Beyond the Trump-Erdoğan Meeting: The Rise of Eurasianists and Turkey’s Syria Policy

Mustafa Gurbuz

May 23, 2017 Beyond the Trump-Erdoğan Meeting: The Rise of Eurasianists and Turkey’s Syria Policy Mustafa Gurbuz

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit relations with the United States in the coming to Washington did not usher the “new years. beginning” in US-Turkey relations that he had expected to attain. Right after Erdoğan’s return The Fall of Neo-Ottomanism, The Rise of to , Turkey accused the US envoy to the anti-ISIS coalition, Brett McGurk, of backing Kurdish militants and demanded his removal. Since Erdoğan’s removal of Ahmet Davutoğlu Meanwhile, Senators John McCain and Dianne as prime minister in May 2016, Turkey’s Syria Feinstein called on Erdoğan to hold Turkish policy has changed significantly in favor of security personnel accountable for attacking the Eurasianist elements within the Turkish state protesters near the Turkish ambassador’s apparatus. With thousands of Turkish Army residence in the American capital, adding that officers sacked following the botched coup the United States should throw Turkey’s attempt in July 2016, the Eurasianist generals ambassador “the hell out.” Moreover, new filled the vacuum by offering support to revelations on former National Security Erdoğan against the “western-backed plot.” Advisor Michael Flynn’s controversial dealings Turkey’s Syria policy evinces concrete foreign with Turkey continue to put pressure on the policy implications; Ankara has prioritized its Trump Administration—which may otherwise fight against the Kurds over supporting the be willing to be more open about discussing Syrian opposition—which was one of the Erdoğan’s obsessive demands for extradition of reasons for the fall of Aleppo—and engaged the Turkish activist preacher Fethullah Gulen as consecutive deals with Moscow, including a well as the release of the Iranian-Turkish potential contract for the S-400 Russian defense businessman Reza Zarrab (accused of violating shield system. The Eurasianists played a key sanctions on Iran). role in arranging back-stage talks with the Asad regime as well as restoring the crumbling Beyond Trump-Erdoğan relations, however, Erdoğan-Putin relations. there may be a deeper, structural divergence between Washington and Ankara in the long Eurasianism forges a plethora of intellectual term. Although most critics focus on Erdoğan’s and social trends including , Turkish authoritarianism as a threat to Turkey’s future nationalism, , and radical secularism. in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization The perspective is rooted far back in the Marxist (NATO), the rising tide of a Eurasianist civil- Kadro and Yon movements in the early decades military elite in the country has received little of the Turkish Republic and gained momentum attention. It is imperative to understand during the 1990s under emboldened Kemalist Eurasianism as it gains ground in various generals. Although there are many factions and sectors in Turkish society, as it will likely shape variants of Turkish Eurasianism, three main Turkey’s Syria policy and beyond, and thus, tenets of the Eurasianist worldview are

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important to note: (1) an anti-imperialist his government and decided to mend fences reading of western capitalist development and with the generals. Since then, the Eurasianists a deep skepticism toward globalization; (2) a have strongly supported Erdoğan’s war against conspiratorial belief that Turkey’s unity and “western-backed” enemies—Gulen, liberals, borders are threatened by the western powers’ and Kurds—and gradually formed a marriage self-interested policies in Iraq and Syria, of convenience with the AKP government. referred to as the “Sèvres Syndrome”; and, (3) a perspective that places Turkey’s future as part How Do Eurasianists Influence Turkey’s Syria of the Eastern bloc, primarily Russia, the Policy? Central Asian Turkic republics, and China, as western organizations gradually lose their Exploiting Erdoğan’s weakness in the domestic significance around the globe. and international arenas, the Eurasianists, remarkably, have reinterpreted the AKP’s neo- Following the “post-modern coup” against Ottomanism as part of Turkish chauvinist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamist nationalism. The shift in Turkey’s Kurdish in 1997, the Kemalist generals policy was the best example. While the architect with a Eurasianist vision rose to the upper of the neo-Ottomanist vision, Ahmet echelons of the state apparatus and suggested Davutoğlu, was advocating for a Muslim that Turkey should establish a new alliance with brotherhood between Turks and Kurds, the Russia. With the rise of Erdoğan’s Justice and Eurasianists perceived the Kurdish issue as a Development Party (AKP) and the ensuing pro- national security threat. The Eurasianists’ European reform packages, however, the position has strongly been against Turkey’s Eurasianists lost their influence. In fact, the support of the Syrian opposition and the leading figures of the movement were Muslim Brotherhood. As they helped to break imprisoned due to their alleged roles in down Turkey’s peace process during 2013-15, extrajudicial killings of Kurds during the 1990s they paved the way for military operations in and the later coup attempts against the AKP southeast Turkey and eventually changed the government—famously known as the course of Turkey’s policy in Syria—drawing and Balyoz trials. principal attention to the Kurdish threat and hindering the government’s ability to support In early 2014, the trial cases were ended the Syrian opposition. abruptly after corruption allegations surfaced against Erdoğan’s inner circle. After the Although neo-Ottomanism and Eurasianism attempted coup in July 2016, Erdoğan declared are clashing perspectives, it is important to that Turkey had entered “a new war of highlight how anti-American/anti-western liberation”—using the Kemalist lexicon— discourse becomes the overlapping feature of against the “western plot” aiming to overthrow the two, often feeding into each other. Beyond the Trump-Erdoğan Meeting: The Rise of Eurasianists and Turkey’s Syria Policy Mustafa Gurbuz

Animosity toward the United States is on the silenced—that the Eurasianist bureaucrats are rise and the anti-western rhetoric in the Turkish finding a fertile environment to shape state media cuts across party lines: the pro- policies. government media blames “traitors” for having alleged ties to a western-backed coup against The Eurasianists, for example, strongly support Erdoğan, while the opposition aims to prove its Erdoğan’s proposal of reinstating the death authentic patriotism by blaming Erdoğan’s penalty—which is declared as the “reddest of concessions to the United States. Thus, given the the red lines” by European officials—hoping to fact that the Eurasianist vision and Euro- see further deterioration of Turkish-EU skepticism have reached major political parties, relations. They also support Turkey’s further such as the Turkish Nationalist Action Party engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation (MHP) and Republican People’s Party (CHP), Organization (SCO) as an alternative path. some marginal Eurasianist groups such as Doğu Perincek’s Patriotic Party (VP) enjoy A Detachment from the Arab Gulf? disproportionate influence in shaping Ankara’s policies—reminiscent of the rising clout of anti- The major fault line between neo-Ottomanism globalist, isolationist groups around the world. and Eurasianism is the vision of Turkey’s role in the Middle East. Davutoğlu has been an ardent Beyond the ideological realm, Perincek’s group critic of Kemalist foreign policy, which long has cultivated deep connections to many key discarded cultural and religious affinities positions in the state’s intelligence and judicial between Turks and Arabs. The Eurasianists, on apparatuses in the wake of a massive purge the other hand, view Turkey’s strong relations following the coup attempt in July 2016. As with the Arab Gulf states and the Muslim some 130,000 civil servants were sacked, the Brotherhood at best as a liability, and at worst government aimed to fill the vacancies with a as a dangerous association. Turkey’s active pro-AKP constituency; however, a quirky policy in Syria was especially criticized by the vetting process under the state of emergency Eurasianists who have Alevi backgrounds, and often invited controversy in conservative they accused the Turkish government of circles. Some fear that purges in the bureaucracy pursuing sectarian politics. Although Turkey’s are getting out of Erdoğan’s control. Many are Alevis and Syria’s Alawis are historically and concerned about the purges since they reach culturally different, both groups are fearful of deep into the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the the Sunni identity that is associated with the armed forces, and the universities. Even many neo-Ottoman perspective. conservative intellectuals are now afraid of providing constructive criticism—including the In this regard, the Eurasianist perspective of circles of Abdullah Gul, Bulent Arinc, and Iran has evolved over the years. For long, Iran Ahmet Davutoğlu, who were effectively as an “Islamic Republic” was perceived as a

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threat to Turkey’s secular order, and thus, the Does Washington Grasp the Structural Shift Eurasianists were most skeptical about close beyond Erdoğan? relations between Ankara and Tehran under Erdoğan’s AKP. After the Syrian civil war, The recent spat between Turkey and Germany Iran’s support of the Asad regime and the over the use of the Incirlik air base is the latest increasingly sectarian nature of the Turkey-Iran indicator of Ankara’s fragile relations with competition have transformed Eurasianist NATO. Turkey’s increasing drift away from thinking. The Eurasianists are against Turkey’s NATO, however, is often depicted in the alliance with Saudi Arabia to protect the Sunni western media as a result of Erdoğan’s population in Iraq; for them, Ankara’s Iran stumbling policy choices in Syria. Such analyses policy should focus solely on cutting links omit consideration of the structural between Tehran and the Kurdistan Workers’ transformations inside the Turkish state Party (PKK). Moreover, as an anti-Western apparatus, which are now successfully power, Iran is considered a potential partner on exploited by Russia. certain issues. For instance, Russian Eurasianists with ties to Overall, the Eurasianist vision has strong Alexander Dugin—dubbed as “Putin’s reservations regarding Turkey’s current policy Rasputin”—have provided ample support to in the Middle East. Given the deep mistrust the Perincek group and played a key role in between Erdoğan and the Eurasianists, the repairing Putin-Erdoğan relations in favor of a question revolves around the durability of the Turkish Eurasianist expansion of influence. pragmatic alliance. Erdoğan recently declared Whether Moscow has any relations with that the state of emergency may be extended Turkey’s anti-NATO officers is a mystery. What seemingly forever—“until the country achieves is known, however, is that the massive purge welfare and peace.” Whereas the presidential after the coup attempt targeted western ruling by decree will empower Erdoğan, the educated officers including hundreds of senior state of emergency conditions invite messy military staff serving in NATO in Europe and wars in the Turkish state apparatus, which the United States. Not surprisingly, officers eventually harm the normalization of the with Eurasianist leanings have become the country. Despite their dislike of the all-powerful primary beneficiaries of the purge process. Of Erdoğan, the Eurasianists cherish Turkey’s new particular note, among the Eurasianist generals presidential system that revolves around a who received promotions after the July 2016 strong man—an authoritarian structure with a coup attempt was Lt. Gen. Zekai Aksakalli, Putinesque model where they have increased commander of the Turkish Special Forces in ability to exert influence in the long term. Syria and Iraq. Aksakalli oversaw the Operation Euphrates Shield, which almost put Turkey on Beyond the Trump-Erdoğan Meeting: The Rise of Eurasianists and Turkey’s Syria Policy Mustafa Gurbuz a collision course with the United States in northern Syria. What is most needed, however, is Washington’s serious diplomatic efforts to ensure a new Putin’s goal to detach Turkey from NATO, of round of a peace process between Turkey and course, is not bound to the Syrian dynamics. the PKK. Focusing on short-term maneuvers The increasingly strong economic relations based on armed operations in Syria and Iraq, between Ankara and Moscow facilitate Turkish- the United States inadvertently feeds Turkish Russian cooperation. Yet, the weakest link in the Eurasianist views. This short-term focus may be chain vulnerable to Russian manipulation caused by the fact that Washington’s between Washington and Ankara is Turkey’s perspective of Turkey is partially shaped by war against the PKK. The Trump dominant media imagery of Erdoğan’s Turkey Administration appears to be confused as to as a “neo-Ottoman” (read “anti-NATO”) state. how to deal with the issue. The confusion is Such a depiction is misleading not because most clearly reflected in Washington’s decision Ankara is strongly committed to NATO; to arm the PKK’s affiliate, the People’s instead, Turkey’s drift away from NATO is Protection Units (YPG), in Syria while more serious, structural, and deeper, and simultaneously increasing pressure on the surely, it goes well beyond Erdoğan’s grip. group to cut its ties to the PKK. Some officials That, perhaps, is why Washington should care believe that US relations with the Syrian Kurds more, not less, about Turkey’s domestic politics are “temporary, transactional, and tactical” and in the long term. In disregarding human rights thus, relations with Turkey are a long-term abuses and the media crackdown in Turkey, strategic priority for Washington. Others are Washington risks losing its soft power among aware of the potential consequences for arming the Turkish citizenry—who no longer see the PKK-affiliates at the conclusion of the Raqqa United States as “the leader of the free world”— operation. Regarding a long-term strategic and thus, the ideology of Eurasianism could partnership, the Trump Administration appears find broad public appeal. to be giving Ankara assurances for cooperation against the PKK in Turkey and Iraq.

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