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Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: IND33307 Country: Date: 26 May 2008

Keywords: India – – Arjan – Atarjit Singh – (KZF)

This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein.

Questions 1. Please provide information on Atarjit Singh and his role and activities in the Khalistan Zindaband Movement (KZF). 2. Please provide information regarding the movements of Atarjit Singh in 2007, particularly July to September 2007. 3. Please provide a photograph of Atarjit Singh or any description of his physical appearance. 4. Please advise of the attitude of the authorities to Atarjit Singh. 5. Please provide any information on the activities of the KZF on the border with , around the village Kotli Arjan Singh, Teh R.S. Pura in Jammu. 6. Please provide any information on the use of sexual assault and kidnapping children as a tool of the KZF. 7. Please provide information on the village Kotli Arjan Singh, Teh R.S. Pura in Jammu. 8. Please provide any other relevant information.

RESPONSE

1. Please provide information on Atarjit Singh and his role and activities in the Khalistan Zindaband Movement (KZF).

Several sources were located, dated between July 1997 and June 2005, all of which suggest that Atarjit (also Attarjit, Atarjeet, Attarjeet, and Attar Jeet) Singh was an active and high- profile member of the Khalistan Zindabad Force during this period. In various reports he is described as a “prominent terrorist”, “a KZF cadre and professional border crosser”, the “deputy chief” of the KZF, “one of the key persons of the Khalistan Zindabad Force”, and the “mastermind” behind 1997 KZF bombings in Pathankot that killed 11 people and injured 23. Most recently, three reports state that Atarjit Singh was arrested in June 2005 in relation to a bank robbery in south , released on bail on 23 June, and no further information was found to indicate what has happened to him since. Prior to that, several sources state that he was interrogated over his role in a 2004 jailbreak involving Sikh militants escaping from Burail jail, in Chandigahr. Of particular interest may be a 18 February 2004 report from Online Edition, which claims that Atarjit planned to leave India “as he was not to be accepted back in the family”, although no reason is given as to why this might be the case. An October 2003 report located on the Church of the East website claims that Atarjit was among four men acquitted of involvement in a 1997 Jammu bus bombing, and two reports from October 1999 quote police sources claiming that he and the KZF were implicated in the bombing of the Jammu-Delhi express train. An April 1998 report and two July 1997 articles note Atarjit’s suspected role in the 1997 Pathankot bombings; detailed reports follow below (for Atarjit as a “prominent terrorist” and the Jammu-Delhi train bombing, see: ‘KZF behind blast, says Punjab DGP’ 1999, Tribune Online Edition, 14 November http://www.tribuneindia.com/1999/99nov14/head4.htm – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 9; and ‘Punjab ultras’ hand in Pooja Exp blast likely – DGP’ 1999, Indian Express, 15 November http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19991115/ige15023.html – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 10; for Atarjit as a “KZF cadre and professional border crosser”, and his alleged involvement in the Burail jailbreak, see: ‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ (undated), Portal website http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/terrorist_outfits/KZF.htm – Accessed 7 December 2007 – Attachment 7; Sharma, A. 2004, ‘Burail Jailbreak: Police find skeletons in Rana’s report’, Chandigahr Newsline, 16 April http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=81916 – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 3; Sharma, A. 2004, ‘Under escape plan, Hawara and Co partied hard’, Chandigahr Newsline, 17 April http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=82021 – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 4; for Atarjit as a “key person” in the KZF and for his claim that he could not return to his family, see: Sharma, S. 2004, ‘Hawara’s “border guide” quizzed for escape clues’, Tribune Online Edition, 11 February http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040211/cth1.htm – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 5; and for Atarjit as the “deputy chief” of the KZF and the “mastermind” of the Pathankot bombings, see: Taggar, R. 1998, ‘Biography of an unexploded bomb’, Indian Express, 9 April http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19980409/09950334.html – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 11; ‘Brain behind Pathankot blasts held’ 1997, Indian Express, 22 July http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19970723/20450263.html – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 12; and ‘Punjab cops break bus blast cases, arrest KZF deputy chief’ 1997, Rediff on the Net, 22 July http://www.rediff.com/news/jul/22punj.htm – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 13).

The most recent reports concerning Atarjit Singh date from June 2005, one in the Newsline and the other in the Tribune Online Edition. According to these reports, Atarjit was arrested by the Pathankot police after bomb blasts in Delhi theatres, and was subsequently handed over to the Haryana police in connection with a bank robbery (or ‘dacoity’). No reports were located indicating whether he was charged or tried with any offence, or whether he was subsequently held in custody. The Tribune report describes him as “an alleged militant of the Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF)”, and goes on to note that “Atarjit Singh, a resident of the RS Pora area of Jammu, was earlier arrested by the on the charge of carrying out a series of bomb blasts in Pathankot and its surrounding areas in 1997” (Pathankot is a city in Punjab, less than 100km from Teh R.S Pura). The Ludhiana Newsline report states that Atarjit was arrested in connection with the ‘dacoity’ at the Jalbehra (a village on the border of Punjab and Haryana) branch of Punjab National Bank. This report also provides background on Atarjit Singh, suggesting that his parents handed him over to the police, although this is not made entirely clear. The report also claims that Atarjit uses the alias “Bitoo”, “Bittu” or “Bittoo”, but searches for this name located no additional information. The report places Atarjit Singh in Burail jail between 1999 and October 2003:

Atarjit confessed that he had also gone to Pakistan via Nepal and Bangkok and met Neeta at from where he was sent back to India with a consignment of weapons including AK 47, RDX, detonator, safety fuse battery, wireless set, safety fuse wire etc. and had buried them across the border near RS Pura.

However, these were dug out by the road building department during construction of a road. While he was with his parents, they handed over to the police and he was implicated in several cases of bomb blasts in J&K, and also in Ambala. He was taken on remand by the police along with other four terrorists. But he stated that Neeta couldn’t be arrested and slipped away to Pakistan with his wife.

Atarjit Bitoo stated that he was discharged in 1998 by the Sessions Judge Ambala, while he was in Burail jail in 1999 and was discharged from the jail in October 2003. He said that he was facing a case in and Sessions Court and the next hearing is on June 9.

He was again picked up by the Jammu & police for interrogation in the Burail jail incident in which Jagtar alias Tara Paramjit alias Tyora who had assassinated Punjab Chief Minister was involved, but was released after interrogation (Divakar, D. 2005, ‘Bank heist case solved, with a surprise’, Ludhiana Newsline, 3 June http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=132217 – Accessed 20 May 2008 – Attachment 1; ‘KZF militant arrested’ 2005, Tribune Online Edition, 3 June http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050603/punjab1.htm#11 – Accessed 20 May 2008 – Attachment 2).

A 24 June article from the Tribune Online Edition states that Atarjeet Singh was released on bail on June 23. The report claims that Atarjeet’s parents “had alleged that the Ambala police had implicated his son in a false case”, and that “[t]he counsel for Atarjeet also stated in the court during the argument on bail application that the police had tried to implicate Atarjeet” in the case (‘Bail for bank robbery accused’ 2005, Tribune Online Edition, 24 June http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050624/haryana.htm#13 – Accessed 26 May 2008 – Attachment 40).

Two April 2004 reports from the Chandigahr Newsline (dated 16 and 17 April) discuss Attarjit Singh’s relationship with , of the Babbar International (BKI) Sikh militant group, while the two were in Burail jail. The articles are mostly about Hawara’s January 2004 escape from prison with three fellow inmates (not Attarjit, who had already been released), but they also provide some information about Attarjit’s activities. The 16 April report notes that Attarjit is “close to Hawara”, and had been “segregated” from contact with him and that his cell had been searched in response to violent threats from Hawara, who is reported by the jail superintendent to have “started raising pro-Khalistan slogans and threatened to kill me and other jail officials”. The 17 April report notes that Attarjit was regularly allowed to visit Hawara in his cell for “parties”, and reports claims from the superintendent that Attarjit was a confidant of Hawara “and in know of the unlawful activities of the Beant accused” (Sharma, A. 2004, ‘Burail Jailbreak: Police find skeletons in Rana’s report’, Chandigahr Newsline, 16 April http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=81916 – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 3; Sharma, A. 2004, ‘Under escape plan, Hawara and Co partied hard’, Chandigahr Newsline, 17 April http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=82021 – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 4).

Three reports from February 2004 note the arrest of Attarjit Singh by police for questioning over the Hawara jailbreak. An 11 February report in the Tribune Online Edition claims that Attarjit “had figured as one of the suspects as he was missing from Jammu immediately after the escape”, and describes him as “one of the key persons of the Khalistan Zindabad Force led by Pakistan-based Nitta” and as “a professional border crosser”. The article provides detail regarding Attarjit’s role in making border crossings from Pakistan to Jammu, transporting explosives and other militants. The report states that Attarjit had been in Burail jail “in connection with carrying out two bomb blasts in Pathankot in August 1998” and that “[h]e was arrested soon after”. Pathankot is in Punjab state, 5km from the Jammu and Kashmir border and 90km from Jammu district and Teh R.S. Pura:

Attarjit Singh had a record of having helped terrorists in crossing border from Jammu and transporting explosives. The sources said Attarjit Singh had contacts with Paramjit Singh Bheora, one of the three co-escapees of Hawara. Bheora and Attarjit Singh had been together in Jammu for some time before they were arrested by the police. Attarjit was arrested sent to the Burail Jail.

According to sources in one of the blasts Attarjit had removed a 37-metre stretch of a railway line near Damtal. In another blast at the Pathankot bus stand he had killed five persons. Attarjit is believed to be acquainted with the routes to Pakistan from side. He used to transport explosive supplies from Kartarpur in Pakistan, just 5 km from the border. In the Pathankot bus stand blast even his outfit’s chief Ranjit Singh Nitta had crossed over to India to carry out the ‘assignment’. Attarjit was known to be in contact with bail-jumping militants like Baghel Singh, the sources said (Sharma, S. 2004, ‘Hawara’s ‘border guide’ quizzed for escape clues’, Tribune Online Edition, 11 February http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040211/cth1.htm – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 5).

An 18 February report, also from the Tribune Online Edition, claims that Chandigahr police had interrogated Attarjit Singh in Jammu in an attempt “to find a link between the escape of Hawara and Attarjit’s disappearance from Jammu”, but the report noted that “[a]s of now no link has been established”. The report quotes Attarjit as drawing attention to the links between Hawara and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency, and denying that he had seen Hawara or been in Chandigahr since October 2003. It may be of interest to note that in the course of interrogation Attarjit “revealed that he was also planning to slip away abroad as he was not to accepted back in the family [sic]”, although no reason is given as to why this might be the case (‘Hawara retained his Pak code name, says Attarjit’ 2004, Tribune Online Edition, 18 February http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040218/cth1.htm – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 6).

An undated report from the South Asia Terrorism Portal website notes that, on 10 February 2004, “Attarjit Singh, a KZF cadre and reportedly a professional border crosser, is arrested by the Jammu Police for his alleged links to the January 21, 2004 escape of Jagtar Singh Hawara, an accused in the Beant Singh assassination case, from the Burail Jail” (‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ (undated), South Asia Terrorism Portal website http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/terrorist_outfits/KZF.htm – Accessed 7 December 2007 – Attachment 7).

A 10 October 2003 report located on the Church of the East website states that Attarjit Singh was among four people acquitted of involvement in 1997 bombings in Jammu. It is not clear whether this is the same case as the Pathankot bombings, but it would appear to be given that Attarjit was being held in jail over that incident, and was released in October 2003:

Attarjit Singh, Ravinder Kaur, Balbir Singh and Paramjit Singh were acquitted acting on the discharge application moved by them, claiming that the main witness in the case, Sai Dass, had died on July 21, 1997, 12 days after the bomb blast and many of the witnesses in the case did not identify any of them while deposing before the court. Another accused, Ranjit Singh, alleged to be involved in the case, had been declared a proclaimed offender by the police.

On June 6, 1997, four persons had died and 12 had sustained serious injuries in a bomb blast that took place in a bus at Jammu. The four were alleged to be responsible for the blast. They were arrested on charges of murder and under sections of the Explosive Act (‘4 acquitted in Jammu blast case’ 2003, Church of the East website, 10 October http://churchoftheeast.ca/archive/news_03oct11.htm – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 8).

A November 1999 article in the Tribune Online Edition mentions Atarjit Singh as a “prominent terrorist” of the KZF in the course of reporting the bombing of the Jammu-Delhi Pooja Express, an act attributed by the Director-General of Police to the KZF. The report also notes that the KZF had a base in Gurdaspur in Punjab, 35km from the Jammu and Kashmir border and 90km from Jammu district, and that the KZF is “comprised largely of Jammu- based ” and has links with other Kashmiri terrorist organisations:

Punjab police chief Sarabjit Singh today said Khalistan Zindabad Force terrorists were suspected behind the bomb which blew up a coach of the Jammu-Delhi Pooja Express on Thursday and revealed that it was planted in Jammu. “The bomb, containing a high-powered explosive, probably RDX, was planted in Jammu in a crate of apples and the fact that it was deliberately planted in a coach carrying Army jawans showed that the terrorists wanted to send a sinister message to the security forces,” the Director-General of Police said here today

He said preliminary investigations revealed that one to 2 kg of explosive was used in the blast which claimed 14 lives. “We cannot be absolutely sure, but the finger of suspicion points to the Khalistan Zindabad Force headed by Ranjit Singh Neeta who was in Pakistan till recently but may have crossed over into India,” he said. The DGP said the KZF already had its base in Gurdaspur and the police had arrested a prominent terrorist of the force, Atarjit Singh, a year ago. He said this particular outfit comprised largely of Jammu based Sikhs and “the links of the KZF with Kashmiri terrorists were a natural corollary of this fact” (‘KZF behind blast, says Punjab DGP’ 1999, Tribune Online Edition, 14 November http://www.tribuneindia.com/1999/99nov14/head4.htm – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 9).

A 15 November 1999 article in the Indian Express makes similar claims about the bombing of the Jammu-Delhi train and the KZF, and goes on to quote the Director-General of Police as claiming that “there is no mass base for terrorism in Punjab but over the course of the past nine months since I took over, there has been a continuous thrust in militant activity”. A 9 April 1998 article from the same source refers to Attarjit Singh as a “top terrorist … who masterminded the Pathankot blasts” (‘Punjab ultras’ hand in Pooja Exp blast likely – DGP’ 1999, Indian Express, 15 November http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19991115/ige15023.html – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 10; Taggar, R. 1998, ‘Biography of an unexploded bomb’, Indian Express, 9 April http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19980409/09950334.html – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 11).

A 23 July 1997 report in the Indian Express notes the arrest of “Jammu-based Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF) deputy chief Attarjit Singh” over the Pathankot bombings, claiming that he “masterminded the two blasts” and that he “did not plant these bombs, but had supplied the RDX” (‘Brain behind Pathankot blasts held’ 1997, Indian Express, 22 July http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/1970723/20450263.html – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 12).

An article sourced from rediff.com and dated 22 July provides more detail regarding the bombing and Attarjit Singh’s activities in the KZF. The article states that the bombings took place in May and June, and “claimed 11 lives and left 23 injured”, and provides detail of Atarjit Singh’s border-crossing activities and involvement in supplying weapons and explosives to Sikh militants. The report also notes that money sourced from overseas is used by the KZF “for recruiting youngsters from Jammu area for terrorist activities”, and reports telephone calls to “KZF locations in Jammu and Pakistan” before the bombings”. The report also claims that Atarjit had a “hideout” in Nepal:

On information provided by Singh, 20 packets of RDX totalling 10 kilograms, four time pencils, four sophisticated time devices, four batteries of nine volts each, cordex wire, 10 detonators, one AK-56 rifle, seven magazines and 161 rounds were recovered. The police said Singh brought three consignments into the country in April-June 1997 from across the R S Pura border in Kaliana. The consignments included 76 kgs of RDX, AK-47 rifles, and time pencils detonators. The explosives were then handed over to a person Singh knew well. Singh, however, did not know the group which actually planted these in the buses, police said.

The Khalistan Zindabad Force, founded by leader Wadhwa Singh, was functioning under the Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence’s directions, Dogra said. The operation was under Ranjit Singh’s command from Pakistan. The funds needed for KZF activities, Dogra went on, were mobilised from foreign countries through a certain R S Ginny, a Bangkok resident. Further, Dogra said Rs 200,000 in Indian currency was brought into the country along with the first and third RDX consignments. The money was utilised for recruiting youngsters from Jammu area for terrorist activities.

He said investigation revealed that telephone calls were made to KZF locations in Jammu and Pakistan from Pathankot and Nepal before and after the blasts, and that hideouts in Nepal were used by KZF members. The Punjab police, Dogra revealed, had monitored Singh’s hideout in Nepal for over six weeks before arresting him (‘Punjab cops break bus blast cases, arrest KZF deputy chief’ 1997, Rediff on the Net, 22 July http://www.rediff.com/news/jul/22punj.htm – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 13).

2. Please provide information regarding the movements of Atarjit Singh in 2007, particularly July to September 2007.

Searches were conducted employing Atarjit (or Attarjit, Atarjeet, Attarjeet, and Attar Jeet) Singh’s name within Factiva news database and the web, including site searches of relevant Indian websites. No information was located in the course of this search relating to the movement of Atarjit Singh in 2007. The most recent reports located date from June 2005, and can be found in Question 1 above.

3. Please provide a photograph of Atarjit Singh or any description of his physical appearance.

No photograph was located of Atarjit (or Attarjit) Singh, nor any physical description of him, or any details regarding date of birth, height or any other personal details.

4. Please advise of the attitude of the authorities to Atarjit Singh.

For an indication of the attitude of Indian authorities to Atarjit Singh, please refer to Question 1 above.

5. Please provide any information on the activities of the KZF on the border with Pakistan, around the village Kotli Arjan Singh, Teh R.S. Pura in Jammu.

For general information on Kotli Arjan Singh and R.S. Pura in Jammu, including maps of the region, please refer to Question 7 below. For reports of Atarjti Singh’s activities between 1997 and 2005, some of which mention KZF activity in the Jammu region, please refer to Question 1 above.

Several sources make reference to KZF activity in the Jammu district, to the relationship between Sikh militant groups and Islamic groups in Jammu and Kashmir, and to links between the KZF and Pakistani intelligence agencies. An analysis of the KZF sourced from the South Asia Terrorism Portal website states that the group is “largely comprised of Jammu-based Sikhs”, and quotes a Punjab Police chief stating that “the KZF always had links with Kashmiri terrorists”, as well as making reference to leading members of the KZF being active around R.S. Pura. A 2008 report from the same source claims that the Pakistani ISI (Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence) are trying to revive militancy in Punjab by supporting the KZF, among other Sikh extremist groups. A 2007 report from Frontline magazine also draws attention to links between the KZF and Islamic militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir, and notes the roots of the KZF in cross-border smuggling operations based in Jammu. Several sources from 2005 and 2004 report on KZF activity in Jammu, one of which refers to cross-border smuggling in “Jammu border areas”, and a 2002 article describes Jammu as “the cradle of the KZF”. Two articles, one from March 2000 and one from February 1999, make specific reference to KZF militants being active in R.S. Pura. Detailed reports follow below (for analysis of the KZF, reports of recent activities, and links with other groups see: ‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ (undated), South Asia Terrorism Portal website http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/terrorist_outfits/KZF.htm – Accessed 7 December 2007 – Attachment 7; and ‘Punjab Assessment – Year 2008’ 2008, South Asia Terrorism Portal website http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/index.html – Accessed 4 March 2008 – Attachment 14; Swami, P. 2007, ‘Plot against peace’, Frontline magazine, 24 February – 9 March http://frontlineonnet.com/fl2404/stories/20070309006112100.htm – Accessed 7 December 2007 – Attachment 15; for 2005 and 2004 reports, see: Kak, M. 2005, ‘KZF activists trying to revive militancy’, Tribune Online Edition, 28 August http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050828/j&k.htm#3 – Accessed 22 May 2008 – Attachment 16; ‘3 Khalistan Zindabad Force activists held’ 2005, Tribune Online Edition, 27 June http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050627/j&k.htm#12 – Accessed 22 May 2008 – Attachment 17; and ‘Tunnel to Khalistan’ 2004, Frontline magazine, Vol. 21, Issue 4, 14-27 February http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2104/stories/20040227004303100.htm – Accessed 22 May 2008 – Attachment 18; for Jammu as “the cradle of the KZF”, see: Walia, V. 2002, ‘Three states join hands to nab militants’, Tribune Online Edition, 7 May http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020507/punjab1.htm – Accessed 22 May 2008 – Attachment 19; and for references to KZF members in R.S. Pura, see: ‘Sirhind bus blast, Sealdah Express blast worked out’ 2000, Jammu & Kashmir.com website (source: Daily Excelsior), 25 March http://www.jammu- kashmir.com/archives/archives2000/kashmir20000325a.html – Accessed 22 May 2008 – Attachment 21; and ‘KZF terrorist arrested’ 1999, Indian Express website, 18 February http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19990218/ige18156.html – Accessed 23 May 2008 – Attachment 22).

An undated (but likely from 2007) analysis of the KZF, sourced from the South Asia Terrorism Portal website, states that the group is “largely comprised of Jammu-based Sikhs”, and lists Punjab, Jammu and Delhi as their main areas of operation. The report also claims that the KZF has close links with the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen group in Jammu & Kashmir, and quotes a Punjab Police chief stating that “the KZF always had links with Kashmiri terrorists as it comprised Sikhs from the Jammu region”. The report also makes two specific references to leading members of the KZF being active in the R.S. Pura Tehsil (or Sector):

Ranjit Singh Neeta heads the KZF. Originally a resident of the Sumbal Camp area in Jammu, Neeta is reportedly now based somewhere in Pakistan. One of the 20 terrorists that India wants Pakistan to deport, Neeta began his career as a small-time criminal and subsequently developed links with smugglers in the R.S. Pora and Samba areas. His name figures in at least six First Information Reports filed after bomb blasts on trains and buses running between Jammu and Pathankot between 1988 and 1999. He is also alleged to have been involved in the killing of Deputy Superintendent of Police Devinder Sharma in district of Jammu and Kashmir in October 2001.

…Khuram Masih alias Manjit Singh alias Kala alias Akaal, a Christian-turned-Sikh and a close associate of Neeta, was shot dead by the police during an encounter at village Dablehar in the RS Pura Sector of Jammu on December 28, 2000. Reportedly a ‘hit-man’ for Neeta, Khuram Masih was involved in at least 20 explosions in Jammu, Punjab and (‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ (undated), South Asia Terrorism Portal website http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/terrorist_outfits/KZF.htm – Accessed 7 December 2007 – Attachment 7).

A 2008 assessment also sourced from the South Asia Terrorism Portal website claims that “the [Pakistani] ISI were trying to revive militancy in Punjab through sympathisers of Sikh militant groups like the BKI, the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF) and (KCF)”. The report provides the following summary of the present state of the KZF:

Ranjit Singh Neeta, hailing from area in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), is the head of this outfit, which had an operational alliance with ISYF & BKI in the past, is now operating independently. Neeta’s associates were responsible for a series of explosions in running trains and buses in Punjab, Delhi, Haryana & J&K. Neeta emerged as a leading terrorist not only in the context of Punjab militancy but developed operational alliances with splinter groups of J&K militants. Neeta is presently very active and transferred a number of consignments of explosives, small weapons, ammunition and fake currency to his associates in Punjab over the years. With an estimated dozen-odd active associates in Punjab, he retains some striking potential, and has executed a number of strikes in the State, including the Jalandhar bus terminus blasts in April 2006 and the Goraya railway track explosions near Goraya in January 2004 (‘Punjab Assessment – Year 2008’ 2008, South Asia Terrorism Portal website http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/index.html – Accessed 4 March 2008 – Attachment 14).

A 2007 article in Frontline magazine draws attention to the links between the KZF and Kashmiri extremist groups, claiming that “the KZF has well-documented links with the and other Jammu and Kashmir-based terrorist groups” and that “[i]ts Pakistan-based chief, Ranjit Singh Neeta, was originally a trans-border trafficker operating out of Jammu” (Swami, P. 2007, ‘Plot against peace’, Frontline magazine, 24 February – 9 March http://frontlineonnet.com/fl2404/stories/20070309006112100.htm – Accessed 7 December 2007 – Attachment 15).

An October 2007 report sourced from the and located on the Rantburg website, a right-leaning American blog, stated that 25kg of heroin had been seized by police in R.S. Pura. The report does not mention the KZF, but claims that “money-starved Lashker- e-Taiba miltiants are smuggling in high quality narcotics particularly heroin from and Pakistan to fund their activities in Jammu and Kashmir” (‘Lashker smuggling in narcotics for financing militancy in JK’ 2007, Rantburg website (source: Press Trust of India) 22 October http://207.114.86.27/poparticle.php?ID=203344&D=2007-10- 22&SO=India-Pakistan&HC=2 – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 33).

An August 2005 report in the Tribune Online Edition states that KZF activists are “trying to revive militancy in the border areas of Jammu and Punjab”, and that the KZF is raising funds through smuggling opium from Pakistan across the border in Jammu district. According to this source, these funds are then used to “lure youths living in the Jammu border areas into militancy”:

The officials said the police arrested two KZF activists recently in Jammu along with arms and explosives. During their interrogation, the two KZF activists had revealed that Neeta, who is among 20 hardcore militants having sought shelter in Pakistan whose repatriation was being demanded by India, had become active again after the agencies across the border had been goading him to persuade his supporters in the Jammu border areas to kick up subversive activities.

In order to lure youths living in the Jammu border areas into militancy, the KZF activists were raising huge resources through smuggling of charas and opium from across the international border in Jammu. A police officer said contraband worth between Rs 30 and Rs 50 lakhs was being smuggled from across the international border between and Kathua. The officer said the border routes at Kanachak and Akhnoor in Jammu were the usual smuggling zones (Kak, M. 2005, ‘KZF activists trying to revive militancy’, Tribune Online Edition, 28 August http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050828/j&k.htm#3 – Accessed 22 May 2008 – Attachment 16).

A June 2005 article in the Tribune Online Edition reports the arrest of “three activists of the Khalistan Zindabad Force” in Jammu, and a February 2004 analysis in Frontline magazine suggests that the KZF was forging an alliance with the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), describing the KZF as an organisation “which draws its cadre from Jammu and has easy access to weapons and explosives in that State” (‘3 Khalistan Zindabad Force activists held’ 2005, Tribune Online Edition, 27 June http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050627/j&k.htm#12 – Accessed 22 May 2008 – Attachment 17; ‘Tunnel to Khalistan’ 2004, Frontline magazine, Vol. 21, Issue 4, 14-27 February http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2104/stories/20040227004303100.htm – Accessed 22 May 2008 – Attachment 18).

A May 2002 article in the Tribune Online Edition reports that “[t]he Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir police has launched a massive joint … operation to nab extremists responsible for a number of inter-state crimes”. The report claims that the KZF is “now the frontal organisation of separatists” and that “Jammu was the cradle of the KZF”, allowing its members to “easily infiltrate into Gurdaspur, especially Pathankot”:

The decision of launching a coordinated drive against the separatist elements also assumed significance as the intelligence agencies had definite reports that Ranjit Singh Neeta, a self- styled chief of the Jammu-based Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF), who figured among India’s 20 most wanted criminals, had joined hands with the Pakistan-based Lashar-e-Toiba to revive terrorism in the region.

…Mr Uppal said the coordinated efforts of the three states would help in curbing the ongoing espionage activities of extremists. He said the KZF, now the frontal organisation of separatists, had been working at the behest of the ISI. Since Jammu was the cradle of the KZF, its activists could easily infiltrate into Gurdaspur, especially Pathankot. The town is significant due to many important installations (Walia, V. 2002, ‘Three states join hands to nab militants’, Tribune Online Edition, 7 May http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020507/punjab1.htm – Accessed 22 May 2008 – Attachment 19).

A February 2000 report sourced from the Daily Express and located on the Jammu & Kashmir.com website noted that Khalistani “ultras” were infiltrating into the Jammu region, and claimed that more than one hundred Sikh militants may have crossed the border from Punjab. While the report does not mention the KZF, it does name the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), and suggests that Khalistani organisations are working in concert with Islamic Kashmiri groups:

The captured ultras, said to be from the dreaded Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), had planned to visit Jammu to assess the progress made by their colleagues, who had, in two and threes, managed to enter the area(Jammu region) since the beginning of December last. The number of Sikh ultras, who had infiltrated into Jammu region, could be more than 100. The three captured KCF ultras, according to sources, had also revealed that while some transporters in Punjab and proved helpful while financing and making possible inland journey of several militants, fresh consignments of deadly arms and ammunition had been delivered in certain pockets of Jammu town, Samba, Ranbir Singh Pora, Bishna, and Poonch last month.

Intelligence sleuths, sources said, had also come across equally sensational aspect of the Pak plan, namely, the unity of purpose and of action having been brought about between the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and two extremist Sikh organisations, one of them being the Khalistan Commando Force (“Khalistan’ ultras sneak into J&K’ 2000, Jammu & Kashmir.com website (source: Daily Excelsior), 11 February http://www.jammu- kashmir.com/archives/archives2000/kashmir20000211d.html – Accessed 22 May 2008 – Attachment 20).

A March 2000 article, again sourced from the Daily Excelsior and located on the Jammu & Kashmir.com website, reports the arrest of “three associates of hardcore militant Ranjit Singh alias Neeta alias Manpreet Singh, supremo of the banned Khalistan Zindabad Force”. The report characterises the KZF as a “group of dreaded militants” and claims that the group was working “in league with J&K Islamic Front”. The article goes on to state that Ranjit Singh “spent about some days [sic] in Digiana Ashram and Rohi Morh Ashram, near R S Pura using his associates and contacts”, and also refers to him making trips to the border, before crossing the border into Pakistan on 9 March 2000 (‘Sirhind bus blast, Sealdah Express blast worked out’ 2000, Jammu & Kashmir.com website (source: Daily Excelsior), 25 March http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2000/kashmir20000325a.html – Accessed 22 May 2008 – Attachment 21).

A February 1999 report from the Indian Express relates the arrest of Inderjit Singh, described as a “hardcore terrorist” of the KZF, in Gurdaspur, northern Punjab. The report notes that Inderjit Singh is “a resident of Malakpur, falling under police station Mir Sahib R.S Pura (Jammu and Kashmir)” (‘KZF terrorist arrested’ 1999, Indian Express website, 18 February http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19990218/ige18156.html – Accessed 23 May 2008 – Attachment 22).

6. Please provide any information on the use of sexual assault and kidnapping children as a tool of the KZF.

No information was found indicating that the KZF in particular use sexual assault or the kidnapping of children as tools in Jammu & Kashmir. Nonetheless, several sources indicate that the abduction of children by militant groups is common in the region, and other sources suggest that rape is commonly used as a tool by security forces.

Abduction of children by militant groups

A 2006 Human Rights Watch report titled “Everyone Lives in Fear” – Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir highlights the difficulty of accurately assessing the practices of militant groups in Kashmir. The report suggests that the main problems in documenting abuses by militant groups are the focus on state-perpetrated atrocities by human rights groups, sympathy for the militants’ cause among the general population, and fear among the population of reprisal from militants:

Despite their scale and frequency, abuses by militants in Jammu and Kashmir are seldom carefully documented. One reason for this is that militant groups are not state actors. Even the State Human Rights Commission says that it concentrates on abuses by state agencies. Another reason is that Pakistan seems beyond the reach of Kashmiri NGOs and victim groups.

Another explanation is that within Jammu and Kashmir there is greater political sympathy for the militants’ cause than for the government. Violations by armed groups are rarely opposed as vociferously as those committed by Indian security forces. But a key reason for the lack of attention is less widely discussed: people are afraid that they too will be targeted. In interviews with Human Rights Watch, ordinary Kashmiris, as well as journalists and human rights defenders, said that there was deep fear in Jammu and Kashmir of the militants. Militant abuses have been brutal, plentiful, and continuous against anyone seen to be opposed to their agenda (Human Rights Watch 2006, “Everyone Lives in Fear” – Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir, Vol. 18, No. 11(C), September http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/india0906webwcover.pdf – Accessed 20 May 2008 – Attachment 23).

Nonetheless, the report concludes that “[m]ilitant groups have drafted children in Jammu and Kashmir”, and that such recruits may be “abductees”. The report quotes the South Asia Terrorism Portal stating that “nearly three thousand boys have been abducted by alleged militants since the conflict began”:

Militants in Kashmir have long been responsible for attacks on schools and for recruiting children into their forces.

…Militant groups have drafted children in Jammu and Kashmir, Azad Kashmir, and Pakistan. Recruits may be volunteers or abductees. The militants have engaged in active recruitment of children into their forces. Although Human Rights Watch did not interview any child soldiers, some former militants said that they had joined the armed groups when they were children.

…According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, nearly three thousand boys have been abducted by alleged militants since the conflict began. For example, in Chootwaliwar, Gandherbal, villagers told Human Rights Watch that at least three people had been abducted by militants in 2003, one of them a schoolboy; none of them have returned. Children are put to work in various roles by militant groups after receiving rudimentary arms training. With children being used as messengers or to ferry weapons, security forces have started checking them as well, and several have reportedly been arrested while crossing the border. Members of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court Bar Association say there are several child soldiers in custody in various jails. This fact that children serve with the militants places many other children at the risk of aggressive questioning by troops at check posts. The use of children by militants may have led to abuses by security forces, such as the killing of four boys playing cricket in in 2006 (see above). Troops say that they opened fire because they believed a militant was hiding among the boys (Human Rights Watch 2006, “Everyone Lives in Fear” – Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir, Vol. 18, No. 11(C), September http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/india0906webwcover.pdf – Accessed 20 May 2008 – Attachment 23).

A November 2005 article sourced from the Boloji.com website states that “[a]n alarming number of children are being used as ‘terror tools’ by various terrorist groups in Jammu and Kashmir”. The report claims that “children are used as spies, porters, and as guerrillas who throw grenades and plant IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices]. The children (some barely nine or 10 years of age) are even used as shields in encounters and deployed in operations against Indian security agencies”:

Most of the children picked up by terrorists are from remote areas of Rajouri, Poonch, Doda, Udhampur and , and belong to very poor and illiterate families. In fact, the Jammu and Kashmir police has noticed a clear trend since 2004 – more and more children go missing from remote areas. An estimated 100 children have been reported missing in Kashmir since 2004.

“In the early 1990s,” says Inspector General of Police Javed Maqdoomi, “a handful of children were involved. Last year (2004), around 200 were recruited by the terrorists and hidden in the mountains. We only know of children missing when a complaint is registered. If we consider unreported cases, the number of children missing and recruited by terrorists may run into hundreds” (Gupta, P. 2005, ‘Child Warriors of Kashmir’, Boloji.com website, 20 November http://www.boloji.com/wfs4/wfs495.htm – Accessed 20 May 2008 – Attachment 24).

A 2003 report in Frontline magazine, titled ‘Jehad’s child warriors’, suggests that while many children are “lured or press-ganged into service by Pakistan-backed jehadi organisations”, “unemployment and the poor state of the rural economy” are also factors in the recruitment of children to militant groups. It may be of interest to note that the report quotes Kashmiri children who have been abducted and taken to Pakistani training camps, and who claim that “sexual and physical abuse is common” in that environment:

Over a hundred teenagers, some as young as 12, have been rescued from terrorist groups since January this year. An estimated 500 teenagers in Jammu and Kashmir have not been so lucky. Variously lured or press-ganged into service by Pakistan-backed jehadi organisations, hundreds of young recruits are receiving arms training in the heavily forested mountains that surround the . Others have been pushed into service in the war raging on the heights of Poonch and Doda. Most of them receive rudimentary arms training, and work as cooks, cleaners, porters and guides. Those who pass this test well are sent to Pakistan for further training; others are despatched back to set up safehouses and infrastructure for the jehadi groups. Although no one has definite figures, several of these young recruits are believed to have died in encounters between terrorists and the Indian security forces.

…Farmers in the Bandipora belt readily acknowledge the problem. “Boys from other villages have gone into the mountains recently,” says Mohammad Yakub, a resident of Kyunus on the banks of the Wullar lake, “but not from ours.” “Some families here have expanded their land by encroaching on the lake,” he says, “and others supplement their income by fishing or gathering water-chestnuts and so on.”

Sadly, there are few serious studies over the possible linkages of the rural economy with the ongoing recruitment of teenagers by terrorist groups. It is also possible that cultural factors play a role. For many teenagers, the romance of waging war for a supposedly righteous cause could also offer a liberation from a life in which they have little income, less respect, and no future at all. “I’ve come across cases,” says Bandipora Deputy Superintendent of Police Khalid Madni, “where the Pakistani terrorists in the mountains give kids Rs.500 and ask them to purchase something trivial, like a few packets of cigarettes or some batteries. They let them keep the change. Romance, escape from school, money, what more could a kid want?”

…An investigation by Frontline had found that most of the 20 terrorists who were claimed to have been killed in a 2001 encounter near Khari Dhoke in Hil Kaka were in fact children taken up to the area as slave labour. Army operations earlier this year in Hil Kaka had shown that jehadi groups continue to put teenagers in harm’s way. One survivor, 12-year- old Altaf Husain, gave an idea of life as a Lashkar recruit. “We trainees were given food only once a day while the commanders, who hailed from Pakistan, used to take food three times,” Husain said. Most of the children never saw a gun, and were used instead to clean dishes, haul firewood, and cook food. According to another child recruit, Mohammad Younus of Harmain near , there were five major hideouts around Hil Kaka, which housed some 75 Lashkar cadre. Forty of these, he said, were armed terrorists; the rest, children press-ganged from villages in Poonch and southern Kashmir.

…Although few recruits actually make it to training camps in Pakistan, new evidence has emerged of horrific conditions at training camps run by jehadi groups there. On September 13, (BSF) personnel at the Rorawala border outpost near Wagah interdicted two Kashmir residents while they were trying to cross into India – 18-year-old Arshad Ahmad Mir, from Rainawari in , and 25-year-old Mukhtiar Ahmad Sofi. They said they had been kidnapped by Hizbul Mujahideen cadre near on August 19, while picnicking in the forests above the resort town. They were then force- marched for 18 days, before reaching a training camp in Muzaffarabad. They left the camp on the pretext of needing treatment for injuries sustained during training, and reached Lahore by bus on September 13. From there they reached the village of Wagah and sneaked past Pakistani border guards.

According to Mir and Sofi, any resistance to orders at the Muzaffarabad camp was punished with brutal assault by Pakistan Army officers present there. Part of the training consisted of lectures on Islamist ideology, focused on the need for warfare against enemies of the faith. The majority of the 250-odd people present in the camp, Mir and Sofi say, were Kashmiris – mostly young people kidnapped from villages across the State. The rest were Pakistani nationals, along with a smattering of volunteers from Sudan and Afghanistan. Children who have escaped from terror camps in the past, notably at least two Hil Kaka survivors, have also suggested that sexual and physical abuse is common. Efforts to escape are often met with beatings, and sometimes execution.

…The recruitment goes on. On September 13, villagers from hamlets around the mountain town of Gool filed reports saying that five children had been picked up by unidentified terrorists. The recruitment of young people by terrorist groups is not really new. Since the early 1990s, there have been cases of children throwing grenades at security force pickets in the Kashmir Valley. The trend is alarming. “In the early 1990s,” says Inspector-General of Police K. Rajendra, “perhaps a handful of children were involved. Last year, we knew of a 100-odd children being recruited and taken into the mountains. This year isn’t through, and that number has already quadrupled” (Swami, P. 2003, ‘Jehad’s child warriors’, Frontline magazine, Vol. 20, No. 20, 27 Sep. – 10 Oct http://www.flonnet.com/fl2020/stories/20031010004203200.htm – Accessed 20 May 2008 – Attachment 25.)

Militant groups and rape in Jammu and Kashmir

In an October 2007 article sourced from the CounterCurrents website, the author claims that “[a] study done by Medecins Sans Frontieres in mid 2005 reveals that Kashmiri women are among the worst sufferers of sexual violence in the world”, noting that 11.6% of respondents to the study reported having been subjected to sexual abuse. The report also notes that “[c]ases of rape and molestation abound in Kashmir and many go unreported because of the fear of social stigma, and of reprisal by state agencies” (Anjum, A. 2007, ‘Wailing Woes’, CounterCurrents website, 10 October http://www.countercurrents.org/anjum101007.htm – Accessed 23 May 2008 – Attachment 26)

Two sources provide information on the laws of rape and male-to-male sex in India. They indicate that the legal situation of an Indian male subjected to rape by another male could be potentially problematic because rape law in India is applicable only to offences against women, and a complaint of male-to-male rape “would implicate the person offended as well”. A 2006 report released by the Naz Foundation International states that “[r]ape law is limited by gender and applicable to women only and further is limited to cases of penile vaginal intercourse only. This leaves a huge gap in terms of protecting children both male and female from sexual abuse”. A 2000 report from the National Human Rights Commission of India concurs, stating that “[t]here is no legal recourse against sexual abuse and violence within same sex behaviour. A complaint under Section 377 would implicate the person offended as well. As such, the law does not recognise male rape and child sexual abuse of boys” (Narrain, A. & Brototi, D. 2006, Male-to-male sex, and sexual minorities in South Asia – An analysis of the politico-legal framework, Naz Foundation International (sourced from Risks & Responsibilities.org website) http://www.risksandresponsibilities.org/ArvindNarrain.pdf – Accessed 23 May 2008 – Attachment 27; National Human Rights Commission, New Delhi, India 2000, Report of the National Conference on Human Rights and HIV/AIDS, New Delhi, 24-25 November 2000, National Human Rights Commission website http://nhrc.nic.in/Publications/report_hiv-aids.htm#no6 – Accessed 23 May 2008 – Attachment 28).

For more information please see the Gay Resource Guide for India produced by the Research & Information section. RRT Research Response IND30144 of 22 May 2006 may also be of interest, as it provides information regarding societal attitudes to homosexuality in India, and RRT Research Response IND16882 of 17 July 2004 provides links to information regarding the attitude of the Sikh community to homosexuality (RRT Country Research 2006, Gay Resource Guide – India, 22 May – Attachment 37; RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response IND30144, 22 May – Attachment 38; RRT Country Research 2004, Research Response IND16882, 17 July – Attachment 39).

7. Please provide information on the village Kotli Arjan Singh, Teh R.S. Pura in Jammu.

R.S. Pura is a ‘Tehsil’ (administrative division) of Jammu District, and Kotli Arjan Singh is a village in R.S. Pura; a Tehsil map of Jammu District is provided as Attachment 29. A map pinpointing the location of Kotli Arjan Singh in relation to Jammu city and the Pakistan border is provided as Attachment 30. A map of the Jammu district in context with eastern Pakistani Punjab, northern Indian Punjab and Himichal Pradesh is provided as Attachment 31. The OurVillageIndia.org website states the population of Kotli Arjan Singh as 1,644 (‘Tehsil Map of Jammu District’ (undated), District Jammu & Kashmir, India website http://jammu.gov.in/district/tehsilmap.asp – Accessed 22 May 2008 – Attachment 29; ‘Map of Kotli Arjan Singh, Jammu, Jammu & Kashmir, India’ (undated), MapmyIndia website http://mapmyindia.com/online/?q=map&type=best&addr=Kotli+Arjan+Singh,Jammu,JAMM U+&+KASHMIR – Accessed 19 May 2008 – Attachment 30; ‘Detail of Map of Kashmir Region’ 2004, University of Texas Library website http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/kashmir.html – Accessed 22 May 2008 – Attachment 31; ‘Kotli Arjan Singh VILLAGE’ (undated), OurVillageIndia.org website http://www.maavooru.net/Place.aspx?PID=209095 – Accessed 21 May 2008 – Attachment 32).

8. Please provide any other relevant information.

The most recent assessment of the situation in Jammu and Kashmir provided by the South Asia Terrorism Portal website notes that 2007 was notable for deaths caused by armed conflict falling to 777, down from a peak of 4,507 in 2001 and from 1, 116 in 2006. The report notes substantial decreases in both civilian and terrorist fatalities, and that “militancy- related incidents” were down by 33%. Nonetheless, the report goes on to state that:

Diminished violence, however, did not indicate a necessary decline in the capacity for terrorism, and there are clear indications that the infrastructure that supports and sustains the Kashmir jihad remains intact in Pakistan. Official sources disclose that at least 52 terrorist training camps were still operating, including 30 in Pakistan and Gilgit-Baltistan, and the rest in the area of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) referred to as Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK). At least one-third of these camps are known to be “fully active” at any given point of time.

…The General Officer Commanding (GOC) 15 Corps in Kashmir valley, Lt Gen A. S. Sekhon, stated on November 1, 2007, that there were 1,500 militants operating in the State, including 700 to 800, in the Kashmir Valley. Earlier, the GOC 16 Corps of the Northern Army Command, Lt. Gen. T. K. Sapru, had disclosed, on August 23, 2007, that nearly 200 Pakistan-trained militants had crossed over to the Indian side of the LoC in the preceding six months, while at least 400 militants, including a large number of foreigners, were operating in the Jammu region. Sapru added, further, that the proportion of foreign terrorists operating on the Indian side was just below 50 per cent, compared to the locals.

…Infiltration into J&K during 2007 may have dropped marginally in comparison to the preceding two years. According to Sriprakash Jaiswal, Union Minister of State for Home, there were an estimated 499 cases of infiltration in 2007 (till October), whereas in 2005 and 2006, the figure was 597 and 573 respectively. Jaiswal disclosed further, on November 27, 2007, that these figures pertained to those militants who had been apprehended or killed while crossing the LoC/borders.

…Even as the troops continue to engage the terrorists, sources claim that, with the increasing turmoil in Pakistan, ‘sleeper’ terrorist cells in J&K have been progressively activated and there is a possibility of a gradual upsurge in violence over the coming months. Intelligence sources suggest that militant groups could raise the stakes in an election year in J&K.

…Though violence levels are down and there is a perceptible improvement in normal life patterns in the State, there is no compelling rationale for a lowering of guard. Grave risks also loom large in the future: “if Western attention is diverted from the region, or if the Islamists in Pakistan are able to carve out autonomous capacities and regions, free of their dependence on the state’s covert agencies, or if there is a radical escalation in the ‘global jihad’ in the wake of the proposed US withdrawal from Iraq in the foreseeable future, the developments in Kashmir could once again find the state unprepared as the situation spirals out of control.”

The gains of 2007 cannot be allowed to lead to complacency. Pakistan’s intentions remain unchanged; its terrorist reserves are intact; Islamist terrorist groups have established some autonomous capacities for operation, independent of Pakistani state agencies; and the South Asia and wider Asian region teeters on the brink of spiralling instability. In the long war against Islamist terrorism, the partial relief in J&K could well prove the calm before a rising storm (‘Jammu and Kashmir Assessment – Year 2008’ 2008, South Asia Terrorism Portal website http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/index.html – Accessed 23 May 2008 – Attachment 34).

Two reports from the Tribune Online Edition, both dated 10 May 2008, provide information regarding border crossing and the discovery of weapons caches in the Jammu region, and suggest that increasing levels of militant activity are likely in the near future. An article titled ‘Infiltrations witness upswing after lull’ states that “[t]he intensified vigil of security forces in north Kashmir … is likely to have forced militants and their Pakistani backers to look for other spots like Sambha sector”, around 30km south of Jammu and Kotli Arjan Singh, to infiltrate from Pakistan to India. Discussing the infiltration of Pakistani-trained militants into Jammu and Kashmir, the report notes that “numbers were not more than 100-125 in 2005 after which it continues to see a major upswing”. Another article, titled ‘Forces on alert after infiltration bid’, reports the confiscation of “a rich haul of arms and ammunition” by Indian forces in Samba district. According to the Tribune article, “intelligence reports indicated that being an election year, Pakistan’s ISI wanted to push more and more militants from the Samba sector”. The report claims that “the ISI had moved over 800 militants in different launching pads on other side of the IB, keeping them small groups” (Rakesh, K. 2008, ‘Infiltrations witness upswing after lull’, Tribune Online Edition, 10 May http://www.tribuneindia.com/2008/20080511/j&k.htm#4 – Accessed 20 May 2008 – Attachment 35; ‘Forces on alert after infiltration bid – Rich haul of ammunition recovered’ 2008, Tribune Online Edition, 10 May http://www.tribuneindia.com/2008/20080511/j&k.htm#4 – Accessed 20 May 2008 – Attachment 36).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources:

Search Engines Alltheweb http://www.alltheweb.com/ Altavista http://www.altavista.com/ Ask.com http://www.ask.com/ Exalead http://www.exalead.com/search Google http://www.google.com.au/ Staggernation Google API Proximity Search http://www.staggernation.com/cgi-bin/gaps.cgi Yahoo http://search.yahoo.com/ International News & Politics BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk Daily India http://www.dailyindia.com/ Frontline http://www.frontlineonnet.com/ http://www.hindustantimes.com/ India Daily http://www.indiadaily.com/ India Today http://www.india-today.com/itoday/ rediff.com http://in.rediff.com/index.html The Telegraph http://www.telegraphindia.com/ http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ The Tribune http://www.tribuneindia.com/ Non-Government Organisations Amnesty International http://www.amnesty.org/ Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/

Databases:

FACTIVA (news database) BACIS (DIAC Country Information database) REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database) ISYS (RRT Research & Information database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports) RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. Divakar, D. 2005, ‘Bank heist case solved, with a surprise’, Ludhiana Newsline, 3 June http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=132217 – Accessed 20 May 2008.

2. ‘KZF militant arrested’ 2005, Tribune Online Edition, 3 June http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050603/punjab1.htm#11 – Accessed 20 May 2008.

3. Sharma, A. 2004, ‘Burail Jailbreak: Police find skeletons in Rana’s report’, Chandigahr Newsline, 16 April http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=81916 – Accessed 21 May 2008. 4. Sharma, A. 2004, ‘Under escape plan, Hawara and Co partied hard’, Chandigahr Newsline, 17 April http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=82021 – Accessed 21 May 2008.

5. Sharma, S. 2004, ‘Hawara’s ‘border guide’ quizzed for escape clues’, Tribune Online Edition, 11 February http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040211/cth1.htm – Accessed 21 May 2008.

6. ‘Hawara retained his Pak code name, says Attarjit’ 2004, Tribune Online Edition, 18 February http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040218/cth1.htm – Accessed 21 May 2008.

7. ‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ (undated), South Asia Terrorism Portal website http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/terrorist_outfits/KZF.htm – Accessed 7 December 2007.

8. ‘4 acquitted in Jammu blast case’ 2003, Church of the East website, 10 October http://churchoftheeast.ca/archive/news_03oct11.htm – Accessed 21 May 2008.

9. ‘KZF behind blast, says Punjab DGP’ 1999, Tribune Online Edition, 14 November http://www.tribuneindia.com/1999/99nov14/head4.htm – Accessed 21 May 2008.

10. ‘Punjab ultras’ hand in Pooja Exp blast likely – DGP’ 1999, Indian Express, 15 November http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19991115/ige15023.html – Accessed 21 May 2008.

11. Taggar, R. 1998, ‘Biography of an unexploded bomb’, Indian Express, 9 April http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19980409/09950334.html – Accessed 21 May 2008.

12. ‘Brain behind Pathankot blasts held’ 1997, Indian Express, 22 July http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19970723/20450263.html – Accessed 21 May 2008.

13. ‘Punjab cops break bus blast cases, arrest KZF deputy chief’ 1997, Rediff on the Net, 22 July http://www.rediff.com/news/jul/22punj.htm – Accessed 21 May 2008.

14. ‘Punjab Assessment – Year 2008’ 2008, South Asia Terrorism Portal website http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/index.html – Accessed 4 March 2008.

15. Swami, P. 2007, ‘Plot against peace’, Frontline magazine, 24 February – 9 March http://frontlineonnet.com/fl2404/stories/20070309006112100.htm – Accessed 7 December 2007.

16. Kak, M. 2005, ‘KZF activists trying to revive militancy’, Tribune Online Edition, 28 August http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050828/j&k.htm#3 – Accessed 22 May 2008.

17. ‘3 Khalistan Zindabad Force activists held’ 2005, Tribune Online Edition, 27 June http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050627/j&k.htm#12 – Accessed 22 May 2008. 18. ‘Tunnel to Khalistan’ 2004, Frontline magazine, Vol. 21, Issue 4, 14-27 February http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2104/stories/20040227004303100.htm – Accessed 22 May 2008.

19. Walia, V. 2002, ‘Three states join hands to nab militants’, Tribune Online Edition, 7 May http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020507/punjab1.htm – Accessed 22 May 2008

20. “Khalistan’ ultras sneak into J&K’ 2000, Jammu & Kashmir.com website (source: Daily Excelsior) 11 February http://www.jammu- kashmir.com/archives/archives2000/kashmir20000211d.html – Accessed 22 May 2008.

21. ‘Sirhind bus blast, Sealdah Express blast worked out’ 2000, Jammu & Kashmir.com website (source: Daily Excelsior), 25 March http://www.jammu- kashmir.com/archives/archives2000/kashmir20000325a.html – Accessed 22 May 2008

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