Reference Hunker URiiaa Ruxm Saba~ 3ES4460-II 100 A 40 A 250V DC RKV Bd 3A, 45H763-12R2 Breaker Breaker Bkr 181 3ES1960-I 100 A 40 A 250V DC RMOV Bd 3B, 458763-llR2 Breaker Breaker Bkr 881 3ES1350-I 40 A 30 A 250V DC RMOV Bd 3Cg 458714-5R7 Breaker Breaker Bkr 3D 3ES1339-I 40 A 30 A 250V DC RKV Bd 3Cg 45N714&RG Breaker Breaker Bkr 7B 3ES1371-I 30 A 20 A 250V DC RMOV M 3Cg 45N714-5R7 Breaker Breaker Bkr 4B APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACT I ON PREPARED 'EVIem: DATE 062170.10 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-M2 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-M3 Some power circuit cables from 480-volt motor control centers in the shutdown board rooms have enough available fault current to raise conductors to the cable auto-ignition temoerature before a fault could be cleared. Cables that are not protected and that can share a common enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability are listed by MCC: Reactor NOV Board 3A Reactor MOV Board 38 Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t Cable No. ~Com t PL1237 1A 3ES2291-I R981 3PL2350 1A 3ES4782-II R90 3PL2014,15,16 10 3ES2292-I R982 PLR2068 18 3ES4786-II R9F 3PL2275 4E . 3ES2286-I R9F 3ES2900-II 1C 3PC1003-I I R10F 3V 2800- IE 58 3P C1001-I R10F ES2652-II 4C 3PL 2210 118 3PL2325 5E 3V2475 5A 3PL2250 110 3V2235 6E 3V2450 6A 3ES3700-II 12A 3PL2052 7A 3PL2040 6C-1 3ES4365-II 13A 3PC700-I 78 3V2244 7A ES1387- I 17A 3ES1125-I 7E 3ES3680-II 8C 3PC504-II 178 3V2788- IE 98 3V2831-IE 98-2 3PL2300 18A 3V2781- IE 9C 3V2838- IE 90 PLR2056 188 3PL442 9E-1 3V2850-IE 9E 3PL2025 Iml 6 18E 3PL2200 11A 3ES4450-II 10A 3PC710-II llA 3ES1428-I 17E 3ES4791-II R98-1 3ES1450-I 19A 3ES4792-II R98-2 Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuits with clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See attached sketches. AP P Eilo I X R CORRECT I VE ACT ION PREPARE: REVIEh 63: DATE '. 052172.01 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-N3 BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-H3-1 HCC Bus Load BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-M3-1 BFN- IT-SBR-AC-3-M3-2 ttCC Bus Load BFN-IT-SBR-AC-3-H3-2 Cable 1PL881 fran 480-volt auxiliary boiler board (NCC) and cable 3PL4871 fran 480-volt condensate demineralizer board 3 (NCC) can share a ccmmon enclosure with cables that are recpired for shutdown capability and have available fault current high enough to raise conductor temperature to the auto- ignition level before a fault could be cleared. Corrective action is to install fuses in the power circuit with clearing characteristics fast enough to ensure that faulted cables do not reach auto-ignition temperature. See the attached sketch. Cable PL232 fran 480-volt comnen board 3 (swgr) can share a cammon enclosure with cables that are required for shutdown capability and has available fault current high enough to raise conductor ~rature to its auto-ignition level before a fault would be cleared by its non-instantaneous circuit breaker. Corrective action is to move the cable to a circuit breaker with an instantaneous trip element installed in an adjacent canpartment. APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT ION PREPARED: rl 4 /'ATE. I / 8 062170.01 BFH-IT-TB-AC-0-Ml BFN-IT-TB-AC-0-f11 51CC Bus Load BFN- IT-TB-AC-0-P1 A postulated fire could involve.both the 4160-volt cables (1PP400, 1PP401, and 1PP402) supplying power to reactor recirculation pump 3A motor-generator set and protective relaying control cables (1PP431 and 1PP450i for the power circuit. If the fire faulted the control circuit first; causing the dc control circuit fuse to clear, protection for the 4160-volt circuit would be lost and a fault to that circuit could not be cleared. 'this possible problem also exists for the power circuit to reactor recirculation pump lB motor-generator set (4160-volt power cables 1PP525, 1PP526, and 1PP527, and control circuit cables lPP432 and 1PP575) . The corrective action is to place a coordinating fuse (6 ampere) downstream of the main circuit fuse (35 ampere) in the negative polarity of the protective relaying circuits. Since the control power of the circuits in question is ungrounded, this will isolate the control cables as required for proper circuit operation. (Reference attached marked copy of schematic drawing No. 45N763-6 with changes circled) . APPENDIX R CORRECT I VE ACT ION fhviem: DATE: 4 lb'Z 062166. 07 BFN-IT-TB-AC-1-N1 BFN-IT-TB-AC-2-Nl A postulated fire could involve both the 4160-volt cables (2PP400, 2PP401, and 2PP402) supplying gower to reactor recirculation.gump 2A motor-generator set and protective relaying control. cables (2PP430 and 2PP450) for the gower circuit. If the fire faulted the control circuit first, causing the dc control circuit fuse to clear, protection for the 4160-volt circuit would be lost and a fault to that circuit could not be cleared. This possible problem also exists for the power circuit to reactor recirculation pump 2B motor-generator set (4160-volt power cables 2PP525, 2PP526, and 2PP527, and control circuit cables 2PP431 and 2PP575) . The corrective action is to place a coordinating fuse (6 ampere) downstream of the main circuit fuse (35 ampere) in the negative polarity of the protective relaying circuits. Since the control power of the circuits in question is ungrounded, this will isolate the control cables as required for proper circuit operation. (Reference attached marked copy of schematic drawing No. 45N763& with changes circled) . APPENDIX R CORRECTIVE ACTION PREPARED 'EVIEWED: HATE: 062166. 08 BFN-IT-TB-AC-2-Ml BFH-IT TB-AC-3-Ml A postulated fire could involve both the 4160-volt cables (3PP400, 3PP401, and 3PP402) supplying power to reactor recirculation pump 3A motor-generator set and protective relaying control cables (3PP569 and 3PP450) for the power circuit. If the fire faulted the control circuit first, causing the dc control circuit fuse to clear, protection for the 4160-volt circuit would be lost and a fault to that circuit could not be cleared. This possible problem also exists for the power circuit to reactor recirculation pump 3B motor-generator set (4160-volt power cables 3PP525, 3PP526, and 3PP527, and control circuit cables 3PP568 and 3PP575) . The corrective action is to place a coordinating fuse (6 ampere) downstream of the main circuit fuse (35 ampere) in the negative polarity of the protective relaying circuits. Since the control power of the circuits in question is ungrounded, this will isolate the control cables as required for proper circuit operation. (Reference attached marked copy of schematic drawing No. 45N763% with changes circleS . 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Iterorctc g)C T t CC»tier CrKur ri Cretee Cortcrrer Ce»I J rr r«r OtCC W I (S)i ~ eatw'eitce, oet ra«relict oe Irr AereK coetlrl crerrrt oKI I CCOS( rll('SI- rj I at)I ceAltre Iree rraKfe»r crcaar Iecaa rr etta»rt eeictee/ I IC circa»rl dec«-» areola ore ravr /tert eKr tortile tleeertr ~ ol»ct~ tteattKD )de) C «g»» I»»» rear treat»ac tat«a»e crl catt lat crccer saecer jol eae ool let+ et I» eeoc ao riKeoet l Kcercrae«ere«I«r reaewyp coetol'oearceeret C Ierte»r «art e eea so» er»eac) «ITTTT ID (cert tr «Orrt DTIT«erer OOO7TT ~ IS«rt f) " OaIIK er»r DI- j re«ate»r, ooecra»oat eccfal o) I» oe)et fcc oeoc)rte)r''LL «cttetlecl oeee»eas ea«leek,t.f reer s»»ac clat Daaaee»s Tsocfteae ac. «»c srsrse cat»cer«er oeaseaec roc)co Lt rcclec cTcrcee tctlc»TMT DI«cea»c OOCI Tfecfll Dc rr»IMT CD»TMI»crr cls CIC» c»aaea»s CC sf te e»a«ovt tat roe ~vert'o»tcoe IttrcrTe»e CCOSCO Ceto c»rc» 'el * rI o OO ~ a 44) ~ ~ C rs ~ % ~ Cy «SS as 4«Ce Ii OIT» CS CTOSC IS UNlTS l-g tp Ster(»CS Il»lr kS Irdor o»cr «cert ervr WIRING DIAGRAM~ al eol eoccie eeir ~ 480'v SHUTDOWN AUX POWER era» ir»oer Iea ta rcr-I sr war cree» chore» ease I Ic'«I terre Icrr»e I Krce <~I'so >»l sl(eat cocr orri» eee It SCHEMATI DIAGRAM tar.rSO cree. Street C»t Oretc rt CSDCSIme K)e I ee oecsseor co eo oc ~ ~ Ice na Iae ea e«VI IcscowlUx 9 ?I-'To 01 E 45N779-7 ls ISI k ~ eM» ea ~cae IS UNDSk SUNCtlONA NC ~~I'yP ~Agid(f ~ r q4 7l CeICC 4o IIS 't .'Iickr, - .. DSD. I» '0 8-ITI9NSIT ) aas ~ Ilr(NS I Clat rtCTNtisa r terat ISO rrtcics ls Cu'lC arse rrsr I ~ s(v I4( fl~ ss9p wl"~ Area Near 0 osa vee asa Nv +'T a).(I ~ r'I all k ~ ar salve Sl C C ss laaav CL(eoa orl' ~ C CIC ISV I.WL 5 a) ) Krrs~ ~ (Vas~~ ' ~ (Vassar Orl a la)IA clast ~ 54( SI ~ CN 'Cl(A rr(v C 'sssss ~ O(A)l I a ~ Ca 5( sll( al k I'assr . T terr 0 sais ~ ~ I lo Cere APPENDlX 4 AAVas(vssaVQ 4 0 rs tra he I p» 3 00 Irat ala 1 k y "R AT rSCIC s aes I ~ OCrol I ~ ~ t ~ a) ~ sse ~ rrr -ass& TO ,I ~ AVSO ~ IIII ) -elfu( oa worse osr ~I VO k I rr ala(i rsNOrss ella NNOVIS ~ awa rav ssl rai'N ~I ~ N ~ Q 55) P «0 vr a kl srcAN lvllvef ILSW PMnl lra ao seshrv lo Kali s ((Ks) au. ~ a w WOSKI c)zas 4 ™ rafa >0 t)aavda 0 cJ'K nd(i av Ws(ardll lacv af(ra SIITKN se QCSI IITA.S))+ ~ saa ~m(5 vva ~ g ~ ~ J 0 ovr alta Asa ~ I slu ~ I (s(rssu IOO SI' ~ ull ~ Ssl shoo ra aa slaw toKC ~ vea aso ~ae flo era~I ~gk Ia assed Tl asa 4 +Vs sa KTVLI Lao(a voa lso ~ asst 0)Val I StaaJISIV Trail Sl IT(Le C ~ Lasasl av) l)CIC 05Atla llwa seasan. all(a aria 0 ~ls 11 rull asv. ~ Kr C ~ vc l ~ i%as ~ TTLTC y ss salt cvssr (a(astro) 1 SVLW 1 aa ss 04LSV 'r r ses' 0 wtvsacosee oss ~ CEh) CAI 4 COCS Srl .. ~ 5 'lrlaVI ~ QNsca racs(D)ct ' V 4 O' ss k ~lk NLAV a Ac V 5 5 ~ss 'a (or rsal ~ esr ~ 0 J ~:Cr ~a ssaao. IKVNVasses \ i=i' ,„. (INTv(a va(vale b: ss Sv h ~ 4 (5 i. p 4 Alai sea v claus Vrs$ 4 y Qlrsla N) T5 ~ r SSAIMI COS(AC'(5 T 5 6 1+sell ILONvel sseo ic V5 ~kj wst Nn f rasa salsa Ns ~ vast ara Ssst( Nssascf k 'K seat Claus (slarraas) 2 I c 6 I I 4 ~oosaadvr t COssat I ~lsvosa rlr'l'l ra aolt OC'I ~ Vau ro ~ I C rlvres cr ILK'e C I ssr ao asN ~ orav ~ ~sllT vav(, eaason I vo oeNII ra Ie vel vsse, ~Karsvaea IKaroasrea , als ~ I Iao Vase sever adeoew ~ lair uu OCAT eer vase ~\vaav Salva aaa s~ l(S(l I(~ ~ 'sr ~ ~ ' I ~ 5an"4( srIN4» sONAra aso Ssa(N ~ l ssl aa as 5 aaN orNas SINN s(oasoa rrlaa\ (Isis soaa vwa 55 ,Ssa(N 0\II Vase (slu ~ AsoososK costscnfl Ssu tllsa( 5(scd Kn (sa I ~ ~alar( 4 aatsvaaodr Paar+ ao(r osv 0à rcvaro OSN aavvea AL COrrussa(f 5la(aa Overs rs-W-)5 NNa)4 ~ Kaawa at Oost os Ive tsls) osac I 0 osav ra ac $ al L(Ksv ssso Wsw TsSNat I I— tcv.a( t) sasrvssl covacss Cvrua ~ 1 ~s 40 I ~ ~ SN4 (OAS 0 otto tt ~ I')5 tcsf )4(ls rsaa )OS(tveaa Ness CL(SC C DIAGRAMS k I sacr Tsscsll Ale(allot VTON Sal als C CONTACT CLO((i~case)ra 'Q cLCWO ( leorCOATIVC os lorw sssc I OC)0 Oct I crrNal NSC 4 ~ACIS Ls rrre Dais I( (COWS C ~.C. Oa area foe'rt cA5 ossf lls )0 IALLANVA(ca I KILI15 14 rlulall ====.,'I( TtclTNCLT OACslT(oh arras( ~ vsse na olwsc( laoadasla k 4 4 a(ac L scare)(JL( IOIN Iee ) II.=.-I ~ I)OOSII(ls I 40 ~ I s 4 t(utsa(L(e au, 1IIC(D Iat ~Kw toa otf cls fl)f~ ~II so«ulna Is(soa(tw(.La-50 Oala t Tat a fNC4T elollTIOIL O(t) e,' 4 Isnssscl(d(oh lsu ssl au ~elr ra)r ~5 4 (rl(o(lVN.LvLI) r stl su(esurf nv(t eo() ll I~ ~ wSO )C)(sra IS) 0 ~sl aads( ~Wall(lsl lass(Of (I fllIu(tacit (s so) Ceofc t) () s. wruL C ~Ol 0 ll'41 Ca(SO($ ll'IVII~ )a o 4 ~slot(so T 4 ((sas OeC) 0 6 CCCATIOI t 0 ~ le> STA(SOLS 5 ~CC o ' (wc(I Pg CO(T OD IW AICR i—~es Is(STC crs Tasse( ))X a„ 7 ~ «g» 0 sa CI t sWea fs 6 CLOVE MIICI 4 l ( Ousa LOC~ 0 444 (I 4 g~ 5 aZ,j CC ll iC )I as C tc.lr)51 I ~ ISTNavs rsvNa-t)CT) lrr 0 lsa VKTI Ioa OIKAS SOL rKTI Ioa ssasava I olwv ri Tla To or ~ Cae coa Sears vasav os llll Os(S AT clv'lvstsrsca'rssss iasl caAsss osvrsolcasov vowl oaa ~ valve alia(ca( Wsaraan 10 OKA VKVO 0 14L %sf sfs aa 'cc sa (Isa a(Ill lcl 0 vcralrso cfsravrhv~ asv I 5) 10 oua TKvQ 5 I s 'ftI II t Olar Ovles( 1ICc Ires(ATION coasoe evc tears(lce )v'rcsltcl Lisle oao-saovfaKNS $ 15'tell al'TCAS )a(5(LOC 5(0544$ l(VIL Crala)L 10 olla(la (LSer Llv(L AO)VC orNAI coaarcvcass(w Ort Lls L(rhaSCOSCAII)V (saASW )LSSL(l COL (VAO VKVC Occ f(T'4 ta fcv CC ts fcv a( tc t(>SC tr SJAE A AND GFF GAS cuwc C)(st aol( 1 I'Sa a) ) 4 tto ssal tt ssas YSTEM CHANNEL A 4CC)IIIL"I Vs)lVCS C ((t I s ~ ~ ~ ~o)a OC) OCS C f ) a g l »0»a E E'-Ir)9NSt 0 49 f(Y.(lri~ 7 15 Vv'sf ir(OCDIS ~ (J(e v(r c c c freaai C c 1 ~ ilfIDs) TC rra 1 ~ rial ai shalo VALVIu11\iv Ciau Oz(a ssf 4 CLSIC ccrsact 4 4 01(s. ~Taarsl avso 11 ~ ~ 5 ~4 (rq tres )ne CL r poser s OCO)OA Isa« D'1(DI) CEO O!J 040$ ir I: n aor« «»4 C rata 4 al 0 arDI u Jn ) ~ ) APPENDtv R 7 I Clef Safe« 4rl. 51 fra ~rre asra ~ caoa j a)' ort S SAC Ssec I 'I Co 0 C ss 5 ar sra «I 41 SR war ss .0 ~Sl DISsor ~ 4 ~I ~S ~ ~ ~ 0 (rtraasru) 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ lt(a( «$ astor I) r Sf W Q~ ou Sserrl!I tea I MDD>RATIO ' I 4 n g»g »DezDkf (DD le«oar 4 aaaÃaaaa ~0 0 0 «I 44 aa (IXI I sac at N ~iiN+ ~aaszD«aur Ii ac CAI sue(4 5«S Iris>«u SO I Q» Lu.~ ()D«o OOS IOO SLSaar() ~era rrrl ih ls44 ~D'Df) OCOo) ta (!oa SDEIS) arne» see 1 Iamava or»o» «I jra ~v sv u rasa av rasa««au IAA ~ av CCa)l 00 Sa1SOTS(D. ~ 4 / ~ QS» Wa a Io«4 4 1004 ~l (De(acts !C««SO Off (- 55)> I «Du ~ CS)ue «55 Srua « II r ' aseaaiazu esne s$ t ~ ~aaesN csfacre s(5 ~7 4 rile 5 ~Cvtzst ~ ICai-er Af cuapourie4 rosa IC+rns Ila Ea ~Sst Nasa oa Iuasa seas SA«a 4 "='- osaa>slee»as ae ~I «T 'C 0 H raus » f sv ~aoss 0 ~1 oa«eo 4 " aisoas Isla 4 I ~ ra~ 4 I DIP 0 r a>s 4 Ila sua 'ae NB ~1 Zzaasa (CDua} 7 o«e ~ gr Cg « ac ~ »7 ~ C 4 ao 0 IL yg-'-' fiD'I SLaria «ka ~ooaa VK.~ Iba a«aSA ONE 7 ~ ~r v ra\ rsu so»a «»rsra V '» If ~ a c' I I (( ~ore 4 c 4 o sa I a se» I ~ a«I hau ~7 oe er eeoa ar vvu VVNW lr 4 ae 44ouar aw ~s aeirt IN ~a.cure ore 4«r as 5 ~ ~ sra ev Uu' u«e I4 n C ~ Ni-l Ie 4 )za .U;. STATOL}f IS W w vzaaa ~su 0 «ale earns r«>a teresa ~soaa Icia 4 u Savzaac De 'slu Oeoeaa Ve ee eras casse ra area aura $ ) 7$ C ~ I earl«« -.0::M::t I DIAGRAMS sana ) ~ v V tI CONTACT ~V 'Y«av ~ &% 0 srasssael SnS (Sera 54 e} usa ar JJS ~aa tulvs rsoasraa ssu< ofscsis cssrccf a OLUU vscocs ssua ran vltvl Situ tl SSna Valet 1Ce.DISS 4 aCr Slit IIILIIC 5su 0 IEIO 'Lint 4 sns lain cosa el hL 5JAE B AND OI F.GAS CD(!I a«frl Vuef IS fISLLT Drsis (II~ ) one e»tevuvc isrsacr ccoicoprtD SYSTEM CHANNEL B c urt cfcsuvar nest roost Stra ufo oe ssof so c 0 c' VALVES / 0 0 cus Jest 0 0 c c B «~ral o «sails «s ~ I sl «i as «~or «Derko «DOI ia ~ I-D on a «0}t ' I f I 4 off4 QDSE au ~t ~lceasr Cris Jih (5(» Ae(O A~ 7 ail ls Ioassu f(var ",I Joet ~ srs so sla Ss +St f0acWII} .1$ I( L»T I) ls'll I) LS kla«1 t} ASS(uat'z (fs )0) I Nes Lsa sll TAB}E A Nn re«cru» ~0 I K(s. 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Iu Luaraw ia nnelan «en n sl rse(L are uu tuaJ Ill ia ae I,S,LLI (}) a«e Dsoiuer a>L l ms a I~ l>lr J "~ «avI az( I nks )YILT ( ar Cat) ~ wear~ . ~ Iaersin sasoisis ole Laic h'q ris. Do u nssil ~ >rs 7 I ~ @flu, Ihsl, ul k aoe ~ I« I,LLLLV} fitrini Iir I «C s a oars! Is 7 „V „1 j,a (NSI Iat} ~ '1 ~ I ~ ~ «4 m ar . ~ Ia Ia u(N se II Isi n va us»INC LLLL(r)~ ' carr Ka I« nc u4slcs L IIIfels sposrlc 1(t Lt, Nl norm ca tel cu!t (lest fait() ' sJ tea(T ze ~ [4 ~ Ii!O.TJII ~ 11CIO ~ Ir}0, IIDI,LT.LI Cteiul Cits($ I~ IlacaIL 'J I ui'(uiu, UDWSDI,LLLL ~I '7 O al ncf'Trill ~ Sr ~ 1, r I SSI ~ ~ 77 .a Vr Sa 1 \I+a I. ' Ieslilif ul'llfurl alit N llrI(illa nlun Tr Va»SC ~ 5 lf aealeiu>$ SAC CC;Cfrra«S 4 ~ ~, C rfa rant.aaf Tacfff(Secs CSOCSff(u(rraf ODZILY esl ~ vrocsl aavccss e' rt '0 4 ~ al ~ I SCC e 7'» ~ allf>SS li ~ g CELTI Cl s'for J sl ~ h ar (csaaaar! h ia Nsesaa ~ '( 1 ICr. I e(vlaCDrsr (7 es es I llf~ ICe-s.alar Nrgatre)rf 0 li hSTta.«CSOY ACLULTIC4'0 7' - aaaos I aair««SS>'« 5 fs f 0 ao «r(aa ~ ~ I~ C v, a ~ rie. » ~ 'Jooazoe VS k 5141 AOSCD rs ~ I ~ IT I ra Era!lira ~ c« i,ft ~ oe « ~ ~ I 77 4 ~rat te su fat(flora Do CIE(sa«a olceaaca suatf DLtsu oal sac)asc uesrJA C::0 7 ~ hh 1 \ 1 ~ ~ a'1' I or ~ 4~4 ~ I 4 UNITS I-3 is ~ ~ aaa y«vaa I( I 1 ct >Isla ae»la rcs ~ I IL ~ ~ 1to ~,I esssk IIL ut nL 514J( Ns($ ~rear » err 4 A crea IJoss'fl rl~ (car rr 0 uoeaDI r,u,cr,rttcoo vase iil!ta ~ oivaa ~7 ~ « gj ~ aal J I,se cf « '5 I WIRING DIAGRAMS ~ ~ I li I rr ~e ~ I ~ C ~ vn I e,e )D ~ 4 ~ a«su ls ~ ra«$ silica ~ 7 z ~ su o.ssv ~ ~ aazo ~ Ta'1 7'ri eau ~ s(ifi an rekl 'naielII( sar>) rvat ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ I20V AC/2SOV DC VALVES MISC. ~, ««7 ~ Oin«0 If ~ 1 ~ arl In >Su our ul 1CVN $PQSIIC & ~I ~ CC Jsl'isis« ~ Oeuer IO uil sile ts ~.Jo ~ stsisru ~ I ~ eisa Ias J»L rec 4 fl ~ 4 1 rae I ~ ar ~ oos ~ « ~ov seovzifs l eeet I le ~ ~ \ ' I 7 \ er erot I QCHEIVIATIC DIAGRAM SH-3 ~ 0 «5 h.) «1 SAISC f I~ IlrliI Vail l ~ CO«JAOSOSI Sara ~ 45aaie a ~ t ~ ~ ol BRO'IVNS ~I v« OFF-QS fLOW FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT ~ 1 ~ o rsa asvr ~ « ~ > ~ TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY » Jre;.~ ' ~ r INOICATICN larva«a'0 10 ~ asct ra ~ 1 ~ ~ e ~ 8 ~ oa' 1 c osvsseor or ce J ccaaea ocs ce JL ~ Tilht'I' II asia nis sass 7 ~ CO ~ I I o 4 aas ra ae. ~ z 7» 7 ~ ~ Wo 4r«IID 4 IWII o»eah,iOa I r¹C) ATVD eo!iee'7 l f0 0 Oart IS ~ L 7 ~ a az.arrl. ~ ~/J~l~r I I l ~p 5 ~ e ~vr 7» «4 ro «I ke ea Io 7 i. «oil'tVILL~ y. ~ I et v.'s.i) v 4 QQ ay l I- 3 er « * ', o »I A sears J 'a 7 S(S aaolu I 0 ( ~ Sraae ~ ra ~ rhr fear(I af tenlirh t 4 e ~ -r ".' i -I C a ~ .Iff}( 7 r«e S Q g 0 ea 0 ~ o >gfzg /is 0 r J . L L-Sr}9NSSP APPE4gg R Ro 01FlcHT 'tat sas m WE t.s I aa 0 ~slau ~ .~oui I ol sul Uu ~TW Iras il isis< E I '"'I OD s IA QcZNI (0$hala.u) 5 i PUU KTCO ~447 Sa Srt ~DC< Luw WITSS NlflsKitCSWNCI NES Cuff% tw SOOLEW TNS S4au Illus h cueufu Sfteep focetow lpv Wtl Wl IAE) «D IWIQEW 4 ILIW ofessS vpavt r ~SA I I aotu «44 sis oor 4$ I paao r- SW s ILO Ieo ~N~ ~N so«su a ~ I Wf ~tw I I I I ~ I SW CLNIIuto ~etr feet CEND WD M r I ~OI'C CSLD Qao Cat fit WD Ill SD Af fotraan I fr I ~ ruat II PSCE Wi aalu ~ I II ss«44 ~cescr s eee«SO( t I mess I ~esfl I I PIS RNtl IIAffOOICO nuf OSN fea41l 4 C a fsffow I Csrtrf P» t) I Opuf rs~ I I I ocs ntwu I I s) I I Clefltsslf QI l J I wfuau IILets I ~It e(TLIED a t'u'») g= I I I ~I ~ I s I :i I ocs w on wol aa ~a«» o nv u-Wa 1~ 5$ a Csadt POL Ns c4eeva M I 14 ufO«NOT $6 i lie »4$ 14 cfo«seesf coae~aslfl Neacil Oassatfe Tesw 1f CIIEOL frareeeic w octal 10 oto eap« ill ne»OI) = ~ ~c«u fl) ~4 CIO >P«OC.u-4$ coo ucftw @pc«»oo rais. ec«»a real ECPLS 4 alfaf t»AA ~a«Paw I EIL clouo) casa») eu.».s w.f .Olp ji Ae~ufuf ) ~ctf le« u tt iJASA Oe«e ~ Oral SPOO f)! 1st MPv«ufas I44 gf Itt LPO /5A fg » Iwn of oe if«tata IS w spc» lsuo ~LITOLCI«aaaa 44 aPLTLSe Or R (e«cil ail I, lst Iu'I N, h LIECIEELTS ILOCCIT h Tfl lwfW. ggo)F(c87IOhl ~ l Nns Tl Ll. «4 Tittup swpLED 'nfo Tll cwfuch Ncwrpaa APPENDIX R ~ afcwsf EEA IESI.LLLL IN ~ rwcfefwiufctffffrP wllciicwf ~ It lal ewcul /5A oefae ero ILEPL tfs lwculaai scfcunuL cist ar ulf lu NL IITLcuu N l P N) Ifwce warl ~. W«ta carr afe Sess saaa aut aa cooefnfs sssfsss rw Nfwfc Iu «PL IftTTEU uafw Csffiltle, ra ceeerll ls Sl«OQ @C4' ~1111 Leae L rw W NIIL«aCSS lt SL4$4Q4 SN4, Nasa SILL NLL SEW ca«cusp) sct MwuuaL .st.e m Wjl g dna( I I Nla gt on« «IP I NOP aw vaso aaf ee eaALT ea IOLT I 1(= casus IIO)f I To ffftfecaa I ( ls I ~ I scfuua aun» eC, '1«t«aro ova 4«f«c«cc I Ih ~a ev ctaaoa »slaps pc A I lt 8) Aufoplaio ITSIN-ESJL».a tact Taasf fw tcaes af tto a ep t at t I effuwLILILa ofcL cwf sua jl atrfl It.ta.u.» Wue LNEC Silo cocle e«aaf 41 eca cfae WD PES SW ACOCO PCV tris POL af$ Toes Lpoffcot« 1 ( c«ptt»D 4u a ccrv A IL u«»4 - - - SEIILLLfcl~ fat n faotpa Ace« rsv»a POPO refae fas SO OS ~ ~ «I ~ ~ wffws- setto tue. Swi IN M ~ fp 44 oaat w .Pp tt ~ ~ WNIU4J,I r C» SUL Pa 'll- Sass«I cea«Moeae L ew 4 et»lt IIAC w us~ Ovat~ Wfla el r ~ «WW COS WC IOCIA 4 aeaeecaeaaa ~spapo spa UNITS I-3 eto ~O«fs Pfsocaev farce aa rffeewr I fa ~«err»ere Plvrtsar ~ ««kfe O.l AlofocsfaCU WIRING DIAGRAMS ~ a+I eco tco erao Cfg eeaI)re ettsestiaes SAOESIAI Ifrpto ccr aa aft l20V AC/2SOV DC VALVES 8 MISC I !CI=t= a«v««ra e. ~ Cfr«rs SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM SH-9 I~ Opeesaa CONf Pas ~OTTSLL cleorL Mapaattas 0N s ease ~ s44) la 4 vLT ocefpfcNLTS wlua ut Io SIEwa Ctttfst)L Afe TO OIACTOs efffttsffo ~ I BROWNS. FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT ~ e ~ «4 cp«e aaa ee«IOOL Ifo 'IOLTLCIOCMf Lets «WC L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUT)IOR)TY ~\ oeeesaor op caaooeccas4 oceasr ~I Os N, e ~ a««fees frere, I M Oll vo aaeep Spree ~ re«ee ee asll 11 ~ eseearno OVWST'Ils ~ccesar t 4 0+I 4 O I rp ~ I 'Nl sae l««p 4 aa— (4 arorase sp ~ II lo a«eie I«IO Lee ..IJCPf~CP.'6 XP/ .....P MISCELLANEOUS VALVES ceoiflOL Afo Cfscfster 4iafw fs 4 N5TRUHENT5 W4 W Ist ~ ia v erl tt)toxvtLLt t-ts.tt ~ 4SNSI4-9 a I~ sacs ~ ee ees«aa ae 0 U)!OILIU)IWONAL 0 gr A I 'P f Cele PAN 'Ag LT p e 0 A "r p ~~- ZIWZ9NSO . COVVEOI OI VSNESON Oel SSI MALO tl ~ov ELO 'oll OOTAN taalae Mlav OteanO oe oae It PW sfl uuI7 t4 ONLY as at SS ~AL'san cel u ~ SAC/OOP LC ~ a DOWEEPL\ Ts , II J aolfl Iol XA-55-20A. ~OEL CO m ~ SOT I MEET ta A~LASO I ~VLso caol A e 4 4 I 5 I 5 g ill I l 'I IS AA >I VE IIII',$ Ol tl ~nts to fiiigt; TtLT QiES Dta ~sol uee OI IA ILIAIOtne OI ~ ~ov ILO IAAOW ~IL O-O Cao. I waa 01 tw t t ll Il) )rrr!!'EI CAL ~ ~a~tao I I ~ ~ D j j k I I I I II) kt A 5 v 0 j5 A A e a 5 ~I ~ ~ ~r ~I rs v R 5 ' j e ~ ~ ~ A ~ e tf e e R < gatt riER1'ERR ? ?I! 5 ??????T?? v uetr Wall Wall W Ile Iat Wta eats ~Sel Alit ~sile Offt ~tffl Will ~OIS ~ ~T 'T owfacts close ao MDOj AIVMOIAL$ to ~sL ~ tl.l~ CEOTCS tin CCe Cllelt tie Ctv clolts as coo CLOV5 IOI COD Clolll IEV OPO CLCSIS DON Cce aovs Ios Aae ELPVE Aw cowl cLolts aa oce Aosao ssrec L el Coe Oet . ~ ssl ote OPT ~IAD A Lots AAO ~ EOTT AAO ~IAP C LOSC aeo A es OLIN ece O Al rant OOE c At rant eol ~LANS tlr A OCN rane Sewaol atarWO $1$ WNW IANNA IIOI IAOI cooulw ealle Ats COILWL VANAtill CSAIWI calla ASN LEVEL LOV ltVEL ION LTVCI loe MISS IOV IAV llvsl IAS Aaeolwa ~Iltlllu tIL SSSEA tIL SLAM MLt$1$ $ ~e'L tsfSL PIN TS 11 ~ Ml SSOEA ~IL CSWC DVSTTTVOI Illwasat Eow uuesAII Ctleteuf) (ste lte'a) flsello a) ~ tste to o) e eou 1 ~Ia1 I W II as lao WTIO Wlll Ti Will tootnll CCATICTC aOOC IOA I O $ Arvse trANL OOA OAALS 5 ~el SOL ~POS D J AL ~ tI'I~ atets tte coo clolll tos cows CLOEES IEN Ceel Clolt5 POE cloctt at tast Clolls Ice COD CICCtl Iol COAO ClOOE$ 1OS CCIO aOSIS IOA Ste CLOÃ$ Ios EICV OAVAAlaNVttrfeoAAA A ll CCN o $$ CCN C $$ CCN euvola Socle Dans Polls al A $$ Nano oce ~ tl va'ts ox c $$ esne ool ~uat TDLT ~OOONN ovw Icacce IOWAN frrev 'TAOOLS OA OPI Ace OPI WCS Wes IEAD IOV IEW LCW IOV WW ~ OA 5IA ~fill IIVIL loe LEVL WW D5CV LON MESS loe MLS at EQAaaeettt ~IL SSOEO ESQOEO 4 Veffft~ Ol SLNTEO'S) ~IL tofsa tIL aofrW AA torso AAtswa uuwvn Ol swvlaO tl Ollaaaaa lollSt ftPSA LTRE LEIlls ~Sill IIITOS T ~ 5 /-2d52- A f ~r L&CT SC -! S N IIII7 tILC tILC M. ~ 4e rCIOTES Ial CEWI CLOSCS POA aosls scr ar ~av DN coo clcv SENTS Ioe pless Etw SOW ~Clothe llTEL ~W. Srffe OL tl'tats no tt Tate ftlITOS ~ Lov aosts tol coslpoL sal AA ccwo A6KISeaa lllllstfll I No fclI L-gll1 Ltoe stwoaa Volts stt ~~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ I r ' Attn 4) tat tot A closls ae oce aoooo toll oatsas Toen Looc les ~NVIT OIN OPT eov IOELNI oofre corowut Ac. I WELT Eccano os ~tleo AMACAETTC Ta CONTEECT IO Otleel'j ~ ~ ~IL 0 Q OWT I f1, Af UNITS I-3 ~ OI ~ Ife rlaPAI )OAALTO WIRING, DIAGRAMS TOES ~ EI Ill e e ' v VI I ANNUNGIATOR SYSTEM I f)ttattr) Act?T T? Enfant RIL AMP Nutso Sotltns ota COO La lt 1st Elo DVAeff KEY DIAGRAM SH-l2 Vtwooor IPEN el etrpt lo MTOT . M 8ROVlNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT ~OOSL wSNIL fvs t ow DDIAMItve,'9 t TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTNOTIITY- s Ws JCS rAO ~IVVEOI ot CSLMCCNMO OCIILN AOJV? A. ~ OJIW l IEO Ntltese C etta APPAOICO II~ T ~ ~ I VA ~ ~ a a)f» IALW s Maallfls CMWIS taa Ml'Wela ~ Ae Aaaalt ASSSI f erfe tae ~ I tla PL EtttcfaTEELT.R t STE OT t 45N62O-I2 ee lll W N ~\rrv DwW ~ ~I%0 ~ '" % r A I.r ~ ~ IS I)NNR?TJNCI)6NAL - ta rt~- CONTI4URATTON , A CONTROL ~ ~ ~ r "~ ... --f-4-t?VA r l 4 -KIT9MSII ~ v v 3 4 5 9 10 ~ 12 v tot oc scssssoo soeco r tiara I asaoa r I , A r x. s L L s I as as I d' r IT I ~os es L L rgi L r L fftsCALOCS AU. VSN srsra I r r, r r Asocsso wtaats el fxeoassL e~ 10 XC VSS Ccasatf ~ I osesas Wo OSSCLK~CONS ss I y$ 0 osoats.aaasso alosefs Nsxs Ycsssala I OOS ~s stsctef os ssseaactcoifosc. sssssss Aatote 0 Tftsaoaa OSSTSOS ~ OSOS fafcsssa fttfAsss 4 st r IID 9 ALAONTsar aesfsoo.- . Il 1 scl 0 SOTS S 3 fa e ~SJsa I I 3 I. I U ~ I COICTACT DIACsITAM t as f l l CfftsCAL,ALLTCST i! I '-llas I c s' as I Ld 'w w I Alslitt ~) r Sftf fttf JPL J Q CLV L I IJJT 4 p J JPJ. Is JtLT JJCJ I tfat fsal sJLC ~al s CLLs istic I '1 T T U La Lt Ll lt I 4 M 4 IS 1 Ll lf 4 M 4 I 4 lf 4 lf I I 1 a o*'w I. m'LU uo I TN Lv lto luo Casf I O'DJYJ',lw C TL -.$ 1L B I 5V"t" /CIA]fs T ~sect p)p)!'o oc't 5<('"8'<6" 58~., g ~ 0-CTv11 CL ~ sU atasoo iOO IotfSail dfeXYILLd Cr t 3 1 ~ i ~rs 4 ~JSC) 0 1 t e'4 Iee' el 5-f ~ ~ r C/Ilsre re reer/er /S terlr rect f Vs/I I rresrr Ave ~ dr~i Ir 5 keel risjrerr Sf ILNSt'sdesc ~ilrrr f/ /1/ /tra S/S rre/IS I rfdrt/C I ate I n.tAr IS Ien gee ~ t It t Id srsc INrit ~ II 4), 1 tsrtt 1st $ Pc slot 4 zo/CA Aorist I'I tc dsrl 5 C y C c Icvj/vsjtrt Cddct riffreer c cdt I css Ctette eecjee t C lO'1//8 rl dfnce f rIsrstt I Ctrees eja/ee rit jttt 1 /st 1/f Ae /err ~ MC/f ~ tec.F tp,) score/cs/ dr /trtinc nAI ~ r W ICV~Ctt t -egg ts ~~ f I Cddt Ant„ K fs-n fs /8 ~ nn ff /ttr /jt/V I C Cs+ Ster Atlrr C Ctte Aejs I Cttr tree r C oe AA C/ ~ AA I/ Hhi Ss Cl ~tss Ct rt K C r tt» ~ xf r CO/Id desi c Cev// e s ts.dti net-/t /dc IJC Scs-Cdrodsd n Ittt 'cs-18~58 t t Acts- SIC'/oed Sesr I ) scsnicltdas K I rrtr e/C Ir RCIC STEAkt SUPPLY LIIIEISQLATIOII VALVEFA'/-3 (IIO IZ /6) RCIG NVDEIISATESTORAGE TAIN SUCTIOII VALVEFCV 7/ /9 (NOIZ./8J APPED DII( R MODIF ICATION t n sr 8 rcv tccsd s te AAweelaL rtdidc ~Ase lese efeeflw w i5 sert ( f I Attt i tsar AirtW Orsf~tsare ~ Isr csedt cere IS lf tc //55A'8 (I' Q IIIIL8'8 IKA t IKP /Vjct CSIO I/Ot It./IA Eo/II eAS/tne f k. it IttrifS X$3 7ii Iss cadet jjeevE) adds'S/I IS 1 rem-streets c t/Lt Stre s C» ddsf ac ede» et/erie st~ tettf Ce/et/tele J lirteer~esjat re nrf ddS'l/IIJ < ad-n 15 Wd dl'>W d 15 terr Az d/X — IS I/ n ser I rttl f — - z AOt Kf3f t— AC/C t AOC fdclrst 15scsctrt s Cdd/ 1$ az t id ft p/v 15'lf fs'/8 ~ Ae/a C C 5< S$/t tetr I C Isd Stet ~C CsjS/ Ctrt I C I58 g«Aeter I WAII/ I ~rth It 's.r re IA I/ oe st r/ sr/I ~t ~,. 'ttawe 1A/ t C I ~ 0 C ~ r dee 1st dd/It r C 45 15 trd tt-Irs IS Iee Isle /I erc dss-Iwsavsd 5crre I z t l OCI-IWCO58 dc/see MK SCC /des See I CKJ 1 ca 4 scc Ides 5/seel. g «Csr e I/C ii RCIC TUR8/IIE'TEAII/'SUPPLY VALVE /c CV 7/-8 (ltKt-IZLt/) RCIC PSC SUCTIOII VALVE FCV 7/-/7 (/ROID Jl) Pd /I/O 8/Iecto orwvs rcv Act tire 1$ Cs Pd dt oaujvo Oe sess Cde/ff W. nc Aed Cdr CCLAV 4 Itsl AO AO Ajz ./df cjcsxoeftdr dcctjt AS sttl dad dcfc Izttdtvc dfcdtl COOCV Axvc i8 ~ 1/ d At st dr At'tl dd At tl cst Ar rtwreso tseiseS Cszt tl.ll /1 rl cjcfc psc dec'ldtt/ vie vE dd ls'tl-/1 At tl-Ild /ts.//.Itd ti I dd d. 1 /5.85 /ICEC ta/tip cv5ct/AACC vtcvl 8 IS I' ~ I 5IA As'I/5 8 «5'll f,C 1st I'5/5 C tr/8» rKfd psc sucttov vtcvc ttt 15 tres A$ 1/ /dr At'tl/sd At'1t tdc ddtd 88/I Is e deer'eee trtrjtttr5ee/CA ~ sjei 8-Ct Stsl Idtd Cdjtf OC COCCIIAS evirclt vwvs dd 15 tl 1/ rsd Ks.trctd trrtd Itt.ar I I Cd'rettrl ltd rt Cite. 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To bring the plant into compliance with this section, the following modifications will be implemented: Preaction sprinkler systems will be added in the following areas: a. The entire floor on elevation 621 of the Reactor Building except for the shutdown board rooms. b. Between columns r and u on elevation 639 of the Reactor Building except for the areas over the recirculation pump MG sets which are already protected by aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) systems. c. In the residual heat removal system pump rooms at elevation 519 and 541 of the Reactor Building. The new systems will be designed in accordance with NFPA 13-1980 and will tie into existing sprinkler systems located on elevations 565 and 593 of the Reactor Building. The new systems will be hydraulically designed for a density of 0.22 gal/min/ft2 over a maximum area of 1500 ft2. Intermediate classification sprinkler heads will be utilized that have a temperature rating of between 175o to 225oF. All piping will be seismically supported so it will not fall during a design basis earthquake (DBE). 2. Total flooding Halon 1301 suppression systems will be added in shutdown board rooms A, C, and E. Separate pre-engineered systems complying with NFPA 12A-1980 will be provided for each board room. Halon storage cylinders, including 100 percent reserve capacity, will be located in the Control Building immediately outside the board rooms. The design Halon concentration will be 5 percent. Upon actuation of a system, the fire dampers located in ventilation duct penetrations through the . board room walls will close. All piping located in the board rooms will be seismically supported so it will not'fall during a DBE. 3. Cross-zoned ionization smoke detectors will be added to actuate the suppression systems identified in items 1 and 2 above. The detectors will be located in accordance with NFPA 72E-1978. The detectors will be monitored over class A supervised circuits by local panels designed in accordance with NFPA 72D-1979. The local panels will be provided with individual detection zone fire and trouble annunciations. The panels will contain the logic for suppression system actuation and for tripping the shutdown board room fire dampers. Nonsupervised output circuits from the local panels will provide common fire and trouble annunciation in the main control room on existing annunciation panels. The board room local panels, detectors, and damper release devices will be designed so they will not spuriously operate during a DBE. In addition, the detectors in the Reactor Building will be seismically mounted so they will not fall during a DBE. 5-2 E52165.02 TVA has evaluated existing fire suppression and detection systems for compliance with applicable NFPA standards in the areas where these features are required by sections III.G.2 or III.G.3. Several deviations have been identified and will be addressed as follows: l. Ionization smoke detectors in the auxiliary instrument rooms 1, 2, and 3, at elevation 595 of the Control Building are an excessive distance from the ceiling. These detectors will be relocated to the ceiling and additional detectors will be installed in rooms 2 and 3 to provide coverage of beam pockets in accordance with NFPA 72E-1978. 2. The closed sprinkler heads used on the AFFF systems over the recirculation pump MG sets on elevation 639 of the Reactor Building are an excessive distance from the ceiling. Heat collectors will be provided over each head. 3 . The closed sprinkler heads in the battery and battery board rooms 1, 2, and 3 on elevation 593 of the Control Building are located an excessive distance from the ceiling. Heads are also obstructed in the three battery board rooms. Heat collectors will be provided over each head in the battery rooms. Addition of heat collectors and relocation of heads will be used to address the deviations in the board rooms. Two deviations to NFPA 13 were intentionally designed into the preaction sprinkler systems located in the Reactor Building and the cable spreading rooms. The deviations involve the use of pendant sprinkler heads in the upright. position and locating closed sprinkler heads some distance from the ceiling. Both deviations were necessary to provide sprinkler discharge patterns required for a criteria mutually agreed to by the NRC staff and TVA in Part X, Section 5.2 of the Browns Ferry Recovery Plan for the March 1975 fire. This criteria called for the wetting of conduits at locations where the conduits of one division cross cable trays of the other division. The intentional deviations will not be corrected. 5-3 E52165.02 ATTACHMENT 6 SAFETY EVALUATION 6-1 E5216 5. 02 1 0 PURPOSE Determine the impact on safety due to the circuit and fire suppression system modifications required to satisfy the requirements of section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10CFR50. Rerouting of cables and wrapping of conduits with fire resistive material is not addressed in this evaluation. A detailed evaluation to satisfy the requirements of IOCFR50.59 will be conducted as part of the standard design review cycle. 2 0 INTRODUCTION Appendix R requires that safe shutdown capability must be provided regardless of a fire in any area of the plant. Upon reviewing the shutdown capability for a fire in the Control Building (CB) fire area, deficiencies were found in some circuits required. This is due, in part, to the expansion of the fire area considered in the design basis for backup control (reference FSAR section 7.18). Therefore, adequate backup control isolation from the expanded fire area and the additional circuits requiring backup control will be provided for the following equipment for the reasons given: Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Pcv-1-41 PcV-1-41 Pcv-1-41 PCV-1-181 PCV-1-181 PCV-1-231 PCV-1-231 Pcv-1-231 PCV-1-301 Pcv-1-411 Pcv-1-411 Pcv-1-311 PCV 1 421 PCV-1-421 PCV-1-421 PCV-1-1791 Pcv-1-1791 PCV-1-1791 PCV-1-1801 Pcv-1-1801 PCV-1-1801- FCV-74-301 Fcv-74-71 FCV-74-71 FCV-68-31 FCV-68-791 FCV-68-791 FCV-74-722 FCV-74-582 Fcv-74-582 FCV-78-612 'FCV-78-622 Fcv-78-62 RHR Pumps A,B,C,D3 RHR Pumps A,B,C,D RHR Pumps A,B,C,D3 Notes: area. 1 ~ Providing better isolation to meet the expanded fire 2. Providing backup control for these valves. 3. Modifying backup control to bypass drain valve position interlock. In addition to the above modifications, valves FCV-74-53 and FCV-74"67 will be provided with a redundant low pressure„signal in the manual control portion of the circuit for each unit. This will ensure that the loss of power to one logic circuit will not preclude manual operation of the valves. 6-2 E52165.02 To provide oroper protection of required circuits from associated circuits, additional fuses and circuit breakers will be added to selected circuits as described in Attachment 4. The existing circuit configuration downstream of the proposed protective devices will remain unchanged. Additional fire suppression will be added to Reactor Building elevations "519, 541, 621, and 630 in the form of nr eaction spr inkier svstems. A Halon 1301 fire suppression system will be added for shutdown board rooms A, C, and E. Cross-zoned ionization smoke detectors will be installed to actuate these additions. Each general change is addressed independently in the evaluation. =3.0 EVALUATION A. Rackuo Control Modifications The design bases for the backup control system listed in section 7.18 of BFN FSAR will be met for the expanded CB fire area. The circuit changes wil be limited to the backup control function and meet the bases for,the circuitry defined in'he BFN FSAR section 7.18. The normal function of the equipment will remain unchanged. Therefore, the addition or modification to the backup control circuits for the listed valves will not have any adverse impact on safetv. B. 'Manual Control Modification The manual control circuit presently has a low pressure interlock to preclude opening both RHR in)co)ion valves when Reactor Pressure Vessel pressure is above 450 lb/in g. This function will be maintained with redundancy added to preclude a single failure preventing manual operation of the valve. The automatic operation of the valve will remain the same and adequate isolation between channels will be maintained. Therefore, this change will'edundant not have any adverse imoact on safety or the operation of the system. C. Associated Circuit Modifications The function of each circuit modified will remain the same. The protective devices are sized to permit all required operations while still providing the necessary interruption protection for faulted conditions. These devices also will be procured to the same requirements as the existing circuits to be modified. Therefore, the addition of the .protective devices to the circuits listed in Attachment 4 will not adversely affect safety. E52165.02 D. Fire Suppression System Modifications The oreaction sprinkler systems will be installed to the same criteria as existing systems, with regard to seismic. supports and potential spraying of safety rela ted electrical equiomen t. Conduits carrying Class 1H cables in the areas where the systems will be installed will be identified and sealed as necessary. This will assure existing safety systems will not be jeopardized. The Halon 1301 .system will be installed to preclude damaging safety related equipment during a seismic event. The gas will not hard electrical'equipment if it is spuriously actuated. The cross-zone ionization smoke detectors will.be installed to the same criteria as the existing detectors. These fire suppression system modifications will be tested after installation in accordance with the procedures developed for the existing systems. They will be included in the documented administrative control system'used for existing systems to assure periodic inspection, testing and .maintenance. Based on the above'onsiderations, the fire suppression system modifications will not adversely impact safety. >).0 CONCLUSIONS The circuit and fire suppression system changes to be made to comply with section III.G.2 of Appendix H will not degrade the safety systems ahilitv to per form their design basis functions. 6-l) F52165.02 ATTACHMENT 7 EXEHPTION REQUESTS 7-1 E52165.02 TVA requests NRC approval of the following exceptions to the requirements of 10 CPR 50.48 and section III.G of Appendix R: 1. Ezception — The modifications identified in Attachments 4 and 5 will be completely implemented on all three units by the end of the unith3, cycle~7 outage which is presently scheduled to be complete by February 1987. This schedule will not satisfy the requirements of Section 50.48(c) . Justification — The justification and Appendix R implementation schedule are presented in attachment 9 of this report. 2. Exception — Section III.G.2 requires three hour fire rated separation between the three redundant battery and battery board room complezes located on elevation 593 of the Control Building. The walls around each complez are only 1-1/2-hour construction. Justification — Elevation 593 of the Control Building is separated from other areas of the plant by at least 3-hour fire rated construction. The. battery and battery board room complezes are separated from each other by two 1-1/2-hour fire barriers and at least 90 feet of spacial sepa'rate (refer to drawings 47W200-5 and 47W200-13) . This level of separation is more than adequate considering the combustible loadings . present. Combusti)le Equiv al ent Loading> Combust ible2Wei,ght Room(s) (~b/ft ) Instrument Shop, Office 5,100 0.64 and Storige Battery and Battery Board 26,100 3.26 Complex 1 'Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument 21,800 2.73 Room Units 1 and 2 Computer Room 16,000 2 ~ 00 7-2 E52165.02 0' Combusti)le Equivalent Loadinp> Combustible>".1eight Room(s) (Btu/ft ) (lb/ft2) Unit 2 Auxiliary,'Instrument 21,800 2 73 Room Battery and Battery Board 23,900 2.99 Complex 2 Communications Battery and 18,000 2.25 Battery Board Rooms Communications Room 2,800 0.35 Unit 3 Computer Room 11,900 1.>19 Unit 3 Auxiliary Tnstrument 8,300 1.04 Room'attery and Battery Board 23,900 2.99 Complex 3 Record Storage Room and 11,200 1.40 Mechanical Equipment Room Corridor No Significant Combustibles Notes: 1. Potential heat release per unit of floor area. 2. Combustible loading divided by 8,000 Btu/lb. 3. The battery and battery board room complexes include DC equipment; rooms. The record storage room is currently being used as a temporary office. 5. The communications battery board .room is labeled as a temporary DPO office on drawing 47N200-5. Table 5-9B in the 1>tth edition of the National Fire Protection Association Handbook indicates that 1-1/2-hour construction is adequate for occupancies similar to the -areas jn question if the combustible loadings are less than 120,000 Btu/ft . The actual loading for every . area on elevation '593 is less than 22 percent of this value. The fire severity curve A (the most 'conservative curve) on figure 5-9D of the same handbook indicates that 1-1/2-hour constr uction is adequate- for up to tt lh/ft of equivalent combustible weight. The equivalent weight for all areas on elevation 593 are less than 82 percent of the limit. Manually actuated fire suppression systems are provided in several areas on elevation 593. Preaction sprinkler systems are located in t;he battery and battery board rooms and total flooding carbon dioxide systems are provided in the auxiliary instrument rooms and the computer rooms. The sprinkler systems can be actuated from one of the main control rooms or at the'reaction valves which are located in the Turbine Building. The carbon dioxide systems can be actuated at; a control station located immediately outside each room. E52165.02 IV All rooms on elevation 593 except the corridor and the record storage room are provided with ionization smoke detectors that annunciate in the main control rooms. 3 . Exception — Section III.G.3 requires that alternative shutdown capability, fire detection, and fixed fire suppression be provided for the main control rooms (MCR). The fixed suppression is not provided. Justification — Ionization smoke detectors are provided in .the MCRs as shown on drawings 47W605-1 and 47W605-2. Protable fire extinguishers and fire hose stations are also provided in the rooms as shown on drawings 47W200-3 and 47W200-12 . These features coupled with the fact that the rooms are continuously manned ensure that any fire in an MCR will be quickly detected and extinguished. 7-4 E52165.02 'J 1 c'OZMG I- C final: t-o- Df.ri » . m ~ /I - Ot. .- Qo I.f,. Qg „.'," C/, 'le 255', OIO td' d-« 0 a 25 0 /5 tt-C hfa 2 /I« ~ rd'o'leo//hrsacttspl- ' Vaja azt/h a 'ft/ acr.'SC a' r la. se' ilrroacsvasa»2 z ~ fI/rrwtare 8 Tio» Co»fre/Or/ o/s»f aatzh see/atahaf ) /Opads IAVwoah rd p y ~Isielv t ~ h. I Cr,dalai tlair.dy I~ e;, Has iarhwt h V .I ~ TOhl T Cdtr Sara cvr dKaaje f Prost»t estd rr»hashrf erwptare / f 'carrie/ doo/i 0 sr»t' or hd ,."a=-g I I poor/ ajjrdf4 -.' 'a."~ 5 a(4~ J'. IvOe 2 ~ rg a Wqvvsro/ Jolar ~ Iaevwd 5 lVII~I aL . „ rrsa r~ .hffprzr a/uashd» Vp jaI. 5 a( 'I la/ id/ /Cl »h l CT haha ~ /»thfI s$ dfC I l . I I f/hp rvpd Hl / I V j -I ~ Oaf a- I I ~ — .f~ 2 jff ,I=I =~ (dfat . 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SECTION 8 OF ENCLOSURE 1 TO GFNFRIC LETTER 81-12 information Required for Staff Review: (a) Description of the systems or portions thereof used to provide the shutdown capability and modifications required to achieve the alternative shutdown capability if required. TVA Resoonse: Attachment 2 identifies the backup control equipment that will be utilized for plant shutdown for a fire in one of these rooms. No new systems or components will be added for alternative shutdown capability. The existing backup control system described in section 7.18 of the Browns Ferry FSAR with the circuit modifications proposed in Attachment 4 provides alternative shutdown capability for a fire in a main control room, a cable spreading room, or an auxiliary instr ument r oom. (b) System design by drawings which show normal and alternate shutdown control and power circuits, location of components, and that wiring which is in the area and the wiring which, is out of the area that required the alternative system. TVA Resoonse: Since no systems or components have been added to comply with section III.G.3 of Appendix R, the requested information has not been included in this report per 10CFR50.08 paragraph (c)(5). However, schematic drawings showing normal and alternate control ~ and power circuits and cable tray and conduits drawings marked to show cable routings for the circuits evaluated in the safe shutdown analysis are available for NRC review upon .request. (c) Demonstrate that changes,to safety svstems will not degrade safety systems (e.g. new isolation switches and control switches should meet design criteria and standards in FSAR for electrical equipment in the svstem that the switch is to be installed; cabinets that the switches are to be mounted in should also met the same criteria (FSAR) as other safety related cabinets and panels; to avoid inadvertent isolation from the control room, the isolation switches should be key locked, or alarmed in the control room if in the "local" or "isolated" position; periodic checks should be made to verify switch is in the proper position for normal operation; and a single transfer switch or other new device should not be a source for a single failure to cause loss of redundant, safety svstems). TVA Resoonse: See Attachment 6 for an evaluation of the nuclear safety impact of modifications identified in Attachments '< and 5. 8-2 E52165.02 (d) Demonstrate that wiring, including power sources for the control circuit and equipment operation for the alternate shutdown method, is independent of equipment wiring in the area to be avoided. The associated circuit analysis discussed in Attachment 3 and implementation of modifications identified in Attachment 4 will ensure that all wiring for required normal and alternate shutdown equipment is independent of equipment wiring located in postulated fire areas. (e) Demonstrate that alternate shutdown power sources, including all breakers, have isolation devices on control circuits that are routed through the area to be avoided, even if the breaker is to be operated manually. The associated circuit analysis discussed in Attachment 3 and implementation of modifications identified in Attachment 4 will ensure that required normal and alternate shutdown power sources have adequate isolation devices on control circuits routed through postulated fire areas. (f) Demonstrate that licensee procedure(s) have been developed which describe the tasks to be performed to effect the shutdown method. A summary of these procedures should be submitted. Emergency Operating Instructions (EOIs) are currently in place which specify the operator actions necessary to achieve and maintain safe reactor conditions by identifying the methods which may be available and when to use them for given events. The equipment or systems to be used to this end are listed in the procedures under automatic or manual actions as appropriate. These instructions are the appropriate actions for a given plant condition regardless of what equipment or systems may be unavailable during a fire. Normal operation instructions in conjunction with operator training tell the operator how to operate specific equiment or systems when called upon to do so by the EOIs. Manual operations identified to affect safe shutdown are consistent with the manner in which the equipment is operated in the non-fire condition with exception of those methods involving backup control. For cases including a fire in which the control room and automatic controls are no longer functioning, a special EOI describes operator actions necessary to transfer control of plant systems to 8-3 E52165.02 backup control. All systems identified as h'aving backup control operation to affect safe shutdown are included in this procedure. These procedures will be modified as appropriate to include any new provisions required by future Appendix R related modifications. The current procedures are available for NRC inspection on request. (g) Demonstrate that spare fuses are available for control circuits where these fuses may be required in supplying power to control circuits used for the shutdown method and may be blown by the effects of a cable spreading room fire. The spare fuses should be located convenient to the existing fuses. The shutdown procedure should inform the operator to check these fuses. Separately fused normal and alternate control power sources are provided on required shutdown circuits with conductors located in the cable spreading rooms and in the other plant areas provided with alternate control. The portions of the circuits located outside these areas are protected against fire induced faults inside the areas by the normal control power fuses. To shift plant operation to the alternate contxol stations, transfer switches are manipulated in the required circuits to disconnect the potentially blown fuses and faulted cable. The same switches, using break-before- make contacts, then tie in the alternate fuses and control power sources. This scheme eliminates the need for spare fuses during the shutdown process. (h) Demonstrate that the manpower required to perform the shutdown . functions using the procedures of (f) as well as to provide fire brigade members to fight the fire is available as required by the fixe brigade technical specifications. Operation of equipment identified as required to affect safe shutdown may be executed by a single operator from the control room except for cases in which backup stations must be manned (contxol room abandonment). In this worst case, at least four licensed operators and two assistant operators would be available to man backup panels while maintaining the fire brigade at full strength. These numbers do not include the shift engineer, an extra reactor operator normally on shift, and extra assistant operators. Additional operators and support personnel are also on call at short notice in conjunction with the Bxowns Ferry site emergency plans. This staffing is sufficient to perform the shutdown function while maintaining the fire brigade as required by technical specifications. 8-4 E52165.02 (i) Demonstrate that adequate acceptance tests are performed. These should verify that: equipment operates from the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is placed in the "local" position and that the equipment cannot be operated from the control room'and that equipment operates from the control room but cannot be operated at the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is in the "remote" position. All required safe shutdown equipment was thoroughly tested during the plant's preoperational and startup test programs. Adequate acceptance tests will be performed on any existing circuits that are modified to meet Appendix R requirements. (j) Technical specifications of the surveillance requirements and .limiting conditions for operation for that equipment not already covered by existing technical specifications. Por example, if new isolation and control switches are added to a service water system, the existing technical specifications surveillance requirements on the service water system should add a statement similar to the following: "Every third pump test should also verify that the pump starts from the alternate shutdown station after moving all service water system isolation switches to the local control position." to the existing technical specifications. (k) Demonstrate that the systems available are adequate to perform the necessary shutdown functions. The functions required should be based on previous analyses, if possible (e.g., in the FSAR), such as a loss of normal alternating-current power or shutdown of a Group E isolation (BWR) . The equipment required for the alternate capability should be the same or equivalent to that relied on in the above analysis. All systems that are required to be available as described in Attachment 2 will perform the same functions as they do in the FSAR analyses. The FSAR analyses bound all actions described in Attachment 2 with the exception of the RHR system torus cooling mode. Attachment 2 assumes that one RHR pump with its associated valves and heat exchanger is sufficient for torus cooling following vessel depressurization with four S/R valves. The PS'essel depressurization cases assume that two RHR pumps with their associated valves and heat exchangers are used for torus cooling. Using one RHR pump results in a higher torus bulk water temperature than occurs in the PSAR analyses. This higher bulk water temperature could affect the required net positive suction head for the operating RHR pump, 8-5 E52165.02 thermal stresses imoosed on the torus structure, and the steam condensation capability of the torus. Each of these has been evaluated and the impact found to be acceptable for the specific vessel depressurization case assumed in Attachment 2. Thus the torus cooling ~ function is adequately met. (l) Demonstrate that repair procedures for cold shutdown systems are developed and materials for repairs is maintained on site. TVA Resoonse: Operation of the equipment identified in Attachment 2 and implementation of the modifications defined in Attachment 4 will ensure that the plant can'e brought to a cold shutdown condition in 72 hours without relying on equipment reoairs. E52165.02 Y ENCLOSURE 2 OF GENERIC LETTER 81-12 Re uest for Additional Information: I. For each fire area where an alternative or dedicated shutdown method, in accordance with section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50, is provided by proposed modifications, the following information is required to demonstrate that associated circuits will not prevent operation or cause maloperation of the alternative or dedicated shutdown method: a. Provide'a table that lists all equipment including instrumentation and support system equipment that are required by the alternative or dedicated method of achieving and maintaining hot shutdown. b. For each alternative shutdown equipment listed in I.a above, provide a table that lists the essential cables (instrumentation, control, and power) that are located in the fire area. c. Provide a table that lists safety related and non-safety-related cables associated with the. equipment and cables constituting the alternative or dedicated method of shutdown that are located in the fire area. d. Show that fire induced failures of the cables listed in b and c above will not prevent operation or cause maloperation of the alternative or dedicated shutdown method. e. For each cable listed in 1.b above, provide detailed electrical schematic drawings that show how each cable is isolated from the fire area. added for compliance with section III.G.3 of Appendix R~ 2 ~ The residual heat removal system is generally a low-pressure system that interfaces with the high-pressure primary coolant system. To preclude a LOCA through this interface, we require compliance with the recommendations of Branch Technical'Position RSB5-1. Thus, this interface most likely consist of two redundant and i.ndependant motor- operated valves. These two motor-operated valves and their associated cable may be subject to a single fire hazard. It is our concern that this single fire could cause the two valves to open resulting in a fire-initiated LOCA through the subject high-low pressure system interface. To assure that this interface and other high-low pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effects of a single fire we require the following information: a. Identify each high-low pressure interface that uses redundant electrically controlled devices (such as two series motor-operated valves) to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary coolant'oundary. 8-"7 E52165.02 b. Identify the devices essential cabling (power and control) and describe the cable routing (by fixe ares) from source to termination. c. Identify each location where the identifed cables are separated by less than a wall having a 3-hour fire rating from cables for the redundant device. d. For the areas identifed in item 2.c above (if any), provide the basis and justification as to the acceptability of the existing design or any proposed modifications. electrically controlled devices to isolate or preclude rupture of a primary coolant boundary are identified in the Shutdown Logic Diagrams of Attachment 2 (see figures I.a, I.b, and I.c). The redundant devices were treated like all other required circuits in the safe shutdown analysis. Proposed modifications associated with high«low pressure interfaces axe identified in Attachment 4 . Z52165.02 ATTACHMENT 9 IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE -9«1 E52165.02 ATTACHMENT 9 IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE AND JUSTIFICATION As stated in the letter from L. M. Mills to H. R. Denton dated October 28, 1981, the present schedule to implement NRC modification commitments at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant through October 1983 is already supersaturated. No additional modifications without extensive priority changes can be added to the present schedule through October 1983 because of our design schedule capabilities and manpower limitations imposed at the site for safety and security reasons. Therefore, we are scheduling Appendix R work to commence with the unit 2, cycle 5 outage which presently is schedule to start in March 1984. 1 We have optimistically estimated that it will take an average of 150,000 man-hours per unit at Browns Ferry to implement the Appendix R modifications. From April 1981 through February 1984, Browns Ferry has scheduled or will have completed five outages betwen 121 and 184 days in length. The reason for the increased outage durations is because of the extensive amount of torus work and other. commitments which have been requir ed. Upon completion of the torus outages (i.e., at the end of the unit 3, cycle 5 outage in February 1984), TVA had estimated the remaining outage durations to be between 60 and 66 days in length. If we are to attempt to implement the Appendix R modifications and Postaccident Sampling Facility work which is also now scheduled during this timeframe, during one outage, it could increase the outage dur ation per unit to 250 days or greater. This is unacceptable to us for two reasons. It would force us into a dual outage situation at Browns Ferry which could not be 'safely supported or managed. Secondly, it would not support the capacity needed for our system load considerations. Therefore, we are scheduling Appendix R modifications to be completed over a be , period of two outages on each unit. Each of these outages will approximately 2 to 2.5 times greater than our originally estimated outage lengths. If we were to attempt to maintain our present estimated outage durations, the Appendix R work'ould require approximately five outages on each unit to implement. TVA has considered this type of schedule and has determined that outage duration increases. will be mandatory in order to support implmentation of Appendix R in a more timely fashion. 9-2 ' J In summary, below is the schedule for implementing the Appendix R modifications for each unit at Browns Ferry. Schedule b Unit Start Date Finish Date Unit 1, cycle 6 - October 1984 Unit 1, cycle 7 - August 1986 Unit 2, cycle 5 — March 1984 Unit 2, cycle 6 — February 1986 Unit 3, cycle 6 - March 1985 Unit 3, cycle 7 - February 1987 It is our intention to do as much nonoutage work as possible before the above outageq. Our present schedule, however, does not indicate that much nonoutage work can be completed before the, unit 2, cycle 5 outage. 9-3 /O ."Vs>Cf< NOuII5 ffrlIY sllIQ(hR Plgif '.I 54cIS t+vf IS v &Ca.l ~ e +lull II.IIIAC-2 ~ e/ / IfcfI
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